5076 GI/2023
(2713)
रजिस्ट्री सं. डी.एल. (एन) 04/0007/2003—05
REGD. NO. D. L. (N) 04/0007/2003—05
xxxGIDHxxx
xxxGIDExxx
प्राजिकार से प्रकाजित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
साप् ताजिक
WEEKLY
सं. 33]
नई दिल् ली, अगस्ट् त 13—अगस्ट् त 19, 2023, िजनवार/श्रावण 22—श्रावण 28, 1945
No. 33]
NEW DELHI, AUGUST 13—AUGUST 19, 2023, SATURDAY/SHRAVANA 22—SHRAVANA 28, 1945
इस भाग में जभन् न ृष् सं् ा िी िाती िज जिससे दक ि ृष क संकलन के प ृ में र ा िा सके
Separate Paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation
भागII— ण् ड 3—उृ- ण् ड(ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)
भारत सरकार के मंत्राल ों (रक्षा मंत्राल को छोड़कर) द्वारा िारी दकए गए सांजवजिक आिेि और अजिसूचनाएं
Statutory Orders and Notifications Issued by the Ministries of the Government of India
(Other than the Ministry of Defence)
जवत्त मंत्राल
(जवत्ती सेवाएं जवभाग)
नई दिल्ली, 14 अगस्ट्त, 2023
का.आ. 1287.—भारती िीवन बीमा जनगम अजिजन म, 1956 (1956 का 31) की िारा 4 द्वारा प्रित्त
िजि ों का प्र ोग करते हुए, केन्री सरकार, एतद्द्वारा, सुश्री आईृे जमनी के स्ट् ान ृर श्री आर. िोराईस्ट्वामी (िन्म जतज :
29.8.1966), का यृालक जनिेिक (आईटी/एसडी), भारती िीवन बीमा जनगम (एलआईसी), केन्री का ायल , मुम्बई
को दिनांक 1.9.2023 को ा उसके ृश्चात ृि का का यभार ग्रिण करने की तारी से अजिवर्षयता की तारी (अ ायत
31.8.2026) तक अ वा अगले आिेिों तक, िो भी ृिले िो, 2,05,400 रुृए से 2,24,400 रुृए के वेतनमान में
भारती िीवन बीमा जनगम में प्रबंि जनिेिक के ृि ृर जन ुि करती िज।
[फा. सं. ए-11011/04/2023-बीमा-I]
जवनोि कुमार, अवर सजचव
सी.जी.-डी.एल.-सा.-02092023-248471
CG-DL-W-02092023-248471
2714
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
(Department of Financial Services)
New Delhi the 14th August, 2023
S. O. 1287.—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 4 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956
(31 of 1956), the Central Government hereby appoints Shri R. Doraiswamy (date of birth: 29.08.1966) Executive
Director, (IT/SD) Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) of India, Central Office, Mumbai as Managing Director, LIC of
India, in the pay scale of Rs. 2,05,400/- to Rs. 2,24,400/- vice Ms. Ipe Mini with effect from the date of assumption of
charge of office on or after 1.9.2023 and upto the date of his superannuation (i.e. 31.08.2026), or until further orders,
whichever is earlier.
[F. No. A-11011/04/2023-Ins.I]
VINOD KUMAR, Under Secy.
जविेि मंत्राल
(सी.ृी.वी. प्रभाग )
नई दिल् ली, 10 अगस्ट्त, 2023
का.आ. 1288.—रािनज क और कोंसुली अजिकारी (िृ एवं फीस) के अजिजन म, 1948 की िारा 2 के
ंड (क) के अनुसरण में वजिाजनक आिेि।
एतद्द्वारा, केंर सरकार भारत के प्रिान कोंसलावास ह् ूस्ट्टन में श्री मिन लाल, सिा क अनुभाग अजिकारी, को
10 अगस्ट्त, 2023 से सिा क कांसुलर अजिकारी के प ृ में कांसुलर सेवाओं का जनवयिन करने के जलए अजिकषत करती िज।
[फा. सं. टी. 4330/01/2023(25)]
एस.आर.एच. फिमी, जनिेिक (सीृीवी-I)
MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(CPV Division)
New Delhi, the 10th August, 2023
S.O. 1288.—Statutory Order in pursuance of clause (a) of the Section 2 of the Diplomatic and Consular
Officers (Oaths and fees) Act, 1948 (41 of 1048), the Central Government hereby appoints Shri Madan Lal, Assistant
Section Officer in the Consulate General of India, Houston, as Assistant Consular Officer to perform Consular
services with effect from August 10, 2023.
[F. No. T. 4330/01/2023(25)]
S. R. H FAHMI, Director (CPV-I)
नागर जवमानन मंत्राल
नई दिल्ली, 4 अगस्ट् त, 2023
का.आ. 1289.—केन्री सरकार, रािभाषा (संघ के िासकी प्र ोिनों के जलए प्र ोग), जन म, 1976 के
जन म-10 के उृ-जन म (4) के अनुसरण में, नागर जवमानन मंत्राल के अंतगयत, नागर जवमानन सुरक्षा ब् ूरो के
जनम् नजलज त का ायल ों, जिनमें 80 प्रजतित कार्मयकों ने हिंिी का का यसािक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर जल ा िज,
को एतद्द्वारा अजि सूजच त करती िज।
1
क्षेत्री का ायल , नागर जवमानन सुरक्षा ब् ूरो, ृटना
2
क्षेत्री का ायल , नागर जवमानन सुरक्षा ब् ूरो, िेिरािून
[फा. सं. ई. 11014/9/2015-रा.भा.]
ृी ूष श्रीवास्ट् तव, वरर् आर् यक सलािकार एवं अृर सजचव
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2715
MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION
New Delhi, the 4th August, 2023
S.O. 1289.—In pursuance of Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Languages (Use for the Official
Purposes of the Union) Rules, 1976, the Central Government, hereby notifies the following Offices of the Bureau of
Civil Aviation Security, under Ministry of Civil Aviation , whereof 80% staff have acquired the working knowledge
of Hindi.
1
Regional Office, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, Patna
2
Regional Office, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, Dehradun.
[F. No. E-11014/9/2015-OL]
PIYUSH SRIVASTAVA, Senior Economic Advisor & Addl. Secy.
जवद्युत मंत्राल
नई दिल्ली, 7 अगस्ट्त, 2023
का.आ. 1290.—केंरी सरकार, रािभाषा (संघ के िासकी प्र ोिनों के जलए प्र ोग) जन म, 1976 के
जन म 10 के उृ जन म (4) के अनुसरण में जवद्युत मंत्राल के प्रिासजनक जन ंत्रणािीन ृावर जग्रड काृोरेिन ऑफ इंजड ा
जलजमटेड के जनम्नजलज त का ायल ों, जिनके 80 प्रजतित कमयचारीवषंि ने हिंिी का का यसािक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर जल ा िज, को
एतिद्वारा अजिसूजचत करती िज:
1. ृावर जग्रड काृोरेिन ऑफ इंजड ा जलजमटेड
400 केवी िीआईएस चँिवा उृकेंर,
चँिवा, लातेिार,
झार ंड, जृन-829203
4. ृावर जग्रड काृोरेिन ऑफ इंजड ा जलजमटेड,
400/220 केवी ृांजड ाजबली उृकेंर,
ोिाय-ृट्टनाज का रोड, जतररमल, ोिाय,
ओजडिा-752050
2. ृावर जग्रड काृोरेिन ऑफ इंजड ा जलजमटेड,
400/132 के.वी. उृकेंर,
ग्राम – ड़गवारा, ृोस्ट्ट- रामगढ़,
जिला-ल ीसरा ,
जबिार-811311
5. ृावर जग्रड काृोरेिन ऑफइंजड ा जलजमटेड,
400 केवी इंरावती उृकेंर,
ृोस्ट्ट-मुज गुड़ा, जिला-कलािांडी,
ओजडिा-766026
3. ृावर जग्रड काृोरेिन ऑफ इंजड ा जलजमटेड,
ओजडिा ृरर ोिनाएं, क्षेत्री मु् ाल
प्लॉट सं.-4, ूजनट-41, नीलारी जविार,
चंरिे रृुर, भुवनेश्वर,
ओजडिा-751021
[फा. सं. 11011/06/9/2023-हिंिी]
जितेि िॉन, आर् यक सलािकार (रा.भा.)
2716
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
MINISTRY OF POWER
New Delhi, the 7th August, 2023
S.O. 1290.—In pursuance of Sub Rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Languages (Use for Official Purpose of
the Union) Rules, 1976, the Central Government hereby notify the following offices of Power Grid Corporation of
India Limited under the administrative control of Ministry of Power, where 80% of the staff have acquired working
knowledge of Hindi:
1.
Power Grid Corporation of India Limited
400 KV GIS Chandwa S/S,
Chandwa, Latehar,
Jharkhand, Pin-829203
4.
Power Grid Corporation of India Limited
400/220 KV Pandiabili Substation,
Khurda-Pattanaikia Road, Tirimal, Khurda,
Odisha-752050
2.
Power Grid Corporation of India Limited
400/132 KV Substation,
Vill.-Kharagwara, P.O.-Ramgarh,
Distt-Lakhisarai,
Bihar-811311
5.
Power Grid Corporation of India Limited
400 KV Indravati Substation,
Post-Mukhiguda, Dist.-Kalahandi,
Odisha-766026
3.
Power Grid Corporation of India Limited
Odisha Projects, Regional Headquarter,
Plot No.-4, Unit-41, Niladri Vihar,
Chandrashekharpur, Bhubaneshwar,
Odisha-751021
[F. No. 11011/06/9/2023-Hindi]
JITHESH JOHN, Economic Advisor (In-Charge O.L.)
श्रम और रोिगार मंत्राल
ubZ fnYyh] 8 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh; ljdkj
नेिनल एजवएिन कंृनी ऑफ इंजड ा जलजमटेड ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
सि
–
] िजिराबाि ds iapkV (
/
) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[la- ,y-11012/32/2010-vkbZ-vkj (सी.एम. -I)]
मजणकंिन एन, उृ जनिेिक
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT
New Delhi, the 8th August, 2023
S.O. 1291.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 19/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, HYDERABAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
National Aviation Company of India Ltd and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 07/08/2023.
[No. L-11012/32/2010 – IR (CM-I)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2717
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of July, 2023
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 19/2011
Between:
The Regional Secretary,
Air Corporation Employees Union,
Indian Airlines Limited, Hyderabad -16.
..….Petitioner
AND
1. The Executive Director(South), Air India,
NACIL, Airlines House, Meenambakkam,
Chennai – 600 017.
2. The Area Marketing Manager,
Air India, NACIL, Haka Bhavan, Saifabad,
Hyderabad – 16.
… Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : M/s. Ch. Indra Sena Reddy, Advocates
For the Respondent: M/s. K. Srinivasa Murthy & V. Uma Devi, Advocates
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.L-11012/32/2010-IR(CM-I) dated 7.4.2011
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of NACIL and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
“Whether the action of the Management of National Aviation Company of India Ltd., Hyderabad in
withdrawing canteen facilities for the Main Booking Office staff at Haka Bhawan, Hyderabad and
denying suitable monetary compensation in lieu of canteen facility is justified and legal? To, what
relief the workmen are entitled to?”
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 19/2011 and notices were issued to the parties concerned and
the Petitioner entered appearance. Petitioner filed claim statement and Respondent filed counter statement.
2.
Case is fixed for cross examination of WW1. But since last many dates of hearing Petitioner is absent. On
27.3.2023 also Petitioner absent and Respondent was present. Again date was fixed on 12.5.2023 for WW1 cross
examination but despite sufficient opportunities granted to Petitioner, he did not adduce evidence in support of his
claim. It is noticeable that earlier also, Petitioner’s claim was dismissed for non-appearance and it was reopened
vide order dated 26.12.2015 and again Petitioner committed same default. It appears that he do not want to prosecute
his case and merely prolonging the matter by keeping it pending. His claim statement has not been substantiated by
any cogent evidence. As per law, in the absence of cross examination of WW1, chief evidence of the Petitioner in
affidavit of WW1 can not be read as evidence. Since the Petitioner’s claim is not substantiated by any cogent
evidence, a ‘No claim ‘ award is passed. Transmit.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, corrected by me on this the 26th day of
July, 2023.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
2718
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
ubZ fnYyh] 8 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 ¼1947 dk 14½ dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh; ljdkj
नेशनल एविएशन कंपनी ऑफ इंविया वलविटेि ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सह
–
] हैदराबाद ds iapkV (
/
)
dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[la- ,y-11012/28/2010-vkbZ-vkj (सी.एि. -I)]
मजणकंिन एन, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 8th August, 2023
S.O. 1292.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 10/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, HYDERABAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
National Aviation Company of India Ltd and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 07/08/2023.
[No. L-11012/28/2010 – IR (CM-I)]
MANIKANDAN. N , Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of July, 2023
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 10/2011
Between:
The Regional Secretary,
Air Corporation Employees Union,
Indian Airlines Limited, Hyderabad -16.
..….Petitioner
AND
1. The Executive Director(South), Air India,
NACIL, Airlines House, Meenambakkam,
Chennai – 600 017.
2. Station/General Manager (Engg.)
Air India, NACIL, Begumpet, Hyderabad – 16.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2719
3. Dy. General Manager (Finance),
Air India, NACIL, Begumpet, Hyderabad.
… Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : M/s. Ch. Indra Sena Reddy, Advocates
For the Respondent: M/s. K. Srinivasa Murthy & V. Uma Devi, Advocates
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.L-11012/30/2010-IR(CM-I) dated 3.8.2012
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of NACIL and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
“Whether the action of the Management of National Aviation Company of India Ltd., Hyderabad by
deducting one day the wages of Sri G. Raj Kumar and thirty other workmen (list enclosed) is justified and
legal? To, what relief the workmen are entitled to?”
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 53/2012 and notices were issued to the parties concerned and
the Petitioner entered appearance. Petitioner filed claim statement and Respondent filed counter statement.
2.
Case is fixed for cross examination of WW1. But since last many dates of hearing Petitioner is absent. On
27.3.2023 also Petitioner absent and Respondent was present. Again date was fixed on 12.5.2023 for WW1 cross
examination but despite sufficient opportunities granted to Petitioner, he did not adduce evidence in support of his
claim. It is noticeable that earlier also, Petitioner’s claim was dismissed for non-appearance and it was reopened
vide order dated 26.12.2015 and again Petitioner committed same default. It appears that he do not want to prosecute
his case and merely prolonging the matter by keeping it pending. His claim statement has not been substantiated by
any cogent evidence. As per law, in the absence of cross examination of WW1, chief evidence of the Petitioner in
affidavit of WW1 can not be read as evidence. Since the Petitioner’s claim is not substantiated by any cogent
evidence, a ‘No claim ‘ award is passed. Transmit.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, corrected by me on this the 26th day of
July, 2023.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
ubZ fnYyh] 8 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj नेिनल एजवएिन कंृनी ऑफ इंजड ा जलजमटेड ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp]
vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सि
–
] िजिराबाि ds iapkV
(
/
) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk
FkkA
[la- ,y--11012/30/2010-vkbZ-vkj (सी.एि. -I]
मजणकंिन एन, उृ जनिेिक
2720
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 8th August, 2023
S.O. 1293.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 53/2012) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, HYDERABAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
Management of National Aviation Company of India Ltd and their workmen, received by the Central
Government on 07/08/2023.
[No. L-11012/30/2010 – IR (CM-I)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of July, 2023
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 53/2012
Between:
The Regional Secretary,
Air Corporation Employees Union,
Indian Airlines Limited, Hyderabad -16.
..….Petitioner
AND
1. The Executive Director(South), Air India,
NACIL, Airlines House, Meenambakkam,
Chennai – 600 017.
2. Station/General Manager (Engg.)
Air India, NACIL, Begumpet, Hyderabad – 16.
3. Dy. General Manager (Finance),
Air India, NACIL, Begumpet, Hyderabad.
… Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : M/s. Ch. Indra Sena Reddy, Advocates
For the Respondent: M/s. K. Srinivasa Murthy & V. Uma Devi, Advocates
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.L-11012/30/2010-IR(CM-I) dated 3.8.2012
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of NACIL and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
“Whether the action of the Management of National Aviation Company of India Ltd., Hyderabad by
deducting one day the wages of Sri G. Raj Kumar and thirty other workmen (list enclosed) is justified and
legal? To, what relief the workmen are entitled to?”
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 53/2012 and notices were issued to the parties concerned and
the Petitioner entered appearance. Petitioner filed claim statement and Respondent filed counter statement.
2.
Case is fixed for cross examination of WW1. But since last many dates of hearing Petitioner is absent. On
27.3.2023 also Petitioner absent and Respondent was present. Again date was fixed on 12.5.2023 for WW1 cross
examination but despite sufficient opportunities granted to Petitioner, he did not adduce evidence in support of his
claim. It is noticeable that earlier also, Petitioner’s claim was dismissed for non-appearance and it was reopened
vide order dated 26.12.2015 and again Petitioner committed same default. It appears that he do not want to prosecute
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2721
his case and merely prolonging the matter by keeping it pending. His claim statement has not been substantiated by
any cogent evidence. As per law, in the absence of cross examination of WW1, chief evidence of the Petitioner in
affidavit of WW1 can not be read as evidence. Since the Petitioner’s claim is not substantiated by any cogent
evidence, a ‘No claim ‘ award is passed. Transmit.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, corrected by me on this the 26th day of
July, 2023.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
ubZ fnYyh] 8 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh; ljdkj
नेिनल एजवएिन कंृनी ऑफ इंजड ा जलजमटेड ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सि
–
] िजिराबाि ds iapkV (
/
) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[la- ,y--11012/27/2010-vkbZ-vkj (सी.एि. -I]
मजणकंिन एन, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 8th August, 2023
S.O. 1294.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 11/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, HYDERABAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
Management of National Aviation Company of India Ltd and their workmen, received by the Central
Government on 07/08/2023.
[No. L-11012/27/2010 – IR (CM-I)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of July, 2023
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 11/2011
Between:
The Regional Secretary,
Air Corporation Employees Union,
Indian Airlines Limited, Hyderabad -16.
..….Petitioner
2722
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AND
1. The Executive Director(South), Air India,
NACIL, Airlines House, Meenambakkam,
Chennai – 600 017.
2. The Area Marketing Manager,
Air India, NACIL, Haka Bhavan, Saifabad,
Hyderabad – 16.
3. Dy. General Manager (Finance),
Air India, NACIL, Hyderabad-16.
… Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : M/s. Ch. Indra Sena Reddy, Advocates
For the Respondent: M/s. K. Srinivasa Murthy & V. Uma Devi, Advocates
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.L-11012/27/2010-IR(CM-I) dated 28.3.2011
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of NACIL and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
“Whether the action of the Management of National Aviation Company of India Ltd., Hyderabad by
deducting the wages of Ms. Sujitha Mathur and twenty other workmen is justified and legal? To, what
relief the workmen are entitled to?”
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 11/2011 and notices were issued to the parties concerned and
the Petitioner entered appearance. Petitioner filed claim statement and Respondent filed counter statement.
2.
Case is fixed for cross examination of WW1. But since last many dates of hearing Petitioner is absent. On
27.3.2023 also Petitioner absent and Respondent was present. Again date was fixed on 12.5.2023 for WW1 cross
examination but despite sufficient opportunities granted to Petitioner, he did not adduce evidence in support of his
claim. It is noticeable that earlier also, Petitioner’s claim was dismissed for non-appearance and it was reopened
vide order dated 26.12.2015 and again Petitioner committed same default. It appears that he do not want to prosecute
his case and merely prolonging the matter by keeping it pending. His claim statement has not been substantiated by
any cogent evidence. As per law, in the absence of cross examination of WW1, chief evidence of the Petitioner in
affidavit of WW1 can not be read as evidence. Since the Petitioner’s claim is not substantiated by any cogent
evidence, a ‘No claim ‘ award is passed. Transmit.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, corrected by me on this the 26th day of
July, 2023.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2723
ubZ fnYyh] 8 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj नेिनल एजवएिन कंृनी ऑफ इंजड ा जलजमटेड ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सि
–
] िजिराबाि ds iapkV (
/
) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[la- ,y-11012/24/2010-vkbZ-vkj (सी.एि. -I]
मजणकंिन एन, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 8th August, 2023
S.O. 1295.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 12/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, HYDERABAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
National Aviation Company of India Ltd and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 07/08/2023
[No. L-11012/24/2010 – IR (CM-I)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of July, 2023
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 12/2011
Between:
The Regional Secretary,
Air Corporation Employees Union,
Indian Airlines Limited, Hyderabad -16.
..….Petitioner
AND
1. The Executive Director(South), Air India,
NACIL, Airlines House, Meenambakkam,
Chennai – 600 017.
2. The Chief Manager (Personnel),
NACIL, Begumpet,
Hyderabad – 16.
… Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : M/s. Ch. Indra Sena Reddy, Advocates
For the Respondent: M/s. K. Srinivasa Murthy & V. Uma Devi, Advocates
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.L-11012/24/2010-IR(CM-I) dated 28.3.2011
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of NACIL and their workman. The reference is,
2724
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
SCHEDULE
“Whether the action of the Management of National Aviation Company of India Ltd., Hyderabad by not
granting promotion to Shri Ch. Raman Reddy, Senior Helper (Commercial), NACIL, Hyderabad
(Employee No.643693) with effect from 1.10.2008 is justified and legal? To, what relief the workman
is entitled to?”
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 12/2011 and notices were issued to the parties concerned and
the Petitioner entered appearance. Petitioner filed claim statement and Respondent filed counter statement.
2.
Case is fixed for cross examination of WW1. But since last many dates of hearing Petitioner is absent. On
27.3.2023 also Petitioner absent and Respondent was present. Again date was fixed on 12.5.2023 for WW1 cross
examination but despite sufficient opportunities granted to Petitioner, he did not adduce evidence in support of his
claim. It is noticeable that earlier also, Petitioner’s claim was dismissed for non-appearance and it was reopened
vide order dated 26.12.2015 and again Petitioner committed same default. It appears that he do not want to prosecute
his case and merely prolonging the matter by keeping it pending. His claim statement has not been substantiated by
any cogent evidence. As per law, in the absence of cross examination of WW1, chief evidence of the Petitioner in
affidavit of WW1 can not be read as evidence. Since the Petitioner’s claim is not substantiated by any cogent
evidence, a ‘No claim ‘ award is passed. Transmit.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, corrected by me on this the 26th day of
July, 2023.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
ubZ fnYyh] 8 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj नेिनल एजवएिन कंृनी ऑफ इंजड ा जलजमटेड ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सि
–
] िजिराबाि ds iapkV (
/
) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[la- ,y--11012/26/2010-vkbZ-vkj (सी.एि. -I]
मजणकंिन एन, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 8th August, 2023
S.O. 1296.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 13/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, HYDERABAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
National Aviation Company of India Ltd and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 07/08/2023.
[No. L-11012/26/2010 – IR (CM-I)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2725
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of July, 2023
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 13/2011
Between:
The Regional Secretary,
Air Corporation Employees Union,
Indian Airlines Limited, Hyderabad -16.
..….Petitioner
AND
1. The Executive Director(South), Air India,
NACIL, Airlines House, Meenambakkam,
Chennai – 600 017.
2. The Area Marketing Manager,
Air India, NACIL, Haka Bhavan, Saifabad,
Hyderabad – 16.
… Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : M/s. Ch. Indra Sena Reddy, Advocates
For the Respondent: M/s. K. Srinivasa Murthy & V. Uma Devi, Advocates
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.L-11012/26/2010-IR(CM-I) dated 28.3.2011
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of NACIL and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
“Whether the action of the Management of National Aviation Company of India Ltd., Hyderabad
by deducting the wages of Tamara Martin and twelve other workmen is justified and legal? To,
what relief the workmen are entitled to?”
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 13/2011 and notices were issued to the parties concerned and
the Petitioner entered appearance. Petitioner filed claim statement and Respondent filed counter statement.
2.
Case is fixed for cross examination of WW1. But since last many dates of hearing Petitioner is absent. On
27.3.2023 also Petitioner absent and Respondent was present. Again date was fixed on 12.5.2023 for WW1 cross
examination but despite sufficient opportunities granted to Petitioner, he did not adduce evidence in support of his
claim. It is noticeable that earlier also, Petitioner’s claim was dismissed for non-appearance and it was reopened
vide order dated 26.12.2015 and again Petitioner committed same default. It appears that he do not want to prosecute
his case and merely prolonging the matter by keeping it pending. His claim statement has not been substantiated by
any cogent evidence. As per law, in the absence of cross examination of WW1, chief evidence of the Petitioner in
affidavit of WW1 can not be read as evidence. Since the Petitioner’s claim is not substantiated by any cogent
evidence, a ‘No claim ‘ award is passed. Transmit.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, corrected by me on this the 26th day of
July, 2023.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
2726
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ubZ fnYyh] 10 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससय इम्प्रेिंस सर्वयसेि प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मंडल रेल प्रबंिक ृूवोत्तर रेलवे ल नऊ मंडल; मेससय आर.एन इंडस्ट्रीि ds izca/kr=] lac)
fu;kstdkas vkSj श्रीमती अनीता िेवी ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je
U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (38/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y--12025/01/2023-vkbZ-vkj- (बी –I)-67]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 10th August, 2023
S.O. 1297.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 38/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama M/s Impressions
Services Private Limited; Mandal Rail Prabandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal; M/s R.N. Industries and
Smt Anita Devi.
[No. L-12025/01/2023– IR (B-1)-67]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 38/2021
BETWEEN
Smt. Anita Devi wife of Sri Lakshaman, R/o village Phulvariya, Gulriha Gorakhpur (U.P.)- 273013
AND
1. General Manager, M/s Impressions Services Private Limited through W.Z.8/7 First Floor
Kirtinagar New Delhi-110015.
2. Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok Marg
Lucknow- 226001.
3. Sh. Abhishek Kumar Mishra Prop. M/s R.N. Industries Shop No. 80 Apnandani Transport
Corporation New T.P. Nagar, Gorakhpur- 273016.
AWARD
On 05.04.2021 claimant filed the present case before this Tribunal under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial
Dispute Act 1947 (hereinafter referred as Act).
Facts in brief:-
The facts as taken by claimant in her claim petition are that she was engaged on the post of Safai Karamchari
through opposite party no.3 as contractual employee for doing cleaning work at Gorakhpur Railway Station.
It is further submitted in the claim petition that for discharging the duties she was paid salary at the rate of
7500/- per month.
Respondent No. 2 had entered into agreement thereby giving contract to respondent no.3 for clearing work
for the period 31.10.2018 to 30.10.2018, however her services were terminated/disengaged from 14th 2019
without following the provisions as provided under section 25-A, 25-B, 25-D and 25-F of the Act.
Accordingly prayer has been made that oral order of termination/disengagement of her services dated 14th
August 2019 may be set aside and respondent be directed to take back into services with all consequential
effect.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2727
On behalf of Respondent No. 2 (Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok
Marg Lucknow- 226001). Preliminary objection has been filed taking the plea that claimant was not engaged
by respondent no. 2 so no question arises whatsoever to disengaged/terminated her services.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
Today the matter is taken up neither the workman/claimant nor his authorize/Representative Mohammad
Khalid is present.
On behalf of respondent no. 2 Sri Rahul Nigam on behalf of respondent no. 3 Sri Arvind Mishra are present.
From the perusal of record the position is emerged out that after filing of the statement of claim on
05.08.2021 supported by an affidavit and the preliminary objection filed on 22.10.2021 in spite of time
granted to the claimant neither any reply to the preliminary objection nor any rejoinder has been filed.
On the last date i.e.09.02.2023 an order was passed the relevant portion of the same is quoted here in below.
“In spite of the last opportunity documentary evidence on behalf of appellant is not filed. Accordingly to
file evidence on behalf of workman is closed list on 02.05.2023 for ex-parte hearing”.
Taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as the fact that no oral/documentary evidence has been filed on
behalf of the claimant to support his claim, as such, so adjudication case is liable to be dismissed.
Because, Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194
as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which the
order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to appear
or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government cannot be
answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s UptronPowertronics Employees’ Union, iabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court (II), Ghaziabad and others2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of ShankerChakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd.,
V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1984
(49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of any
evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court against
the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at all. The
obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making the
allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C. Services v.
Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519 has held as under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders of
the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first which he
failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be dismissed.”
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed.
And the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 10 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससय इम्प्रेिंस सर्वयसेि प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मंडल रेल प्रबंिक ृूवोत्तर रेलवे ल नऊ मंडल; मेससय आर.एन. इंडस्ट्रीि ds izca/kr=] lac)
fu;kstdksa vkSj श्रीमती आरती िेवी ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je
U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (39/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y--12025/01/2023-vkbZ-vkj- (बी –I)-70]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
2728
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 10th August, 2023
S.O. 1298.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 39/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama M/s Impressions
Services Private Limited; Mandal Rail Prabandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal; M/s R.N. Industries and
Smt. Arti Devi.
[No. L-12025/01/2023–IR (B-I)-70]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 39/2021
BETWEEN
Smt. Arti Devi wife of Sri Lal Mohan, R/o 116 Jangal Ekla No.2 Vichala Tola, Gulriya, Gorakhpur
(U.P.)- 273013
AND
1. General Manager, M/s Impressions Services Private Limited through W.Z.8/7
First Floor
Kirtinagar New Delhi-110015.
2. Mandal Rail Prabhandhak
Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok Marg Lucknow- 226001.
3. Sh. Abhishek Kumar Mishra Prop. M/s R.N. Industries Shop No. 80
Apnandani Transport Corporation New T.P. Nagar, Gorakhpur- 273016.
AWARD
On 05.04.2021 claimant filed the present case before this Tribunal under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial
Dispute Act 1947 (hereinafter referred as Act).
Facts in brief:-
The facts were taken by claimant in her claim petition are that she was engaged on the post of Safai
Karamchari through opposite party no.3 as contractual employee for doing cleaning work at Gorakhpur
Railway Station.
It is further submitted in the claim petition that for discharging the duties she was paid salary at the rate of
570/- per month.
Respondent No. 2 had entered into agreement thereby giving contract to respondent no.3 for clearing work
for the period 31.10.2018 to 30.10.2018, however her services were terminated/disengaged from 14th 2019
without following the provisions as provided under section 25-A, 25-B, 25-D and 25-F of the Act.
Accordingly prayer has been made that oral order of termination/disengagement of her services dated 14th
August 2019 may be set aside and respondent be directed to take back into services with all consequential
effect.
On behalf of Respondent No. 2 (Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok
Marg Lucknow- 226001). Preliminary objection has been filed taking the plea that claimant was not engaged
by respondent no. 2 so no question arises whatsoever to disengaged/terminated her services.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
Today the matter is taken up neither the workman/claimant nor his authorize/Representative Mohammad
Khalid is present.
On behalf of respondent no. 2 Sri Rahul Nigam on behalf of respondent no. 3 Sri Arvind Mishra are present.
From the perusal of record the position is emerged out that after filing of the statement of claim on
05.08.2021 supported by an affidavit and the preliminary objection filed on 22.10.2021 in spite of time
granted to the claimant neither any reply to the preliminary objection nor any rejoinder has been filed.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2729
On the last date i.e.09.02.2023 an order was passed the relevant portion of the same is quoted here in below.
“In spite of the last opportunity documentary evidence on behalf of appellant is not filed.
Accordingly to file evidence on behalf of workman is closed list on 02.05.2023 for ex-parte
hearing”.
Taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as the fact that no oral/documentary evidence has been filed on
behalf of the claimant to support his claim, as such, so adjudication case is liable to be dismissed.
Because, Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194
as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s UptronPowertronics Employees’ Union, iabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court (II), Ghaziabad and others2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of ShankerChakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C. Services v.
Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519 has held as under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the
shoulders of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead
evidence first which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence
either oral or documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to
be dismissed.”
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed.
And the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 10 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससय इम्प्रेिंस सर्वयसेि प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मंडल रेल प्रबंिक ृूवोत्तर रेलवे ल नऊ मंडल; मेससय आर.एन. इंडस्ट्रीि ds izca/kr=] lac)
fu;kstdkas vkSj श्रीमती बसंती िेवी ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je
U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (40/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y--12025/01/2023-vkbZ-vkj- (बी –I)-66]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 10th August, 2023
S.O. 1299.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 40/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama M/s Impressions
Services Private Limited; Mandal Rail Prabandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal; M/s R.N. Industries and
Smt. Basanti Devi.
[No. L-12025/01/2023– IR (B-1)-66]
SALONI, Dy. Director
2730
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 40/2021
BETWEEN
Smt. Basanti Devi wife of Rampat, R/o Koiritola, Janglaurhi, Gorakhpur
(U.P.)- 273013
AND
1. General Manager, M/s Impressions Services Private Limited through W.Z.8/7
First Floor, Kirtinagar New Delhi-110015.
2. Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok Marg
Lucknow- 226001.
3. Sh. Abhishek Kumar Mishra Prop. M/s R.N. Industries Shop No. 80
Apnandani Transport Corporation New T.P. Nagar, Gorakhpur- 273016.
AWARD
On 05.04.2021 claimant filed the present case before this Tribunal under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act
1947 (hereinafter referred as Act).
Facts in brief:-
The facts as taken by claimant in her claim petition are that she was engaged on the post of Safai Karamchari through
opposite party no.3 as contractual employee for doing cleaning work at Gorakhpur Railway Station.
It is further submitted in the claim petition that for discharging the duties she was paid salary at the rate of 7500/- per
month.
Respondent No. 2 had entered into agreement thereby giving contract to respondent no.3 for clearing work for the
period 31.10.2018 to 30.10.2018, however her services were terminated/disengaged from 14th 2019 without following
the provisions as provided under section 25-A, 25-B, 25-D and 25-F of the Act.
Accordingly prayer has been made that oral order of termination/disengagement of her services dated 14th August
2019 may be set aside and respondent be directed to take back into services with all consequential effect.
On behalf of Respondent No. 2 (Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok Marg
Lucknow- 226001). Preliminary objection has been filed taking the plea that claimant was not engaged by respondent
no. 2 so no question arises whatsoever to disengaged/terminated her services.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
Today the matter is taken up neither the workman/claimant nor his authorize/Representative Mohammad Khalid is
present.
On behalf of respondent no. 2 Sri Rahul Nigam on behalf of respondent no. 3 Sri Arvind Mishra are present.
From the perusal of record the position is emerged out that after filing of the statement of claim on 05.08.2021
supported by an affidavit and the preliminary objection filed on 22.10.2021 in spite of time granted to the claimant
neither any reply to the preliminary objection nor any rejoinder has been filed.
On the last date i.e.09.02.2023 an order was passed the relevant portion of the same is quoted here in below.
“In spite of the last opportunity documentary evidence on behalf of appellant is not filed. Accordingly to file
evidence on behalf of workman is closed list on 02.05.2023 for ex-parte hearing”.
Taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as the fact that no oral/documentary evidence has been filed on
behalf of the claimant to support his claim, as such, so adjudication case is liable to be dismissed.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2731
Because, Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194
as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s UptronPowertronics Employees’ Union, iabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court (II), Ghaziabad and others2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of ShankerChakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C. Services v.
Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519 has held as under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed.
And the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 10 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससय इम्प्रेिंस सर्वयसेि प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मंडल रेल प्रबंिक ृूवोत्तर रेलवे ल नऊ मंडल; मेससय आर.एन. इंडस्ट्रीि ds izca/kr=]
lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj श्रीमती जवन्रावती ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd
vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (41/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y--12025/01/2023-vkbZ-vkj- (बी –I)-69]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 10th August, 2023
S.O. 1300.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 41/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama M/s Impressions
Services Private Limited; Mandal Rail Prabandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal; M/s R.N. Industries and
Smt. Vindravati
[No. L-12025/01/2023– IR (B-1)-69]
SALONI, Dy. Director
2732
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 41/2021
BETWEEN
1. General Manager, M/s Impressions Services Private Limited through W.Z.8/7
First Floor Kirtinagar New Delhi-110015.
2. Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok Marg
Lucknow- 226001.
3. Sh. Abhishek Kumar Mishra Prop. M/s R.N. Industries Shop No. 80 Apnandani
Transport Corporation New T.P. Nagar, Gorakhpur- 273016.
AWARD
On 05.04.2021 claimant filed the present case before this Tribunal under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act
1947 (hereinafter referred as Act).
Facts in brief:-
The facts as taken by claimant in her claim petition are that she was engaged on the post of Safai Karamchari through
opposite party no.3 as contractual employee for doing cleaning work at Gorakhpur Railway Station.
It is further submitted in the claim petition that for discharging the duties she was paid salary at the rate of 7500/- per
month.
Respondent No. 2 had entered into agreement thereby giving contract to respondent no.3 for clearing work for the
period 31.10.2018 to 30.10.2018, however her services were terminated/disengaged from 14th 2019 without following
the provisions as provided under section 25-A, 25-B, 25-D and 25-F of the Act.
Accordingly prayer has been made that oral order of termination/disengagement of her services dated 14th August
2019 may be set aside and respondent be directed to take back into services with all consequential effect.
On behalf of Respondent No. 2 (Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok Marg
Lucknow- 226001). Preliminary objection has been filed taking the plea that claimant was not engaged by respondent
no. 2 so no question arises whatsoever to disengaged/terminated her services.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
Today the matter is taken up neither the workman/claimant nor his authorize/Representative Mohammad Khalid is
present.
On behalf of respondent no. 2 Sri Rahul Nigam on behalf of respondent no. 3 Sri Arvind Mishra are present.
From the perusal of record the position is emerged out that after filing of the statement of claim on 05.08.2021
supported by an affidavit and the preliminary objection filed on 22.10.2021 in spite of time granted to the claimant
neither any reply to the preliminary objection nor any rejoinder has been filed.
On the last date i.e.09.02.2023 an order was passed the relevant portion of the same is quoted here in below.
“In spite of the last opportunity documentary evidence on behalf of appellant is not filed. Accordingly
to file evidence on behalf of workman is closed list on 02.05.2023 for ex-parte hearing”.
Taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as the fact that no oral/documentary evidence has been filed on
behalf of the claimant to support his claim, as such, so adjudication case is liable to be dismissed.
Because, Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194
as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to
prove illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the
Court must fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of
service if is imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out
grounds on which the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If
the workman fails to appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2733
the State Government cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to
any relief.”
In the case of M/s UptronPowertronics Employees’ Union, iabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court (II), Ghaziabad and others2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of ShankerChakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and
Ors. 1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the
absence of any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered
by the court against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead
any evidence at all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on
the party making the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C. Services v.
Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519 has held as under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral
or documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed.
And the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 10 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससय इम्प्रेिंस सर्वयसेि प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मंडल रेल प्रबंिक ृूवोत्तर रेलवे ल नऊ मंडल; मेससय आर.एन इंडस्ट्रीि ds izca/kr=] lac)
fu;kstdks vkSj श्रीमती िुलारी ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je
U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (42/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y--12025/01/2023-vkbZ-vkj- (बी –I)-68]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 10th August, 2023
S.O. 1301.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 42/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama M/s Impressions
Services Private Limited; Mandal Rail Prabandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal; M/s R.N. Industries and
Smt. Dulari.
[No. L-12025/01/2023– IR (B-1)-68]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 42/2021
BETWEEN
Smt. Dulari wife of Sri Ramdev, R/o Bagra Deyur Post Barsaina Baghra
Daud Kushi Nagar (U.P.)- 274207
AND
1. General Manager, M/s Impressions Services Private Limited through W.Z.8/7
First Floor Kirtinagar New Delhi-110015.
2. Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok Marg
Lucknow- 226001.
2734
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
3. Sh. Abhishek Kumar Mishra Prop. M/s R.N. Industries Shop No. 80
Apnandani Transport Corporation New T.P. Nagar, Gorakhpur- 273016.
AWARD
On 05.04.2021 claimant filed the present case before this Tribunal under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act
1947 (hereinafter referred as Act).
Facts in brief:-
The facts as taken by claimant in her claim petition are that she was engaged on the post of Safai Karamchari through
opposite party no.3 as contractual employee for doing cleaning work at Gorakhpur Railway Station.
It is further submitted in the claim petition that for discharging the duties she was paid salary at the rate of 7500/- per
month.
Respondent No. 2 had entered into agreement thereby giving contract to respondent no.3 for clearing work for the
period 31.10.2018 to 30.10.2018, however her services were terminated/disengaged from 14th 2019 without following
the provisions as provided under section 25-A, 25-B, 25-D and 25-F of the Act.
Accordingly prayer has been made that oral order of termination/disengagement of her services dated 14th August
2019 may be set aside and respondent be directed to take back into services with all consequential effect.
On behalf of Respondent No. 2 (Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok Marg
Lucknow- 226001). Preliminary objection has been filed taking the plea that claimant was not engaged by respondent
no. 2 so no question arises whatsoever to disengaged/terminated her services.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
Today the matter is taken up neither the workman/claimant nor his authorize/Representative Mohammad Khalid is
present.
On behalf of respondent no. 2 Sri Rahul Nigam on behalf of respondent no. 3 Sri Arvind Mishra are present.
From the perusal of record the position is emerged out that after filing of the statement of claim on 05.08.2021
supported by an affidavit and the preliminary objection filed on 22.10.2021 in spite of time granted to the claimant
neither any reply to the preliminary objection nor any rejoinder has been filed.
On the last date i.e.09.02.2023 an order was passed the relevant portion of the same is quoted here in below.
“In spite of the last opportunity documentary evidence on behalf of appellant is not filed. Accordingly
to file evidence on behalf of workman is closed list on 02.05.2023 for ex-parte hearing”.
Taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as the fact that no oral/documentary evidence has been filed on
behalf of the claimant to support his claim, as such, so adjudication case is liable to be dismissed.
Because, Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194
as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s UptronPowertronics Employees’ Union, iabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court (II), Ghaziabad and others2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of ShankerChakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2735
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C. Services v.
Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519 has held as under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed.
And the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 10 vxLr] 2023
1302.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससय इम्प्रेिंस सर्वयसेि प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मंडल रेल प्रबंिक ृूवोत्तर रेलवे ल नऊ मंडल; मेससय आर.एन. इंडस्ट्रीि ds izca/kr=] lac)
fu;kstdks vkSj श्रीमती गीता िेवी ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je
U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (43/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y--12025/01/2023-vkbZ-vkj- (बी –I)-72]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 10th August, 2023
S.O. 1302.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 43/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama M/s Impressions
Services Private Limited; Mandal Rail Prabandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal; M/s R.N. Industries and
Smt. Geeta Devi.
[No. L-12025/01/2023– IR (B-I)-72]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 43/2021
BETWEEN
Smt. Geeta Devi wife of Sri Mahesh Gaud, R/o 176, Humayupur Uttari
Gorakhpur (U.P.)- 273015
AND
1. General Manager, M/s Impressions Services Private Limited through
W.Z.8/7 First Floor Kirtinagar New Delhi-110015.
2. Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok
Marg Lucknow-
2736
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
3. Sh. Abhishek Kumar Mishra Prop. M/s R.N. Industries Shop No. 80
Apnandani Transport Corporation New T.P. Nagar, Gorakhpur- 273016.
AWARD
On 05.04.2021 claimant filed the present case before this Tribunal under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial
Dispute Act 1947 (hereinafter referred as Act).
Facts in brief:-
The facts as taken by claimant in her claim petition are that she was engaged on the post of Safai Karamchari
through opposite party no.3 as contractual employee for doing cleaning work at Gorakhpur Railway Station.
It is further submitted in the claim petition that for discharging the duties she was paid salary at the rate of
7500/- per month.
Respondent No. 2 had entered into agreement thereby giving contract to respondent no.3 for clearing work
for the period 31.10.2018 to 30.10.2018, however her services were terminated/disengaged from 14th 2019
without following the provisions as provided under section 25-A, 25-B, 25-D and 25-F of the Act.
Accordingly prayer has been made that oral order of termination/disengagement of her services dated 14th
August 2019 may be set aside and respondent be directed to take back into services with all consequential
effect.
On behalf of Respondent No. 2 (Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok
Marg Lucknow- 226001). Preliminary objection has been filed taking the plea that claimant was not engaged
by respondent no. 2 so no question arises whatsoever to disengaged/terminated her services.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
Today the matter is taken up neither the workman/claimant nor his authorize/Representative Mohammad
Khalid is present.
On behalf of respondent no. 2 Sri Rahul Nigam on behalf of respondent no. 3 Sri Arvind Mishra are present.
From the perusal of record the position is emerged out that after filing of the statement of claim on
05.08.2021 supported by an affidavit and the preliminary objection filed on 22.10.2021 in spite of time
granted to the claimant neither any reply to the preliminary objection nor any rejoinder has been filed.
On the last date i.e.09.02.2023 an order was passed the relevant portion of the same is quoted here in below.
“In spite of the last opportunity documentary evidence on behalf of appellant is not filed.
Accordingly to file evidence on behalf of workman is closed list on 02.05.2023 for ex-parte
hearing”.
Taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as the fact that no oral/documentary evidence has been filed on
behalf of the claimant to support his claim, as such, so adjudication case is liable to be dismissed.
Because, Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194
as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s UptronPowertronics Employees’ Union, iabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court (II), Ghaziabad and others2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of ShankerChakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C. Services v.
Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519 has held as under:
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2737
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed.
SSAnd the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 10 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससय इम्प्रेिंस सर्वयसेि प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मंडल रेल प्रबंिक ृूवोत्तर रेलवे ल नऊ मंडल; मेससय आर.एन. इंडस्ट्रीि ds izca/kr=] lac)
fu;kstdks vkSj श्रीमती कमली ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je
U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (44/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- L-12025/01/2023-vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-71]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 10th August, 2023
S.O. 1303.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 44/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama M/s Impressions
Services Private Limited; Mandal Rail Prabandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal; M/s R.N. Industries and
Smt. Kamli.
[No. L-12025/01/2023-IR(B-I)-71]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 44/2021
BETWEEN
Smt. Kamli wife of Lallan, R/o Laxmipur Harsewakyapur No. 2 Gorakhpur-
273014
AND
1. General Manager, M/s Impressions Services Private Limited through W.Z.8/7
First Floor Kirtinagar New Delhi-110015.
2. Mandal Rail Prabhandhak
Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok Marg Lucknow- 226001.
3. Sh. Abhishek Kumar Mishra Prop. M/s R.N. Industries Shop No. 80
Apnandani Transport Corporation New T.P. Nagar, Gorakhpur- 273016.
2738
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AWARD
On 05.04.2021 claimant filed the present case before this Tribunal under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial
Dispute Act 1947 (hereinafter referred as Act).
Facts in brief:-
The facts as taken by claimant in her claim petition are that she was engaged on the post of Safai Karamchari
through opposite party no.3 as contractual employee for doing cleaning work at Gorakhpur Railway Station.
It is further submitted in the claim petition that for discharging the duties she was paid salary at the rate of
7500/- per month.
Respondent No. 2 had entered into agreement thereby giving contract to respondent no.3 for clearing work
for the period 31.10.2018 to 30.10.2018, however her services were terminated/disengaged from 14th 2019
without following the provisions as provided under section 25-A, 25-B, 25-D and 25-F of the Act.
Accordingly prayer has been made that oral order of termination/disengagement of her services dated 14th
August 2019 may be set aside and respondent be directed to take back into services with all consequential
effect.
On behalf of Respondent No. 2 (Mandal Rail Prabhandhak Purvotter Railway Lucknow Mandal, Ashok
Marg Lucknow- 226001). Preliminary objection has been filed taking the plea that claimant was not engaged
by respondent no. 2 so no question arises whatsoever to disengaged/terminated her services.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
Today the matter is taken up neither the workman/claimant nor his authorize/Representative Mohammad
Khalid is present.
On behalf of respondent no. 2 Sri Rahul Nigam on behalf of respondent no. 3 Sri Arvind Mishra are present.
From the perusal of record the position is emerged out that after filing of the statement of claim on
05.08.2021 supported by an affidavit and the preliminary objection filed on 22.10.2021 in spite of time
granted to the claimant neither any reply to the preliminary objection nor any rejoinder has been filed.
On the last date i.e.09.02.2023 an order was passed the relevant portion of the same is quoted here in below.
“In spite of the last opportunity documentary evidence on behalf of appellant is not filed.
Accordingly to file evidence on behalf of workman is closed list on 02.05.2023 for ex-parte
hearing”.
Taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as the fact that no oral/documentary evidence has been filed on
behalf of the claimant to support his claim, as such, so adjudication case is liable to be dismissed.
Because, Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194
as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s UptronPowertronics Employees’ Union, iabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court (II), Ghaziabad and others2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of ShankerChakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2739
Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C. Services v.
Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519 has held as under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the
shoulders of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead
evidence first which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence
either oral or documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to
be dismissed.”
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed.
And the workman is not entitled for any relief.
LUCKNOW.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
09.05.2023.
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
1304.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार प्रबंि
जनिेिक एवं सीईओ, नोदक ा सॉल् ूिंस एंड नेटवर्कसय इंजड ा प्राइवेट जलजमटेड, जबड़ला सेंचुरर न, वली, मुंबई ; प्रबंि
जनिेिक एवं सीईओ, वोडाफोन आइजड ा जलजमटेड , डीएलएफ साइबर ग्रीन्स, टॉवर ए, छ ी मंजिल, डीएलएफ साइबर
जसटी, डीएलएफ चरण II, सेर्कटर -24, गुरुग्राम, के प्रबंितंत्र के संबद्ध जन ोिकों और श्री प्रवीण कुमार, कामगार,के बीच
अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ ृंचाट (संिभय सं् ा 14/2021) को
िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में दि ा ा ग ा िज, प्रकाजित करती िज िो केन्री सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के सा 20/07/2023 को
प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y- 42025/07/2023/169- आईआर(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1304.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 14/2021) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
The Managing Director& CEO, Nokia Solutions and Networks India Private Limited. Birla Centurian,Worli,
Mumbai ; The Managing Director & CEO, Vodafone Idea Limited. DLF Cyber Greens, Tower A, 6th Floor,
DLF Cyber City, DLF Phase II, Sector-24, Gurugram, and Shri Praveen Kumar, Worker, which was received
along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 20/07/2023.
[No. L-42025/07/2023/169- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 14/2021
Ref. No. K-10/1-13/2020-IR dated 18.01.2021
BETWEEN
Shri Praveen Kumar. (U.P.). ([email protected])
2740
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AND
1. The Managing Director& CEO, Nokia Solutions and Networks India Private Limited. Birla Centurian, 10th
Floor, Plot No.794,B Wing, Pandurang Budhkar Marg, Worli, Mumbai-400030.
2. The Managing Director & CEO, Vodafone Idea Limited. DLF Cyber Greens, Tower A, 6th Floor, DLF Cyber City,
DLF Phase II, Sector-24, Gurugram-122002.
AWARD
By order No. K-10/1-13/2020-IR dated 18.01.2021 the present industrial dispute has been referred for
adjudication to this Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A)
of Section 10 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with following schedule:
“Whether Shri Praveen Kumar, Bss Cluster Lead can be treated as workman ? If so, whether the alleged
termination of his services by the management of Nokia Solutions and Networks India Pvt. Ltd./ Vodafone
Idea Limited is legal & justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workman is entitled to and from which
date? "
Accordingly, an industrial dispute No. 14/2021 has been registered on 28.01.2021.
From the perusal of record, the position which emerge out is that till date the claimant/workman has not filed any
statement of claim.
Moreover, as a matter of fact and record, neither workman nor its authorized representative has turned up before this
Tribunal nor has filed any statement of claim.
Findings & Conclusion:
Taking into consideration the fact that till date no statement of claim has been filed by the claimant in order to
establish his claim as per the reference dated 18.01.2021.
So in view of the said facts, as well as the law laid by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v.
Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
As the workman has not filed any statement of claim/oral/documentary evidence, so the present case is liable to be
dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Award as above.
Lucknow.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2741
15th May, 2023
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार मेससय
हिंिुस्ट्तान एंटीबा ोरटर्कस जलजमटेड बी-61, सेर्कटर-एच अलीगंि, ल नऊ, के प्रबंितंत्र के संबद्ध जन ोिकों और
श्री इंरृाल हसंि, कामगार,के बीच अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ
ृंचाट (संिभय सं् ा 22/2018) को िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में दि ा ा ग ा िज, प्रकाजित करती िज िो केन्री सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के सा 20/07/2023 को प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y-42025/07/2023/167- आईआर(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1305.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 22/2018) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
M/s Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd.B-61, Sector- H Aliganj, Lucknow, and Shri Inderpal Singh, Worker, which was
received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 20/07/2023.
[No. L- L- 42025/07/2023/167- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
I.D. Case No. 22/2018
Sri Inderpal Singh S/o Sri Ramcharan Yadav C/o Rakesh Mani, 529 K/1033, Panth Nagar, Khuram Nagar, Lucknow
…… Applicant
VERSUS
M/s Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd.
B-61, Sector- H Aliganj,
Lucknow
………. Opp. Party.
Facts in facts
On behalf of the claimant on 09.06.2008 present claim petition has been filed under section 2-A(1) read with section
2-A(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
Facts in brief as taken by workman in the claim petition are that on 03.02.2007 he was engaged on the post of Helper
Mali in the Institution Lucknow, M/s Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. Lucknow/ employer.
On 07.08.1995 the service of workman was retrenched without following the provisions of Section 25(F) of Industrial
Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as Act) read with Sub Section 6A and Section 6Q of the Act.
2742
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Accordingly a prayer has been made by workman that order of retrenchment may be set aside and he may be taken
back in service with back wages.
On behalf of respondent written statement supported by affidavit was filed on 18th February 2021 in the written
statement following preliminary objection has been taken as under:-
(a) “Because the present matter of dispute does not constitute a valid industrial dispute as the dispute has
not been legally and properly transformed into a valid ‘industrial dispute’.
(b) Because the present claim application moved u/s -2A of the Industrial dispute Act, 1947 is not
maintainable as the claim application of the applicant is time barred.
(c) Because Section 2-A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 states as under:-
“Section 2-A
(1) ………..
(2) ………..
(3)
The application referred to in sub-Section (2) shall be made to
the Labour Court or Tribunal before expiry of 3 years from the
date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise
termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).
(d) Because the above provisions clearly direct that the claim application can be moved directly u/s 2A if he
same is moved within a period of 3 years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
otherwise termination of services.
(e) Because here it is relevant to state that the claim application preferred by the applicant Mr. Indra Pal
Singh is dated 09.06.2018 wherein para-6 of the claim statement Mr. Indra pal Singh is stating his
services has been terminated on 07.08.1995 which clearly proved that the present matter of dispute has
not been raised within a period of 3 years as required in u/s 2-A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947”
Matter taken in the revise list none for workman Sri Raje Bhasin Advocate for respondent.
It is relevant to mention by an order dated 23.01.2023 it is ordered that in spite of last opportunity vide order dated
03.11.2022 rejoinder is not filed; accordingly opportunity to file rejoinder is closed.
List on 30.03.2023 for ex-parte hearing. Notice be issued to workman.
Lastly the case was listed on 06.06.2023, none appeared on behalf of workman, accordingly counsel for respondent
was heard.
Sri Raje Bhasin learned counsel for respondent and argued placed reliance on the preliminary objection as taken by
the respondent quoted hereinabove and submits that in view of the same the present claim petition filed by
claimant/workman liable to be dismissed.
I have heard the learned counsel for respondent and gone through the record.
Before deciding the same it will be appropriate to go through aims and objects of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 in brief
which are that Industrial Disputes Bill was introduced by the Government of India in the Legislative Assembly on the
28th October 1946. After the Select Committee’s report on 3rd February 1947, with some amendments, it was passed
in March 1947 and became the law from Ist April 1947 repealing the Trade Disputes Act 1929.
While retaining most of the provisions of the earlier law, this Act introduced two new institutions for the prevention
and settlement of industrial disputes; works committees consisting of representatives of employers and workers; and
machinery for industrial adjudication.
A reference to an industrial tribunal under this Act lies where both parties to any industrial dispute apply for such
reference, and also where the appropriate Government considers it expedient so to do. An award of a tribunal has
normally to be enforced by the Government and is binding on both parties to the dispute for such periods as may be
specified, upto a maximum of one year. This Act seeks to give a new orientation to the entire conciliation machinery.
Another important new feature of the Act is the prohibition of strikes and lockouts during the pendency of conciliation
and adjudication proceedings of settlements reached in the course of conciliation proceedings and of awards of
industrial tribunals declared binding by the appropriate government.
Rules, orders or notifications requiring the larger industrial establishments to set up works committees were issued by
the Government of India and most of the State Governments.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2743
Objectives: General
The objectives of industrial relations and industrial disputes legislation, may be outlined as under:-
(i)
Industrial Peace: For prosperity of industry, it is necessary that there be a continuous and growing production
which is only possible if (a) there are no interruptions and stoppages in production i.e. absence of disputes,
and (b) if the various agencies of production are satisfied and are in a harmonious bent to work. In other
words, industrial peace is very necessary for the vitality of industry.
(ii)
Economic Justice: All interruptions in production arising out of industrial dispute are really caused by the
dissatisfaction of labour with their existing economic condition. The history of labour struggle is nothing but
a continuous demand for fair return to labour expressed in varied forms e.g. (a) increase in wages, (b)
resistance to decrease in wages, (c) grant of allowances and benefits etc.(Hariprasad Vs. A.D.Divelkar, AIR
1957 SC 121)
Social and economic justice which is the bedrock of our Constitution and economic organization also requires that any
industrial relations or disputes legislation, to be effective remedial statute, must embrace not only law for regulation of
labour relations with capital, process for channelizing collective bargaining methods for negotiation, mediation,
conciliation and settlements of industrial conflict, but also a system for giving fair play and justice to labour and
removal of economic injustice.
The preamble of the Act states that its main object is to make provision for investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes. Viewed in the above background, the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is a progressive piece of social
legislation and is designed to settle the disputes on a new pattern known under the Act as adjudication machinery.
The object of all labour legislation is to ensure fair wages and to prevent disputes so that production might not be
adversely affected. (Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1957 SC 167)
The purpose of the Act is to provide machinery for a just and equitable settlement by adjudication, (G. Claridge and
Company Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, AIR 1951 Bombay 100) and amelioration of the conditions of
workmen in industry.
Individual and collective industrial disputes: Individual as well as collective disputes may ripen into industrial
disputes. The true nature of an individual dispute is that it is a collective dispute. Though a dispute may at the
inception be initiated by an individual, yet if it is taken up by the fellow-workers or a union, or a sufficient number of
workers, it may assume the collective character and would become an industrial dispute. (Standard Vacum Oil Co.
Errakulam Vs. I.Tribunal, Errakulam 1952-II LLJ 612). A dispute which continues to retain its individual
character cannot be regarded as an industrial dispute. This being the basic law, it is within the competence of the
legislature to widen or narrow the coverage of an industrial dispute. The Industrial Disputes Act has also been
amended to cover some individual disputes. It is not necessary that a majority should take an industrial dispute. It is
sufficient if a substantial group of workmen take it up. When thus taken, it becomes an industrial or collective
dispute.
Individual dispute an industrial dispute: The important amongst the above are however the amendments of 1965.
By the Act of 1965, a new Section 2A has been added in Act whereby specified categories of individual disputes are
also deemed to be industrial disputes. The section reads as under:
“2A. Dismissal, etc of an individual workman to be deemed to be industrial dispute-
Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual
workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out
of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute
notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.”
This amendment revives, impediment in the way of workman with the necessity that to make an industrial dispute it
must be taken up or espoused by substantial section of the workmen or any union of those workmen and gives an
individual workman a remedy for security of his service and indirectly freedom to join or not to join any union. Thus,
individual disputes could be referred to Tribunal as per Section 2A after 1.12.1965. (National Productivity Council,
1969-II LLJ 186).
Thereafter, by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 2010 (Act No. 24 of 2010), Section 2A(a), was renumbered as
Sub-section (1) and by the same Act i.e. Act No.24 of 2010 Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) have been inserted
after Section 2A (1) of Industrial Dispute Act 1947 which came into effect w.e.f. 15.09.2010, which reads as under:
"2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute -
"(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the
services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his
employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
2744
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other
workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in
sub-Section(1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for
adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date
he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for
conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal
shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute
referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in
relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-Section(2) shall be made to the Labour Court or
Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment
or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section(1)."
Now the core question to be considered is that in view of the facts which are stated hereinabove, that admittedly the
services of applicant was terminated on 07.09.1995, thereafter he has filed the present case before this Tribunal u/s
2A of the Act on 09.06.2008 on the grounds as taken by him in his claim petition, is maintainable or barred by the
period of limitation as provided u/s 2A(3) of the Act.
Answer to the said question find place in the judgment passed by Hon’ble the Karnataka High Court in ITC Infotech
India Ltd. vs. Venkataramana Uppada ILR 2016 Karnataka 3041, relevant potion quoted as under:
“19. Keeping the above principles in mind, a reading of Section 2A(3) would lead to an irresistible
conclusion that time stipulated for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the
case may be, has to be necessarily "before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section (1)." Time limit
for making an application to the Labour Court stipulated in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A does not
appear to have a bearing to the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 2A. In any event right
conferred under Section 2A would lapse immediately preceding the date of expiry of three years from
the date of dismissal, discharge etc.,. In other words, the limitation of three years prescribed under
sub-Section (3) of Section 2A being mandatory, same cannot be condoned by taking recourse to
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which has no application to the provisions of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
20. It is well settled principle that if an act is required to be performed within a specified time, the
same would primarily be mandatory. It has been held in the case of NAZIRUDDIN VS SITARAM
AGARWAL reported in AIR 2003 SCW 908 to the following effect:
"The Courts jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It
is well known that in a given case, the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the
texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language
of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract the words to a statute or
read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also
necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any
superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of legislature must be gathered
from the language used."
21. Thus, in the background of the dicta of the Apex Court in NAZIRUDDIN's case referred to supra,
when Section 2A is perused, it would indicate that if the legislature really intended that the period of
limitation provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A was to be construed as directory, then it would not
have prescribed the limitation of three years and it would have used the words "at any time" instead of
using the words "before the expiry of three years". Though the words at any time' is found in Section
10(1), same is conspicuously absent in sub-Section(3) of Section 2A which would clearly depict the
intention of the legislature namely, it had deliberately imposed limitation period under sub-Section (3)
of Section 2A and as such legislature did not employ the words at any time' in the said provision as
found in Section 10(1) and in its place, it has specifically incorporated the words before the expiry of
three years'. Hence, to interpret the period of limitation found in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A as
directory and not mandatory would amount to adding something which is not provided in the provision
by the legislature or it would amount to doing violence to the provision, if such interpretation is sought
to be made."
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2745
And Hon’ble Rajasthan High court in the case of Pankaj Swami vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation &
ors. MANU/RH/1788/2019 after taking into consideration the provisions of sedation 2A(2) & 2A(3) of the Act held as
under:
“The provisions are explicit, wherein the workman can approach the Labour Court for adjudication of
the dispute in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment etc., however, sub-section (3) provides that
the application should be made to the Labour Court before the expiry of three years from the date of
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified.
8. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the cause of action arose to the
petitioner prior to introduction of the provision of limitation by sub-section (3) the same would have no
application is concerned, the submission made is fallacious, inasmuch as, the provision under which
the application has been filed by the petitioner i.e. section 2-A(2) of the Act, itself was introduced by
the amendment Act of 2010 alongwith the limitation therein and therefore, the provision of limitation
which was introduced in the year 2010 alongwith the main provision providing for the limitation would
apply with all force and the submission that the same would have no application to the cause of action,
which arose prior to 2007, has no basis.
The submissions as made, if accepted, would result in circumstances where if the cause of action has
arisen post 2010, the same would be barred, whereas the causes, which arose prior to 2010 like in the
year 2007 in the present case and the application is filed after 7 years, the same would never become
barred by limitation, such a result is legally untenable.
9. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the petitioner had approached
the Conciliation Officer and had raised the dispute before him, where there was no limitation and the
petitioner approached the Labour Court only as per the directions of the Conciliation Officer the claim
could not be rejected by barred by limitation also does not advance the cause of the petitioner,
inasmuch as, the petitioner could have taken advantage of the said position, if the Conciliation Officer
had sent a failure report to the appropriate Government who in turn had referred the dispute to the
Labour Court. Merely because the Conciliation Officer suggested approaching the Labour Court,
which suggestion was accepted by the petitioner, cannot be termed as a reference under section 10 of
the Act to the Labour Court.
10. In view of the above discussion in so far as the rejection of the claim of the petitioner by the Labour
Court being barred by limitation is concerned, the same cannot be faulted.”
And in the case of Parthasarathy vs. Souther Pins and Products Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. MANU/TN/6691/2020 Hon’ble
the High Court of Madras has held as under:
“Inasmuch as the notice of termination of the Petitioner in the present case has been made on
06.10.2014 under Section 2-A(2) of the Act after the said amendment has come into force, the
limitation of three years prescribed under Section 2-A(3) of the Act would necessarily apply. As such,
there is no infirmity in the decision-making process of the Labour Court in refusing to entertain the
application made by the Petitioner has time barred. This view is supported by the decisions of this
Court in the following cases:-
(i) ITC Infotech India Ltd. v. Venkataramana Uppada (Order dated 03.03.2016 in W.P. No.
27510 of 2015 passed by the High Court of Karnataka)
(ii) Management of Ashok Leyland v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (Order dated
13.04.2016 in W.P. Nos. 9640 and 9641 of 2016 passed by this Court)
(iii) Ravi Kumar v. Management, Tamil Nadu State Road Transport Corporation (Order
dated 11.04.2017 in W.P. (MD) No. 4269 of 2017 passed by the Madurai Bench of this Court)
(iv) K. Settu v. Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Order dated 20.09.2019 in
W.P. No. 8413 of 2019 passed by this Court)
5. A feeble attempt is made on behalf of the Petitioner to suggest that the period of conciliation must be
excluded while computing the limitation. It is, no doubt, true that Section 2-A(2) of the Act
contemplates such application to be made to the Labour Court after the expiry of 45 days from the date
of application to the Conciliation Officer is made. However, it does not require that the conciliation
proceedings should have been completed before making that application under Section 2-A(2) of the
Act. The words in Section 2-A(3) of the Act are clear enough that the limitation has to be reckoned on
the expiry of three years from the date of termination. The Petitioner in the instant case had made the
application for conciliation on 12.04.2017 which had also concluded on 27.06.2017, but the Petitioner
2746
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
had not approached the Labour Court after 45 days either from 12.04.2017 or even from 27.06.2017.
As such, the contentions made on behalf of the Petitioner cannot be countenanced.”
(see also Kandasamy Spinning Mills Private Ltd. vs S. Palanisamy and Ors. MANU/RN/6831/2019
Thus, in view of above said fact, combined reading of section 2A (2) and 2A (3) of the Act, the legal position which
emerge out is that if a workman is aggrieved by order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination,
he may approach the Tribunal within a period three years from dated of passing of order.
Taking into consideration, above said facts and positon of law as well that “if law provides a particular thing that all
other modes or methods of doing that thing must be deemed to have been prohibited”, the said proposition of law is
first held in the case of Tylor Vs. Tylor (1875) LR 1 ChD 426 and adopted later by the Judicial Committee in Nazir
Ahmed Vs. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 and thereafter by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a series of judgments
including those in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & another Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322, State of
Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358, Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad 1999 (8) SCC 266,
Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka 2001 (4) SCC 9 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Essar Power
Ltd. 2008 (4) SCC 755.
In the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as under:-
“No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of
interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words.
No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and
every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an
edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to
gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and
there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court
to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is
clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been
said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its
support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided”.
Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111,
held as under:-
“24.
True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what provides by its clear
language, with due regard to the scheme of law.
25.
Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of
the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed
according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly
necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or
totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute”.
In the case of Harshad S. Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 257, it has been held as under:-
“There is no doubt that if the words are plain and simple and call for only one construction that construction
is to be adopted whatever be its effect”.
In the case of Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devo (2002) 7 SCC 273, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as under:-
“9.It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the
courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act.”
In the case of Patango Kadam Vs. Prithviraj Sayajiro Yadav Deshmukh (2001) 3 SCC 594, took the view:-
“12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a provision, one must look at well-settled principles of
construction but it is not open to first to create an ambiguity which does not exist and then try to resolve the
same by taking recourse to some general principle.”
Also, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane & others vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer & another (2013) 10 SCC 765 has held as under:
“16.
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2747
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is
never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation."
(See Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta10, AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitash Kumar v. Om
Prakash Sharma11.)
Reverting to the facts of the present case the position is emerged out that the appellant was initially engaged on the
post of Helper Mali and he was retrenched from service on 07.08.1995 and the present claim petition has been filed by
him before this Tribunal on 09.06.2008 so in view of the fact stated herein the same was liable to be dismissed on the
ground of limitation as provided under section 2-A(3) of the Act.
For the foregoing reasons filed by workman/claimant is dismissed as barred by period of limitation under section 2-
A(3) of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947, with liberty to the claimant/workman to pursue his case before appropriate
forum as per law.
Lucknow
Date 16.06.2023
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार प्रबंि जनिेिक
एवं सीईओ, नोदक ा सॉल् ूिंस एंड नेटवर्कसय इंजड ा प्राइवेट जलजमटेड, जबड़ला सेंचुरर न, वली, मुंबई ; प्रबंि जनिेिक एवं सीईओ,
वोडाफोन आइजड ा जलजमटेड, डीएलएफ साइबर ग्रीन्स, टॉवर ए, छ ी मंजिल, डीएलएफ साइबर जसटी, डीएलएफ चरण II,
सेर्कटर-24, गुरुग्राम, के प्रबंितंत्र के संबद्ध जन ोिकों और श्री अि हसंि, कामगार,के बीच अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ ृंचाट(संिभय सं् ा 13/2021) को िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में दि ा ा ग ा िज, प्रकाजित
करती िज िो केन्री सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के सा 20/07/2023 को प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y-42025/07/2023/166-आईआर(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1306.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 13/2021) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
The Managing Director& CEO, Nokia Solutions and Networks India Private Limited. Birla Centurian,Worli,
Mumbai ; The Managing Director & CEO, Vodafone Idea Limited. DLF Cyber Greens, Tower A, 6th Floor,
DLF Cyber City, DLF Phase II, Sector-24, Gurugram, and Shri Ajay Singh, Worker, which was received along
with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 20/07/2023.
[No. L-42025/07/2023/166- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 13/2021
Ref. No. K-10/1-14/2020-IR dated 18.01.2021
BETWEEN
Shri Ajay Singh (UP) ([email protected])
2748
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
And
1. The Managing Director& CEO, Nokia Solutions and Networks India Private Limited. Birla Centurian, 10th
Floor, Plot No.794,B Wing, Pandurang Budhkar Marg, Worli, Mumbai-400030.
3. The Managing Director & CEO, Vodafone Idea Limited. DLF Cyber Greens, Tower A, 6th Floor, DLF Cyber City,
DLF Phase II, Sector-24, Gurugram-122002.
AWARD
By order No. K-10/1-14/2020-IR dated 18.01.2021 the present industrial dispute has been referred for
adjudication to this Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A)
of Section 10 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with following schedule:
“Whether Shri Ajay Singh, Bss Cluster Lead can be treated as workman ? If so, whether the alleged
termination of his services by the management of Nokia Solutions and Networks India Pvt. Ltd./ Vodafone
Idea Limited is legal & justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workman is entitled to and from which
date? "
Accordingly, an industrial dispute No. 13/2021 has been registered on 28.01.2021.
From the perusal of record, the position which emerge out is that till date the claimant/workman has not filed any
statement of claim.
Moreover, as a matter of fact and record, neither workman nor its authorized representative has turned up before this
Tribunal nor has filed any statement of claim.
Findings & Conclusion:
Taking into consideration the fact that till date no statement of claim has been filed by the claimant in order to
establish his claim as per the reference dated 18.01.2021.
So in view of the said facts, as well as the law laid by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v.
Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
As the workman has not filed any statement of claim/oral/documentary evidence, so the present case is liable to be
dismissed.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2749
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Award as above.
Lucknow.
15th May, 2023
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार स्ट्टेिन जनिेिक,
नरोरा ृरमाणु ऊिाय स्ट्टेिन, नरोरा, बुलन्िििर, उत्तर प्रिेि, के प्रबंितंत्र के संबद्ध जन ोिकों और नरौरा ृरमाणु जवद्युत स्ट्टेिन
कमयचारी संघ, नरौरा, बुलन्िििर, उत्तर प्रिेि, के बीच अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ ृंचाट (संिभय सं् ा 25/2017) को िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में दि ा ा ग ा िज, प्रकाजित करती िज िो केन्री सरकार
को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के सा 20/07/2023 को प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y-42011/74/2017- आईआर(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1307.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 25/2017) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
Station Director, Narora Atomic Power Station,Narora, Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh, and Narora Atomic
Power Station Employees Association, Narora, Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh, which was received along with soft
copy of the award by the Central Government on 20/07/2023.
[No. L-42011/74/2017- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No.25/2017
Ref. No. L-42011/74/2017-IR(DU) dated: 17.07.2017
BETWEEN
Narora Atomic Power Station Employees Association D-22/1, NAPS Township, Narora, Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh -
202389
AND
Station Director, Narora Atomic Power Station,
Narora, Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh - 202389
2750
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AWARD
Facts of the case:
By order No. L-42011/74/2017-IR(DU) dated: 17.07.2017 the present industrial dispute has been referred for
adjudication to this Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A)
of Section 10 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with following schedule:
"Whether action of management of Narora Atomic Power Station, Narora, Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh in
refusing to implement the system of food item payment, based on food items consumed by workmen is
justified? If not, than what remedies lie with the union."
Accordingly, an industrial dispute No. 25/2017 was registered before this Tribunal and on 21.08.2017, notices were
issued to the parties.
On 10.10.2019 statement of claim has been filed.
On 07.12.2019 written statement has been filed and time was granted to file rejoinder affidavit.
In spite of the time granted to the workman he has not filed rejoinder affidavit, as such, by an order dated 25.02.2020,
opportunity to file rejoinder affidavit has been closed.
Further, from perusal of the order sheet it appear that since 25.02.2020 neither workman nor any legal representative
appeared on his behalf.
By an order dated 22.04.2022, time granted to the workman to file its evidence was closed and management was
directed to file its evidence on affidavit; the same was closed vide order dated 29.09.2022.
Again on 02.12.2022 and order was passed, relevant portion:
“Matter taken up in revised list.
Parties absent.
Opportunity to lead management evidence is closed.
List on 03.02.2023 for ex-parte argument. Office is directed to issue notice to parties.”
Thereafter, on 03.02.2023, when the matter was taken up in revised list, neither workman nor any legal representative
appeared on his behalf.
Sri B.V. Upadhyay, learned counsel for respondent was present.
Finding and conclusion:
After hearing the learned counsel for respondent and going through the record, admitted positon which come to light
is that statement of claim was filed on behalf of workman; and after filing of written statement on behalf of the
respondent, the workmen neither filed its rejoinder nor turned up to substantiate his claim through evidence on oath.
So in view of the said facts, as well as the law laid by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v.
Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2751
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
As the workman has not filed any oral/documentary evidence, so the present case is liable to be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Award as above.
Lucknow.
15th June, 2023
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार प्रबंि जनिेिक
एवं सीईओ, नोदक ा सॉल् ूिंस एंड नेटवर्कसय इंजड ा प्राइवेट जलजमटेड, जबड़ला सेंचुरर न, वली, मुंबई ; प्रबंि जनिेिक एवं सीईओ,
वोडाफोन आइजड ा जलजमटेड, डीएलएफ साइबर ग्रीन्स, टॉवर ए, छ ी मंजिल, डीएलएफ साइबर जसटी, डीएलएफ चरण II,
सेर्कटर -24, गुरुग्राम, के प्रबंितंत्र के संबद्ध जन ोिकों और श्री मनीष हसंि, कामगार, के बीच अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ ृंचाट (संिभय सं् ा 08/2021) को िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में दि ा ा ग ा िज,
प्रकाजित करती िज िो केन्री सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के सा 20/07/2023 को प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y-42025/07/2023-165-आईआर(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1308.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 08/2021) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
The Managing Director& CEO, Nokia Solutions and Networks India Private Limited. Birla Centurian,Worli,
Mumbai; The Managing Director & CEO, Vodafone Idea Limited. DLF Cyber Greens, Tower A, 6th Floor,
DLF Cyber City, DLF Phase II, Sector-24, Gurugram, and Shri Manish Singh, Worker, which was received
along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 20/07/2023.
[No. L-42025/07/2023-165- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 08/2021
2752
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ref. No. K-10/1-18/2020-IR dated 18.01.2021
BETWEEN
Sri Manish Singh (UP) ([email protected])
AND
1. The Managing Director& CEO, Nokia Solutions and Networks India Private Limited. Birla Centurian, 10th
Floor, Plot No.794,B Wing, Pandurang Budhkar Marg, Worli, Mumbai-400030.
2.. The Managing Director & CEO, Vodafone Idea Limited. DLF Cyber Greens, Tower A, 6th Floor, DLF Cyber
City, DLF Phase II, Sector-24, Gurugram-122002.
AWARD
By order No. K-10/1-18/2020-IR dated 18.01.2021 the present industrial dispute has been referred for
adjudication to this Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A)
of Section 10 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with following schedule:
“Whether Shri Manish Singh, Bss Cluster Lead can be treated as workman ? If so, whether the alleged termination of
his services by the management of Nokia Solutions and Networks India Pvt. Ltd./ Vodafone Idea Limited is legal &
justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workman is entitled to and from which date?"
Accordingly, an industrial dispute No. 08/2021 has been registered on 28.01.2021.
From the perusal of record, the position which emerge out is that till date the claimant/workman has not filed any
statement of claim.
Moreover, as a matter of fact and record, neither workman nor its authorized representative has turned up before this
Tribunal nor has filed any statement of claim.
Findings & Conclusion:
Taking into consideration the fact that till date no statement of claim has been filed by the claimant in order to
establish his claim as per the reference dated 18.01.2021.
So in view of the said facts, as well as the law laid by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v.
Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2753
As the workman has not filed any statement of claim/oral/documentary evidence, so the present case is liable to be
dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Award as above.
Lucknow.
15th May, 2023
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार मु्
ृररचालन अजिकारी ( ूजनट प्रमु ), इंडो गल्फ फर्टयलाइिसय िगिीिृुर औद्योजगक क्षेत्र, छत्रृजत साहूिी मिाराि नगर; वररष्ठ
उृाध् क्ष (एफ एंड सी), इंडो गल्फ फर्टयलाइिसय िगिीिृुर औद्योजगक क्षेत्र, छत्रृजत साहूिी मिाराि नगर; सिा क उृाध् क्ष
(एचआर) इंडो गल्फ फर्टयलाइिसय िगिीिृुर औद्योजगक क्षेत्र, छत्रृजत साहूिी मिाराि नगर, के प्रबंितंत्र के संबद्ध जन ोिकों और श्री
सरोि कुमार जमश्रा, कामगार, के बीच अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ ृंचाट
(संिभय सं् ा 66/2012) को िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में दि ा ा ग ा िज, प्रकाजित करती िज िो केन्री सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के सा
20/07/2023 को प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y-42025/07/2023-164-आईआर(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1309.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 66/2012) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
The Chief Operating Officer (Unit Head), Indo Gulf Fertilisers Jagdishpur Industrial Area, Chhtrapati Sahuji
Maharaj Nagar ; The Senior Vice President ( F & C), Indo Gulf Fertilizers Jagdishpur Industrial Area,
Chhtrapati Sahuji Maharaj Nagar ; The Assistant Vice President (HR) Indo Gulf Fertilizers Jagdishpur
Industrial Area, Chhtrapati Sahuji Maharaj Nagar, and Shri Saroj Kumar Misra, Worker, which was received
alongwith soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 20/07/2023.
[No. L-42025/07/2023-164- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 66/2012
BETWEEN
Saroj Kumar Misra, S/o Late Sri S. S. Misra
R/o 5/343, Viram Khand-V, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow-226 010
Vs.
2754
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
1. Chief Operating Officer (Unit Head), Indo Gulf Fertilisers
Jagdishpur Industrial Area, Chhtrapati Sahuji Maharaj Nagar
2. Senior Vice President ( F & C), Indo Gulf Fertilizers
Jagdishpur Industrial Area, Chhtrapati Sahuji Maharaj Nagar
3. Assistant Vice President (HR) Indo Gulf Fertilizers
Jagdishpur Industrial Area, Chhtrapati Sahuji Maharaj Nagar
AWARD
The present industrial dispute has been filed under sub section (2) of Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the claimant before this tribunal for adjudication on 19.07.2012, registered
as ID case No. 66/2012.
On behalf of the respondent a preliminary objection has been taken on 15.03.2013 (M-7).
By an order dated 23.08.2013, this Tribunal rejected the preliminary objection taken by the respondent.
Aggrieved by the same the respondent file a Writ Petition No. 7515 (MS) of 2013, which was decided by the Hon’ble
High Court, Lucknow vide order dated 23.09.2019, the copy of the same produced before this Tribunal by the
workman, operative portion reads as under:
“11. Learned counsel for respondent no.3 Sri Lalla Chauhan, on the other hand, has argued on the same
lines as have been considered and relied upon by the respondent no.2 in passing the order dated 23.8.2013.
He has argued that the definition of "appropriate Government" in relation to any industrial dispute
concerning any such controlled industry, as specified in this behalf, by the Central Government, may be read
along with Section 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. Under Schedule 1 of the Act
of 1951, fertilizers are mentioned at Item no.18. Hence, for an industry, manufacturing fertilizers, the
"appropriate Government" is the Central Government. The Fertilizer (Control) Order has also been issued
by the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The control of the Central
Government over the production and supply of fertilizers would make the Fertilizer Industry a controlled
industry and, therefore, amenable to the jurisdiction of CGIT.
12. Very much the same argument was raised before the Supreme Court in the cases of Bijay Cotton Mills
Limited (supra) and Management of Vishnu Sugar Mills Limited (supra). The Supreme Court has rejected
such argument and observed that unless there is a notification of the Central Government with regard to
bringing any industry under its control with respect to Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the same cannot be said
to be a controlled industry under the Industrial Disputes Act. The "appropriate Government" would,
therefore, not be the Central Government, but only the State Government.
13. Since in this case, the respondent no.3 had approached the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central),
Lucknow initially and while conciliation proceedings remained pending, he also approached the CGIT
directly under the enabling provisions of Section 2(A)(2) of the Act of 1947. the order passed by the
respondent no.2 dated 23.8.2013 while it is being set aside by this Court. liberty is granted to the respondent
no.3 to approach, either the State Government or the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal directly by filing
a claim petition before it under the enabling provisions of Section 2(A)(2) of the Act. If such a petition is
filed, the same shall not be rejected only on the ground of delay and shall be considered on merits, by the
appropriate Court.”
Sri Saroj Kumar Mishra, claimant/workman submits that in pursuance to order dated 23.09.2019, passed by the
Hon’ble High Court he has already filed a claim petition before the Labour Court under the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 and same is pending for adjudication.
I have heard learned counsel for parties and gone through the record, as on the same cause of action, as per the order
passed by Hon’ble High Court, in Writ Petition No. 7515 (MS) of 2013, the workman has already filed a case before
the U.P. Industrial Tribunal, for redressal of his grievances, admitted by him. So on the same course of action, the
present case is not maintainable.
Award as above.
LUCKNOW.
27th June, 2023.
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2755
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार अध् क्ष-सि-
प्रबंि जनिेिक, मेससय स्ट्कूटर इंजड ा जलजमटेड, सरोजिनी नगर, ल नऊ, के प्रबंितंत्र के संबद्ध जन ोिकों और श्री दिनेि हसंि,
कामगार, के बीच अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ ृंचाट (संिभय
सं् ा 86/2021) को िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में दि ा ा ग ा िज, प्रकाजित करती िज िो केन्री सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के सा
20/07/2023 को प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y-42025/07/2023-163-आईआर(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1310.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 86/2021) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
The Chairman-cum Managing Director, M/s Scooter India Limited, Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow, and Shri Denesh
Singh, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 20/07/2023.
[No. L-42025/07/2023-163- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 86/2021
BETWEEN
Denesh Singh, s/o Late Sri Rajendra Bahadur Singh
R/o Village & Post Thawer, Malihabad, Lucknow
AND
M/s Scooters India Ltd., Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow
Through its Chairman cum Managing Director
AWARD
On 23.08.2021 the claimant/workman has field the ID case No. 86/2021 as per the provisions of Section 2A (2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Facts of the case:
Facts, in brief, of the present case are claimant, Denesh Singh was initially appointed in establishment, known as
Scooters India Limited as Factary Grade ‘D’ unskilled worker and services number which was allotted to him by the
establishment was 04566.
During the tenure his service respondent float a scheme for voluntary retirement. As per the facts of the case (para 4 of
the claim petition) workman on 21.12.1993 applied for voluntary retirement w.e.f. 31.03.1994 under the voluntary
retirement scheme dated 08.12.1988. It is further submitted by claimant in statement of claim that a circular dated
06.11.1993 was circulated by the establishment stating therein that the voluntary retirement scheme, circulated vide
circular dated 08.12.1993 will remain suspended w.e.f. 14.12.1993.
It is also not in dispute that option was given by applicant for voluntary retirement, had been accepted by
establishment and he was voluntary retired after giving all consequential benefits.
2756
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
In view of the above said factual background, the present claim petition has been filed by the claimant u/s 2A (2) of
the ID Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with following prayer:
“Wherefore, it is prayed that the illegal Voluntary Retirement of the applicant- workman w.e.f. 21-12-
93 is liable to be set aside and the opposite party/employer may kindly be directed to reinstate
applicant-workman on the post with all consequential service/salary benefits and pay his arrears of
salary within stipulated period with 12% interest, and/or pass such other order or direction, which this
Hon'ble Tribunal may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case.”
Sri Neeraj Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent on the basis of the preliminary objection taken by respondent
has submitted that that initially aggrieved by the voluntary retirement, applicant workman and other workmen union to
which the present workman and other workmen who are similarly situated workmen approached the Appropriate
Authority u/s 10 of the Act for conciliation, accordingly a case was registered before the Regional Labour
Commissioner (C), Lucknow File No. LKO.8(2-12)/2020 and vide an order dated 17.02.2021 the same was rejected,
relevant portion as under:
“After having ceased the matter in conciliation, may dates for joint discussion were fixed so as to arrive at
an amicable settlement of the dispute. However, in spite of having conducted prolonged joint discussions
with the parties, the settlement could not be reached due to divergent views held by the parties. The parties
have also been suggested to refer the matter for arbitration under section 10 A of the Industrial Dispute Act,
1947. The union had agreed, however the management had declined the same.
In view of the above the conciliatory efforts made by me have ended in failure.”
Accordingly, he submits that in view of the said facts the present claim petition filed by the workman u/s 2A (2) of the
Act is not maintainable, liable to be dismissed.
Sri V.K. Jaiswal, learned counsel for claimant has not disputed the said fact; however, he has submitted that as the
voluntary of the applicant is contrary to law so the applicant has rightly approached this Tribunal for redressal of his
grievance.
Findings and conclusion:
I have heard learned counsel for parties and gone through record.
Before deciding the same it will be appropriate to go through aims and objects of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 in brief
which are that Industrial Disputes Bill was introduced by the Government of India in the Legislative Assembly on the
28th October 1946. After the Select Committee’s report on 3rd February 1947, with some amendments, it was passed
in March 1947 and became the law from Ist April 1947 repealing the Trade Disputes Act 1929.
While retaining most of the provisions of the earlier law, this Act introduced two new institutions for the prevention
and settlement of industrial disputes; works committees consisting of representatives of employers and workers; and
machinery for industrial adjudication.
A reference to an industrial tribunal under this Act lies where both parties to any industrial dispute apply for such
reference, and also where the appropriate Government considers it expedient so to do. An award of a tribunal has
normally to be enforced by the Government and is binding on both parties to the dispute for such periods as may be
specified, upto a maximum of one year. This Act seeks to give a new orientation to the entire conciliation machinery.
Another important new feature of the Act is the prohibition of strikes and lockouts during the pendency of conciliation
and adjudication proceedings of settlements reached in the course of conciliation proceedings and of awards of
industrial tribunals declared binding by the appropriate government.
Rules, orders or notifications requiring the larger industrial establishments to set up works committees were issued by
the Government of India and most of the State Governments.
Objectives: General
The objectives of industrial relations and industrial disputes legislation, may be outlined as under:-
(i)
Industrial Peace: For prosperity of industry, it is necessary that there be a continuous and growing production
which is only possible if (a) there are no interruptions and stoppages in production i.e. absence of disputes,
and (b) if the various agencies of production are satisfied and are in a harmonious bent to work. In other
words, industrial peace is very necessary for the vitality of industry.
(ii)
Economic Justice: All interruptions in production arising out of industrial dispute are really caused by the
dissatisfaction of labour with their existing economic condition. The history of labour struggle is nothing but
a continuous demand for fair return to labour expressed in varied forms e.g. (a) increase in wages, (b)
resistance to decrease in wages, (c) grant of allowances and benefits etc.(Hariprasad Vs. A.D.Divelkar, AIR
1957 SC 121)
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2757
Social and economic justice which is the bedrock of our Constitution and economic organization also requires that any
industrial relations or disputes legislation, to be effective remedial statute, must embrace not only law for regulation of
labour relations with capital, process for channelizing collective bargaining methods for negotiation, mediation,
conciliation and settlements of industrial conflict, but also a system for giving fair play and justice to labour and
removal of economic injustice.
The preamble of the Act states that its main object is to make provision for investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes. Viewed in the above background, the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is a progressive piece of social
legislation and is designed to settle the disputes on a new pattern known under the Act as adjudication machinery.
The object of all labour legislation is to ensure fair wages and to prevent disputes so that production might not be
adversely affected. (Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1957 SC 167)
The purpose of the Act is to provide machinery for a just and equitable settlement by adjudication, (G. Claridge and
Company Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, AIR 1951 Bombay 100) and amelioration of the conditions of
workmen in industry.
Individual and collective industrial disputes: Individual as well as collective disputes may ripen into industrial
disputes. The true nature of an individual dispute is that it is a collective dispute. Though a dispute may at the
inception be initiated by an individual, yet if it is taken up by the fellow-workers or a union, or a sufficient number of
workers, it may assume the collective character and would become an industrial dispute. (Standard Vacum Oil Co.
Errakulam Vs. I.Tribunal, Errakulam 1952-II LLJ 612). A dispute which continues to retain its individual
character cannot be regarded as an industrial dispute. This being the basic law, it is within the competence of the
legislature to widen or narrow the coverage of an industrial dispute. The Industrial Disputes Act has also been
amended to cover some individual disputes. It is not necessary that a majority should take an industrial dispute. It is
sufficient if a substantial group of workmen take it up. When thus taken, it becomes an industrial or collective
dispute.
Individual dispute an industrial dispute: The important amongst the above are however the amendments of 1965.
By the Act of 1965, a new Section 2A has been added in Act whereby specified categories of individual disputes are
also deemed to be industrial disputes. The section reads as under:
“2A. Dismissal, etc of an individual workman to be deemed to be industrial dispute-
Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual
workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out
of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute
notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.”
This amendment revives, impediment in the way of workman with the necessity that to make an industrial dispute it
must be taken up or espoused by substantial section of the workmen or any union of those workmen and gives an
individual workman a remedy for security of his service and indirectly freedom to join or not to join any union. Thus,
individual disputes could be referred to Tribunal as per Section 2A after 1.12.1965. (National Productivity Council,
1969-II LLJ 186).
Thereafter, Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 2010 (Act No. 24 of 2010), Section 2A(a), was renumbered as Sub-
section (1) and by the same Act i.e. Act No.24 of 2010 Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) have been inserted after
Section 2A (1) of Industrial Dispute Act 1947 which came into effect w.e.f. 15.09.2010, which reads as under:
"2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute -
"(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the
services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his
employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other
workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in
sub-Section(1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for
adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date
he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for
conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal
shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute
referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in
relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-Section(2) shall be made to the Labour Court or
Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment
or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section(1)."
2758
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Now the core question to be considered is that in view of the facts which are stated hereinabove, when admittedly the
was voluntarily retired on 21.12.1993, thereafter he has filed the present case before this Tribunal u/s 2A of the Act on
23.08.2021 on the grounds as taken by him in his claim petition, is maintainable or barred by the period of limitation
as provided u/s 2A(3) of the Act.
Answer to the said question find place in the judgment passed by Hon’ble the Karnataka High Court in ITC Infotech
India Ltd. vs. Venkataramana Uppada ILR 2016 Karnataka 3041, relevant potion quoted as under:
“19. Keeping the above principles in mind, a reading of Section 2A(3) would lead to an irresistible
conclusion that time stipulated for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the
case may be, has to be necessarily "before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section (1)." Time limit
for making an application to the Labour Court stipulated in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A does not
appear to have a bearing to the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 2A. In any event right
conferred under Section 2A would lapse immediately preceding the date of expiry of three years from
the date of dismissal, discharge etc.,. In other words, the limitation of three years prescribed under
sub-Section (3) of Section 2A being mandatory, same cannot be condoned by taking recourse to
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which has no application to the provisions of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
20. It is well settled principle that if an act is required to be performed within a specified time, the
same would primarily be mandatory. It has been held in the case of NAZIRUDDIN VS SITARAM
AGARWAL reported in AIR 2003 SCW 908 to the following effect:
"The Courts jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It
is well known that in a given case, the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the
texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language
of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract the words to a statute or
read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also
necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any
superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of legislature must be gathered
from the language used."
21. Thus, in the background of the dicta of the Apex Court in NAZIRUDDIN's case referred to supra,
when Section 2A is perused, it would indicate that if the legislature really intended that the period of
limitation provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A was to be construed as directory, then it would not
have prescribed the limitation of three years and it would have used the words "at any time" instead of
using the words "before the expiry of three years". Though the words at any time' is found in Section
10(1), same is conspicuously absent in sub-Section(3) of Section 2A which would clearly depict the
intention of the legislature namely, it had deliberately imposed limitation period under sub-Section (3)
of Section 2A and as such legislature did not employ the words at any time' in the said provision as
found in Section 10(1) and in its place, it has specifically incorporated the words before the expiry of
three years'. Hence, to interpret the period of limitation found in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A as
directory and not mandatory would amount to adding something which is not provided in the provision
by the legislature or it would amount to doing violence to the provision, if such interpretation is sought
to be made."
Further, Hon’ble Rajasthan High court in the case of Pankaj Swami vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation
& ors. MANU/RH/1788/2019 after taking into consideration the provisions of section 2A(2) & 2A(3) of the Act held
as under:
“The provisions are explicit, wherein the workman can approach the Labour Court for adjudication of
the dispute in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment etc., however, sub-section (3) provides that
the application should be made to the Labour Court before the expiry of three years from the date of
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified.
8. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the cause of action arose to the
petitioner prior to introduction of the provision of limitation by sub-section (3) the same would have no
application is concerned, the submission made is fallacious, inasmuch as, the provision under which
the application has been filed by the petitioner i.e. section 2-A(2) of the Act, itself was introduced by
the amendment Act of 2010 alongwith the limitation therein and therefore, the provision of limitation
which was introduced in the year 2010 alongwith the main provision providing for the limitation would
apply with all force and the submission that the same would have no application to the cause of action,
which arose prior to 2007, has no basis.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2759
The submissions as made, if accepted, would result in circumstances where if the cause of action has
arisen post 2010, the same would be barred, whereas the causes, which arose prior to 2010 like in the
year 2007 in the present case and the application is filed after 7 years, the same would never become
barred by limitation, such a result is legally untenable.
9. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the petitioner had approached
the Conciliation Officer and had raised the dispute before him, where there was no limitation and the
petitioner approached the Labour Court only as per the directions of the Conciliation Officer the claim
could not be rejected by barred by limitation also does not advance the cause of the petitioner,
inasmuch as, the petitioner could have taken advantage of the said position, if the Conciliation Officer
had sent a failure report to the appropriate Government who in turn had referred the dispute to the
Labour Court. Merely because the Conciliation Officer suggested approaching the Labour Court,
which suggestion was accepted by the petitioner, cannot be termed as a reference under section 10 of
the Act to the Labour Court.
10. In view of the above discussion in so far as the rejection of the claim of the petitioner by the Labour
Court being barred by limitation is concerned, the same cannot be faulted.”
And in the case of Parthasarathy vs. Souther Pins and Products Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. MANU/TN/6691/2020 Hon’ble
the High Court of Madras has held as under:
“Inasmuch as the notice of termination of the Petitioner in the present case has been made on
06.10.2014 under Section 2-A(2) of the Act after the said amendment has come into force, the
limitation of three years prescribed under Section 2-A(3) of the Act would necessarily apply. As such,
there is no infirmity in the decision-making process of the Labour Court in refusing to entertain the
application made by the Petitioner has time barred. This view is supported by the decisions of this
Court in the following cases:-
(i) ITC Infotech India Ltd. v. Venkataramana Uppada (Order dated 03.03.2016 in W.P. No.
27510 of 2015 passed by the High Court of Karnataka)
(ii) Management of Ashok Leyland v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (Order dated
13.04.2016 in W.P. Nos. 9640 and 9641 of 2016 passed by this Court)
(iii) Ravi Kumar v. Management, Tamil Nadu State Road Transport Corporation (Order
dated 11.04.2017 in W.P. (MD) No. 4269 of 2017 passed by the Madurai Bench of this Court)
(iv) K. Settu v. Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Order dated 20.09.2019 in
W.P. No. 8413 of 2019 passed by this Court)
5. A feeble attempt is made on behalf of the Petitioner to suggest that the period of conciliation must be
excluded while computing the limitation. It is, no doubt, true that Section 2-A(2) of the Act
contemplates such application to be made to the Labour Court after the expiry of 45 days from the date
of application to the Conciliation Officer is made. However, it does not require that the conciliation
proceedings should have been completed before making that application under Section 2-A(2) of the
Act. The words in Section 2-A(3) of the Act are clear enough that the limitation has to be reckoned on
the expiry of three years from the date of termination. The Petitioner in the instant case had made the
application for conciliation on 12.04.2017 which had also concluded on 27.06.2017, but the Petitioner
had not approached the Labour Court after 45 days either from 12.04.2017 or even from 27.06.2017.
As such, the contentions made on behalf of the Petitioner cannot be countenanced.”
(see also Kandasamy Spinning Mills Private Ltd. vs S. Palanisamy and Ors. MANU/RN/6831/2019
Thus, in view of above said fact, combined reading of section 2A (2) and 2A (3) of the Act, the legal position which
emerge out is that if a workman is aggrieved by order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination,
he may approach the Tribunal within a period three years from dated of passing of order. Because, it is settled positon
of law as well that “if law provides a particular thing that all other modes or methods of doing that thing must be
deemed to have been prohibited”, the said proposition of law is first held in the case of Tylor Vs. Tylor (1875) LR 1
ChD 426 and adopted later by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmed Vs. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 and
thereafter by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a series of judgments including those in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh &
another Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322, State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC
358, Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad 1999 (8) SCC 266, Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka 2001
(4) SCC 9 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Essar Power Ltd. 2008 (4) SCC 755.
In the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as under:-
“No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of
interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words.
No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and
2760
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an
edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to
gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and
there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court
to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is
clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been
said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its
support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided”.
Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111,
held as under:-
“24.
True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what provides by its clear
language, with due regard to the scheme of law.
25.
Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of
the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be
construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it
is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable,
unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute”.
In the case of Harshad S. Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 257, it has been held as under:-
“There is no doubt that if the words are plain and simple and call for only one construction that construction
is to be adopted whatever be its effect”.
In the case of Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devo (2002) 7 SCC 273, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as under:-
“9.It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the
courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act.”
In the case of Patango Kadam Vs. Prithviraj Sayajiro Yadav Deshmukh (2001) 3 SCC 594, took the view:-
“12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a provision, one must look at well-settled principles of
construction but it is not open to first to create an ambiguity which does not exist and then try to resolve the
same by taking recourse to some general principle.”
Also, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane & others vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer & another (2013) 10 SCC 765 has held as under:
“16.
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is
never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation."
(See Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta10, AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitash Kumar v. Om
Prakash Sharma11.)
Reverting to the facts of the present case, as per the admitted position, workman was voluntarily retired which does
not fall within the definition of section 2A of the Act; moreover, conciliations initiated before Regional Labour
Commissioner (C), Lucknow ended up with failure report of the Regional Labour Commissioner, so, his present claim
petition cannot be entertained u/s 2A (2) of the Act.
Accordingly, the same is rejected on the ground that same is not maintainable before this Tribunal, with liberty to the
claimant to pursue its case before appropriate forum as per law.
Award as above.
LUCKNOW.
06th July, 2023.
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2761
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार मिाप्रबंिक,
हिंिुस्ट्तान ए रोनॉरटर्कस जलजमटेड, ल नऊ; मजससय िाि बंिु, द्वारा श्री ोगेंर प्रसाि िाि, स्ट्वच्छता ेकेिार, िरिेंर नगर, कानृुर ;
मजससय ग्रुृ-4 फजजसजलटी सर्वयस, द्वारा श्री नवल कृूर, जनिेिक कार्मयक, 1/97, जवद्युत ंड, गोमती नगर, ल नऊ, के प्रबंितंत्र के संबद्ध
जन ोिकों और श्री केिन (अब मषतक के स्ट् ान ृर उनकी कानूनी उत्तराजिकारी श्रीमती िांजत िेवी, कामगार,के बीच अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट
केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ ृंचाट(संिभय सं् ा 90/2011) को िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में
दि ा ा ग ा िज, प्रकाजित करती िज िो केन्री सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के सा 27/07/2023 को प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y-42025/07/2023-161-आईआर-(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1311.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 90/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
The General Manager, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Lucknow ;M/s Shah Bandhu, through Shri Yogendra
Prasad Shah,Sanitation Contractor, Harjendra Nagar, Kanpur ; M/s Group -4 Facilities Service, through
Shri Nawal Kapoor, Director Personnel, 1/97, Vidyut Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, and Shri Keshan (now
deceased substituted by his legal heirs Smt. Shanti Devi), Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the
award by the Central Government on 27/07/2023.
[No. L-42025/07/2023-161- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT
LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 90/2011
BETWEEN
Sri Keshan (now deceased substituted by his legal heirs Smt. Shanti Devi) son of late Lutai,
Resident of 631/614, Ismailganj, Post Chinhat, Faizabad Road, District Lucknow.
AND
1.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Lucknow Division, Lucknow through its General
Manager.
2.
General Manager, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Lucknow Division, Lucknow.
3. M/s Shah Bandhu, through Sri Yogendra Prasad Shah,
Sanitation Contractor, 504, Viman Nagar, G.T. Road.
Harjendra Nagar, Kanpur.
4.
M/s Group -4 Facilities Service, through Sri Nawal Kapoor, Director Personnel, 1/97,
Vidyut Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow.
2762
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AWARD
On 28.02.2011 the claimant/workman has filed the ID case No. 89/2011 as per the provisions of Section 2A (2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Facts of the case:
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Lucknow Division (hereinafter referred to as Establishment), is a factory registered
under the provisions of the Factories Act, which is situated at Faizabad Road, Lucknow and the sanitation work of the
premises of the Establishment as well as Plant and Machinery installed at the factory premises is a perennial as well
regular nature of job.
Establishment is an Engineering Industry and the Government has issued a notification dated 24.04.1990 under
Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 after the recommendation of Contract Labour
Advisory Board, whereby 18 works of the Engineering Industry, which are regular or perennial in nature has been
prohibited.
However, it was the prevalent practice in establishment that they employed the contract labour for sanitation work of
the establishment/premises despite the fact that the sanitation work was regular in nature; and the claimant/workman
was working in the establishment right from the very beginning i.e. from the date, the factory was established and
continuously worked till the date of termination i.e. 21.12.2001.
As per the case workman order of termination dated 21.12.2001 by which his services in an illegal and unjustified
manner was terminated, inasmuch as in establishment of the employers there were more than 100 workmen employed
as such the compliance of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act was necessary but before terminating the
services of the workmen, the employers have not complied with the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
Further, the services of the workman have been terminated by the principal employer not by the contractor and the
work which were being performed by the concerned workman still exist with employers and the same is being carried
out by employing new workmen on contract basis.
In the claim petition it has been pleaded that earlier the workmen’s Union in Establishment i.e. Hindustan Aeronautics
Karamchari Sabha, raised the dispute of the workman along with some other workmen before the State Government
which, was referred for adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal (II), U.P., Lucknow, registered before Industrial
Tribunal (II), U.P., Lucknow as Adj. Case No.: 126 of 2002.
However, on account of the fact that the workman along with some other workmen were not satisfied with the pairavi
of the Union as such an authority letter was filed along with an application by 20 workmen amongst the concerned
workman to represent the said case but the Union, filed objection that as applicants who have filed the application are
not party in the said case as such they are not entitled to represent the case. By an order dated 10.03.2010, the Hon'ble
Presiding Officer held that the workmen are not satisfied with the proceedings through Union, they can raise separate
dispute "under the provisions of Act.
Thereafter, an application was filed by 36 workmen including the claimant/workman on 10.07.2010 before, the
Hon'ble Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (2), U.P., Lucknow for deletion of the names of the workmen from the
reference order so that they may be in position to raise fresh industrial dispute before the competent Forum and the
Hon'ble Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (2), U.P., Lucknow after hearing the parties concerned was pleased to
allow the said application except three whose names were not mentioned in reference order.
In pursuance to order dated 20.07.2010 the workman concerned along with 32 other workman filed an application
before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Lucknow which was registered as Case No. LKO-8(2-32)/2010:
Laxmi Narain and 32 others Vs. General Manager, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and others.
Thereafter, Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Lucknow, called upon the parties for conciliation proceedings
and in pursuance thereof Hindustan Aeronautics Limited appeared before him and filed their objections and due to the
negative attitude of the employers, no settlement could be arrived between the parties.
Since the mandatory period i.e. 45 days as specified under Section 2- A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as
amended by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 (No. 24 of 2010) had been expired as such the concerned
workman seek the permission from the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Lucknow to withdraw the case and
to approach the Hon'ble Court on 27.01.2011, which was duly accepted by the Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central), Lucknow.
In view of above said factual background the present case has been filed u/s 2A (2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with following prayer:
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2763
“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to declare that
the action of the management in terminating the services of workman with effect from 21.12.2001 is
neither legal nor justified and accordingly the workman concerned is entitled to get reinstatement in
service together with entire consequential benefits including back wages and other service benefits, in
the interest of justice.”
On behalf the respondent written statement has been filed on 15.05.2012 in which following preliminary objection
was taken:
“1. That the aforesaid ID Case No.82/2011 is not maintainable as per the provisions of ID Act 1947
(as mended by ID (Amendment) Act 2010) because the same is barred by limitation U/S 2A(3) of the ID
Act (Amendment 2010) which is quoted as below:
2A(3) "the application referred to in sub section 2 shall be made to Labour Court or Tribunal
before the expiry of 3 years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise
termination service as specified in sub section 1".
In addition to the above said facts, the respondent in its written statement also given the parawise reply to the
case as set up by the claimant in his statement of claim.
During the pendency of the present case workman/Sri Kesan died on 19th November 2012 as such an application
for substitution was made on behalf of his legal heirs Smt. Shanti Devi his wife, allowed by order
dated 03.03.2023.
Sri Adarsh Jadghari has submitted that before deciding the matter in question on merit, the question “whether
the claim petition filed by the claimant on 28.02.2011 as per the provisions of section 2A (2) of the Act,
aggrieved by the order of termination/retrenchment dated 21.12.2001 is barred by the period of limitation as
provided u/s 2A(3) of the Act or not?”
Sri Adarsh Jadghari in support of his argument submits, admittedly as per the case of the claimant his services
were terminated on 21.12.2001, aggrieved by the same he filed present industrial dispute u/s 2A (2) of the Act;
however, u/s 2A (3) of the Act the period of limitation is provided for three years, from the date of
retrenchment/termination, so, the present claim petition is barred by the period of limitation as provided u/s 2A
(3) of the Act, liable to be dismissed.
Sri Arjun Singh, learned counsel for claimant, rebutting the said contention has placed reliance as pleaded in the
statement of claim and submits that in view of the facts as stated hereinabove especially in paragraph 27 & 28,
which are quoted herein below:
“27.
That since the mandatory period i.e. 45 days as specified under Section 2- A (2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 (No. 24
of 2010) had been expired as such the concerned workman seek the permission from the Regional
Labour Commissioner (Central), Lucknow to withdraw the case and to approach the Hon'ble
Court on 27.01.2011, which was duly accepted by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central),
Lucknow.
28.
That in pursuance thereof, the workman concerned approaching the Hon'ble Tribunal
for the adjudication of the industrial disputes as prevalent between the workman and the
employers.”
The present claim petition filed u/s 2 (2) of the Act is maintainable and the arguments as raised by the learned
counsel for respondent that same is barred by the period limitation is devoid of merit, be rejected.
I have heard the learned counsel for parties and gone through the record.
Before deciding the same it will be appropriate to go through aims and objects of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 in brief
which are that Industrial Disputes Bill was introduced by the Government of India in the Legislative Assembly on the
28th October 1946. After the Select Committee’s report on 3rd February 1947, with some amendments, it was passed
in March 1947 and became the law from Ist April 1947 repealing the Trade Disputes Act 1929.
While retaining most of the provisions of the earlier law, this Act introduced two new institutions for the prevention
and settlement of industrial disputes; works committees consisting of representatives of employers and workers; and
machinery for industrial adjudication.
A reference to an industrial tribunal under this Act lies where both parties to any industrial dispute apply for such
reference, and also where the appropriate Government considers it expedient so to do. An award of a tribunal has
normally to be enforced by the Government and is binding on both parties to the dispute for such periods as may be
specified, upto a maximum of one year. This Act seeks to give a new orientation to the entire conciliation machinery.
2764
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Another important new feature of the Act is the prohibition of strikes and lockouts during the pendency of conciliation
and adjudication proceedings of settlements reached in the course of conciliation proceedings and of awards of
industrial tribunals declared binding by the appropriate government.
Rules, orders or notifications requiring the larger industrial establishments to set up works committees were issued by
the Government of India and most of the State Governments.
Objectives: General
The objectives of industrial relations and industrial disputes legislation, may be outlined as under:-
(i)
Industrial Peace: For prosperity of industry, it is necessary that there be a continuous and growing production
which is only possible if (a) there are no interruptions and stoppages in production i.e. absence of disputes,
and (b) if the various agencies of production are satisfied and are in a harmonious bent to work. In other
words, industrial peace is very necessary for the vitality of industry.
(ii)
Economic Justice: All interruptions in production arising out of industrial dispute are really caused by the
dissatisfaction of labour with their existing economic condition. The history of labour struggle is nothing but
a continuous demand for fair return to labour expressed in varied forms e.g. (a) increase in wages, (b)
resistance to decrease in wages, (c) grant of allowances and benefits etc.(Hariprasad Vs. A.D.Divelkar, AIR
1957 SC 121)
Social and economic justice which is the bedrock of our Constitution and economic organization also requires that any
industrial relations or disputes legislation, to be effective remedial statute, must embrace not only law for regulation of
labour relations with capital, process for channelizing collective bargaining methods for negotiation, mediation,
conciliation and settlements of industrial conflict, but also a system for giving fair play and justice to labour and
removal of economic injustice.
The preamble of the Act states that its main object is to make provision for investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes. Viewed in the above background, the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is a progressive piece of social
legislation and is designed to settle the disputes on a new pattern known under the Act as adjudication machinery.
The object of all labour legislation is to ensure fair wages and to prevent disputes so that production might not be
adversely affected. (Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1957 SC 167)
The purpose of the Act is to provide machinery for a just and equitable settlement by adjudication, (G. Claridge and
Company Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, AIR 1951 Bombay 100) and amelioration of the conditions of
workmen in industry.
Individual and collective industrial disputes: Individual as well as collective disputes may ripen into industrial
disputes. The true nature of an individual dispute is that it is a collective dispute. Though a dispute may at the
inception be initiated by an individual, yet if it is taken up by the fellow-workers or a union, or a sufficient number of
workers, it may assume the collective character and would become an industrial dispute. (Standard Vacum Oil Co.
Errakulam Vs. I.Tribunal, Errakulam 1952-II LLJ 612). A dispute which continues to retain its individual
character cannot be regarded as an industrial dispute. This being the basic law, it is within the competence of the
legislature to widen or narrow the coverage of an industrial dispute. The Industrial Disputes Act has also been
amended to cover some individual disputes. It is not necessary that a majority should take an industrial dispute. It is
sufficient if a substantial group of workmen take it up. When thus taken, it becomes an industrial or collective
dispute.
Individual dispute an industrial dispute: The important amongst the above are however the amendments of 1965.
By the Act of 1965, a new Section 2A has been added in Act whereby specified categories of individual disputes are
also deemed to be industrial disputes. The section reads as under:
“2A. Dismissal, etc of an individual workman to be deemed to be industrial dispute-
Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual
workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out
of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute
notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.”
This amendment revives, impediment in the way of workman with the necessity that to make an industrial dispute it
must be taken up or espoused by substantial section of the workmen or any union of those workmen and gives an
individual workman a remedy for security of his service and indirectly freedom to join or not to join any union. Thus,
individual disputes could be referred to Tribunal as per Section 2A after 1.12.1965. (National Productivity Council,
1969-II LLJ 186).
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2765
Thereafter, by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 2010 (Act No. 24 of 2010), Section 2A(a), was renumbered as
Sub-section (1) and by the same Act i.e. Act No.24 of 2010 Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) have been inserted
after Section 2A (1) of Industrial Dispute Act 1947 which came into effect w.e.f. 15.09.2010, which reads as under:
"2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute -
"(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the
services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his
employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other
workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in
sub-Section(1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for
adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date
he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for
conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal
shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute
referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in
relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-Section(2) shall be made to the Labour Court or
Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment
or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section(1)."
Now the core question to be considered is that in view of the facts which are stated hereinabove, that admittedly the
services of applicant was terminated on 21.12.2001, thereafter he has filed the present case before this Tribunal u/s 2A
of the Act on 28.02.2011 on the grounds as taken by him in his claim petition, is maintainable or barred by the period
of limitation as provided u/s 2A(3) of the Act.
Answer to the said question find place in the judgment passed by Hon’ble the Karnataka High Court in ITC Infotech
India Ltd. vs. Venkataramana Uppada ILR 2016 Karnataka 3041, relevant potion quoted as under:
“19. Keeping the above principles in mind, a reading of Section 2A(3) would lead to an irresistible
conclusion that time stipulated for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the
case may be, has to be necessarily "before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section (1)." Time limit
for making an application to the Labour Court stipulated in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A does not
appear to have a bearing to the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 2A. In any event right
conferred under Section 2A would lapse immediately preceding the date of expiry of three years from
the date of dismissal, discharge etc.,. In other words, the limitation of three years prescribed under
sub-Section (3) of Section 2A being mandatory, same cannot be condoned by taking recourse to
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which has no application to the provisions of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
20. It is well settled principle that if an act is required to be performed within a specified time, the
same would primarily be mandatory. It has been held in the case of NAZIRUDDIN VS SITARAM
AGARWAL reported in AIR 2003 SCW 908 to the following effect:
"The Courts jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It
is well known that in a given case, the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the
texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language
of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract the words to a statute or
read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also
necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any
superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of legislature must be gathered
from the language used."
21. Thus, in the background of the dicta of the Apex Court in NAZIRUDDIN's case referred to supra,
when Section 2A is perused, it would indicate that if the legislature really intended that the period of
limitation provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A was to be construed as directory, then it would not
have prescribed the limitation of three years and it would have used the words "at any time" instead of
using the words "before the expiry of three years". Though the words at any time' is found in Section
10(1), same is conspicuously absent in sub-Section(3) of Section 2A which would clearly depict the
intention of the legislature namely, it had deliberately imposed limitation period under sub-Section (3)
2766
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of Section 2A and as such legislature did not employ the words at any time' in the said provision as
found in Section 10(1) and in its place, it has specifically incorporated the words before the expiry of
three years'. Hence, to interpret the period of limitation found in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A as
directory and not mandatory would amount to adding something which is not provided in the provision
by the legislature or it would amount to doing violence to the provision, if such interpretation is sought
to be made."
And Hon’ble Rajasthan High court in the case of Pankaj Swami vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation &
ors. MANU/RH/1788/2019 after taking into consideration the provisions of sedation 2A(2) & 2A(3) of the Act held as
under:
“The provisions are explicit, wherein the workman can approach the Labour Court for adjudication of
the dispute in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment etc., however, sub-section (3) provides that
the application should be made to the Labour Court before the expiry of three years from the date of
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified.
8. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the cause of action arose to the
petitioner prior to introduction of the provision of limitation by sub-section (3) the same would have no
application is concerned, the submission made is fallacious, inasmuch as, the provision under which
the application has been filed by the petitioner i.e. section 2-A(2) of the Act, itself was introduced by
the amendment Act of 2010 alongwith the limitation therein and therefore, the provision of limitation
which was introduced in the year 2010 alongwith the main provision providing for the limitation would
apply with all force and the submission that the same would have no application to the cause of action,
which arose prior to 2007, has no basis.
The submissions as made, if accepted, would result in circumstances where if the cause of action has
arisen post 2010, the same would be barred, whereas the causes, which arose prior to 2010 like in the
year 2007 in the present case and the application is filed after 7 years, the same would never become
barred by limitation, such a result is legally untenable.
9. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the petitioner had approached
the Conciliation Officer and had raised the dispute before him, where there was no limitation and the
petitioner approached the Labour Court only as per the directions of the Conciliation Officer the claim
could not be rejected by barred by limitation also does not advance the cause of the petitioner,
inasmuch as, the petitioner could have taken advantage of the said position, if the Conciliation Officer
had sent a failure report to the appropriate Government who in turn had referred the dispute to the
Labour Court. Merely because the Conciliation Officer suggested approaching the Labour Court,
which suggestion was accepted by the petitioner, cannot be termed as a reference under section 10 of
the Act to the Labour Court.
10. In view of the above discussion in so far as the rejection of the claim of the petitioner by the Labour
Court being barred by limitation is concerned, the same cannot be faulted.”
And in the case of Parthasarathy vs. Souther Pins and Products Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. MANU/TN/6691/2020 Hon’ble
the High Court of Madras has held as under:
“Inasmuch as the notice of termination of the Petitioner in the present case has been made on
06.10.2014 under Section 2-A(2) of the Act after the said amendment has come into force, the
limitation of three years prescribed under Section 2-A(3) of the Act would necessarily apply. As such,
there is no infirmity in the decision-making process of the Labour Court in refusing to entertain the
application made by the Petitioner has time barred. This view is supported by the decisions of this
Court in the following cases:-
(i) ITC Infotech India Ltd. v. Venkataramana Uppada (Order dated 03.03.2016 in W.P. No.
27510 of 2015 passed by the High Court of Karnataka)
(ii) Management of Ashok Leyland v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (Order dated
13.04.2016 in W.P. Nos. 9640 and 9641 of 2016 passed by this Court)
(iii) Ravi Kumar v. Management, Tamil Nadu State Road Transport Corporation (Order
dated 11.04.2017 in W.P. (MD) No. 4269 of 2017 passed by the Madurai Bench of this Court)
(iv) K. Settu v. Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Order dated 20.09.2019 in
W.P. No. 8413 of 2019 passed by this Court)
5. A feeble attempt is made on behalf of the Petitioner to suggest that the period of conciliation must be
excluded while computing the limitation. It is, no doubt, true that Section 2-A(2) of the Act
contemplates such application to be made to the Labour Court after the expiry of 45 days from the date
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2767
of application to the Conciliation Officer is made. However, it does not require that the conciliation
proceedings should have been completed before making that application under Section 2-A(2) of the
Act. The words in Section 2-A(3) of the Act are clear enough that the limitation has to be reckoned on
the expiry of three years from the date of termination. The Petitioner in the instant case had made the
application for conciliation on 12.04.2017 which had also concluded on 27.06.2017, but the Petitioner
had not approached the Labour Court after 45 days either from 12.04.2017 or even from 27.06.2017.
As such, the contentions made on behalf of the Petitioner cannot be countenanced.”
(see also Kandasamy Spinning Mills Private Ltd. vs S. Palanisamy and Ors. MANU/RN/6831/2019
Thus, in view of above said fact, combined reading of section 2A (2) and 2A (3) of the Act, the legal position which
emerge out is that if a workman is aggrieved by order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination,
he may approach the Tribunal within a period three years from dated of passing of order.
Taking into consideration, above said facts and positon of law as well that “if law provides a particular thing that all
other modes or methods of doing that thing must be deemed to have been prohibited”, the said proposition of law is
first held in the case of Tylor Vs. Tylor (1875) LR 1 ChD 426 and adopted later by the Judicial Committee in Nazir
Ahmed Vs. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 and thereafter by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a series of judgments
including those in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & another Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322, State of
Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358, Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad 1999 (8) SCC 266,
Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka 2001 (4) SCC 9 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Essar Power
Ltd. 2008 (4) SCC 755.
In the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as under:-
“No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of
interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words.
No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and
every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an
edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to
gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and
there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court
to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is
clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been
said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its
support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided”.
Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111,
held as under:-
“24.
True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what provides by its clear
language, with due regard to the scheme of law.
25.
Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of
the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be
construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it
is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable,
unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute”.
In the case of Harshad S. Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 257, it has been held as under:-
“There is no doubt that if the words are plain and simple and call for only one construction that construction
is to be adopted whatever be its effect”.
In the case of Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devo (2002) 7 SCC 273, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as under:-
“9.It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the
courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act.”
In the case of Patango Kadam Vs. Prithviraj Sayajiro Yadav Deshmukh (2001) 3 SCC 594, took the view:-
“12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a provision, one must look at well-settled principles of
construction but it is not open to first to create an ambiguity which does not exist and then try to resolve the
same by taking recourse to some general principle.”
2768
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Also, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane & others vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer & another (2013) 10 SCC 765 has held as under:
“16.
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is
never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation."
(See Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta10, AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitash Kumar v. Om
Prakash Sharma11.)
Reverting to the facts of the present case, as per admitted position, the services of the workman was terminated on
21.12.2001 and the same has been challenged by him by filing the present industrial dispute on 28.02.2011.
So, keeping in view the above said facts as well as that the workman/Sri Keshan (now deceased substituted by his
legal heirs Smt. Shanti) Devi cannot derive any benefit from the facts on which he has approached the Tribunal after
expiry of period three years from the date of his termination, because his services were terminated on 21.12.2001 and
filed the present case on 28.02.2011 u/s 2A (2) of the Act, as such, the claim petition is barred by the period of
limitation provided u/s 2A (3) of the Act, liable to be rejected.
Accordingly, the same is rejected on the ground that same is barred by period of limitation as per section 2A (3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, with liberty to the claimant to pursue its case before appropriate forum as per law.
Award as above.
LUCKNOW.
13.07.2023
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार मिाप्रबंिक,
हिंिुस्ट्तान ए रोनॉरटर्कस जलजमटेड, ल नऊ; मजससय िाि बंिु, द्वारा श्री ोगेंर प्रसाि िाि, स्ट्वच्छता ेकेिार, िरिेंर नगर, कानृुर ;
मजससय ग्रुृ-4 फजजसजलटी सर्वयस, द्वारा श्री नवल कृूर, जनिेिक कार्मयक, 1/97, जवद्युत ंड, गोमती नगर, ल नऊ, के प्रबंितंत्र के संबद्ध
जन ोिकों और श्री ृाल (अब मषतक के स्ट् ान ृर उनके कानूनी उत्तराजिकारी श्रीमती गुड्डी िैं), कामगार,के बीच अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट
केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ ृंचाट (संिभय सं् ा 92/2011) को िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में
दि ा ा ग ा िज, प्रकाजित करती िज िो केन्री सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के सा 27/07/2023 को प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y-42025/07/2023-162-आईआर-(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1312.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 92/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
The General Manager, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Lucknow ;M/s Shah Bandhu, through Shri Yogendra
Prasad Shah,Sanitation Contractor, Harjendra Nagar, Kanpur ; M/s Group -4 Facilities Service, through Shri
Nawal Kapoor, Director Personnel, 1/97, Vidyut Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, and Shri Pal (now deceased
substituted by his legal heirs Smt. Guddi), Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27/07/2023.
[No. L-42025/07/2023-162- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2769
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 92/2011
BETWEEN
Sri Pal (now deceased substituted by his legal heirs Smt. Guddi) son of late Lekhai,
Ismailganj, Post Chinhat,
Faizabad Raod District Lucknow.
AND
1.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Lucknow Division, Lucknow through its General
Manager.
2.
General Manager, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Lucknow Division, Lucknow.
3. M/s Shah Bandhu, through Sri Yogendra Prasad Shah
Sanitation Contractor, 504, Viman Nagar, G.T. Road. Harjendra Nagar, Kanpur.
4.
M/s Group -4 Facilities Service, through Sri Nawal Kapoor, Director Personnel, 1/97,
Vidyut Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow.
AWARD
On 28.02.2011 the claimant/workman has filed the ID case No. 89/2011 as per the provisions of Section 2A (2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Facts of the case:
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Lucknow Division (hereinafter referred to as Establishment), is a factory registered
under the provisions of the Factories Act, which is situated at Faizabad Road, Lucknow and the sanitation work of the
premises of the Establishment as well as Plant and Machinery installed at the factory premises is a perennial as well
regular nature of job.
Establishment is an Engineering Industry and the Government has issued a notification dated 24.04.1990 under
Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 after the recommendation of Contract Labour
Advisory Board, whereby 18 works of the Engineering Industry, which are regular or perennial in nature has been
prohibited.
However, it was the prevalent practice in establishment that they employed the contract labour for sanitation work of
the establishment/premises despite the fact that the sanitation work was regular in nature; and the claimant/workman
was working in the establishment right from the very beginning i.e. from the date, the factory was established and
continuously worked till the date of termination i.e. 21.12.2001.
As per the case workman order of termination dated 21.12.2001 by which his services in an illegal and unjustified
manner was terminated, inasmuch as in establishment of the employers there were more than 100 workmen employed
as such the compliance of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act was necessary but before terminating the
services of the workmen, the employers have not complied with the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
Further, the services of the workman have been terminated by the principal employer not by the contractor and the
work which were being performed by the concerned workman still exist with employers and the same is being carried
out by employing new workmen on contract basis.
In the claim petition it has been pleaded that earlier the workmen’s Union in Establishment i.e. Hindustan Aeronautics
Karamchari Sabha, raised the dispute of the workman along with some other workmen before the State Government
which, was referred for adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal (II), U.P., Lucknow, registered before Industrial
Tribunal (II), U.P., Lucknow as Adj. Case No.: 126 of 2002.
However, on account of the fact that the workman along with some other workmen were not satisfied with the pairavi
of the Union as such an authority letter was filed along with an application by 20 workmen amongst the concerned
workman to represent the said case but the Union, filed objection that as applicants who have filed the application are
not party in the said case as such they are not entitled to represent the case. By an order dated 10.03.2010, the Hon'ble
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Presiding Officer held that the workmen are not satisfied with the proceedings through Union, they can raise separate
dispute "under the provisions of Act.
Thereafter, an application was filed by 36 workmen including the claimant/workman on 10.07.2010 before, the
Hon'ble Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (2), U.P., Lucknow for deletion of the names of the workmen from the
reference order so that they may be in position to raise fresh industrial dispute before the competent Forum and the
Hon'ble Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (2), U.P., Lucknow after hearing the parties concerned was pleased to
allow the said application except three whose names were not mentioned in reference order.
In pursuance to order dated 20.07.2010 the workman concerned along with 32 other workman filed an application
before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Lucknow which was registered as Case No. LKO-8(2-32)/2010:
Laxmi Narain and 32 others Vs. General Manager, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and others.
Thereafter, Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Lucknow, called upon the parties for conciliation proceedings
and in pursuance thereof Hindustan Aeronautics Limited appeared before him and filed their objections and due to the
negative attitude of the employers, no settlement could be arrived between the parties.
Since the mandatory period i.e. 45 days as specified under Section 2- A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as
amended by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 (No. 24 of 2010) had been expired as such the concerned
workman seek the permission from the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Lucknow to withdraw the case and
to approach the Hon'ble Court on 27.01.2011, which was duly accepted by the Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central), Lucknow.
In view of above said factual background the present case has been filed u/s 2A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with following prayer:
“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to declare that
the action of the management in terminating the services of workman with effect from 21.12.2001 is
neither legal nor justified and accordingly the workman concerned is entitled to get reinstatement in
service together with entire consequential benefits including back wages and other service benefits, in
the interest of justice.”
On behalf the respondent written statement has been filed on 15.05.2012 in which following preliminary objection
was taken:
“1. That the aforesaid ID Case No.82/2011 is not maintainable as per the provisions of ID Act 1947
(as mended by ID (Amendment) Act 2010) because the same is barred by limitation U/S 2A(3) of the ID
Act (Amendment 2010) which is quoted as below:
2A(3) "the application referred to in sub section 2 shall be made to Labour Court or Tribunal
before the expiry of 3 years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise
termination service as specified in sub section 1".
In addition to the above said facts, the respondent in its written statement also given the parawise reply to the
case as set up by the claimant in his statement of claim.
During the pendency of the present case workman/Sri Pal died on 16.09.2019 as such an application for
substitution was made on behalf of his legal heirs Smt. Guddi his wife, allowed by order dated 13.03.2023.
Sri Adarsh Jadghari has submitted that before deciding the matter in question on merit, the question “whether
the claim petition filed by the claimant on 28.02.2011 as per the provisions of section 2A (2) of the Act,
aggrieved by the order of termination/retrenchment dated 21.12.2001 is barred by the period of limitation as
provided u/s 2A(3) of the Act or not?”
Sri Adarsh Jadghari in support of his argument submits, admittedly as per the case of the claimant his services
were terminated on 21.12.2001, aggrieved by the same he filed present industrial dispute u/s 2A (2) of the Act;
however, u/s 2A (3) of the Act the period of limitation is provided for three years, from the date of
retrenchment/termination, so, the present claim petition is barred by the period of limitation as provided u/s 2A
(3) of the Act, liable to be dismissed.
Sri D.K. Gupta, learned counsel for claimant, rebutting the said contention has placed reliance as pleaded in the
statement of claim and submits that in view of the facts as stated hereinabove especially in paragraph 27 & 28,
which are quoted herein below:
“27.
That since the mandatory period i.e. 45 days as specified under Section 2- A (2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 (No. 24
of 2010) had been expired as such the concerned workman seek the permission from the Regional
Labour Commissioner (Central), Lucknow to withdraw the case and to approach the Hon'ble
Court on 27.01.2011, which was duly accepted by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central),
Lucknow.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2771
28.
That in pursuance thereof, the workman concerned approaching the Hon'ble Tribunal
for the adjudication of the industrial disputes as prevalent between the workman and the
employers.”
The present claim petition filed u/s 2 (2) of the Act is maintainable and the arguments as raised by the learned
counsel for respondent that same is barred by the period limitation is devoid of merit, be rejected.
I have heard the learned counsel for parties and gone through the record.
Before deciding the same it will be appropriate to go through aims and objects of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 in brief
which are that Industrial Disputes Bill was introduced by the Government of India in the Legislative Assembly on the
28th October 1946. After the Select Committee’s report on 3rd February 1947, with some amendments, it was passed
in March 1947 and became the law from Ist April 1947 repealing the Trade Disputes Act 1929.
While retaining most of the provisions of the earlier law, this Act introduced two new institutions for the prevention
and settlement of industrial disputes; works committees consisting of representatives of employers and workers; and
machinery for industrial adjudication.
A reference to an industrial tribunal under this Act lies where both parties to any industrial dispute apply for such
reference, and also where the appropriate Government considers it expedient so to do. An award of a tribunal has
normally to be enforced by the Government and is binding on both parties to the dispute for such periods as may be
specified, upto a maximum of one year. This Act seeks to give a new orientation to the entire conciliation machinery.
Another important new feature of the Act is the prohibition of strikes and lockouts during the pendency of conciliation
and adjudication proceedings of settlements reached in the course of conciliation proceedings and of awards of
industrial tribunals declared binding by the appropriate government.
Rules, orders or notifications requiring the larger industrial establishments to set up works committees were issued by
the Government of India and most of the State Governments.
Objectives: General
The objectives of industrial relations and industrial disputes legislation, may be outlined as under:-
(i)
Industrial Peace: For prosperity of industry, it is necessary that there be a continuous and growing production
which is only possible if (a) there are no interruptions and stoppages in production i.e. absence of disputes,
and (b) if the various agencies of production are satisfied and are in a harmonious bent to work. In other
words, industrial peace is very necessary for the vitality of industry.
(ii)
Economic Justice: All interruptions in production arising out of industrial dispute are really caused by the
dissatisfaction of labour with their existing economic condition. The history of labour struggle is nothing but
a continuous demand for fair return to labour expressed in varied forms e.g. (a) increase in wages, (b)
resistance to decrease in wages, (c) grant of allowances and benefits etc.(Hariprasad Vs. A.D.Divelkar, AIR
1957 SC 121)
Social and economic justice which is the bedrock of our Constitution and economic organization also requires that any
industrial relations or disputes legislation, to be effective remedial statute, must embrace not only law for regulation of
labour relations with capital, process for channelizing collective bargaining methods for negotiation, mediation,
conciliation and settlements of industrial conflict, but also a system for giving fair play and justice to labour and
removal of economic injustice.
The preamble of the Act states that its main object is to make provision for investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes. Viewed in the above background, the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is a progressive piece of social
legislation and is designed to settle the disputes on a new pattern known under the Act as adjudication machinery.
The object of all labour legislation is to ensure fair wages and to prevent disputes so that production might not be
adversely affected. (Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1957 SC 167)
The purpose of the Act is to provide machinery for a just and equitable settlement by adjudication, (G. Claridge and
Company Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, AIR 1951 Bombay 100) and amelioration of the conditions of
workmen in industry.
Individual and collective industrial disputes: Individual as well as collective disputes may ripen into industrial
disputes. The true nature of an individual dispute is that it is a collective dispute. Though a dispute may at the
inception be initiated by an individual, yet if it is taken up by the fellow-workers or a union, or a sufficient number of
workers, it may assume the collective character and would become an industrial dispute. (Standard Vacum Oil Co.
Errakulam Vs. I.Tribunal, Errakulam 1952-II LLJ 612). A dispute which continues to retain its individual
character cannot be regarded as an industrial dispute. This being the basic law, it is within the competence of the
legislature to widen or narrow the coverage of an industrial dispute. The Industrial Disputes Act has also been
amended to cover some individual disputes. It is not necessary that a majority should take an industrial dispute. It is
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
sufficient if a substantial group of workmen take it up. When thus taken, it becomes an industrial or collective
dispute.
Individual dispute an industrial dispute: The important amongst the above are however the amendments of 1965.
By the Act of 1965, a new Section 2A has been added in Act whereby specified categories of individual disputes are
also deemed to be industrial disputes. The section reads as under:
“2A. Dismissal, etc of an individual workman to be deemed to be industrial dispute-
Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual
workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out
of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute
notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.”
This amendment revives, impediment in the way of workman with the necessity that to make an industrial dispute it
must be taken up or espoused by substantial section of the workmen or any union of those workmen and gives an
individual workman a remedy for security of his service and indirectly freedom to join or not to join any union. Thus,
individual disputes could be referred to Tribunal as per Section 2A after 1.12.1965. (National Productivity Council,
1969-II LLJ 186).
Thereafter, by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 2010 (Act No. 24 of 2010), Section 2A(a), was renumbered as
Sub-section (1) and by the same Act i.e. Act No.24 of 2010 Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) have been inserted
after Section 2A (1) of Industrial Dispute Act 1947 which came into effect w.e.f. 15.09.2010, which reads as under:
"2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute -
"(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the
services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his
employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other
workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in
sub-Section(1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for
adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date
he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for
conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal
shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute
referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in
relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-Section(2) shall be made to the Labour Court or
Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment
or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section(1)."
Now the core question to be considered is that in view of the facts which are stated hereinabove, that admittedly the
services of applicant was terminated on 21.12.2001, thereafter he has filed the present case before this Tribunal u/s 2A
of the Act on 28.02.2011 on the grounds as taken by him in his claim petition, is maintainable or barred by the period
of limitation as provided u/s 2A(3) of the Act.
Answer to the said question find place in the judgment passed by Hon’ble the Karnataka High Court in ITC Infotech
India Ltd. vs. Venkataramana Uppada ILR 2016 Karnataka 3041, relevant potion quoted as under:
“19. Keeping the above principles in mind, a reading of Section 2A(3) would lead to an irresistible
conclusion that time stipulated for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the
case may be, has to be necessarily "before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section (1)." Time limit
for making an application to the Labour Court stipulated in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A does not
appear to have a bearing to the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 2A. In any event right
conferred under Section 2A would lapse immediately preceding the date of expiry of three years from
the date of dismissal, discharge etc.,. In other words, the limitation of three years prescribed under
sub-Section (3) of Section 2A being mandatory, same cannot be condoned by taking recourse to
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which has no application to the provisions of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
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20. It is well settled principle that if an act is required to be performed within a specified time, the
same would primarily be mandatory. It has been held in the case of NAZIRUDDIN VS SITARAM
AGARWAL reported in AIR 2003 SCW 908 to the following effect:
"The Courts jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It
is well known that in a given case, the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the
texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language
of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract the words to a statute or
read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also
necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any
superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of legislature must be gathered
from the language used."
21. Thus, in the background of the dicta of the Apex Court in NAZIRUDDIN's case referred to supra,
when Section 2A is perused, it would indicate that if the legislature really intended that the period of
limitation provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A was to be construed as directory, then it would not
have prescribed the limitation of three years and it would have used the words "at any time" instead of
using the words "before the expiry of three years". Though the words at any time' is found in Section
10(1), same is conspicuously absent in sub-Section(3) of Section 2A which would clearly depict the
intention of the legislature namely, it had deliberately imposed limitation period under sub-Section (3)
of Section 2A and as such legislature did not employ the words at any time' in the said provision as
found in Section 10(1) and in its place, it has specifically incorporated the words before the expiry of
three years'. Hence, to interpret the period of limitation found in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A as
directory and not mandatory would amount to adding something which is not provided in the provision
by the legislature or it would amount to doing violence to the provision, if such interpretation is sought
to be made."
And Hon’ble Rajasthan High court in the case of Pankaj Swami vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation &
ors. MANU/RH/1788/2019 after taking into consideration the provisions of sedation 2A(2) & 2A(3) of the Act held as
under:
“The provisions are explicit, wherein the workman can approach the Labour Court for adjudication of
the dispute in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment etc., however, sub-section (3) provides that
the application should be made to the Labour Court before the expiry of three years from the date of
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified.
8. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the cause of action arose to the
petitioner prior to introduction of the provision of limitation by sub-section (3) the same would have no
application is concerned, the submission made is fallacious, inasmuch as, the provision under which
the application has been filed by the petitioner i.e. section 2-A(2) of the Act, itself was introduced by
the amendment Act of 2010 alongwith the limitation therein and therefore, the provision of limitation
which was introduced in the year 2010 alongwith the main provision providing for the limitation would
apply with all force and the submission that the same would have no application to the cause of action,
which arose prior to 2007, has no basis.
The submissions as made, if accepted, would result in circumstances where if the cause of action has
arisen post 2010, the same would be barred, whereas the causes, which arose prior to 2010 like in the
year 2007 in the present case and the application is filed after 7 years, the same would never become
barred by limitation, such a result is legally untenable.
9. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the petitioner had approached
the Conciliation Officer and had raised the dispute before him, where there was no limitation and the
petitioner approached the Labour Court only as per the directions of the Conciliation Officer the claim
could not be rejected by barred by limitation also does not advance the cause of the petitioner,
inasmuch as, the petitioner could have taken advantage of the said position, if the Conciliation Officer
had sent a failure report to the appropriate Government who in turn had referred the dispute to the
Labour Court. Merely because the Conciliation Officer suggested approaching the Labour Court,
which suggestion was accepted by the petitioner, cannot be termed as a reference under section 10 of
the Act to the Labour Court.
10. In view of the above discussion in so far as the rejection of the claim of the petitioner by the Labour
Court being barred by limitation is concerned, the same cannot be faulted.”
And in the case of Parthasarathy vs. Souther Pins and Products Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. MANU/TN/6691/2020 Hon’ble
the High Court of Madras has held as under:
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“In as much as the notice of termination of the Petitioner in the present case has been made on
06.10.2014 under Section 2-A(2) of the Act after the said amendment has come into force, the
limitation of three years prescribed under Section 2-A(3) of the Act would necessarily apply. As such,
there is no infirmity in the decision-making process of the Labour Court in refusing to entertain the
application made by the Petitioner has time barred. This view is supported by the decisions of this
Court in the following cases:-
(i) ITC Infotech India Ltd. v. Venkataramana Uppada (Order dated 03.03.2016 in W.P. No.
27510 of 2015 passed by the High Court of Karnataka)
(ii) Management of Ashok Leyland v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (Order dated
13.04.2016 in W.P. Nos. 9640 and 9641 of 2016 passed by this Court)
(iii) Ravi Kumar v. Management, Tamil Nadu State Road Transport Corporation (Order
dated 11.04.2017 in W.P. (MD) No. 4269 of 2017 passed by the Madurai Bench of this Court)
(iv) K. Settu v. Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Order dated 20.09.2019 in
W.P. No. 8413 of 2019 passed by this Court)
5. A feeble attempt is made on behalf of the Petitioner to suggest that the period of conciliation must be
excluded while computing the limitation. It is, no doubt, true that Section 2-A(2) of the Act
contemplates such application to be made to the Labour Court after the expiry of 45 days from the date
of application to the Conciliation Officer is made. However, it does not require that the conciliation
proceedings should have been completed before making that application under Section 2-A(2) of the
Act. The words in Section 2-A(3) of the Act are clear enough that the limitation has to be reckoned on
the expiry of three years from the date of termination. The Petitioner in the instant case had made the
application for conciliation on 12.04.2017 which had also concluded on 27.06.2017, but the Petitioner
had not approached the Labour Court after 45 days either from 12.04.2017 or even from 27.06.2017.
As such, the contentions made on behalf of the Petitioner cannot be countenanced.”
(see also Kandasamy Spinning Mills Private Ltd. vs S. Palanisamy and Ors. MANU/RN/6831/2019
Thus, in view of above said fact, combined reading of section 2A (2) and 2A (3) of the Act, the legal position which
emerge out is that if a workman is aggrieved by order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination,
he may approach the Tribunal within a period three years from dated of passing of order.
Taking into consideration, above said facts and positon of law as well that “if law provides a particular thing that all
other modes or methods of doing that thing must be deemed to have been prohibited”, the said proposition of law is
first held in the case of Tylor Vs. Tylor (1875) LR 1 ChD 426 and adopted later by the Judicial Committee in Nazir
Ahmed Vs. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 and thereafter by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a series of judgments
including those in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & another Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322, State of
Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358, Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad 1999 (8) SCC 266,
Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka 2001 (4) SCC 9 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Essar Power
Ltd. 2008 (4) SCC 755.
In the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as under:-
“No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of
interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words.
No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and
every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an
edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to
gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and
there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court
to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is
clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been
said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its
support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided”.
Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111,
held as under:-
“24.
True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what provides by its clear
language, with due regard to the scheme of law.
25.
Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of
the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2775
construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it
is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable,
unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute”.
In the case of Harshad S. Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 257, it has been held as under:-
“There is no doubt that if the words are plain and simple and call for only one construction that construction
is to be adopted whatever be its effect”.
In the case of Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devo (2002) 7 SCC 273, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as under:-
“9. It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the
courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act.”
In the case of Patango Kadam Vs. Prithviraj Sayajiro Yadav Deshmukh (2001) 3 SCC 594, took the view:-
“12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a provision, one must look at well-settled principles of
construction but it is not open to first to create an ambiguity which does not exist and then try to resolve the
same by taking recourse to some general principle.”
Also, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane & others vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer & another (2013) 10 SCC 765 has held as under:
“16.
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is
never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation."
(See Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta10, AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitash Kumar v.
Om Prakash Sharma 11.)
Reverting to the facts of the present case, as per admitted position, the services of the workman was terminated on
21.12.2001 and the same has been challenged by him by filing the present industrial dispute on 28.02.2011.
So, keeping in view the above said facts as well as that the workman/Sri Pal (now deceased substituted by his legal
heirs Smt. Guddi) cannot derive any benefit from the facts on which he has approached the Tribunal after expiry of
period three years from the date of his termination, because his services were terminated on 21.12.2001 and filed the
present case on 28.02.2011 u/s 2A (2) of the Act, as such, the claim petition is barred by the period of limitation
provided u/s 2A (3) of the Act, liable to be rejected.
Accordingly, the same is rejected on the ground that same is barred by period of limitation as per section 2A (3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, with liberty to the claimant to pursue its case before appropriate forum as per law.
Award as above.
LUCKNOW.
13.07.2023
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—औद्योजगक जववाि अजिजन म, (1947 का 14) की िारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्री सरकार मु् ाल ,
मध् कमान (एसीसीटीएस), नेिप रोड, कैंट, ल नऊ; मु् ाल , मध् सब एरर ा कमांडर, मिात्मा गांिी मागय, ल नऊ, के प्रबंितंत्र
के संबद्ध जन ोिकों और श्री ि नारा ण, कामगार,के बीच अनुबंि में जनर्ियष्ट केन्री सरकार
ल नऊ ृंचाट (संिभय सं् ा 10/2016) को िजसा दक अनुलग्नक में दि ा ा ग ा िज, प्रकाजित करती िज िो केन्री सरकार
को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के सा 20/07/2023 को प्राप्त हुआ ा l
[la- ,y-42025/07/2023-168-आईआर(डी ू)]
डी. के. जिमांिु, अवर सजचव
2776
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1313.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 10/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court–Lucknow, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to
Head Quarter, Central Command (ACCts), Neharu Road, Cantt, Lucknow ; Head Quarter, Madhya Sub Area
Commander, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Lucknow, and Shri Jai Narayan, Worker, which was received along with
soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 20/07/2023.
[No. L-42025/07/2023-168- IR (DU)]
D. K. HIMANSHU, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 10/2016
BETWEEN
Jai Narayan, aged 33 years, son of Shri. Jamuna, R/o C/o Shri. Ram Milan
Prajapati, House No. 818, Shah Keda, Arjun Ganj, Lucknow
AND
1. Head Quarter, Central Command (ACCts), Neharu Road, Cantt, Lucknow-226002
2. Head Quarter, Madhya Sub Area Commander, Mahatma Gandhi Marg. Lucknow 226002
AWARD
Present industrial dispute has been filed by the workman/Jai Narayan u/s 2A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Accordingly, an industrial dispute No. 10/2016 has been registered on 26.02.2016.
Brief facts of the case:
Facts of the case, as taken by the claimant in his statement of claim is that he was appointed as Gardner on a fixed
salary of Rs. 5800/- along with bonus of Rs. 1000/- vide letter No. 1722/I.B./P.R.I. dated April, 2010; and he worked
as such for two years and thereafter his services were terminated/retrenched orally.
Accordingly, a prayer has been made that his termination be set aside and he be reinstated/regularized with
consequential benefits.
On 01.12.2020, behalf of the respondent, counter affidavit has been filed; wherein it has been submitted that the
claimant was never appointed on the post of Gardner; rather he was a contractual worker for up keep and maintenance
of valuable plants since 2010 and after completion of contract for the year 2012-2013, the services of claimant came
to an end.
From perusal of the order sheet, the position, emerged out that on 09.10.2017 time was granted to the workman to file
rejoinder affidavit; but he has not filed the same till date; however, he has not turned up since 05.02.2018.
On 02.11.2018, opportunity to file rejoinder was closed and by order dated 30.09.2022 last opportunity was granted to
file workman’s evidence on affidavit.
On 15.11.2022, when the matter was taken up in revised cause list, parties remain absent; accordingly, the case was
reserved for order.
Findings & Conclusion:
Accordingly, taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as material on record, admitted position which
emerged out that after filing of statement of claim no oral/documentary evidence has been filed on behalf of the
claimant to support his claim, as such, adjudication case is liable to be dismissed.
So, in view of the said facts, as well as the law laid by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v.
Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2777
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
Thus, taking into consideration the facts on record that in the present case the workman has not filed any
oral/documentary evidence in support of his claim, so the same is liable to be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
LUCKNOW.
26th July, 2023.
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj ृरात्मा
ू.ृी. ग्रामीण बैंक; ू.ृी. ग्रामीण बैंक; ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj श्री सुनील कुमार जमश्रा ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (09/2020) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y-39025/01/2023-vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-17]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1314.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 09/2020) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Pratma U.P. Gramin
Bank; U.P. Gramin Bank; and Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra.
[No. L-39025/01/2023-IR(B-I)-17]
SALONI, Dy. Director
2778
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM –LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. 09/2020
Ref. No.-K-10/1-5/2019-IR, Dt. 30.01.2020
BETWEEN
Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra
S/o Sri Jagdamba Prasad
Village Saraiya (Pure Tiwari)
Kherhansa, Tehsil and District- Gonda
272003 (U.P.)
AND
1.
G.M.
Pratma U.P. Gramin Bank
Head Office, Ram Ganga Vihar
Vihar Phase-II,
District- Moradabad.
2.
Regional Manager
U.P. Gramin Bank
Regional Office, 508, Phoolvila
Malviya Nagar, District 272003 (U.P.)
3.
Branch Manager
U.P. Gramin Bank
Branch Kherhansha,
District Gonda, 271123.
AWARD
By order No. I.D. 09/2020 Ref. No.-K-10/1-5/2019-IR, Dt. 30.01.2020 present industrial dispute has been
referred for adjudication to this Tribunal dispute in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of Sub- Section (1)
and sub-Section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with
following schedule:
“Whether the action of management of Sarv U.P. Gramin Bank, Gonda by terminating the services of
Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra S/o Sri Jagdamba Prasad with effect from 30.07.2014 without complying the
provision of Section 25(f) of ID Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If so, to what relief concerned workman is
entitled to and from which date?.
Accordingly an industrial dispute No. 31/2019 has been registered.
On 13.03.2020 time was granted to claimant to file statement of claim.
On 01.04.2021 an order was passed quoted herein below:-
“case called out.
Parties absent.
From perusal of tracking report, downloaded from the internet, it is evident that the notice has sufficiently
been served upon workman and OP No. 1 and 3 whereas notice issued to the OP No. 2 has been received
back in the office however, in the interest of justice. One more opportunity is granted”.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2779
Thereafter on 30.12.2022 an order was passed quoted herein below:-
“Matter taken up in revise list.
Parties absent.
Last opportunity is granted to file statement of claim.
On 27.02.2023 an order was passed, quoted here in below:-
“Matter taken up in revised list.
Parties absent.
In spite of last opportunity claim is not filed.
List on 23.05.2023 for ex-parte hearing. Notice to parties.
In spite of notice when the matter was taken up. On 23.05.2023 neither claimant/legal representative appeared on his
behalf nor claim statement was filed.
Accordingly I have heard learned counsel for respondent and perused on record.
Taking into consideration the fact till date no statement of claim has been filed by the claimant in order to establish his
claim as per the reference dated 30.01.2020.
So in view of the said facts, as well as the law laid by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of V.K. Industries Vs.
Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR as under:-
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must fail.
Whenever a workman raised a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is imperative
for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which the order is
challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to appear or to file
written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government cannot be answered in
favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief”.
In the case of M/s Uptron powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary V. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:-
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shankar Chakravarti Vs Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd.,
V.K. Raj Industries V. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. 1984 (49)
FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of any evidence led by
or on behalf of the workman reference is bound to be answered by the Court against the workman. In such a
situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at all. The obligation to lead evidence to
establish and allegation made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would be, who would
fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee U.P. P.A. C.C.S.C.
Services V. Secretary-cum- G.M. District Co-Operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:-
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the
shoulders of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead
evidence first which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any
evidence either oral or documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the
reference has to be dismissed”.
As the workman had not filed any statement of claim/oral/documentary evidence, so the present case is liable to be
dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief:-
Lucknow
Date: 11.07.2023.
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
2780
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ubZ fnYyh] 11 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
नॉियनय रेलवे; मेससय िाजिि फजज़ान अिमि एंड ब्रिसय ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj श्री राि कुमार ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (10/2012) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y-12025/01/2023-vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-73]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023
S.O. 1315.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 10/2012) of the Cent. Govt.Indus. Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama Northern
Railway; M/s Shahid Faizan Ahmad & Brothers and Shri Raj Kumar.
[No. L-12025/01/2023-IR(B-I)-73]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT
LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 10/2012
BETWEEN
Raj Kumar S/o Sri Ram Kailash
Vill. Budehari, PO– Ram Sanehi Ghat,
Distt. Barabanki
Vs
1. General Manager
Northern Railway, Baroda House,
New Delhi 110001.
2. Divisional Rail Manager,
Northern Railway, Hazratganj
Lucknow 226001.
3. M/s Shahid Faizan Ahmad & Brothers
654, Begum Ka Makbara, Faizabad (UP) 224001
AWARD
None present on behalf of the claimant.
Heard Sri U.K. Bajpai, learned counsel for respondent and perused the record.
Brief facts of the case:
Present industrial dispute has been filed by the claimant/workman before this Tribunal as per the provisions of section
2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947).
On 16.01.2012 the claimant filed a claim petition, as per the pleading made by claimant in his claim petition, that he
was appointed/engaged by the opposite party No. 1 through the contractor, M/s Shahid Faizan & Brothers (Opposite
part No.3) for doing work of Driver Box handling under the opposite party No. 2, DRM, NR, Lucknow; and for said
purpose gate pass was issued by the respondent no. 2, given by the respondent No. 3.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2781
On 25.04.2009 without giving any notice, his services were terminated/retrenched.
Accordingly, it is prayed by the claimant that as he has continuously worked from 05.10.2003 to 25.04.2009 i.e. for
six years, thus, completed 120 days’ continuous service, so as per Railway Establishment Rules he is entitled for
temporary status; however, without giving the same his services were terminated.
In view of the said factual back ground claimant, prays for following relief:
“(क) वदनांक 25.04.2009 से की गयी सेिा सिाप्ति आदेश को अिैध ठहराये।
(ख) सेिा की वनरन्तरता के साथ कायय पर बहाल कराये ।
(ग) बेकारी काल का िेतन ि अन्य अनुिन्य वहतलाभ भी वदलाये।
(घ) िाद का पररव्यय भी वदलाये।“
Case of respondent:
On 17.05.2011, written statement was filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 & 2 (railway authorities).
Respondents No. 1 & 2 in their written statement, in brief, submitted that workman was never engaged by the
respondent no 1 & 2 but was a casual worker through contractor, admitted by the claimant in himself in the claim
statement.
In the written statement it was also pleaded by respondent 1 & 2 that Railway Establishment Rules and D & AR
Rules, 1968 are not applicable in the case of applicant, as he was not engaged by the railway administration, so, he
cannot claim any benefit from the provisions/rules in respect to the period in which he was engaged as casual labour
by the contractor.
On behalf of respondent no. 3 a written statement, was filed on 16.10.2012 (M-10), it is categorically pleaded that the
claimant was never employed/engaged by respondent no 3 as well as by respondent no. 1 & 2 and respondent no. 3
never got any work order or Form-V issued for appointment/engagement of claimant on the post of Box Porter by the
railway authorities. It is also pleaded that in department there is no post of Box Porter.
On 14.05.2013 workman/claimant filed rejoinder statement, denying averments as made in the written statement filed
by respondent no. 1 & 3.
On 04.03.2014 in support of his case, the claimant has field certain documents, for example various bills submitted by
M/s Mo. Shahid Faizan & Brothers to the railway authorities in respects to the work performed by the
persons/workers who have been engaged for transportation of drivers Khana/Line Boxes etc. with respondent
no. 1 & 2.
In addition to the above said facts the claimant also filed a photo copy of notary affidavit dated 03.07.2009 of one
Sri Lala Singh in order to establish that the claimant was working with the respondents.
Accordingly, it has been pleaded by the claimant that M/s Mo. Shahid Faizan & Brothers has engaged the workman as
contractual employee on 05.10.2003, in said capacity, the said fact established from affidavit of Lala Singh who was
also engaged by contractor, M/s Mo. Shahid Faizan & Brothers; however, no reply or any documents have been
submitted to deny the said fact either by the respondent no 1 & 2 or by respondent no. 3.
However, no evidence has been filed either on behalf of the workman or on behalf of the respondents in order to prove
his case in spite of due notice.
Submissions on behalf of the respondent:
Sri U.K. Bajpai, learned counsel for the respondent while pressing the case of respondent placed reliance on the facts
as stated in the written statement and also on award given by a co-ordinate bench of this Tribunal dated 04.10.2018 in
I.D. Case No. 43/2012 Pradeep Kumar vs. GM, Norther Railway & others, notified on 23.10.2018 by the Central
Government, relevant portion of the same reads as under:
“2.
The case of the workman, Pradeep Kumar, in brief, is that he was appointed as Box Porter
with opposite party No. 02 against the permanent vacant post; and worked accordingly w.e.f.
01.09.2003 to 25.04.2009 continuously when his services have been terminated without any notice. It
is submitted by the workman that the opposite party No. 02 has kept opposite party No. 03 to escape
from the responsibilities and labour laws though he performed duties of opposite party No. 2 under its
directions. He also submitted that he was issued a gate pass by the opposite party No. 03, under
directions of the opposite party No. 02, which used to be taken back at the end of the year. The
workman has stated that he after continuous service of 120 days was entitled for temporary status and
other service benefits under service Rules. Accordingly, the workman has prayed for reinstatement
with full back wages with continuity in service.
2782
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
3.
The opposite party No. 01 & 02 has disputed the claim of the workman by filing its written
statement; wherein it has mentioned that the workman had never been engaged/appointed by the
opposite party No. 01 & 02; moreover the railway management entered into an agreement with the
opposite party No. 03 for executing the day to day casual work at railway stations; and accordingly,
the railway administration is not liable for any claim made by the workman as the railway
administration neither engaged the workman nor did it terminate him; and also that it did not make
any violation of any labour law or engaged in any kind of unfair labour practice; hence it has been
prayed by the opposite party No. 1 & 2 that the claim of the workman be rejected without any relief to
him being devoid of merit.
4.
The opposite party No. 03 has also disputed the claim of the workman with submission that
neither any post of Box Porter was ever vacant nor the opposite party No. 3 ever received work order
or Form-V from railway administration nor the workman was ever appointed with the opposite party
No. 1, 2 & 3 on the post of Box Porter; hence there is no question of his termination. It has submitted
that the workman was never issued any gate pass by the opposite party No. 3 and various benefits such
as salary, weekly holiday, Provident Fund and medical facilities are available to the regularly
appointed employee who are appointed after adopting due procedure; and the workman is not entitled
for the same as there was no violation to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Accordingly, the opposite
party No. 03 has prayed that the claim of the workman be rejected.
5.
The workman has filed its rejoinder wherein he has denied the counter allegations of the
opposite parties reiterating the averments already made in the statement of claim.
6.
The opposite party No. 03 did not turn up after filing of its written statement.
7.
The workman and opposite party No. 01 & 02 filed photocopies of documents in support of
their cases. The workman examined himself; whereas the opposite party No. 01 & 02 examined Shri P.
K. Singh, ADME (O&F), Northern Railway, Lucknow in support of their respective stands. The parties
availed opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of each other apart from forwarding oral
arguments.
8.
Heard the authorized representatives of the parties and perused entire evidence available on
record.
9.
The authorized representative of the workman has argued that he was appointed as Box
Porter with opposite party No. 02 against the permanent vacant post; and worked accordingly w.e.f.
01.09.2003 to 25.04.2009 continuously when his services have been terminated without any notice or
notice pay or assigning any reason thereof in contravention to the provisions of Section 25 F of the
I.D. Act, 1947. The learned authorizes representative of the workman has also asserted that the
workman after continuous service of 120 days was entitled for temporary status and other service
benefits under service Rules. He has relied upon
(i)
The Judgment and order dated 15.02.2013 of Hon’ble Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.
433 of 1998
(ii)
Judgment dated 27.01.1999 of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Sheikh Jahangir Ali & others
vs Calcutta Port Trust & others.
(iii)
(2006) 12 SCC 380 District Rehabilitation Officer & others vs Jay Kishore Maity & others.
(iv)
(2003)11 SCC 590 A.I. Railway Parcel & Goods Porters’ Union vs Union of India & others.
10.
In rebuttal, the opposite party No. 01 & 02’s representative has contended that the workman
is contractor’s employee as the opposite party has undergone a contract with the M/s Industrial
Security Services for supply of security personnel; and accordingly the workman was one of the
security guards provided by M/s Industrial Security Services and the said contractor/agency was duly
paid for it, which in turn paid salary to the workman. It has been urged that the management of
opposite party No. 01 neither appointed the workman nor terminated his services; rather his
employment was regulated by M/s Industrial Security Services and the same came to an end with the
end of contract with the agency; hence there was no violation of provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. He has relied upon:
(i)
2017 LLR 940, the Secretary, BSNL, Contractor Mazdoor Union & others vs. The Chief
General Manager, BSNL.
(ii)
2018 LLR 758 Civil Aviation Training College, Bamrauli vs Mohan Lal Prajapati.
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2783
11.
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of the parties and perused
entire evidence available on file.
12.
The workman has come up with a case that he had been appointed by the opposite party No. 2
on the clear vacancy of Box Porter and the management of railways engaged the opposite party No. 3
in order to deprive the workman of his legitimate rights. It has also been contended by the workman
that keeping in view the long and continuous service with the opposite party No. 1 & 02 he was entitled
for grant of temporary status and other consequential benefits admissible to the employees with
temporary status under Railway Establishment Rules; but on the contrary the management of Railways
has acted in utter disregard to the norms and has terminated his services without any reason or rhyme
or any notice or any notice pay in lieu thereof, which is voilative of the provisions of the Section 25 F
of the ID Act, 1947. It is also the case of the workman that keeping in view the pronouncement of the
Hon’ble Apex Court regarding regularization/absorption of Box Porters with railway administration,
he was also entitled for regularization/absorption into the services of the Railways. The workman has
filed photocopy of gate pass/Identity card, purported to be issued by opposite party No. 3.
13.
Per contra, the opposite party No.1 & 2 has come forward with a clear cut case that the
management of railways neither appointed the workman in any capacity nor there arises any question
of his termination or violation of any of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is the
case of the management of railways that the management of railways entered into an agreement with
M/s Shahid FAizan Ahmed & Brother’s for transportation of driver line boxed from Charbagh &
Alamnagar station and accordingly, the workman’s services were availed by the said
contractor/opposite party No. 3 by engaging him; and was paid accordingly. Thus, there was no direct
employer-employee relationship between the management of railways and the workman, therefore, the
management of railways is not liable to the workman in any way as claimed before this Tribunal. The
opposite party No. 01 & 02 has filed photocopy of the contract dated 22.01.2009 entered between the
railway administration and the opposite party No. 3.
14.
Moreover, the opposite party No. 03 has also rebutted the claim of the workman with
submissions that the workman had never been appointed by any of the opposite parties and he was not
entitled for any of the benefits as claimed by him as they were admissible to the regularly appointed
employees of the railways. It also mentioned that there was no vacancy of the Box Porter nor any such
post was advertised by the railways or any recruitment was done in pursuance thereof. However, the
opposite party No. 03 did not turn up after filing its written statement. But its absence does not
automatically create any legal rights in favour of the petitioner workman.
15.
Having gone through the respective pleading of the parties and entire documentary evidence
available on record it comes out that the railway administration entered into a contract with the
opposite party No. 03 viz. M/s Shahid Faizan Ahmed & Brother’s to carry out the working according
to the specification provided in the contract for a period or two years only; and in consequence
thereto; workman had been engaged by the opposite party No. 03 viz. M/s Shahid Faizan Ahmed &
Brother’s for transportation of Driver line boxes from Charbagh & Alam Nagar station railway
platform.
The workman has examined himself in support of his case and during his cross-examination
has stated that he had been appointed by the contractor on the orders of the railway officer; but he
could not show any such order of the railway officer. He admitted that the railway neither appointed
nor terminated his services; rather he stated that the Contractor, Shahid Faizan terminated him. He
also admitted that he had not filed any such document which goes to show that he continuously worked
from 2003 to 2009 with the railways.
On contrary, the management of the railway has examined Sri P. K. Singh, ADME (O&F),
who stated in his cross-examination that contractor is being allotted ‘work order’, which is for a
specific time period; however the time period keeps on changing with reference to the condition and
this may be for 6 months, some time for 01 year and sometimes it may be for 02 years also, depending
on the nature of the work. He stated that Indian Railway does not have direct relation with any Box
Porter and the contractor is fully responsible for quality of work. He further stated that the contractor
is directly related with the workman and Railways has no role in the appointment of Box Porter by the
contractor; nor does the railway issues any identity card to any of the Box Porter engaged by the
contractor. The management witness specially stated that since the contract used to be time bound,
therefore, on its expiry, the contract is issued again; hence there is no relation with the railways
regarding regularization.
16.
During course of the oral submissions the learned authorized representative of the workman
has stressed over the order of Hon’ble Apex Court’s Judgment and order dated 15.02.2013 of Hon’ble
2784
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 433 of 1998 and has submitted that the case of the workman is
covered with the said order of the Hon’ble Apex Court and since the railway management has given
appointment/regularized other box porters in light of above order dated 15.02.2013 of the Hon’ble
Suprem Court, therefore the workman is also entitled for regularization accordingly. The learned
authorized representative of the management of railway has vehemently opposed the same. Having
taken into account the contentions of the rival parties and perusal of the Judgment and order dated
15.02.2013 of Hon’ble Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 433 of 1998 and various letters filed by
the workman, obtained through Right to Information Act, 2005, it appears that the Judgment and order
dated 15.02.2013 of Hon’ble Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 433 of 1998 was in personam and
not in rem, therefore, the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court shall apply to the workmen who
approached the Hon’ble Sureme Court; and since the workman never approached the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, therefore, the Judgment and order dated 15.02.2013 of Hon’ble Apex Court in Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 433 of 1998 is of no use for him.
Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in 2017 LLR 940, the Secretary, BSNL, Contractor Mazdoor
Union & others vs. The Chief General Manager, BSNL has held that admission of the workmen that
they were working under their respective contractor, is sufficient to establish that they were having no
employer-employee relationship with BSNL management; hence, the workmen are not entitled to seek
any relief from BSNL management. Hon’ble High Court has observed as under:
“The ratio of the Division Bench in the case of the Binoy Bhushan Chakraborty (supra) is that
when a workman is engaged by a contractor to carry out some work at any establishment of BSNL,
if such workman is retrenched by the contractor while working under him, BSNL cannot be
regarded as employer of such workman with the meaning of “employer” as defined in the Industrial
Disputes Act nor such workman can be held to be a “workman” under BSNL within the meaning of
the said term, as defined under the said Act and such workman cannot claim to be absorbed in the
service of BSNL.”
Hon’ble Allahabd High Court in 2018 LLR 758 Civil Aviation Training College, Bamrauli vs
Mohan Lal Prajapati has observed as under:
“Since, prima facie there was no employment of the respondent with the petitioner there could not
have been any termination. I am therefore, of the definite opinion that the Labour Court decided
the dispute erroneously. It had no jurisdiction to decide the matter. In fact, when the workman was
not at all a workman as had been stated by the petitioner and as was also clear from the averment
made in paragraph-10 of the counter affidavit the respondent/workman who had been engaged by a
contractor had the remedy to file a claim under the Contract Labourer (Regulation and Abolition)
Contract Rules, 1971 (hereinafter called the 1971 Rules)”
17.
It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of order, the burden lies upon him to
prove illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced, the party invoking jurisdiction of the court
must fail. In the present case burden was on the workman to set out the grounds to challenge the
validity of the termination and to prove that the alleged termination by railways. It was the case of the
workman that he had been appointed on the post of Box Porter under the opposite party No. 02 and
had worked continuously w.e.f. 01.09.2003 to 25.04.2009, when his services have been terminated
without any notice by the railways. This claim has been denied by the railway management; therefore,
it was for the workman to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked continuously for the
claimed duration before his alleged termination. In (2002) 3 SCC 25 Range Forest Officer vs S.T.
Hadimani Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:
“It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It
was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the
year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and
that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion
that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement
for that period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set
aside.”
18.
Analyzing its earlier decisions on the aforesaid point Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in
2006 (108) FLR R.M. Yellatti & Asstt. Executive Engineer as follow:
“It is clear that the provisions of the evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under
section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the
aforestated judgments we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof
is on the claimant to show that he had worked 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged
only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2785
adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily
wages earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or
proof of payment. Thus, in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to
produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or
termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference
ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it
clear that mere affidavits or self serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice
in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked
for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non production of
muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground
for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management.”
In the present case the workman has come up with a case that he had been appointed on the
post of Box Porter under the opposite party No. 02 and thus, worked continuously w.e.f. 01.09.2003 to
25.04.2009, but has not produced any document neither original nor photocopy in support of his
pleadings . The burden was on the workman to show by the way of cogent evidence that there was
employee-employer relationship; and he actually worked for claimed duration; but he failed to do so
as he could not bring this fact on record. In view of denial of the management regarding his claim, the
workman has nothing to support his version, except photo copy of the so called identity card,
purported to be issued by the opposite party No. 03 i.e. the contractor viz. M/s Shahid Faizan Ahmed &
Brother’s. Further, the opposite party No. 03, the contractor has also refuted the claim of the
workman regarding his appointment with the railways. Hence, the workman could not establish that
there was any employee and employer relationship between him and the opposite party No. 01 & 02 i.e
railways.
19.
On the other hand the management of the railways has well proved its case by filing copy of
the contract with the M/s Shahid Faizan Ahmed & Brother’s for supply of labourers for transportation
of Driver line boxes at railway platform.
Mere pleadings are no substitute for proof. Initial burden of establishing the fact of
continuous work on the date of alleged termination was on the workman but he failed to discharge the
above burden. There is no reliable material for recording findings that the workman had been
appointed by the railway administration on the post of Box Porter or he worked continuously with the
opposite party No. 01 & 02; and the alleged unjust or illegal order of termination was passed by the
management of opposite party No. 01 & 02 or any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had
been violated by them.
20.
Thus, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and discussions made herein above I
am of considered opinion that the workman could not be able to prove through cogent evidence that
there was a relationship of employee and employer between him and the opposite party No. 01 & 02;
rather from the evidence adduced it is established that he was and an employee of the contractor viz.
M/s Shahid Faizan Ahmed & Brother’s, therefore, the workman could not be granted the relief of
reinstatement or any other relief sought by the workman against the opposite party No. 01 & 02.
21.
Award as above.”
It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for respondent that award dated 04.10.2018 published on
23.10.2018, passed in ID case no. 43/2012, attained finality as the same has not been challenged by the workman
before any higher authority, and as the present case stands on the same footing, liable to be dismissed.
Further, present case, the workman was engaged as contractual employee by the respondent no. 3 M/s Mo. Shahi
Faizan & Brothers 05.10.2003; and his services were terminated on 25.04.2009.
So far as the engagement of Sri Raj Kumar, claimant on the post of Box Porter as contract worker of M/s Mo. Shahi
Faizan & Brothers from the material on record especially from the affidavit given by Sri Lala Singh who was also
working on the post of Box Porter under contractor M/s Mo. Shahi Faizan & Brothers and clearly established that he
was engaged as a contract employee by the contractor, M/s Mo. Shahi Faizan & Brothers.
Further, on behalf of the claimant there is no document on record in order to establish and prove that was engaged by
respondent no. 1 & 2 only a bald statement has been made in claim statement that was issued gate pass by respondent
no. 3 on the direction of respondent no. 2.
Even no pleading, documentary or oral evidence have been adduced by the claimant that prior to termination of
services on 25.04.2009, he has continuously worked for 120 days continuously for four months with the respondent
no. 2 (DRM, NR, Lucknow) by virtue of which he can have a right to get temporary status.
2786
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
As per the settled preposition of law, initially onus on this regard lies on the claimant that he must establish the said
fact by any material, then the onus, shifted on respondents to contradict the said facts.
Further, the present case is standing on the same footing; rather the facts of the present case are identical to which are
involved in the case of Sri Pradeep Kumar who has filed ID case No. 43/2012, dismissed by award dated 04.10.2018,
quoted hereinabove, which has attained finality as the same has not been challenged before any higher court, so, a
judgment rendered by a co-ordinate bench/Tribunal on the same facts and circumstances as of the present case, I am
bound by the “Award” passed in the case of Pradeep Kumar (supra) and cannot take a different view as taken in the
ID case No. 43/2012 Pradeep Kumar (supra).
Because Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Workmen v. Straw Board Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1974) 4 SCC 681 held as under:
“It is now well-established that, although the entire Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to
industrial adjudication, the principles of res judicata laid down under Section II of the Code of Civil
Procedure, however, are applicable, wherever possible, for very good reasons. This is so since
multiplicity of litigation and agitation and re-agitation of the same dispute at issue between the same
employer and his employees will not be conducive to industrial peace which is the principal object of
all labour legislation bearing on industrial adjudication.”
And in the case of Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Employees AIR 1957 SC 38 has held as under:
“Likewise, where an award was passed in earlier proceedings, it was held that the said award was
binding on the parties and the subsequent proceedings initiated by the employees were barred.”
(See also Workmen v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. AIR 1984 SC 516)
Moreover, in the case of Gopabadndhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty & Ors. (1998) 4 SCC 44 Hon’ble the
Supreme Court said precedent is an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application
in individual cases. It provides a basis for orderly development of legal rules, that is to say that if certain decision is
taken then the said decision if attains finality is a precedence on other matters which on same footing and facts and no
different view can be taken which have been taken in earlier judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, present adjudication case stands on the same facts and footing as of Pradeep Kumar
(supra), decided by this Tribunal vide order dated 04.10.2018, so, this Tribunal cannot take a different view, as such,
the present case, filed by claimant/workman is liable to be dismissed, having no merit.
Accordingly, dismissed; resultantly the workman is not entitled to any relief.
Award as above.
LUCKNOW.
26th June, 2023.
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 14 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
नॉियनय रेलवे; मेससय िाजिि फजज़ान अिमि एंड ब्रिसय ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj श्री दिनेि चौरजसआ ds chp vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (15/2015) izdkf”kr djrh
gSA
[la- ,y-41012/12/2015-vkbZ-vkj (B-I)]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 14th August, 2023
S.O. 1316.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 15/2015) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama Northern
Railway; M/s Shahid Faizan Ahmed & Brothers and Shri Dinesh Chorasia.
[No. L-41012/12/2015-IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2787
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 15/2015
Ref. No. L-41012/12/2015-IR(B-I) dated: 20.04.2015
BETWEEN
Shri Dinesh Chorasia, S/o late Shri Ganesh Prasad
548/197, Pal Aatta Chakki, Surya Nagar, Rajajipuram, Lucknow 226017
AND
1. The Divisional Railway Manager Northern Railway, New Delhi-110001
2. The Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway
DRM Office, Hajratganj, Lucknow
3. M/s. Shahid Faizan Ahmed & Brothers
654 Begum ka Makbara, Janpad, Faizabad
AWARD
By order No. L-41012/12/2015-IR(B-I) dated: 20.04.2015 the present industrial dispute has been referred for
adjudication to this Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A)
of Section 10 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with following schedule:
“क्या िैससय शावहद फैजान अहिद एंि ब्रदसय, फैजाबाद ि प्रबंधन, उत्तर रेलिे, लखनऊ द्वारा श्री वदनेश चौरवसया पुत्र
स्व. गणेश प्रसाद को वदनांक 25-01-2013 को नौकरी से वनकाला जाना न्यायोवचत एिं बैध है? यवद नहीं तो िादी वकस
राहत को पाने का हक़दार है?”
Accordingly, an industrial dispute No. 15/2015 has been registered on 13.05.2015.
When workman did not turn to file statement of claim the reference was adjudicated vide award dated 28.04.2017 and
the same was notified vide dated 24.05.2017; however, the said award was recalled and, Industrial dispute was
restored; and workman was afforded an opportunity to file statement of claim.
Brief facts of the case:
Facts of the case, in brief are that claimant was appointed as Box Porter with respondent no. 2 on 01.04.2009 and he
worked continuously as such till the date of his termination on 25.04.2013.
Accordingly, a prayer has been made that his termination be set aside and he be reinstated with consequential benefits.
On 07.06.2019, behalf of the respondent 1 & 2, written statement has been filed; wherein it has been submitted that
the claimant was never appointed on the post of Box Porter; rather he was a contractual worker, engaged through
respondent no. 3/M/s Shahid Faizan Ahmad & Brothers and there is no relationship of employee and employer
between the claimant and the respondent no. 1 & 3.
From perusal of the order sheet, the position, emerged out that on 07.06.2019 time was granted to the workman to file
rejoinder affidavit; but he has not filed the same till date; however, he has not turned up since 27.02.2020.
On 27.02.2020, opportunity to file rejoinder was closed.
On 14.11.2022, when the matter was taken up in revised cause list, neither workman nor his legal representative was
present.
Sri U.K. Bajpai, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 & 2 was present.
Findings & Conclusion:
I have heard learned counsel for respondent no. 1 & 2 and gone through record.
2788
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Thus, taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as the fact that after filing of statement of claim no
oral/documentary evidence has been filed on behalf of the claimant to support his claim, as such, the adjudication case
is liable to be dismissed.
So, in view of the said facts, as well as the law laid by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v.
Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
Thus, taking into consideration the facts on record that in the present case the workman has not filed any
oral/documentary evidence in support of his claim, so the same is liable to be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
LUCKNOW.
26th July, 2023.
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 14 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
कॉरृोरेिन बैंक ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj कॉरृोरेिन बैंक वकयसय जगल्ड ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (31/2019) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y-12011/43/2018- vkbZ-vkj (ch-II)]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 14th August, 2023
S.O. 1317.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 31/2019) of the Cent. Govt. Indus. Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama Corporation
Bank and Corporation Bank Workers Guild.
[No. 12011/43/2018-IR (B-II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2789
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM–LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. 31/2019
Ref. No.-L-12011/43/2018-IR (B II), Dt. 28.11.2018.
BETWEEN
The Zonal Secretary
Corporation Bank wokers Guild,
11, B.N. Road, Kesarbagh, Main Branch,
Lucknow-226001
AND
The Deputy Chief Manager
Corporation Bank, Zonal Office
1-IF, near-Nisantganj, Gomti Bridge, Gokhale, Marg, Lucknow
AWARD
By order No. L-12011/43/2018-IR(B II), Dt. 28.11.2018 present industrial dispute has been referred for
adjudication to this Tribunal dispute in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of Sub- Section (1) and sub-
Section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with
following schedule:
“Whether the action of the management of DGM, Corporation Bank Lucknow in allegedly transferring Sri
Santosh Sambal working at Ram Sanehi Ghat to Viraj Khand and Sri D.K. Singh to Khurdahi Bazar from
Bhetua violates the transfer policy and Seniority list of the management? If so, what relief the workman are
entitled to?”.
Accordingly an industrial dispute No. 31/2019 has been registered.
On 14.10.2018 an order was passed which is quoted herein below:-
“Case called out.
No Successor of the PO is appointed
Put up on 13.01.2020”.
Thereafter on 16.09.2022 an order was passed quoted herein below:-
“case called out.
Parties absent. Last opportunity granted for CS.
On 28.02.2023 an order was passed which quoted here in below:-
“Matter taken up in revised list.
Parties absent.
Last opportunity is granted to claimant to file statement of claim, failing which the case proceed ex-parte”.
In spite of notice neither clamant/or his legal representative appeared nor any statement of claim was filed when the
case was taken up on 25.03.2023.
Accordingly I have heard learned counsel for respondent and perused on record.
Taking into consideration the fact till date no statement of claim has been filed by the claimant in order to establish his
claim as per the reference dated 28.11.2018
So in view of the said facts, as well as the law laid by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of V.K. Industries Vs.
Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR as under:-
2790
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must fail.
Whenever a workman raised a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is imperative
for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which the order is
challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to appear or to file
written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government cannot be answered in
favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief”.
In the case of M/s Uptron powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary V. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:-
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shankar Chakravarti Vs Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd.,
V.K. Raj Industries V. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. 1984 (49)
FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of any evidence led by
or on behalf of the workman reference is bound to be answered by the Court against the workman. In such a
situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at all. The obligation to lead evidence to
establish and allegation made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would be, who would
fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee U.P. P.A. C.C.S.C.
Services V. Secretary-cum- G.M. District Co-Operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:-
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the
shoulders of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead
evidence first which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any
evidence either oral or documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the
reference has to be dismissed”.
As the workman had not filed any statement of claim/oral/documentary evidence, so the present case is liable to be
dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief:-
Lucknow
Date: 11.07.2023
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
ubZ fnYyh] 14 vxLr] 2023
.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससय आर. के. एसोजसएट्स; इंजड न बैंक ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj श्री िीतेन्र चतुवेिी ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
vkS|ksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;] ल नऊ ds iapkV (67/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[la- ,y-39025/01/2023- vkbZ-vkj (ch-II)-18]
सलोनी, उृ जनिेिक
New Delhi, the 14th August, 2023
S.O. 1318.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 67/2021) of the Cent. Govt. Indus. Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Prathama
M/S R.K. Associates; Indian Bank and Shri Jitendra Chaturvedi.
[No.L-39025/01/2023-IR (B-II)-18]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II— ण् ड3(ii)]
भारत का रािृत्र : अगस्ट् त 19, 2023/श्रावण 28, 1945
2791
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL–CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 67/2021
No. K-10/1-2/2021-IR dated 27.05.2021
BETWEEN
Shri Jitendra Chaturvedi S/o Shri Munna Lal Chaturvedi, R/O Gazipur, Balrampur, Faizullaganj, Lucknow-226013.
AND
1. The Proprietor, M/S R.K. Associates, 631/106, Ajay Nagar,
Surendra Nagar, Luckno
2. The Assistant General Manager, Indian Bank (formerly known as
Allahabad Bank) Staff College, Sector 21, Ring Road,
Indira Nagar, Lucknow-226016.
AWARD
By order No. K-10/1-2/2021-IR dated 27.05.2021 the present industrial dispute has been referred for
adjudication to this Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A)
of Section 10 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with following schedule:
“Whether the action of management of Indian Bank Staff College, Lucknow in terminating the services of
Shri Jitendra Chaturvedi S/O Shri Munna Lal Chaturvedi, Receptionist w.e.f. 01.07.2020 who was engaged
through contractor M/s R.K. Associates, without following the provisions of Section 25 F of L.D. Act, 1947,
is Legal and justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to and from which date?"
Accordingly, an industrial dispute No. 67/2021, registered before this Tribunal on 02.06.2021.
On 17.08.2021, on behalf of the claimant, statement of claim was filed praying therein that he was appointed as
receptionist in the Allahabad Bank/Indian Bank Staff College, Lucknow through respondent no. 1, who is a contractor
in the year 2019; however, his services were disengaged/retrenched w.e.f. 01.07.2020.
Further the claimant has prayed in view of the facts stated in claim petition that as he has completed 240 days in a
calendar year so his termination/retrenchment be set aside and he may also be given amount as prayed by him in the
relief.
On behalf of the respondent no. 1 i.e. R.K. Associates, written statement has been filed on 28.10.2021, inter alia
stating therein that that M/s R.K. Associates is a proprietor firm registered under the U.P. Dookan aur Viniya
Adhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962.
It is further stated that claimant was hired as contract labour and he was paid wages by the contractor and as such was
reimbursed to him by principle employer. Moreover, the respondent contractor was awarded contract for supply of
specific number of contract labour with duties to carry out specific nature of work as required by the principle
employer establishment.
Moreover, respondent has also pleaded in written statement that contractor had been awarded for specific time.
Thus it is clear the contract labour were also engaged for specific period of contract and after completion of contract
period they are deemed to be discontinued and after successful binding process and allotment of contract labour were
engaged against fresh contract. The claimant was contract labour and he was hired for a specific period of work
contract and he was never issued any appointment letter.
Respondent also mentioned in the written statement that the work contract in respect to which claimant was engaged
there was no further requirement, therefore the services of claimant was disengaged/terminated and he was given
intimation in regard to his full and final payment. The contract worker has no right to seek permanency against any
post as his appointment was contractual and he has no right to continue/ seek regular employment. The terms and
conditions of contract labour are governed by the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.
2792
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : AUGUST 19, 2023/SHRAVANA 28, 1945
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
In spite of repeated opportunity had been provided to the workman to file rejoinder affidavit; however, the same has
not been filed. Lastly on 03.02.2023 an order was passed, relevant portion of the same is as under:
“In spite of last opportunity granted vide order dated 2.12.2022, rejoinder has not been filed,
accordingly opportunity of rejoinder is closed.”
On 18.04.2023, when the matter was taken up in revised list; neither the claimant nor his legal representative turned;
accordingly, arguments of Sri Sharad Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for opposite party no. 1 was heard ex-parte.
Findings & Conclusion:
Thus, taking into consideration, the above said facts as well as the fact that no oral/documentary evidence has been
filed on behalf of the claimant to support his claim, as such, the adjudication case is liable to be dismissed. Because in
the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (I) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must
fail. Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is
imperative for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which
the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to
appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government
cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
Ltd., V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors.
1984 (49) FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of
any evidence led by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court
against the workman. In such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at
all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making
the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders
of the respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first
which he failed. A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or
documentary was led by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be
dismissed.”
Thus, taking into consideration the facts on record that in the present case the workman has not filed any
oral/documentary evidence in support of his claim, so the same is liable to be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
LUCKNOW.
06th July, 2023.
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
Uploaded by Dte. of Printing at Government of India Press, Ring Road, Mayapuri, New Delhi-110064
and Published by the Controller of Publications, Delhi-110054. MANOJ KUMAR
VERMA
Digitally signed by MANOJ
KUMAR VERMA
Date: 2023.09.02 15:44:26
+05'30'