4079 GI/2017
(123)
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REGD. NO. D. L. (N) 04/0007/2003—05
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PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
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193
9
No. 18]
NEW DELHI, JULY 9— JULY 15, 2017, SATURDAY/ ASADHA 18— ASADHA 24, 1939
bl Hkkx esa fHkUu i`"B la[;k nh tkrh gS ftlls fd ;g i`Fkd ladyu ds :i esa j[kk tk lds
Separate Paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation
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II—
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3—
mi&[k.M(iii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (iii)
dsUæh; vf/dkfj;ksa (
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)
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Orders and Notifications issued by the Central Authorities (Other than the Administrations of Union Territories)
Hkkjr fuokZpu vk;ksx lfpoky;
नई दिल्ली, 1 जून, 2017
vk-v- 29-— लोक प्रतितनतित्व अतितनयम, 1950 (1950 का 43) की िारा 13-क की उप-िारा (1) द्वारा प्रित्त
शतियों का प्रयोग करिे हुए भारि तनवााचन आयोग उत्तराखण्ड़ राज्य सरकार के परामशा से एिद्द्वारा, श्रीमिी रािा रिूरी,
आई.ए.एस. के स्थान पर डॉ. उमाकाांि पांवार, आई.ए.एस. (यू.के.़ी. 1991) को उनके कायाभार ग्रहण करने की िारीख से
आगामी आिेशों िक के तलए उत्तराखण्ड़ राज्य के मुख्य तनवााचन अतिकारी के रूप में नातमि करिा है।
2.
डॉ. उमाकाांि पांवार, उत्तराखण्ड़ सरकार के अिीन सभी पिभार या दकसी काया के पिभारों को ित्काल सौंप िेंगे या
िारण करना समाप्त कर िेंगे, जो दक वे ऐसा पिभार ग्रहण करने से पहले िारण कर रहे थे।
3.
डॉ. उमाकाांि पांवार, मुख्य तनवााचन अतिकारी, उत्तराखण्ड़ के रूप में काया करिे हुए उत्तराखण्ड़ सरकार के अिीन
दकसी भी प्रकार का कोई अतिररि कायाभार ग्रहण नहीं करेंगे तसवाय इसके दक उनको राज्य सतचवालय में तनवााचन तवभाग
के प्रभारी, सरकार के सतचव पिातभतहि दकया जाएगा।
[सां. 154/यूकेडी/2017-पी.प्रशा.]
vkns’k ls]
स्टैण्डडहोप युहलुांग, प्रिान सतचव
124 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
SECRETARIAT OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
New Delhi, the 1st June, 2017
O. N. 29.— In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 13A of the Representation of
the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950), the Election Commission of India in consultation with the Government of
Uttarakhand hereby nominates Dr. Umakant Panwar, IAS, (UKD:1991) as the Chief Electoral Officer for the State of
Uttarakhand with effect from the date he takes over charge and until further orders vice Smt. Radha Raturi, IAS.
2.
Dr. Umakant Panwar shall cease to hold and hand over forthwith the charge of all or any charges of work under
the Government of Uttarakhand, which he may be holding before such assumption of office.
3.
Dr. Umakant Panwar while functioning as the Chief Electoral Officer, Uttarakhand shall not hold any
additional charge whatsoever under the Government of Uttarakhand except that he should be designated Secretary to the
Government in charge of Election Department in the State Secretariat.
[No. 154/UKD/2017-P. Admn.]
By Order,
STANDHOPE YUHLUNG, Principal Secy.
नई दिल् ली, 6 जुलाई, 2017
आ.अ. 30.—लोक प्रतितनतित्व अतितनयम, 1950 (1950 का 43) की िारा 13-क की उप-िारा (1) एवां जम्मू व
कश्मीर लोक प्रतितनतित्व अतितनयम 1957 की िारा 7-क द्वारा प्रित्त शतियों का प्रयोग करिे हुए एवां आयोग की
समसांख्यक अतिसूचना दिनाांक 30.06.2017 के अतिक्रमण में भारि तनवााचन आयोग जम्मू व कश्मीर राज्य सरकार के
परामशा से एिद्द्वारा, श्री शाांिमनु, आई.ए.एस. के स्थान पर श्री शालीन काबरा, आई.ए.एस. (जे.के. 1992) को उनके
कायाभार ग्रहण करने की िारीख से आगामी आिेशों िक के तलए जम्मू व कश्मीर राज्य के मुख्य तनवााचन अतिकारी के रूप में
नातमि करिा है।
2.
श्री शालीन काबरा, जम्मू व कश्मीर सरकार के अिीन सभी पिभार या दकसी काया के पिभारों को ित्काल सौंप िेंगे
या िारण करना समाप्त कर िेंगे, जो दक वे ऐसा पिभार ग्रहण करने से पहले िारण कर रहे थे।
3.
श्री शालीन काबरा, मुख्य तनवााचन अतिकारी, जम्मू व कश्मीर के रूप में काया करिे हुए जम्मू व कश्मीर सरकार के
अिीन दकसी भी प्रकार का कोई अतिररि कायाभार ग्रहण नहीं करेंगे तसवाय इसके दक उनको राज्य सतचवालय में तनवााचन
तवभाग के प्रभारी, सरकार के सतचव पिातभतहि दकया जाएगा।
[सां. 154/जे एण्ड ड के/2017-पी. प्रशा.]
आिेश से,
स्टैण्डडहोप युहलुांग, प्रिान सतचव
New Delhi, the 6th July, 2017
O.N. 30.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 13A of the Representation of the
People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950) and Section 7A of the Jammu & Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957 and in
supersession of the Commission’s Notification of even number dated 30.06.2017, the Election Commission of India in
consultation with the Government of Jammu & Kashmir hereby nominates Shri Shaleen Kabra, IAS, (JK:1992) as the
Chief Electoral Officer for the State of Jammu & Kashmir with effect from the date he takes over charge and until
further orders vice Shri Shantmanu, IAS.
2.
Shri Shaleen Kabra shall cease to hold and hand over forthwith the charge of all or any charges of work under
the Government of Jammu & Kashmir, which he may be holding before such assumption of office.
II—
(iii)
125
3.
Shri Shaleen Kabra while functioning as the Chief Electoral Officer, Jammu & Kashmir shall not hold any
additional charge whatsoever under the Government of Jammu & Kashmir except that he should be designated Secretary
to the Government in charge of Election Department in the State Secretariat.
[No. 154/J&K/2017-P. Admn.]
By Order,
STANDHOPE YUHLUNG, Principal Secy.
नई दिल् ली, 7 जुलाई, 2017
आ.अ. 31.— लोक प्रतितनतित्व अतितनयम, 1950 (1950 का 43) की िारा 13-क की उप-िारा (1) द्वारा प्रित्त
शतियों का प्रयोग करिे हुए भारि तनवााचन आयोग तहमाचल प्रिेश राज्य सरकार के परामशा से एिद्द्वारा, श्री नररांिर चौहान,
आई.ए.एस. के स्थान पर श्री पुष्पेन्द्र राजपूि, आई.ए.एस. (एच.पी. 1999) को उनके कायाभार ग्रहण करने की िारीख से
आगामी आिेशों िक के तलए तहमाचल प्रिेश राज्य के मुख्य तनवााचन अतिकारी के रूप में नातमि करिा है।
2.
श्री पुष्पेन्द्र राजपूि, तहमाचल प्रिेश सरकार के अिीन सभी पिभार या दकसी काया के पिभारों को ित्काल सौंप िेंगे
या िारण करना समाप्त कर िेंगे, जो दक वे ऐसा पिभार ग्रहण करने से पहले िारण कर रहे थे।
3.
श्री पुष्पेन्द्र राजपूि, मुख्य तनवााचन अतिकारी, तहमाचल प्रिेश के रूप में काया करिे हुए तहमाचल प्रिेश सरकार के
अिीन दकसी भी प्रकार का कोई अतिररि कायाभार ग्रहण नहीं करेंगे तसवाय इसके दक उनको राज्य सतचवालय में तनवााचन
तवभाग के प्रभारी, सरकार के सतचव पिातभतहि दकया जाएगा।
[सां. 154/एचपी/2017-पी.प्रशा.]
आिेश से,
बी. सी. पात्रा, सतचव
New Delhi, the 7th July, 2017
O. N. 31.— In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 13A of the Representation of the
People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950), the Election Commission of India in consultation with the Government of Himachal
Pradesh hereby nominates Sh. Pushpendra Rajput, IAS, (HP:1999) as the Chief Electoral Officer for the State of
Himachal Pradesh with effect from the date he takes over charge and until further orders vice Sh. Narinder Chauhan,
IAS.
2.
Sh. Pushpendra Rajput, IAS, cease to hold and hand over forthwith the charge of all or any charges of work
under the Government of Himachal Pradesh, which he may be holding before such assumption of office.
3.
Sh. Pushpendra Rajput, IAS while functioning as the Chief Electoral Officer, Himachal Pradesh shall not hold
any additional charge whatsoever under the Government of Himachal Pradesh except that he should be designated
Secretary to the Government in charge of Election Department in the State Secretariat.
[No. 154/HP/2017-P. Admn.]
By Order,
B. C. PATRA, Secy.
नई दिल् ली, 11 जुलाई, 2017
आ. अ. 32.—लोक प्रतितनतित्व अतितनयम, 1950 (1950 का 43) की िारा 13-क की उप-िारा (1) द्वारा प्रित्त
शतियों का प्रयोग करिे हुए भारि तनवााचन आयोग िमन एवां िीव िथा िािरा एवां नगर हवेली सांघ राज्य क्षेत्रों के प्रशासन
के परामशा से एिद्द्वारा, श्री िीपक कुमार एस.बी., आई.ए.एस. (ए.जी.एम.यू.-2005) को, उनके कायाभार ग्रहण करने की
िारीख से, आगामी आिेशों िक के तलए िमन एवां िीव िथा िािरा एवां नगर हवेली सांघ राज्य क्षेत्रों के मुख्य तनवााचन
अतिकारी के रूप में नातमि करिा है।
[सां. 154/डीडी एवां डीएनएच/2017-पी. प्रशा.]
आिेश से,
बी. सी. पात्रा, सतचव
126 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
New Delhi, the 11th July, 2017
O. N. 32.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 13A of the Representation of the
People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950), the Election Commission of India, in consultation with the Administrations of the Union
Territories of Daman & Diu and Dadra & Nagar Haveli, hereby nominates Shri Deepak Kumar S.B., IAS (AGMU:2005)
as the Chief Electoral Officer for the Union Territories of Daman & Diu and Dadra & Nagar Haveli, with effect from the
date he takes over charge and until further orders.
[No. 154/DD&DNH/2017-P. Admn.]
By Order,
B. C. PATRA, Secy.
Hkkjr fuokZpu vk;ksx
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vk-v- 33-— ;r% fuokZpu vk;ksx dks lek/kku gks x;k gS fd uhps dh lkj.kh ds LrEHk ¼2½ esa ;Fkk&fofufnZ”V jktLFkku ls yksd lHkk
ds lk/kkj.k fuokZpu] 2014 ds fy, tks LrEHk ¼3½ esa fofufnZ”V fuokZpu {ks= ls gqvk gS] LrEHk ¼4½ esa mlds lkeus fofufnZ”V fuokZpu yM+us okys
izR;sd vH;FkhZ] yksd çfrfuf/kRo vf/kfu;e] 1951 rFkk r)hu cuk, x, fu;eksa ,oa vkns’kksa }kjk visf{kr mDr lkj.kh ds LrEHk ¼5½ esa ;Fkk&nf’kZr
vius fuokZpu O;;ksa dk dksbZ Hkh fof/k }kjk visf{kr ys[kk nkf[ky djus esa vlQy jgs gSa( vkSj
;r%] mDr vH;fFkZ;ksa us fuokZpu vk;ksx }kjk lE;d~ lwpuk fn, tkus ij Hkh mDr vlQyrk ds fy, dksbZ dkj.k vFkok Li”Vhdj.k ugha
fn;k gS ,oa fopkj djus ds i’pkr~ fuokZpu vk;ksx dks ;g lek/kku gks x;k gS fd muds ikl mDr vlQyrk ds fy, dksbZ i;kZIr dkj.k ;k
U;k;kSfpR; ugha gS (
vr%] vc fuokZpu vk;ksx] yksd çfrfuf/kRo vf/kfu;e] 1951 dh /kkjk 10d ds vuqlj.k esa uhps ds lkj.kh ds LrEHk ¼4½ esa fofufnZ”V
O;fDr;ksa dk laln ds fdlh Hkh lnu ds ;k fdlh jkT;@la?k jkT; {ks= dh fo/kku lHkk vFkok fo/kku ifj”kn~ ds lnL; pqus tkus vkSj gksus ds fy,
bl vkns’k dh rkjh[k ls rhu o”kZ dh dkykof/k ds fy, fujfgZr ?kksf”kr djrk gS %&
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II—
(iii)
127
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
ORDER
New Delhi, the 7th July, 2017
O. N. 33.—Whereas, the Election Commission is satisfied that each of the contesting candidates specified in
column (4) of the Table below at the General Election to the Lok Sabha in Rajasthan, 2014 as specified in Column (2)
held from the constituency specified in column (3) against his/her name, has failed to lodge any account of his/her
election expenses required by law as shown in column (5) of the said Table as required by the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 and Rules and Orders made there under; and
Whereas, the said candidate(s) have not furnished any reason or explanation for the said failure even after due
notice and the Election Commission is satisfied that they have no good reason or justification for the said failure;
Now, therefore, in pursuance of Section 10A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Election
Commission hereby declares the persons specified in column (4) of the table below to be disqualified for being chosen
as, and for being, a member of either House of the Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a
State/Union Territory for a period of three years from the date of this order:—
TABLE
Sl.
No.
Particulars
of
Election
No. and Name of
Constituency
Name and address of contesting candidate
Reasons
for
disqualification
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1.
General Election to
the
Lok
Sabha,
2014 in the State of
Rajasthan
09- Bharatpur
(SC)
Smt. Sheetal Jatav,
Arvind Colony, Kaman Gate, Deeg,
Tehsil
-
Deeg,
Distt.-
Bharatpur,
Rajasthan.
Failure to lodge any
account of election
expenses.
2.
-do-
09- Bharatpur
(SC)
Sh. Lakhan Singh
Village & Post Barigha,
Tehsil
-
Rupbas,
Distt.-
Bharatpur,
Rajasthan.
-do-
[No. 76/RJ– HP/2014]
By Order,
PRAMOD KUMAR SHARMA, Secy.
आिेश
नई दिल् ली, 7 जुलाई, 2017
आ. अ. 34.—यि: तनवााचन आयोग को समािान हो गया है दक नीचे की सारणी के स्िम्भ (2) में यथा-तवतनर्िाष्ट
राजस्थान तविान सभा के सािारण तनवााचन, 2013 के तलए जो स्िम्भ (3) में तवतनर्िाष्ट तनवााचन क्षेत्र से हुआ है, स्िम्भ (4)
में उनके नाम के सामने तवतनर्िाष्ट तनवााचन ल़ने वाले प्रत्येक अभ्यथी, लोक प्रतितनतित्व अतितनयम, 1951 िथा िद्धीन
बनाए गए तनयमों एवां आिेशों द्वारा अपेतक्षि उि सारणी के स्िम्भ (5) में यथा-िर्शाि अपने तनवााचन व्ययों का कोई भी
तवति द्वारा अपेतक्षि लेखा िातखल करने में असफल रहे हैं ; और
यि:, उि अभ्यर्थायों ने तनवााचन आयोग द्वारा सम्यक् सूचना दिए जाने पर भी उि असफलिा के तलए कोई कारण
अथवा स्पष्टीकरण नहीं दिया है , एवां तवचार करने के पश्चाि् तनवााचन आयोग को यह समािान हो गया है दक उनके पास उि
असफलिा के तलए कोई पयााप्त कारण या न्द्यायौतचत्य नहीं है :
अि:, अब तनवााचन आयोग, उि अतितनयम की िारा 10क के अनुसरण में नीचे के स्िम्भ (4) में तवतनर्िाष्ट व्यतियों
का सांसि के दकसी भी सिन के या दकसी राज्य/सांघ राज्य क्षेत्र की तविान सभा अथवा तविान पररषि के सिस्य चुने जाने और
होने के तलए इस आिेश की िारीख से िीन वषा की कालावति के तलए एिद्द्वारा तनरर्हाि घोतषि करिा है :—
128 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
सारणी
क्रम सां.
तनवााचन का तववरण
तनवााचन क्षेत्र की
क्रम सां. एवां नाम
तनवााचन लडने वाले अभ्यथी
का नाम िथा पिा
तनरहािा का कारण
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1.
राजस्थान तविान सभा के
सािारण तनवााचन, 2013
30-उियपुरवाटी
श्री नरेंर सैनी,
वाडा नां. 2, मातलयो की ढाणी,
तच़ावा, तिला - झुांझुनू
राजस्थान।
तनवााचन व्ययों का
कोई
भी
लेखा
िातखल
करने
में
असफल
2.
-वही-
51-तसतवल लाईन्द्स
श्री गोपाल कृष्ण,
28, सुशीलपुरा, सरकारी स्कूल
के पास, सोडाला, जयपुर
राजस्थान।
-वही-
3.
-वही-
194-दकशनगांज
(अ.ज.जा.)
श्री हरियाल, ग्राम व पोस्ट -
ढोटी, िहसील- अटरू,
तजला - बाराां राजस्थान ।
-वही-
[सां. 76/राज.-तव.स./2013]
आिेश से,
प्रमोि कुमार शमाा, सतचव
ORDER
New Delhi, the 7th July, 2017
O. N. 34.—Whereas, the Election Commission is satisfied that each of the contesting candidates specified in
column (4) of the Table below at the General Election to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly, 2013 as specified in
Column (2) held from the constituency specified in column (3) against his name, has failed to lodge any account of his
election expenses required by law as shown in column (5) of the said Table as required by the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 and Rules and Orders made there under; and
Whereas, the said candidate(s) have not furnished any reason or explanation for the said failure even after due
notice and the Election Commission is satisfied that they have no good reason or justification for the said failure;
Now, therefore, in pursuance of Section 10A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Election
Commission hereby declares the persons specified in column (4) of the table below to be disqualified for being chosen
as, and for being, a member of either House of the Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a
State/Union Territory for a period of three years from the date of this order: —
TABLE
Sl.
No.
Particulars of Election
Sl.No. and Name of the
Assembly Constituency
Name and Address of the
Contesting Candidate
Reason
for
disqualification
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1.
General Election to the
Legislative Assembly, 2013
in the State of Rajasthan
30-Udaipurwati
Sh. Narendra Saini,
Ward No. 2, Maliyo Ki Dhani,
Chidawa,
Distt.-
Jhunjhunu,
Rajasthan.
Failure to lodge any
account of election
expenses
2.
-do-
51- Civil Lines
Sh.
Gopal
Krishan
28,
Sushilpura, Sarkari School Ke
Pass, Sodala, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
-do-
3.
-do-
194- Kishanganj (ST)
Sh. Hardayal
Village & Post Dhoti, Tehsil-
Ataroo, Distt.- Baran, Rajasthan.
-do-
[No. 76/RJ-LA/2013]
By Order,
PRAMOD KUMAR SHARMA, Secy.
II—
(iii)
129
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130 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
ORDER
New Delhi, the 7th July, 2017
O. N. 35.— Whereas, the Election Commission of India is satisfied that each of the contesting candidate
specified in column (4) of the table below at the General Election to the Lok Sabha, 2014 from the State of Uttar Pradesh
as specified in column (2) held from the Constituency specified in column (3) against his/her name has failed to lodge
the account of his/her election expenses as shown in column (5) of the said table as required by the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 and the rules made thereunder;
And, whereas, the said candidates have either not furnished any reason or explanation for the said failure even
after due notices of the Election Commission or after considering the representation made by them, if any, the Election
Commission is satisfied that they have no good reason or justification for the said failure;
Now, therefore, in pursuance of section 10A of the said Act, the Election Commission hereby declares the
persons specified in column (4) of the table below to be disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of
either House of the Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State/ Union Territory for a
period of three years from the date of this order: —
TABLE
Sl. No.
Particular of Election
Sl.No. & Name
of Constituency
Name & Address of
Contesting Candidates
Reason of Disqualification
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1.
General Election to the
House of the People, State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2014.
37-Amethi
Ravi Kumar,
Village & Post- Sarvan
(Fursatganj),
District- Amethi.
Failed to lodge account of
his/her election expenses.
2.
General Election to the
House of the People, State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2014.
37-Amethi
Vedpal Shastri,
Aray Samaj Mandir
Jhilmil Colony,
Shahadra, Delhi-110095
Failed to lodge account of
his/her election expenses.
3.
General Election to the
House of the People, State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2014.
37-Amethi
Uma Kant,
Mohalla- Markseed,
Narnaul, Tehsil- Narnaul,
District Mahendragarh
(Hariyana).
Failed to lodge account of
his/her election expenses.
4.
General Election to the
House of the People, State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2014.
37-Amethi
Jitendra Singh,
Village- Bardharme,
Post- Barkot, Tehsil- Tiloi,
District- Amethi.
Failed to lodge account of
his/her election expenses.
5.
General Election to the
House of the People, State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2014.
37-Amethi
Dwarika Prasad,
Village- Pure Ojha Majre
Nuruddinpur,
Post- Karahia Bazar,
District Raebarely.
Failed to lodge account of
his/her election expenses.
6.
General Election to the
House of the People, State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2014.
37-Amethi
Mithilesh Kumari,
Village- Ghuraha,
Post- Tikari,
District- Amethi.
Failed to lodge account of
his/her election expenses.
[No. 76/UP-HP/2014]
By Order,
ANUJ JAIPURIAR, Principal Secy.
II—
(iii)
131
नई दिल् ली, 13 जुलाई, 2017
आ.अ. 36.—लोक प्रतितनतित् व अतितनयम, 1951(1951 का 43) की िारा 106(क) के अनुसरण में तनवााचन
आयोग 2014 की तनवााचन यातचका सां. 27 में आांध्र प्रिेश एवां िेलांगाना उच् च न्द् यायालय के आिेश दिनाांक 15.02.2017 को
एिद्द्वारा प्रकातशि करिा है।
(तनणाय अतिसूचना के अांग्रेजी भाग में छपा है)
[सां. 82/ईसीआई/प्रािेतशक/िेलांगाना-लो.स. (27)/2014/2017]
आिेश से,
एस.के. रुडोला, प्रिान सतचव
New Delhi, the 13th July, 2017
O. N. 36.—In pursuance of section 106 (a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), the
Election Commission hereby publishes the Order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana dated
15-02-2017 in Election Petition No. 27 of 2014.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD
FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
WEDNESDAY, THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND SEVENTEEN
PRESENT
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT
ELECTION PETITION No: 27 of 2014
Between:
M.A. Basith, S/o M.A. Lateef, Age about 60 years, Occ: Public service, R/o H. No. 20-2-930/1, Doodh Bowli,
Hyderabad.
…PETITIONER
AND
1. Asaduddin Owaisi, S/o, Late Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi, Aged 43 years, Occ: Politician, #3-6-149, Hyderguda,
Hyderabad-500029
2. The Returning Officer, 09-Hyderabad Parliamentary Constituency, O/o. The District Collector, Hyderabad Dist.
Hyderabad.
3. District Election Officer, O/o The Commissioner, GHMC, CC Complex, Tank Bund Road, Lower Tank Bund,
Hyderabad-500029.
4. Chief Electoral Officer of A.P., Secretariat Complex, Hyderabad.
5. The Election Commission of India, Nrvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001.
(RR 4 & 5 are deleted from the array of the Respondents as per Court Order dated 07/02/2017 vide Appl. No.85/15.)
…RESPONDENTS
Petition under Section 81 r/w Sec. 100 (1) (d) (iv) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 praying that in
the circumstances stated in the petition/affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to
a) Call for record related to the elections to the 09 –Hyderabad Parliamentary Constituency held on 30-4-2014 and
declare the election of the 1st respondent (Mr. Asaduddin Owaisi) to the 09-Hyderabad Parliamentary Constituency to
be null and void; and set aside the same
b) Call for duty log of the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPF) personnel posted at each polling booh of 09-Hyderabad
Parliamentary Constituency on 30-4-2014
c) Call from the election commissioner the registers (Form 17-A) in which signature of all voters are available for
judicial scrutiny.
132 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
d) Call for records from MRO, Rajendranagar Mandal, in respect of 4 acres of land acquired by the 1st respondent in
Survey No. 15 of Mailardevpally village in Rajendranagar Mandal, R.R. District for judicial scrutiny
e) Direct the 5th Respondent to furnish before this Hon’ble court for judicial scrutiny a printed report of – the result of
poll, event log data, hourly total data, voter map data and voter time stamp data – which can be taken from all the
EVMs used in the election for 09-Hyderabad Parliamentary Constituency.
f) Call for records for judicial scrutiny from R.D.O & S.D.M Chevella Division in respect of Conversion of land from
Agriculture to Non- agriculture in connection with the land acquired by the 1st respondent in Sy. No. 15,
Mailardevpally village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy district.
g) Call for records for District Collector Ranga Reddy in respect of land use Certification in respect of conversion from
Agriculture to Non-Agriculture for Commercial/Residential purpose in connection with the land owned by the 1st
respondent in Sy. No. 15, Mailardevpally village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy district.
h) award the coast of the Petition
i) and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
The petition coming on for hearing upon perusing the petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof and upon
hearing the arguments of Sri V. Venkata Mayur, Advocate, for the petitioner ad of Sri. S. Niranjan Reddy, Advocate, for
the Respondent No. 1 and of GP for General Administration (TS), for the Respondent Nos. 2 & 3.
The Court made the following Order:-
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT
ELECTION PTITION No. 27 OF 2014
ORDER:
Sri V. Venkat Mayur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has informed this Court that the
petitioner in the present petition has expired recently.
Accordingly, this Election Petition is dismissed as abated as per Section 112 (1) of Representation of the
Peoples Act, 1951 (for short “the Act”).
Consequently, the Registrar (Judicial) is directed to publish the same under Section 112 (2) of the Act.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Micellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.
Sd/-
V. RAMESH
Jt. REGISTRAR
HIGH COURT
DATED : 15.02.2017
ORDER
EP. No. 27 of 2014
DISMISSING THE EP AS ABATED
WITHOUT COSTS.
[No. 82/ECI/TERR/TEL-HP (27/2014)/2017]
By Order,
S. K. RUDOLA, Principal Secy.
II—
(iii)
133
भारि तनवााचन आयोग
नई दिल् ली, 23 जून, 2017
आ.अ. 37.—तनवााचन अजी सांख् या 02/2014 में झारखांड उच् च न्द् यायालय के िारीख 22 तसिम् बर, 2015 के तनणाय
के तवरुद्ध िातखल की गई 2015 की तसतवल अपील सांख् या 14007 में भारि के उच् चिम न्द् यायालय के दिनाांक 11 दिसम् बर,
2015 के तनणाय को लोक प्रतितनतित् व अतितनयम,1951 (1951 का 43) की िारा116ग (2) (ख) के अनुसरण में, तनवााचन
आयोग एििद्वारा प्रकातशि करिा है।
(आिेश अतिसूचना के अांग्रेजी भाग में छपा है)
[सां. 82/ईपी/(02/2014)/टीईआरआर/ईएस-आई/जेएच-एचपी/2017]
आिेश से,
केिार नाथ भार, सतचव
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
New Delhi, the 23rd June, 2017
O. N. 37.—In pursuance of clause (b) sub Section (2) of Section 116C of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 (43 of 1951), the Election Commission hereby publishes the Order dated 11th December, 2015 of the Supreme
Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 14007 of 2015 filed against the Judgement, dated 22.9.2015 of the High Court of
Jharkhand at Ranchi in Election Petition No. 02 of 2014.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 14007 of 2015
DR. SURAJ MANDAL
…Appellant (s)
VERSUS
DR. RAVINDRA KUMAR ROY AND ANR.
…Respondent (s)
ORDER
We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. We do not see any cogent reason to
entertain the appeal. The judgment impugned does not warrant any interference.
The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
.…………………….J.
[J. CHELAMESWAR]
……………………..J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi
Dated : December 11, 2015
ITEM No. 13
COURT No. 5
SECTION XVII
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
134 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
Civil Appeal No (s). 14007/2015
DR. SURAJ MANDAL
…Appellant (s)
VERSUS
DR. RAVINDRA KUMAR ROY AND ANR.
…Respondent (s)
(with appln. (s) for exemption from filing O.T.)
Date : 11.12.2015 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J. CHELAMESWAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
For Appellant(s) Mr. Mohak Badana, Adv.
Mr. P. N. Puri, Adv.
Mrs. Reta Dewan Puri, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
ORDER
Application for exemption from filing O.T. is allowed.
The appeal is dismissed, in terms of the signed order.
[O. P. SHARMA]
[INDU BALA KAPUR]
AR-cum-PS
COURT MASTER
(Signed order is placed on the file)
[No. 82/EP/(02/2014)/TERR/ES-I/JH-HP/2017]
By Order,
KEDAR NATH BHAR, Secy.
नई दिल् ली, 28 जून, 2017
आ.अ. 38.— लोक प्रतितनतित् व अतितनयम, 1951(1951 का 43) की िारा 106(क) के अनुसरण में तनवााचन
आयोग 2016 की तनवााचन यातचका सां. 1 में आांध्र प्रिेश एवां िेलांगाना उच् च न्द् यायालय के आिेश दिनाांक 19.09.2016 को
एिद्व् िारा प्रकातशि करिा है।
(तनणाय अतिसूचना के अांग्रेजी भाग में छपा है)
[सां. 82/ईसीआई/प्रािेतशक/िेलांगाना-लो.सां. (1/2016)/2017]
आिेश से,
एस. के. रुडोला, प्रिान सतचव
New Delhi, the 28th June, 2017
O. N. 38.— In pursuance of section 106 (a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), the
Election Commission hereby publishes the Order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana dated
19-09-2016 in Election Petition No. 1 of 2016.
II—
(iii)
135
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD
FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
MONDAY, THE NINETEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND SIXTEEN
PRESENT
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K. JAISWAL
ELECTION APPLICATION NO. 623 OF 2016
IN
ELECTION PETITION NO. 1 OF 2016
Between:
Mr. Dayakar Pasunoori, S/o, Prakasham,
Aged about 48 years,
R/o. H. No. 3-129, Bollikunta village & Post,
Sangem Mandal, Warangal District.
… Petitioner/1st Respondent
AND
1.
Survey sathyanarayana, S/o. Late Laxmaiah,
Aged about 61 years, Occ: Agriculture,
R/o. Plot No. 43, Road No. 4,
Thrimoorthy Colony, Mahendra Hills,
East Marredopally, Secunderabad – 500 026
… Respondent/Petitioner
2.
Mr. Devaiah Pagidipati, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 1-118/A/B/409,
Plot No. 409, BETA, Jayabheri Silicon County,
Madapur, Hyderabad – 500 082.
3.
Mr. Nalla Surya Prakash, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 42-748/V/25, Moulali,
Malkajigiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.
4.
Mr. Kanakam Devadas, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o H. No. 9-220, Mulugu Village and Mandal,
Warangal District.
5.
Mr. Jajula Bhaskar, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 1-6-48, Old Alwal, Bollaram Post,
Secunderabad – 500 010.
6.
Mr. Jeedi Sadanandam, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 1-148/1, Kanagarthi Village,\
Jammikunta Mandal, Karimnagar District.
7.
Mr. Pasula Rammurthy, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 1-128/A, Narlapur Village,
S.S. Thadvai Mandal, Warangal District.
8.
Mr. Palvai Venu, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 4-12-10/2, High Court Colony,
Road No. 4, Vanasthalipuram, Hayathnagar,
Ranga Reddy District.
9.
Mr. Bandi Kranthi Kumar, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. Baironipalli, Siddapur Post, Hasanparthy
Mandal, Warangal District.
136 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
10. Velthuru Mallaiah, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 21-2-195/9/1, Larthu Nagar,
F.C.I. Road, Shanthi Naagar, Ramagundam,
Karimnagar District.
11. Mr. Gabbeta Babu, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 3-88, Mylaram Village,
Rayaparthi Mandal, Warangal District.
12. Prof. Gali Vinod Kumar, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 12-13-132/1, Flat No. 202,
Kibriya Residency, Street No. 3, Tarnaka,
Secunderabad – 500m 017.
13. Mr. Guggilla Sagar, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 5-41/2, Ambedkar Colony,
Mulugu Village and Mandal, Warangal District.
14. Mr. Gangaram Saibaba, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 11-9-115/2/2, Plot No. B4,
Road No. 2, Laxminagar Colony, Kothapet,
Saroornagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.
15. Mr. Jannu Mahendar, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 14-6-296, Nizampura, Mandi Bazar,
Warangal, Warangal District.
16. Mr. Pendela Devaraju, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 2-57, Bagirthipeta Village,
Regonda Mandal, Warangal District.
17. Mr. Barla Srinivas, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 3-88, Madikonda Village,
Hanamakonda Mandal, Warangal District.
18.
Smt. Banda Susheela, W/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 1-17, Burahanpaliy Village,
Rayaparthi Mandal, Warangal District – 506 314.
19.
Mr. Yeachu Sunil, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 8-3-51, Nizampet,
Khammam District.
20. Mr. Ripeeka Prem Kumar, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. 8-3-51, Nizampet,
Khammam District.
21. Mr. Vemula Ramesh, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. 3-6, Duddenapally Village,
Saidapur Mandal, Karimnagar District.
22. Mr. Sandra Johnson, S/o. Not known to the Petitioner,
Aged Major, R/o. H. No. 16-8-200, Abbanikunta,
Warangal, Warangal District – 506 013.
23. The Election Commission of India,
rep. by its Secretary, Nirvachan Sadan,
Ashoka Road, New Delhi – 110 001.
24. The Returning Officer-cum-District Collector,
Warangal District, State of Telangana.
II—
(iii)
137
25. The Chief Electoral Officer,
Andhra Pradesh and Telangana,
South, H. Block, Secretariat, Hyderabad – 500 022.
26. Union of India,
Represented by its Secretary,
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, New Delhi.
… Respondents/Respondents 2 to 26
(Respondents 2 to 26 are not necessary)
Election Application under Order VII Rule II of C.P.C. Praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit
filed therewith, the High Court will be pleased to reject the Election Petition in E.P. No. 1 of 2016 under Order VII Rule
II of Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
The Application coming on for hearing upon perusing the Petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof and
upon hearing the arguments of Sri P. Kesava Rao, Advocate for the Petitioner and of Sri T. Lakshmi Narayana,
Advocate for the Respondent.
The Court made the following Order:
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M. S. K. JAISWAL
APPLICATION No. 623 of 2016
IN
ELECTION PETITION No. 1 of 2016
ORDERS:
The present application is filed by the petitioner/1st respondent-Dayakar Pasunoori under Order VII Rule – 11
of Code of Civil Procedure to reject the Election Petition No. 1 of 2016 filed by the respondent/petitioner-Survey
Sathyanarayana.
2. For the sake of Convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the main Election Petition No. 1 of
2016.
3. The main Election Petition No. 1 of 2016 is filed seeking to declare to election of the 1st respondent-Dayakar
Pasunoori as Member of Parliament for 15-Warangal (SC) Parliamentary Constituency as void and in turn to declare the
petitioner-Survey Sathyanarayana as duly elected person.
4. The present application is filed on the ground that petitioner has failed to comply with the provisions of
Section 123 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 (for short “the Act”). Under Section 83 (1)(a) of the Act, it is
obligatory on the part of the petitioner to file an election petition with all material facts. The 1st respondent did not
mention in Form No.26 about the contract entered into by himself and his wife with Bharath petroleum Corporation
Limited. The Petitioner failed to give material particulars to satisfy the ingredients of Section 9-A and 123 of the Act
with supporting evidence. As per Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act, every election petition shall be signed by the petitioner
and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure and it is Mandatory to sigh in the presence of
Notary, but the petitioner has not done so. It is settled law that election petitions can be rejected at the threshold for non-
compliance of the mandatory provisions as contemplated under the Act. There is no cause of action to file the election
petition.
5. The basic ingredient of Section 9-A of the Act is that there should be a subsisting contract entered into with
the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or for execution of any works undertaken by that Government.
The appropriate Government is the State Government or the Central Government, but not the local or other authorities
under the control of the State Government/Central Government. Since the Bharath Petroleum Corporation Limited
cannot be equated with the appropriate Government as per Section 9-A of the Act, the ground on which the election
petition is field is untenable and the election petition is liable to be dismissed. The petitioner cannot club the Election
Press Note and the declaration of result in form No. 21-D together, since both are independent of each other. Form No.
21-D is not filed along with the verification. Each annexure does not have verification separately. The documents
referred to in Annexure-VIII are independent newspaper clippings and they would have been filed independently with
separate verifications. The petitioner failed to file separate affidavits in compliance with the provisions as well as the
Rules framed with regard to proving the corrupt practice. The election petition suffers from lack of material facts and
hence the same is liable to be rejected.
138 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
6. The petitioner filed counter denying the contentions of the 1st respondent. It is submitted that the present
application filed by the 1st respondent under Order 7 Rule -11 CPC do not fall within the ambit of Order 7 Rule -11(a),
(b), (c) & (d) of CPC. Whether the election petition discloses a cause of action or not, the Court has to look into the
allegations in the election petition. There is no contention raised by the 1st respondent that the relief claimed is
undervalued and the petitioner is required to correct the valuation within a time fixed by the court. In the absence of any
such contention or pleading, within the ambit or order 7 Rule-11(b) CPC, the present application is liable to be
dismissed.
7. The non-filing of verification in respect of Election Press Note and the declaration of result in Form-21D are
curable defects. The present application is not filed by the counsel for the 1st respondent Mr. M. Ajay Kumar, who was
on record as on 07.07.2016, but it was filed by Mr. P. Keshava Rao and D. Narsimulu, who are not the counsel on record
for the respondent, and therefore, the application is liable to be dismissed.
8. The Election Petition was filed on 04.01.2016, registered on 18.01.2016, summons for settlement of issues
was served on the respondent on 08.04.2016 and the respondent entered appearance through his counsel Mr. M. Ajay
Kumar on 21.04.2016. The 30 days time prescribed under Order 8 Rule-1 CPC for filing written statement/counter to the
Election petition expired on 08.05.2016. The 90 day time under proviso to Order 8 Rule-1 CPC also expired by
07.07.2016. The time extended by this Court for the respondent to file his written statement/counter expired on
08.07.2016. The respondent failed to file written statement/counter within 90 days. The filing of piecemeal applications,
raising objections, be it preliminary or otherwise, including the present application, would lead to undesirable result and
the application is liable to be dismissed.
9. The averments of the present application are very vague and do not specify which part of the election petition
do not comply with the provisions of the Act. The averments in the election petition alone have to be looked into and
should presume to be correct for the time being so as to find out whether such averments disclose a cause of action or
not, but not any other material. Material fact means a subject-matter of the statement related to a fact or circumstance
which would be important, significant or essential for making a reasonable decision and hence the averments made in
the election petition contain full material facts making out prima facie case. The election Petition and other affidavits are
sworn, affirmed and signed in the presence of the notary. The petitioner has complied has complied with the procedure
as contemplated under the mandatory provisions of the Act. The petitioner denied all the contentions as raised by the 1st
respondent in the present application. It is stated that the election petition contain full material facts and there is cause of
action to file the election petition and thus it is maintainable, and therefore, the present application is liable to be
dismissed.
10. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel appearing for the 1st
respondent.
11. The points that arise for consideration are as to:-
1) Whether the Election Petition, in the instant case, contains material facts so as to proceed with the trial?; Or
2) Whether the petitioner/R.1 has suffered disqualification falling within the ambit of Section 9-A of the Act?;
or
3) Whether the averments made in the Election Petitioner do not disclose any cause of action so as to reject the
same at the threshold under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C.?
Points:
12. The petitioner/R.1 was declared elected as a Member of Parliament for the Warangal (SC) parliamentary
constituency in the election held on 21.11.2015. The first respondent herein was the unsuccessful candidate. He filed the
Election Petition alleging that the petitioner/R.1 has suffered the disqualification in view of his existing contract along
with his wife with Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, which is a disqualification as per Section 9-A of the Act and
that the petitioner/R.1 has indulged in corrupt practices as envisaged under Section 123 of the Act. The first respondent
in the Election Petition has filed the application in hand for rejecting the Election petition at the threshold under the
provisions of Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., on the ground that there is no cause of action for the Election Petitioner and that
the material facts as required under Section 83 of the Act have not been set forth. Even though it was not specifically
mentioned in the application that the Election Petition is sought to be rejected for w3ant of cause of action as
contemplated under sub-clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., but the contents thereof make it clear that the
petitioner is seeking the rejection of the Election petition on that ground.
13. It is well-settled that for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., the averments in the
petition are relevant and suffice it if material facts are averred in a petition though it may not incumbent for the
petitioner to set out the material particulars, In this connection, it may be appropriate to refer to the authority of the
Supreme Court reported in MAHADEORAO SUKAJI SHIVANKAR v. RAMARATAN BAPU AND ORS1,
1 (2004) 7 SCC 181
II—
(iii)
139
Wherein it is observed at para 6 as under:-
“Now, it is no doubt true that all material facts have to be set out in an election petition. If material facts are not
stated in a plaint or a petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone as the case would be covered by
Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code. The question, however, is as to whether the petitioner had set out
material facts in the election petition. The expression “material facts” has neither been defined in the Act nor in the
Code. It may be stated that the material facts are those facts upon which a party relies for his claim or defence. In other
words, material facts are facts upon which the plaintiff’s cause of action or defendant’s defence depends. What
particulars could be said to be material facts would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal
application can be laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential that all basic and primary facts which must be proved at
the trial by the party to establish existence of cause of action or defence are material facts and must be stated in the
pleading of the party.”
14. Other decision on this aspect is the one reported in MAHENDRA PAL V. RAM DASS MALANGER &
ORS.2. The Hon’bel Supreme Court at paragraphs-7 & 24 held as under:
“7. Section 83(1)(a) of the Act mandates that in order to constitute a cause of action, all material facts, that is,
the basic and preliminary facts which the petitioner is bound under the law to substantiate in order to succeed,
have to be pleaded in an election petition. Whether in an election petition, a particular fact is material or not and
as such required to be pleaded is a question which depends upon the nature of the charge leveled and the facts
and circumstances of each case. The distinction between ‘material facts’ and ‘particulars’ has been explained by
this Court in a large number of cases and we need not refer to all those decided cases. Facts which are essential
to disclose a complete cause of action are material facts and are essentially required to be pleaded. On the other
hand “particulars” are details of the case set up by the party and are such pleas which are necessary to amplify,
refine or explain material facts. The function of particulars is, thus, to present a full picture of the cause of
action to make the opposite party understand the case that has been set up against him and which he is required
to meet. The distinction between ‘material facts’ and ‘material particulars’ is indeed important because different
consequences follow from a deficiency of such facts or particulars in the pleadings. Failure to plead even a
single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and incomplete allegations of such a charge are liable
to be struck off under Order 6, Rule 16, CPC. In the case of a petition suffering from deficiency of material
particulars the Court has the discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars even after the
expiry of limitation. Thus, whereas it may be permissible for a party to furnish particulars even after the period
of limitation for filling an election petition has expired, with permission of the Court, no material fact unless
already pleaded, can be permitted to be introduced, after the expiry of the period of limitation.
24. Our perusal of various paragraphs of the election petition and particularly of the averments contained in
paragraphs 10 to 13, 16 and 20, go to show that sufficient material facts, to provide a cause of action, for trial of
the election petition have been provided in the election petition. In various sub-paras of paragraph 11 of the
election petition particulars of irregularities have also been spelt out. The non-mention of serial numbers of the
improperly counted ballot papers, keeping in view the averments made in paragraph 16 of the petition, could
not be a ground to non-suit the election petitioner at the threshold, without trial more particularly because of the
discrepancy between Ex.P.2 and Ex,P.3. Pleadings have to be read as a whole to ascertain their true import. It is
the substance and not merely the form, which is required to be looked into for construing the pleadings. The
intention of the party needs to be gathered form the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. These
well settled principles appear to have been lost sight of by the learned designated judge. Construed reasonable,
the averments in the election petition, in our opinion, do make out a case for the petition proceeding to trial.
Whether or not a case is eventually made out to justify recount/inspection would depend upon the evidence led
by the parties in support of their pleadings at the trial.”
15. Adverting to the facts of the case in hand, as already stated, the main stay of the petitioner’s case is that the
contents of the Election petition are vague and they do not contain the material particulars as required and that the first
respondent/Election Petitioner has no cause of action.
16. As noticed above, the election of the petitioner is challenged on the ground that he suffered disqualification
under Section 9-A of the Act and also indulged in corrupt practices as contemplated under Section 123 of the Act.
During the course of hearing, learned senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent/Election Petitioner fairly submits
that the Election Petition does not satisfy the requirements of the Act, inasmuch as, it do not contain the details as are
required for questioning the election of the successful candidate on the grounds of corrupt practices. It is conceded that
the petition do not contain material facts insofar as this ground is concerned. Therefore, this aspect need not detain as
long.
17. The contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner/successful candidate is that even if the
allegation in the Election Petition is taken on its face value, it does not attract the provisions of Section 9-A of the Act
since the successful candidate along with his wife are undoubtedly carrying on distributorship of a Government owned
oil company dealing in the liquefied petroleum gas.
2 AIR 2000 SC 16
140 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
18. The fact not in controversy is that the petitioner/R.1 along with his wife are having subsisting
distributorship with the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., with the dealer code No. 142270 of village Wardhannapet,
Warangal District. Whether this act of the successful candidate having a Distributorship in the Government owned Oil
Company Constitutes disqualification so as to hold that the successful candidate is not competent to contest in an
election to the Parliament, is in question.
19. Section 9-A of the Act reads as under:-
“Disqualification for Government contracts, ets.,.—A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as,
there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate
Government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works undertaken by, that Government.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this Section, where a contract has been fully performed by the person by
whom if has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by
reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part.”
20. As per Section 2 (e) or the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 2000
(for short ‘the Order’) a distributor has been defined as a person appointed by a Government oil company and engaged
in the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of liquefied petroleum gas in cylinders to consumers on the basis of
an agreement with a Government oil company.
21. What is the Government Oil Company has been defined in sub-clause (g) of Section 2 of the above Order
and it includes Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, which is relevant in the instant case.
22. Sub-clause (I) of Section 2 of the above Order defines the public distribution system as a system of
distribution, marketing or selling of liquefied petroleum gas by Government oil company at the Government controlled
or declared prices through a distribution system approved by the Central or State Government. Section 9 of the above
Order puts restrictions and controls the business activities of a distributor in the following words:-
“Procurement, storage and sale of liquefied petroleum gas by a distributor.—(a) No distributor having
stock of liquefied petroleum gas at the business premises, including storage point, shall, unless otherwise
directed by a Government oil company or a parallel marketer, refuse to sell L.P.G. on any working day during
working hours, to the consumer registered with that distributor.
(b) No distributor shall keep his business premises including the storage point closed during working hours on
any working day without the prior written permission of the Government oil company or the parallel marketer.
Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-clause (a) and (b), the expression “working hours” means the working
hours fixed by the concerned Government oil company or the parallel marketer in accordance with the
provisions of the Shops and Establishments Act and the rules made thereunder, as in force in the respective
States or the Union Territories, as the case may be.
(c) Every distributor shall take step to ensure that stocks of liquefied petroleum gas are available at the business
premises, including the storage point, at all times.
(d) No distributor shall sell liquefied petroleum gas at a higher price than that fixed by the Government oil
company or the parallel marketer.
(e) No distributor shall, without prior written permission of the concerned Government oil company, refuse to
make home delivery at the address of the consumer, as registered with the distributor:
Provided that the State Government may, fix additional charges for home delivery of L.P.G. cylinders to the
consumers, as it may deem necessary in view of the geographical terrain and/or the distance in the area of
distribution.
(f) Every distributor shall display the working hours prominently at the place of business including the place of
storage on a conspicuous place.”
23. Section 13 of the above Order confers power on any Officer of the Central or State Government in the
following words:-
“Power of entry, search and seizure.—(1) Any Officer of the Central or the State Government not below the
rank of Inspector duly authorised by a general or a special order, by the Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be or any Officer of a Government oil company not below the rank of Sales
Officer, authorised by the Central Government, may, with a view to securing due compliance of this Order or
any other order made thereunder:-
(a)
stop and search any vessel or vehicle used or capable of being used for the transport or storage of any
petroleum product,
(b)
enter and search any place,
II—
(iii)
141
(c)
seize stocks of liquefied petroleum gas along with container and/or equipments, such as cylinders, gas
cylinder valves, pressure regulators and seals in respect of which he has reason to believe that a
contravention of this Order has been, or is being, or is about to be made.
(2) The sales Officer of a Government Oil Company shall be authorised to secure compliance of this Order by
the distributors appointed under the Public distribution system and or by the consumer registered by them.”
24. Learned Counsel appearing for the Election Petitioner submits that if the provisions of the above Order are
read along with Section 9-A of the Act it is clear that the petitioner/successful candidate is disqualified from contesting
an election since admittedly there subsisted a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the
Government for the supply of goods.
25. During the elaborate arguments, both the learned Counsel appearing for the Election Petitioner as well the
Successful Candidate submitted various authorities in support of their respective contentions, which are briefly referred
to hereunder:-
26. In RAVINDER SINGH V. JANMEJA SINGH & ORS.3 the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph-11
held as under:
“11. Section 83 of the Act is mandatory in character and requires not only a concise statement of material facts
and full particulars of the alleged corrupt practice, so as to present a full and complete picture of the action to be
detailed in the election petition but under the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act, the election petition leveling a
charge of corrupt practice is required, by law, to be supported by an affidavit in which the election petitioner is
obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of that corrupt practice. The reason
for this insistence is obvious. It is necessary for an election petitioner to make such a charge with full
responsibility and to prevent any finishing and roving enquiry and save the returned candidate from being taken
by surprise. In the absence of proper affidavit, in the prescribed form, filed in support of the corrupt practice of
bribery, the allegation pertaining thereto, could not be put to trial the defect being of a fatal nature.”
27. In KARTAR SINGH BHADANA V. HARI SINGH NALWA 4 the Hon’bel Supreme Court at
paragraphs-8,12 & 13 held as under:
“8. Insofar as is relevant to a case where it is alleged that a candidate holds a contract for the execution of
works undertaken by an appropriate Government, Section 9A requires (a) that there should be a contract
entered into by the candidate; (b) that is should be entered into by him in the course of his trade or business; (c)
that it should be entered into with the appropriate Government; (d) that it should subsist; (e) that it should relate
to works undertaken by that Government and (f) that it should be for the execution of such works. The
provisions of Section 9A disqualify a citizen form contesting an election; a citizen may, therefore, be
disqualified only if the facts of his case squarely fall within the conditions prescribed by Section 9A.
12. Reference was made to the mining leases by learned counsel for the first respondent. Thereunder, the
appropriate Government has granted and demised to a partnership firm of which the appellant is a partner the
right to win mineral from the areas therein mentioned. Clause 23 thereof, which was relied upon, says that if the
lessee does not carry out its obligations under the covenants in the lease the lessor may cause the same to be
carried out and performed and the lessee shall pay the lessor all expenses in this behalf. There is nothing in this
clause in the leases which can support the submission made on behalf of the first respondent that the appellant
had entered into a contract for the execution of any works undertaken by the Government.
13. As we see it, it is only when the appropriate Government has undertaken works, such as the laying of a
road, the erection of a building or the construction of a dam, and has entered into a contract for the execution of
such works that the contractor is disqualified under Section 9A. Section 9A does not operate to disqualify the
lessee of a mining lease such as the appellant.”
28. In DEWAN JOYNAL ABEDIN V. ABDUL WAZED5 the Hon’bel Supreme Court at paragraphs -16, 17,
18, 19 & 20 held as under:
“16. An analysis of Section 9-A of the Act shows that only in two cases a person would be disqualified if he has
entered into a contract with the appropriate Government in the course of his trade or business which is
subsisting on the date of scrutiny of nomination. They are (i) when the contract is none for supply of goods to
the appropriate Government and (ii) where the contract is for the execution of any works undertaken by that
Government. If a contract belonging to either of the two categories is subsisting on the date of the nomination,
the person will be disqualified for being chosen as a member. In the present case the contract is not one for
supply of goods to the Government. It does not, therefore, fall under the first class of contracts which create the
3 AIR 2000 SC 3026
4 (2001) 4 SCC 661
5 1988 (sup) SCC 580
142 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
disqualification. The question for determination is whether the contract to collect toll at a Government ferry
entered into in accordance with the Ferries Act amounts to a contract for the execution of any works undertaken
by the Government. At this stage we should remember that the words ‘or the performance of ay services’ were
omitted from Section 7(d) by the amendment made in the year 1958. In N. Satyanathan v. K. Subramanyan and
Ors. : [1955] 2SCR83 this Court had occasion to construe Section 7(d) of the Act before its amendment in
1958. In that case the appellant was a contractor who had entered into an agreement with the Central
Government whereby he had contracted with the Governor-General for the provision of a Motor Vehicle
Service for the conveyance of postal articles and mail bags. Under the contract the Governor-General had
agreed to pay to the contractor Rs.200/- per month during the subsistence of the agreement as his remuneration
for service to be rendered by him. The appellant therein was held to be disqualified under Section 7(d) of the
Act, as it stood then, as he had undertaken to carry out a service which the Government had undertaken to do.
The Court said that “it cannot be gainsaid that the Government in the Postal Department is rendering a very
useful service and that the appellant has by his contract with the Government undertaken to render that kind of
service on a specified route. The present case is a straightforward illustration of the kind of contract
contemplated by Section 7(d) of the Act.”The Court took the above view in view of the presence of words ‘the
performance of any service’ under Section 7(d) of the Act, as it stood then. Those words were omitted from
Section 7(d) on its amendment in the year 1958 and Section 9-A of the Act as it stands today also does not
contain those words. In Ram Padarath Mahto v. Mishri Singh and Anr. : [1961]2SCR470 a similar question
arose for consideration. The appellant in that appeal was a member of a joint Hindu family which carried on the
business of Government stockists of grain under a contract with the Government of Bihar. His nomination for
election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly was rejected on the ground that he was disqualified under Section
7(d) of the Act, as he had an interest in a contract for the performance of service undertaken by the Bihar
Government. The appellant contended that the service undertaken by the Government was the sale of food
grains under the Grain Supply Scheme and the contract was not for the sale of such food grains and did not
attract the provisions of Section 7(d) of the Act. This Court held that the contract was not one for the purpose of
any service undertaken by the Government and the appellant therein was not disqualified under Section 7(d) of
the Act. The Court held that a contract of bailment which imposed on the bailee the obligation to stock and
store the food-grains in his godowns was not a contract for the purpose of the service of sale of grain which the
Government had undertaken. The Government had undertaken the work of supplying grain but the contract was
not one for the supply of grain. The Court distinguished the decision in N. Satyanathan v. K. Subramanayam
(supra) while reaching the conclusion that the appellant was not disqualified for being chosen as a member of
the Bihar Legislature. So even at a time prior to the amendment of Section 7(d) of the Act in the year 1958 it
was possible to take the view that certain types of contracts entered into with the appropriate Government, even
though they were subsisting on the date of scrutiny of nomination did not disqualify a person from being
chosen as a member of the State Legislature. It is pertinent to refer to the observation made by Gajendragadkar,
J. in Ram Padarath Mahto’s case (supra) which runs as under:
It may sound technical, but in dealing with a statutory provision which imposes a disqualification on a citizen it
would be unreasonable to take merely a broad and general view and ignore the essential points of distinction on
the ground that they are technical. The narrow question is: if the State Government undertook the work of
supplying the grain, is the contract one for the supply of grain?; in our opinion, the answer to this question must
be in the negative; that is why we think the High Court did not correctly appreciate the effect of the contract
when it held that the said contract brought the appellant’s case within the mischief of Section 7(d).
17. Unless the contract in question in one which clearly falls under Section 9-A of the Act, it would not be
proper to hold that the person who is a party to the contract is disqualified for being chosen as a member to the
State Legislature. In Lakshmikantha Rao v. D. Chinna Mallaiah and Ors. : AIR 1979AP132 the question that
arose for consideration was whether a person who was carrying on the business in arrack and toddy under the
contract with the Government under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 was disqualified
for being chosen as a member of the Legislature. The facts of that case briefly stated were thus. There was an
agreement between the highest bidder, i.e., the returned candidate and the Government in respect of the
carrying on the business in arrack and toddy. A perusal of the relevant provisions, i.e., Sections 15 and 17 of the
Andhra Pradesh Excise Act and Rule 21 of the Rules framed under that Act as well as the agreements signed
framed under that Act as well as the agreements signed by the returned candidate, showed that the highest
bidder had to deposit the monthly rentals and purchase the arrack from the Government at the issue price and
sell the same to the public. If there were any arrears in the monthly rentals the same could be recovered as
arrears of land revenue. Similarly with regard to the toddy shop he had to tap the toddy from the trees allotted to
him by the Government by paying the tree-tax and sell the toddy to the public. For the toddy shop also he had
to pay monthly rentals and if he fell in arrears the same could be recovered as arrears of land revenue. There
were other incidental conditions in the agreements. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that since the
contracts entered into by the successful candidate with the State Government to sell arrack and toddy did not
come within the State Government to sell arrack and toddy did not come within the mischief of Section 9-A of
the Act as they were neither for supply of goods to the Government nor for the execution of any works
II—
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143
undertaken he did not suffer from any disqualification for being chosen as a member of the Legislative
Assembly. We have gone through the above decision carefully. We are of the view that the High was right in
the said case in holding that the returned candidate had not suffered from any disqualification by reason of the
fact that he was an excise contractor.
18. In the present case the position of the 1st respondent is more or less similar to the position of the returned
candidate in the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The 1st respondent had acquired in the public
auction the right to collect the toll by paying the amount which he had offered to pay under the contract. He had
not undertaken thereby any contract for execution of any works undertaken by the Government. The word
‘works’ in the expression in ‘execution of any works’ appearing in Section 9-A of the Act is used in the sense
of ‘projects’, ‘schemes’, ‘plants’, such as building works irrigation works defence works etc. The 1st respondent
in this case had not undertaken to carry on any such work. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
the expression ‘work’ means a structure or apparatus of some kind; an architectural or engineering structure, a
building edifice. When it is used in plural, i.e., as ‘works’ it means ‘architectural or engineering operations; a
fortified building; a defensive structure, fortification; any of the several parts of such structure.’ The word
‘works’ used in Entry 35 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India which reads as “works,
lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the State” is used in the same sense. The running of boats
across inland waterways is a topic which falls under Entry 32 of List III of the Seventh Schedule which reads
thus: “Shipping and navigation on inland waterways as regards mechanically propelled vessels, and the rule of
the road on such waterways, and the carriage of passengers and goods on inland waterways subject to the
provisions of List I with respect to national waterways.” It is, therefore, difficult to hold that when a person
acquires the right to collect toll at a public ferry under Section 8 of the Ferries Act he is performing a contract
of execution of works undertaken by the Government. It may have been perhaps different if the words ‘in
performance of any services’ which were present in Section 7(d) of the Act, as it stood prior to its amendment
in 1958 had been there in Section 9-A of the Act.
19. We do not find any substance in the argument urged on behalf of the appellant that because under Condition
No. 10 of the form of lease prescribed under the Ferries Act the lessee is under an obligation during the period
of lease to mark buoys or in any other suitable manner, all submerged obstruction or dangerous rocks in the
rivers within half a mile of the landing ghats and shall be held responsible for any loss of damage caused to the
mar boats striking against such submerged obstructions or dangerous rocks it should be held that the 1st
respondent had undertaken to execute works undertaken by the Government. The above condition only requires
the lessee to mark buoys or in any other suitable manner the places where there were any submerged
obstruction or dangerous rocks within half a mile of the landing ghats. Having regard to the conditions of the
leas and the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder we are clearly of the view that the activity
undertaken by the lessee under the agreement cannot be considered as an agreement for execution of works
undertaken by the State Government.
20. We are, therefore, of the view that the contract which the 1st respondent had entered into with the State
Government even though it was subsisting on the date of scrutiny of nominations would not have the effect of
disqualifying him for being chosen as a member of the State Legislative Assembly since Section 9-A of the Act
is not at all attracted to such a case.”
29. In C.V.K. Rao V. DANTU BHASKARA RAO6 the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph-3 held as under:
“3. The disqualification which results from s.7(d) is conditioned by a number of circumstances. First, there
must be a subsisting contract (this is to say in actual existence) between the appropriate Government and the
candidate. Then the contract must be in the course of the trade or business of the candidate and, finally, it must
be inter alia for the supply of goods to such Government. The appropriate Government according to the
definition of the expression is the Government of Andhra Pradesh……..”
30. In LAKSHMIKANTHA RAO V. CHINNA MALLAIAH7 this Court at paragraphs-12, 17 & 18 held as
under:
“12. There is no doubt that the object of the Parliament in enacting Section 9-A was to preserve the integrity
and independence of the members of the Legislature and to keep the Legislature beyond any suspicion in the
interests of public morality. But as observed by the Supreme Court in Konappa v. Vishwanth,. : [1969] 2SCR
90 the right of a person to stabd for an election is valuable right just as a right of a person to vote and that a
sensible view of the section will have top be taken. In Bhaskara Rao v. C. V. K. Rao, : AIR1964AP77 a
Division Bench of this court while considering the cope of the old Section 7(d) which is analogous to the
present Section 9-A, observed thus (at P. 82):
6 AIR 1965 SC 93
7 1978 (II) Andhra Law Times Reports-460
144 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
“Since Section 7(d) is disabling provision and deprives citizens of India of the right to stand for election and
servethe community, it should receive a very strict interpretation. Statutes which encroach on the rights of the
subject, whether as regards person or property, are subject to a strict construction and it is a recognised rule that
they should be interpreted if possible, so as to respect such rights and if there is any ambiguity as to the
meaning of the sections, inasmuch as it is a disabling section, the construction which is in favour of the freedom
of the individual should be given effect to as stated by Maxwell.”
The learned Judges The learned Judge also considered the other contention viz., that the object of the
Parliament in enacting the disabling section is to maintain the integrity of the members of the Legislature and
that any interpretation contrary to such an intendment cannot be made, and held thus (at P. 83):-
No exception could be taken to these rules as stated thus. But at the same time, we cannot overlook the
cardinal rule that Courts should not strain the language of a stature in order to cover cases which are plainly
excluded from the natural meaning of the words.
In this context it is beneficial to refer to some passages from ‘Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes’, which
read thus:-
The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of
technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise in their
ordinary meaning, and the second is that the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of
grammar. The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words
themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without. In the first instance reference to cases.
The rule of construction is ‘to intend Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed.’ The object
of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, ‘but the intention of Parliament must be deduced
from the language used, ‘for it’ it is well accepted that the belief and assumptions of those who frame Acts of
Parliament cannot make the law.’
Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the plain language of Section 9-A we notice that the two
important requirements, apart from other requirements, under the section are, the subsisting contract must be for
the supply of goods to the Government, or for the execution of any works undertaken by the Government. The
nature of the contract in the instant case prima facie is such that the 1st respondent was not under an obligation
to supply any goods to the Government or the contract is for the execution of any works undertaken by the
Government.
17. It can. Therefore, be seen that the contract entered into by the 1st respondent in the present case with the
Govt. to sell arrack end teddy to the public after due payments of rentals to the Government does not amount to
contract for the execution of any works undertaken” by the Government. The relevant Provisions of the A.P.
Excise Act and the Rules referred to above only indicate that the Government has the monopoly to buy, sell or
to import any intoxicant: and under Section 17 it can grant a lease in favour of any person for fixed period
subject to certain conditions for the supply, manufacture or sale of intoxicants. In the instant case the lease
granted in favour of the 1st respondent who was the highest bidder, was only for the sale toddy and arrack in
those two villages for one year. The scheme of the Excise Act of the Rules made thereunder do not in any way
indicate that the Government has undertaken any works” within the meaning Section 9-A or the Representation
of the People Act, and I see no reason to take a different view from the one taken by the Madhya Pradesh High
Court in Satya Prakash’s case: AIR1963MP316, which has been followed by the Patna and the Allahabad High
Courts as mentioned supra.
18. It may be that if Section 9-A had been in the Same terms as that of Section 7(d) as it stood prior to the
amendment the contracts of this nature under the A.P. Excise Act would have come within the sweep of the
words ‘‘the performance of any services’’. But those words are omitted by the amendment Act of 1958. It is
already noticed that Same innocuous Contracts like carrying Postal mail bags, etc. came within the mischief of
Sec. of 7(d) as it stood prior to the Amendment and the candidates holding such contracts were disqualified. But
Section 9-A which is in pari material with Section 7(d) after amendment does not cover all kinds of contract
which are in a way meant for ‘he performance of any services undertaken by the Government. It may not be
possible to say that the persons who have excise contracts with the Government are of lesser consequence front
the point of view of the integrity and independence of the Legislators when compared to the other persons who
have some contracts either for supply of goads to the Government or for the execution of any works undertaken
by the Government. The accusing finger in this context can as well be pointed against the persons doing Excise
contracts. But after the omission of the words “the performance of any services’ in the relevant provision of law
it can no more he said that all contracts for the performanceof any services undertaken by tin Government still
come within the mischief of Section 9-A The language of ‘‘Section 9-A is clear and this Court cannot construe
the section in a different manner by straining the same. The remedy to set right incongruity, it any, lies with the
Legislature.”
II—
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145
31. In RANJEET SINGH V. HARMOHINDER SINGH PRADHAN 8 the Hon’ble Supreme Court at
paragraphs 3 & 7 held as under:
“3. On its plain reading, Section 9A of the Act requires (i) that there must be a subsisting contract which has
been entered into by the person whose candidature is sought to be disqualified with the government; (ii) that
contract is for the supply of goods to the Government, or (iii) that the contract is for the execution of any works
undertaken by the Government.
7. Section 9A is s statutory provision which imposes a disqualification on a citizen. It would, therefore, be
unreasonable to take a general or broad view, ignoring the essentials of the Section and the intention of the
Legislature. Purposive interpretation is necessary. In DewanJoynal’s case (supra), Section 9A of the Act has
been correctly interpreted in the following words:
An analysis of Section 9A of the Act shows that only in two cases a person would be disqualified if he has
entered into a contract with the appropriate Government in the course of his trade or business which is
subsisting on the date of scrutiny of nomination. They are (i) when the contract is one for supply of goods to the
appropriate Government and (ii) where the contract is for the execution of any works undertaken by the
Government….
….the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that since the contracts entered into by the successful candidate with
the State Government to sell a rack and toddy did not come within the mischief of Section 9A of the Act as they
were neither for supply of goods to the Government nor for the execution of any works undertaken he did not
suffer from any disqualification for being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly. We have gone
through the above decision carefully. We are of the view that the High Court was right in the said case in
holding that the returned candidate had not suffered from any disqualification by reason of the fact that he was
an excise contractor.”
32. In UMESH CHALLIYILL V. K.P. RAJENDRAN9 the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraphs-6, 12, 19,
& 20 held as under:
“6.Section 83 of the Act of 1951 states what are the contents of the election petition. Section 83 reads as under:
83. Contents of petition.- (1) An election petition-
(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies;
(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges including as full a statement
as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of
the commission of each such practice; and
(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings: Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the
petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in, support of the allegation of such
corrupt practice and the particulars thereof.
(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same
manner as the petition.
As per section 83, a concise statement of material facts should be given in the petition and if the allegations are
of corrupt practice then the a full statement, as far as possible, all names of the parties alleged to have
committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice has to be
disclosed and it shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the CPC for
verification of the pleadings. It further provided that where the allegations are of corrupt practice, the petition
shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt
practice and the particulars thereof in Form No. 25.
12. Both the defects which have been pointed out by learned Single Judge were too innocuous to have resulted
in dismissal of the election petition on the basis of the preliminary objection. The Courts have to view it
whether the objections go to the root of the matter or they are only cosmetic in nature. It is true that the election
petition has to be seriously construed. But that apart the election petition should not be summarily dismissed on
such small breached of procedure. Section 83 itself says that the election petition should contain material facts.
Section 86 says that the High Court shall dismiss the election petition which does not comply with the
provisions of Section 81 of Section 82 or Section 117. But not of defect of the nature as pointed out by the
respondent would entail dismissal of the election petition. These were the defects, even if the Court has
construed them to be of serious nature, at least notice should have been issued to the party to rectify the same
instead of resorting to dismissal of the election petition at the outset.
19. In R.P. Moidutty v. P.T. Kunju Mohammad and Anr.—AIR 2000SC3388 their Lordships have
expressed that heavy onus lies on the election petitioner seeking setting aside of the election of a successful
candidate to make out a clear case for such relief both in the pleadings and at the trial. The mandate of the
8 (1999) 4 SCC 517
9 (008) 11 SCC 740
146 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
people should not be interfered lightly and it emphasized that under Section 83 of the Act ordinarily it would
suffice if the election petition contains concise statement of the material facts relied on the petitioner but in the
case of corrupt practice the election petition must set forth full particulars thereof including as full a statements
as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice, the date and place of
the commission of each such practice. An election petition is required to be signed and verified in the same
manner as is laid down in the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 for the verification of pleadings. But this case has
nothing to do with regard to the defective pleadings. This case only emphasized that the election petition should
not be lightly dealt with. In this case also objection of improper verification was pressed into service but neither
the verification in the election petition nor the affidavit was cured and on the contrary the same was pressed
into service and pursued by the election petitioner by arguing the matter before the Court. The election
petitioner persistently pursued the election petition without rectification, therefore, this Court dismissed the
petition on that ground. It was therefore, observed as follows:
“The object of requiring verification of an election petition is to clearly fix responsibility for the averments and
allegations in the petition on the person signing the verification and, at the same time, discouraging wild and
irresponsible allegations unsupported by facts. However, the defect of verification is not fatal to the petition, it
can be cured. In the present case the petitioner persisted in pursuing the petition without proper verification
which the petitioner should not have been permitted to do. Unless the defect in verification was rectified, the
petition could not have been tried. For want of affidavit in the required form and also for lack of particulars, the
allegations of corrupt practice could not have been enquired into and tried at all. In fact, the present one is a fit
case where the petition should have been rejected at the threshold for non-compliance with the mandatory
provisions of law as to pleadings. The affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of the election petition as
required by Rule 94-A also does not satisfy the requirement of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 83 of
the Act and Form 25 appended to the rules.”
In this case, the election petition was dismissed not on the threshold but after going through the whole trial. It
was observed at paragraph 35 of the judgment as follows:
“35. All the averments made in paras 1 to 17 of the petition have been stated to be true to the personal
knowledge of the petitioner and in the next breath the very same averments have been stated to be based on the
information of the petitioner and believed by him to be true. The source of information is not disclosed. As
observed by the Supreme Court in F.A. Sapa v. Singora the object of requiring verification of an election
petition is to clearly fix the responsibility for the averments and allegations in the petition on the person signing
the verification and, at the same time, discouraging wild and irresponsible allegations unsupported by facts.
However, the defect of verification is not fatal to the petition, it can be cured (see Muraka Radhey Shyam Ram
Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore and A.S. Subbaraj v. M. Muthiah). In the present case the defect in verification
was pointed out by raising a plea in that regard in the written statement. The objection was pressed and pursued
by arguing the same before the court. However, the petitioner persisted in pursuing the petition without proper
verification which the petitioner should not have been permitted to do. In our opinion, unless the defect in
verification was rectified, the petition could not have been tried. For want of affidavit in the required form and
also for lack of particulars, the allegations of corrupt practice could not have been enquired into and tried at all.
In fact, the present one is a fit case where the petition should have been rejected at the threshold for non-
compliance with the mandatory provisions of law as to pleading.”
Therefore, this case is entirely different where trial was gone into and it was clearly found that the verification
was not in proper form. Therefore, that evidence cannot be taken into consideration. The petitioner even did not
rectify the defect. The Court found that the averments could not be looked into. Therefore, this case is
distinguishable on the facts and as successive judgments which have been quoted above have consistently taken
the view that such defects cannot be taken as a ground for dismissing the election petition and such defects are
curable.
20. 15. However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed then the proper course for the Court is not to
dismiss the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the sanctity of the election the Court should not take
such a technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the threshold. On the contrary after finding the
defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/cure the
defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 17 or Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Though
technically it cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can be rejected when the election
petition is not properly constituted as required under the provisions of the CPC but in the present case we regret
to record that the defects which have been pointed out in this election petition was purely cosmetic and it does
not go to the root of the matter and secondly even if the Court found them of serious nature then at least the
court should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify such defects.”
33. Having given a thoughtful consideration to the erudite submissions of the learned Counsel and the
authorities referred to above, I am of the opinion that at this stage it may not be proper to go into the question as to
whether the business which the successful candidate was doing as a distributer of the liquefied petroleum gas can be said
II—
(iii)
147
to fall within the mischief of Section 9-A of Act so as hold that he is disqualified from contesting the election or for that
matter that do not disentitle the petitioner/1strespondent to contest the elections. This is a matter which has to be
adjudicated after a detailed inquiry in the Election Petition but it may not be proper to reject the Election Petition at the
threshold on the ground that it does not disclose cause of action. As already observed, the specific allegation of the
Election Petitioner is that the successful candidate suffers the disqualification in view of his admitted business of being a
distributer in the liquefied petroleum gas under an agreement with the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, which is
admittedly a Government owned oil company. Whether such a trade or business amounts to having a contract with the
State or Central Government is a matter to be adjudicated after full-fledged trial or inquiry in the Election Petition. At
the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., and as held by the Apex Court, what is all that is
required to be seen is as to whether a reading of the Election Petition in to shows the existence of a cause of action for an
Election Petitioner to challenge the election of a successful candidate or not. The facts which are essential to disclose the
complete cause of action are required to be pleaded and a perusal of the Election Petition particularly paras 6 and 7
clearly show the existence of a cause of action, which read as under:
“6. I submit that the respondent No.1 submitted Form-26 to the Returning Officer-cum-District Collector while
submitting his nomination where under while giving the details of movable assets against the column “personal
loans/advance given to any person or entity including firm, company, trust etc., and other receivables from”, the
respondent No.1 categorically stated that “Advance with BPCL Rs. 1,49,393/- and there by the respondent No.
1 admitted his investment in the contract entered into by M/s. Roni Bharath Gas with the Central Government
being the appropriate Government in the course of his business and therefore the respondent No. 1 suffered the
disqualification under section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 consequently the election of
the respondent No. 1 to the 15-Warangal (SC) Parliamentary Constituency is liable to be declared as void and
consequently the petitioner shall be declared as duly elected.
7. I submit that the respondent No. 1 made a false statement in the Form-26 where under at the column ‘‘details
of profession or occupation’’ the respondent No. 1 categorically stated that the profession or occupation of his
spouse as ‘‘House Wife’’ which is a false statement inasmuch as the spouse of the respondent No. 1 is an
authorized signatory to the contract entered into between the Bharath Petrolem Corporation Limited and M/s.
Foni Bharath Gas which is proprietary concern owned by the respondent No. 1’’
34. The truthfulness, the validity or the correctness thereof cannot be decided at the threshold. In may opinion,
it may be just and proper to adjudicate on this issue without affording an opportunity to either of the parties to
substantiate or rebut the allegations as contained in the Election Petition.
35. The scope of the enquiry in the present application is limited to the extent to see as to whether the plain
reading of the averments contained in the Election Petition in its entirety disclose the cause of action so as to proceed
with the trial in the Election Petition. In the instant case, the averments in the Election Petition do disclose the cause of
action and the issues raised are triable.
36. The other objection of the petitioner/1st respondent is that the election petition has not been properly filed in
as much as there is no compliance of Section 83 (1) (c) of the Act which mandates that every petition shall be signed by
the petitioner and the same is to be filed in the manner as laid down in the Civil Procedure Code for the verification of
pleadings and it is mandatory that the 1st respondent/petitioner shall affirm and sign in the presence of notary. On the
other hand, in the election petition filed by the 1st respondent/petitioner it is only stated that the petition is affirmed and
it is not stated that the 1st respondent/petitioner affirmed in the presence of notary, and omission to state that the petition
is signed in the presence of notary is an omission of vital nature and does not amount substantial compliance of the
provisions of the Representation of People Act.
37. There is no dispute insofar as the legal position is concerned. However, it is settled proposition that the
defects which are pointed out are curable defects and on that score the election is not liable to be rejected under the
provision of Order VII Rule-11 C.P.C. As a matter of fact, the 1st respondent/election petitioner has already filed
applications in order to cure the defects pointed out by the petitioner herein. Therefore, there is no substance in the
objection of the petitioner herein.
38. The cumulative effect of the above discussion is that there are no merits in the present application and the
same is liable to be dismissed. Needless to say that any observations made herein are made only for adjudicating the
application in hand without touching into the merits of the main Election Petition. It is also made clear that the question
as to whether the petitioner herein suffered disqualification in view of the existing trade or business with Bharath
Petroleum Corporation Limited, which disentitles him to contest the election or otherwise, is left open to be adjudicated
in the main election petition.
39. In view of the foregoing reasons, this Application is dismissed.
Sd/- S.V. RAMANA MURTHY
Jt. REGISTRAR
148 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JULY 15, 2017/ASADHA 24, 1939 [PART II—SEC. 3(iii)]
HIGH COURT
Dt: 19.09.2016
ORDER
ELECTION APPLICATION NO. 623 OF 2016
IN
ELECTION PETITION NO.1 OF 2016
DISMISSING THE ELECTION APPLICATION.
[No. 82/ECI/TERR/TEL-HP(1/2016)/2017]
By Order,
S. K. RUDOLA, Principal Secy.
Uploaded by Dte. of Printing at Government of India Press, Ring Road, Mayapuri, New Delhi-110064
and Published by the Controller of Publications, Delhi-110054.
ALOK KUMAR
Digitally signed by ALOK KUMAR
Date: 2017.07.28 16:00:26 +05'30'