985 GI/2025
(581)
रजजस्ट्री सं. डी.एल. (एन) 04/0007/2003—05
REGD. NO. D. L. (N) 04/0007/2003—05
xxxGIDHxxx
xxxGIDExxx
प्राजधकार से प्रकाजित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
साप् ताजहक
WEEKLY
सं. 06]
नइ ददल् ली, फरवरी 16—फरवरी 22, 2025, िजनवार/माघ 27—फाल् गुन 3, 1946
No. 06]
NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 16—FEBRUARY 22, 2025, SATURDAY/MAGHA 27–PHALGUNA 3, 1946
आस भाग में जभन् न ृृ् सं् या दी जाती हज जजससे दक यह ृृथक संकलन के प ृ में रखा जा सके
Separate Paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation
भाग II—खण् ड 3—ईृ-खण् ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)
भारत सरकार के मंत्रालयों (रक्षा मंत्रालय को छोड़कर) द्वारा जारी दकए गए सांजवजधक अदेि और ऄजधसूचनाएं
Statutory Orders and Notifications Issued by the Ministries of the Government of India
(Other than the Ministry of Defence)
जवदेि मन्त्रालय
(सी.ृी.वी. प्रभाग )
नइ ददल्ली, 18 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 201.—राजनजयक और कोंसुलीय ऄजधकारी (िृथ एवं फीस) के ऄजधजनयम, 1948 की धारा 2 के
खंड (क) के ऄनुसरण में वजधाजनक अदेि ।
एतद् द्वारा, सरकार भारत का दूतावास, वागाडुगू, में श्री प्रवीन सुहाग, जनजी सहायक, को फरवरी 18, 2025 से
सहायक कांसुलर ऄजधकारी के प ृ में कांसुलर सेवाओं का जनववहन करने के जलए ऄजधकृत करती हज
[फा. सं. टी. 4330/01/2025(06)]
एस.अर.एच. फहमी, जनदेिक (सीृीवी)
सी.जी.-डी.एल.-सा.-07032025-261494
CG-DL-W-07032025-261494
582
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(CPV Division)
New Delhi, the 18th February, 2025
S.O. 201.—Statutory Order in pursuance of the clause (a) of the Section 2 of the Diplomatic and Consular
Officers (Oaths and fees) Act, 1948 (41 of 1048), the Central Government hereby appoints Shri Parveen Suhag,
Personal Assistant as Assistant Consular Officer in the Embassy of India, Ouagadougou, to perform the consular
services as Assistant Consular Officer with effect from February 18, 2025.
[F. No. T. 4330/01/2025(06)]
S.R.H FAHMI, Director (CPV)
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 202.—राजनजयक और कोंसुलीय ऄजधकारी (िृथ एवं फीस) के ऄजधजनयम, 1948 की धारा 2 के
खंड (क) के ऄनुसरण में वजधाजनक अदेि ।
एतद् द्वारा, सरकार भारत का दूतावास, दुसांबे, में श्री मनीष कुमार और श्री ददलीृ कुमार वमाव, सहायक ऄनुभाग
ऄजधकाररयो, को फरवरी 19, 2025 से सहायक कांसुलर ऄजधकाररयो के प ृ में कांसुलर सेवाओं का जनववहन करने के जलए
ऄजधकृत करती हज ।
[फा. सं. टी. 4330/01/2025(07)]
एस.अर.एच. फहमी, जनदेिक (सीृीवी)
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 202.— Statutory Order in pursuance of the clause (a) of the Section 2 of the Diplomatic and Consular
Officers (Oaths and fees) Act, 1948 (41 of 1048), the Central Government hereby appoints Shri Manish Kumar and
Shri Dilip Kumar Verma, both Assistant Section Officers as Assistant Consular Officers in the Embassy of India,
Dushanbe, to perform the consular services as Assistant Consular Officers with effect from February 19, 2025.
[F. No. T. 4330/01/2025(07)]
S.R.H FAHMI, Director (CPV)
ृेरोजलयम और प्राकृजतक गजस मंत्रालय
नइ ददल्ली, 31 जनवरी, 2025
का.अ. 203.—केन् रीय सरकार, राजभाषा (संघ के िासकीय प्रयोजनों के जलए प्रयोग) जनयम, 1976 के
जनयम 10 के ईृजनयम (4) के ऄनुसरण में ृेरोजलयम और प्राकृजतक गजस मंत्रालय के प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रणाधीन साववजजनक
क्षेत्र के ईृक्रम के जनम् नजलजखत कायावलय को, जजसके 80 या ऄजधक प्रजतित कमवचारी वृन् द ने जहन् दी का कायवसाधक ञान
प्राप् त कर जलया हज, ऄजधसूजचत करती हज:-
आजण्डयन ऑयल कॉृोरेिन जलजमटेड (ृाआृलाआन्स प्रभाग),
ृजिमी क्षेत्र ृाआृलाआन्स, फेगजमल ृररसर, जोधृुर
[फा. सं. 11012/3/2021-रा.भा.(2025)-23]
डॉ. ज्योजत जमश्रा, ईृ जनदेिक (राजभाषा)
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS
New Delhi, the 31st January, 2025
S.O. 203.—In pursuance of Sub Rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Language (Use for official purpose of the
Union) Rules, 1976, the central Government hereby notifies the following office of the Public Sector undertaking
under the administrative control of the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, in which 80 or more percent of the staff
have acquired working Knowledge of Hindi:-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
583
Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (Pipelines Division)
Western Region Pipelines, Fegmil Complex, Jodhpur
[F. No. 11012/3/2021-OL(2025)-23]
Dr. JYOTI MISHRA, Dy. Director (OL)
श्रम एवं रोजगार मंत्रालय
नइ ददल्ली, 11 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 204.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में,केन्रीय
सरकार एंड्रयू यूल एंड कंृनी जलजमटेड, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री जमजहर कोले, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में
जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण-सह-श्रम न्यायालय,कोलकाता, ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या REF. NO. 37 OF
2013) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ
11.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. एल - 42011/102/2013 -अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT
New Delhi, the 11th February, 2025
S.O. 204.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. NO. 37 OF 2013) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Kolkata, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers
in relation to Andrew Yule & Company Limitted, and Shri Mihir Koley,Worker, which was received along with
soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 11.02.2025.
[No. L-42011/102/2013 -IR (DU]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present : Justice K. D. Bhutia, Presiding Officer.
REF. NO. 36 OF 2013
REF. NO. 37 OF 2013
REF. NO. 38 OF 2013
REF. NO. 39 OF 2013 AND
REF. NO. 43 OF 2013
Parties : Employers in relation to the management of
Andrew Yule & Company Limited
VS
1. Sri Naresh Kumar Chakraborty,
2. Sri Mihir Koley,
3. Sri Joydeb Chatterjee,
4. Sri Samarendra Nath Mukherjee, and
5. Sri Subhas Chandra Naskar
584
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Appearance:
On behalf Andrew Yule & Company Limited: Mr. Sushil Kumar Karmakar, Ld. Advocate.
On behalf of Five workmen: Mr. Saibal Mukherjee, Ld. Advocate.
Dated: 21st January, 2025
AWARD
This common award disposes all the above mentioned five reference cases as issues involved in all those
cases are exactly same and parties are five workmen who have alleged to have been illegally terminated from their
permanent regular service by their employer Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., on their attaining the age of 58 years.
The Central Government, Ministry of Labour vide Order Nos. L-42011/103/2013 –IR(DU) dated 25-07-
2013: No.L-42011/102/2013-IR(DU) dt.25-07-2013; No. L-42011/101/2013-IR (DU) dt. 25-07-2013; No. L-
42011/100/2013-IR (DU) dt.29-07-2013 and No L-42012/59/2013-IR (DU) dt. 12-09-201, in exercise of power
conferred sub-section 1(d) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 has referred the
following disputes to this Tribunal for adjudication:-
1. (Ref. 36/2013)
―Whether the action of the management of Andrew Yule & Company Limited in terminating the service of Sri
Naresh Kumar Chakraborty w.e.f. 01-01-2012 by way of premature retirement without extending the benefit of
enhanced age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years and implementing the orders of the Ministry of Heavy Industries
& Public Enterprises, Dept. of Heavy Industries, Govt. of India vide memo no.10 (23)/2011-PEI dated 03-11-2011,
with immediate effect is legal and justified? To what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
2. (Ref. 37/2013)
―Whether the action of the management of Andrew Yule & Company Limited in terminating the service of Sri Mihir
Koley w.e.f. 01-01-2012 by way of premature retirement without extending the benefit of enhanced age of
superannuation, from 58 to 60 years and implementing the orders of the Ministry of Heavy Industries & Public
Enterprises, Dept. of Heavy Industries, Govt. of India vide memo no. 10(23)/2011-PEI dated 03-11-2011, with
immediate effect is legal and justified? To what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
3. (Ref. 38/2013)
―Whether the action of the management of Andrew Yule & Company Limited in terminating the service of Sri
Joydeb Chatterjee w.e.f. 01-02-2012 by way of premature retirement without extending the benefit of enhanced age
of superannuation, from 58 to 60 years and implementing the orders of the Ministry of Heavy Industries & Public
Enterprises, Dept. of Heavy Industries, Govt. of India vide memo no. 10(23)/2011-PEI dated 03-11-2011, with
immediate effect is legal and justified? To what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
4. (Ref. 39/2013)
―Whether the action of the management of Andrew Yule & Company Limited in terminating the service of Sri
Samarendra Nath Mukherjee w.e.f. 01-07-2012 by way of premature retirement without extending the benefit of
enhanced age of superannuation, from 58 to 60 years and implementing the orders of the Ministry of Heavy Industries
& Public Enterprises, Dept. of Heavy Industries, Govt. of India vide memo no. 10(23)/2011-PEI dated 03-11-2011,
with immediate effect is legal and justified? To what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
5. (Ref. 43/2013)
―Whether the action of the management of Andrew Yule & Company Limited in terminating the service of Sri
Subhas Chandra Naskar w.e.f. 01-01-2012 by way of premature retirement without extending the benefit of
enhanced age of superannuation, from 58 to 60 years and implementing the orders of the Ministry of Heavy Industries
& Public Enterprises, Dept. of Heavy Industries, Govt. of India vide memo no. 10(23)/2011-PEI dated 03-11-2011,
with immediate effect is legal and justified? To what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
That contents of their separate claim statements appear to be exactly same save and except their date of
joining, category of service to which they joined the establishment of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., their date of birth and
their date of superannuation.
Sri Naresh Kumar Chakraborty, in his written statement has alleged that he joined the establishment of
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. as a clerical staff (Typist) on 16-08-1979 on probation and later his service was confirmed
on 16-02-1980 and all along he was posted at Head Office at Kolkata.
Sri Mihir Koley, in his written statement has alleged that he joined the establishment of Andrew Yule &
Co. Ltd. as a Subordinate Staff (Driver) on 20-03-1980 on probation and later his service was confirmed on 20-09-
1980 and all along he was posted at Head Office at Kolkata.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
585
Sri Joydeb Chatterjee, in his written statement has alleged that he joined the establishment of Andrew Yule
& Co. Ltd. as a Typist on 01-09-1987 and all along he was posted at Head Office at Kolkata.
Sri Samarendra Nath Mukherjee, in his written statement has alleged that he joined the establishment of
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. as a Durwan on 05-07-1990 and all along he was posted at Head Office at Kolkata, and
Sri Subhas Chandra Naskar, in his written statement has alleged that he joined the establishment of
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. as a Clerk on 01-10-1985 and all along he was posted at Head Office at Kolkata.
However, they all have alleged that when they joined the establishment of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., their
age of superannuation was fixed at 60 years. That company was declared as a sick industry in the year 2001 and as
such their age of superannuation was rolled to 58 years with the approval of the Cabinet.
But later, Central Govt. had taken a decision to increase the age of superannuation of Board Level and Below
Board Level employees of Central Public Sector Enterprise from 58 years to 60 years vide D.P.E. O.M. No. 18 (6)/98
–GM-GL-002 dated 19-05-1998.
Further, when the sick CPSEs started making profit after 2004, then those CPSEs requested the concerned
Ministry/Department to enhance the age of superannuation of its employees from 58 years to 60 years. That D.P.E.
approved the proposal to enhance the age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years on fulfilment of certain conditions by
issuing memorandum No. 18(1) / 2007- GM-GL-80 dated 20-04-2007.
On receiving such memorandum Board of Directors of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. called a meeting on 27-07-
2011 and decided to enhance the age of superannuation of its all employees from 58 to 60 years and sent a proposal to
that effect before Dept. of Heavy Industries, Govt. of India for approval of proposal w.e.f. 01-04-2011. Further, the
management sent a proposal letter no. AY/CMD /31 dated 03-08-2011 to the Dept. of Heavy Industries, Ministry of
Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, for enhancement of retirement age of its all employees from 58 to 60 years.
That management further vide letters dt. 30-09-2011 and 05-10-2011 to the Ministry of Heavy Industries, appraised
that enhancement of age of retirement from 58 to 60 years will not be applicable to the unionised employees in the
workmen category placed at the tea garden of the company and who are governed by Plantation Labour Act, 1951 and
workmen placed at the factories of the company, who are governed by the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act, 1946.
Accordingly, Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Deptt. of Heavy Industry vide memo no.
10(23)/-2011/PE.1 dated 03-11-2011, accorded approval for enhancement of the retirement age from 58 years to 60
years in respect of Board and Below Board Level and employees of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. governed by DPE
guidelines with immediate effect. But such enhancement will not be applicable to the employees of Andrew Yule &
Co. Ltd. who are governed by Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 or Plantation Labour Act, 1951.
On receiving such memo, the management of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. issued an Administrative Circular No.
2012/07 dated 01-03-2012 enhancing the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years for the Board Level and below Board
Level Officer and Assistances on the Roll of the company on or after 03-11-2011.
Now, all the five workmen have alleged that all along they were posted at the Head Office of Andrew Yule
& Co. Ltd. at Kolkata and which is governed by West Bengal Shops & Establishment Act and DPE guidelines. The
Head Office is neither a tea garden governed by Plantation Labour Act,1951 nor a Factory being governed by the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. It has also been alleged that there was a tripartite settlement
dated 04-02-2011 under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in between the management of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. and its
workmen posted at the Head Office for compliance of retirement age fixed by the Ministry.
They have alleged that in violations of memo no. 10(23)/-2011/PE.1 dated 03-11-2011 issued by Ministry of
Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Dept. of Heavy Industry, they have been retrenched from their respective
services on their attaining the of 58 years. That they have raised objection in writing against their premature
retirement before the management of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. in the year 2012 itself but of no avail. Then they made
a complaint before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Kolkata, but who failed to resolve their dispute and
referred their matter to the Ministry for making reference before Industrial Tribunal.
That they have alleged that due to premature retirement they have suffered financial loss and they have
claimed the losses suffered due to premature retirement and other consequential financial benefits.
The management of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. contested the claim of all those five workmen by filing five
separate written statements and where it has taken the same stand and alleged that all those five workmen were
members of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. Workmen‘s Union (Calcutta Region) and they being unionised employees of
the company are governed by tripartite settlement or bipartite settlement executed between the management and their
unions. They are not governed by D.P.E. guidelines. That there was tripartite settlement executed between the
management of the company and the unions on 04-02-2011 and where it was settled that retirement age of unionised
workmen would be 58 years and they would superannuated on the last working days on their attaining the age of
superannuation in terms of their date of birth recorded in their Service Books. Such tripartite settlement was in force
at the time of retirement of those employees.
586
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
It has also alleged that in Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. there are four categories of employees namely (1) Officer
Category, (2) Non-unionised Staff, who are exclusively governed by DPE guidelines, (3) Unionised Staff other than
tea garden employees who are governed by tripartite agreement arrived at the intervention of Labour Commissioner
and (4) Tea Garden workers governed by Plantation Labour Act, 1951. That Memo no. 10(23)/ 2011-PE-1 dated 03-
11-2011 issued by Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprise, Govt. of India was/ is applicable to the
employees of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. who comes within the purview of DPE guidelines and those who were /are
Board Level, below Board Level and Assistance and not to those employees who are governed by the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, Plantation Labour Act, 1951 and unionised workmen.
Further, it has alleged that all the employees were intimated about the date of their retirement in advance by
issuing notices to them. That all those employees on receiving such retirement notices made application for final
withdrawal of their provident fund. That they were paid their provident fund, leave encashment and gratuity on the
date of their superannuation and which they accepted without any objection and that too by issuing receipts to that
effect. So, it has alleged that all five case are barred by principle of acquiescence, estoppel and not maintainable. It
has prayed for dismissal of all five reference cases.
The concerned workmen have filed rejoinder and where they have invariably reiterated what they have
alleged in their claim statements.
All five workmen to prove their cases have filed their evidence in chief on affidavit. That they have tendered
their evidence on affidavit and cross examined by the management of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
The management of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd too has produced Mr. Satyendra Kumar Pandey, Dy. Manager
(Personnel & Administration) as M. W.1 and who was extensively cross examined by all the five workmen.
Parties have produced same set of following documents and which have been marked as exhibits.
Following documents have been filed from the side of workmen and exhibited:-
1) Appointment letters of Sri Naresh Kumar Chakraborty dt. 13-08-1979 as a Typist, Appointment letters
of Sri Mihir Koley dt. 19-03-1980 as a probationer Driver, Sri Joydeb Chatterjee dt. 28-08-1987 as a
Typist, Sri Samarendra Nath Mukherjee dt.05-07-1990 as a Durwan and that of Sir Subhash Chandra
Naskar dt. 30-09-1985 as a Clerk.
2) Confirmation letters dt.14-02-1980 and 12-03-1982 of Sri Naresh Kumar Chakraborty and Sri Mihir Kr.
Koley.
3) Copy of DPE guidelines dt. 19-05-1998 whereby retirement age of below Board Level employees of
Central PSEs was raised from 58 to 60 years but on certain conditions,
4) DPE guidelines dt.20-04-2007 whereby retirement age of Board and below Board Level employees of
profit earning Central Public Sector Enterprises was enhanced from 58 to 60 years on fulfilment of
certain conditions,
5) Extract of minutes of meeting of Board of Directors of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. held on 27-07-2011,
6) Copy of letter dt. 03-08-2011 of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. in respect of revision of pay scales of Board
Level and below Board Level Executives and non-unionised Supervisors and enhancement of retirement
age from 58 to 60 years of the employees of company,
7) Copy of company‘s letter dt.30-09-2011, 25-07-2013 to Deptt. of Heavy Industries, where it was
clarified that retirement age of unionised employees in the workmen category, placed at the Tea Gardens
of the company being governed by the Plantation Labour Act, 1951 and workmen placed at the factories
of the company governed by the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 was/ is fixed at 58
years and had enclosed a chart depicting the age of Officers and Assistances of the company with their
date of retirement year-wise.
8) The letter dt. 03-11-2011 of Ministry of Heavy Industries & Public Enterprises, Govt. of India addressed
to Chairman & M.D., Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., whereby the retirement age of the employees of Andrew
Yule & Co. Ltd. belonging to Board Level and below Board Level and those employees governed by
DPE guidelines was enhanced from 58 to 60 years and such benefit was not extended to those
employees of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. who are governed by the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 and those governed by Plantation Labour Act, 1951.
9) Administrative circular dt. 01-03-2012 issued by Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. increasing the age of
retirement from 58 to 60 years only to Board Level and below Board Level and Assistance and not to
the other categories of its employees,
10) The memorandum of settlement dt. 04-02-2011 executed in between management of Andrew Yule &
Co. Ltd. and their unions before Regional Labour Commissioner (C ), Kolkata,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
587
11) Copy of notices of retirement dt. 13-10-2011 issued to Sri Naresh Kumar Chakraborty, to Sri Mihir
Koley who were going to attained the age of superannuation on 31-12-2011, to Sri Joydeb Chatterjee on
22-12-2011 who was going to attain age of superannuation on 31-01-2012, to Sri Samarendra Nath
Mukherjee on 26-04-2012 who was going to retire on 30-06-2012 and to Sir Subhash Chandra Naskar
on 13-10-2011 and who was going to retire on 31-12-2011.
12) Copy of joint petition dt. 06-07-2012 submitted by Sri Naresh Kumar Chakraborty, Sri Subhash Naskar,
Sri Mihir Koley, Sri Joydeb Chatterjee and Sri Samarendra Nath Mukherjee to the Director (Personnel),
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., Kolkata,
13) Copy of petition dt.20-07-2012 of Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty to Dy. Secretary, Govt. of India, Ministry
of Heavy Industries & Public Enterprises,
14) Copy of reply dt. 26-09-2012 by Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. to Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty,
15) Copy of complaint dt.23-05-2012, 30-11-2012, and 04-04-2013 of Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty and Sri
Mihir Kr. Koley to R.L.C/ A.L.C, Kolkata,
16) Copy of letters of Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty, Sri Mihir Kr. Koley, Sri Joydeb Chatterjee, Sri
Samarendra Nath Mukherjee and Sir Subhash Chandra Naskar to Director, Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. dt.
26-11-2012 and 04-02-2013
17) Copy of self-prepared list by Sri Naresh Kr.Chakraborty, Sri Mihir Kr. Koley, Sri Joydeb Chatterjee, Sri
Samarendra Nath Mukherjee and Sir Subhash Chandra Naskar, projecting names of those workmen of
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. posted at Head Office and who have been retained beyond the age of 58 years.
18) Copy of letter of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. dt. 18-02-2013 to ALC(C), Kolkata,
19) Copy of proceeding before ALC (C), Kolkata dt. 20-03-2012 and 02-05-2013,
20) Copy of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.‘s letter dt.05-10-2011 addressed to Jt. Secretary, Ministry of Heavy
Industries showing details of no. of employees of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. in the category of Officer
governed by DPE guidelines, non-unionised staff governed by DPE guidelines, unionised staff other
than tea garden governed by tripartite settlement and tea garden workers governed by Plantation Labour
Act, 1951.
On the other hand following documents have been exhibited from the side of management:-
1. Copy of letter dt.03-08-2011 of Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Deptt. of Heavy
Industry addressed to Chairman-Managing Director, Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. with regard to
enhancement of age of retirement from 58 to 60 years in respect of certain categories of the employees
of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
2. Copy of letters of settlement of P.F. account dt.20-12-2011, 12-12-2011, 27-12-2011, 21-06-2012 and
12-12-2011 submitted by Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty, Workman No.607, Tea Division, Sri Mihir Koley,
Sri Joydeb Chatterjee, Workman no.660, Tea Division, Sri Samarendra Nath Mukherjee, Workman
No.376 and Sir Subhash Chandra Naskar , Workman No.630 to the Trustee of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
Provident Fund Instn. for the Indian Clerical Staff.
3. Copy of mandate forms along with a receipts showing payment of Rs.1,85,656.49, Rs.5,20,847/-,
Rs.3,38,350.86P and Rs.3,00,905.12P towards provident fund to Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty , Sri Mihir
Koley, Sri Joydeb Chatterjee and Sir Subhash Chandra Naskar on 30-12-2011, 31-01-2012 and on 30-
12-2011.
4. Copy of receipts issued by Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty, Sri Mihir Koley, Sri Joydeb Chattrerjee, Sri
Samarendra Nath Mukherjee and Sri Subhash Chandra Naskar acknowledging receipt of
Rs.2,70,230.33P towards leave encashment for 358 days, Rs.1,71,616/- towards leave encashment for
320 days, Rs.2,62,323.80P towards leave encashment Rs.1,69,630.93P towards leave encashment for
338 days and Rs.2,05,393.60P towards leave encashment for 330 days. It further shows that
Rs.4,18,061.54P, Rs.2,97,027.69P, Rs.2,95,836.92P, Rs.1,91,095.38P and Rs.3,05,040/- towards
gratuity to them on 30-12-2011, 31-01-2012, 29-06-2012 and on 31-12-2011.
5. Copy of retirement notices dt. 13-10-2011 addressed to Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty, Employee no.607
and Sri Mihir Koley, Employee No.288, informing them, their date of retirement on 31-12-2011, Copy
of retirement notice dt. 22-12-2011 addressed to Sri Joydeb Chatterjee, , informing him, his date of
retirement on 31-01-2012, to Sri Samarendra Nath Mukherjee dt.26-04-2012 informing him his date of
date of retirement was on 30-06-2012 and copy of retirement notice of retirement dt. 13-10-2011 to Sir
Subhash Chandra Naskar informing him his date of retirement to be on 31-12-2011.
588
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
6. Copy of Andrew Yule‘s letter dt. 24-04-2013 to ALC (C), Copy of ALC‘s letter dt. 05-04-2013 to
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
7. Copy of complaint petition of Sri Mihir Koley to RLC dt.02-04-2013,
8. Copy of letters dt.05-10-2011, 30-09-2011, 19-08-2013, 25-07-2013, 10-07-2013 addressed to Jt.
Secretary, Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Deptt. of Heavy Industry by Andrew Yule & Co.
Ltd. regarding revision in respect of age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years and pendency of
Industrial Disputes on the date of retirement of the concerned workmen
9. Copy of appointment letter of Sri Naresh Kumar Chakraborty dt.13-08-1978,
10. Copy of confirmation letter dt. 14-02-1980 addressed to Naresh Kr. Chakraborty,
11. Copy of Memorandum of settlement dt. 04-02-2011.
12. Copy of failure reports dt. 17-05-2013 of ALC to Ministry of Labour & Employment.
13. Copy of letter dt. 30-12-2011, 31-01-2012, 28-06-2012 and 30-12-2011 addressed to Sri Naresh
Kr. Chakraborty, Sri Mihir Koley, Sri Joydeb Chatterjee, Sri Samarendra Nath Mukherjee and
Sir Subhash Chandra Naskar by Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. disclosing the statement of their deposit in
provident fund,
14. Copy of joint petition dt. 06-07-2012 submitted by Sri Naresh Kumar Chakraborty, Sri Subhash Naskar,
Sri Mihir Koley, Sri Joydeb Chatterjee and Sri Samarendra Nath Mukherjee to the Director (Personnel),
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., Kolkata,
15. Copy of letters of Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty, Sri Joydeb Chatterjjee, Sri Samarendra Nath Mukherjee
and Sir Subhash Chandra Naskar dt. 26-11-2012 and 04-02-2013 addressed to the Director (Personnel),
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
16. Copy of complaint of Sri Naresh Kr. Chakraborty, Sri Joydeb Chatterjee and Sir Subhash Chandra
Naskar to R.L.C, Kolkata dt.30-11-2012 and on 02-04-2013,
17. Copy of letter of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. dt. 18-02-2013, 24-04-2013 to ALC(C), Kolkata,
18. Copy of letters dt. 10-07-2013, 05-10-2011 of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. to Ministry of Heavy Industries
& Public Enterprises , Govt. of India,
19. Copy of notice of retirement dt. 13-10-2011 issued by Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. to Sri Naresh
Ch. Chakraborty,
20. Copy of administrative circular dt. 01-03-2012 issued by Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
21. Copy of wage policy of Board Level posts and below Board Level posts including non-unionised
Supervisors in Public Sector Enterprises w.e.f. 01-01-1997,
22. Copy of letter dt. 26-11-2008 of Ministry of Heavy Industries & Public Enterprises, Deptt. of Public
Enterprises with regard to revision of scales of pay w.e.f. 01-01-2007 in respect of Board Level and
below Board Level Executives and non-unionised Supervisors,
23. Office memorandum dt.19-07-2007, 20-04-2007 and 26-11-2008 of Ministry of Heavy Industries,
24. Copy of wage policy w.e.f. 01-01-1997,
25. Copy of appointment letter of Sri Joydeb Chatterjee dt. 28-08-1987,
26. Administrative circular dt. 01-03-2012 issued by Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. increasing the age of
retirement from 58 to 60 years only to Board Level and below Board Level and Assistance and not to
the other categories of its employees,
27. Copy of letter dt.03-11-2011 of Ministry of Heavy Industries to Chairman, Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
28. Copy of petition dt.12-12-2011 of Sir Subhash Chandra Naskar for payment of his P.F. due before
31-12-2011 i.e. prior to his date of superannuation addressed to the Trustee Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
29. Copy of ALC‘s letter dt.05-04-2013 to Sir Subhash Chandra Naskar.
Both sides have also filed their written notes of arguments.
Gone through the oral evidence of all the workmen and that of management witness Mr. Satyendra Kumar
Pandey filed in the form of affidavit as well as that have been recorded by the Tribunal along with the documents that
have been filed by workmen and management and from where it appears the only issue that need to be decided in the
present five reference cases is ―whether the age of superannuation of concerned workmen in the category of Typist,
Clerk , Driver and Durwan of Andrew Yule Co. Ltd. posted at Head Office, Kolkata was 58 years or 60 years as
claimed by them‖?
The appointment letters and confirmation letters of those five workmen which have come on record do not
disclose what their age of superannuation was at the time of joining the establishment of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
However, M.W.1 in his evidence recorded by the Tribunal under oath has admitted that when those five workmen
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
589
joined the establishment of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., their age of superannuation was 60 years. Further, both sides
have admitted that when Central Public Sector Enterprises were declare sick, then Cabinet roll back the age of
superannuation of the employees of such sick CPSEs from 60 years to 58 years in respect of all categories of
employees duly approved by the Board of Directors of such CPSEs in the month of August, 2001. Such decision was
reviewed in April,2005 and decided to enhance the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years only in respect of those
employees working in those CPSEs who have started making profit for last three years continuously with positive net
worth for last three years as per annual audited report, that CPSEs did not avail any budgetary support during the last
three years and who will not avail budgetary support in future and left the decision for the Board of Directors of the
CPSE concerned.
Further, the exhibited documents show that Ministry of Heavy Industries by issuing memo no. 10(23)/2011-
PE1 dt.03-11-2011 allowed Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. to enhance the retirement age from 58 to 60 years only in
respect of Board Level, below Board Level and those employees who comes within the purview of DPE guidelines,
but not to those employees who are governed by Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 or Plantation
Labour Act, 1951. Therefore, here it is necessary to find out who are the employees who fall in the category of Board
Level, Below Board Level and those governed by Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 or Plantation
Labour Act, 1951.
It is undisputed fact Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., a Central Govt. Public Sector Enterprise/Undertaking under
the ownership of Heavy Industries, Govt.of India. The majority of products and service offered by it and its
subsidiaries are related to heavy industry and engineering and it also owns tea gardens/ tea estates including Hooghly
Printing. It comes within the definition of an industry as defined in section 2(j) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
as the establishment where more than 50 employees are engaged. Further, in view of provisions of section 2 (s) any
person working in such industry and employed to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or
supervisory work for hire or reward and those Supervisors who draw less than Rs.10,000/- per month and who does
not discharge managerial nature of job comes within the definition of workman. The Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 applies to employees in industrial establishment with 50 or more employees. The Act
regulates the condition of employment for these employees.
It is a matter of common sense, a person holding Board Level position in a Public or Private Sector
Undertakings indicate such person who holds the position such as Chief Executive Officer, Managing Director, or
such person who takes decision on behalf of the Corporation or the person who holds highest level of hierarchy in any
organisation or who are part of the Board of Directors of the company.
A Below Board Level employee is an employee in Central Public Sector Enterprises who is not a member of
Board of Directors but who holds managerial post and those who do not come within the definition of workman as
provided in section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The present five persons being employees of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. in the capacity of Clerk, Typist,
Driver and Durwan squarely falls within the definition of workman. It is also admitted by all those workmen in their
cross examination that they are the members of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. (Calcutta Region) Workmen‘s Union i.e.
unionised employees.
It has also come on record that there was a settlement between the different unions of Andrew Yule & Co.
Ltd. and the management before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Kolkata on 04-02-2011, under
provisions of section 12 (3) of the I.D. Act, 1947. It is noted that two of the workmen namely Sri Naresh Chakraborty
and Sri Subhas Chandra Naskar, being the Assistant Secretary and Vice President of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. and its
Group (Calcutta Region) Workmen‘s Union, were present and were the signatories of the said settlement. By
executing such settlement it was agreed and settled that the superannuation age of unionised workmen of Andrew
Yule & Co. Ltd. will be 58 years on and from the closing of business of the last working day of the English Calendar
month in which the incumbent attains the age of superannuation in terms of his/her date of birth recorded, admitted
and incorporated at the end of the Company at the time of commencement of employment is a Service Condition/
terms for employment for all practical purposes and for all times to come in supersession/ cancellation/ abrogation/
discontinuance of all past practices, systems, procedures, circulars, notices, orders, understanding, settlement/s etc.
However, Orders from the Ministry, if any, to be complied with. Provisions in respect of retirement age as contained
in the Standard Office Procedure applicable for staff and sub-ordinate staff placed at the Registered Office of the
Company stands superseded for all practical purpose.
Permanent employees appointed on any date prior to September 01, 1984, will retire and accordingly the
contract of employment by an between the Company and the concerned employee will stand terminated on attaining
the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years in terms of the date of birth recorded, admitted and incorporated at the end of
the Company at the time of commencement of employment on and from the closing of business of last working day of
the English calendar year the incumbent attains the age of superannuation. However, in case there is a change in the
age of superannuation, the concerned employees will retire on and from the closing of business of the last working
day of the English calendar month in he or she attains the age of superannuation according to the date of birth
recorded, admitted and incorporated at the end of the Company at the time of commencement of employment
590
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
provided the date of birth is other than 1st day of the English calendar month. In case, the date of birth is 1st day of the
English calendar month the incumbent will retire and accordingly the contract of employment by and between the
company and the concerned employee will stand terminated on and from the closing of business of the last working
day of the previous calendar month. Date of birth in respect of each permanent employee/ workman recorded,
admitted and incorporated at the end of the company at the time of commencement of employment shall remain
unaltered for all practical purposes for all times to come.
It is true that Ministry of Heavy Industry by issuing memo no. 10(23)/2011-PE1 dt. 03-11-2011 had
enhanced the retirement age of the employees of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. i.e. after the execution of the above
settlement on 04-02-2011, but the above memo of Ministry of Heavy Industries has clearly provided that retirement
age of Board Level, Below Board Level employees and those employees who are governed by DPE guidelines would
be enhanced from 58 to 60 years but such benefit was not extended to those employees of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd.
governed by Industrial Employment( Standing Order) Act, 1946 and Plantation Labour Act, 1951.
Further, Andrew Yule Co. Ltd. by issuing an administrative circular no. 2012/07 dt. 01-03-2012 in
pursuance of memo no. 10(23)/2011-PE1 dt. 03-11-2011 issued by Ministry of Heavy Industries had extended the
benefit of enhancement of age of retirement only to the Board Level, Below Board Level Officers and Assistance on
the Roll of the company and not to any other categories of employees of the company.
The present set of workmen not being Board Level, Below Board Level or Assistance, but who belong to the
category of workman as defined in section 2(s) of I.D. Act, being unionised employees bounded by tripartite
settlement dt. 04-02-20211 and employees governed by Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are not
covered by the benefit of memo no. 10(23)/2011-PE1 dt. 03-11-2011.
Further, nothing has come on record to show that legality of memo no. 10(23)/2011-PE1 dt. 03-11-2011
issued by Ministry of Heavy Industries and the Administrative Circular no. 2012/07 dt. 01-03-2012, issued by
Andrew Yule Co. Ltd. were challenged by the present set of workmen or by any employees of Andrew Yule &
Co. Ltd. before any Court of Law. Thus, as per unchallenged memo dt. 03-11-2011 of Ministry of Heavy Industries
and the administrative circular no. 2012/07 dt. 01-03-2012 issued by Andrew Yule Co. Ltd., the present set of
workmen have no locustandi to claim benefit of memo dt.03-11-2011 of Ministry of Heavy Industries and
Administrative Circular dt.01-03-2012, which exclude them from benefit of enhanced age of retirement being
workman category of employees.
Further, the workmen have failed to produce any subsequent settlement executed between the management
of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. and unions, extending the benefits of memo no. 10(23)/2011-PE1 dt. 03-11-2011 and the
administrative circular no. 2012/07 dt. 01-03-2012 issued by Andrew Yule Co. Ltd., superseding the settlement dt.
04-02-2011, where the retirement age of the workman category employees of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. was fixed at
58 years and by which they are bounded.
That apart, from the above mentioned exhibited documents, it is seen that all the five workmen were served
with notice of their retirement 2/3 months prior to their actual retirement on their attaining age of 58 years by the
company. It has come on record that none of those workmen who retired after December, 2011 have raised any
objection against notices of retirement served upon them alleging that their retirement age was already enhanced to 60
years by virtue of memo no. 10(23)/2011-PE1 dt. 03-11-2011 issued by Ministry of Heavy Industries. It is very
interesting to note that all workmen have accepted their retirement on attaining the age of 58 years without any
qualms and by withdrawing their Provident Fund, accepting leave encashment and gratuity from the management of
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. on the day they retired from the service. Then, a question may arise, how a workman who
has received provident fund, leave encashment and gratuity from the employer can raise a dispute alleging that they
have been illegally retrenched /terminated from the service by the employer on their attaining the age of 58 years as
contended by them in their claim statements or their retirement was premature as contained in order of reference.
Further, those five workmen have failed to produce any official record and other independent witnesses to
prove and corroborate that employees of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. in the category of unionised workman posted at
Head Office were extended the benefit of memo no. 10(23)/2011-PE1 dt. 03-11-2011 issued by Ministry of Heavy
Industries, post their retirement and as shown by them in their self-prepared list and which have been exhibited by
them.
In view of the above discussion, this Tribunal is of view all the five workmen being unionised workmen,
governed and bounded by the tripartite settlement executed in between the management and unions on 04-02-2011.
They being employee in the category of a workman as defined in section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, and
governed by Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are not entitled to get the benefit of memo no.
10(23)/2011-PE1 dt. 03-11-2011 issued by Ministry of Heavy Industries and which has been given effect only to
Board Level, Below Board Level and Assistance by Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. by issuing administrative circular no.
2012/07 dt. 01-03-2012. Further, all workmen who have honourably acknowledged their age of superannuation on
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
591
completion of age of 58 years and who have withdrawn all their deposit in provident fund and accepted leave
encashment and gratuity from the employer, the day they superannuated from the service are barred by the principle
of estoppel and acquiescence in raising the dispute alleging that they have been prematurely terminated from their
services. In fact, this Tribunal holds the dispute raised by all the five employees claiming termination by way of
premature retirement without extending the benefit of memo no. 10(23)/2011-PE1 dt. 03-11-2011 issued by Ministry
of Heavy Industries to be speculative.
Hence, this Tribunal holds the claims of all five workmen are not maintainable. Accordingly Reference No.
36 of 2013, Reference No. 37 of 2013, Reference No.38 of 2013, Reference No. 39 of 2013 and Reference No. 43 of
2013 in respect of ex-workmen namely Sri Naresh Kumar Chakraborty, Sri Mihir Koley, Sri Joydeb Chatterjee, Sri
Samarendra Nath Mukherjee, and Sri Subhas Chandra Naskar of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. are dismissed and an award
to that effect is passed.
Justice K. D. BHUTIA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 205.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) कीधारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार जनदेिक, संत लोंगोवाल आंस्ट्टीट्यूट ऑफ आंजीजनयररग एंड टेक्नोलॉजी (एसएलअइइटी), लोंगोवाल, संगप र;
ग्लोबल कंस्ट्रक्िन कंृनी, नानदकयाना चौक, ृरटयाला बाइ ृास, संगप र, ृंजाब, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
सकवल सजचव, राष्ट्रीय ग्रामीण डाक सेवक संघ ृंजाब सकवल, (बेहाला एस.ओ.), होजियारृुर, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट
केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण-सह-श्रमन्यायालय-1, चंडीगढ़,ृंचाट(संदभव सं्या अइडी नंबर 257/2013,
श्री बलजीत ससह,अइडी नंबर 258/2013, श्री बरजेि कुमार, अइडी नंबर 259/2013, श्री दिवन ससह, अइडी
नंबर 260/2013, जगसीरससह, अइडीनंबर 261/2013, ृलासवदरससह,अइडीनंबर 262/2013, श्रीराजूखान, अइडी
नंबर 263/2013, श्री मक्खन ससह, अइडी नंबर 264/2013, श्री सुखजंत ससह, अइडी नंबर 265/2013, श्री बहादर
ससह, अइडी नंबर 01/2014, श्री सुखदेव ससह, अइडी नंबर 02/2014, श्री जगतार ससह, अइडी नंबर 03/2014,
श्री जबक्कर ससह, अइडी नंबर 04/2014, श्री लीला ससह, अइडी सं. 05/2014, श्री बाला ससह, अइडी सं. 06/2014,
श्री लीला ससह, अइडीसं. 07/2014, श्री सीता ससह, अइडी नंबर 08/2014, श्री करम चंद, अइडी नंबर 09/2014,
श्री चमकौर ससह, अइडी नंबर 10/2014, श्री करम ससह,अइडी नंबर 11/2014, श्री सुखचजन ससह, अइडी
नंबर 12/2014, श्री मेजर ससह, अइडी नंबर 13/2014, श्री जगसीर ससह, अइडी नंबर 14/2014, श्री सोमा ससह,
अइडी नंबर 15/2014, श्री बलदेव ससह, अइडी नंबर 16/2014, श्री गोसबद ससह, अइडी नंबर 17/2014, श्री सुखदेव
दास, अइडी नंबर 18/2014 श्री भोला ससह, अइडी नंबर 19/2014, श्री काका ससह, अइडी नंबर 20/2014, श्री हरनेक
ससह, अइडी नंबर 21/2014, श्री भोलू दास, अइडी नंबर 22/2014, श्री जरनजल ससह, अइडी नंबर 23/2014,
श्री गुरसवदर ससह, अइडी नंबर 24/2014, श्री लीला ससह,अइडी नंबर 25/2014, श्री जगसीर ससह, अइडी
नंबर 26/2014, श्री मघर ससह, अइडी नंबर 27/2014, श्री जग्गर ससह, अइडी नंबर 28/2014, श्री सतनाम ससह,
अइडी नंबर 29/2014 श्री जग्गा ससह, अइडी नंबर 30/2014, श्री राम ससह, अइडी नंबर 31/2014, श्री बहादर ससह,
अइडी नंबर 32/2014, श्री जगसीर ससह, अइडी नंबर 33/2014, श्री बलजीत ससह, अइडी नंबर 34/2014, श्री नजर
ससह, अइडी नंबर 35/2014, श्री जगतार ससह, अइडी नंबर 36/2014, श्री ऄजायब ससह,अइडी नंबर 37/2014,
श्री जगसमदर ससह, अइडी नंबर 38/2014, श्री सुखदेव ससह, अइडी नंबर 39/2014, श्री बलवीर ससह, अइडी
नंबर 40/2014, श्री मलकीत ससह, अइडी नंबर 41/2014, श्री बलसवदर ससह, अइडी नंबर 42/2014, श्री काला ससह,
अइडी नंबर 43/2014, श्री ृरमजीत ससह, अइडी नंबर 44/2014, श्री गुरचरण ससह, अइडी नंबर 45/2014, श्री भीम
ससह, अइडी नंबर 46/2014, श्री नारंग ससह,अइडी नंबर 47/2014, श्री राज ससह, अइडी नंबर 48/2014, श्री जरनजल
ससह, अइडी नंबर 49/2014, श्री भोला ससह, अइडी नंबर 50/2014, श्री लीला राम, अइडी नंबर 51/2014, श्री लाल
खान, अइडी नंबर 52/2014, श्री लीला ससह, अइडी नंबर 53/2014, श्री बलदेव ससह, अइडी नंबर 54/2014,
श्री जमट् ू ससह, अइडी नंबर 55/2014, कौर ससह, अइडी नंबर 56/2014, श्री मेहंगा ससह, अइडी नंबर 57/2014, श्री
जबक्कर ससह, अइडी नंबर 58/2014, श्री भूरा ससह 68. अइडी नंबर 59/2014, श्री गुरचरण ससह, अइडी
नंबर 59/2014, गुरचरण ससह, कामगार,) को जजसादक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय
सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ थाl
[सं. एल-42025-07-2025-39-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
592
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 205.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. ID No. 257/2013,Shri Baljit Singh , ID No. 258/2013, Shri
Barjesh Kumar, ID No. 259/2013, Shri Darshan Singh, ID No. 260/2013, Shri Jagsir Singh, ID No. 261/2013,
Shri Plawinder Singh, ID No. 262/2013, Shri Raju Khan,ID No. 263/2013, Shri Makhan Singh,
ID No. 264/2013, Shri Sukhjant Singh, ID No. 265/2013, Shri Bahadar Singh,ID No. 01/2014, Shri Sukhdev
Singh,ID No. 02/2014, Shri Jagtar Singh, ID No. 03/2014, Shri Bikkar Singh,ID No. 04/2014, Shri Leela Singh,
ID No. 05/2014, Shri Baala Singh,ID No. 06/2014, Shri Leela Singh, ID No. 07/2014, Shri Sita Singh,
ID No. 08/2014, Shri Karam Chand,ID No. 09/2014, Shri Chamkaur Singh, ID No. 10/2014, Shri Karam Singh,
ID No. 11/2014, Shri Sukhchain Singh,ID No. 12/2014,Shri Major Singh, ID No. 13/2014, Shri Jagsir Singh,
ID No. 14/2014, Shri Soma Singh,ID No. 15/2014, Shri Baldev Singh, ID No. 16/2014, Shri Gobind Singh,
ID No. 17/2014, Shri Sukhdev Dass, ID No. 18/2014 Shri Bhola Singh ID No. 19/2014, Shri Kaka Singh,
ID No. 20/2014, Shri Harnek Singh, ID No. 21/2014, Shri Bholu Dass,ID No. 22/2014, Shri Jarnail Singh,ID
No.23/2014,Shri Gurvinder Singh,ID No. 24/2014, Shri Leela Singh, ID No. 25/2014, Shri Jagsir Singh,
ID No. 26/2014, Shri Maghar Singh,ID No. 27/2014, Shri Jaggar Singh, ID No. 28/2014, Shri Satnam Singh, ID
No. 29/2014, Shri Jagga Singh,ID No. 30/2014, Shri Ram Singh, ID No. 31/2014, Shri Bahadar Singh,
ID No. 32/2014, Shri Jagsir Singh,ID No. 33/2014, Shri Baljit Singh, ID No. 34/2014, Shri Nazar Singh,
ID No. 35/2014,Shri Jagtar Singh, ID No. 36/2014, Shri Ajaib Singh,ID No. 37/2014, Shri Jagminder Singh,
ID No. 38/2014 , Shri Sukhdev Singh,ID No.39/2014, Shri Balvir Singh, IDNo.40/2014,ShriMalkit
Singh,ID.No.41/2014,Shri Balwinder Singh, ID No. 42/2014, Shri Kala Singh,ID No. 43/2014, Shri Paramjit
Singh,ID No. 44/2014, Shri Gurcharan Singh, ID No. 45/2014, Shri Bhim Singh, ID No. 46/2014, Shri Narang
Singh,ID No. 47/2014, Shri Raj Singh ID No. 48/2014, Shri Jarnail Singh, ID No. 49/2014, Shri Bhola Singh,
ID No. 50/2014, Shri Leela Ram,ID.No.51/2014, Shri Lal Khan,ID No.52/2014, Shri Leela Singh,
ID No. 53/2014, Shri Baldev Singh, ID No. 54/2014, Shri Mithu Singh, ID No. 55/2014, Shri Kaur Singh,
ID No. 56/2014, Shri Mehanga Singh,ID No. 57/2014, Shri Bikkar Singh, ID No. 58/2014, Bhura Singh,
ID.No.59/2014,Shri Gurcharan Singh,ID No. 59/2014, Shri Gurcharan Singh,Worker, of the Central
Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, Chandigarh, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial
dispute between the employers in relation to The Director, Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering & Technology
(SLIET), Longowal, Sangrur; Global Construction Company, Nankiana Chowk, Patiala Bye Pass, Sangrur,
Punjab, andThe Circle Secretary, National Union of Gramin Dak Sewak Punjab Circle, (Bihala S.O.),
Hoshiyarpur, which was receivedalong with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 12.02.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-39-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH.
Present: Sh. Brajesh Kumar Gautam, Presiding Officer
1. ID No. 257/2013, Registered on 18.03.2014, Baljit Singh S/o Teja Singh R/o Village Bhaini, Tehsil and
District Barnala.
2. ID No. 258/2013, Registered on 18.03.2014, Barjesh Kumar S/o Sh. Kasi Lal R/o Village Tohana, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
3. ID No. 259/2013, Registered on 18.03.2014, Darshan Singh S/o Sh. Atma Singh R/o Village Kunran, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
4. ID No. 260/2013, Registered on 18.03.2014, Jagsir Singh S/o Sh. Samundar Singh R/o Village Balian,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
5. ID No. 261/2013, Registered on 18.03.2014, Plawinder Singh S/o Sh. Samundar Singh R/o Village Balian,
Tehsil Dhuri and District Sangrur.
6. ID No. 262/2013, Registered on 18.03.2014, Raju Khan S/o Sh. Chanan Khan R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
7. ID No. 263/2013, Registered on 18.03.2014, Makhan Singh S/o Sh. Mahinder Singh R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
8. ID No. 264/2013, Registered on 18.03.2014, Sukhjant Singh S/o Sh. Najar Singh R/o Village Sahoke, Tehsil
Longowal and District Sangrur.
9. ID No. 265/2013, Registered on 18.03.2014, Bahadar Singh S/o Sh. Gurdial Singh R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
593
10. ID No. 01/2014, Registered on 01.04.2014, Sukhdev Singh S/o Sh. Mukhtiar Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
11. ID No. 02/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jagtar Singh S/o Sh. Sukhdev Singh R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
12. ID No. 03/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Bikkar Singh S/o Sh. Teja Singh R/o Village Kubbe, Tehsil
Longowal and District Sangrur.
13. ID No. 04/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Leela Singh S/o Murti Singh R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil and
District Sangrur.
14. ID No. 05/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Baala Singh S/o Sh. Sadhu Singh R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
15. ID No. 06/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Leela Singh S/o Sh. Gurdev Singh R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
16. ID No. 07/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Sita Singh S/o Sh. Gurdev Singh R/o Village Duggan, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
17. ID No. 08/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Karam Chand S/o Sh. Amar Nath R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
18. ID No. 09/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Chamkaur Singh S/o Sh. Karnail Singh R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
19. ID No. 10/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Karam Singh S/o Sh. Mohinder Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
20. ID No. 11/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Sukhchain Singh S/o Sh. Gurcharan Singh, R/o Village
Jakhepal, Tehsil and District Sangrur.
21. ID No. 12/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Major Singh S/o Sh. Gurbaksh Singh, R/o Village Duggan,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
22. ID No. 13/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jagsir Singh S/o Sh. Dharma Sngh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
23. ID No. 14/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Soma Singh S/o Sh. Mara Singh, R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
24. ID No. 15/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Baldev Singh S/o Sh. Gujar Singh,R/o Village Kunran, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
25. ID No. 16/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Gobind Singh S/o Sh. Ghuman Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
26. ID No. 17/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Sukhdev Dass S/o Sh. Jagan Dass, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
27. ID No. 18/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Bhola Singh S/o Sh. Babu Singh, R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
28. ID No. 19/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Kaka Singh S/o Sh. Joginde Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
29. ID No. 20/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Harnek Singh S/o Sh. Puran Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
30. ID No. 21/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Bholu Dass S/o Sh. Prem Dass, R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
31. ID No. 22/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jarnail Singh S/o Sh. Gurdev Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
32. ID No. 23/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Gurvinder Singh S/o Sh. Bachan Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
33. ID No. 24/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Leela Singh S/o Sh. Darwara Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
34. ID No. 25/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jagsir Singh S/o Sh. Saun Singh, R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
594
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
35. ID No. 26/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Maghar Singh S/o Sh. Joginder Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
36. ID No. 27/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jaggar Singh S/o Sh. Puran Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
37. ID No. 28/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Satnam Singh S/o Sh. Kaur Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
38. ID No. 29/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jagga Singh S/o Sh. Dhanna Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
39. ID No. 30/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Ram Singh S/o Sh. Sadhu Singh, R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
40. ID No. 31/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Bahadar Singh S/o Sh. Bachan Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil Sunam and District Sangrur.
41. ID No. 32/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jagsir Singh S/o Sh. Dalip Singh, R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
42. ID No. 33/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Baljit Singh S/o Sh. Ishar Singh, R/o Village Longowal, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
43. ID No. 34/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Nazar Singh S/o Sh. Hamir Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
44. ID No. 35/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jagtar Singh S/o Sh. Gurcharan Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
45. ID No. 36/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Ajaib Singh S/o Sh. Kundan Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
46. ID No. 37/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jagminder Singh S/o Sh. Jarnail Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
47. ID No. 38/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Sukhdev Singh S/o Sh. Moti Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
48. ID No. 39/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Balvir Singh S/o Sh. Kartar Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
49. ID No. 40/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Malkit Singh S/o Sh. Biram Singh, R/o Village Longowal,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
50. ID No. 41/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Balwinder Singh S/o Sh. Tara Singh, R/o Village Takipur,
Tehsil Longowal and District Sangrur.
51. ID No. 42/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Kala Singh S/o Sh. Piara Singh, R/o Village Takipur, Tehsil
Longowal and District Barnala.
52. ID No. 43/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Paramjit Singh S/o Sh. Khetu Ram, R/o Village Bhathal, Tehsil
and District Barnala.
53. ID No. 44/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Gurcharan Singh S/o Sh. Kundha Singh, R/o Village Bhathal,
Tehsil and District Barnala.
54. ID No. 45/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Bhim Singh S/o Sh. Telu Singh, R/o Village Kunran, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
55. ID No. 46/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Narang Singh S/o Sh. Piara Singh, R/o Village Kunran, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
56. ID No. 47/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Raj Singh S/o Sh. Joginder Singh, R/o Village Duggan, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
57. ID No. 48/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Jarnail Singh S/o Sh. Roop Singh, R/o Village Duggan, Tehsil
and District Sangrur.
58. ID No. 49/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Bhola Singh S/o Sh. Joginder Singh, R/o Village Duggan,
Tehsil and District Sangrur.
59. ID No. 50/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Leela Ram S/o Sh. Mukand Ram, R/o Village Bhani, Tehsil
Sunam and District Barnala.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
595
60. ID No. 51/2014, Registered on 01.04.2014, Lal Khan S/o Sh. Nek Khan R/o Village Bheni, Tehsil and
District Barnala.
61. ID No. 52/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Leela Singh S/o Sh. Inder Singh, R/o Village Bhani, Tehsil and
District Barnala.
62. ID No. 53/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Baldev Singh S/o Sh. Hari Singh R/o Village Japada Pindi,
Tehsil and District Barnala.
63. ID No. 54/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Mithu Singh S/o Sh. Jagar Singh R/o Village Satauj, Tehsil
Sunam and District Sangrur.
64. ID No. 55/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Kaur Singh S/o Sh. Harnek Singh R/o Village Badbar, Tehsil
and District Barnala.
65. ID No. 56/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Mehanga Singh S/o Sh. Mukhtiar Singh R/o Village Ratoken,
Tehsil and District Barnala.
66. ID No. 57/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Bikkar Singh S/o Sh. Zora Singh R/o Village Harigarh, Tehsil
and District Barnala.
67. ID No. 58/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Bhura Singh S/o Sh. Kartar Singh R/o Village Amru Kotra,
Tehsil Sunam and District Sangrur.
68. ID No. 59/2014 , Registered on 01.04.2014, Gurcharan Singh S/o Sh. Tara Singh R/o Village Balian, Tehsil
Dhuri and District Sangrur.
...........Workmen
Versus
1. Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering & Technology (SLIET), Longowal, District Sangrur through its
Director.
2. Global Construction Company, Nankiana Chowk, Patiala Bye Pass, Sangrur, Punjab.
........Respondents
Sh. S.C. Gupta AR for Workmen
Sh. Eklavya Gupta AR for Management
Judgment reserved on 7thJanuary, 2025
Judgment Pronounced on 16th January, 2025
JUDGMENT/ AWARD
1.
All these Petitions/ cases have been filed separately by individual workmenunder Section 2-Aof the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(hereinafter called the Act), raising Industrial Dispute and challenging their
termination of services by the respondents with effect from 01.11.2011, with a prayer to reinstate them with
back wages. Since the respondents in all above cases were common and common points of facts and law arose,
vide order dated- 30.10.2014 all the 68 cases have been clubbed together for hearing and ID case no. 257/2013
was made leading case. It may be noted here that the respondent no.2 did not contest the claims of workmen
and no written statement was filed by it during the hearing proceeding.
2. The case of Workmen/ Petitioners-As indicated herein above facts of all the claims raised by the different
workmen being almost the same,the brief facts of the case as unfolded from the claim statements in the
respective cases, may be stated that services of the workmen was illegally terminated by the respondents. As
per facts stated in the claim petitions the workmen were employed with the contesting respondent No.1
between the periods from 01.04.1991 to 01-04-2005 (as different dates of joining are stated in separate
claim petitions and in the lead case it is mentioned as 01-04-1996). It may be mentioned that out of 68
workmen, 59 were doing work of Mali (gardener) and remaining being on the post of helper, welder and
plumbers. It is case of all the workmen that their services have been wrongly and illegally terminated by the
respondents No.1 and 2 on 01.11.2011. It is alleged that initially they were appointed directly by the
Respondent no.1 but subsequently from 1998 onward their services were placed through Respondent No.2 - the
Contractor, under whom the workmen were working at the time of alleged illegal termination. The further case
of the workmen has been that the nature of jobs of mali, helper welder and plumber is of perennial nature and
is essential for the efficient running of the Institute of S.L.I.E.T. which is the Principal Employer of the
596
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Workmen. The contractors were changed from time to time by the Institute. The workmen were carrying out
the work which is being carried out by permanent workers. The system of employing workers through a
Contractor is a sham and the contractual system has been set up only in order to save the monetary costs of
employing the workmen directly with the Respondent No.1 as permanent employees. The cause of prejudice
against the workmen by the Management and the Contractors is that the S.L.I.E.T. Trade Union of Workmen
through their General Secretary, Jagsir Singh, filed a complaint to the Authorities under the EPF & MA Act,
1952 against the respondent No.1 for non-deposit of the amount into the account of the Workmen for Provident
Fund, Family Pension Fund, Insurance Fund & Administrative charges of Employees Provident Fund and
Employees Deposit Linked Insurance Fund. Vide order dated 25.06.2010 passed by the Assistant Provident
Fund Commissioner, Bathinda under Section 7-A of the EPF & MP Act, 1952, the Respondent No.1/
S.L.I.E.T. was directed to deposit an amount of Rs.17,47,121/- as dues amount for the period from 3/1996 to
10/2009 pertaining to the contractor M/s Punia Security Services, Sangrur. Vide another order dated
11.02.2011 passed by the APFC, Chandigarh, under Section 7-A of EPF & MP Act, 1952, the Respondent
No.1 was directed to deposit an amount of Rs.10,45,525/- for the period 3/2007 to 3/2008 pertaining to the M/s
Roving Eyes Security and Intelligence Service, Patiala dues on account of the aforesaid benefits. Similarly,
vide order dated 08.08.2011, passed by the APFC, Chandigarh the Respondent No.1 was directed to deposit a
sum of Rs.1,52,49,131/- for the period from 4/1998 to 3/2008 pertaining to the contractor M/s National
Building Construction Corporation Limited, Chandigarh on account of the aforesaid heads of monetary scheme
benefits. Further case of workmen has been that being upset with the workers‘ Union for having exposed the
corrupt and fraudulent practices being undertaken by the management- respondent No.1 in connivance with the
contractors working for it, and fastening of liability to pay a huge amount, the Respondent No.1 in connivance
with the contractors decided to wreak vengeance upon the workman and therefore terminated them in a display
of utter vindictiveness. The terminated workmen made representations to the Assistant Labour Commissioner
(Central) Karnal and raised claim for reinstatement. Pursuant thereto Conciliation proceedings ensued and the
Conciliation Officer took up the matter on various dates, however, since no satisfactory resolution arrived at,
due to the obdurate and vindictive attitude of the respondents, the conciliation talks finally broke down and the
Ld. Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) Karnal has disposed of the representations mentioning failed
conciliation. It is also of the case of the workmen that they have been in continuous service of the employer/
Management and worked for the mandatory period of 240 days in the year preceding their illegal termination.
The cause of action arose to the workman on 01.11.2011 when the workmen were retrenched. Prayer for
reinstatement with back wages with interest has been made in all the above noted cases.
3. The case of Respondent No.1-Management- In response to notices issued to the Respondents only
respondent No.1 appeared and filed its written statement and contested the claims of workmen. According to
the case of the respondent no.1 the claim petitions deserve to be dismissed as there was no relationship of
employees and employer between the workmen and the management of Institute. It is denied by the
Management that the workmen have been ever terminated by the answering respondent/ management. The
contesting respondent has denied that the workmen in these claim petitions were directly appointed on different
posts of mali, helpers welder or plumbers. According to the case of management the Institutes out sourced the
manpower for required job through the contractors. It is denied by the answering Respondent/ Management that
the services of workmen were terminated on 01.11.2011. According to the responded no.1 the factual position
is that the Respondent/ Management used to float tenders the supply of various workmen - weldor, mali, driver,
helper, plumber etc. After examining the competitive rates given by the contractors, the respondent/
management used to give tender to the private contractors. The workmen were engaged by the contractors and
at no point of time they were employees of answering Respondent/ Management. The workers employed solely
by the contractors. Their attendances are marked by the contractors, their work is supervised by the contractors.
The employment, termination and re-employment of workmen is in the exclusive domain of the contractors. In
the para-wise reply the contesting respondent no.1 has denied contents of the claim petitions regarding
workmen direct employment by the Institute management. In the written statement contesting respondent No.1
has given details of various contractors and the period during which they were engaged. According to the case
of respondent no.1 right from the year 1992 practice of floating tenders and engaging contractors for supply of
workers for various purpose is going on.The perusal of the contents of the enclosed agreements reveals that the
hollowness of the story of employment by the answering Respondent/ Management is cooked up by the
workmen. The contesting respondent has stated being unaware of the claim about the exact salary as is
contended in the respective claim petitions by the workmen. The case of the respondent in this regard has been
that the payment made directly to the contractors as per bill raised by them in accordance with the agreement
and it was for the contractors to whatever salary was being paid by them to the workmen. According to the
contesting respondent since there has been no employee and employer relationship between claimants
/workmen and the management the claim petitions are not maintainable and the workmen are not entitled for
reliefs they have sought in respective petitions, therefore their petitions may be dismissed.
4. Issues: On the basis of pleadings of the parties following issues are framed to be decided in the present case-
i.
Whether there was Employer-Employee relationship between respondents and the
workmen?
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
597
ii.
Whether the terminations of services of workmen in these petitions are illegal and in
violation of provisions contained in Chapter VA and Section 25-F & G of the
Industrial Dispute Act?
iii. Whether the workmen-applicants are entitled for reinstatement with back wages as
prayed in respective claim petitions?
iv.
What other relief if any in the facts and circumstances of the case?
5. Evidence: During the hearing/ trial proceedings of these cases on behalf of petitioners/ workmen, two
witnesses have been examined in the lead case ID No.257/2013 and several documents have been brought on
record as exhibits. The witnesses examined in support of workmen are WW-1- Sukhdev Singh (petitioner in ID
No.01/2014) and WW-2- Jagsir Singh (petitioner in ID No.260/2013). The documents which have been
brought on record through evidence of WW-1- Sukhdev Singh & WW-2- Jagsir Singh are same documents and
marked as exhibits as follows:
Particulars
Exhibits
Copy of order dated 25.06.2010 under Section 7-A of EPF Act, passed by
Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Bathinda.
Ex.W-1/A
Copy of order dated 11.02.2011 under Section 7-A, passed by Assistant
Provident Fund Commissioner, Chandigarh.
Ex.W-2/A
Copy of order dated 08.08.2011 passed by Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner, Chandigarh.
Ex.W-3/A
Copy of report dated 27.12.2013 submitted by Assistant Labour Commissioner.
Ex.W-4/A
6. On behalf of Management/ Respondent No.1 one witness Sh. Mandeep Singh has been examined as MW-1
and as many as 19 agreements between Management and different Contractor‘s for different period have been
brought on the record and these agreements are marked as Exhibits Ex.M-1/1 to 1/19 For Management.
7. Argument on behalf of Workman-Applicant: Ld. Authorized Representative appearing on behalf of all the
workmen in above noted cases submitted that the initial engagement of workmen with respondent No.1 was
directly but later on the respondent engaged these workman through contractors in violation of Principal of
Labour Laws. The nature of services with respondent No.1 the Principle Employer was of permanent nature
and that was the reason Provident Fund Commissioner had directed to deposit various amounts as per different
orders for the Employees Provident Fund benefits. It is also argued that no notice of any retrenchment
compensation has been given to these workmen before terminating their services. It is argued by Ld.
Authorized Representative that even management witness in his deposition before the Court has admitted
during his cross examination that work of horticulture, plumber, driver is perennial nature and still available.
The management witness has also admitted that there was direction by EPF Provident Fund Authority to
deposit Provident Fund, Family Pension Fund, Insurance and Employees Deposit Linked Insurance and the
amount was also deposited. It is also argued that management was supervising and controlling the work of
these workmen and even a muster roll was maintained by it. The Ld. Authorized Representative pointed out
documents which are marked as (H) to demonstrate that there was muster roll maintained by respondent No.1.
According to Ld. Counsel in fact the respondent No.1 being principle employer cannot stop workmen from
their duties and terminating their services without payment of any compensation or without prior notice of
retrenchment is illegal and against the provisions of Labour laws. The Ld. Authorized Representative has in the
last submitted that all the workmen who have filed these petitions separately are entitled for the reliefs they
have prayed for.
8. Before concluding the argument Ld. Counsel for Workmenappearing in all these above noted cases had
pointed out that during the pendency of these ID Cases some of the workmen died, some of them had become
over aged for the purpose of their reinstatement. A tabular list was also supplied by the Ld. Counsel for
Workmen wherein at Sr. No.1 Baljeet Singh (ID Case No.257/2013) at Sr. No. 21 Major Singh (ID Case
No.12/2014), at Sr. No.30 Bhola Dass (ID Case No.21/2014), at Sr. No. 55 Narang Singh (ID Case
No.46/2014), at Sr. No.56 Raj Singh (ID Case No.47/2014) and Sr. No.67 Bhura Singh (ID No.58/2014) are
shown dead. Similarly, as many as 18 Workmen in different ID cases- 02/2014, 03/2014, 07/2014, 08/2014,
15/2014, 18/2014, 19/2014, 20/2014, 23/2014, 28/2014, 31/2014, 34/2014, 38/2014, 41/2014, 45/2014,
51/2014, 52/2014, 53/2014 and 59/2014 are shown aged above 60 years and more. Ld. Counsel has urged while
supplying list of date and over aged workmen that in case the dispute is decided against the management and in
favor of workmen in these cases suitable compensation award may be passed in place of order/ award of
reinstatement of these dead or over aged workmen. It may be pointed out here that in none of the above referred
cases where workmen had died, any substitution application to substitute their legal heirs has been filed so far.
598
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9. Argument on behalf of Respondent No.1: The Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of contesting respondent
has submitted that the Institute- Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering and Technology is a deemed
University which imparts education in different branches. To run the Institute properly work force are needed
by the University which includes work of electricity, gardening, plumbering etc. Since, 1992 the Institute for
the purpose of hiring work force used to float tenders and through agreement with different contractors
workmen were engaged. It is also argued that the Institute neither engaged these workmen directly nor any
wages were paid directly to them. As per the agreement between contractor and Institute the bill was being
raised by contractors from time to time and it was being cleared/ paid by the Institute as and when as and when
bills were raised. It is argued also that work supervision, attendance and other disciplinary function connected
with the hired workmen were exclusive in the domain of respective contractors through which these workmen
were hired and at no point of time there was relationship of employees and employer. The Ld. Counsel for the
contesting respondent has also argued that Provident Fund Authorities had directed to deposit amounts only
because the contractors were not depositing the same with the Provident Fund Authorities and it was the
liability of contractors which was discharged by the contesting respondent. During the arguments Ld. Counsel
for the respondent pointed out that only for a very short period of two months a muster roll was prepared and
maintained by the Institute when there was no contractor engaged neither any appointment letter was given to
anyone of the worker nor any termination order has been passed and therefore the claim of workmen in all
these petitions are not sustainable and all the petitions are liable to be dismissed.
FINDINGS
10. Points No.(i)-Whether there was Employer-Employee relationship between respondents and the workmen? (ii)
Whether the terminations of services of workmen in these petitions are illegal and in violation of provisions
contained in Chapter VA and Section 25-F & G of the Industrial Dispute Act?Since these two points are
interconnected and therefore these are taken together. On the case record of all these cases not a single
document purported to be appointment letter/ offer of employment issued by contesting respondent has been
brought on the record. The claim of workmen that they were initially engaged by the contesting respondent
directly is only oral claim which is denied by the contesting respondent. On the other hand the case of
contesting respondent has been that from the very beginning the workmen for the purpose of different works
were taken to perform the task through contractors after floating tenders by the management at no point of
time these workmen were ever appointed or directly recruited by the contesting respondent. In support of
claim the workmen had brought on record certain orders which were passed by Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner against M/s Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering & Technology directing the institute to
deposit certain amounts which were assessed as dues on account of provident funds, family pension funds,
Insurance Funds and Administrative charges on employees provident fund. A perusal of these orders reflects
that the EPF Authority while passing the order has taken note about a provision in the contract regarding
deposit of PPF Contribution in reference of workers implied through the contractor but it is also noticed that
the Institute never bothered to check whether contractor was having a PF Code or not and also that the
Institute never insured before settlement of bill raised by contractor as to whether the PPF Contributions are
being deposited or not by the contractor and it appears that in above facts and circumstances the institute was
held liable for the assessed dues amount through different orders passed under Section 7-A proceeding of the
EPF & MP Act. On the record the contesting respondent has produced agreements between contractors and
the management for engagement of workers and therefore it is clear that at no point of time these workmen
were engaged directly by the management. Merely because certain orders under EPF & MP Act have been
passed against the contesting respondent/ management of Sant Longowal Technical Institute, it cannot be
concluded that these workers were employee of the contesting respondent-management. Had there been direct
engagement by the contesting respondent some documentary proof must have come on the record but no such
documentary proof has been brought on record by the employees. Similarly, the so called termination is also
not in writing and has not been produced on the record by the workmen in above noted cases. It is only orally
stated that these workmen were terminated from their services since 01.11.2012. The stand of contesting
respondent management in this regard has been that neither these workmen were ever engaged directly by the
Institute nor they supervised or controlled their work and therefore, there was no question of terminating the
services of workmen. According to the stand taken by contesting respondent terminating the services or
engaging these workmen was in the exclusive domain of the contractors engaged from time to time for the
purpose of various job required in the Institute. From the perusal of agreements which have been brought on
the record it is clear that institute used to engage workers through contractors by floating tenders. Even the
direction of EPF Authority has been there but infact the liability of contractor was shifted on the institute by
passing the 7-A proceeding order under the EPF Act. On the record there is nothing to show as to what happen
to these orders passed by EPF Authorities whether they were challenged and set aside in appeal are same
remain intact is not clear. The agreement between contractor and Institute clearly stipulates that the Institute
shall not be liable to pay any amount/ contribution, compensation under the provisions of ESI Act, 1948,
Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, EPF & MP Act, 1952 etc and such amount shall be paid by the agency
hired. It appears that when the contractor failed to comply provisions of EPF Act. The authorities directed
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
599
institute to deposit the assessed dues. In the present case the workmen have clearly failed to prove the
employer-employee relationship and in fact they were engaged to perform different works at the institute
through the contractors which were being engaged by the Institute from time to time. I am of the considered
view that there has been no employer-employee relationship between the contesting respondent and the
workmen. Since there is no evidence on the record regarding the employment of these workmen directly by
the institute and also there is no any documentary proof that the institute had ever terminated these workmen
by passing order it is not possible for this Court to record finding as to whether the show cause termination
was legal or illegal. It appears that these workmen were being hired to perform different jobs through
contractors and contractors were therefore, liable for payment of wages to these workmen and thus Point No.
(i) & (ii) are decided against the workmen in above noted all the cases.
11. Point No.(iii) Whether the workmen-applicants are entitled for reinstatement with back wages as prayed in
respective claim petitions? (iv) What other relief if any in the facts and circumstances of the case?While
discussing Point No. (i) & (ii) hereinabove this Court has arrived at a conclusion that there was no employer-
employees relationship between the contesting respondent-management and therefore, no relief can be granted
to these workmen for reinstatement. The contractor Global construction company which is respondent No.2 in
these cases is proceeded ex-parte. On the record no evidence has been laid as to whether the said contractor
company is still functional or not and therefore, it is not possible for this Court in absence of any evidence on
the financial viability of respondent No.2 no compensatory order can be passed in these cases. Therefore,
these two points are also decided against the workmen in all above noted cases.
12. In the light of discussion made hereinabove and in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
it is-
ORDERED
That all these above noted ID cases leading case being ID No.257/2013 titled as Baljeet Singh Vs.
Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering & Technology (SLIET) are dismissed. No relief may be given to these
workmen as prayed in the respective claim petitions.
13.
Let copy of this award be sent to the Appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the
Act for publication.
Dated: 16.01.2025
B. K. GAUTAM, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 206.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक
fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
I
ds iapkV (a223/2015) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-01]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 206.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 223/2015) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
No. I Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of CPWD and their
workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025– IR(B-1) -01]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI No.1 NEW
DELHI.
ID. No. 223/2015
Shri. Rajeev Saxena, S/o Late Ashok Kumar Saxena C/o All India Central PWD (MRM)
Karamchari Sangathan (Regd), House No. 4823, Gali No. 13, Balbir Nagar Extension,
Shahdara, Delhi-110032.
Workman……
600
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Versus
1. The Executive Engineer Dehradun Central Division-1 CPWD, 20, Subhash Road, Dehradun.
2. The Executive Engineer Mussoorie Central Division Lal Bahadur Shastri IAS Academy Mussoorie, Distt.
Dehradun.
Management…
Shri Satish Kumar Sharma, A/R for the claimant.
Shri Atul Bhardwaj, A/R for the management.
Justice Vikas Kunvar Srivastava (Retd.)
(Presiding Officer)
1.
The Present Industrial Dispute is registered in this Central Government Industrial Tribunal on the application
moved by the claimant/workman Sh. Rajeev Saxena under section 2A of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947,
which shall herein after be called ‗The ID Act‘ only. Opposite parties to the dispute are -
(i) Executive Engineer Dehradun Central Division-1 CPWD, 20, Subhash Road Dehradun and
(ii) Executive Engineer Mussoorie Central Division Lal Bahadur Shastri IAS Academy Mussoorie, Distt. Dehradun.
FACTUAL MATRIX
2.
The workman‘s claim as emerges from the statement of claim filed on his behalf before this tribunal is that he
was initially appointed as Mali/ Helper with effect from 01.04.1996 through contractor for day to day work at
Lal Bahadur Shastri IAS Academy, Mussoorie by the management (CPWD). Some issues on differences with
management were raised by the workman before conciliation officer, of the Labour Department Dehradun who
fixed several dates for their settlement but the management remained adamant and reluctant to cooperate. The
union of the workman has given an application to the Conciliation Officer to discontinue running conciliation
process and permit the workman to take up the case with Central Government Industrial Tribunal directly
under sub section 2 and 3 of section 2A of the ID Act, which was allowed and consequent thereupon the
Conciliation Officer issued certificate in that regard. It is stated in the claim that the management has been in
usual practice to utilize services of the workmen through several contractors engaged by them from time to
time keeping continued the same workman working the same work at the same work place. The service of the
workman was illegally terminated with effect from 01.01.2014. Till date of the termination, the workman had
already rendered services for a continuous period of much more than 240 days in each year with effect from
his initial date of joining. He was issued throughout his continuous service identity card by the contractor
forwarded by Junior Engineer concerned which are evidence of his continuity in service as stated above.
CPWD and his contractor both have not paid minimum wages to the workman though he was legally entitled
for regular pay scale of post of Mali/ Helper in relation to the work performed and duties discharged by him at
par with regular Mali/ Helper. This is also claimed that regular sanctioned posts of Malis were available in his
division and regular workmen are posted qua sanctioned posts under other divisions of CPWD all over India,
who are enjoying the benefits of regular pay scale and allowances. This act of non-payment of regular pay
scale is violative of the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA Act)
3. The workman further claims that he fulfills the qualification/eligibility criteria of recruitment rules for the post
of Mails/ Helper and was performing his duties continuously under the direct control and supervision of
principal employer w.e.f. 01.04.1996 till 31.12.2013, therefore, he is entitled for regularization and to receive
the consequential benefits of pay and allowances equivalent to regular counterparts in CPWD in observance of
the principal of equal pay for equal work. It is further stated that in the matter of All India CPWD (MRM)
Karamchari Sanganthan Vs. Union of India and Ors. Vide order dated 26.05.2000 The High Court of Delhi
in CWP No. 4817/99 directed the Ministry of Labour for constitution of a board to look into the aspect of
contract system prevalent in the CPWD under section 10 of the Contract Labour (Abolition & Regulation) Act,
1970 (CLRA Act). The said board was constituted and recommended for abolishing contract system for 15
posts including the post of Plumber and Helper also. The Ministry of Labour issued the notification u/s 10 of
CLRA Act, dated 31.07.2002 in accordance with the recommendation. The same was circulated to all
concerned for implementation. The workman complains that the said notification had not been implemented in
the CPWD at the level of Executive Engineer Division in violation of labour laws, the workmen were being
adversely affected due to non-implementation of that prohibition notification. The matter of non-
implementation had been brought to the notice of management by the Union of workman namely, ―All India
CPWD (MRM) Karamchari Saganthan‖ raised the issue but the same remained in vain. The purpose of
keeping the concerned workman on contract basis and also use of the contractors was with intention to avoid
payment of their wages as per Minimum Wages Act. The workman was working directly under the control of
the principal employer CPWD and even was unable to know who was his contractor and when the new
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
601
contract came into force. The reason behind this unawareness was simple as only the concerned JE/AE were
issuing directions to workman for doing works assigned to him as well as supplying materials for completing
the day to day maintenance works. JE/AE concerned were the only authority to employ a workman and even to
terminate his employment by restraining them from entering physically into premises for any work. The work
which was being performed by him is of perennial nature under the principal employer. The contract entered
into between the management and contractor is a sham and camouflage. High Court of Delhi in CWP No.
4817/99 (Supra) in its order dated 26.05.2000 had also issued direction for not substituting/terminating the
service of such workman even after change of contractor. On the basis of above gamut of facts the workman
claims themselves entitled to be reinstated in service w.e.f. the date of illegal termination with full back wages
and regularization in service w.e.f. the date of initial employment under the CPWD. He further claims right to
receive benefits of pay at par with the regular counterparts in the CPWD as per the provision of CLRA Act,
1970.
4. The claimant in support of his pleadings has submitted documents in evidence viz. letter of conciliation officer
certifying that the workman Sh. Rajeev Saxena raised an industrial Dispute under section 2 A of the ID Act
which was taken up by conciliation officer on 03.08.2015. As the mandatory 45 days of raising dispute before
the conciliation officer has been completed on 21.05.2015 but conciliation could not be arrived at, certificate
for filing industrial dispute case was issued (Annexure-1). Further representation of workman Sh. Rajeev
Kumar Saxena dated 20.06.2015 against the action of management stopping the workman from discharging his
duties on 01.01.2014 with the prayer for reinstating him in service (Annexure no. 2). Annexure no. 3 is the
photocopy of identity card issued by establishment management in favour of the workman. Authority letter
executed by the workman in favour of General Secretary of the Union Sh. Satish Kumar, Narender Dev &
Sunil Dutt Assistant Secretary of the Union of All India CPWD (MRM) Karamchari Sangathan New Delhi,
with signature of their acceptance. (Annexure 8) along with letter of espousal of dispute by the Labour Union.
Circular letter issued by undersecretary to the Ministry of Labour Union of India communicating minutes of
the meeting of the Central Advisory Contract Labour Board held on 22.11.2001 with recommendation of the
Board on the basis of majority view that, ―the contract workers employed in 22 categories of job enumerated
therein including the posts of plumber and helper are such jobs which satisfy the criteria laid down in sub
section 2 of section 10 of the CLRA Act, 1970 because they are incidental to and necessary in terms of the
responsibility entrusted to the CPWD for maintenance of buildings, plants and equipment under the control of
the Central Government. All these are perennial in nature regular workers have been required on the jobs and
nature and duration of the job is such the reasonable plumber of old-time workers can be employed
accordingly‖. The aforesaid communication of meeting with recommendation is annexure 5. The notification
issued by the Central Government in official gazette regarding recommendation for abolishing the contract in
the services of 15 categories as also made annexure with the statement of claim and affidavit in support which
consists of 15 categories of job including the post of plumber and helper.
5. The workman has prayed the tribunal on the basis of above facts and benefits following relief:
(i)
To pass an award for reinstatement of service of Sh. Rajeev Saxena. Mali/ Helper w.e.f. the
date of his illegal termination with full back wages.
(ii) To pass an award for regularization of services of the workman Sh. Rajveev Saxena under
the CPWD w.e.f. the date of his initial employment with regular pay and allowances at
par with the other regular counterpart workmen.
(iii) Any other relief which may kindly be deemed fit and proper to meet the end of justice.
Defense set forth by the management
6. The management on the other hand in their written statement have contested the claim with preliminary
objection to the effect that, there is no relationship of employer and employee and that of a master and servant
existing or otherwise exists between claimant and management. Claimant is labour of contractor to whom
contract has been awarded by competent authority of CPWD in due course of procedure prescribed by law.
Workman had never been appointed nor recruited in the employment by management of the CPWD. If any
contract is in between the workman and his contractor the same would abide the contractor, the CPWD
authorities are not responsible. The workman along with other workmen was working under the contractor‘s
control and supervision, and even wages were being paid by the said contractor. The claim is not maintainable
in view of the judgment passed by Supreme Court in cases v.i.z. State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi & Ors.
(2006) 4 SCC 1, Surender Prasad Tiwari Vs. U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parisad (Appeal Civil
3981 of 2006. Management vehemently pleads that in view of para 34 and 36 of the judgment in Uma Devi
case (Supra). Unless the appointment is in terms of relevant rules and after the proper competition amongst
qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the
appointments come to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily
wages of casual basis the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. It is further impressed that the
workman who had accepted the employment with open eyes, one has to proceed on the basis of that the
602
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it, his claim is not
maintainable. The management denies that one who has been working for some time on any post he will have
right not to be discontinued.
7. In addition to the above preliminary objections and the maintainability of claim. The management has
further denied that the workman has put in 240 days regular service in each year w.e.f. his initial date of
joining till illegal termination as alleged. According to the management the workman was not their employee
hence the question of working 240 days in their establishment does not arise. They have specific pleading that
neither the management of CPWD nor the contractors engaged for hiring the services of the workman have
paid wages lessor than minimum wages to the workman and he is not entitled to regular pay scale of the post
of Mali/Helper as alleged. According to them the workman never complained about the payment of wages
below minimum wages rates to the office of the management. They further denied that the workman was
performing his duties continuously under the principal employer w.e.f. 01.4.1996 till 31.12.2013therefore,
entitled for regularization in services as alleged.
8. The management further submits that they have well defined procedure with regard to the selection of
contractors through whom thousands of employees work for the establishment. They have selected genuine
contractor, entered with him agreement genuinely and overall performance of the contractor is monitored by a
team of engineers and the executive engineer concerned. The workman had also been fired by the contractor
directly for any fault in his duties, if any, the true fact is that the official of answering management has no
control over the workers of the contractor. Moreover, the management CPWD cannot force the contractor to
retain the same worker who were engaged by the earlier contractor. They further have specifically denied that
workman is entitled to be reinstated in service w.e.f. the date of initial employment under the CPWD. It is
stated that workman is not unemployed as alleged and that since the workman was never engaged by the
department the question of regularization does not arise and he is not entitled for any relief.
Issues framed for adjudication
9. On the basis of above facts pleaded by the contesting parties of the present industrial dispute on 27.05.2016
following issues were framed.
(i)
Whether termination of the job of the claimant by the management is wrong and illegal
and as such claimant is liable to be reinstated, as alleged?
(ii)
Whether the services of the claimant is liable to be regularized form the date of his initial employment, as
alleged?
(iii) Whether there is no relationship of employer/employee between the claimant and the management?
(iv) Whether the petition is not maintainable in view of preliminary objections?
10. In view of the issues framed by the tribunal the first point of determination in the present industrial dispute, prior
to adjudicate dispute relating to termination of service, if illegal and other consequential reliefs thereto, would
be the question as to the maintainability of the workman‘s claim which is raised in issue no. 3 & 4. Unless there
exists relation between the claimant and the opposite party (management) of workman-employer this tribunal
will have no jurisdiction to entertain the claim for the purpose of adjudication under the ID Act. The pivotal
question in present industrial dispute is legality of termination of service of the workman by the management. If
termination of services in the facts found illegal, then his entitlement to be reinstated may be considered,
likewise on positive answer to the question of reinstatement next question whether with or without back wages
may be answered. The determination of the right of workman for regularization is contingent upon his
reinstatement in services of the management. Tribunal has to look into not only pleadings of the parties to the
industrial dispute but also evidences oral and documentary adduced before it.
11. Perused the documentary evidence placed on record by the litigating parties to the industrial dispute in hand.
Perused the oral evidences of witnesses of claimant and management. Heard the arguments. Parties have filed
their written argument also.
12. Management has relied on decision of the Supreme Court and High Court in support of their argument;
(i)
Workman V. Coates of India Ltd.‘s (2004)3 SCC, 547
(ii)
Haldia Refinery Canteen employee‘s union V. Indian Oil Corpn, Ltd (2005) SCC 51
(iii) Balwant Rai Saluja Vs. Air India Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 407
(iv) Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. V. State of Saurastra, AIR 1957 SC 274
(v)
Ram Singh V. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (2004) 1 SCC 126
(vi) Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills V. Bharat Lal (2011) 1 SCC 635
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
603
(vii) Workman of Nilgiri Coop. Mkt. Society Ltd. V. State of T.N., (2004) 3 SCC 514
(viii) State of Karnataka V. Uma Devi & Ors [2006 (4) SCC 1
(ix) Union of India & Anr V. Arulmozhi Iniarasu & Ors (2011) 9 S.C.R. 1
Whereas, no case law has been referred or relied on during the argument on behalf of the claimant. Having
gone through the case laws cited by the management I, proceed to discuss the issue involved in the present
matter in succeeding paras.
13. In oral evidence the concerned workman has submitted himself as claimant/witness WW1 and placed on record
his affidavit in examination in chief as Ex. WW1/A. He is subjected to cross examination on Dec 18, 2017 and
cross examined. He reiterated his averment in claim statement and stood firm and consistent thereon in cross
examination which shall be discussed in forth coming paras wherever required.
Relationship of employee (workman) and the employer (Management) in the present case.
14. The claimant claims himself that he has been throughout his employment as contractual workman doing the
work, discharging his duties under the control and supervision of CPWD through its authorities. It is also stated
by the workman that the management has been in usual practice to utilize services of the workman through
several contractors engaged by them from time to time keeping continued the same work at the same work
place. He states that with effect from the initial date of his employment i.e. 01.04.1996 his services were utilized
as contractual workman of CPWD till date of his termination w.e.f. 01.04.2014. In their pleading, management
though has denied existence of employer and employee relationship with the concerned workman but his
engagement as contractual labour is not denied. Management pleads that claimant is labour of contractor to
whom contract had been awarded by the competent authority of CPWD in due course of procedure prescribed
by the law. Further the management has stated that the claimant has never been appointed or recruited in the
employment by the management of CPWD and if any contract between the workman and the contractor exists,
the same is not binding upon CPWD authorities. The management in explicit and unequivocal terms has
admitted in written statement that concerned workman along with other workmen was working under the direct
control and supervision of the contractor and even wages to them was also paid by the said contractor.
Vehemence is placed on Para 34 & 36 of the judgment of Hon‘ble Apex Court in the State of Karnataka Vs.
Uma Devi & Ors. (Supra) highlighting the pleading in written statement that in the absence of appointment
and recruitment the management the concerned workman on the basis of his contractual appointment does not
have any right as workman of the CPWD.
15. When deployment of the concerned workman in the premises of the management though as contractual labour
since 01.04.1996 till the end of his disengagement on 01.01.2014 is not denied and even admitted fact that the
management has been in usual practice throughout in aforesaid period to engage workmen through several
contractors engaged by them from time to time. It is also not specifically denied that work used to be done
continuing the same workman working the same work at the same workplace, the tribunal has to examine
whether utilization of claimant‘s labour and services by the management throughout the aforesaid period of his
employment as contractual labour shall create relationship between him and the management as employee-
employer. The Industrial Dispute Act defines ‗workman‘ in following terms of section 2(s):
2 (s) “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual,
unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the
terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes includes any such person who has been
dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose
dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person-
(i) Who is subject to the Air force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46(of 1950), or the
Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) Who is employed in the police service of as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) Who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding [ten thousand rupees] per
mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the
powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
16.
According to the definition of workman ‗any person‘ employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled,
skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward shall be treated as workman for
the purposes of any proceeding under the ID Act in relation to an industrial dispute like dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment which had held that dispute provided such person does not fall in any exceptional category
specified in definition from (i) to (iv) under section 2(s) of the ID Act.
604
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
17.
In the ―Contract Labour (Abolition and Regularization) Act‖, 1970 (the CLRA Act) definition of workman is
also inclusive of contractual labours.
18.
In Section 2(1) (b) of the CLRA Act, 1970 “a workman shall be deemed to be employed „as contract labour‟
in or in connection with the work of an establishment when he is hired in or in connection with such work by
or through a contractor, with or without the knowledge of principal employer”.
Thus, in accordance with the aforesaid definition the claimant whose services is admittedly hired by the
management of CPWD through a contractor the CPWD shall be treated as employer in relation to the claimant
a workman.
Section 2(1) (c) defines ‗contractor‘ also as under.
Sec 2 (1) (c)„Contractor ‟―in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to produce a
given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or articles of manufacture
to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any work of
the establishment and includes a sub-contractor”.
19.
Admittedly, the workman/claimant is contract labour whose services is hired by the CPWD through the
contractor therefore, CPWD shall be treated as principal employer in relation to the claimant/workman.
The CLRA Act further defines the ―Principal employer‖ in section 2 (1) (g) which runs as under-
Section 2(1) „Principal employer‟ (g) means (i). in relation to any office or department of the
Government or a local authority, the head of that officer or department or such other officer as
the government or the local authority, as the case may be, may specify in this behalf,
(ii)…….
(iii)…....
(iv)…….
20.
There are oral and documentary evidences also in addition to the admitted fact of the claimant/workman
working as contract labour in the establishment of management CPWD. The claimant/workman Sh. Rajeev
Kumar Saxena deposed on oath before the tribunal as witness and submitted on oath in the affidavit that, he
acted on day to day labour basis as mali/helper in the campus of the management under direct control and
supervision of one junior engineer of CPWD who used to take his attendance also. The witness was subjected
to cross-examination by the management who did not carved out anything against the above statement on oath.
He specifically denied the suggestion during cross examination that he was working through the contractor. In
cross-examination he stands firm and reasserted that his wages were paid by the JE of the CPWD. He proved
Ex. WW1/3 the entry pass issued to him as contract labour for entry in the premises of the CPWD where he
was posted to work. He further denied that he was paid his wages by the contractor in cash and his work was
supervised by him only. MW1 the management witness Sh. Prashant Singh admits in cross examination dated
21.08.2019 that Ex WW1/3 was issued by CPWD to the claimant on receiving the letter from contractor to
make deployment of the workers and issuance of the gate pass. He also admitted as correct that for last more
than 10 years the post of mali remains vacant in the division and the workman engaged as contractual
workmen through the contractor is covered by the notification of prohibition of contract labour. He further
admits as correct that daily or casual labour were not issued any letter of appointment.
21.
The above pleadings and evidences when taken cumulatively they show and establish that there exist
unambiguous relationship of workman and principal employer, between the claimant/ workman and the
management CPWD and they have a relation of employer-employee in terms of the Industrial Dispute Act
section 2(s) as well as with the deeming effect under section 2 (1) (b) of the CLRA Act 1970.
22.
The recommendation of Central Advisory Board of the Appropriate Government made before issuance of
notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and other evidences of the management itself show that they
had post of the helper/plumber vacant for a considerably long period of 10 years. The claimant has established
through evidence that during the entire period he was working as contract labour on the above vacant post
without having been issued any letter of appointment.
23. Formally, the appointments are made through prescribed recruitment agencies but exigencies of work may
sometimes call for making appointments on adhoc or temporary basis. In the present case the claimant has
pleaded that he possessed at the time of his initial engagement the requisite qualification and eligibility required
for the post of plumber/helper. This is not explained and clarified by the management that what exigencies
occurred before them not to fill up the post by regular appointment and to continue utilizing the service of the
concerned workman as contract labour on the vacant post. In the State of Haryana Vs. Piara Singh AIR 1992
Supreme Court 2130 The Supreme Court held that though the normal rule is recruitment through the
prescribed agencies but due to administrative exigencies an adhoc or temporary appointment may be made. If
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
605
casual or temporary or adhoc appointment were made against sanctioned posts and the policy is fell vacant for a
long period without filling up those post on a regular basis then the Courts has reason to interfere. In Rattan
Lal vs. State of Haryana AIR 1987 Supreme Court 478 Hon‘ble Supreme Court held that such situation
cannot be permitted to last any longer.
24. The case of Uma Devi (Supra) which lays down that there should be no back door entry and every post should
be filled by regular employment with terms of relevant service rules does not apply to the facts of present
industrial dispute because it has severally been judicially noticed that in spite rigor of Uma Devi case (Supra)
the same was being ignored and conveniently overlooked by various states by making appointments on
contract/daily wage basis without due payment of salary. In Shiv Narain Nagar and Ors. Vs. State of U.P and
Ors. (2018) 13 SCC 432 the Apex Court held that since the management themselves have conferred temporary
status to the employees even when there was requirement of work and availability of post, consequently there
was no case of back door entry since there were no recruitment rules governing such situation then their
appointment cannot be said to be illegal or in contravention of rules.
25. In the present matter where the workman is engaged directly or through a contractor as contract labour by an
employer and the services is discharged, terminated or retrenched against the provision of Industrial Dispute
Act the matter shall be governed under the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and other legislations
connected therewith.
26. The present industrial dispute is brought before the tribunal for the purpose adjudicating disputes as to claim of
workman for regularization in services of the management who have completed the required period of
continuous services 240 days in every year prior to the termination of his services and for reinstatement of his
services. Therefore, the present dispute comes within the definition of ‗Industrial Dispute‘ as define in section 2
(k) of the Act.
2 (k); ―industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers
and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment
or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person”.
27. On the basis of discussions, made hereinabove the issue no 3 & 4 are positively decided in favour of the
workman/claimant and against the management. The workman/claimant and the management were in relation of
employee and employer. The present industrial dispute is maintainable before the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal under the industrial dispute act for adjudication of the claim of the workman.
Discussion on issue no 1 & 2
Contractual workman through the contractor in continuous services
28. The claimant‘s case of initial date of employment 01.04.1996 as daily wager on contract basis in the services of
management CPWD as Helper/Mali in their premises is not specifically denied in written statement. Likewise,
the fact of termination of claimant‘s services w.e.f. 01.01.2014 is also evasively replied on the pretext of want
of knowledge as he was employed by contractor. Moreover, it is admitted that the concerned workman was
employee of contractor from whom his labour and services were hired by the management.
Want of specific denial, instead vague denial and consequence
29. General rule of pleading requires the burden of proof on the party to a his who pleaded a fact as ground of claim
or defense as the case may be, but such burden arise when that fact is specifically denied by opponent. Failure
of the management to specifically deny the fact of initial date of employment with CPWD would make the
allegation in this regard made in the statement of claim as admitted against management. Principle of pleadings
propounded in Civil Procedure Code, 1908 equally applicable to pleadings in all legal proceedings whether
judicial or quasi-judicial. Order VIII R 3 & 5 of Civil procedure Code 1908 clearly provides for specific
admission and denial of the pleading in the plaint. A General and evasive denial amounts deemed admission of
the fact. In such an event the admission itself being proof, no other proof is necessary. (Supreme Court in
Jaspal Kaur Chema and Another V. Industrial Trade Links and Others (2017) 8 SCC 592 of which Para 7
is quoted below:
Para 7 In terms of Order 8 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the Code”), a defendant is
required to deny or dispute the statements made in the plaint categorically, as evasive denial would amount to
an admission of the allegation made in the plaint in terms of Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code. In other words, the
written statement must specifically deal with each of the allegations of fact made in the plaint. The failure to
make specific denial amounts to an admission. This position is clear from the decisions of this Court in Badat
and Co. v. East India Trading Co. [Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co., (1964) 4 SCR 19: AIR 1964 SC
538], Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar [Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673] and M.
Venkataramana Hebbar v. M. Rajagopal Hebbar [M. Venkataramana Hebbar v. M. Rajagopal Hebbar, (2007)
6 SCC 401]
30. The MW1 (management‘s witness) during his oral examination stated on oath when cross examined that, the
606
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
post against which claimant asserts to have worked remained vacant for last 10 years without regular
appointment. He further states that CPWD‘s competent authorities used to enter into contract with Contract
Labour providers to do works in the department. Thus, in the absence of specific denial and presence of direct
admissions on record with deemed admissions by virtue of evasive denial of the fact coupled with evidence of
MW1 as to the availability of concerned post and work qua which the claimant claims his employment as
contractual labour and utilization of his services by the management as such since 01.04.1996 till 01.04.2014 it
is found established. This is importantly noteworthy that management has not denied eligibility and
qualification which the claimant pleaded to possess at the time of his initial engagement with CPWD in their
premises through a contractor.
31. The management in their pleading asserted the contract with concerned contractor who provided them
contractual workmen including the claimant genuinely entered into following all prescribed procedures by
competent authorities. This makes the employment of claimant as contractual workman legal emanating
benevolence of the protective provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act relating to regularization in and
termination from service. Section 25 B under the chapter V.A. of Industrial Dispute Act which governs
retrenchment defines the continuous service as under Section 25 B
Section 25B. Definition of continuous service for the purpose of this chapter -
1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the
workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer —
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than —
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than —
(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation—For the purposes of clause
(2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which
—
(i)He has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial
establishment;
(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years;
(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment; and
(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave
does not exceed twelve weeks.
32. Since nothing is pleaded by the management in their written statement against the uninterrupted utilization of
claimant‘ services except the specific plea of his being employee of the contractor has no right to be treated as
employee of the management therefore, it is held that claimant had been in Continuous service of the
management as contractual workman since 01.04.1996 to 01.04.2014. This would be noteworthy here that
claimant has successfully discharged his burden to establish his relation with employer on the basis of number
of days he has served as held by the Apex Court in state of Uttrakhand Vs. Suresh wati 2021(168) FLR 488
(SC) and Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills, Rajnand Gaon Vs. Bharat Lala and Ors. (2011) 1 SCC 635.
Prohibition of employment of contract Labour
33.
Before proceeding to discuss the prohibition of employment of contract Labour it would be pertinent to quote
section 10 of The CLRA Act which is under
Section-10 Prohibition of employment of contract labour-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
607
(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the appropriate Government may, after
consultation with the Central Board or, as the case may be, a State Board, prohibit, by
notification in the Official Gazette, employment of contract labour in any process, operation
or other work in any establishment.
(2)
Before issuing any notification under sub-section (1) in relation to an establishment, the
appropriate Government shall have regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the
contract labour that establishment and other relevant factors, such as-
(a)
whether the process, operation or other work is incidental to, or necessary for the industry, trade,
business, manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the establishment;
(b) whether it is of perennial nature, that is to say, it is so of sufficient duration having regard to
the nature of industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation carried on in that establishment;
(c) whether it is done ordinarily through regular workmen in that establishment or an
establishment similar thereto;
(d) whether it is sufficient to employ considerable number of whole-time workmen.
Explanation. - If a question arises whether any process or operation or other work is of perennial nature,
the decision of the appropriate Government thereon shall be final.
34.
Exhibit WW1/5 (Colly), filed and proved by the claimant and admitted also by the management, is minutes
of the meeting of the Central Advisory Contract Labour Board constituted by the Appropriate Government in
terms of the section 10. The CLRA Act published on 18.12.2001 which recommends twenty number of posts
for abolition of contract labour system in the establishment of CPWD which are-
1. AC Mechanic.
2. AC Operator.
3. AC Khalasi/helper.
4. Electrician.
5. Wireman.
6. Khalasi (Electrical).
7. DG Set Operators.
8. Pump Operators.
9. Fire Pump/fire alarm Operator.
10.
Carpenter.
11.
Mason.
12.
Fitter.
13.
Plumber.
14.
Enquiry Clerk.
15.
Helper/Beldar.
16.
Mechanic.
17.
Sewerman.
18.
Sweeper.
19.
Foreman.
20.
Lift Operator.
35.
As the board reached at opinion that the jobs under consideration are of perennial nature and must go from
day to day. Further the board has opined in its recommendation, ―CPWD wing of the Central Government
has been created to undertake construction and maintenance of buildings, equipments and plants within such
buildings complex of the central government. In the majority of cases they are engaged in the business of
maintenance of building of regular establishment of the central government on continuous basis. In effect the
function of the owner of these buildings relating to maintenance has been assigned to CPWD‖. The board
has further recorded in its aforesaid recommendation that, CPWD have admitted that the works are being
done through contractors for regular man power did not available due to non-recruitment and have also not
denied that regular workers have been deployed in the jobs. It is also recorded that the volume and duration
of work is not insufficient. No instances have been cited by the CPWD wherein the yearly contracts have not
been renewed and the work therefore, is of uncertain nature to employ considerable number of workmen.
608
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
36. Exhibit WW1/5 (Colly) includes the notification dated 31.07.2002 in the official gazette of India and
prohibited employment of contract labours in the process, operation or work specified in the scheduled
appended therewith in exercise of powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 10 of the CLRA Act. The
schedule consists of following 15 categories of work-
1. Air conditioner Operator.
2. Air conditioner khalasi/helper.
3. Electrician.
4. Wireman.
5. Khalasi (Electrical).
6. Carpenter.
7. Mason.
8. Fitter.
9. Plumber.
10. Helper/Beldar.
11. Mechanic.
12. Sewerman.
13. Sweeper.
14. Foreman.
Employment of contract labour by CPWD opposed to law
37.
The claimant in his statement of claim has clearly stated that he was initially appointed as mali/helper
w.e.f. 01.04.1996 through contractor for day to day work at Lal Bahadur Shastri IAS Academy,
Mussoorie, and the contractors engaged for hiring the services of contractual workmen were being replaced
from time to time by the management of CPWD. The workman was continuously working the same work at
the same place prior to termination of his services till 31.12.2013. The notification dated 31.07.2002 has
been circulated by the Ministry of Urban Development/Director General of works CPWD for
implementation which is Ex. WW1/6 proved by the claimant and also admitted by the management. In his
statement the workman further states, the work which was being performed by him is of perennial nature
under the principal employer. And that contract entered into between the management and the contactor is
sham and camouflage. In written statement the said notification of the central government issued for
prohibition of contract labour in aforesaid categories of work not denied but is admitted in evidence.
Likewise, the fact of entering into contract for supply of hiring of labours (workman) including the present
workman is not justified despite the fact they were squarely covered from the notification of prohibition of
contract labour. It is also not explained in pleading and evidence that why the CPWD had not implemented
the said notification for abolition of contract labour on 15 posts though brought into notice of the CPWD by
Union of Workmen nothing was done by the CPWD. It is pleaded, impressed in affidavit of evidence that
contractors were being used only for the purpose of getting payment of remuneration from them payable to
the workman and the workman was engaged directly under the control of the principal employer and most of
the time the workman was not aware of the contractor and when the new contract came into force. These
facts are not denied specifically are by necessary implication in the written statement of the management.
The claimant in his affidavit submitted in examination in chief before the tribunal deposed the above facts
but in cross examination nothing could be elicited to the contrary by the management. In his cross-
examination dated 18.12.2017 the claimant/workman has very clearly stated that he was terminated by Sh.
―Gopal Singh Bhakuni, Assistant Director of the CPWD‖, he was appointed on 01.04.1996 and terminated
from service on 01.01.2014.
38.
Explaining the expression ―Control and Supervision‖ the Apex Court in the case of International Airport
Authority of India V. International Air Cargo workers and another (2009) 13 SCC 374 in Para 38 & 39 of
the judgement laid down the tests to find out that in fact there is a direct employment. It has further been
observed in Para 38 & 39 as under: -
“38” The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor
may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal
and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour
supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the principal
employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is with the
contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
“39” The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour, when such
labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses whether the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
609
worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short, worker being
the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he
decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to what conditions. Only
when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal employer, the worker works
under the supervision and control of the principal employer but this is secondary control. The primary
control is with the contractor.
Management (CPWD) whether principal employer in relation to the claimant
39.
CPWD is undisputedly a department of Central Government Section 2(g) of The Contract Labour (Regulation
and Abolition) Act, 1970, in brief CLRA Act defines, principal employer means in relation to any office or
department of government any person responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment. Further,
in the context of present industrial dispute the ―contractor‖ as defined in section 2(1) (c) of the CLRA Act,
means and includes a person who supplies contract Labour for any work of the establishment. The case of the
management is that claimant was hired under a contract duly entered with contractor for supply of contract
Labour.
40.
It is not the case of the management that they entered in contract with any person who undertakes to produce a
given result for the establishment. Though, management had burden of proof but did not discharge the same by
adducing evidence as to the terms of contract, neither the deed of contract entered with contractor itself is
produced and proved, nor any contractor is examined in support of the control and supervision over the work
to be done by a contract Labour supplied by him who is deployed in the premises of management in
connection with their work. The claimant in his statement in chief examination as well in cross examination
has stated consistently that he was issued entry pass in premises of the management, his attendance was
checked and works to be done were instructed and supervised in daily routine by a junior engineer of the
establishment. Payment of wages were also made by the establishment accordingly. The management being in
possession of the best evidence like book of account entering payment of wages to contractual workmen
whether directly or through the contractor failed and more properly to say skipped to produce and prove before
the tribunal. An adverse inference therefore, in the above context may be drawn against the management that
they were in direct control, supervision and in payment of wages of contract laborers working in the
establishment.
41. In Nil Giri Co-op. Marketing Society Ltd V. State of Tamil Nadu 2004 last suit (SC) 142 where the facts
were similar as in the present case the Apex Court has observed as under.
It is submitted by the Respondents- Unions that, the documents executed between petitioner and
the Contractors are bogus, sham, concocted, fraudulent and inadmissible in evidence. The same
have been prepared to avoid the statutory liability to give permanency benefits to these workmen
and to deprive them of their legitimate rights of equal work equal pay at par with the permanent
employees of the petitioner. They submitted that, many alleged contractors have come and gone in
last 20 years but the concerned workmen involved in the Reference have been continued in service.
Had these concerned workmen been the employees of somebody else, their service would have
been terminated at the time of changing the contractor and or terminating the earlier alleged
contracts with the contractors.
The learned counsel for the Unions contended that though the notification dated 9th December,
1976 may have been abolished, however the notification dated 30th January, 1996 is very much in
existence. The said notification is in respect of the Petitioner Company. The said notification
covers the workers in this petition who are working in the establishment of the Petitioner. Though,
the members of the Respondents are covered by the notification dated 30th January,1996, however,
in breach of this notification, the petitioner continues to employ contract labour including the
workmen concerned with this petition. Out of the 37 employees, 21 are working as a valve
operator, 13 are working in housekeeping in plant area and 3 are working as helpers
(Maintenance), all of which as per the 1996 notification are prohibited jobs. The employment of
contract labour in specified jobs was prohibited as per the notification w.e.f. 01st March, 1996, yet
the Petitioner continues to treat the workmen concerned as contract labour. The learned counsel
for the Respondents submitted that nowhere in the evidence, the petitioner has denied that the
workmen concerned are not squarely covered by the notification dt. 30th January, 1996.
The Apex Court has held that question whether employee of principal employer of contractor is pure question of fact
deserve to be decided by tribunal on the basis of evidence on record. Likewise, question whether the contract was a
sham a camouflage is also a question of fact, to be decided by tribunal by piercing the veil, having regard to the
provision of the Act when a definite plea is raised.
42.
Notification issued by the central government on 04.07.2002 produced in evidence by the claimant, nothing is
said against that by the management in their pleading hence the tribunal has taken judicial notice of prohibition
610
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of contract Labour in categories of work mentioned therein. Nowhere in their pleading and evidence the
management has denied that the workman concerned is squarely covered with the notification under section 10
of the CLRA Act. The post of helper and plumber both are enumerated at serial no. 9 and 10 in the notification
of prohibition issued under section 10 of CLRA Act dated 31.07.2002 as category of work where upon
contract labour is prohibited. It is not denied that as contract labour the concerned workman‘s services were
utilized by the CPWD. The workman has also proved in his statement before the tribunal in evidence that his
services were utilized as helper/mali and with plumber also. He further states that his services were utilized
day to day by the junior engineer who after taking attendance used to send him with either plumber, mason,
carpenter etc. to redress complaints as helper and eventually work of Mali was also done by him on being
deployed as such. He has completed in each and every year since the date of his initial engagement till
termination of service that is to say 01.04.1996 to 31.12.2013 continuous service of more than 240 days. He
had stated on oath that he was paid the salary by the junior engineer getting his signature on blank voucher in
cash. In cross-examination the management has not elicited and carved out anything in rebuttal and
contradiction of the said facts. Even, in cross-examination dated 18.12.2017 the claimant witness denied the
suggestion by saying that it is wrong that I had never worked 240 days in a calendar year. It is wrong to
suggest that I was working through the contractor. My wages were paid by JE of the management.
Management had not produced documentary evidence in support of their pleading and arguments despite
opportunity afforded.
Documents relevant to the issues summoned from the management- Not produced
43.
The workman, before parties enter into the stage of leading evidence moved an application on 20.09.2016 para
2 whereof contains eight numbers of documents to be summoned from the management for production before
the tribunal. For the purpose of easy reference, the said para 2 along with the details of documents sought to be
summoned for production by the management are given here under: -
1. Copies of agreements since 1.4.1996 till date (Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy)
2. Original copies of letters of contractors written for the purpose of issuing photo passes to allowing them to
enter into premises for completing day to day maintenance works.
3. Copies of proof of work assigned to the workman by the engineer-in-charge.
4. Copies of attendance registered since 1.4.1996 till date (LBS Academy Mussoorie Site of Works) as per
agreement signed between the principal Employer and contractor.
5. Copies of salary register maintained by the contractors since 1.4.1996 till date (LBS Academy Mussoorie
Site) as per agreement signed between the principal employer and contractor.
6. Copies of appointment letter issued by the contractor to the workmen as per agreement signed between the
contractors and principal employer in respect of LBS Academy Mussoorie site.
7. Copies of wage card/slips issued by the contractors to the workmen since 1.4.1996 till date as per agreement
signed between principal employer and contractors in respect of LBS Academy Mussoorie site.
8. Copies of Licence obtained by the Department as well as contractors from the labours Department (LBS
Mussoorie Site).
44. The tribunal vide its order dated 04.01.2017 ordered the management to
produce those documents which is
reproduced here under: -
February 1, 2017
Present: Shri. Satish Kumar Sharma, A/R for the claimant.
Shri. Atul Bhardwaj, A/R for the management.
Arguments on the application heard. It is clear from the averments made in the application that the claimant
has desired the management to produce documents as mentioned in para 2 of the application.
Documents in question are part of public record and are in possession of the management. All these
documents are relevant so as to adjudicate the controversy in the present case. Resultantly, the
application is allowed and management is directed to produce the same on 23.03.2017.
45.
Despite the order of the tribunal and repeated time were sought by the management, the documents were not
produced before the tribunal nor any explanation for non-production thereof was submitted by them. Though
the documents were relevant and sufficient to throw light upon the nature of contractors‘ role in controlling and
supervising the work of workman concerned and that of the management‘s authorities like JE & AE etc. in
taking work from contract labours. The decision upon the lis before the tribunal required those documents
which being relevant to the issue could certainly be helpful in reaching at its conclusion. Without any
explanation since the documents were withheld and were not produced by the management, being custodia
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
611
legis thereof, the management is liable to be drawn adverse inference against them, in view of the law laid
down by Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Gopal Krishna Ji Ketkar Vs. Mohamad Haji Latif and Another AIR
1968 SC 1413: (1968) 3 SCR 862: (1968) SC Online 5C63. The relevant para 5 of the above judgment quoted
below.
Para 5 On behalf of the appellant reference was made to the Area Book, Ex. 66 of the year 1890. The
entry shows the name of Laxmibai widow of Govind Gopal Ketkar under the heading “bl eps ukao”
(name of the person). Exhibit 67 is the entry from the Phalani Book for the year 1897 and shows the land
as “Kilyacha Dongar” and under the column “bl eps ukao” is shown the name of Laxmibai widow of
Govind Gopal. Exhibit 68 is of the same year from the revision Phalani containing similar entry with the
map attached. In Exhibit 70 the name of Laxmibai is shown as “Khatedar” for the year 1906. In the
remarks column there is an entry “one built well, one pakka built masjid, one Dargah, one tomb”. Exhibit
71 is an entry for the year 1915 from Akar Phod Patrak and in the column of “Kabjedar” the name of
Rukminibai Hari appears with regard to Plot 134. Thereafter, in the record of rights for the year 1913,
Exhibit. 76, the name of the predecessor of the appellant is shown. On the basis of these entries it was
submitted by Mr Gokhale that the ownership of the Plot was with the appellant and not with the Dargah.
But there are important circumstances in this case which indicate that the appellant is not the owner of
Survey Plot No. 134. Exhibits 64 and 65 are significant in this connection. Exhibit 64 is an entry from the
“Sud” in Marathi for the year 1858 in connection with Survey Plot No. 134 (Revisional Survey Number).
The original survey number of this Plot was 24 and it was known as “Kilyacha Dongar”. The total area
is shown to be 249 acres and 24 gunthas. It is shown as “Khalsa” land. Kharaba is shown as 89 acres 24
gunthas and the balance of the area is shown as 160 acres. In the last column the name of the cultivator
is not mentioned but it is shown as “Khapachi”. It is significant that the name of the Ketkar family is
absent from this record. No convincing reason was furnished on behalf of the appellant to show why his
name was not entered in the “Sud”. It is also important to notice that the appellant has furnished no
documentary evidence to show how his family acquired title to the land from the earliest time; there is no
sanad or grant produced by the appellant to show that he had acquired title to the land. It further appears
that the appellant's family did not assert any title to the land at the time of the survey made in 1858;
otherwise there is no reason why its name was not entered in the “Sud” of the year 1858. It is true that
there are a number of entries subsequent to the year 1890 and 1897 in which the Ketkar family is shown
as the “Khatedar” or the occupant but these entries are not of much significance since the Ketkar family
was in the fiduciary position of a manager of the Dargah and was lawfully in possession of Survey Plot
No. 134 in that capacity. There is also another important circumstance that the appellant has no lands of
his own near Plot No. 134 and the nearest lands he owns are in Bandhanwadi which are admittedly 3 ½
to 4 miles away from the top of the hill. There is also the important admission made by the appellant in
the course of his evidence that there are 2 or 3 tombs behind the Musaferkhana. He stated further that
“there is no cemetery or burial ground in Survey No. 134”. But this evidence is in direct conflict with the
statement of the appellant in the previous case that “Round about the Dargah many people die every
year…. Anyone that died there, whether Hindu, Muslim or Parsee if he has no heirs is buried there”. He
also conceded that there is one public tank known as “Chasmyachi Vihir” near the Dargah and there are
5 wells near the Dargah and five boundaries “Aranas” about one mile from the Dargah. Lastly,
reference should be made to the important circumstance that the appellant has not produced the account
of the Dargah income. In the course of his evidence the appellant admitted that he was enjoying the
income of Plot No. 134 but he did not produce any accounts to substantiate his contention. He also
admitted that “he had got record of the Dargah income and that account was kept separately”. But the
appellant has not produced either his own accounts or the account of the Dargah to show as to how the
income from Plot No. 134 was dealt with. Mr Gokhale, however, argued that it was no part of the
appellant's duty to produce the accounts unless he was called upon to do so and the onus was upon the
respondents to prove the case and to show that the Dargah was the owner of Plot No. 134. We are unable
to accept this argument as correct. Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw
an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the
facts at issue. It is not, in our opinion, a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of
facts to withhold from the Court the best evidence which is in their possession which could throw light
upon the issues in controversy and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of onus of proof.
46.
The withholding of material documents by non-production of documents summoned by the tribunal further
reflects in non-production of contractor in evidence to prove the effective control and supervision of the
contractor rather than that of the management such an omission result in inferring that control and supervision
over the contract labour of the management. The reason for that inference is that contractor was reasonably
treated to be a person required to maintain register of labours employed for work, muster role register, wage
register, register of accident, register of fines. Register for deduction for damages or loss, register for advances,
register of overtime work performed by the contract employees, if he is alleged principal employer. He is
burdened with an obligation to issue identity card cum wage slip, employment for and service certificate
612
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
records referred above and were to be preserved by the contractors in ordinary course of their business. Labour
officer was empowered to make investigation or inquiry with a view to ascertain and enforce due and proper
observance of the regulations. Therefore, it emerges that regulation were made by the management itself in
order to see that the contract employees get their dues under the law.
47.
In the case of Chintaman Rao, 1958 (II) LLJ 252 the Apex Court ruled that the concept of employment
involves three ingredients:
(i)
Employer
(ii)
Employee
(iii)
The contract of employment.
48.
The employer is one who employs, that is one who engages the services of other persons. The employee is one
who works for another for hire. The employment is the contract of services between the employer and
employee where under the employee agrees to serve the employer subject to his control and supervision. In
Food Corporation of India 1985 (II) LLJ 4 the Apex Court held that a contract of employment discloses a
relationship of command and obedience between them. Where a Contractor employs a workman to do the
work which he contracted with a third person to accomplish, the workman of the contractor would not without
something more become the workman of third person. The Apex Court further in the case of Dharangadhara
Chemical Works Ltd., 1957 (1) LLJ 477 ‗Case of supervision and control‘ may be taken as the prima facie
case for determining the relationship of employment it was further laid that existence of the right in master to
supervise and control the work to be done by the servant, not only matter of directing that work the servant is
to do but also the manner in which he shall do his work with the prima facie test for determining the existence
of master and servant relationship.
49.
In the Case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) case, (2001) 7 SCC 1 the Apex Court ruled that there
cannot be automatic absorption of contract labour by principal employer on issuance of notification by the
Appropriate Government on abolition of contract labour system. Consequently, the principal employer cannot
be required to order for absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment concerned. The Apex
Court in the steel Authority of India (Supra) has made it clear that where workman is hired in or in connection
with the work of an establishment by the principal employer through a contractor, he merely acts as an agent
so there will be master and servant relationship between the principal employer and the workman. But when
workman is hired in or in connection with the work of an establishment by a contractor, either because he has
undertaken to produce a given result for the establishment or because he supplies workmen for any work of the
establishment, a question might arise whether the contractor is a mere camouflage in Husain Bhai Case and in
Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Case, 1999 (6) SCC 439, if the answer is in affirmative the workman will
be in fact an employee of the principal employer.
50.
In the present matter the management failed to prove the deed of contract entered with its contractor to supply
the contract labour. Even term of the contract is not made clear in the pleading and explained in the evidence
also. The argument of the management that the contractor might have engaged the workman on the work
assigned to him by the department does not seem to be true in the wake of evidences placed on record and non-
production of documentary evidences of which management custodia legis, to produce before the tribunal.
51.
The tribunal tends to record its finding on the basis of discussions made herein above that concerned workman
was under the direct control and supervision of the principal employer namely the CPWD in the present
industrial dispute. The contract under which contract labours were hired for the works and prohibited under the
notification dated 31.07.2002 section 10 of the CLRA Act was sham and camouflage, had a nullity.
Effect of engagement of contract labour even after the notification prohibiting the contract labour for the work
on 15 posts in the CPWD.
52.
Undoubtedly the management was not just and rightful to engage contract labour on those 15 posts enumerated
in the notification of prohibition issued under section 10 of the CLRA Act dated 31.07.2002. The present
workman if continued working as contract labour even after the issuance of notification of prohibition under
section 10 of the CLRA Act does not give him the right to be automatically absorbed in the CPWD
establishment. In SAIL case (Supra) explained the position of workman engaged even after the issuance of
notification of prohibition under section 10 of the CLRA Act in the case of Kirloshkar Brothers Limited Vs.
Ramcharan and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 8446-8447 of 2022) Justice M.R. Shah. Has summarised it relying
on SAIL case Para 125. The Para 4.4 and 4.5 of the judgement in kirloshkar Brothers Limited (Supra) is being
quoted here:
Para 4.4 After considering various decision of this court on the point, in paragraph 125. It was concluded as under: -
―125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
613
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the question referred
to above, has to be found in clause
(a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act; if
(i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is included therein
eo nomine, or
(ii) any industry is carried on
(a) by or under the authority of the Central Government, or
(b) by a railway company; or
(c) by a specified controlled industry, then the Central Government will be the appropriate Government;
otherwise in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment
is situated, will be the appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in any
process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the case may be, and (2)
having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10;
(b) In as much as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not satisfy
the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from the date of
this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order passed or no
action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this judgment, shall be called
in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has otherwise attained finality and/or it
has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary
implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by the
appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract
labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment.
Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in
the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and declare
that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court, for
absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall hold
good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment in cases
where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard
to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result
for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine
contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to
deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere
camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal
employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of the contract labour in the establishment
concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6
614
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
hereunder. (6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of
the CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any
establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal
employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour,
if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age
appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by
the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical
qualifications.
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour
working in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the
aforesaid decision that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act,
prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before
it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to
consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having
undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work
of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefits there under.
53.
Despite the order of the Delhi High Court and even after the recommendation of notification under section 10
of the CLRA Act 31.07.2002 for abolishing contract system for 15 posts including the post of helper contract
labour was employed for the work of helper by the CPWD. Helper seems to be a comprehensive term which
signifies those workmen who work in assistance to the skilled labour like Plumber, Mali, Mason etc., though
the workman employed as helper may be unskilled. In the present case the workman states himself in pleading
and evidence a ‗helper‘ with plumber or mason wherever he was deployed. When the Appropriate Government
notified and prohibited the employment of contract labour in the category of work of helper what would be the
status of the contract labour such a question arose before the Apex Court SAIL case (Supra). The apex Court
ruled therein that there cannot be automatic absorption of contract labour by principal employer on issuance of
notification by the appropriate government on abolition of contract labour system under sub section 1 of
section 10 of the CLRA Act.
54.
There is no explanation in pleadings of the management that how and why the management opted to terminate
the services of workman who have stated in his statement of claim that in CWP No.4817/99 in the matter of
All India CPWD (MRM) Karamchari Sangathan Vs, Union of India and Ors. Dated 26.05.2000 the Hon‘ble
High Court of Delhi directed the Ministry of Labour for constitution of a board to look into the aspect of
contract system prevalent in the CPWD under the section 10 of the Contract labour in para 4 and 5 of the said
order of Hon‘ble Delhi High Court which is Ex.WW1/4 on record and quoted here under for easy reference
Para 4. If the decision is taken to abolish the contract labour in particular job/work process in any of the
offices/establishments of CPWD (as per the terms of reference contained in Resolution dated 30th
march, 2000), as per the judgement of the Supreme Court in All India Statuary Corporation (Supra)
such Contract workers would be entitled to be absorbed with CPWD and would be entitled to claim the
benefits in terms of aforesaid judgment. In case the decision of the “appropriate government” is not to
abolish contract labour system in any of the works/jobs process in any offices/establishments of CPWD
the effect of that would be that contract labour system is permissible and, in that eventuality, CPWD
shall have the right to deal with these contract workers in any manner it deems fit.
Para 5. Such contract labours who are still working shall be paid their wages regularly as per the provision of
section 21 of the Act and in those cases where the contractors fail to make payment of wages, it shall be
the responsibility of the CPWD as principal employer to make the payment of wages.
55.
The claimant rendered continuous service of more than ten years to the management on the date when his
services were illegally retrenched he had to be given retrenchment compensation in accordance with section
25F of the Industrial Dispute Act if the retrenchment is made abruptly. Claimant sustained loss of means of
livelihood without any just and proper cause the salient fact which the tribunal considered is that the workman
who has been retrenched is a workman under section 2 (s) in an industry defined under section 2 (j) who has
been in continuous service for more than one year could be retrenched provided the employer complies with
the twin conditions provided under clauses (a) & (b) section 25F of the Act 1947 before the retrenchment is
given effect to Section 25F of the act 1947 is reproduced here under for easy reference:
Section 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman- No workman employed in any industry
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
615
who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched
by that employer until-
(a) The workman has been given on month‟s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice;
(b) The workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days‟ average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in
excess of six months, and
(c) Notice in the prescribed manner is served on the Appropriate Government [ or such authority as
may be specified by the appropriate government by notification in the official Gazette.]
Termination of service if illegal - consequence of illegal termination
56.
It is proved in evidence by claimant/workman that his services were orally terminated by ‗Mr. Gopal Singh
Bhakuni‘ an assistant director of CPWD on 01.01.2014 the name of assistant director Sh. Gopal Singh
Bhakuni comes into cross-examination of the workman/claimant by the management on 18.12.2017 recorded
before the tribunal. The management has not rebutted the said fact of ‗oral termination‘ by aforesaid assistant
director of the CPWD through it‘s own witness. It remained on it‘s stand that claimant was employee of
contractor therefore, it had no concern with his termination, but this argument has no legs to stand as against
the evidence on record brought before the tribunal. This is also proved that claimant was in continuous
employment as contract labour on 31.12.2013. Though he acquired legal right to be regularized in services of
the CPWD, keeping him as daily wager contractual workman in the establishment was not just and legal under
the provisions and prohibition contained in Industrial Dispute Act. Question to be decided by this tribunal is
that whether the services of the claimant terminated by the management wrongfully and illegally? As such, to
what relief the claimant is entitled will be a prime question for grant of relief. It is also proved that the
workman was working as helper since the initial date of joining, discharged duties as such workman associated
with and in assistance to plumber, electrician, mason, etc. as and when and wherever he was deployed. There
is no evidence to contradict and repudiate the claim of workman that he has completed more than 240 days in
every year of his employment. The termination of service in other word is called retrenchment under the
Industrial Dispute Act Section 2 (oo) defines the retrenchment as under:
Section 2(oo) “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any
reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but
does not include-
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment
between the employer and the workman concerned contains s stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment
between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being
terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c)
Termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.
57. In K.V. Anil Mithra & Another V. Sree Sankaracharya University of
Sanskrit & Another (2021 SCC
online SC 982) the Apex Court in Para 22,
held as under: -
22:- The term „retrenchment‟ leaves no manner of doubt that the termination of the workman for any
reason whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action are being
termed as retrenchment with certain exceptions and it is not dependent upon the nature of
employment and the procedure pursuant to which the workman has entered into service. In
continuation thereof, the condition precedent for retrenchment has been defined under Section 25F
of the Act 1947 which postulates that workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year can be retrenched by the employer after clauses (a)
and (b) of Section 25F have been complied with and both the clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F
have been held by this Court to be mandatory and its non-observance is held to be void ab initio
bad and what is being the continuous service has been defined under Section 25B of the Act 1947.
58. In the case of K.V Anil Mithra (Supra) the Apex Court further held-
23:-
The scheme of the Act 1947 contemplates that the workman employed even as a daily
wager or in any capacity, if has worked for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months from
the alleged date of termination and if the employer wants to terminate the services of such a
workman, his services could be terminated after due compliance of the twin clauses (a) and (b) of
Section 25F of the Act 1947 and to its non-observance held the termination to be void ab initio bad
616
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
and so far as the consequential effect of non-observance of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act
1947, may lead to grant of relief of reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service in
favour of retrenched workman, the same would not mean that the relief would be granted
automatically but the workman is entitled for appropriate relief for non-observance of the
mandatory requirement of Section 25F of the Act, 1947 in the facts and circumstances of each
case.
24:- The salient fact which has to be considered is whether the employee who has been retrenched
is a workman under Section 2(s) and is employed in an industry defined under Section 2(j) and
who has been in continuous service for more than one year can be retrenched provided the
employer complies with the twin conditions provided under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of
the Act 1947 before the retrenchment is given effect to. The nature of employment and the manner
in which the workman has been employed is not significant for consideration while invoking the
mandatory compliance of Section 25F of the Act 1947.
25:-
This can be noticed from the term „retrenchment‟ as defined under Section 2(oo) which in
unequivocal terms clearly postulates that termination of the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever provided it does not fall in any of the exception clause of Section 2(oo), every
termination is a retrenchment and the employer is under an obligation to comply with the twin
conditions of Section 25F of the Act 1947 before the retrenchment is given effect to obviously in
reference to such termination where the workman has served for more than 240 days in the
preceding 12 months from the alleged date of termination given effect to as defined under Section
25B of the Act.
If termination of service by the employer to save skin from their unlawful acts, opposed to status and public
policy: -
59.
Though this tribunal is not kept into a state of things by the management to know and peruse the terms of the
contract between the ‗contractor‘ and ‗management‘ due to which ‗pleadings‘ and ‗statement in evidence of the
management‘ that, workman concerned had been an employee of the contractor only working under his control
and supervision find no support from facts to the contrary proved by the workman remained a bald statement
only. The admission of management to the effect that the concerned post remained vacant for approximately
10 years, regular employee was not recruited against that post in the division whereas the other division of the
management has such regular appointment, the contract labour after the year 2002 prohibited on 15 posts
including helper, plumber, etc., then also employing and continuing the workman as contractual labour
establishes the intention of management malicious to continue with the services of workman concerned year to
year. Established principal of law relating to contracts is that parties to contracts are to be allowed to regulate
their rights and liabilities themselves. However, the law in some cases over rights the will of the individuals
making ineffective some intention under the contract which are opposed to statuary policy the tribunal will not
to extend its aid to a party who based his cause of action or ground of defense on an immoral or illegal act. The
Industrial Dispute Act and the Standing Orders Act both prohibit to keep a workman in temporary services for
time infinite if he has successfully worked for a considerable length of time provided under the Industrial
Dispute Act 240 days in a year (preceding 12 months).
60.
Section 2 (ra) of the Industrial Dispute Act defines ‗Unfair Labour Practice‘ means any of the practices
specified in the 5th schedule of the Act. In 5th schedule there is item no. 10 which declares unlawful the practice
to employ workman as ―badlis”, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object
of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen. Moreover, item no. 5 in the same
schedule makes the practice unlawful to discharge or dismiss workmen not in good faith, but in the colourable
exercise of the employer‘s rights. In the present case the management has repeated pleading and statement in
evidence also that the workman was contractual labour and his services were terminated by the contractor to
whom management had no right to compel to keep particular workman to supply but this statement and
pleading of the management is not proved whereas, the workman has successfully pleaded and proved in
evidence also that he was used to be employed continuously irrespective of the change of contractors.
Therefore, action of the management if it be impeachable on the ground of dishonesty, or as being opposed to
public policy, if it be forbidden by law the tribunal would not be just to allow itself to be made the instrument
of enforcing obligations alleged to arise out of a contract for transaction which is illegal.
61.
The management has not stated in its pleading or submitted any policy framed after the notification of
prohibition u/s 10 of the CLRA Act. For the purposes of regularizing the services of such employees either
“badlis” casual temporary or contract labours. Management failed to explain situations under which despite of
issuance of notice of prohibition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, the contract labour was
kept continued. They failed to rebut workman‘s pleading and evidence as to the continuous utilization of his
services in the premises of management CPWD for the considerable long period of more than 10 years. The
only provision in law upon which workman has based his claim for regularization is under Section 25 B of the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
617
Act, which defines the ‗continuous service‘. The aforesaid provision of the Act entitles the workman to claim
regularization being a workman who worked under the direct supervision and control of the management
CPWD for continuous period as specified in Sub Section 1 & Sub Section 2 of Section 25B. But, the
management wrongfully stopped him to work thereafter. Therefore, in the present case of a workman who
worked under the supervision of the management Section 25 B read with section 25 F shall be applicable. Non
observance of both the provision shall be treated malafide.
62.
The scheme of the ID Act 1947, thus contemplates that the workman though employed as a daily wager or in
any other capacity, if has worked for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months for the alleged date of
termination and if the employer wants to terminate the services of such workman he may do so after due
compliance of the section 25F of the Act. In the present matter there is no pleading and evidence of such
compliance of twin clause (a) & (b) of section 25F therefore, termination of the
workman is held illegal and
declared void ab initio.
63.
In the facts and circumstances established and proved by evidences available on record the tribunal tends to
declare that termination of services of the concerned workman Sh. Rajeev Saxena not only illegal and void ab
initio but malafide also because same was done by the management in utter violation and non-observance of
section 2 (ra) section 25 B read with section 25 F of the I.D Act, so as to defy their obligation accrued from the
continuous service of the workman.
The consequence of non-observance of the provision of section 25 F. Whether reinstatement in service?
64.
On the relief of reinstatement with or without back wages the tribunal has to consider, consequence of it‘s
finding as to the termination of service illegal, malafide and void ab initio, whether the workman should be
treated as continued in services of the management. The Apex Court in three judge bench decision in
Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. V. Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (1979) 2
SCC 80, where retrenchment of employees was declared illegal, held in para 9 -
―It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given
that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of
common law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the
doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement
with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It
would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to
the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings.
If thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be
reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman
has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer. Speaking realistically, where
termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the
gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such
an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our
system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and
energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is
to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to
him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly
undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be
entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced
idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative
activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is
motivated as in this case viz. to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination
may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal
rule, it should be followed with full back wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would assist
us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect. By a suitable legislation, to wit, the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, the State has endeavored to secure work to the workmen. In breach of the
statutory obligation the services were terminated and the termination is found to be invalid; the
workmen though willing to do the assigned work and earn their livelihood, were kept away
therefrom. On top of it they were forced to litigation up to the Apex Court now they are being told
that something less than full back wages should be awarded to them. If the services were not
terminated the workmen ordinarily would have continued to work and would have earned their
wages. When it was held that the termination of services was neither proper nor justified, it would
not only show that the workmen were always willing to serve but if they rendered service they would
legitimately be entitled to the wages for the same. If the workmen were always ready to work but
they were kept away therefrom on account of an invalid act of the employer, there is no justification
for not awarding them full back wages which were very legitimately due to them. A Division Bench
of the Gujarat High Court in Dhari Gram Panchayat v. SafaiKamdar Mandal [(1971) 1 LLJ 508
618
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(Guj)] and a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Postal Seals Industrial Cooperative
Society Ltd. v. Labour Court II, Lucknow [(1971) 1 LLJ 327 (All)] have taken this view and we are
of the opinion that the view taken therein is correct”
65.
In his cross-examination workman replying the quarry of the Learned Authorized Representatives of the
management has unequivocally asserted that ―I am unemployed now, I was terminated by ‗Sh. Gopal Singh
Bhakuni‘ (Assistant Director). I have two children, household expenses are borne by my mother. She is
pensioner‖. This part of the cross
examination is carved out from the cross-examination done by the
management on 18.12.2017. Exhibit WW1/2 proved by the workman in his evidence on affidavit filed as
examination in chief before the tribunal. The said letter reveals that after his employment with the management
CPWD in the premises of Lal Bahadur Shastri IAS Academy as contract labour right from 1.4.1996 discharged
his uninterrupted and continuous services till 31.12.2013 but on 01.01.2014 he was abruptly stopped from
working there. ExhibitWW1/2 aforesaid is an application addressed to the Executive
Engineer
Dehradun Central Circle-1 by workman praying to reinstate him in services w.e.f. the date of termination of
services. The date on which Exhibit WW1/2 is received in the office of the Executive Engineer in 20.05.2015.
Exhibit WW1/1 shows the notice of the Industrial Dispute issued by secretary of this Central Government
Industrial Tribunal No.1 New Delhi issued by the Executive Engineer Dehradun Central Division and the
Executive Engineer Mussorrie Central Division with regard to present industrial dispute under section 2A filed
by Sh. Rajeev Saxena claimant/workman concerned on
19.10.2015.Though there is no provision in
the Industrial Dispute Act and Central Rules made there under prescribing limitation for the claim of
reinstatement of services setting aside termination of service of the workman but the tribunal has to
consider the effect of delayed raising of dispute, over the claim of reinstatement and regularization. There is no
explanation justifying in such passes of time the workman in his evidence has not stated anything why he had
not raised his claim regularization at any point of time after the notification u/s 31/7/2002 of
u/s 10 and prior to his illegal termination from service.
66.
In Deepali Gundu Surwase V. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya & Ors. (2013) 10 SCC 324
Hon‘ble Apex Court highlighted the need to adopt a restitutionary approach, the court has to consider whether
to reinstate an employee and if so, the extent to which back wages is to be ordered. Para 22 judgment in the
aforesaid case is being reproduced here under-
Para 22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held dismissal or removal or
termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would
have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is
dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of
money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee
relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned, but his
entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children
are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times,
the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These
sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by
the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent
judicial/quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant
statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages.
If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get
consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the
intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The
denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would
amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him
of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.
67.
When termination of daily wager workman is done by the management and the termination is found illegal
because of procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25 F of the Industrial Tribunal Act, Hon‘ble
Apex Court has consistently taken the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic
and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation. The aforesaid view expressed in Para 33 &
34 by the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. V. Bhurmal, (2014) 7 SCC 177
Para 33 It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant
of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-F
of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
619
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious.
Para 34 the reason for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law
that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment
compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes
Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of
that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was
working on daily-wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization
[see State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1: 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]]. Thus when he
cannot claim
regularization and he has no right to continue even as a daily-wage worker, no
useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary
compensation by the Court itself in as much as if he is terminated again after reinstatement
compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a
long gap, would not serve any purpose.
68.
The contract labour whose services were terminated without observance of section 25F of the Act may be
monetarily compensated rather to reinstate in services. The reason to deny the relief of reinstatement in such
cases are obvious. It is well established that the opposite party management cannot be absolved of the primary
responsibility in its litigated proclivity the workman has waited for approximately 9 years in getting his claim
adjudicated the denial of back wages may result in punching him although the delay may be attributable to the
judicial process. The litigation cost may also be given in the circumstances of the case where management
made all possible twists and hassles in expeditious disposal of the claim like non-production of documents
which were best evidence and in possession of the management itself.
69.
In the above context, it also has been noticed from facts and evidences on record that that workman has not
cited any instance where termination of his service as daily wager turned illegal because the same was resorted
to in violation of principle of last come first go viz, while retrenching him daily wager junior to him were
retained. It is also not pleaded and proved that person junior to him were regularized under some policy but he
was terminated. It is noticed that claim of regularization is not pleaded and proved by the concerned workman
raised at any point of time at any forum of law during his continuation in service.
70.
Applying the above principles as laid down by the Apex Court it is kept in mind that the claimant was working
as a daily wager. Moreover, the termination took place more than 10 years ago. However, the fact remains that
no direct evidence for working 10 years has been furnished and most of his documents which he could place
by his efforts relatable to few years only. For all these reasons the tribunal is of the view that ends of justice
would be met by granting compensation in monetary terms in lieu of ―reinstatement‖.
71. (a) The tribunal declares termination (retrenchment) of claimant Sh. Rajeev Saxena, daily wager from
his services by the management on 01.01.2014 illegal for non-observance of section 25F of the ID
Act, 1947 malafide and void ab initio.
(b) The tribunal further declares the claimant entitled to be paid compensation by the management in
terms of money in lieu of his reinstatement in services of the management to the tune of
Rs.10,00,000/- (Ten Lakhs only). The management of CPWD (Opposite parties no. 1 & 2) are
jointly and severally directed to pay pf the amount of compensation ordered above within 30 days
from the date of order, failing which interest @ 6% per annum shall be leviable till the date of
actual payment to the claimant/workman.
(c) A litigation cost of Rs. 2 Lakhs (Two lakhs only) shall be payable to the claimant/workman by the
opposite parties 1 & 2 jointly and severally within 30 days from the date of award in failure to pay
off same shall be leviable with interest @ 6% per annum till the date of actual payment.
(d) The opposite parties 1 & 2 are further held responsible for paying penal cost amounting to Rs. 2
Lakhs (Two lakhs only) on account of the claimant‘s suffering mental harassment and trauma by
reason of abrupt loss of livelihood through illegal retrenchment. The above cost shall also be
payable along with the amount of compensation and litigation cost as ordered above within
aforesaid period of 30 days, in failure to pay within prescribed time interest shall be leviable at the
rate of 6 % per annum till the date of actual payment.
(e) Office is directed to send the award in the manner as prescribed under section 17 of the I.D Act,
1947 to the appropriate government for implementation and enforcement of the Award.
Justice VIKAS KUNVAR SRIVASTAVA, (Retd.) Presiding Officer
30.05.2024
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 207.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
620
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
कंटेनर कॉृोरेिन ऑफ आंजडया जलजमटेड ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
I
ds iapkV (a168/2023) izdkf”kr
djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-02]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 207.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 168/2023) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
No. I Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of The Container
Corporation of India Ltd and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025– IR(B-1) -02]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1,
NEW DELHI.
ID No. 168/2023
Sh. Jitender Kumar,
Through Indian National Migrant Worker‘s Union,
1770/8, 3rd Floor, Govind Puri Extn.,
Main Road Kalkaji, New Delhi-110019.
Workman…
Versus
1. The Container Corporation of India Ltd.,
Inland container Depot, Tughlakabad,
New Delhi-110020.
2. M/s Asian Cargo Movers,
21 Floor, DDA Market, M-Block,
Yojna Vihar, Delhi-110092.
Management…
AWARD
In the present case, a reference was received from the appropriate Government vide letter No. ND-25/II-
21/2023-IR dated 31.07.2023 under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Act, for
adjudication of a dispute, terms of which are as under:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of M/s Asian Cargo Movers in terminating the services of
Sh. Jitender Kumar S/o Raj Kishore Thakur, Ex Import Incharge w.e.f. 01.06.2020 is legal, just and
proper? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?”
2.
In the reference order, the appropriate Government commanded the parties raising the dispute to file statement
of claim, complete with relevant documents, list of reliance and witnesses with this Tribunal within 15 days of receipt
of the reference order and to forward a copy of such statement of claim to the opposite parties involved in the dispute.
Despite directions so given, Claimant union opted not to file the claim statement with the Tribunal.
3.
On receipt of the above reference, notice was sent to the workman as well as the managements. Neither the
postal article sent to the claimant, referred above, was received back nor was it observed by the Tribunal that postal
services remained unserved in the period, referred above. Therefore, every presumption lies in favor of the fact that
the above notice was served upon the claimant. Despite service of the notice, claimant opted to abstain away from the
proceedings. No claim statement was filed on his behalf. Thus, it is clear that the workman is not interested in
adjudication of the reference on merits.
4.
Since the workman has neither put in his appearance nor he led any evidence so as to prove his cause against the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
621
management, this Tribunal is left with no choice, except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. Let this award be sent
to the appropriate Government, as required under Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for publication.
Justice VIKAS KUNVAR SRIVASTAVA, Retired Judge, Allahabad High Court Presiding Officer
Date: 07.11.2024
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 208.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; लखनउ ds iapkV (a21/2009) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 41011/78/2008- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 208.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.21/2009) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of North Central
Railway and others.
[No. L-41011/78/2008- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE PRESIDING OFFICER
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No.21 of 2009
Reference No.L-41011/78/2008-IR(B-I) dated 25.6.2009
Divisional Secretary, Bridge Division,
Rail Mazdoor Union, Lucknow
-----Applicant/
Workman
Versus
Chief Bridge Engineer, North Central Railway, HQ Office of NC Railway,
Subedarganj, Allahabad
-------Opp.Party/Respondent
Judgment
By means of order/reference no.L-41011/78/2008-IR (B-I) dated 25.6.2009, the Central Government considered it
desirable to refer the dispute for adjudication to the following effect:-
―Whether the demand of the Rail Mazdoor Union over the matter of correct pay and designation of material
checker grade Rs.225-308 along with all consequential benefits to be given to Sri D.N. Jha and Murlidhar
the then Storemen and now Material Checker w.e.f. 5.10.1982 till 25.3.2008 is just, fair and legal? If yes,
what relief the workmen are entitled to?”
Case of the Workman:
The statement of claim was filed on behalf of workman/applicant before this Tribunal stating that the applicants Sri
D.N. Jha and Sri Murlidhar who were initially appointed as Khalasi in Bride Department of Northern Railway, had
been promoted as Storeman in Grade Rs.210-270/800-1150 for dealing with store matters in Bridge Department. It
was also submitted on behalf of workmen that the standard designation of staff dealing with store matters in
Department other than Stores is Material Checker in Grade Rs.225-308(RS)/825-1200 (RPS) and as such the action of
622
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Bridge Department of Northern Railway in according the designation of Storeman and the scale of Rs.210-
270(RS)/Rs.800-1150 (RPS) is absolutely in contravention of Railway Board‘s policy/instructions/Rules. It has been
averred on behalf of workmen that the Railway Board‘s order dated 27.9.1963 clearly speaks in Para-1(i) that in the
departments other than Stores, for staff dealing with stores matter only two designations shall be used namely
Material Checkers and Material Clerks. On behalf of workmen it has also been mentioned that the workmen
performed all the duties connected with dealing Store matters in Field Units of Bridge Department of Northern
Railway now North Central Railway with headquarter at Allahabad and Kanpur independently but even then the
Railway Management/respondent did not consider the representation of the workmen and Union and had not given
the correct pay and designation for the period mentioned therein.
On the strength of above said facts, the applicant prayed that the workmen Sri D.N. Jha and Sri Murlidhar are entitled
for correct pay and designation of Material Checker Grade Rs.225-308(RS)/825-1200(RPS) and difference of pay
along with interest for the period 5.10.1982 to 25.3.2008.
Case of the Respondents:
The respondent filed written statement to the statement of claim filed on behalf of workmen stating that Sri D.N. Jha
and Sri Murlidhar preferred an Original Application No.648 of 1999 before the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Principal Bench, New Delhi along with other similarly situated workers for the purposes of promotion from the post
of Storeman to M.C.C. and the Principal Bench passed an order dated 3.4.2003 with certain direction to the Railway
Administration for the purposes of regularization & re-designation. It has further been stated on behalf of respondent
that Railway Administration on the basis of judgment passed by the Tribunal implemented the decision of
regularization of 28 workers and accordingly promoted them. Thus no industrial dispute exists and the reference is
bad in law because the matter in dispute is barred by the principles of res-judicata.
On behalf of respondent it was submitted that for the purposes of promotion in clerical posts in Engineering Bridge
Department, the written test shall be qualified by worker concerned and then the promotion will be allowed on the
basis of 33¹/3 and 16¾ formula prescribed percentage for departmental promotion quota. Although the notification
dated 3.10.2006 was issued but Sri Murlidhar did not submit his application and Sri D.N. Jha failed to appear in the
selection Examination. Some of similarly situated workers qualified the examination and posted as Clerk.
It has also been submitted on behalf of respondent that the second notification was issued on 13.3.2008 in which both
the workmen submitted their applications through proper channel and their names were mentioned at Serial no.32 and
33 of eligibility list. Workman Sri Murlihdar appeared in the written examination but did not qualify on one hand and
on the other hand Sri D.N.Jha qualified the examination but he refused to join on the post through letter dated
6.4.2009. It has categorically been stated in the written statement filed on behalf of respondent that both the workmen
promoted from time to time as per direction given by the Tribunal. Sri Murlidhar retired on 28.2.2009 from the post
of Material Checker (M.C.) in amended scale of 5200-20200 GP-1800 and he had been paid all the dues which was
received by him without any protest so that there is no dispute or difference of pay and consequential benefits.
It has also been mentioned in the written statement that Union is unrecognized and espousing the cause of workmen
Sri D.N. Jha and Sri Murlidhar without their consent in this regard. One of the workers Sri Lalta Prasad Maurya
given in writing to the department that he has no grievance against the Railway Administration.
On the basis of above said facts, the respondent prayed that the claim raised on behalf of the workmen being
misconceive is liable to be rejected.
Thereafter documents as well as evidence between the parties were exchanged between the parties.
Finding & Conclusion:
In spite of notice none appeared on behalf of claimant/applicant whereas Sri U.K. Bajpai appeared on behalf of
respondent. From the pleadings exchanged between the parties the undisputed fact of the present case which emerges
out is that by means of reference dated 25.6.2009 Sri D.N. Jha and Sri Murlidhar the then Storemen raised a dispute
that they should have been given the correct pay and designation of the posts of Material Checker Grade-2 w.e.f.
5.10.1982 till 25.3.2008. Further Sri U.K. Bajpai Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that Sri Murlidhar
retired on 28.2.2009 prior to the date of reference and Sri D.N. Jha retired on 31.8.2004. Thus in view of said facts
the point which is to be considered is that whether the relief claimed on behalf of workmen namely Sri Murlidhar and
Sri D.N. Jha can be granted to them or they are not entitled for the same as they had not raised any grievances and the
grievance raised by them is at belated stage i.e. nearly about 27 years or not? Answer to the said question find place
in the judgment passed in the case of M.D./Chief Manager, Jaipur Agar, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation,
Jaipur Versus General Secretary, Rajashtan Transport Workers Organization, Jaipur reported in 2024 (182) FLR 892
in which it had been held as under:-
―6. In the case at hand, the respondent-workman was appointed on the post of Driver vide order dated
17.12.1986. Accordingly, the benefit of first selection scale became due after nine years, sometime in 2004-
2005. The same was not done and neither was the non-grant of the benefit at the time was [2024:RJ-
JP:2574] (5 of 11) [CW-4687/2022] challenged by the respondent-workman. The benefit of first selection
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
623
scale was only granted vide order dated 06.04.2004. This deferment was also not challenged immediately
and was only challenged for the first time in 2013. The first issue that is to be decided by this Court is what
effect, if any, would this delay have on the merits of the case.
7. To decide the first issue, recourse may be taken to Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment of Mohan Lal
(supra), the relevant portion of which is reproduced as under:
"19.
We are clearly of the view that though the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the
reference made under the ID Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion
irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position
laid down by this Court in Gitam Singh [Rajasthan Development Corpn. v. Gitam Singh, (2013) 5
SCC 136] that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all
relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of
service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed.
20. Now, if the facts of the present case are seen, the position that emerges is this: the workman
worked as a work-charged employee for a period from 1-11-1984 to 17- 2-1986 (in all he worked
for 286 days during his employment). The services of the workman were terminated with effect from
18-2-1986. The workman raised the industrial dispute in 1992 i.e. after 6 years of termination. The
Labour Court did not keep in view admitted delay of 6 years in raising the industrial [2024:RJ-
JP:2574] (6 of 11) [CW-4687/2022] dispute by the workman. The judicial discretion exercised by
the Labour Court is, thus, flawed and unsustainable. The Division Bench of the High Court was
clearly in error in restoring the award of the Labour Court whereby reinstatement was granted to
the workman. Though, the compensation awarded by the Single Judge was too low and needed to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief."
Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sadhu Singh (supra), held as under:
"6. We shall at the outset deal with the issue of limitation. The respondent was retired compulsorily
from service on 4- 1-2003. Original Civil Suit No. 41 of 2010 was instituted in 2010. The trial Judge
as well as the first appellate court were of the view that the suit was not barred by limitation since
the representation of the respondent for the grant of the three selection grades was rejected on 18-
1-2010. The first appellate court, while concurring with the trial Judge also noted that the "final
request" made by the respondent- plaintiff on 18-1-2010 was rejected and hence the suit was within
limitation.
7. The respondent waited for seven long years after his retirement to pursue a claim for the grant of
selection grade. This was clearly beyond the residuary period of limitation of three years provided
in Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. That apart, in the decision of this Court
in State of Rajasthan v. Shankar Lal Parmar: (2011) 14 SCC 235, the Court has considered the
ambit of the scheme for selection grade. This Court has held thus:
"6. Another important and relevant clause in the said order for our perusal is Clause 7,
which is also reproduced hereinbelow:
'7. Selection grades in terms of this order shall be granted only to those employees
whose [2024:RJ-JP:2574] (7 of 11) [CW-4687/2022] record of service is satisfactory. The
record of service which makes one eligible for promotion on the basis of seniority shall be
considered to be satisfactory for the purpose of grant of the selection grade.'
7. Clause 7 makes it clear that only those employees would be entitled for grant of selection grades,
whose service record has been satisfactory and are otherwise eligible for promotion on the basis of
seniority but have not been able to get the same as there might not be any channel of promotion or
for want of sanctioned posts in the cadre."
8. The Court held that in terms of Clause 7, only those employees whose service record has been satisfactory
would be entitled to be granted selection grade. In this context, the Court held:
"17. Clause 7 further makes it clear that only those/such employees would be entitled to be granted
selection grade whose service record has been satisfactory. This implicitly shows that the person
who has an untainted, unblemished, clean and unpolluted record in service would be treated on a
higher pedestal than those who have either tainted, blemished, unclean or polluted record. This
obviously appears to be a reasonable classification and is under the ambit and touchstone of Article
14 of the Constitution. There is neither any ambiguity nor any doubt in the same."
9. On the touchstone of the above principles, it is evident that the respondent had been subjected to several
624
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
disciplinary proceedings and as many as 19 charge-sheets were issued against him which resulted in
penalties of a varying nature. The service record of the respondent cannot be regarded as untainted or clean.
10. Ms Nidhi, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that some of the penalties which were imposed
on the respondent were without cumulative effect. The consequence of the withholding of increments
without [2024:RJ-JP:2574] (8 of 11) [CW-4687/2022] cumulative effect is that after the period prescribed,
the respondent would be entitled to restoration of the original pay scale or the original pay. However, this
does not obviate the position that the imposition of the penalty itself indicates that the service record of the
employee was not satisfactory. Another submission which has been urged is that the penalties were of a
minor nature. Assuming that to be so, it is evident that for the grant of selection grade, the respondent did
not fulfil the requirements of a clean record of service. The grant of the selection grade is not a matter of
right and was subject to the terms and conditions which were stipulated. The respondent failed to fulfil these
terms and conditions.
11. For the above reasons, we are of the view that both on the question of limitation as well as on merits, the
respondent was not entitled to the relief which was sought. The suit instituted by the respondent seven years
after he had demitted office was barred by limitation. That apart, the respondent failed to meet the basic
requirements for the selection grade."(emphasis supplied).
Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Bichitrananda Behera (supra), after considering the erstwhile
judgments of Union of India v. Tarsem Singh: (2008) 8 SCC 648, Union of India v. N. Murugesan: (2022) 2
SCC 25, and Chairman, State Bank of India v. M.J. James: (2022) 2 SCC 301, concluded that delay and
laches are vital in service matters, and can be seen as acquiescence.‖
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workmen are not entitled for any relief as per the Reference No. L-41012/33/2017-
IR(B-I) dated 25.4.2018 and the claim of the workmen is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.
Award as above.
Lucknow.
10th June, 2024
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 209.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn
esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; लखनउ ds iapkV (a72/2012) izdkf”kr djrh gS
[सं. ,y - 41012/05/2012- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 209.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 72/2012) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of North Central
Railway and others.
[No. L-41012/05/2012- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
625
I.D. No. 72/2012
Ref. No. L-41012/05/2012-IR(B-I) dated 29.08.2012
BETWEEN
Ashok Kumar Sharma S/o Late Shri Satya Narayan Sharma R/o H. No. 281/286, Mavaiyya, P.O. Rajendra Nagar
Dist. Lucknow
AND
1. Divisional Railway Manager (Personal), North Eastern Railway, DRM Office, Ashok Road, Hazratganj, Lucknow
2. Senior Divisional Electrical Engineer, North Eastern Railway, Ashok Marg, Lucknow.
3. Section Engineer (Electrical), North Eastern Railway, Office of Section Engineer, Mailanee Lakhimpur Kheri
AWARD
By order No. L-41012/05/2012-IR(B-I) dated 29.08.2012 the present industrial dispute has been referred
for adjudication to this Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section
(2A) of Section 10 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with following
schedule:
“"Whether the action of the management of North Eastern Railway in imposing the penalty of removal from
service upon Shri Ashok Kumar vide their order dated 27/12/1999 is legal and justified? To what relief the
workman is entitled?"
Accordingly, an industrial dispute No. 72/2012 has been registered on 11.09.2012.
On 05.10.2013 claimant filed claim statement.
Facts stated in the claim petition are in brief that claimant was initially appointed with the respondent; however his
services have been terminated without any reason by oral order dated 27.12.1999 in voilation to the provisions of the
Industrial Dispute Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) his services were dispensed on 24.04.2020.
On behalf of the respondent statement of defense filed on 29.07.2017, denying facts stated by the workman in his
statement of claim.
After filing of the written statement by respondent, in spite of opportunities given to workman, he neither filed
rejoinder nor evidence in support of his case on affidavit.
None of the parties were present on the date of hearing; accordingly case was reserved for orders.
In view of the above said facts the claimant/workman has not field any rejoinder/evidence in support of his case on
affidavit, in spite of several opportunities given to him and taking into consideration the law as laid by the Hon'ble
High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (1) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must fail.
Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is imperative
for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which the order is
challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to appear or to file
written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government cannot be answered in
favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon‘ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd.,
V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1984 (49)
FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of any evidence led
by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court against the workman. In
such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at all. The obligation to lead
evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would be,
who would fail if no evidence is led.”
626
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
And by the Hon‘ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders of the
respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first which he failed.
A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or documentary was led
by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be dismissed.”
As the workman has not filed any statement of claim/oral/documentary evidence, so the present case is liable to be
dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Award as above.
Lucknow.
18th November, 2024
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 210.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; लखनउ ds iapkV (a65/2020) izdkf”kr djrh gS
[सं. ,y - 41012/401/2000- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 210.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 65/2000) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Uttar Railway
and others.
[No. L-41012/401/2000- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 65/2000
Ref. No. L-41012/401/2000/IR(B-I) dated: 17.08.2000
BETWEEN
Sri Dilip Kumar S/o Sh. Purvi Deen
872, Lakari Mohal, Sadar Bazar, PO-Diskusha Cantt, Lucknow
AND
The Works Manager, Loco Work Shop
Uttar Railway, Charbagh, Lucknow.
AWARD
By order No. L-41012/401/2000/IR(B-I) dated: 17.08.2000 the present industrial dispute has been referred
for adjudication to this Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section
(2A) of Section 10 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with following
schedule:
“Whether the action of the management of Uttar Railways Lucknow was justified in terminating the services
of Shri Dilip Kumar from 13-12-867 If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?"
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
627
Accordingly, an industrial dispute No. 65/2000 has been registered on 05.09.2000.
Thereafter, statement of claim was filed and this Tribunal on 29.09.2000 passed an order dated 14.05.2001.
Aggrieved by the said order the workman has filed a Writ Petition before the Hon‘ble High Court No 2541 (SS) of
2001 wherein an order dated 23.05.2001 has been passed, quoted hereunder:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the case
is applicable to this case and proviso to Section 11-A provides that in any proceeding under this section the
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record
and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter. By the impugned order (Annexure-1 to the
writ Petition), the Labour Court has summoned certain documents from Janta Inter College, Bharawan,
Hardoi which were not on the record. As per provisions of the Act, the Tribunal has to decide the matter only
on the material on record.
Learned Standing Counsel 1 for the Railways submits that in the instant case, provisions of Section) 11 of
Industrial Disputes Act are applicable and under the provisions of that section documents can be summoned
to substantiate the evidence already on record and Section 11-A is not applicable to the first part of the
reference made to the Labour Court. The question requires detailed examination.
Opposite party no.2 may file counter-affidavit within four weeks.
List in the week commencing 16th July, 2001. Till next date of listing, proceedings in I.D.No. 65 of 2000
shall I remain stayed.”
Lastly, on 14.12.2016 an order was passed, which reads as under:
“List has been revised.
No one appears on behalf of the petitioner to press this petition.
This writ petition was filed challenging the order dated 14.05.2001 passed in I.D. Case No. 65 of 2000. By
means of which the labour court had summoned certain documents from Janta Inter College, Bharawan,
Hardoi, which were not on record.
This writ petition was filed in the year 2001. More than 15 years have passed. It appears that the petitioner
has lost interest in the matter and that is the reason why no one has put in appearance on behalf of the
petitioner to press this petition.
By efflux of time the petition has become infructuous.
Dismissed accordingly.”
In view of said facts the matter was considered and in spite of notice, sent to the workman he did not turn up;
accordingly, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case that claimant has not field any evidence on
affidavit in support of his case, so, keeping in view said facts as well as the law as laid by the Hon'ble High Court in
the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (1) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove
illegality of the order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must fail.
Whenever a workman raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is imperative
for him to file written statement before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which the order is
challenged and he must also produce evidence to prove his case. If the workman fails to appear or to file
written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred by the State Government canot be answered in
favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon‘ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd.,
V.K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1984 (49)
FLR 38 and Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of any evidence led
by or on behalf of the workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court against the workman. In
such a situation it is not necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at all. The obligation to lead
evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would be,
who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon‘ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders of the
respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first which he failed.
A perusal of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or documentary was led
by the respondent. In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be dismissed.”
As the workman has not filed any statement of claim/oral/documentary evidence, so the present case is liable to be
dismissed.
628
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Award as above.
Lucknow.
15th July, 2024
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 211.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
mÙkj jsyos ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjkas ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; लखनउ ds iapkV (a06/2013) izdkf”kr djrh gS
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-03]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 211.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 06/2013) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Uttar Railway and
others.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR(B-I)-03]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 06/2013
BETWEEN
(1) रामायन प्रसाद गुप्ता ृुत्र श्री, सोहनलाल गुप्ता
(2) िजिकान्त जद्ववेदी ृुत्र श्री. केिव प्रसाद जद्ववेदी
(3) कमलेश्वर साही ृुत्र श्री. राज दकिोर साही
(4) सुिील कुमार ृुत्र श्री, संकटा प्रसाद
(5) तीरथ लाल ृुत्र श्री, बजनाथ
द्वारा:- ृरवेज अलम, मॅडल सँग न मन्त्री, ई०२०, कमवचारी यूजनयन 283/63 ख, गढ़ी कनौरा, (प्रेमवती नगर)
ृो०-मानक नगर, लखनउँ-11- -कमवकार।
AND
(1) मॅडल रेल प्रबन्धक (कार्ममक) महोदय,
ईत्तर-रेलवे, डी०अर०एम० कायावलय, लखनउँ।
(2) वररष्ठ मंडल जसग्नल एवं टेलीकाम ऄजभयन्ता महोदय, ईत्तर-रेलवे, डी०अर०एम० कायावलय, लखनउँ
AWARD
On 12.12.2012 the claimants/workmen have filed the present industrial dispute as per the provisions of Section 2A (2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
The claimant in para 4 of their statement of claim have submitted as under:
“(4) यह दक ईृरोक्त अदेि के ऄनुृालन में सेवायोजक महोदय ने कमवकारों से कुछ स्ट्ृष्टीकरण माँगा जजसके
जवषय में कमवकारों ने मान्नीय सेवायोजक महोदय से अवश्यक ऄजभलेखों की माँग की ृरन्तु सेवायोजक महोदय ने
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
629
ईक्त ऄजभलेखों की प्रजतजलजृयाँ कमवकारों को अजतक ईृलब्द्द्ध नही करायी और न तो कोइ जवभागीय जाँच
करायी न कमवकारों को ऄृने बचाव हेतु ईजचत ऄवसर प्रदान दकये तथा कमवकारगंण को ृुनः रेल सेवा से ऄवजध
रुृ से जन्काजसत कर ददया। जजसका जववरण जनम्नजलजखत हज:-
क्रम सं.
नाम
जृता का नाम
ृुनः सेवा समाजप्त की जतजथ
1.
रामायन प्रसाद गुप्ता
श्री सोहनलाल गुप्ता
04-10-2005
2.
िजिकान्त जद्ववेदी
श्री केिव प्रसाद जद्ववेदी
07-06-2005
3.
कमलेश्वर साही
श्री राज दकिोर साही
07-06-2005
4.
सुिील कुमार
श्री संकटा प्रसाद
27-07-2004
5.
तीरथ लाल
श्री बजनाथ
07-06-2005
Accordingly, the workman has prayed for following relief:
“ऄतः कमवकारगंण जवनमता ृूववक जनवेदन करते हज दक कमवकारगण को जजनका जववरण प्रस्ट्तर-1 मे प्रस्ट्तुत दकया
गया हज, को ऄवजध सेवा समाजप्त की जतजथ जजसका जववरण प्रस्ट्तर-4 में ददया गया हज, से वेतन अदद सभी जहत
लाभों सजहत सेवा में बहाल (Re-instet) करने हेतु अदेि करने की कृृा करें। महान कृृा होगी।“
After filing of pleadings on behalf of parties, learned counsel for respondent has raised a preliminary objection that
the present case, aggrieved by the alleged impugned action by which the services of the applicant was
terminated/retrenched, he has approached this Tribunal by invoking the provisions of Section 2A of the Act read with
section 2A (3) of the Act, so, in view of provisions as provided in section 2A (3) of the Act, as period of limitation is
three years i.e. fixed period of limitation, thus, taking into consideration the provisions of section 2A(3) of the Act,
present claim petition filed by the applicant on 12.12.2012 allegedly aggrieved by the order of
termination/retrenchment in the year 2004/2005 is totally illegal and arbitrary and is barred by period of limitation as
provided in the section 2A(3) of the Act.
In rebuttal, reliance has been placed on para 08 of the statement of claim, which reads as under:
“(8) यह कि िर्मिारगॊण ने अऩनी अवैध सेवा सर्ाप्ति िो ननरस्ि िरने व वेिन आदि सभी दहि ऱाभों सदहि री-
ईन्सस्टेट िरने हेिु र्ान्सनीय ऺेत्रीय श्रर्ायुक्ि (िे०) र्होिय, ऱखनऊॉ िे सर्ऺ अऩना औ० वव० सॊ०- ऱखनऊॉ-8 (1-
72)/12 प्रस्िुि किया था प्िसर्े र्ान्सनीय ऺेत्रीय श्रर्ायुक्ि (िे०) र्होिय ने दि० 16/08/12 िो र्ान्सनीय
सी०िी०आई०टी०, ऱखनऊॉ िे सर्ऺ वाि सीधे प्रेवषि िरने िा आिेश किया था प्िसिे ऩररणार् स्वरुऩ िर्मिारगण
अऩना यह वाि र्ान्सनीय न्सयायाऱय िे सर्ऺ प्रस्िुि िर रहे हैं। आर्मर शीट दि० 16/08/12 सॊऱग्न है।‖
I have heard learned counsel for respondent and gone through the record.
Now the core question which is to be considered is that in view of the facts which are stated herein above, admittedly
the services of the applicant was terminated in the year 2004/2005 and thereafter he has filed the present case before
this Tribunal u/s 2A of the Act on 12.12.2012 on the grounds as taken by him as quoted hereinabove, is maintainable
or barred by the period of limitation as provided u/s 2A(3).
Hon‘ble the Karnataka High Court in ITC Infotech India Ltd. vs. Venkataramana Uppada ILR 2016 Karnataka
3041 has held as under:
“9. Section 2A of the I.D. Act enables the individual workman to raise a dispute connected with or arising
out of his discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of his services by his employer and by
legal fiction it would constitute "Industrial Dispute". No other type of dispute regarding an individual
workman is contemplated by Section 2A. After the enactment of Section 2A, it is not necessary that a dispute
relating to the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service of a workman must be
sponsored by a trade union or a substantial number of workman. In other words, even if it is not sponsored
by a trade union or a substantial number of workman, such a dispute will be deemed to be an industrial
dispute. Section 2A of the ID Act reads as under:
"2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute -
"(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of
an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer
630
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be
deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of
workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-
Section(1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the
dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the
application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the
dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate
Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall
apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it
by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-Section(2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal
before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise
termination of service as specified in sub-Section(1)."
10. By Act 24 of 2010, Section 2A was renumbered as sub-Section(1) and by same Act i.e., Act 24 of 2010
sub-Section (2) and (3) came to be inserted after Section 2A(1) of the I.D. Act. The said amendment Act came
into effect on and from 15th September, 2010. In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary Act 24
of 2010 is to be held operative prospectively.
11. The effect of amendment is that any workman who has been discharged, dismissed, retrenched or
terminated as specified in sub-section (1) of Section 2A may make an application directly to the Labour
Court or Tribunal for adjudication of his individual dispute after the expiry of 45 days from the date he has
made an application to the conciliation officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute.
Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A lays down the time limit for making such application to Labour Court or
Tribunal. It provides that such application to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute
shall be made before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal and retrenchment or
otherwise termination of service as specified in subSection(1).
12. A bare reading of above provision would indicate that a dispute covered under sub-Section(1) can be
agitated or questioned by a workman by making an application directly to the Labour Court or Tribunal for
adjudication of such dispute and such application should be filed before the expiry of three years from the
date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service. In other words, the right
conferred under Section 2A would lapse immediately preceding the date of expiry of three years of the date
of dismissal, discharge etc. Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A would operate independently. The right available
to the workman under Section 2A is not withstanding anything contained in Section 10 of the ID Act.
13. Thus, question which would arise for consideration in the instant case is; Whether dispute raised beyond
three years from the date of discharge, dismissal or retrenchment can be entertained by the Labour Court or
Tribunal by condoning the delay if any in raising the dispute or filing a claim petition or in other words, if
an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is filed, would it be
maintainable and such delay can be condoned?
14. Prior to incorporation of Section 2A a workman had to necessarily depend upon the trade unions to
espouse his cause for seeking reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the I.D. Act. The incorporation of Section
2A enabled the workman to approach the Labour Court or Tribunal directly and prevented the mischief of
unreasonable delay occasioning on account of reference not being referred to by the appropriate
Government under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act.
15. Section 10(4A) of the I.D. Act introduced by Karnataka Amendment Act 5 of 1988 enables an individual
workman to challenge a termination order by directly applying to the Labour Court within six months from
the date of communication of such order of termination.
16. The period of limitation for filing a petition before the Labour Court is six months from the date of
communication of such order. A Division Bench of this Court has held in KSRTC Vs KHALEEL AHMED
AND ANR reported in ILR 2002 (3) Kar 3827 that the period of six months prescribed under Section 10(4A)
cannot be extended. It has been held by the Division Bench as under:
"23. It seems quite clear to us that the State Legislature has incorporated sub-Section (4A) in
Section 10 of the Act to provide a more expeditious remedy to the workman enabling him to redress
his grievances without undergoing the ordeal of approaching any Labour Union and without
approaching the State Government for referring his case to the Labour Court. Therefore, the
remedy provided under sub-Section (4-A) is a remedy alternative to what is provided under sub-
Section (1) of Section 10 of the Act. But the right created under the State Amendment is coupled
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
631
with a condition that individual workman has to prefer application before the Labour Court within
the time frame of six months fixed by the legislature. It is a statutory condition precedent for
exercise of the right and availment of remedy under sub-Section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act.
Therefore, it has to be held that if an application is filed beyond the period of 6 months as
prescribed under the above sub-Section, then it will be incumbent on the part of the Labour Court
not to entertain such an application since the condition does not only bars the special remedy but it
also strikes at the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain such an application. Such an
interpretation is in consonance with the general rule of interpretation of statute. Such construction
will not also in any way prejudice the right of a workman to get his dispute resolved by a reference
under sub-Section 10(1) of the Act provided the dispute sought to be raised do not become stale
because of his inaction as held by the Supreme Court in the cases of Balbir Singh Vs Punjab
Roadways, Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Vs Prahlad Singh and Telecom District Manager Vs A.A.
Angali".
(emphasis supplied)
17. In EXECUTIVE ENGINEER AND OTHERS VS LOKESH REDDY AND OTHERS reported in
MANU/KA/0190/2003 : 2003 (3) LLJ 662 the point which came up for consideration was whether the period
of limitation provided under Section 10(4A) of the Act is directory or mandatory and it came to be held that
it was mandatory. It has been held as under:
"40. In view of the discussion made so far, we respectfully disagree with the view taken by the
learned single judge in the present matters in holding the period of limitation provided under
Section 10(4-A) of the Act as directory and not mandatory and affirm the view taken in the case of
Khaleel Ahmed (supra), which has already clarified the said position of law holding the period of
limitation in Section 10(4-A) as mandatory. So, the view taken by the Labour Court and affirmed by
the learned single judge in the matters relating to period of limitation provided under Section 10(4-
A) of the Act, being contrary to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the Case of Khaleel
Ahmed (Supra) cannot be sustained and consequently, the impugned awards in allowing the
applications filed after about six years (and not within six months) under Section 10(4-A) of the Act
should have been set aside by the learned single judge. Since that was not done by the learned
single judge in the impugned order, our interference is required".
18. As to whether the plea of limitation though not raised, is required to be considered by the Labour Court
or not while adjudicating a claim petition filed under Section 10(4A), came up for consideration before the
Division Bench in SMT. RUKMINIBAI AND OTHERS VS THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, NEKRTC,
BIDAR DIVISION, BY ITS CHIEF LAW OFFICER reported in ILR 2013 Kar 1024 and held that Section 3
of the Limitation Act 1963, is peremptory in nature and imposing a duty on the Court to dismiss the
applications which are barred by limitation even if the plea of limitation is not raised. It has been held as
under:
"9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is peremptory in nature. It imposes a duty on the Court to
dismiss the applications, which are barred by limitation even if the plea of limitation is not raised. If
the claim petition is barred by time, the Court or an adjudicating authority has no power or
authority to entertain such an application and decide it on merits. As stated, even in the absence of
such a plea by the respondent or opponent, the Court or the authority must dismiss such an
application if it is satisfied that the same is barred by limitation."
19. Keeping the above principles in mind, a reading of Section 2A(3) would lead to an irresistible conclusion
that time stipulated for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the case may be, has
to be necessarily "before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section (1)." Time limit for making an application to the
Labour Court stipulated in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A does not appear to have a bearing to the provisions
of sub-Section (2) of Section 2A. In any event right conferred under Section 2A would lapse immediately
preceding the date of expiry of three years from the date of dismissal, discharge etc.,. In other words, the
limitation of three years prescribed under sub-Section (3) of Section 2A being mandatory, same cannot be
condoned by taking recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which has no application to the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
20. It is well settled principle that if an act is required to be performed within a specified time, the same
would primarily be mandatory. It has been held in the case of NAZIRUDDIN VS SITARAM AGARWAL
reported in AIR 2003 SCW 908 to the following effect:
"The Courts jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well
known that in a given case, the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the
fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is
632
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract the words to a statute or read something into it
which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that
there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled
that the real intention of legislature must be gathered from the language used."
21. Thus, in the background of the dicta of the Apex Court in NAZIRUDDIN's case referred to supra, when
Section 2A is perused, it would indicate that if the legislature really intended that the period of limitation
provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A was to be construed as directory, then it would not have prescribed
the limitation of three years and it would have used the words "at any time" instead of using the words
"before the expiry of three years". Though the words at any time' is found in Section 10(1), same is
conspicuously absent in sub-Section(3) of Section 2A which would clearly depict the intention of the
legislature namely, it had deliberately imposed limitation period under sub-Section (3) of Section 2A and as
such legislature did not employ the words at any time' in the said provision as found in Section 10(1) and in
its place, it has specifically incorporated the words before the expiry of three years'. Hence, to interpret the
period of limitation found in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A as directory and not mandatory would amount to
adding something which is not provided in the provision by the legislature or it would amount to doing
violence to the provision, if such interpretation is sought to be made.
22. In the background of aforestated discussion, when the facts of hand are examined, it would clearly
indicate that on the services of the employee -respondent being terminated by the Management by letter of
termination dated 11.02.2009, a reference was sought under Section 10(1)(c) (d) of the I.D. Act by the
respondent by submitting a representation to Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bangalore on 06.09.2012. The
appropriate Government made a reference by order dated 03.06.2013 - Annexure-N and pursuant to the
same, proceedings was commenced before the Labour Court, Bengaluru in Reference No. 16/2013. After
appearance of the respondent - employee before the Labour Court and before filing of the claim petition, a
memo came to be filed on 07.11.2013 (part of Annexure-M) seeking withdrawal of the reference and
permission to file a fresh application under Section 2A(2) of the I.D. Act. The said memo was partially
accepted by the Labour Court as could be seen from the order dated 07.11.2013 (part of Annexure-M)
passed on the said memo. It reads as under:
"First Party present and filed memo stating that the present reference is not maintainable and he
intent's to file fresh application under Section 2A(2) of the I.D. Act.
Heard the respondent counsel. Perused the memo filed by the first party -workman for the reasons
mentioned in memo the reference is hereby dismissed and case is closed."
And Hon‘ble Rajasthan High court in the case of Pankaj Swami vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation &
ors. MANU/RH/1788/2019 after taking into consideration the provisions of sedation 2A(2) & 2A(3) of the Act held
as under:
“The provisions are explicit, wherein the workman can approach the Labour Court for adjudication of the
dispute in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment etc., however, sub-section (3) provides that the
application should be made to the Labour Court before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified.
8. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the cause of action arose to the
petitioner prior to introduction of the provision of limitation by sub-section (3) the same would have no
application is concerned, the submission made is fallacious, inasmuch as, the provision under which the
application has been filed by the petitioner i.e. section 2-A(2) of the Act, itself was introduced by the
amendment Act of 2010 alongwith the limitation therein and therefore, the provision of limitation which was
introduced in the year 2010 alongwith the main provision providing for the limitation would apply with all
force and the submission that the same would have no application to the cause of action, which arose prior
to 2007, has no basis.
The submissions as made, if accepted, would result in circumstances where if the cause of action has arisen
post 2010, the same would be barred, whereas the causes, which arose prior to 2010 like in the year 2007 in
the present case and the application is filed after 7 years, the same would never become barred by limitation,
such a result is legally untenable.
9. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the petitioner had approached the
Conciliation Officer and had raised the dispute before him, where there was no limitation and the petitioner
approached the Labour Court only as per the directions of the Conciliation Officer the claim could not be
rejected by barred by limitation also does not advance the cause of the petitioner, inasmuch as, the petitioner
could have taken advantage of the said position, if the Conciliation Officer had sent a failure report to the
appropriate Government who in turn had referred the dispute to the Labour Court. Merely because the
Conciliation Officer suggested approaching the Labour Court, which suggestion was accepted by the
petitioner, cannot be termed as a reference under section 10 of the Act to the Labour Court.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
633
10. In view of the above discussion in so far as the rejection of the claim of the petitioner by the Labour
Court being barred by limitation is concerned, the same cannot be faulted.”
And in the case of Parthasarathy vs. Souther Pins and Products Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. MANU/TN/6691/2020 Hon‘ble
the High Court of Madras has held as under:
“Inasmuch as the notice of termination of the Petitioner in the present case has been made on 06.10.2014
under Section 2-A(2) of the Act after the said amendment has come into force, the limitation of three years
prescribed under Section 2-A(3) of the Act would necessarily apply. As such, there is no infirmity in the
decision-making process of the Labour Court in refusing to entertain the application made by the Petitioner
has time barred. This view is supported by the decisions of this Court in the following cases:-
(i) ITC Infotech India Ltd. v. Venkataramana Uppada (Order dated 03.03.2016 in W.P. No. 27510
of 2015 passed by the High Court of Karnataka)
(ii) Management of Ashok Leyland v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (Order dated 13.04.2016 in
W.P. Nos. 9640 and 9641 of 2016 passed by this Court)
(iii) Ravi Kumar v. Management, Tamil Nadu State Road Transport Corporation (Order dated
11.04.2017 in W.P. (MD) No. 4269 of 2017 passed by the Madurai Bench of this Court)
(iv) K. Settu v. Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Order dated 20.09.2019 in W.P.
No. 8413 of 2019 passed by this Court)
5. A feeble attempt is made on behalf of the Petitioner to suggest that the period of conciliation must be
excluded while computing the limitation. It is, no doubt, true that Section 2-A(2) of the Act contemplates such
application to be made to the Labour Court after the expiry of 45 days from the date of application to the
Conciliation Officer is made. However, it does not require that the conciliation proceedings should have
been completed before making that application under Section 2-A(2) of the Act. The words in Section 2-A(3)
of the Act are clear enough that the limitation has to be reckoned on the expiry of three years from the date
of termination. The Petitioner in the instant case had made the application for conciliation on 12.04.2017
which had also concluded on 27.06.2017, but the Petitioner had not approached the Labour Court after 45
days either from 12.04.2017 or even from 27.06.2017. As such, the contentions made on behalf of the
Petitioner cannot be countenanced.”
(see also Kandasamy Spinning Mills Private Ltd. vs S. Palanisamy and Ors. MANU/RN/6831/2019
Reverting the facts of the present case, and taking into the consideration as provided in section 2A (2) read with
section 2A(3) of the Act and the law laid down by the various Hon‘ble High Courts as stated herein above, as in the
present case the services of the employees/workmen have been terminated in the year 2004/2005; and he has filed the
present case on 12.12.2012 on the basis of reasoning as given by him in his claim petition is not maintainable, being
barred by the provisions as provided u/s 2A(3) of the Act i.e. filed after three years, so the present case is liable to be
dismissed.
Accordingly, the same stands dismissed; and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Award as above.
LUCKNOW.
21st August, 2024.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 212.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
mrj jsyos ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; लखनउ ds iapkV (a02/2016) izdkf”kr djrh gS
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-04]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 212.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.02/2016) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
634
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Uttar Railway and
others.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR(B-I)-04]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 02/2016
BETWEEN
जगना ईफव भगवानदेइ, ृत्नी स्ट्व० दया िंकर
द्वाराः- श्री ृरवेज अलम, 283/63 ख, गढ़ी कनौरा, (प्रेमवती नगर) ृो०-मानक नगर, लखनउँ 11
AND
(1) सहायक मॅडल यांजत्रक ऄजभयन्ता (डीजल) महोदय, ई०रे०, डीजल-िेड, अलमबाग, लखनउँ ।
(2) मंडल यांजत्रक ऄजभयन्ता (डीजल) महोदय, ई०रे०, डीजल-िेड, अलमबाग, लखनउँ-
AWARD
Facts of the case:
Smt Jagna, w/o Late Daya Shankar/claimant filed claim petition before this Tribunal on 11.09.2013/18.09.2013 u/s
2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), facts in brief and relief claimed by
claimant are as under:-
Claimant, Jagna, w/o deceased Daya Shankar, who was working as Khalasi (T. No. 483) under respondent no. 2;
however, subsequently while working on post, was dismissed from services by an order dated 28.02.2004 and the
appeal dated 26.03.2004 against said dismissal order is still pending with the respondents. After the death of the
husband of applicant on 17.08.2008, number of representations were moved before respondent but no heed was paid,
so, she moved application before Conciliation Officer on 05.01.2013 and in spite of best efforts no settlement has
taken place between the parties, in said factual background claimant has filed present claim petition before this
Tribunal.
On behalf of respondent preliminary object in has been filed, quoted hereunder:
“1. That the present claim statement has been filed by the claimant, who does not have any locus standei to
institute the present claim statement against the management for the relief, which ought to have been sought
by the deceased employee and the relief for compassionate appointment of the claimant is legally not
maintainable before this Hon'ble Tribunal, as the same are beyond jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Tribunal.
2. That the present claim statement has been filed after lapse of a period of 10 years, as such, the same is
barred by limitation has been inserted as section 2A(3) of the Industrial Dispute Act, reproduced below:
2-A(3)- the application referred to in Sub- section 2 shall be made to the labour Court or Tribunal
before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise
termination of service as specified in Sub-section (1).
That this Hon'ble Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to condone the delay as mentioned above in view of the
provisions contained in the Industrial Dispute Act, as also no cognizance may be taken on the claim
statement of the claimant.
Wherefore, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased to reject and
dismiss the claim statement of the claimant with no relief.”
None turned up on behalf of claimant inspite of notice; so, after hearing learned counsel for respondent and going
through the records, two questions are to be adjudicated:
(a)
Whether the claim petition, filed by the claimant against the order dated 28.02.2004 by which
services of her husband were dismissed is within the period of limitation as provided u/s 2A (3) of the Act?
(b)
Whether the claim petition, filed by the wife of deceased u/s 2A of the Act is maintainable or not?
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
635
Consideration of point (a):
In order to decide the preliminary objection, taken by respondent, it will be appropriate to go through aims and
objects of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
In brief which, the same are that Industrial Disputes Bill was introduced by the Government of India in the Legislative
Assembly on the 28th October 1946. After the Select Committee‘s report on 3rd February 1947, with some
amendments, it was passed in March 1947 and became the law from Ist April 1947 repealing the Trade Disputes Act
1929.
While retaining most of the provisions of the earlier law, this Act introduced two new institutions for the prevention
and settlement of industrial disputes; works committees consisting of representatives of employers and workers; and
machinery for industrial adjudication.
A reference to an industrial tribunal under this Act lies where both parties to any industrial dispute apply for such
reference, and also where the appropriate Government considers it expedient so to do. An award of a tribunal has
normally to be enforced by the Government and is binding on both parties to the dispute for such periods as may be
specified, upto a maximum of one year. This Act seeks to give a new orientation to the entire conciliation machinery.
Another important new feature of the Act is the prohibition of strikes and lockouts during the pendency of
conciliation and adjudication proceedings of settlements reached in the course of conciliation proceedings and of
awards of industrial tribunals declared binding by the appropriate government.
Rules, orders or notifications requiring the larger industrial establishments to set up works committees were issued by
the Government of India and most of the State Governments.
Objectives: General
The objectives of industrial relations and industrial disputes legislation, may be outlined as under:-
(i)
Industrial Peace: For prosperity of industry, it is necessary that there be a continuous and growing production
which is only possible if (a) there are no interruptions and stoppages in production i.e. absence of disputes,
and (b) if the various agencies of production are satisfied and are in a harmonious bent to work. In other
words, industrial peace is very necessary for the vitality of industry.
(ii)
Economic Justice: All interruptions in production arising out of industrial dispute are really caused by the
dissatisfaction of labour with their existing economic condition. The history of labour struggle is nothing but
a continuous demand for fair return to labour expressed in varied forms e.g. (a) increase in wages, (b)
resistance to decrease in wages, (c) grant of allowances and benefits etc.(Hariprasad Vs. A.D.Divelkar, AIR
1957 SC 121)
Social and economic justice which is the bedrock of our Constitution and economic organization also requires that
any industrial relations or disputes legislation, to be effective remedial statute, must embrace not only law for
regulation of labour relations with capital, process for channelizing collective bargaining methods for negotiation,
mediation, conciliation and settlements of industrial conflict, but also a system for giving fair play and justice to
labour and removal of economic injustice.
The preamble of the Act states that its main object is to make provision for investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes. Viewed in the above background, the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is a progressive piece of social
legislation and is designed to settle the disputes on a new pattern known under the Act as adjudication machinery.
The object of all labour legislation is to ensure fair wages and to prevent disputes so that production might not be
adversely affected. (Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1957 SC 167)
The purpose of the Act is to provide machinery for a just and equitable settlement by adjudication, (G. Claridge and
Company Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, AIR 1951 Bombay 100) and amelioration of the conditions of
workmen in industry.
Individual and collective industrial disputes: Individual as well as collective disputes may ripen into industrial
disputes. The true nature of an individual dispute is that it is a collective dispute. Though a dispute may at the
inception be initiated by an individual, yet if it is taken up by the fellow-workers or a union, or a sufficient number of
workers, it may assume the collective character and would become an industrial dispute. (Standard Vacum Oil Co.
Errakulam Vs. I.Tribunal, Errakulam 1952-II LLJ 612). A dispute which continues to retain its individual
character cannot be regarded as an industrial dispute. This being the basic law, it is within the competence of the
legislature to widen or narrow the coverage of an industrial dispute. The Industrial Disputes Act has also been
amended to cover some individual disputes. It is not necessary that a majority should take an industrial dispute. It is
sufficient if a substantial group of workmen take it up. When thus taken, it becomes an industrial or collective
dispute.
Individual dispute an industrial dispute: The important amongst the above are however the amendments of 1965.
By the Act of 1965, a new Section 2A has been added in Act whereby specified categories of individual disputes are
also deemed to be industrial disputes. The section reads as under:
636
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
―2A. Dismissal, etc of an individual workman to be deemed to be industrial dispute-
Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual
workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out
of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute
notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.‖
This amendment revives, impediment in the way of workman with the necessity that to make an industrial dispute it
must be taken up or espoused by substantial section of the workmen or any union of those workmen and gives an
individual workman a remedy for security of his service and indirectly freedom to join or not to join any union. Thus,
individual disputes could be referred to Tribunal as per Section 2A after 1.12.1965. (National Productivity Council,
1969-II LLJ 186).
Thereafter, by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 2010 (Act No. 24 of 2010), Section 2A(a), was renumbered as
Sub-section (1) and by the same Act i.e. Act No.24 of 2010 Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) have been inserted
after Section 2A (1) of Industrial Dispute Act 1947 which came into effect w.e.f. 15.09.2010, which reads as under:
"2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute -
"(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of
an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer
connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be
deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of
workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-
Section(1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the
dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the
application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the
dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate
Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall
apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it
by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-Section(2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal
before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise
termination of service as specified in sub-Section(1)."
Now the core question to be considered is that in view of the facts which are stated herein above, that admittedly the
services of applicant was terminated on 06.08.2010, thereafter he has filed the present case before this Tribunal u/s
2A of the Act on 12.07.2021 on the grounds as taken by him in his claim petition, is maintainable or barred by the
period of limitation as provided u/s 2A(3) of the Act.
Answer to the said question find place in the judgment passed by Hon‘ble the Karnataka High Court in ITC Infotech
India Ltd. vs. Venkataramana Uppada ILR 2016 Karnataka 3041, relevant potion quoted as under:
“19. Keeping the above principles in mind, a reading of Section 2A(3) would lead to an irresistible
conclusion that time stipulated for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the
case may be, has to be necessarily "before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section (1)." Time limit
for making an application to the Labour Court stipulated in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A does not
appear to have a bearing to the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 2A. In any event right
conferred under Section 2A would lapse immediately preceding the date of expiry of three years from
the date of dismissal, discharge etc.,. In other words, the limitation of three years prescribed under
sub-Section (3) of Section 2A being mandatory, same cannot be condoned by taking recourse to
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which has no application to the provisions of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
20. It is well settled principle that if an act is required to be performed within a specified time, the
same would primarily be mandatory. It has been held in the case of NAZIRUDDIN VS SITARAM
AGARWAL reported in AIR 2003 SCW 908 to the following effect:
"The Courts jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It
is well known that in a given case, the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the
texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language
of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract the words to a statute or
read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
637
necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any
superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of legislature must be gathered
from the language used."
21. Thus, in the background of the dicta of the Apex Court in NAZIRUDDIN's case referred to supra,
when Section 2A is perused, it would indicate that if the legislature really intended that the period of
limitation provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A was to be construed as directory, then it would not
have prescribed the limitation of three years and it would have used the words "at any time" instead of
using the words "before the expiry of three years". Though the words at any time' is found in Section
10(1), same is conspicuously absent in sub-Section(3) of Section 2A which would clearly depict the
intention of the legislature namely, it had deliberately imposed limitation period under sub-Section (3)
of Section 2A and as such legislature did not employ the words at any time' in the said provision as
found in Section 10(1) and in its place, it has specifically incorporated the words before the expiry of
three years'. Hence, to interpret the period of limitation found in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A as
directory and not mandatory would amount to adding something which is not provided in the provision
by the legislature or it would amount to doing violence to the provision, if such interpretation is sought
to be made."
And Hon‘ble Rajasthan High court in the case of Pankaj Swami vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation &
ors. MANU/RH/1788/2019 after taking into consideration the provisions of sedation 2A(2) & 2A(3) of the Act held
as under:
“The provisions are explicit, wherein the workman can approach the Labour Court for adjudication of the
dispute in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment etc., however, sub-section (3) provides that the
application should be made to the Labour Court before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified.
8. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the cause of action arose to the
petitioner prior to introduction of the provision of limitation by sub-section (3) the same would have no
application is concerned, the submission made is fallacious, inasmuch as, the provision under which the
application has been filed by the petitioner i.e. section 2-A(2) of the Act, itself was introduced by the
amendment Act of 2010 alongwith the limitation therein and therefore, the provision of limitation which was
introduced in the year 2010 alongwith the main provision providing for the limitation would apply with all
force and the submission that the same would have no application to the cause of action, which arose prior
to 2007, has no basis.
The submissions as made, if accepted, would result in circumstances where if the cause of action has arisen
post 2010, the same would be barred, whereas the causes, which arose prior to 2010 like in the year 2007 in
the present case and the application is filed after 7 years, the same would never become barred by limitation,
such a result is legally untenable.
9. The submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the petitioner had approached the
Conciliation Officer and had raised the dispute before him, where there was no limitation and the petitioner
approached the Labour Court only as per the directions of the Conciliation Officer the claim could not be
rejected by barred by limitation also does not advance the cause of the petitioner, inasmuch as, the petitioner
could have taken advantage of the said position, if the Conciliation Officer had sent a failure report to the
appropriate Government who in turn had referred the dispute to the Labour Court. Merely because the
Conciliation Officer suggested approaching the Labour Court, which suggestion was accepted by the
petitioner, cannot be termed as a reference under section 10 of the Act to the Labour Court.
10. In view of the above discussion in so far as the rejection of the claim of the petitioner by the Labour
Court being barred by limitation is concerned, the same cannot be faulted.”
And in the case of Parthasarathy vs. Souther Pins and Products Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. MANU/TN/6691/2020 Hon‘ble
the High Court of Madras has held as under:
“Inasmuch as the notice of termination of the Petitioner in the present case has been made on 06.10.2014
under Section 2-A(2) of the Act after the said amendment has come into force, the limitation of three years
prescribed under Section 2-A(3) of the Act would necessarily apply. As such, there is no infirmity in the
decision-making process of the Labour Court in refusing to entertain the application made by the Petitioner
has time barred. This view is supported by the decisions of this Court in the following cases:-
(i) ITC Infotech India Ltd. v. Venkataramana Uppada (Order dated 03.03.2016 in W.P. No. 27510
of 2015 passed by the High Court of Karnataka)
(ii) Management of Ashok Leyland v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (Order dated 13.04.2016 in
W.P. Nos. 9640 and 9641 of 2016 passed by this Court)
638
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(iii) Ravi Kumar v. Management, Tamil Nadu State Road Transport Corporation (Order dated
11.04.2017 in W.P. (MD) No. 4269 of 2017 passed by the Madurai Bench of this Court)
(iv) K. Settu v. Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Order dated 20.09.2019 in W.P.
No. 8413 of 2019 passed by this Court)
5. A feeble attempt is made on behalf of the Petitioner to suggest that the period of conciliation must be
excluded while computing the limitation. It is, no doubt, true that Section 2-A(2) of the Act contemplates such
application to be made to the Labour Court after the expiry of 45 days from the date of application to the
Conciliation Officer is made. However, it does not require that the conciliation proceedings should have
been completed before making that application under Section 2-A(2) of the Act. The words in Section 2-A(3)
of the Act are clear enough that the limitation has to be reckoned on the expiry of three years from the date
of termination. The Petitioner in the instant case had made the application for conciliation on 12.04.2017
which had also concluded on 27.06.2017, but the Petitioner had not approached the Labour Court after 45
days either from 12.04.2017 or even from 27.06.2017. As such, the contentions made on behalf of the
Petitioner cannot be countenanced.”
(see also Kandasamy Spinning Mills Private Ltd. vs S. Palanisamy and Ors. MANU/RN/6831/2019
Thus, in view of above said fact, combined reading of section 2A (2) and 2A (3) of the Act, the legal position which
emerge out is that if a workman is aggrieved by order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination,
he may approach the Tribunal within a period three years from dated of passing of order.
Taking into consideration, above said facts and position of law as well that ―if law provides a particular thing that all
other modes or methods of doing that thing must be deemed to have been prohibited‖, the said proposition of law is
first held in the case of Tylor Vs. Tylor (1875) LR 1 ChD 426 and adopted later by the Judicial Committee in Nazir
Ahmed Vs. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 and thereafter by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in a series of judgments
including those in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & another Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322, State of
Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358, Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad 1999 (8) SCC 266,
Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka 2001 (4) SCC 9 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Essar Power
Ltd. 2008 (4) SCC 755.
In the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court held as under:-
“No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of
interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words.
No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and
every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is
an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is
to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity,
and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the
Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language
is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has
been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for
its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided”.
Hon‘ble the Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111,
held as under:-
“24.
True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what provides by its clear
language, with due regard to the scheme of law.
25.
Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of
the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed
according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly
necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or
totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute”.
In the case of Harshad S. Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 257, it has been held as under:-
“There is no doubt that if the words are plain and simple and call for only one construction that construction
is to be adopted whatever be its effect”.
In the case of Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devo (2002) 7 SCC 273, Hon‘ble the Supreme Court observed as under:-
“9.It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the
courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
639
alleged object and policy of the Act.”
In the case of Patango Kadam Vs. Prithviraj Sayajiro Yadav Deshmukh (2001) 3 SCC 594, took the view:-
“12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a provision, one must look at well-settled principles of
construction but it is not open to first to create an ambiguity which does not exist and then try to resolve the
same by taking recourse to some general principle.”
Also, Hon‘ble the Supreme Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane & others vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer & another (2013) 10 SCC 765 has held as under:
“16.
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim
dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a
statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that
provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation."
(See Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta10, AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash
Sharma11.)
In view the above said facts as well as that the workman/Sri Rajesh Kumar Gaur cannot derive any benefit from the
facts on which he has approached the Tribunal after expiry of period three years from the date of his termination,
because his services were terminated on 06.08.2010, filed the present case on 12.07.2021 u/s 2A (2) of the Act, as
such, the claim petition is barred by the period of limitation as provided u/s 2A (3) of the Act, liable to be rejected.
Consideration of point (b):
Keeping in view the provisions of section 2A of the Act which is reproduced hereunder:
“2A.
Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.
(1)
Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an
individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or
arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial
dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2)
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-section
(1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred
to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation
Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the
Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a
dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the
provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial
dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.
(3)
The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before
the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of
service as specified in sub-section (1).]”
From the bare perusal of the said section the position which emerged out that an individual workman whose services
were discharged, dismissed, retrenched or otherwise terminated by employer can raised as dispute aggrieved by same.
Further, as per definition of workman, as provided u/s 2 ‗s‘ of Act, reads as under:
“2 (s)
"workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether
the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in
relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or
retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person-
(i)
who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the
Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii)
who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison, or
(iii)
who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or
(iv)
(iv)who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding [ten thousand rupees]
per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers
vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.”
640
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Thus, from the combined reading of above quoted two sections i.e. 2A and 2 ‗s‘, the widow of deceased employee
cannot be said to fall within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗workman‘, accordingly, claim petition filed by Smt.
Jagna w/o of deceased employee Daya Shankar, liable to be rejected.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, claim petition filed by application u/s 2A of the Act, is rejected on the ground that
applicant does not fall within the decision of ‗workman‘ as provided u/s 2 ‗s‘ of the Act; also, the same is barred by
period of limitation as per section 2A (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, with liberty to the claimant to pursue
its case before appropriate forum as per law.
Award as above.
LUCKNOW.
16th July, 2024
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 213.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; लखनउ ds iapkV (a19/2018) izdkf”kr djrh gS
[सं. ,y - 41012/33/2017- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 213.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.19/2018) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of North Eastern
Railway and others.
[No. L-41012/33/2017- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 19 of 2018
Reference No. L-41012/33/2017-IR (B-I) dated 25.04.2018
BETWEEN
Ravi Ranjan Sinha, Confidential steno/Engineering
D.R.M. Office, N.E. Railway, Ashok Marg, Lucknow (226001)
Versus
1.
General Manager,
North Eastern (N.E.) Railway,
Gorakhpur - 273012
2.
Divisional Railway Manager
North Eastern Railway, Central Railway Administration
Ashok Marg, Lucknow
JUDGMENT
Sri D.P. Awasthi, Learned Counsel for the workman & Sri S. M. Tripathi, Learned Counsel for the respondents.
By means of order/reference no. L-41012/33/2017-IR(B-I) dated 25.04.2018, the Central Government considered it
desirable to refer the dispute for adjudication to the following effect:-
D;k izcU/ku iwoksZRrj jsyos] y[kuÅ ,oa xksj[kiqj }kjk Jh jfo jatu dqekj flUgk] xksiuh; vk'kqfyfid dks fnukad
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
641
20-10-2004 ds LFkku ij 12-9-2003 ls esa inksUufr u fn;k tkuk U;k;ksfpr ,oa oS/k gS\ ;fn ugha rks dkexkj
fdl jkgr dks ikus dk gdnkj gS\
Case of the Workman:
The statement of claim was filed on behalf of workman/applicant before this Tribunal stating that the applicant was
appointed on 15.10.1999 as steno in the pay scale of Rs.4000-6000 and for promotion in the higher grade of Rs.5000-
8000, an examination was conducted in which the applicant was declared successful and a panel of 07 candidates was
formed in which the name of applicant was found place at Serial no.7. On 11.9.2003 at the time of formation of panel
only 4 vacancies of confidential steno of higher grade were lying vacant and the same were to be filled from the
successful candidates from the panel. Out of 07 candidates, 01 refused for promotion and 02 candidates opted for
transfer in East Central Railway/Hajipur Zone and thus only 04 persons including the applicant were left available for
promotion/absorption against the 04 vacant vacancies. In spite of availability of 04 vacancies, the management
promoted and posted only 03 candidates but did not promote and post the applicant which amounts to victimization of
applicant without having any fault on his part. Due to impugned action on the part of respondents, the applicant
suffered irreparable pecuniary loss and also of seniority, however, he was promoted later on w.e.f. 20.10.2004 though
he was entitled to be promoted in higher grade of Rs.5000-8000 w.e.f. 12.9.2003-the date from which other 03
candidates were promoted and posted. The applicant submitted several representations but to no avail, hence, he
raised the present industrial dispute against the unfair Labour practice adopted by the management and also violated
the provisions of Section 25-T of the I.D. Act 1947 which is punishable Under Section 25-U of the Act 1947.
Accordingly the applicant-Rabi Ranjan Kumar Singh prayed that the above said action of the respondents be held as
illegal and not justified and the applicant be held entitle to be promoted in the higher grade of Rs.5000-8000
w.e.f. 2.9.2003 with consequential benefits.
Case of the respondents:
The Learned Counsel for the respondents raised the preliminary objections that -
a) the grievance of the workman is that he should be promoted from Steno Grade Rs.4000-6000 to the next
higher grade of Rs.5000-8000 w.e.f. 12.9.2003 and not from 20.10.2004. The applicant has raised the above
said grievance of promoting him w.e.f. 12.9.2003 by way of order/reference no.L-41012/33/2017-IR(B-I)
dated 25.4.2018 so the same is liable to be dismissed for the want of delay & latches. In support of his
pleadings the Learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the judgment given by the Hon‘ble
Apex Court vide judgment dated 12.3.2018 passed in the case of Union of India Versus Gulshan Kumar
Sharma passed in Civil Appeal No.2763 of 2018;
b) the applicant is employed on the post of a Confidential Steno holding the post in a managerial and
administrative capacity. Therefore, he does not come in the realm of ‗workman‘ under Sectio 2(s) of the
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. His gross pay as per his pay slip for the month of July, 2018 is Rs.65,995/-.
On merits:
Sri Ravi Ranjan Sinha-applicant/workman on the basis of above said facts pleaded in the written statement as under:-
a) That out of 04 vacant posts of Confidential Steno in the pay scale of Rs.5000-8000 only 03 posts were
filled in vide office order dated 12.9.2003 while one general candidate Sri Om Prakash could not pass
the speed test. However, consequent upon his failure in passing speed test, Sri Rabi Ranjan Kumar
Sinha the applicant was promoted as confidential steno (5000-8000) against one vacant post vide office
order dated 20.10.2004.
b) One Sri Om Prakash was the senior most candidate for whom one post was kept vacant as he could not
qualify the speed test. As such, the applicant was not illegible being junior within zone of consideration
for promotion.
c) The applicant since being junior did not come within zone of eligibility for promotion as Confidential
Steno. However, after the senior most candidate one Sri Om Prakash was found unsuccessful in the
Speed Test, the applicant was promoted vide office order dated 20.10.2004 as stated above.
d) The applicant has since now been promoted on availability of the post after his senior person Sri Om
Prakash was found ineligible having failed in the speed test. Hence, the allegations of victimization and
suffering pecuniary loss etc. are completely vague, biased and liable to be rejected.
e) The applicant has come before this Tribunal with an ulterior motive to abuse the process of law by
misstating and suppressing the material particulars since his promotion was deferred due to one general
post was kept vacant as one senior most general candidate Sri Om Prakash could not pass the speed test.
However, consequent upon his failure in passing the speed test, the applicant was promoted as
confidential steno (5000-8000) against the vacant post vide office order dated 20.10.2004. No junior
person to the applicant was promoted ever.
On the basis of above said averments, the Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the applicant is not
642
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
entitled for any relief.
Findings & Considerations on preliminary objections
(i)
Whether the relief as claimed by the workman is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay?
Answer to the preliminary objection raised by the respondent that the claim as raised by the claimant is liable to be
dismissed as the same was raised at belated stage i.e. 17 years finds places in the judgment rendered by the Bombay
High Court in the case of Haribhau Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2002 (92) FLR1011; wherein it has been
held as under:-
4.
The learned counsel for appellant relied upon the judgment of Supreme court in Ajaib Singh Vs.
Sirhind Co-op. Marketing cum-processing service society Ltd. and Anr. (1999) ILLJ1260SC which was also
cited before the learned single Judge. In Ajaib Singh‟s case the Apex Court in paragraph 10 and 11 of the
report held thus at pp. 1264 and 1265 of LLJ.
“10.
It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Art. 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963
are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the
workman merely on ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be
proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No
reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a
case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour Court or Board, dealing with the
case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the ate he
raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. Reliance of
the learned counsel for the respondent-management on the full bench judgment of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya Vs. State of Haryana 1999 (1) SCT 141 is also of no help
to him. In that case the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Art. 137 of the Limitation Act
were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The court specifically held neither any limitation has
been provided nor any guidelines to determine, it went on further to say that “reasonable time in the
cases of labour for demand of reference or dispute by appropriate Government to labour Tribunal will
be five years after which the government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and
laches if there is no explanation to the delay”. We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana
reference made or an application under section 37-C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function
of the Court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had thought if fit not to
prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the
judges presiding the court cannot be stretched to authorize them to interpret law in such a manner
which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the Legislature. The judgment of the full
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court had completely ignored the object of the Act and
various pronouncements of this Court as noted hereinabove and thus is not a good law on the point of
applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the
Courts/Boards and Tribunal under the Act.
11. In the instant case the respondent-management is not shown to have taken any plea regarding
delay as is evident from the issues framed by the Labour Court. The only plea raised in defence was
that the Labour Court had no Jurisdiction to adjudicate the reference and the termination of the
services of the workman was justified. Had this plea been raised, the workman would have been in a
position to show the circumstances preventing him in approaching the Court at an earlier stage or
even to satisfy the Court that such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by the
Government. The learned Judges of the High Court, therefore, were not justified in holding that the
workman had not given any explanation as to why the demand notice had been issued after a long
period. The findings of facts returned by the High Court in writ proceedings, even without pleadings
were, therefore, unjustified. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the Courts were
bound to render an even handed justice by keeping balance between the two different parties. Such an
approach totally ignores the aims and objects and the social object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Even after noticing that "it is true that a fight between the workman and the management is not a just
between equals, "the Court was not justified to make them equals while returning the findings which it
allowed to prevail, would result in frustration of the purpose of the enactment. The workman appears
to be justified in complaining that in the absence of any plea on behalf of the management and any
evidence, regarding delay, he could not be deprived of the benefits under the Act merely on
technicalities of law. The High Court appears to have substituted its opinion for the opinion of the
Labour Court which was not permissible in proceedings under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution."
5.
The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has held that the Limitation Act does not apply to the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
643
proceedings under the Industrial Dispute Act and the relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the
ground of delay. The Apex Court further observed that the plea of delay if raised by the employer is required
to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypothetical defence. It has
further been observed by the Apex court that no reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on
the ground of delay alone.”
Accordingly, preliminary objection taken by the respondent that claim petition as raised by the claimant is barred, as
the same has been filed at belated stated i.e. 17 years has got no force rejected.
(ii)
Whether the applicant falls within the definition of ‗workman‘ as given under Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act 1947.
The question that falls for consideration is whether the claimants were workmen according to the definition of
workman u/s 2(s) of the ID Act. The definition under this Section has undergone changes since its first enactment.
The definition, as it stood originally when the ID Act came into force w.e.f. 1.4.1947, read as follows:-
"(s) “workman‟ means any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or
unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the purposes of any proceeding under
this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military,
or air service of the Crown."
The definition was amended by Amending Act No. 36 of 1956 which came into force from 29th August, 1956 to read
as follows:-
(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or
unskilled manual, supervisory technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of
employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an
industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection
with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal discharge, or retrenchment has led to that
dispute, but does not include any such person -
(i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950, or the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Navy (Discipline)Act,
1934; or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(i)
who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred
rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by
reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature."
The change brought about by this Amendment was that the persons employed to do ―supervisory‖ and ―technical‖
work were also included in the definition for the first time by this Amendment, although those who were employed in
a supervisory capacity were so included in the definition provided their monthly wage did not exceed Rs.500.
The definition of 'workman' was further amended by Amending Act No.46 of 1982 which was brought into force
w.e.f. 21.8.1984 and the same reads as under:-
"(s) “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual,
unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms
of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an
industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection
with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal discharge, or retrenchment has led to that
dispute, but does not include any such person-
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or
the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957);
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six
hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or
by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature."
A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision clearly indicates that a person would come within the purview of the
said definition if he : (i) is employed in any industry; and (ii) performs any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical,
operational, clerical or supervisory work.
644
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Hon‘ble the Apex Court in the case of All India Reserve Bank Employees Association Versus Reserve Bank of
India reported in AIR 1966 SC 305 held as under:-
17.
However, in view of the importance of the subject and the possibility of a recurrence of such
question in other spheres, and the remarks of the National Tribunal as to jurisdiction of the Central
Government and itself we have considered it necessary to go into some of the points mooted before us.
Before we deal with them we shall read some of the pertinent definitions from the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 :
"2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,--
(k) "Industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between
employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or
nonemployment or the terms of employment or with the condition of labour, of any person;
(rr) "wages" means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the
terms of employment, expressed or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his
employment or of work clone in such employment, and includes-
(i) such allowances (including dearness allowance) as the workman is for the time being entitled to;
(ii) the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light, water, medical attendance or other
amenity or of any service or of any confessional supply of woodgrains or other articles;
(iii) any traveling concession;
but does not include-
(a) any bonus;
(b) any contribution paid or payable by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund or for
the benefit of the workman under any law for the time being in force;
(c) any gratuity payable on the termination of his service.
(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or
unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of
employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an
industrial dispute, include,,% any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led
to that dispute, but does not include any such person-
(i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950, or the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Navy (Discipline) Act,
1934, or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per
menses or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the
powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature."
23.
The argument is extremely ingenious and the simile interesting but it misses the realities of the
amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act in 1956. The definition of 'workman' as it originally stood before
the amendment in 1956 was as follows :-
"2.(s) 'workman' means any person employed (including in apprentice) in any industry to do any
skilled (11) 91 L. ed. 104 or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for
the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute a workman
discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in naval, military or air
service of the Government."
24.
The amending Act of 1956 introduced among the categories of persons already mentioned persons
employed to do supervisory and technical work. So far the language of the earlier enactment was used.
When, however, exceptions were engrafted, that language was departed from in clause (iv) partly because
the draftsman followed the language of clause(iii) and partly because from persons employed on supervision
work some are to be excluded because they draw wages exceeding Rs. 500 per month and some because they
function mainly in a managerial capacity or have duties of the same character. But the unity between the
opening part of the definition and clause (iv) was expressly preserved by using the word 'such' twice in the
opening part. The words, which bind the two parts, are not-"but does not include any person". They are --
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
645
"but does not include any such person showing clearly that what is being excluded is a person who answers
the description " employed to do supervisory work" and he is to be excluded because being employed in a
'supervisory capacity' he draws wages exceeding Rs. 500 per month or exercises functions of a particular
character. The scheme of our Act is much simpler then that of the American statutes. No doubt like the Taft-
Hartley Act the amending Act of 1956 in our country was passed to equalize bargaining power and also to
give the power of bargaining and invoking the Industrial Disputes Act to supervisory workmen, but it gave it
only to some of the workmen employed on supervisory work. 'Workman' here includes an employee employed
as supervisor. There are only two circumstances in which such a person ceases to be a workman. Such a
person is not a workman if he draws wages in excess of Rs. 500 per month or if he performs managerial
functions by reason of a power vested in him or by the nature of duties attached to his office. The person who
ceases to be a workman is not a person who does not answer the description "employed to do supervisory
work" but one who does answer that description. He goes out of the category of "workmen" on proof of the
circumstances excluding him from the category.”
Further in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya & others Versus Sandoz India Ltd. reported in (1994) 5 SCC 373, the
Hon‘ble Apex Court held as under:-
"10. It is thus obvious from the decision that the contention on behalf of the workman before the Industrial
Tribunal as well as before this Court was that the employee was doing either manual or clerical work, and
that not only he had no supervisory duties but he was doing his work under the direction of his superiors
and, therefore, he was a workman within the meaning of the definition of workman as it stood then. The
dispute in question had arisen prior to 6th January, 1956. The definition of 'workman' at the relevant time
included only those persons who were employed to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work.
Hence the relevant contention on behalf of the workman which was negatived by this Court. An inference
from this decision is also possible, viz., that if the employees' work was mainly manual or clerical, he would
have, even as the definition stood then, been covered by it."
Hon‘ble the Supreme Court in the case of C.G. Gupta Versus Glaxo Smith Klin Pharmaceutical Limited reported in
(2007) 7 SCC 171 held as under:-
“23. In the present case, we find that for determining the nature of amendment, the question is whether it
affects the legal rights of individual workers in the context that if they fall within the definition then they
would be entitled to claim several benefits conferred by the Act. The amendment should be also one which
would touch upon their substantive rights. Unless there is a clear provision to the effect that it is
retrospective or such retrospectivity can be implied by necessary implication or intendment, it must be held
to be prospective. We find no such clear provision or anything to suggest by necessary implication or
intendment either in the amending Act or in the amendment itself. The amendment cannot be said to be one
which affects procedure. In so far as the amendment substantially changes the scope of the definition of the
term "workman" it cannot be said to be merely declaratory or clarificatory. In this regard we find that
entirely new category of persons who are doing "operational" work was introduced first time in the
definition and the words "skilled" and "unskilled" were made independent categories unlinked to the word
"manual". It can be seen that the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 was enacted by Parliament on
31.8.1982. Page 2633 However, the amendment itself was not brought into force immediately and in Sub-
section (1) of Section 1 of the Amending Act, it was provided that it would come into force on such day as the
Central Government may be Notification in the official Gazette, appoint. Ultimately, by a Notification the
said amendment was brought into force on 21.8.1984. Although this Court has held that the amendment
would be prospective if it is deemed to have come with effect on a particular day, a provision in the
amendment Act to the effect that amendment would become operative in the future, would have similar effect.
24. Therefore, by the application of the tests mentioned above, it is clear that the definition of workman as
amended must, therefore, presumed to be prospective.
25. In this regard we would like to give one further reason as to why the definition of workman as prevailing
on the date of dismissal should be taken into account. When the workman is dismissed, it is usually
contended (as has been done in the present case) that the relevant conditions precedent for retrenchment
under Section 25N having not been followed and that, therefore, the termination is illegal. Section 25Q of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 lays down that contravention of the provision of Section 25N shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to
Rs. 1000/- or with both. It is, therefore, clear that on the date of dismissal, the employer must act according
to the then prevailing provision of law. It is only in respect of a workman who is then within the definition
of Section 2(s) of the Act that the employer is required to follow the condition mentioned in Section 25N,
failing which, he will commit an offence. If the employee so dismissed, later becomes a person who is a
workman within an expanded definition brought about by a subsequent amendment held to be of
retrospective nature, the employer will be rendered punishable for an offence under Section 25N and Q as
this would amount to the employer being punishable for an offence, which he could not have envisaged on
the date of dismissal. This would be violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution.
646
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
26. In Burmah Shell's case (supra) it was held as follows:
In this connection, we may take notice of the argument advanced by Mr. Chari on behalf of the
Association that, whenever a technical man is employed in an industry, it must be held that he is
employed to do technical work irrespective of the manner in which and the occasions on which the
technical knowledge of that person is actually brought into use. The general proposition put
forward by him was that, if a technical employee even gives advice or guides other workmen, it
must be held that he is doing technical work and not supervisory work. He elaborated this
submission by urging that, if we hold the supervisory work done by a technician as not amounting
to his being employed to do technical work, the result would be that only those persons would be
held to be employed on technical work who actually do manual work themselves. According to him
this would result in making the word "technical" redundans in the definition of 'workman' even
though it Page 2634 was later introduced to amplify the scope of the definition. We are unable to
accept these submissions. The argument that, if we hold that supervisory work done by a technical
man is not employment to do technical work, it would result in only manual work being held to be
technical work, is not at all conect. There is a clear distinction between technical work and manual
work. Similarly there is a distinction between employments which 'are substantially for manual
duties, and employments where the principal duties are supervisory or other type, though
incidentally involving some manual work. Even though the law in India is different from that in
England, the views expressed by Branson, J., in Appeal of Gardner : In re Maschek : In re Tyrrell
[1938] 1 All E.R. 20 are helpful, because, there also, the nature of the work had to be examined to
see whether it was manual work. As examples of duties different from manual labour, though
incidentally involving manual work, he mentioned cases where a worker (a) is mainly occupied in
clerical or accounting work, or (b) is mainly occupied in supervising the work of others, or (c) is
mainly occupied in managing a business or a department, or (d) is mainly engaged in salesmanship,
or (e) if the successful execution of his work depends mainly upon the display of taste or
imagination or the exercise of some special mental or artistic faculty or the application of scientific
knowledge as distinguished from manual dexterity. Another helpful illustration given by him of the
contrast between the two types of cases was in the following words:
If one finds a man employed because he has the artistic faculties which will enable him to
produce something wanted in the shape of a creation of his own, then obviously, although
it involves a good deal of manual labour, he is employed in order that the employer may
get the benefit of his creative faculty.
The example (e), given above, very appropriately applies to the case of a person employed to do technical
work. His work depends upon special mental training or scientific or technical knowledge. If the man is
employed because he possesses such faculties and they enable him to produce something as a creation of his
own, he will have to be held to be employed on technical work, even though, in carrying out that work, he
may have to go through a lot of manual labour. If, on the other hand, he is merely employed in supervising
the work of others, the fact that, for the purpose of proper supervision, he is required to have technical
knowledge will not convert his supervisory work into technical work. The work of giving advice and
guidance cannot be held to be an employment to do technical work.”
Hon‘ble the Apex Court in the case of Chauharya Tripathi & others Versus L.I.C. of India & others reported in
2015 (7) SCC 263, in Para-7 held as under:-
―7. Keeping in view the question posed at the beginning, we are obligated to make a survey of the authorities
that have been pronounced by this Court specifically pertaining to the Development Officers working in LIC.
A three-Judge Bench of this Court in S.K. Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra & Anr.3, adverted to the definition of
'workman' as originally defined under Section 2(s) of the Act and the substantial amendment that was
brought in 1956 in respect of the definition of 'workman' and referred to the decision in Workmen vs. Indian
Standards Institution4 and dwelled upon the hierarchy of officers working in LIC, the duties performed by
such officers and 2 (2008) 11 SCC 319 3 (1983) 4 SCC 214 4 (1975) 2 SCC 847 eventually held thus :
“A perusal of the above extracted terms and conditions of appointment shows that a development
officer is to be a whole time employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. that his
operations are to be restricted to a defined area and that he is liable to be transferred. He has no
authority whatsoever to bind the Corporation in anyway. His principal duty appears to be to
organise and develop the business of the Corporation in the area allotted to him and for that
purpose to recruit active and reliable agents, to train them to canvass new business and to render
post-sale services to policy-holders. He is expected to assist and inspire the agents. Even so he has
not the authority to appoint agents or to take disciplinary action against them. He does not even
supervise the work of the agents though he is required to train them and assist them. He is to be the
'friend, philosopher and guide' of the agents working within his jurisdiction and no more. He is
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
647
expected to stimulate and excite the agents to work, while exercising no administrative control over
them. The agents are not his subordinates. In fact, it is admitted that he has no subordinate staff
working under him. It is thus clear that the development officer cannot by any stretch of
imagination be said to be engaged in any administrative or managerial work. He is a workman
within the meaning of s.2(s) of the Industrial, Disputes Act.‖
(See also : Om Carrying Corporation Versus Tilock Narang & others reported in 2016(148) FLR 915 &
T.Boby Francis Versus Lucy Varghese & others reported in 2016(149) FLR 866)
Hon‘ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad Sharma Versus Presiding Officer, Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-I, Gurugram & another reported in 2023 (178) FLR 565 held as under:-
“5.
After hearing learned counsel and consideration his submissions, it transpires that in the ex parte
evidence in support of his claim, the petitioner tendered affidavit Ex.PW1/A in evidence and a perusal of the
same shows that it is no where mentioned by the petitioner that he by the nature of his duties and work is a
workman. Further, it is categorically mentioned therein that he joined the respondent-Company as
Superintendent Grade-II, who was later on confirmed as an Operation Manager and worked till 01.06.2020.
The petitioner revealed his last drawn wages as Rs.40,500/- per month. A perusal of the impugned award
shows that the Labour Court has carefully examined the evidence on record including his affidavit Ex.PW-
1/A, while holding that he failed to lead any evidence that he is a workman and dismissed his claim. In the
given facts this Court does not find any merit in the argument that petitioner would fall within the definition
of workman defined in Section 2(s) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Further, the decision in S.K. Maini's case
(supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner also does not lend any help to the petitioner's case,
wherein, it was held that whether an employee is a workman or not is required to be determined with
reference to the nature of duties and functions. The relevant observations read as under:-
"After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that whether or not an
employee is a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be
determined with reference to his principal nature of duties and functions. Such question is required
to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and materials on record
and it is not possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula which can decide the dispute as to the
real nature of duties and functions being performed by an employee in all cases. When an employee
is employed to do the types of work enumerated in the definition of workman under Section 2(s),
there is hardly any difficulty in treating him as a workman under the appropriate classification but
in the complexity of industrial or commercial organizations quite a large number of employees are
often required to do more than one kind of work. In such cases, it becomes necessary to determine
under which classification the employee will fall for the purpose of deciding whether he comes
within the definition of workman or goes out of it."
6.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court while rejecting the case of appellant on merits also analyzed the nature
and work of the appellant therein and upheld the findings of the High Court that he being Manager/In-
charge of the shop was not a workman under Section 2(s) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.”
Recently the Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. S.K. International & another Versus Ashok Tanaji Tambe &
another reported in 2024 (180) FLR 994 has held as under:-
“17. On the aspect of determination of status of workmen, within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act,
1947, the legal position is fairly crystalized. Such determination must be based on the appreciation of the
nature of the duties performed by the employee. Nomenclature of the post, which the employee holds, is not
of decisive significance. The description of the nature of the duties also does not furnish a surer foundation
for determination. Use of grandstanding expressions and management jargon to describe otherwise ordinary
and normal functions, is not uncommon. It is, therefore, necessary to correctly appreciate the nature of the
core duties discharged by a person whose status is questioned.
18.
Section 2(s) of the ID Act, 1947 defines the expression workman to mean any person employed in
any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for
hire or reward. In the case of H.R. Adyanthaya and ors. vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd., the Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court enunciated that to be qualified to be workman under Section 2(s), the person must be
employed to do the work which falls in any of the specified categories, manual, unskilled, skilled, technical,
operational, clerical or supervisory. To put it in other words, it is not enough that a person is not covered by
any of the four exceptions to the definition. It is also fairly well settled that the burden is on the person, who
asserts the status of the workman under Section 2(s) to establish with reference to the dominant nature of his
duties that the work which the said person performs falls within one of the specified categories under Section
2(s) of the Act, 1947.
648
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
19.
In the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India Ltd. V/s. The Burmah
Shell Management Staff Association and Others the Supreme Court adverted to a situation where an
employee is entrusted to discharge multifarious duties. In such cases, the Supreme Court held, it would be
necessary to determine under which classification the employee will fall for the purpose of finding out
whether he does not go out of the definition of "workman" under the exceptions. The principle is now well
settled that for this purpose, a workman must be held to be employed to do that work which is the work he is
required to do, even though he may be incidentally doing other types of work. The Supreme Court referred to
its earlier decision in the case of Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. Vs. Workmen, where the principle was
enunciated as under:
"3. The question whether a person is employed in a supervisory capacity or on clerical work, in our
opinion, depends upon whether the main and principal duties carried out by him are those of a
supervisory character, or of a nature carried out by a clerk. If a person is mainly doing supervisory
work, but, incidentally or for a fraction of the time, also does some clerical work, it would have to
be held that he is employed in supervisory capacity; and, conversely, if the main work done is of
clerical nature, the mere act that some supervisory duties are also carried out incidentally or as a
small fraction of the work done by him will not convert his employment as a clerk into one in
supervisory capacity. ...."
(emphasis supplied)
20.
In the case of Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. CIBA Geigy and India Ltd. another three-judge Bench of
the Supreme Court re-exposited the principle in the following words:
"6. where an employee has multifarious duties and a question is raised whether he is a workman or
someone other than a workman the Court must find out what are the primary and basic duties of the
person concerned and if he is incidentally asked to do some other work, may not necessarily be in
tune with the basic duties, these additional duties cannot change the character and status of the
person concerned. In other words, the dominant purpose of employment must be taken into
consideration and the gloss of some additional duties must be rejected while determining the status
and character of the person. ......"
21. A useful reference in this context can also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
S.K.Maini V/s. M/s. Carona Sahu Company Ltd. and Anr.10 wherein it was enunciated that when an
employee is employed to do the types of work enumerated in the definition of workman under Section 2(s),
there is hardly any difficulty in treating him as a workman under the appropriate classification but in the
complexity of industrial or commercial organisations quite a large number of employees are often required
to do more than one kind of work. In such cases, it becomes necessary to determine under which
classification the employee will fall for the purpose of deciding whether he comes within the definition of
workman or goes out of it. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Burmah
Shell Oil Storage (supra). In All India Reserve Bank Employees' Assn. V/s. Reserve Bank of India, it has
been held by this Court that the word 'supervise' and its derivatives are not words of precise import and must
often be construed in the light of context, for unless controlled, they cover an easily simple oversight and
direction as manual work coupled with the power of inspection and superintendence of the manual work of
others. It has been rightly contended by both the learned counsel that the designation of an employee is not
of much importance and what is important is the nature of duties being performed by the employee. The
determinative factor is the main duties of the employee concerned and not some works incidentally done. In
other words, what is, in substance, the work which employee does or what in substance he is employed to do.
Viewed from this angle, if the employee is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally or for a fraction of
time also does some manual or clerical work, the employee should be held to be doing supervisory works.
Conversely, if the main work is of manual, clerical or of technical nature, the mere fact that some
supervisory or other work is also done by the employee incidentally or only a small fraction of working time
is devoted to some supervisory works, the employee will come within the purview of 'workman' as defined
in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.”
Hon‘ble the Bombay High Court in the case of M/s S.K. International & another v. Ashok Tanaji Tambe & another
2024 (180) FLR 994 has held as under:
“17.
On the aspect of determination of status of workmen, within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID
Act, 1947, the legal position is fairly crystalized. Such determination must be based on the appreciation of
the nature of the duties performed by the employee. Nomenclature of the post, which the employee holds, is
not of decisive significance. The description of the nature of the duties also does not furnish a surer
foundation for determination. Use of grandstanding expressions and management jargon to describe
otherwise ordinary and normal functions, is not uncommon. It is, therefore, necessary to correctly
appreciate the nature of the core duties discharged by a person whose status is questioned.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
649
18.
Section 2(s) of the ID Act, 1947 defines the expression workman to mean any person employed in
any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for
hire or reward. In the case of H.R. Adyanthaya and ors. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd., the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court enunciated that to be qualified to be workman under Section 2(s), the person must be
employed to do the work which falls in any of the specified categories, manual, unskilled, skilled, technical,
operational, clerical or supervisory. To put it in other words, it is not enough that a person is not covered by
any of the four exceptions to the definition. It is also fairly well settled that the burden is on the person, who
asserts the status of the workman under Section 2(s) to establish with reference to the dominant nature of his
duties that the work which the said person performs falls within one of the specified categories under Section
2(s) of the Act, 1947.
19.
In the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India Ltd. v. The Burmah
Shell Management Staff Association and others, the Supreme Court adverted to a situation where an
employee is entrusted to discharge multifarious duties. In such cases, the Supreme Court held, it would be
necessary to determine under which classification the employee will fall for the purpose of finding out
whether he does not go out of the definition of "workman" under the exceptions. The principle is now well
settled that for this purpose, a workman must be held to be employed to do that work which is the work he is
required to do, even though he e may be incidentally doing other types of work. The Supreme Court referred
to its earlier decision in the case of Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. Workmen", where the principle was
enunciated as under:
"3.
The question whether a person is employed in a supervisory capacity or on clerical work,
in our opinion, depends upon whether the main and principal duties carried out by him are those of a
supervisory character, or of a nature carried out by a clerk. If a person is mainly doing supervisory
work, but, incidentally or for a fraction of the time, also does some clerical work, it would have to be
held that he is employed in supervisory capacity; and, conversely, if the main work done is of clerical
nature, the mere act that some supervisory duties are also carried out incidentally or as a small
fraction of the work done by him will not convert his employment as a clerk into one in supervisory
capacity......." (Emphasis supplied)
20.
In the case of Arkal Govind Raj Rao v. CIBA Geigy and India Ltd., another three-Judge Bench of
the Supreme Court re-exposited the principle in the following words:
"6. where an employee has multifarious duties and a question is raised whether he is a workman or
someone other than a workman the Court must find out what are the primary and basic duties of the
person concerned and if he is incidentally asked to do some other work, may not necessarily be in tune
with the basic duties, these additional duties cannot change the character and status of the person
concerned. In other words, the dominant purpose of employment must be taken into consideration and
the gloss of some additional duties must be rejected while determining the status and character of the
person.........
21.
A useful reference in this context can also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
S.K. Maini v. M/s. Carona Sahu Company Ltd. and Anr. wherein it was enunciated that when an employee is
employed to do the types of work enumerated in the definition of workman under Section 2(s), there is hardly
any difficulty in treating him as a workman under the appropriate classification but in the complexity of
industrial or commercial organisationd quite a large number of employees employees are often required to
do more than one of work. In such cases, it becomes necessary to determine under which classification the
employee will fall for the purpose of deciding whether he comes within the definition of workman or goes out
of it. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage
(supra). In All India Reserve Bank Employees' Assn. v. Reserve Bank of India, it has been held by this Court
that the word 'supervise' and its derivatives are not words of precise import and must often be construed in
the light of context, for unless controlled, they cover an easily simple oversight and direction as manual work
coupled with the power of inspection and superintendence of the manual work of others. It has been rightly
contended by both the learned counsel that the designation of an employee is not of much importance and
what is important is the nature of duties being performed by the employee. The determinative factor is the
main duties of the employee concerned and not some works incidentally done. In other words, what is, in
substance, the work which employee does or what in substance he is employed to do. Viewed from this angle,
if the employee is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally or for a fraction of time also does some
manual or clerical work, the employee should be held to be doing supervisory works. Conversely, if the main
work is of manual, clerical or of technical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory or other work is also
done by the employee incidentally or only a small fraction of working time is devoted to some supervisory
works, the employee will come within the purview of 'workman' as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act.”
650
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Hon‘ble Supreme Court by means of judgment dated 2.4.2004 passed in the case of M/s. Bharat Airtel Limited
Versus A.S. Raghavendra passed in Civil Appeal No.5187 of 2023 (2024 INSC 265) after taking into consider the
definition of ‗workman‘ as given u/s 2 ‗s‘ of the I.D. Act, 1947; and various judgments on the point in issue, held as
under:-
“23. The records also show that the respondent, in fact, performed a supervisory role over the managers and
was the Assessing Manager of his team, which consisted of Managers in the B-1 & B-2 Levels. Moreover,
after adducing the evidence led by both sides, the Labour Court vide a detailed order and discussion, has
held the respondent not to be covered under “workman” as per Section 2(s), ID Act. The learned Single
Judge has not appreciated the discussion by the Labour Court and the available evidence in their true
perspective, relying mainly upon the judgment in Ved Prakash Gupta (supra). In Paragraph 12 of Ved
Prakash Gupta (supra), it was held “…It must also be remembered that the evidence of both WW1 and MW1
shows that the appellant could never appoint or dismiss any workman or order any enquiry against any
workman. In these circumstances we hold that the substantial duty of the appellant was only that of a
Security Inspector at the gate of the factory premises and that it was neither managerial nor supervisory in
nature in the sense in which those terms are understood in industrial law. In the light of the evidence and the
legal position referred to above we are of the opinion that the finding of the Labour Court that the appellant
is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act is perverse and could not be supported.”
24. A bare perusal of the above makes it crystal clear that absence of power to appoint, dismiss or conduct
disciplinary enquiries against other employees was not the only reason for the Court to conclude in Ved
Prakash Gupta (supra) that the appellant therein was a “workman”. At this juncture, we may note that
although Ved Prakash Gupta (supra) was decided by a 3-Judge Bench, in a later judgment by a 2-Judge
Bench of this Court in S K Maini v M/s Carona Sahu Company Limited, (1994) 3 SCC 510, it was held that
“…It should be borne in mind that an employee discharging managerial duties and functions may not, as a
matter of course, be invested with the power of appointment and discharge of other employees. It is not
unlikely that in a big set-up such power is not invested to a local manager but such power is given to some
superior officers also in the management cadre at divisional or regional level. …” The judgment in S K
Maini (supra) is innocent of Ved Prakash Gupta (supra), but we do not find any inconsistency in the
statement of law laid down in S K Maini (supra), given our reading of Ved Prakash Gupta (supra) as
enunciated hereinabove.
25. That being said, in our considered view, mere absence of power to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary
inquiries against other employees, would not and could not be the sole criterion to determine such an issue.
Holding otherwise would lead to incongruous consequences, as the same would, illustratively, mean that,
employees in high-ranking positions but without powers to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary enquiry
would be included under the umbrella of “workman” under Section 2(s), ID Act. We cannot be oblivious of
the impact of our decisions. In this context, reference to the decision in Shivashakti Sugars Limited v Shree
Renuka Sugar Limited, (2017) 7 SCC 729 is apposite:
“43. It has been recognised for quite some time now that law is an interdisciplinary subject where interface
between law and other sciences (social sciences as well as natural/ physical sciences) come into play and the
impact of other disciplines on Law is to be necessarily kept in mind while taking a decision (of course, within
the parameters of legal provisions). Interface between Law and Economics is much more relevant in today‟s
time when the country has ushered into the era of economic liberalisation, which is also termed as
“globalisation” of economy. India is on 118 [2024] 4 S.C.R. Digital Supreme Court Reports the road of
economic growth. It has been a developing economy for number of decades and all efforts are made, at all
levels, to ensure that it becomes a fully developed economy. Various measures are taken in this behalf by the
policy-makers. The judicial wing, while undertaking the task of performing its judicial function, is also
required to perform its role in this direction. It calls for an economic analysis of law approach, most
commonly referred to as “Law and Economics”. In fact, in certain branches of Law there is a direct impact
of Economics and economic considerations play predominant role, which are even recognised as legal
principles. Monopoly laws (popularly known as “Antitrust Laws” in USA) have been transformed by
Economics. The issues arising in competition laws (which has replaced monopoly laws) are decided
primarily on economic analysis of various provisions of the Competition Commission Act. Similar approach
is to be necessarily adopted while interpreting bankruptcy laws or even matters relating to corporate
finance, etc. The impress of Economics is strong while examining various facets of the issues arising under
the aforesaid laws. In fact, economic evidence plays a big role even while deciding environmental issues.
There is a growing role of Economics in contract, labour, tax, corporate and other laws. Courts are
increasingly receptive to economic arguments while deciding these issues. In such an environment it
becomes the bounden duty of the Court to have the economic analysis and economic impact of its decisions.
44.We may hasten to add that it is by no means suggested that while taking into account these
considerations, specific provisions of law are to be ignored. First duty of the Court is to decide the case by
applying the statutory provisions. However, on the application of law and while interpreting a particular
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
651
provision, economic impact/effect of a decision, wherever warranted, has to be kept in mind. Likewise, in a
situation where two views are possible or wherever there is a discretion given to the Court by law, the Court
needs to lean in favour of a particular view which subserves the economic interest of the nation. Conversely,
the Court [2024] 4 S.C.R. 119 M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra needs to avoid that particular
outcome which has a potential to create an adverse effect on employment, growth of infrastructure or
economy or the revenue of the State. It is in this context that economic analysis of the impact of the decision
becomes imperative.”
Hon‘ble the Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd. Vs. Shivkranit
Kamgar Sanghatana & others 2024 LLR 492 held as under:
“4. The respondent is a union registered under the Trade Unions Act of 1926 representing workmen of the
company established in Satara.
5. In 2015, the respondent raised a Charter of Demands seeking an increase in wages, benefits and
emoluments for the workmen concerned. Since the conciliation proceedings failed, the dispute was referred
to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The union raised the dispute on behalf of about 44 employees
whose names were stated in Annexure-A to the Statement of Claim.
6. The petitioner applied framing of a preliminary issue as, according to the petitioner, persons named in the
Annexure to the statement of claim do not fall within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. By an order
dated 8th November 2017, the Industrial Tribunal framed a preliminary issue as to whether the employees
mentioned in Annexure-A to the statement of claim are workmen.
7. The respondent examined Mr. Sachin Desai as its only witness by filing his affidavit in lieu of
examination-in-chief whom the petitioner cross-examined. Petitioner examined eight witnesses in support of
his plea that persons mentioned in the Annexure are not workmen. The respondent cross-examined the
witnesses. The Industrial Tribunal Satara, by order dated 9th June 2021, held that 20 persons enlisted in the
Annexure to the statement of claim are workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. The
petitioner has, therefore, filed a present writ petition challenging the said order.
8. Mr. Cama learned senior advocate appearing for the company establishment, has urged the following
submissions in support of the challenge to the order of the Industrial Tribunal:
i. The duties assigned to the workers were managerial, administrative, or supervisory. The dominant
nature of their work was managerial or administrative.
ii. The Industrial Tribunal wrongly concluded that the respondent employees are technically qualified
(ITI persons). Hence, they cannot be termed as persons performing supervisory or managerial
functions.
iii. In the letters of appointment, letters of confirmation, and during the annual performance appraisal
process, they were engaged to perform managerial and supervisory functions. Assuming respondent
employees fall within the lowest rank system, they still were in the management cadre of the petitioner
company by nature of their duties.
iv. The initial burden of proving that employees are workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the
I.D. Act is on the employees that they failed to discharge as only one person who later withdrew from
the proceeding deposed on behalf of all the employees.
v. Various material documents produced on record by the petitioner relating to the recruitment
process, duty list, performance appraisal, progressive reviews, management cadre emoluments,
management remuneration package, performance paid, and economic value add, i.e., based on the
profit-showing formula, were not properly considered by the Industrial Tribunal.
vi. The evidence laid by the petitioner in respect of the nature of duties carried out by respondent
employees, which clearly established that duties performed by them do not fall within the inclusive
portion of the definition of the word "workman", remained unchallenged as they were cross-examined
on behalf of the respondent union. According to him, the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal does
not conform with the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution
Company of India Limited Vs. Burmah Shell Management Staff Association and Ors. reported in AIR
1971 SCC 922, this court in case of The National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North), Ltd., and
Ors. Vs. S.M. Tambe and Anr. 2000 (3) L.L.N. 913 and C. Gupta Vs. GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceutical
Ltd. & Anr. 2004 Volume II CLR 23 and, therefore, the order deserves to be set aside, and the matter
needs to be sent back to the Industrial Tribunal for fresh consideration of the question of whether the
concerned employees were working within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act or not.
652
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9. On the other hand, Mr. Nitin Kulkarni, learned counsel appearing of the union, would urge that:
i. The Industrial Tribunal applied the correct test and rightly held that the concerned employees were
workmen under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act.
ii. Witness Sachin Jadhav gave details of the nature of work performed by each employee. In the cross-
examination, petitioners' witnesses admitted that K-Band, where the respondents were carrying out
their work, is the lowest Band. Supervisors belonged to A-Band, Managers to P-Band, Engineers to O-
Band, the Assistant General Manager to T-Band, and the General Manager to E-Band. The respondent
workers belonged to K-Band and held ITI qualifications acquired after passing the 10th standard
examination.
iii. From the available evidence, it is more than clear that employees were discharging the duties of
workers as specified in the Statement of Claim and, therefore, findings recorded by the Industrial
Tribunal do not require any interference in extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India.
10. Before August 29, 1956, the Industrial Disputes Act's definition of "workman" only included skilled and
unskilled manual or clerical workers, excluding those in supervisory, technical roles. However, amendments
in 1956 and 1982 expanded the definition to include these categories. The Supreme Court judgments in May
and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1967 SC 678, Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen
1963:INSC:130 : AIR 1964 SC 472, and Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v.
Burma Shell Management Staff Assn. (1970) 3 SCC 378 interpreted the definition in earlier years, focusing
on whether the work done by individuals fell within the categories of manual, clerical, supervisory, or
technical. These judgments determined the eligibility of individuals as workmen based on the nature of their
tasks. Subsequent judgments in S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983) 4 SCC 214] Ved Prakash Gupta v.
Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. (1984) 2 SCC 569 and Arkal Govind Raj Rao v. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. (1985)
3 SCC 371 failed to notice the earlier decisions and adopted a broader interpretation. They held that
individuals not fitting the four specified categories could still be considered workmen- however, the
judgment in A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu (1988) 4 SCC 42 reaffirmed the importance of
the earlier precedents, asserting that a person must fall within the defined categories to qualify as a
workman. Ultimately, the legal position is crystallized in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya and Ors. Vs. Sandoz
(India) Limited reported in 1994 5 SCC 737 wherein the five Judges' bench of Apex Court held that to be
considered a workman under the ID Act, an individual must be employed in manual, unskilled, skilled,
technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. It is not enough that he is not covered by either of the four
exceptions to the definition. It is held that to attract provisions of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, the employee
must show that he performs any work enumerated in the definition and that he is excluded under the four
exceptions as provided in the definition.
11. For the adjudication of the status of a workman, what is required to be seen is an emphasis on the actual
work performed by such an employee. In other words, if the nature of duties actually performed
predominantly shows that he discharges duties to do the work of any of the categories listed in Section 2(s).
He is not covered by exceptions of Section 2(s); it would be decisive of the matter that the employee is a
workman, and the designation or salary of the employee would be irrelevant.
12. It is now well settled that the adjudication of the issue as to person working within the meaning of
Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act has to be determined with reference to the principle of nature of his duties and
functions. The dominant purpose of employees must be taken into consideration, and the gloss of some
additional duties must be rejected while determining the status and character of a person. The Tribunal
needs to first address itself as to various duties assigned to the employees and then draw a conclusion of law
as to whether in the light of duties assigned to him would be whether the employee would be working or
not.”
Accordingly, in not shell it can be said that from perusal of definition of 'workman' indicates that a person would
come within the purview of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act if he is employed in an industry and performs any manual,
unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work. Further, the definition also indicates exceptions
as to when a person would not be covered in the aforementioned definition. It inter alia states that a person would not
be covered under the definition if (i) he is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity or (ii) who, being
employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem or exercises, either by
the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a
managerial nature.
Reverting to the facts of present case, as per the pleadings/documents filed by the parties on record as well as the
documentary and oral evidence led by them, from careful scrutiny of said material, the position which emerged out
that the claimant/workman who was working on the post Steno with the respondent/NER is workman as per the
definition given u/s 2 ‗s‘ of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
653
In view of the said facts the preliminary objections taken by the Learned counsel for the respondents that the
workman does not fall within the definition of ‗workman‘ as defined under section 2(s) of the Act 1947 has got no
force, hence, rejected.
Consideration on merit:
On the basis of arguments as raised by the parties the admitted position which emerges out that on 15.10.1999
workman was appointed on 15.10.1999 as steno in the pay scale of Rs.4000-6000. On 19.2.2001 a promotional
exercise was conducted for higher grade of Rs.5000-8000. In the said grade the following persons were selected:-
1. Sri Om Prakash
2. Sri Arvind Kumar
3. Sri Yadunath
4. Sri Uttam Kumar
5. Sri Rajesh Misra
6. Sri Ajit Sarkar
7. Sri Rabi Ranjan Kumar Sinha
Further on 11.9.2003 at the time of formation of panel only 04 vacancies of Confidential Steno of higher grade of
Rs.5000-8000 were lying vacant and the same were to be filled in by said panel of aforesaid selected candidates. Sri
Om Prakash who was placed at Serial No.1 of the selection panel refused for promotion due to personal and ill health
reason. Sri Yadunath Prasad placed & Sri Uttam Kumar at Serial nos.3 & 4 respectively opted for transfer in East
Central Railway/Hajipur Zone of Indian Railway, hence, only 04 persons namely Sharvshri Arvind Kumar, Rajesh
Mishra, Ajit Sarkar & Rabi Ranjan Kumar Sinha were left available for promotion/absorption against 04 vacant
vacancies of Confidential Steno in the grade of Rs.5000-8000. Later on by means of an order dated 20.10.2004 the
applicant was promoted in pursuance to the said exercise which reads as under:-
Jh jfo jatu dq0 flUgk] vk'kqfyfid osrueku ¼4000&6000½ v/khu lgk;d lqj{kk vk;qDr@jslqc] y[kuÅ dh
inksUufr xksiuh; vk'kqfyfid osrueku ¼5000&8000½ esa djds iwoZ esa tkjh dk;kZy; vkns'k la[;k 294
bZ@AA@281@dk@eS@ok0fy0 fnukad 13@28-3-2003 ds vuqlkj inLFkkfir fd;k tkrk gSA budk osru
fu/kkZj.k inksUufr ij #0 5000@& fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkrk gSA
;fn deZpkjh fu;e&1313 vkj AA ds vUrZxr osru fu/kkZfjr djuk pkgs rks ,d ekg ds vUnj fodYi
ns ldrs gSaA blds mijkUr izkIr fodYi ij fopkj ugha fd;k tk;sxkA
;g oedkf/k@y[kuÅ ds vkns'k ls tkjh fd;k tkrk gSA
and in pursuance to the above facts the applicant joined his duties on the aforesaid post. Further the applicant has
filed an affidavit in support of his case (examination in chief) dated 2.12.2020 and along with said affidavit he filed
Annexure-5 (representation made by him dated 7.10.2005), the heading of which is as under:-
fo"k;%& xksiuh; vk'kqfyfid osrueku 5000&8000 esa inksUufr ds lEcU/k esaA
lUnHkZ%&vkidk dk;kZy; vkns'k la[;k 458] i`"Bkadu la-&bZ@AA@210@A@pkj@vk'kqfyfid
fnukad 20-10-2004
and in Para-21 of the representation dated 7.10.2005 the applicant stated as under:-
21- ;g fd bl inksUufr dks fn;s tkus ds iwoZ Jh vkse izdk'k gsrq ,d xfr ijh{kk dk vk;kstu fn0 21-9-2004
dks fy;k x;k ,oa vk'kqys[ku ijh{kk dk ifj.kke fnukad 13-10-2004 dks izdkf'kr fd;k x;kA mijksDr ijh{kjh
djk;s tkus dh dksbZ vko';drk ugha FkhA mijksDr ih{kk esa 'kkfey gksus ds fy;s u rks Jh vkse izdk'k dk dksbZ
oS/kkfud nkok Fkk vkSj u gh dksbZ oS/kkfud vf/kdkjA mijksDr ijh{k ek= blfy, vk;ksftr dh xbZ D;ksafd
dkfeZd foHkkx }kjk yEcs le; ls in dks fjDr j[kk x;k Fkk ,oa blh chp inksUufr lac/kh dk;Zokgh iwjh ugha
dj yh x;h FkhA in fjDr j[kus dk ,d ek= mn~ns'; ;g Fkk fd Jh vkse izdk'k dks xfr ijh{kk gsrq ,d
vfrfjDr volj fn;k tk ldsA
Further on behalf of the respondents in support of their case, evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) of one Sri
Daya Shanker, APO in the office of Divisional Railway Manager, N.E. Railway, Lucknow was filed and in paras-3 &
5 it was stated as under:-
―3.
The applicant has been promoted as Confidential Steno in the pay scale of Rs.5000-8000 at pay of
Rs.5000/- vide office order dated 20.10.2004 issued by Divl.Railway Manager (p) NE Railway, Lucknow.
5.
That the promotion of the applicant was deferred due to one general post was kept vacant as one
senior most general candidate Sri Om Prakash could not pass the speed test. However, consequent upon his
654
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
failure in passing the speed test, the applicant was promoted as confidential steno (Rs.5000-8000) against the
vacant post vide office order dated 20.10.2004. It may be pointed out that no junior person to the applicant
was ever promoted.‖
and in the cross examination it has been stated as under:-
iz0 &
pkj in ds fy, izkseks'kuy ,Dlkbt dh x;h Fkh vkSj 12-9-2003 ds rhu in ¼5000&8000½ ij Hkjs x;s]
pkSFkk in blfy, ugha Hkjk x;k D;ksafd vkseizdk'k lcls lhfu;j ds LihM VsLV ds fy;s fj¶;wty ns fn;k tcfd
jfojatu VsLV esa ikl Fks muds }kjk D;ks ugha Hkjk x;kA
m0 & 12-9-2003 dks vkse izdk'k dk fj¶;wty izkIr gqvk vkSj mlh fnu izkeks'ku vkMZj tkjh gqvk Fkk vr% izkFkhZ
dks ugha fy;kA
iz0& vxj vkilh ckr lgh ekuh tk, fd 12-9-2003 dks fyLV tkjh dh x;h vkSj pkSFkh iksLV Jh vkse izdk'k ds
fj¶;wty ls tkjh gq;h rks vkius ml in dks jfo jatu ls D;ks ugha HkjhA
m0 & mudh inksUufr 20-10-2004 dks gq;hA
Further as per facts on record by means of an order dated 12.9.2003 in pursuance to the promotional exercise the
following persons were promoted from Grade 4000-6000 to Grade 5000-8000:-
1. Sri Arvind Kumar
2. Sri Rajeev Mishra
3. Sri Ajit Sarkar
The order dated 12.9.2003 reads as under:-
dk;kZy; vkns'k la[;k % 1513
izcU/k 'kk[kk esa fuEu inksUufr ,oa inLFkkiuk vkns'k rRdky izHkko ls tkjh fd;k tkrk gSA ;fn fdlh deZpkjh
dks inksUufr ij osru fu/kkZj.k gsrq fodYi fu;e 1313 Hkkx&AA ds vUrZxr nsuk gks rks ,d ekg ds vUnj ns nsaA
1- e.My jsy izcU/kd ds vuqeksnu ls xksiuh; vk'kqfyfid osrueku 5000&8000 dk ,d vuqlwfpr tutkfr
dk in vuqlwfpr tkfr esa cnyko djrs gq, Jh vjfoUn dqekj] vuqlwfpr tkfr] vk'kqfyfid dk;Zjr v/khu
e.My ifjpkyu izcU/kd] y[kuÅ dh inksUufr xksiuh; vk'kqfyfid osrueku 5000&8000 esa mlds orZeku
dk;ZLFky ij dh tkrh gSA inksUufr ij budk osrueku 5000&8000 esa osru 5000 fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkrk gSA
2- Jh jkts'k feJ] vk'kqfyfid osrueku 4000&6000 dk;Zjr v/khu e.My jsy izcU/kd] y[kuÅ dh inkUufr
xksiuh; vk'kqfyfid osrueku 5000&8000 esa mlds orZeku dk;ZLFky ij dh tkrh gSA inksUufr ij budk
osrueku 5000&8000 esa osru 5000 fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkrk gSA
3- Jh vthr ljdkj] vk'kqfyfid osrueku 4000&6000 dk;Zjr v/khu e.My okf.kT; izcU/kd] y[kuÅ dh
inksUufr xksiuh; vk'kqfyfid osrueku 5000&8000 esa mlds orZeku dk;ZLFky ij dh tkrh gSA inksUufr
ij budk osrueku 5000&8000 esa osru 5000 fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkrk gSA
bl ij ofj"B e.My dkfeZd vf/kdkjh dk vkns'k izkIr gSA
After issuing the order Sri Om Prakash wrote a letter dated 12.9.2003 which reads as under:-
lfou; fuosnu gS fd esjk vk'kqfyfid xfr ijh{kk 100 'kCn izfr feuV gksuk gS rRi'pkr~ esjh inksUufr ns;
gksxhA futh dkj.kksa rFkk vius vLoLFkrk ds dkj.k izkFkhZ xfr ijh{kk nsus esa vleFkZ gS rFkk xksiuh; vk'kqfyfid
osrueku 5000&8000 esa inksUufr gsrq viuh lgefr ls fcuk fdlh ncko ds fj¶;wty nsrk gSA izkFkhZ ls dfu"Bksa
dks inksUufr fn;s tkus esa gesa dksbZ vkifRr ugha gSA
Moreover as stated hereinabove it is admission on the part of workman Sri Rabi Ranjan Kumar Sinha that after the
rejection of post by Sri Om Prakash, the applicant/workman was promoted vide order dated 20.10.2004 which is
quoted hereinabove and in pursuance to the said order, he joined on the promotional post and at the time of joining he
does not made any protest and thereafter taking into consideration the admission made by him vide Para-21 of his
representation dated 7.10.2005 which is quoted hereinabove, that the said post was fallen vacant only on 13.10.2004
and immediately thereafter the applicant was promoted vide order dated 20.10.2004 so in view of said admission the
relief as claimed by the applicant that he should be promoted w.e.f. 12.9.2003 and not from 20.10.2004 on the fourth
vacancy of Confidential Steno in the grade of Rs.5000-8000 cannot be granted keeping in view the fact that the
admission is the best evidence.
The Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Nayan Bhagwantroo Gosavi Balajiwale Vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi & Ors,
AIR 1960 SC 100 held that admission is best piece of evidence that opposite party can rely upon if the same is not
denied by the person who is made the same.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
655
Further, the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramashwamy Mudaliar
Educational Institution Vs. Education Appellate Tribunal & Anr. (199) 7 SCC 332, held that if the facts are
admitted by a party and same is not denied in any manner then same is binding on it and on the basis of averments if
an order is passed there is no violation of principle of natural justice.
In Nagbubai Ammal and Ors. Vs. B. Shama Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593, the Apex Court held that admission
made by a party is admissible and best evidence unless it is proved that it had been made under a mistaken belief.
While deciding the said case reliance has been placed upon the judgment in Slatterie Vs. Pooley (1840) 6 M & W
664, wherein it has been observed ―What a party himself admits to be true, may reasonably be presumed to be so‖.
“The rule of natural justice must not be stretched too for. Only too often, „the people who have done wrong
seek to invoke the rule of natural justice‟ so as to avoid the consequence.”
Further, the Hon‘ble the Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Susaka Pvt. Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 182, the
relevant paragraph 26 and 27 are quoted below:-
“26.
Everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, which may be dispensed with without
infringing any public right or public policy. Cuilibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto. (see Maxwell on
the Interpretation of statutes 12th Edition at page 328).
27.
If a plea is available-whether on facts or law, it has to be raised by the party at appropriate stage in
accordance with law. If not raised or/and given up with consent, the party would be precluded from raising
such plea at a later stage of the proceedings on the principle of waiver. If permitted to raise, it causes
prejudice to other party. In our opinion, this principle applies to this case. (see alo Rupchand Ghosh Vs.
Savesran Chandra (1906) 33 cell 915 and Sri Karan Singh Vs. Sita Ram Aggrawal AIR 1994 SC page 364.”
Further, in the present case, it is also not in dispute rather admitted by the workman that on 20.10.2004, workman was
promoted to the grade of Confidential Steno Grade-I, and raised the grievance by means of representation dated
07.10.2005, thereafter, he has not taken any step i.e. did not raise any grievance; however the same was raised at a
belated state on the basis of present adjudication case i.e. reference dated 25.04.2018, referred to this Tribunal after 13
years, as such, he is not entitled for any relief. Because, Hon‘ble Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in the case of
M.D./Chief Manager, Jaipur Agar, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corp., Jaipur v. General Secretary, Rajasthan
Transport Workers Organisation, Jaipur, 2024 (182) FLR 892, has held as under:
“6.
In the case at hand, the respondent-workman was appointed on the post of Driver vide order dated
17.12.1986. Accordingly, the benefit of first selection scale became due after nine years, sometime in 2004-
2005. The same was not done and neither was the non-grant of the benefit at the time was challenged by the
respondent-workman. The benefit of first selection scale was only granted vide order dated 06.04.2004. This
deferment was also not challenged immediately and was only challenged for the first time in 2013. The first
issue that is to be decided by this Court is what effect, if any, would this delay have on the merits of the case.
7. To decide the first issue, recourse may be taken to Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment of Mohan Lal
(supra), the relevant portion of which is reproduced as under:
"19. We are clearly of the view that though the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the reference
made under the ID Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance
which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of whether
or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this Court in
Gitam Singh [Asstt. Eng., Rajasthan Development Corpn. v. Gitam Singh], that before exercising its
judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and
manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, of service, the ground on which
termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute, must be invariably followed.
19. Now, if the facts of the present case are seen, the position that emerges is this: the workman worked as a work-
charged employee for a period from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 (in all he worked for 286 days during his employment).
The services of the workman were terminated with effect from 18.2.1986. The workman raised the industrial dispute
in 1992 i.e. after 6 years of termination. The Labour Court did not keep in view admitted delay of 6 years in raising
the industrial dispute by the workman. The judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court is, thus, flawed and
unsustainable. The Division Bench of the High Court was clearly in error in restoring the award of the Labour Court
whereby reinstatement was granted to the workman. Though, the compensation awarded by the Single Judge was too
low and needed to be enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief."
656
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sadhu Singh (supra), held as under:
"6. We shall at the outset deal with the issue of limitation. The respondent was retired compulsorily
from service on 4.1.2003. Original Civil Suit No. 41 of 2010 was instituted in 2010. The trial Judge as
well as the first appellate court were of the view that the suit was not barred by limitation since the
representation of the respondent for the grant of the three selection grades was rejected on 18.1.2010.
The first appellate court, while concurring with the trial Judge also noted that the "final request" made
by the respondent-plaintiff on 18.1.2010 was rejected and hence the suit was within limitation.
7. The respondent waited for seven long years after his retirement to pursue a claim for the grant of
selection grade. This was clearly beyond the residuary period of limitation of three years provided in
Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. That apart, in the decision of this Court in
State of Rajasthan v. Shankar Lal Parmar, the Court has considered the ambit of the scheme for
selection grade. This Court has held thus:
"6. Another important and relevant clause in the said order for our perusal is Clause 7, which is also
reproduced hereinbelow:
7. Selection grades in terms of this order shall be granted only to those employees whose record of
service is satisfactory. The record of service which makes one eligible for promotion on the basis of
seniority shall be considered to be satisfactory for the purpose of grant of the selection grade.'
7. Clause 7 makes it clear that only those employees would be entitled for grant of selection grades,
whose service record has been satisfactory and are otherwise eligible for promotion on the basis of
seniority but have not been able to get the same as there might not be any channel of promotion or for
want of sanctioned posts in the cadre."
8. The Court held that in terms of Clause 7, only those employees whose service record has been
satisfactory could be entitled to be granted selection grade. In this context, the Court held:
"17. Clause 7 further makes it clear that only those/such employees would be entitled to be granted
selection grade whose service record has been satisfactory. This implicitly shows that the person who
has an untainted, unblemished, clean and unpolluted record in service would be treated on a higher
pedestal than those who have either tainted, blemished, unclean or polluted record. This obviously
appears to be a reasonable classification and is under the ambit and touchstone of Article 14 of the
Constitution. There is neither any ambiguity nor any doubt in the same."
9. On the touchstone of the above principles, it is evident that the respondent had been subjected to
several disciplinary proceedings and as many as 19 charge- sheets were issued against him which
resulted in penalties of a varying nature. The service record of the respondent cannot be regarded as
untainted or clean.
10. Ms Nidhi, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that some of the penalties which were
imposed on the respondent were without cumulative effect. The consequence of the withholding of
increments without cumulative effect is that after the period prescribed, the respondent would be
entitled to restoration of the original pay scale or the original pay. However, this does not obviate the
position that the imposition of the penalty itself indicates that the service record of the employee was
not satisfactory. Another submission which has been urged is that the penalties were of a minor nature.
Assuming that to be so, it is evident that for the grant of selection grade, the respondent did not fulfil
the requirements of a clean record of service. The grant of the selection grade is not a matter of right
and was subject to the terms and conditions which were stipulated. The respondent failed to fulfil these
terms and conditions.
11. For the above reasons, we are of the view that both on the question of limitation as well as on
merits, the respondent was not entitled to the relief which was sought. The suit instituted by the
respondent resp seven years after he had demitted office was barred by limitation. That apart, the
respondent failed to meet the basic requirements for the selection grade." (Emphasis supplied)
Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Bichitrananda Behera (supra), after considering the erstwhile
judgments of Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, Union of India v. N. Murugesan, and Chairman, State Bank of
India v. M.J. James, concluded that delay and laches are vital in service matters, and can be seen as
acquiescence.”
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman is not entitled for any relief as per the Reference No. L-41012/33/2017-
IR(B-I) dated 25.04.2018 and the same is answered accordingly.
Lucknow.
30th September, 2024
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
657
नइ ददल्ली, 13 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 214.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
भारतीय लघु ईद्योग जवकास बैंक ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjkas ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक
fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; लखनउ ds iapkV (a104/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gS
[सं. ,y - 12011/23/2021- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th February, 2025
S.O. 214.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.104/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of The Small
Industries Development Bank of India and others.
[No. L-12011/23/2021- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL –CUM- LABOUR COURT, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 104/2021
Ref. No. L-12011/23/2021-IR(B-I) dated: 22.11.2021
BETWEEN
The General Secretary. All India Small Industries Development Bank Employees Association Lucknow-
AND
The Small Industries Development Bank of India, Lucknow
AWARD
By order No. L-12011/23/2021-IR(B-I) dated: 22.11.2021 the present industrial dispute has been referred for
adjudication to this Tribunal for adjudication, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and
sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) by the Central Government, with
following schedule:
“1. Whether the action of the management of SIDBI in not considering the vacancies arising due to
death and superannuation as consequential vacancies and also not making recruitment on these
vacancies is illegal and unjustified in eye of law or not?
2. If yes, what action the management has to take in this regard?"
In response to reference on 02.03.2022, statement of claim has been field, thereafter, written statement was filed on
behalf of respondent.
On 06.05.2024, an application has been moved on behalf of applicant by General Secretary, Union Bank Employees
Union U.P. Lucknow, the same is quoted hereunder:
“1.
The reference order dated 22/11/2021 is on consequential vacancies arising out of death and
superannuation only and the other broad parameters are left and thus the reference order is incomplete.
2.
Pursuing the above reference order the claim statement dated 02/03/2022 is also on limited points.
3.
In view of the above, the above reference order and the claim statement are incomplete in nature.
Prayer
wherefore it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Tribunal may be pleased to allow to withdraw
the claim statement dated 02/03/2022 submitted in this case.”
658
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Authorized representative of the workman on the basis of said application submits that he does not want to press the
present industrial dispute and the same may be dismissed as not pressed.
Counsel for respondent has no objection.
Accordingly, in view of the above said facts, the claim of workman is dismissed as not pressed; and workmen are not
entitled for any relief.
The reference under adjudication is answered accordingly.
Award as above.
Lucknow.
21st June, 2024
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 215.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
नाजसक के एयर ऑदफसर कमांसडग ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक
fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; eqEcbZ- ua- 2 ds iapkV (6/2016) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 14011/24/2015- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 215.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 6/2016) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Mumbai No. 2 as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of The Air
Officer Commanding Nasik and their workmen.
[No. L-14011/24/2015- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.2, MUMBAI
PRESENT
SHRIKANT K. DESHPANDE
Presiding Officer
REFERENCE NO. CGIT-2/6 of 2016
EMPLOYERS IN RELATION TO THE MANAGEMENT OF 25 ED AIR FORCE STATION,
DEVLALI (SOUTH)
1. The Air Officer Commanding,
25 ED Air Force Station, Devlali (South)
Devlali,
Nashik (Maharashtra) - 422501.
AND
THEIR WORKMEN.
E.A.F. Employees Union
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
659
1. The General Secretary,
E.A.F. Employees Union,
C/o. Shri Ratan Uttam Kale,
At PO: Lahavit,
Tal & Dist. Nashik (Maharashtra) 422502.
APPEARANCES:
Party No. 1
:
Mr. A. K. Roy
Advocate
Party No. 2
:
Mr. J. H. Sawant
Advocate
AWARD
(Delivered on 03-10-2024)
1. This Reference has been made by the Central Government in exercise of powers under clause (d) of sub-section
(1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, vide Government of India, Ministry of
Labour & Employment, New Delhi, order No. L-14011/24/2015-IR (DU) dated 09.02.2016. The terms of reference
given in the schedule are as follows:
`Whether the action of the management of 25 Equipment Depot, Air Force Station, Deolali South, Deolali,
Nasik under Indian Air Force in terminating the services of Shri Ratan Uttam kale, Casual worker/ Mess
Boy, orally w.e.f. 21.10.2014 is just and proper? If not, what relief the workman concerned is entitled to ?`
2.
According to the Second Party he was working as Mess Boy in Airmen mess at Air Force Station Devlali of the
First Party since 2007, continued in service as casual/ temporary basis on meagre amount of wages. He was qualified
for the post of Mess Boy or Group-D employee in the establishment of the First Party. He demanded the status and
privileges of the permanent workman however his services were terminated without following the provision of the
Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, by way of victimization, in violation of principles of natural Justice
and by engaging unfair labour practice w.e.f. 21.10.2014. After termination he could not secure employment in any
other establishment thus the Second Party prays for reinstatement with continuity of service with full back wages, by
answering the Reference in affirmative.
3.
The First Party resisted the claim by written statement denied all the contentions of the Second Party including
the tenability of the Reference. The First Party contended that, the Second Party is not a, ‗workmen‘ as defined u/s. 2
(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He was never appointed or selected nor given status of temporary employee as such
there was no relationship on employer and employee therefore the claim of regularization against unsanctioned post is
not tenable under Law. The Second Party also filed a case before the Central Administrative Tribunal Bombay, which
is still pending and this fact has been suppressed by the Second Party, hence the present Reference as framed is not
tenable under Law.
The First Party further contended that, the Second Party was working as hedge cutter on daily wages on
requirement basis and being paid from hedge cutting fund from subscription of employee. His entry inside the camp
area was on the basis of casual visitors issued in the year of 2010 from security station. He was never appointed
against the sanctioned post nor temporary post by Air Force Authority competent to appoint. The Second Party
stopped himself from working as hedge cutter (daily wage job) and return the entry pass to the station security section
and thereafter that pass was cancelled. The First Party also contended that, during routine check by internal security
staff on 19.10.2014, he was found selling milk in camp area unauthorisedly without bearing entrance pass of vendor
and after interrogation he was warned. The Second Party appeared for selection as non-combatant (enrolled) and his
name was recommended for final selection to the Headquarters of higher Authority, in which he was found medically
unfit by medical Authority Kanpur, due to, ―Otitis Media and Sub Std. Weight >1SD‖ problem, however he was
seeking relaxation in merit on the ground of his past experience of his daily wages work and submitted various
representations. Lastly, the First Party urged that, the claim of the Second Party is vexatious as such the Second Party
is not entitled for relief as prayed and ultimately prayed that, the Reference be answered in negative.
4. My Learned predecessor framed the issues at Ex-10, I have rearranged the same as below-
ISSUES
FINDINGS
1)
Whether the Second Party was,
‗workmen‘ of management
Yes.
u/s. 2 of ID Act?
660
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
2)
Whether there was a relationship
of Second Party workmen and
Yes.
First Party and employer &
employee?
3)
Whether the action of the First Party
is terminating the services of Second
Yes.
Party workmen w.e.f. 21.10.2014 is
illegal, unjust & improper?
4)
Whether the Second Party/workmen
is entitled to be reinstated in service
of the First Party w.e.f. 21.10.2014
with continuity in service with
Yes.
full back wages and other
benefits?
5) Whether the Second Party workmen
is entitled for relief as prayed?
Yes.
6)
What order?
As per order below.
REASONS
5. In support of his case the Second Party has filed its own evidence affidavit at Ex-13, subjected himself for cross
examination. Whereas the First Party has filed an evidence affidavit of Sharan Singh, administrative assistant at Ex-
16, subjected him for cross examination. The Second Party also put his reliance mainly on the copies of documents at
Ex-15 placed before the Tribunal.
6. Issue No. 1 & 2- Both these issues are interdependent therefore answered together. The Second Party deposed
before the Court that, he was working as mess boy since April 2007 in the establishment of the First Party and to
substantiate the same he placed the various copies of attendance and payment register for the period May 2012, June
2012, July 2012, August 2012, September 2012, October 2012, November 2012, December 2012, January 2013,
February to May 2013, June to September 2013, October to December 2013, January to March 2014, April 2014,
May 2014, June 2014 and payment register for the November 2013, December 2013, January 2014 to April 2014,
May 2014. Some of these documents bear the signature of the representative/officer of the First Party. All these
documents were shown to the witness of the First Party, however he refused to comment on them. Not only this but, it
is clear from the payment register that, the First Party was paying Rs. 1000/- per month to the Second Party
considering his attendance on duty similarly the Second Party also placed the copy of letter dated 05.05.2016 signed
by T. S. Bisht MWO WO IC Airmen mess management committee and the said letter is address to the Second Party,
the same is in respect of intimation for collection of wages for the month of September & October 2014 and that letter
was issued on 20.05.2016. It is clear from those documents that, the Second Party was working as part-time help on
requirement basis as a mess boy for miscellaneous helping task in Airmen mess till 19.10.2014 and there is specific
mention regarding wages, which were paid to the Second Party. It also reveals that, there are copies of certificate as
well as identity pass, from which it is clear that, the Second Party was working as employee as a casual labour/ mess
boy in the establishment of First Party since April 2007. In such circumstances it is clear that, the Second Party was
working as a casual mess boy with the First Party and for his work he was receiving wages from the First Party
therefore the Second Party is certainly a ―workmen‖ as defined under the ID Act and though the Second Party was
working as casual still there is a relationship of employer & employee between the First Party and the Second Party.
7.
I have carefully gone through the decisions of Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 1185 of 1995 in
Cholan Roadways Corp. ltd. v/s. Presiding Officer Labour Court & Ors., the decision of Supreme Court in
state of Rajasthan v/s. Daya Lal and Ors. and judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka
v/s. Uma Devi and Ors. Both the decisions of Supreme Court are in respect of regularization of employee in service,
whereas in the case in hand the Second Party is not claiming any regularization in service therefore the facts before
me are distinguishable than had before the Apex court of the land therefore those decisions are not anyway helpful for
the First Party in the present case.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
661
8.
In the decision of Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 1185 of 1995, the workmen before the Court was
bus body cleaning, he was allowed to clean the buses and for that he was getting Rs.1/- per bus after the cleaning
operation. There was no documentary evidence before the Hon‘ble Lordship in respect of employment of the
workmen. However in the case in hand, the evidence of the witness of the First Party is very cryptic, he refused to
comment the various copies of documents shown during cross examination. It seems from the document which was
admitted by him, it has been clearly mentioned about the part-time mess boy for miscellaneous task in the mess and
he was being paid wages to the Second Party monthly considering the present for work therefore the facts of this case
of the matter before the Madras High Court is not anyway helpful to the First Party to establish before the Court that,
the Second Party is not a ―workmen‖ and there is no employer-employee relationship.
9.
Much argued about filing of case before the Central Administrative Tribunal Mumbai, by the Second Party
therefore the present Reference is not tenable under Law, however the Second Party in its rejoinder specifically stated
that, the matter before Central Administrative Tribunal pertains to grievance of declaring him by Squadron Leader of
the First Party declaring medically unfit for the post of Lascar and thereby depriving the Second Party from the
appointment in the post of Lascar to which he was entitled under the policy of recruitment. It means the present
dispute is altogether different that, the dispute pending before the Central Administrative Tribunal therefore I do not
think that, on this count the present Reference is not tenable under Law. In short the Second Party is a ―workmen‖ as
defined u/s. 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act therefore, there is employer-employee relationship between the First
Party and the Second Party hence, I answer these issues in the affirmative.
10. Issue No. 3- It is worthwhile to mention here that, the Second Party has specifically pleaded/stated before the
Court that, he was working with the First Party since April 2007 and worked with the First Party till October 2010. To
substantiate the same, the Second Party filed various copies of documents on record. Though, the First Party denied
this contention of the Second Party about the employment and also stated that, the Second Party stopped working
since 2010, however the First Party could not justify the same by acceptable evidence. Moreover it is clear from the
various copies of documents placed on record by the Second Party that, he was certainly working prior to May 2012
which falsify the contention of the First Party that, the Second Party stopped coming since 2010 and the document
dated 20.05.2016 issued by MWO WO IC Airmen mess committee, which has been admitted by the witness of the
First Party, it is clear that, the Second Party worked till September 2014 & October 2014 and also paid wages as per
working days of the Second Party and the various copies of certificates issued by the officer of the First Party in
favour of the Second Party shows that, the Second party was working since April 2007 with the First Party as such
there is no hesitation to except that, the Second Party worked with the First Party during April 2007 to October 2014
with the First Party.
I may mention here that, though it is contended on behalf of the First Party that, the appointment of the
Second Party was not against the sanctioned vacant post, he was not appointed by the Authority competent to appoint
in the employment of the First Party therefore the Second Party has no right on the post and there is no question of
termination much less illegal.
However even accepting the same, in my opinion all these facts are necessary to be considered while
granting permanency to the employee and absolutely irrelevant in case of termination of employee, who worked
continuously more than 240 days in a year with the employer. In the case in hand, the Second Party was continued in
the employment since April 2007 to October 2014, therefore I do not think that, this aspect needs any consideration,
while deciding the legality of termination of the Second Party.
It has sufficiently established before the Court that, the Second Party was employment of the First Party during April
2007 to October 2014, he was allowed to appear for selection as non-competent enrolled and his name was also
recommended by the First Party in 2007. It goes to show that, the Second Party was in continuous service of the First
Party and his services were terminated or it can be said that, he was not allowed to join on duty after 2014. It means
the services of the Second Party were terminated w.e.f. October 2014. Admittedly, at the time of termination, no
notice of one month nor retrenchment compensation was given as required u/s. 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act,
therefore the termination of the Second Party is certainly in violation of the provisions of the Sec. 25 F of the ID Act
therefore the action of the First Party in terminating in services of the Second Party workmen w.e.f. 21.10.2014 is
illegal, unjust & improper, hence, I answer this issue in the affirmative.
11. Issue No. 4 & 5- Once it is established that, the termination of the Second Party is in violation of the provisions
of Sec. 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act therefore liable to be quashed and set aside and the Second Party is entitled
for the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service with full back wages and the Second Party has claimed the
same by making it pleading in the statement of claim that after termination he could not secure employment in any
other establishment and the First Party failed to bring on record about the gainful employment of the Second Party
after termination. In such circumstances the Second Party is entitled for the relief as claimed.
However the First Party stated before the court that, the appointment of the Second Party was not against the
sanctioned vacant post, the Second Party was not appointed by Authority competent to appoint in the employment and
also argued before the Court about non-availability of the post with the First Party. Even accepting the same and in
the light of fact that, after 2014, the Second Party remained unemployed still I do not think that being a casual worker
the Second Party lives with his family without money since last ten years, in such circumstances in my opinion the
662
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Second Party is entitled for the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and 50% back wages as per the last
drawn salary of the Second Party.
I may mention here that, in view of the observations mentioned above, if the reinstatement of the Second
Party is not possible for the First Party due to non-availability of the post, then instead of reinstatement with 50%
back wages, the First Party is directed to pay full back wages to the Second Party as per his last drawn salary till the
implementation of award and this Award will be certainly executable. In short, the Second Party is entitled for relief
partly as prayed, hence, I answer these issues accordingly.
In the result, I proceed to pass the following order-
ORDER
1. The Reference is answered in the affirmative.
2. The Second Party is entitled for the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and 50% back wages
as per the last drawn salary, which he was getting at the time of termination even if the reinstatement is not
possible the First Party is directed to pay full back wages to the Second Party @ of last drawn wages of the
First Party within a period of three months from the date of publication of Award.
3. Both the parties bear their own costs.
4. The copy of Award be sent to the Government.
SHRIKANT K. DESHPANDE, Presiding Officer
Date: 03-10-2024
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 216.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
एएससी सप्लाइ नारायण, राजौरी, केंर िाजसत प्रदेि जम्मू और कश्मीर ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa
ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-II ds
iapkV (34/2023) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-05]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 216.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 34/2023) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-II as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of ASC Supply
Narain, Rajouri , UT of Jammu and Kashmir and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-05]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
In the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II, Chandigarh
(Presided over by Mr. Kamal Kant).
ID No. 34/2023
Registered on:-05.10.2023
Sh. Ajay Kumar, C/o Kalar, Narain, Rajouri, Jammu and Kashmir-185151.
-------- Applicant
Versus
ASC Supply Narain, Rajouri, UT of Jammu, Jammu and Kashmir.
----Respondents
Present:-
None for Workman
None for management.
Award : 06.11.2024
Central Government vide Notification No.08 (11)/2022/RLC/JMU Dated 04.10.2023, under sub-
section 5 of Section 12 read with sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947(hereinafter called the Act), has referred the following Industrial dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal:-
―Whether the demand of Shri Ajay Kumar C/o Kalar, Narian, Rajouri, UT of Jammu and
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
663
Kashmir for regularization of his service w.e.f. 12.10.2004 in the ASC Supply, Narian,
Rajouri, UT of Jammu and Kashmir is legal and justified? If yes then to what relief the
concerned workman is entitled to and from which date?‖
1. On the receipt of the above reference, notice was sent to the workman as well as to the
respondents/managements on 21.11.2023 for 06.02.2024. The notice sent to the workman, referred above, was
duly delivered to the workman on 28.11.2023. But no one turned up on behalf of workman 06.02.2024 and
reference was adjourned for 04.07.2024. On 04.07.2024, notice was again issued to the workman for
06.11.2024 for appearance and filing claim statement. The said notice was delivered to the workman on
03.08.2024. Today also no one turned up on behalf of the workman. The workman has been given sufficient
opportunities to file claim statement but none turned up in spite of the opportunity afforded to file claim
statement, which shows that the workman not interested in adjudication of the matter on merit.
2. Since the workman has neither put his appearance nor he has filed any statement of claim to prove his case
against the respondents/managements, as such, this Tribunal is left with no choice, except to pass a 'No Claim
Award'. Accordingly, 'No Claim Award' is passed in the present reference.
3. Let copy of this award be sent to the Appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the Act for
publication.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 217.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
सवव हररयाणा ग्रामीण बैंक ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn
esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-II ds iapkV (56/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-06]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 217.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 56/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-II as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Sarva Haryana
Gramin Bank and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-06]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
In the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II, Chandigarh
(Presided over by Mr. Kamal Kant).
ID No. 56/2021
Registered on:-03.03.2022
Sh. Sunder son of Sh. Leelay, R/o VPO Pali, Distt. Faridabad, Haryana.
----Workman/Applicant
Versus
Sarva Haryana Gramin Bank, Branch Pali, Distt. Faridabad, through its manager/authorized signatory.
----Respondent/ Management
Present:-
None for Workman.
None for Management.
AWARD
664
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
DATED : 01.11.2024
1. This is a claim filed directly U/s 2-A of the ID Act by authorized representative for the workman on 03.03.2022.
The certificate of Assistant Labor Commissioner (Central) Karnal is dated 02.02.2019 which shows that matter could
not be settled. Workman has challenged his termination order dated 07.02.2019 as such case is cognizable under the
Section 2-A of the ID Act 1947. Notice was issued to the parties for 12.07.2022.
2. Ld. Counsel for workman appeared on 12.07.2022 and filed copy of claim and the case was adjourned for
11.10.2022 for service of management. Sh. Tarun Dhingra appeared on behalf of management, however, no written
statement was filed. Even workman has not appeared since 11.01.2024 and the case was adjourned for 21.03.2024,
31.05.2024, 05.08.2024 and 01.11.2024. Today also nobody has appeared on behalf of both the parties.
3. Since neither the workman is appearing to prove his case against the respondent/management nor the
management has appeared or filed any written statement, as such, this Tribunal is left with no choice, except to pass a
―No Claim Award‖. Accordingly, ―No Claim Award‖ is passed in the present reference.
4. Let copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the Act for
Publication.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 218.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-II ds iapkV (62/2018) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-07]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 218.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.62/2018) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-II as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-07]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-II,
CHANDIGARH.
Present: Mr. Kamal Kant, Presiding Officer.
ID No.62/2018
Registered on:-03.07.2018
Sh. Shambhu Kumar S/o Ltd. Sh. Mahesh Prasad Sinha, R/o H.No.2271-A, Sector 42-C, Chandigarh.
….…..Workman
Versus
1.
The State Bank of India through its Dy. General Manager, ZBO, Chandigarh (Now ZBO, Panchkula).
2.
The Regional Manager, RBO-I, State Bank of India, Madhya Marg, Sector-8, Chandigarh.
.….Respondents/Management
Order
Passed On:-22.11.2024
Present: Sh. O P Indal and Ms. Karamjit Sharma, Ld. Counsel for Workman.
Sh. Chandeep Singh along with Sh. Anup Kumar ( Chief Manager, Law) and Sh. Ravi Kumar (Manager,
HR) for Management.
1. This Order shall dispose of an application under Section 33 read with Rule 60 of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947
(hereinafter called the ID Act) for granting permission for dismissal of the workman applicant during pendency of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
665
present proceedings.
2. The applicant was posted as Customer Assistant and CRO (Officiating) at HCS Branch, Chandigarh. He on his
own opened a saving account No.20053157144 in the name of Shri Bansi Lal, former Chief Minister, Haryana and
carried out various unauthorized transactions amounting to Rs.6,26,930/- in the year 2013, whereas Sh. Bansi Lal has
expired in 2006. Preliminary enquiry was conducted, on the basis of which the matter was reported as fraud to
Reserve bank of India for Rs.6,26,930/-. An FIR Ex.M3 dated 16.02.2016 was lodged informing the said fraud and
hence he was placed under suspension by the competent authority. Vide letter dated 28.01.2016 Ex.M1 explanation of
the applicant was sought, who filed reply Ex.M2 dated 08.02.2016. However, disciplinary proceedings were kept in
abeyance in terms of para no.4 of memo of settlement dated 10.04.2002 executed between Union and the Bank. The
departmental proceedings were initiated and the applicant was charge-sheeted on 08.03.2017 after a period of one
year as per para no.4 of memo of settlement. Five charges were framed against the applicant vide charge sheet dated
08.03.2017 Ex. M4. Though there was no violation of memo of settlement dated 10.04.2002, however, the applicant
issued frivolous demand notice challenging the issuance of charge sheet with intent to delay the process. The
applicant submitted his defence in response to the charge-sheet. Appointment of enquiry officer was intimated to the
applicant and he was given opportunity to participate in the enquiry and an officer of the rank of Chief Manager was
deputed to conduct the departmental enquiry against the applicant-workman. Detailed enquiry was conducted after
giving due opportunity to the applicant-workman. After leading the entire evidence and statements of prosecution as
well as defence, charges No.1 to 4 stood proved against the applicant-workman. However, charge No.5 remained
unproved against the applicant-workman. Copy of enquiry report Ex.M5 dated 19.01.2018 was supplied to the
applicant, which was received by him vide letter dated 20.02.2018 Ex.M6. However, no reply to letter dated
20.02.2018 Ex. M6 was filed by the applicant despite issuance of various letters Ex.M7 dated 01.03.2018, Ex.M8
dated 08.03.2018 and ultimately, the applicant workman submitted his objections Ex.M11 on 27.03.2018. Objections
were duly considered by the management and on 04.05.2018 respondent management issued tentative major penalty
of ―dismissal without notice‖ vide Ex.M12 under Para 6(a) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.04.2002. The
applicant was asked to appear before the disciplinary authority on 15.05.2018 at 11:00 a.m. for personal hearing, who
submitted his representation on 02.06.2018 which was duly considered by the management and the matter was
decided on 02.06.2018 itself vide Ex.M13A. However, the workman refused to take the copy of the order dated
02.06.2018. Before communication of final order dated 02.06.2018, the applicant received summons from this
Tribunal on 13.07.2018 to appear before this Tribunal on 17.08.2018 and order dated 02.06.2018 could not be served
upon the applicant in view of statutory bar contained in ID Act. In the meantime, the Disciplinary Authority was
changed and the workman was granted opportunity of hearing to appear before new Disciplinary Authority on
27.01.2023 vide letter dated 25.01.2023 Ex.M16, who submitted his representation on 27.01.2023 Ex.M17. However,
final order could not be announced as the matter is pending before this Tribunal. In the reference received by this
tribunal, the workman has challenged the charge sheet dated 08.03.2017. The applicant-workman has already
received a sum of Rs.22,00,000/- approximately since June 2018 to January 2023 as salary/suspension allowance and
under these circumstance, it is prayed that permission may be granted to serve final order on the applicant-workman.
3.
Notice of the application was given to the applicant-workman who filed reply raising several preliminary
objections regarding maintainability of the application. The application is vague and is incomplete. The application is
based on sham enquiry report prepared in violation of principle of natural justice. It is maintained that since the
workman has done nothing and made an escape goat and the real culprit has been let out. Local police is still
investigating the matter and challan is yet to be presented. Since the matter has been handed over to third agency, the
bank lost its right to proceed in the matter on the pretext of domestic enquiry. The bank has misrepresented the memo
of settlement which is incomplete. Lodging of FIR in terms of Para no.4 of memo of settlement dated 10.04. .2022 is
fact but issuance of charge-sheet is illegal and wrong. The enquiry has been conducted in violation of memo of
settlement. Remaining averments have been denied and it is maintained that present application is not maintainable
under Section 33 of the ID Act and hence the same be dismissed.
4.
While arguing the case, Ld. Counsel for the management contended that in this case present dispute cannot be
referred as industrial dispute because it is an individual dispute as the workman has challenged to the charge-sheet
issued against him. As per Section 2A of the ID Act, only in circumstances as mentioned therein can be Industrial
Dispute, which are discharge, dismissal, 'retrenchment and termination and matter incidental thereto. The case of the
present applicant does not fall in any of the above instances rather he has challenged the charge sheet in this case
which cannot be termed as an Industrial dispute and the same is an individual dispute. On the present dispute as per
applicant his application has been espoused by SBI SC/ST Employees' Welfare Association which cannot espouse his
case, as only registered Trade union can espouse the case of an individual workman as per Section 2(k) and 2(qq) of
the ID Act. As per Section 2 (qq) only registered Trade Union can espouse the case of individual workman only then
it is maintainable. To support his view he has placed reliance upon case titled as Management of Messers Hotel
Samrat V. Government of NCT, (Delhi) reported as 2007(4)S.C.T. 514. He referred to Para No.12 of the above titled
judgment referred is reproduced as under:
Para No. 12 ... The question arises how the espousal can be inferred. Espousal means that the dispute of an
individual workman is adapted by union as its own dispute or a large number of workmen give support to the
666
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
cause of an individual workman... Does mere lending of name of the union by the union secretary while
raising the conciliation proceedings or for issuing notice amount to 'espousal' of cause?..... In each case, for
ascertaining whether an individual dispute has assumed character of an industrial dispute, the test is whether
on the date of reference, the dispute was taken up and supported by the union of the workmen of the employer
against whom the dispute is raised by the individual workman or by an appreciable number of employees.
Hence, by mere passing of a resolution by other members of the union, the case of the appellant that the
cause of concern workmen was supported by the other employees of Hindu Board, could not be supported.
The Supreme Court observed that unless an individual dispute was taken up by union of employees of the
employer or by appreciable number of employees of the union, it remains as an individual dispute and does
not become an industrial dispute.
5.
As per above para, this dispute of applicant was Individual dispute and not Industrial dispute. Trade Union has
been defined under Section 2(qq) of the ID Act which means a Trade Union Registered under the Trade Union Act.
Even his application before Conciliation Officer was not maintainable as per Rule 4(c) of the Industrial Dispute
Central Rule, 1957 as his application was not attested by any officer of Trade Union as defined under 2(qq). He
further contended that it is settled principle of law as held in Calcutta Port Trust Union v. Haldia Shore Ship &
Transport Handling Work. Co-op. (Calcutta), reported as 2013(16) S.C.T. 776, that only a Registered Trade Union or
group of employee having common cause can espouse a case of individual. Para 13 of the judgment is reproduced as
under:
The word 'Registered Trade Union' is of great significance and can imbibe within it's contour the Trade
Union Register under the Trade Unions Act and not otherwise. The said section further takes care of the
interest of the workman who is not a member of a Trade Union to be represented by any member of the
executive or other office bearer of any Trade Union connected with or by other workmen employed in the
industry in which the worker is employed. In any of such eventualities, the representation is to be made
through a Trade Union Registered under the Trade Unions Act and not through any Association or Union
which is not recognized under the said Act.
So even as per above said para the case of the applicant could not have been espoused by the SBI SC/ST
Employees' Welfare Association. As per above para, only registered trade union can espoused the case of individual
workman and not any association. 6.It is further contended by the ld. counsel of the Management that the
Tribunal/Court has jurisdiction to decide whether espousal of the dispute is proper or not even if the reference has not
been challenged. To support his view he placed reliance upon case titled as Lord Krishna Textile Mills National
Textile Corpn. V. Rampal Singh (Delhi) reported as 2015 (6)S.C.T. 718 as decided by Hon'ble High Court Delhi,
vide which it was held that espousal goes to the root of the matter and objection of maintainability cannot be declined
to be decided merely on the ground that reference has not been challenged. Relevant para of the judgment is being
reproduced hereunder:
Para No. 25. It is pertinent to state here even at the cost of repetition that a Tribunal/Labour Court would get
jurisdiction to decide a dispute only when it is properly espoused under the provisions of the ID Act. In such a
case, any objections to non-espousal or improper espousal cannot be brushed aisde lightly by the
Tribunal/Labour court rather, must be heard and decided before hearing the parties on merits. Further,
merely because a party to a dispute had not objected to the terms of reference would not be sufficient enough
a ground not to entertain objections to proper espousal of a dispute. As I have already observed that the issue
of espousal goes to the root of the matter, hence objections, if any to espousal must be decided first before a
tribunal goes any further to decide on the merits of the dispute.
He further contended that it is settled principle of law that without touching merit of the case, award can be
passed on issue of maintainability. To support this view he has placed reliance upon Ajay Kumar Vs.
Sumitomo Mitusi Banking Corporation, (Delhi) wherein it has been held as under:
Para 37. In light of the above cited judicial dicta, it is clear that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is contingent
upon the existence of an industrial dispute as defined by the ID Act and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is
tied to the presence of an industrial dispute, which necessitates support from a Union or a substantial
portion of the workforce.
Para 38. Furthermore, it is also clarified that if the Tribunal determines that there is no espousal of the
dispute, it loses jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter as it can only arbitrate industrial disputes. Therefore,
the question of adjudication of the dispute does not arise if the Tribunal holds that the dispute raised by
workmen is not an industrial dispute.
7. While rebutting the argument, ld. counsel for the workman contended that in this case, present dispute is
Industrial Dispute and covered under Section 2(k) of the ID Act, as there is no mention of registered Trade Union as
alleged by the management in Section 2 (k) that the case of workman should be espoused by registered trade union,
whereas as per Section 2(k) of Industrial Dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers,
or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or
non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. The claim petition of
claimant was espoused by registered association i.e. SBl SC/ST Employees Welfare Association before the Assistant
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
667
Labour Commissioner and thereafter, it was referred by the appropriate Government. In the present case the
association has duly espoused the claim of the claimant and file duly signed resolution with the claim petition and
further the objection of espousal by SBI SC/ST Employees Welfare Association has already been decided by the
appropriate Government when it was taken at the initial stage before appropriate Government. The appropriate
Government had decided and referred the claim of workmen under Section 2(k) of ID Act after verifying the same.
The management till date had not challenged that reference, if management bank was having grievance against this
reference than it can be challenged before appropriate Court of law and now at this stage again it cannot taken the
same objection which is not maintainable at this stage. That the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held in case titled as
Management of Messers Hotel Samrat V. Government of NCT(Delhi) reported as 2007(4) S.C.T. 514 in Para
No.12 as under:
The dispute between an individual workmen and the employer can be treated as an Industrial Dispute only
where the workmen as a body or a considerable Section of them, make common cause with the Individual
workmen and espoused his demand.
8. Hence, in the present case the cause of the workmen espoused by the association after passing resolution duly
signed by the Group/ members workmen and even in the case titled as Lord Krishna Textile Mills National Textile
Corpn. V. Rampal Singh (Delhi) reported as 2015 (6) S.C.T, 718. In Para No.26 of the Judgment, the case was
remanded back with the direction to frame the issue on espousal and decide the same after affording opportunity to
both the parties to present their case in accordance with law.
Secondly, the association has supported the claim petition of the workman and even before this Court, the
association has not withdraw till date the cause of the claimant. It is pertinent to mention here that this fact needs to
be proved by leading evidence by both the parties whereas the management fails to prove the fact that the Association
had not espoused the case of the workmen and has withdrawn from the claim/demand notice. Even in Failure of
Conciliation Report (Annexure C-5) of claim petition and in reference, (Annexure C-7) applicant was addressed as
C/o (Care of) General Secretary SBI SC/ST Employees Welfare Association which clearly shows that the cause of
the workman was espoused by the members of association.
9. The other objection of the Management that the Union/ Association has not come for evidence in support of
workman goes away as the association which has espoused the claim of workmen would be called in evidence stage
to prove the case of workmen. In case titled as John D. Souza Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has observed in Para No.23, 26 27 in respect of Section 33 of ID Act has observed as under:
Para 23. Having held so, it should not take long to trace out the legislative object behind incorporation of
Section 33, including sub section (2) thereof. The caption of Section 33 itself sufficiently hints out that the
primary object behind this provision is to prevent adverse alteration in the conditions of service of a workman
when 'conciliation or any other proceedings in respect of an 'industrial dispute' to which such workman is also
concerned, are pending before a Conciliation Officer, Board, Arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal. The
Legislature, through Section 33(1)(a) and (b) has purposefully prevented the discharge, dismissal or any other
punitive action against the workman concerned during pendency of proceedings before the Arbitrator, Labour
Court or a Tribunal even on the basis of proven misconduct, save with the express permission or approval of the
Authority before which the proceedings is pending. Sub-section (2) of Section 33 draws its colour from sub-
section (1) and has to be read in conjunction thereto. Sub-section (2), in fact, dilutes the rigours of sub-section
(1) to the extent that it enables an employer to discharge, dismiss or otherwise punish a workman for a proved
misconduct not connected with the pending dispute; in accordance with Standing Orders applicable to the
workman or in absence thereof, as per the terms of contract; provided that such workman has been paid one
month wages while passing such order and before moving application before the Authority concerned 'for
approval of the action', In other words, the Authority concerned (Board, Labour Court or Tribunal, etc.) has to
satisfy itself while considering the employer's application that the 'misconduct' on the basis of which punitive
action has been taken is not the matter sub-judice before it and that the action has been taken in accordance with
the standing orders in force or as per terms of the contract. The laudable object behind such preventive measures
is to ensure that when some proceedings emanating from the subjects enlisted in Second or Third Schedule of the
Act are pending adjudication, the employer should not act with vengeance in a manner which may trigger the
situation and lead to further industrial unrest.
Para 26. The scope of enquiry vested in a Labour Court or Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) has been the subject
matter of a catena of decisions by this Court. In Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Bangerjeel, a Three-Judge Bench of
this Court considered the scope of enquiry under Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act,
1950 whereunder also permission to discharge a workman was required to be obtained in the manner which was
somewhat similar to
1. 1958 SCR 514 Section 33 (2)(b) of the 1947 Act. This Court, thus, held:-
"27. The Labour Appellate Tribunal had to determine on these materials whether a prima facie case had been
made out by the appellant for the termination of the respondent's service. A prima facie case does not mean a
668
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of
the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant
consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not
whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the Tribunal
considering this question may itself have arrived at a different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its
own judgment for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider whether the view taken is a possible
view on the evidence on the record. [Emphasis by us]
Para 27.A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Workmen2, considered and
interpreted the scope of Section 33 to lay down that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in dealing with such
applications is limited. It was held that:-
"24. Where an application is made by the employer for the requisite permission under Section 33 the Jurisdiction
of the tribunal in dealing with such an application is limited. It has to consider whether a prima facie case has
been made out by the employer for the dismissal of the employee in question. If the employer has held a proper
enquiry into the alleged misconduct of the employee, and if it does not appear that the proposed dismissal of the
employee amounts
2.(1960) 1 SCR 806 to victimisation or an unfair labour practice, the tribunal has to limit its enquiry only to the
question as to whether a prima facie case has been made out or not. In these proceedings it is not open to the tribunal
to consider whether the order proposed to be passed by the employer is proper or adequate or whether it errs on the
side of excessive severity; nor can the tribunal grant permission, subject to certain conditions, which it may deem to
be fair. It has merely to consider the prima facie aspect of the matter and either grant the permission or refuse it
according as it holds that a prima facie case is or is not made out by the employer.
Ld. Counsel for workman thus contended that the application under Section 33 be dismissed.
10.
I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by the ld. Counsel of the parties and have gone
through entire file very carefully.
11.
So far this argument of ld. counsel for the workman that in Section 2(k) of Industrial Disputes A ct,1947
there is no mention of "trade union" and as such any association can espoused the case of individual worker, the same
is devoid of merits as in this regard finding of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Lord Krishna Textile Mills National
Textile Corporation Versus Rampal Singh (Delhi) 2015(6) SCT 718 case given in Para Numbers 15,16,17,18,19,20
and 22 are relevant which are reproduced :-
15. The words „Industrial Dispute‟ convey a meaning to the ordinary mind that a dispute must be such that
would affect a large group of workmen and employers ranged on opposite sides on some general questions on
which each group is bound together by a community of interest, such as wages, bonus, allowances, pensions,
provident fund, number of working hours per week, holidays and so on. It is a settled law that an industrial
dispute under Section 2(k) of the ID Act is raised before the authority concerned on a collective basis because a
dispute not espoused by others of the class to which the aggrieved party belongs is not an industrial dispute.
Therefore, a dispute between an employer and a single workman cannot be industrial dispute unless it is taken
up by a number of workmen or trade union.
16. It can be seen from above that an industrial dispute can be raised either for a workman or any person
regarding whom the workmen have substantial interest in the employment or non-employment or terms of
employment or conditions of labour. The expression, 'any person' in the definition has not been equated with
workmen and it has a wider connotation. But 'any person' is also subject to limitation under the process of
judicial interpretation. The expression "any person' must have a direct relation with the workmen about
whose employment or non-employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour, the workmen have
direct and substantial interest. It means that any person must be an employee of the industry in which the
workmen are employees as well. The next point for consideration in this series is that whether an individual
dispute can become an industrial dispute under section 2(k) of the ID Act?
17. Prior to 1965, a workman who claimed relief for himself, or a few workmen, who individually claimed relief
for themselves had no remedy under the ID Act unless their cause was espoused by a substantial Section of
other workmen of the same establishment. There were only two methods by which h such disputes could have
been espoused, namely:-
(i) By a collective demand made by a substantial section of workmen; or
(ii) By espousal of individual causes by a trade union representing a substantial section of the workmen of the
industry.
18) In this context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate Versus The Management of
Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 353 observed as under :-
"15. We reach the same conclusion by approaching the question from a somewhat different standpoint.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
669
Ordinarily, it is only the aggrieved party who can raise a dispute' nit an industrial dispute is put a collective
basis, because it is now settled that an individual dispute, not espoused by others of the class to which the
aggrieved party may belong, is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k). As Issacs),
observed in the Australian case of George Hudson Ltd. Versus Australian Timber workers' Union, 32 CLR
at P. 441(B);
“The very nature of an 'industrial dispute' as distinguished from an individual dispute, is to obtain new
industrial conditions, not merely for the specific individual hen working from the specific individuals then
employing them, and not for the moment only, but for the class of employees from the class of employers.. It is a
battle by the claimants not for themselves alone.”
19) Thus before 1965, the court had consistently taken a view that a dispute which is neither a collective demand of a
substantial section of workmen nor was an individual cause espoused by a trade union, such a dispute was an
'individual dispute and did not attain the character of an 'industrial dispute' so as to give jurisdiction to the
appropriate government to make a reference for adjudication. However, it resulted in severe hardship to workmen in
cases where the question of discharge dismissal, retrenchment or termination of services of a workman was in issue.
At that time, the workmen had to persuade the union for espousing their case falling in such categories and the Union
in turn, may or may not have taken initiatives to espouse even their genuine causes.
20) To prevent such hardships, Section 2A was inserted in the scheme of the ID Act vide Section 3 of Amendment Act
35 of 1965, which came into effect from 01.12.1965 (herein after referred to as the 1965 amendment) Section 2A of
the ID Act reads as under :-
2A Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute-
(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual
workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with or arising out of
such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute
notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub section (1) may,
make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein
after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the
appropriate government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or
Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were dispute referred to it
by the appropriate government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act
shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by
the appropriate government (3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour
Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal retrenchment or
otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
22) What is observed from above is that the disputes falling under the categories specified under Section 2A of
the ID Act are industrial disputes and all other kinds of disputes unless they are espoused properly through a
substantial number of fellow workmen would fall under the category of individual disputes' which are not a
subject matter of concern under the ID Act. Clearly, individual disputes cannot be adjudicated and decided
under the ID Act as they do not fall under the definition of the expression 'industrial dispute' as defined under
section 2(k) thereof.
12.
A perusal of aforesaid judgment makes it ample clear that as per Section 2(k) of the ID Act that a dispute must
be such that would affect a large group of workmen and employers ranged on opposite sides on some general
questions on which each group is bound together by a community of interest, such as wages, bonus, allowances,
pensions, provident fund, number of working hours per week, holidays and so on. A dispute between the employer
and a single workman cannot be an 'industrial dispute unless it is taken up by a number of workmen or trade union.
Further, Section 2(qq) of ID Act defines ―Trade Union‖ as under :-
"Trade union" means a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act 1926.”
14.
Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled as B. Siriniwasa Reddy Versus Karnataka Urban Water Supply
and Drainage Board Employees Association and others 2006 AIR (Supreme Court) 3106 held that in our
opinion, the High Court gravely erred in refusing to examine the question of locus standi on the ground that it is
decided in the earlier writ petition which operates as res judicata and that the petitioners even otherwise have
locus standi. Chapter-lll of the Trade Union Act 1926 sets out rights and liabilities of the registered Trade
Unions. Under the said enactment, an unregistered trade union or a trade union whose registration has been
cancelled has no manner of right whatsoever even the rights available under the ID Act have been limited only to
those trade unions which are registered under the Trades Unions Act 1926 by insertion of clause 2(q)(q) in the ID
Act w.e.f. 21.08.1984 defining trade union to mean a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926.
670
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
14.
Thus contention raised by learned counsel for workman that trade union does not appear anywhere in Section
2(k) is devoid of merits. So far as this contention of learned counsel for workman that appropriate government while
referring the matter to the tribunal has decided that SC/ST welfare association was competent to espoused the case of
applicant the same is devoid of merits as the appropriate government has no authority to decide the case on merits and
to support this view reliance can be placed on Calcutta port Trust Union Versus Haldia Shore Ship and Transport
Handling Workers 2013(16) S.C.T. 776. Para 13 of the said judgment is relevant and reproduced as under:-
"The word 'Registered Trade Union' is of great significance and can imbibe within its contour the Trade Union
Register under the Trade Unions Act and not otherwise. The said section further takes care of the interest of the
workman who is not a member of a Trade Union to be represented by any member of the executive or other
office bearer of any Trade Union connected with or by other workmen employed in the industry in which the
worker is employed. In any of such eventualities, the representation is to be made through a Trade Union under
the Trade Union Act and not through any Association or Union which is not recognized under the said Act.
15.
Since in this case of the applicant was espoused by the SC/ST Association thus the government could not
have referred the matter to this tribunal and reference is bad in law. In this regard, case titled as Shri Nand Kishore
versus Dilshad Public School and another 2022 NCDHC 5424 is also relevant wherein Hon'ble Delhi High Court
held as follows :-
"Therefore, it is only the appropriate government, who is competent to decide whether the dispute(s) is to be
referred to the Industrial Tribunals set up under the Act and insofar as Conciliation Officer is concerned, his
role is that of a mediator and no more. It has been held in various judgments that Conciliation Officer does not
discharge judicial or quasi-judicial functions and his acts are merely administrative in nature. Relevant it is to
note that even if the Conciliation Officer brings about a settlement and records the same, the report so
rendered is not an 'award' defined under the ID Act as an interim or final determination of an industrial dispute
by a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. From the scheme of the ID Act, by no stretch of imagination can it be
said that the functions of a Conciliation Officer are akin to that of an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court.
Looking at the industrial unrest that usually takes place in management-workman dispute, Legislature has
provided a machinery for settlement of disputes but certainly without any powers to the Conciliation Officer to
adjudicate upon them. The only and avowed object and purpose for this machinery under the Act is to provide a
step to attempt to bring an end to the disputes and differences between the rival parties so that the disputes do
not travel to Labour Courts or Industrial Tribunals. In East India Ceramics and others (supra), the Madras
High Court has ruled as follows:
"45. The Conciliation Officer is not vested with the powers to adjudicate on industrial dispute, but he can try to
persuade the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement, besides he has to exercise his resourcefulness
and power of persuasion to try to induce and persuade the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement.
The Conciliation Officer is not competent to decide the various points n issue between the opposing parties of
adjudicate the dispute. The functions of the Conciliation Officer under Section 12 is not of either judicial or
quasi-judicial nature. If it is to be held quasi-judicial or judicial function, then in connection with whatever he
does under section 12 or other provisions of the Act or Rules, the formalities of a judicial trial would have to be
observed. The duties which the Conciliation Officer performs are only administrative and are purely incidental
to industrial adjudication as has been held by the Apex Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut Versus
Lakshmi Chand (cited supra).
46. The Conciliation Officer is not exercising judicial or quasi- judicial powers or authority nor he is a quasi-
judicial or judicial authority but he is a pure and simple administrative functionary. Even where a Conciliation
Officer refused to take a dispute for conciliation after his being satisfied with the action of management in
regard to the promotion in a particular case was bona fide his order could not be interfered with by the High
Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction as has been held by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in
Paints Employees Union Vs. M.,D. Nail (1966) 1 L.LJ. 579.
47. Thus the Conciliation Officer namely, the first respondent not being quasi-judicial authority nor he
exercises a judicial or quasi-judicial function, no question of issue of prohibition prayed for would arise.
xxx xxx xxx
49. In addition to the said aspect it is to be pointed out that the first respondent Conciliation Officer merely
holds a conciliation and sends a report or persuade the parties to arrive at some settlement and beyond that he
has no power or authority to adjudicate.
50. The writ of prohibition will lie in cases as to matter which are judicial in nature. In S. Govinda Menon
Versus Union of India ASIR 1967 S.C 1274, the Apex Court analyzing the case after law held thus:
"The jurisdiction for grant of a writ of prohibition is primarily supervisory and the object of that writ is to
restrain Courts or inferior Tribunals from exercising a jurisdiction which they do not possess at all or else to
prevent them from exceeding the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the object is to confine courts or
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
671
Tribunals of inferior or limited jurisdiction within their inferior or limited jurisdiction within their bounds. It is
well settled that the writ of prohibition lies not only for excess of jurisdiction or for absence of jurisdiction but
the writ also lies in a case of departure from the rules of natural justice.”
16.
In this case, failure report in case CS was submitted by ALC and government has endorsed the same and the
government has not decided whether the association was competent to refer the matter or not. However, Para 46 of
Nand Kishore case (supra) reads as under and is reproduced for the sake of clarity:-
46. The Conciliation Officer is not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers or authority nor he is a quasi-
judicial or judicial authority but he is a pure and simple administrative functionary. Even where a Conciliation
Officer refused to take a dispute for conciliation after his being satisfied with the action of management in
regard to the promotion in a particular case was bona fide his order could not be interfered with by the High
Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction as has been held by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Paints
Employees Union Vs. M.,D. Nail (1966) 1 L.L.J. 579.
Thus it does not lie in the mouth of the workman that the government has already decided the matter regarding
espousal by the association.
17. So far this argument of management that in this case, reference was not challenged by the management and
present objection is not maintainable on behalf of management. The same is devoid of merits in view of the law laid
down in Lord Krishna Supra, Para 25 of which is reproduced as under:
―Para No. 25. It is pertinent to state here even at the cost of repetition that a Tribunal/Labour Court would get
jurisdiction to decide a dispute only when it is properly espoused under the provisions of the ID Act. In such a
case, any objections to non-espousal or improper espousal cannot be brushed aisde lightly by the
Tribunal/Labour court rather, must be heard and decided before hearing the parties on merits. Further, merely
because a party to a dispute had not objected to the terms of reference would not be sufficient enough a ground
not to entertain objections to proper espousal of a dispute, As I have already observed that the issue of
espousal gees to the root of the matter, hence objections, if any to espousal must be decided first before a
tribunal goes any further to decide on the merits of the dispute.”
18. So far as judgment titled as John Disouza (supra) referred by the ld. counsel for workman is concerned, the same
rather supports the case of the management as in the said case it has been held that the tribunal is required to consider
whether a prima-facie case has been made out that for dismissal of the employee, income and granting request
permission under Section 33 of ID Act. In this regard, applicant has been charge-sheeted and he has challenged the
same and simultaneously he has also participated in the departmental enquiry which culminated the finding of his
dismissal and it is also settled principle of law that charge-sheet cannot be challenged. To support this view reference
can -be made to Laxman Singh Gurjar Versus Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation etc. SB Civil Writ
Petition No. 6611 of 2011 wherein it has been held that in the considered opinion of this court, a writ petition
generally does not lie against the charge-sheet unless it is established that the same had been issued by an authority
not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. It is a settled law that charge-sheet cannot be interfered with by
the court lightly or in a routine manner. The delinquent employee instead of seeking quashing of the charge-sheet at
the initial stage must submit his/her reply before the Enquiry Officer/ Disciplinary Authority and wait for conclusion
of the proceedings.
19. Since, in this case, the case has not been espoused by a registered trade union and case has also not been
espoused by considerable section of workman having common cause with the individual workman. So it is held that
there is no espousal of the case as was clear under Section 2k of the ID Act. In this regard, reliance is being placed on
Ajay Kumar Vs. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, (Delhi) reported as 2024 NCDHC 2184 decided by
Hon‘ble Delhi High Court. In the said case, limited question for adjudication before the Court was that whether the
learned CGIT rightly dismissed the dispute on grounds of non-espousal of the dispute or not. It was held by the
Hon'ble Court, Tribunal's jurisdiction is contingent upon the existence of an industrial dispute and the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal is tied to the presence of an industrial dispute. Therefore, the question of adjudication of the dispute does
not arise if the Tribunal holds that the dispute raised by workmen is not an industrial dispute. Relevant paras of the
judgment are reproduced hereunder:
"Para 27. As per the settled position of law, there are two methods for espousal (1) an industrial dispute, where
the first method is raising of a dispute by a substantial number of employees of an establishment, and the
second one is the espousal of an individual cause by a Union of the workmen.
Para 32. Upon perusal of the above cited paragraphs, it is made out that the learned CGIT emphasized the
necessity of the dispute being sponsored or espoused through a Union of the workmen where it was noted that
the Union plays a crucial role in adopting the dispute of individual workmen its own or garnering support from
a large number of workmen for the cause.
Para 33. While adjudicating the issue of espousal, the learned CGIT referred to various judgments to define
'espousal', indicating that it entails the Union adopting the dispute of an individual workman as its own or
gaining substantial support from fellow workmen for the said cause.
672
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
12. The dispute between an individual workman and the employer can be treated as an industrial dispute only
where the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them, make common cause with the individual
workman and espoused his demand.
Para 37. In light of the above cited judicial dicta, it is clear that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is contingent upon the
existence of an industrial dispute as defined by the ID Act and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is tied to the
presence of an industrial dispute, which necessitates support from a Union or a substantial portion of the
workforce.
Para 38. Furthermore, it is also clarified that if the Tribunal determines that there is no espousal of the dispute, it
loses jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, as it can only arbitrate industrial disputes. Therefore, the question of
adjudication of the dispute does not arise if the Tribunal holds that the dispute raised by workmen is not an industrial
dispute.
Para 44. In light of the above, the impugned award dated 10th February, 2017 passed in ID No.159/2011 by the
Learned CGIT, New Delhi is hereby upheld and the present petition, being devoid of any merit is dismissed.”
20.
Keeping in view of the above discussions, it is held as follow:
i.
The present dispute between workman and employer is individual dispute, not industrial dispute.
ii.
Espousal of the claim/dispute of workman by association is not maintainable. It should have been espoused by
Trade Union (Registered) or by appreciable number of employees.
iii.
There is no community of interest involved in the dispute.
iv.
There is jurisdictional error in sending the reference to the Tribunal without considering the fact that an
individual dispute not involving community interest is not maintainable. The management can challenge the
reference before the Tribunal after receipt of it, even if it has not challenged earlier before any competent Court.
v.
There is finding against the workman in domestic enquiry culminating his dismissal and hence application
under Section 33 read with Rule 60 of ID Act is maintainable during the pendency of reference, however,
reference is not maintainable having jurisdictional error.
21.
Thus application is allowed and reference is rejected being not maintainable.
22.
Copy of above be sent to the Central Government for publication as required under Section 17(1) of the ID Act.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 219.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
रक्षा मंत्रालय महाजनदेिक, गुणवत्ता अश्वासन, नइ ददल्ली ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k
esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-II ds iapkV (36/2020)
izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 41011/8/2000- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 219.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 36/2020) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-II as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Ministry of Defence
Director General of Quality Assurance New Delhi and their workmen.
[No. L-14011/8/2020- IR (B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-II,
CHANDIGARH (PRESIDED OVER BY MR. KAMAL KANT).
ID No. 36/2020
Registered on 13.08.2020
1. Mange Ram son of Late Sh. Telu Ram, R/o C-4/3, CQA (I) Estate, Ladpur, Raipur, Dehradun and office
bearer of Defence Instruments Employees‘ Union.
2. Shri Rakesh Sharma son of Late Shri S. D. Sharma, Resident of C-3/7, CQA (I) Estate, Ladpur, Raipur,
Dehradun and member of Defence instruments Employees‘ Union.
----Claimant/Workmen
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
673
Versus
1. The Management – Ministry of Defence through Director General of Quality Assurance, Department of
Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, H Block, DHQ PO, New Delhi-110011.
2. The Controller, CQA (I), Raipur, Dehradun.
----Respondents/Employer
Award : 14.11.2024
Present: Sh. Anshul Mangla, Ld. Counsel for Workmen Union.
Sh. Mukesh Kaushik, Ld. Counsel for Management.
Central Government vide notification no.L-14011/8/2020 (IR(DU)) dated 17.07.2020, under Clause (d) of
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as the Act),
has referred the following Industrial Dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal:-
―Whether the management of CQA(I), Dehradun was justified in posting out the members of the
union/office bearers of the Defence Instruments Employees’ Union on promotion to far off places as
raised by Defence Instruments Employees’ Union vide letter dated 06.01.2020? If not, what relief the
workers are entitled to and what other directions, if any, are necessary in the matter in the given
circumstances?”
1. Today the matter was fixed for filing evidence by way of affidavit of workman. However, ld. counsel for
workmen union stated that one of the workmen namely Sh. Rakesh Kumar has passed away and his legal
representatives and the other workman Shri Mange Ram is not interested in pursuing the matter and wishes to
withdraw the matter. Sh. Mukesh Kaushik filed authority letter on behalf of the management today. Ld. Counsel for
the management also gave no objection statement if the case is withdrawn by the workmen union.
2. In such circumstances, this Tribunal is left with no choice, except to pass a ‗No Claim Award‘. Accordingly, ‗No
Claim Award‘ is passed in the present reference for the non-prosecution of the workmen.
3. Let copy of this award be sent to the Appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the Act for
publication.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 220.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार जमधाजन के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और जमधाजन मज़दूर संघ के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हजदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 14/2024) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया
गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 14.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. tsM - 16025/04/2025- vkbZ vkj (एम)-9]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 220.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 14/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Midhani and Midhani Mazdoor Sangh which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 14.02.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025- IR (M)-9]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 22nd day of January, 2025
674
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 14/2024
Between:
The General Secretary,
Midhani Mazdoor Sangh Midhani,
Kanchanbagh, Hyderabad,
Telangana-500058.
..….Petitioner
AND
The General Manager (HR),
Midhani, Kanchanbagh,
Hyderabad-500058.
…Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : None
For the Respondent: V. Uma Devi, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.8/10/2024-B1 dated 08.03.2024 referred the
following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between the
management of M/s Midhani, and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
Whether the action of the management of MIDHANI, Kanchanbagh, Hyderabad denying to formulate
procedure or policy to restrict the number of office bearers of recognized union and facilities to be availed by
them is justified or not? If not, what relief the union is entitled to?
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No 14/2024 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
Petitioner absent on the date fixed for filing of claim statement and documents. Record reveals
that notice served on Petitioner but none present on behalf of Petitioner. Therefore, in absence of Petitioner and
non-filing of claim statement by the Petitioner, the case is ‗No Claim‘ award is passed.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Shri Vinay Panghal, LDC corrected and signed by me on this the 22nd day of
January, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 221.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार आंजडयन बैंक के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री हरीि चन्र कलाल के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट औद्योजगक
ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, ईदयृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 03/2014) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,
प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 14.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. tsM - 16025/04/2025- vkbZ vkj (एम)-2]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
675
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 221.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 03/2014) of the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court,
Udaipur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to Indian Bank and
Shri Harish Chandra Kalal which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 14.02.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025- IR (M)-2]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ihBklhu vf/kdkjh && lq'khy dqekj tSu ¼ ftyk U;k;k/kh'k laoxZ ½
ITR
gjh'k pUnz dyky firk Jh ek/kq dyky mez o;Ld] fuoklh ?kkVh njoktk
ckgj]
_"kHknso]
ftyk
mn;iqj¼jkt-½
1-
'kk[kk izca/kd bafM;u cSad 'kk[kk _"kHknso ftyk mn;iqj ¼jkt-½
2-
eq[; izca/kd bafM;u cSad] eaMyh; dk;kZy;] thou fuf/k] Hkokuh flag jksM] ,y vkbZ lh fcfYMax] t;iqj
¼jkt ½
izkFkhZ dh vkSj ls %
&Jh dey d`iykuh] Jh Nxu yky dVkjk vf/koDrkA
foi{khx.k dh vkSj ls %
&Jh lat; dksBkjh] Jh v'kksd dksBkjh vf/koDrkA
izkFkhZ dh vksj ls Dyse bl vk'k; dk izLrqr fd;k x;k gS fd izkFkhZ dks foi{khx.k }kjk o"kZ 1996 esa lQkbZ
deZpkjh ds dk;Z gsrq 'kk[kk _"kHknso esa fu;qDr fd;k x;kA izkFkhZ dks ml le; 900@&ekfld osru fn;k tkrk FkkA izkFkhZ
us 1996 ls vxLr] 2011 rd _"kHknso 'kk[kk esa fujarj dk;Z fd;kA bl nkSjku izkFkhZ us lQkbZ deZpkjh] pijklh ,oa
lgk;d dk dk;Z fd;kA izkFkhZ us foi{kh la[;k&1 ds ;gka [kkrs [kksyus] ykWdj b';q djus vkfn ds dk;Z Hkh fd;sA izkFkhZ us
dbZ erZck dsf'k;j dk dke Hkh fd;kA izkFkhZ dks lQkbZ deZpkjh ,oa lgk;d dk;Z gsrq 3200@&:i;s ekfld osru 'kk[kk
izca/kd }kjk fn;k tkrk FkkA izkFkhZ dks mlds dk;ksZa ds fy;s fnukad 22-08-09 dks izek.ki= Hkh tkjh fd;k x;kA izkFkhZ us o"kZ
1996 ls 15 o"kksZa rd izR;sd dSys.Mj o"kZ esa 240 fnu ls vf/kd dk;Z foi{khx.k ds ;gka fd;kA bl nkSjku 22 'kk[kk
izca/kd jgsA izkFkhZ dks 'kk[kk izca/kd us prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh ds in ij fu;qfDr nh] rc ls izkFkhZ yxkrkj _"kHknso 'kk[kk esa
dk;Z djrk vk jgk gSA izkFkhZ ls bl njE;ku dEI;wVj vkfn ds dk;ksZ gsrq Hkh lg;ksx fy;k tkrk jgkA izkFkhZ us tc&tc
LFkkbZ fu;qfDr ds fy;s vkosnu fd;k] rc gj ckj izkFkhZ ds vkosnu dks fdUgh dkj.kksa ls jksd fn;k tkrk Fkk vkSj gj ckj
vk'oklu fn;k tkrk Fkk fd ,d fnu LFkkbZ fu;qfDr ns nh tkosxhA izkFkhZ tc fnukad 01-09-2011 dks jkst dh rjg cSad esa
igqapk rks foi{kh la[;k&1 ds 'kk[kk izca/kd dqat fcgkjh eh.kk us izkFkhZ dks dgk fd vkt ls vkidks dke ij ugha fy;k
tkosxkA bl ckcr izkFkhZ dks dksbZ fyf[kr vkns'k ugha fn;k x;k vkSj u dksbZ dkj.k gh crk;k x;kA izkFkhZ dks dk;Z ls eqDr
fd;s tkus dk dksbZ uksfVl ugha fn;k x;k vkSj u uksfVl ds ,ot esa izkFkhZ dks osru fn;k x;kA izkFkhZ ds fo:} dksbZ
vuq'kklukRed ,oa foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh ugha gqbZ vkSj u dksbZ vkjksi i= fn;k x;k gSA izkFkhZ ,oa foi{khx.k ds e/; le>kSrk
vf/kdkjh {kS=h; Je vk;qDr¼dsUnzh;½ vtesj ds le{k dksbZ lqyg ugha gks ldhA bu vk/kkjksa ij izkFkhZ us mldks iqu% lsok esa
fy;k tkdj izkFkhZ dks LFkkbZ deZpkjh ds in ij fujarj lsok esa j[ks tkus vkSj fnukad 1-9-2011 ls leLr vkfFkZd ykHk
fu;ekuqlkj fnyk;s tkus dk fuosnu fd;k gSA
foi{khx.k us vius tokc fnukad 14-10-2015 esa izkjafHkd vkifr;ka ysrs gq, fy[kk gS fd foi{khx.k bykgkckn cSad
,d jk"Vªh;d`r cSad gS tks fd dsUnz ljdkj dk midze gS tcfd Je U;k;ky; ,oa vkS/kksfxd fookn vf/kdj.k] mn;iqj dk
xBu jkT; ljdkj }kjk fd;k x;k gS vkSj bldks dsUnz ljdkj }kjk dsUnzh; vkS/kksfxd fookn vf/kdj.k ds :i esa
676
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
LislhQkbZ ugha fd;k x;k gSaA vr% bl U;k;ky; dks izkFkhZ }kjk ekaxk x;k vuqrks"k iznku djus dk Jo.kkf/kdkj@
{kS=kf/kdkj izkIr ugha gSA bykgkckn cSad dks i{kdkj ugha cuk;k x;k gSA izkFkhZ dks dHkh Hkh bykgkckn cSad }kjk dksbZ
fu;qfDr i= tkjh ugha fd;k x;k gS vkSj u gh izkFkhZ us foi{khx.k ds ;gka fdlh rjg dk dk;Z fd;k gSA blfy;s izkFkhZ dk
izkFkZuki= izFken`"V;k iks"k.kh; ugha gS blfy;s bUgha vk/kkjksa ij izkFkhZ dk vkosnu fujLr fd;s tkus dk fuosnu fd;k x;k
gSA
foi{khx.k dh vksj ls vius tcko esa fy[kk x;k gS fd foi{kh us izkFkhZ dks dHkh Hkh cSad dh lsok esa fdlh in ij
fu;qDr ugha fd;k] u gh izfrekg dksbZ osru fn;k x;k gSA bl ckcr izkFkhZ fu;qfDr izek.ki= is'k djsA cSad esa lHkh izdkj
dh fu;qfDr;ka dsoy fu;ekuqlkj HkrhZ izfdz;k viukbZ tkdj gh dh tkrh gSA izkFkhZ us ;g vafdr ugha fd;k gS fd mldks
izek.ki= cSad ds fdl O;fDr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;k vkSj u gh ,sls fdlh izek.ki= dh izfr izkFkZuki= ds lkFk foi{khx.k
dks fHktokbZ xbZA izkFkhZ dks prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh ds in ij dHkh fu;qfDr ugha nh xbZA cSad vfHkys[k ds vuqlkj izkFkhZ dks
dHkh dksbZ fu;qfDr i= tkjh ugha fd;k x;kA fdlh izdkj ds QksVks is'k fd;s tkus ek= ls izkFkhZ dh dksbZ fu;qfDr gksus dk
rF; izekf.kr ugha gksrk gSA izkFkhZ tc foi{khx.k ds ;gka dk;Zjr gh ugha jgk rks mls lsoki`Fkd fd;s tkus dk iz'u gha ugh
jgrk gSA izkFkhZ }kjk o"kZ 1996 ls 31-08-2011 rd lsok,a nsus dk rF; xyr gSA izkFkhZ us dHkh foi{khx.k ds ;gka mifLFkr
gksdj dksbZ fuosnu ugha fd;kA vius fo'ks"k dFku esa fy[kk gS fd foi{kh cSad esa 'kk[kk izca/kd dks fdlh Hkh in ij fu;qfDr
djus dk vf/kdkj iznku ugha gSA bu vk/kkjksa ij foi{khx.k us izkFkhZ ds vkosnu dks [kkfjt fd;s tkus dk fuosnu fd;k gSA
izkFkhZ lk{; esa izkFkhZ gjh'k pUnz us vius ekSf[kd dFku crkSj ,-M-1] jke'kadj ,-M-2 o deys'k dyky ds c;ku
crkSj ,-M-3 djokdj viuh lk{; lekIr dhA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izn'kZ-1 yxk;r izn'kZ 5 , nLrkost is'k dj iznf'kZr
djok;s x;sA
foi{khx.k cSad }kjk ,u , M-1 vk;q"k vxzoky ds c;ku djokdj lk{; lekIr dh xbZA foi{khx.k dh vksj ls
flfoy vihy uEcj 1283@2002 jsat QksjsLV vkWfQlj cuke ,l Vh gkMheuh fu.kZ; fnukad 15-2-2002 dh izfr is'k dh
xbZ gSA
bl izdj.k esa eq[; :i ls fuEu fcUnq fu.khZr djuk gS&
1- D;k izkFkhZ gjh'kpUnz foi{khx.k bafM;u cSad dk fu;fer :i ls fu;qDr deZpkjh gS? ;fn gkW] rks D;k izkFkhZ gjh'k
pUnz dks foi{kh cSad }kjk fnukad 01-09-2011 dks fu;e fo:} rjhds ls lsok i`Fkd dj fn;k x;k gS vkSj bl
dkj.k izkFkhZ foi{khx.k cSad ls fnukad 01-09-2011 ds ckn ls mldks lsok esa jgrs gq, feyus okys leLr ykHk
o iqu% fu;qfDr izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\
bl fcUnq ds laca/k esa mHk;i{k dh cgl lquhA mHk;i{k us ewy:i ls vius vfHkopuksa ds rF;ksa dh iqujko`fr dh
gS blfy;s rF;ksa o rdksZa dh iqujko`fr dh vkSipkfjdrk dj vuko';d le; dh cckZnh ugha dh tk jgh gSaA
bl ckcr izkFkhZ us vius eq[; ijh{k.k esa vius izkFkZuki= esa of.kZr rF;ksa dh iqujko`fr dh gS ftUgs nksgjkus dh
vkSipkfjdrk dj vuko';d :i ls le; dh cckZnh ugha dh tk jgh gS blfy;s mu rF;ksa dks ugha nksgjk;k tk jgk gSA
izkFkhZ gjh'k pUnz us vius izfrijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k gS fd ;g lgh gS fd eSus U;k;ky; esa fu;qfDr i= is'k ugha fd;k gS
vt[kqn dgk fd eSa lQkbZ deZpkjh FkkA eSus esjh osru iphZ is'k ugha dh gSA esjs dks cSad us osru iphZ o fu;qfDr i= ugha
nsus ds lanHkZ esa eSus dksbZ i= ugha fy[kkA ;g dguk lgh gS fd izn'kZ-3 i= eSus gh U;k;ky; esa is'k fd;k gSA ;g lgh gS
fd bl izn'kZ-3 esa ekaxs x;s dkxtkr vkt rd uk rks cSad esa vkSj uk gh U;k;ky; esas is'k fd;s gSA izn'kZ 5, cSad ds ysVj
gsM ij ugha gS QksVks dkWih gSA izn'kZ 5, ij cSad ds fMLisp uEcj Hkh vafdr ugha gSA vly esjs ikl ugha gS blfy;s eSa is'k
ugha dj ldrkA eSus tks nLrkost is'k dj fn;s muds vykok dksbZ nLrkost vkt is'k djus dh fLFkfr esa ugha gwWA ;g
lgh gS fd mDr cSad ,d jk"Vªh;d`r cSad gS ftldh p;u o fu;qfDr dh ,d izfdz;k gksrh gSA eSus fu;qfDr ds igys
fu;qfDr ckcr dksbZ vkosnu ugha fd;k] lk{kkRdkj ugha gqvk rFkk eq>s fu;qfDr i= Hkh ugha fn;k Lor% dgk fd eS vLFkkbZ
lQkbZdehZ Fkk ftlesa bl rjg dh izfdz;k ugha viukbZ tkrh gSA dbZ ckj LFkkbZ djus ds ckjs esa cSad esa cksyk rks dgk x;k
fd tc oSdsalh vk;sxh rc LFkkbZ dj nsaxsA blls lEcfU/kr dksbZ i= esjs ikl ugha gSA
bl ckcr ,-M-2 jke'kadj us vius 'kiFki= esa fy[kk gS fd og gjh'kpUnz dks 25&30 lkyksa ls tkurk gS] vDlj
cSad esa vkus tkus ds dkj.k og izkFkhZ dks tkurk gSA izkFkhZ us 1996 ls o"kZ 2011 rd bykgkckn cSad 'kk[kk _"kHknso]
mn;iqj esa lQkbZ deZpkjh] pijklh] lgk;d dk;Z dks fd;k rFkk vU; dk;Z Hkh fd;sA izkFkhZ }kjk ds'k dkmaVj ij udn
ysu&nsu dk dke Hkh fd;k tkrk jgk gSA xokg us vius izfrijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k gS fd vkt eSa gfj'k ds dgus ls c;ku
nsus vk;k gwWA gfj'k us vHkh fdjk.ks dh nqdku dj j[kh gSA eSus vius 'kiFki= dh lkjh ckrs i<h gS ysfdu bckjr D;k gS
;kn ughA eSus gfj'k dk fu;qfDr i= ugha ns[kk eSus gfj'k dks cSad esa dke djrs gq, ns[kk gSA
bl ckcr ,-M-3 deys'k us vius 'kiFki= esa eq[; :i ls ;gh fy[kk gS fd og foxr 20 o"kksZ ls izkFkhZ gfj'kpUnz
dks tkurk gSA og vDlj cSad tkus ds dkj.k izkFkhZ dks tkurk gSA izkFkhZ us 1996 ls o"kZ 2011 rd bykgkckn cSad 'kk[kk
_"kHknso] mn;iqj esa lQkbZ deZpkjh] pijklh] lgk;d dk;Z dks fd;k rFkk vU; dk;Z Hkh fd;sA izkFkhZ }kjk ds'k dkmaVj
ij udn ysu&nsu dk dke Hkh fd;k tkrk jgk gSA xokg us vius izfrijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k gS fd eSa gfj'k dks cSad esa
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
677
feyus ds vykok gekjh tkfr dk gksus ds dkj.k tkurk gwWA nksuksa _"kHknso ds gksus ls feyrs jgrs gSA ;g lgh gS fd eSus
vius 'kiFki= dh dye la[;k&1 esa of.kZr ikl&cqd dh dkWih U;k;ky; esa is'k ugha dh gSA
bl ckcr ,u , M-1 vk;q"k vxzoky us vius 'kiFki= esa fy[kk gS fd og bafM;u cSad ¼ftls iwoZ esa bykgkckn
cSad ds uke ls tkuk tkrk Fkk½ dh _"kHknso ds'kfj;kth esa 'kk[kk izca/kd ds in ij rSukr gksdj bl izdj.k esa foi{kh cSad
dh vksj ls 'kiFki= izLrqr dj jgk gSA izkFkhZ gfj'k dks dHkh Hkh bykgkckn cSad¼bafM;u cSad½ esa fdlh Hkh in ij dksbZ
fu;qfDr ugha nh xbZA izkFkhZ ls foi{kh cSad }kjk dksbZ dke ugha fy;k x;kA izkFkhZ foi{kh cSad ds fu;fer fu;kstu esa ugha
jgkA izkFkhZ ,oa foi{kh cSad ds e/; deZdkj ,oa fu;kstd ds lEcU/k dHkh ugha jgsA vius izfrijh{k.k esa xokg us dFku
fd;k fd og 29-06-2024 ls 'kk[kk izca/kd ds in ij _"kHknso dslfj;kth esa rSukr gSA eSa twu] 2014 ls bafM;u cSad esa
viuh lsok,sa ns jgk gWwA izn'kZ 5, ij eksgj gekjs cSad dh ugha gS] czkap dksM vafdr ugha gksus ls gekjs cSad dh ugha gSA
'kk[kk esa gfj'k dyky ls lEcfU/kr jsdMZ dh Nkuchu dh ysfdu dksbZ jsdMZ ugha feykA ge cSad dk nl lky dk jsdkMZ
laHkkydj j[krs gSA xokg us bl rF; dks lgh gksuk ekuk gS fd tcko ds vafre i`"B ij tks cSad dh lhy yxh gS ml
ij dksbZ dksM vafdr ugha gS] og blfy;s vafdr ugha gS fg eaMy dk;kZy; dh lhy gS ftl ij dksM uacj vafdr ugha
gksrs D;ksfd cgqr lkjh 'kk[kk;s gksrh gSA
bl ckcr bruk fy[k fn;k tkuk i;kZIr gS fd izkFkhZ dh vksj ls vius izfrijh{k.k esa ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd
mDr cSad ,d jk"Vªh;d`r cSad gS ftldh p;u o fu;qfDr dh ,d izfdz;k gksrh gSA eSus fu;qfDr ckcr dksbZ vkosnu ugha
fd;k] lk{kkRdkj ugha gqvk rFkk eq>s fu;qfDr i= Hkh ugha fn;k x;kA gjh'k pUnz us vius izfrijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k x;k gS
fd eSus U;k;ky; esa fu;qfDr i= is'k ugha fd;k gSA eSus esjh osru iphZ is'k ugha dh gSA esjs dks cSad }kjk osru iphZ o
fu;qfDr i= ugha nsus ds lanHkZ esa eSus dksbZ i= ugha fy[kkA ;g dguk lgh gS fd izn'kZ-3 i= eSus gh U;k;ky; esa is'k
fd;k gSA ;g lgh gS fd bl izn'kZ-3 esa ekaxs x;s dkxtkr vkt rd uk rks cSad esa vkSj uk gh U;k;ky; esas is'k fd;s gSA
bl izdkj Lo;a izkFkhZ dh vksj ls gh izLrqr ekSf[kd ,oa nLrkosth lk{; ls ;g rF; lkfcr ugha gks ikrk gS fd izkFkhZ dks
bykgkckn cSad¼bafM;u cSad½ }kjk fdlh in ij dksbZ fu;qfDr nh tkus ckcr dksbZ fu;qfDr i= tkjh fd;k x;k gks vkSj
izkFkhZ dks cSad }kjk fdlh in ij fu;fer :i ls dksbZ fu;qfDr nh xbZ gksA ;fn izkFkhZ dks cSad }kjk va'kdkfyu lQkbZ
deZpkjh ds in ij Hkh fu;qDr fd;k tkrk rks bl ckcr izkFkhZ dks fdlh u fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ vkns'k rks fn;k tkrk
ysfdu ,slk dksbZ vkns'k Hkh izkFkhZ dh vksj ls is'k ugha fd;k x;k gS ftlls ;g izdV gksrk gks fd izkFkhZ dks va'kdkfyd
:i ls lQkbZ deZpkjh ds in ij foi{kh cSad dh vksj ls j[kk tkdj mldks bl dk;Z gsrq Hkqxrku fd;k x;k gksA izkFkhZ
dh vksj ls izLrqr xokgku dh vksj ls ,sls dksbZ iq[rk dFku ugha fd;s x;s gS ftlls ;g fu"d"kZ fudkyk tk lds fd
izkFkhZ dks cSad }kjk fdlh izdkj ls dksbZ fu;qfDr fdlh in ds fy;s] ;gka rd fd va'kdkfyd lQkbZ deZpkjh ds in ds
fy;s] nh xbZ gks vkSj cSad }kjk izkFkhZ dks fdlh izdkj dk Hkqxrku fd;k tkrk gksA bl izdkj tc izkFkhZ viuh lk{; ls ;g
rF; lkfcr gh ugha dj ik;k gS fd foi{kh cSad }kjk mldks fdlh izdkj ls dksbZ fu;qfDr nh xbZ vkSj cSad }kjk mldks
fdlh dk;Z ds fy;s dksbZ Hkqxrku fd;k x;k rks fQj izkFkhZ dks cSad }kjk fnukad 1-9-2011 ls lsoki`Fkd fd;s tkus dk rF;
drbZ lkfcr ugha gks ik;k gSA bl dkj.k izkFkhZ fnukad 1-9-11 ds ckn ls izkFkhZ ls fdlh izdkj ds osru HkRrs ;k vU; ykHk
ikus dk vf/kdkjh ugha ik;k tkrk gS vkSj izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr gLrxr izkFkZuki= vLohdkj dj [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; ik;k
tkrk gSA
mDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij iapkV bl izdkj ikfjr fd;k tkrk gS fd&
izkFkhZ gfj'k pUnz foi{kh cSad dk dHkh Hkh fu;fer :i ls fu;qDr deZpkjh ugha jgk gS vkSj izkFkhZ dks foi{khx.k dh
vksj ls fdlh izdkj ds dk;Z ds fy;s dksbZ Hkqxrku fd;s tkus dk rF; rFkk izkFkhZ dks fnukad 1-9-2011 ls foi{khx.k dh
vksj ls voS/k :i ls lsoki`Fkd fd;s tkus dk Hkh lkfcr ugha gks ik;k gSA blfy;s izkFkhZ] foi{khx.k ls fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ
jkgr ikus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gS vkSj ,rn~}kjk izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr gLrxr Dyse vk/kkjghu gksus ls vLohdkj dj [kkfjt
fd;k tkrk gSA
iapkV izdk'kukFkZ leqfpr ljdkj dks Hkkjr ljdkj ds le>kSrk vf/kdkjh {kS=h; Je vk;qDr ¼dsUnzh;½ vtesj ds
}kjk tkjh izek.ki= fnukad 09-01-2014 ds Øe esa Hkstk tkosA
¼lq'khy dqekj tSu½
[email protected]; vkt fnukad 27-12-2024 dks [kqys U;k;ky; esa fy[kk;k tkdj lquk;k x;kA
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 222.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार जे. के. नेचुरल माबवल जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री गोृालदास के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट
औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, ईदयृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 05/2020) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 14.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. tsM - 16025/04/2025- vkbZ vkj (एम)-3]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
678
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 222.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 05/2020) of the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court,
Udaipur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to J.K. Natural
Marble Limited and Shri Gopaldas which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 14.02.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025- IR (M)-3]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ihBklhu vf/kdkjh && lq'khy dqekj tSu ¼ ftyk U;k;k/kh'k laoxZ ½
ITR
xksikynkl firk dkywnkl oS".ko] mez 57 o"kZ] fuoklh pkjHkqtk eafnj ds ikl] cMxkWo ftyk mn;iqj ¼jkt-½
izca/kd vjksMkt ts-ds- uspqjy ekcZy] fyfeVsM] eksjoM] dk;kZy;&107 LVkj fgrkokyk dSEil] U;w fczt ds ikl iqyk]
mn;iqj ¼jkt-½
izkFkhZ dh vkSj ls %&Jh lqHkk"k Jhekyh vf/koDrkA
foi{kh dh vkSj ls %&Jh jktsUnz flag pkSgku] vf/koDrkA
Hkkjr ljdkj ds Je ,oa jkstxkj foHkkx dh vf/klwpuk fnukad 27-02-2020 ds tfj;s mi eq[; vk;qDr Je
¼dsUnzh;½ vgenkckn fyad vkfQlj vtesj }kjk fuEukafdr fookn bl U;k;ky; dks vf/kfu.kZ;kFkZ izsf"kr fd;k x;k&
^^Whether the action of the Management of Arora's J.K. Natural Marbles Limited Udaipur in terminating the
service of Shri Gopal Das S/O shri Kalu Das ji Vaishnav w.e.f. 13-11-2019 is legal & justified\ if not, what
relief the concerned workman is entitled and from which date?**
mDr vk”k; dk izlax izkIr gksus ij U;k;ky; }kjk izdj.k ntZ jftLVj fd;k x;k ,oa lEcfU/kr i{kdkjku dks
uksfVl tkjh fd;s x;sA ftl ij izkFkhZ dh vkSj ls Dyse o foi{khx.k dh vkSj ls tckc is'k fd;k x;k A
izkFkhZ dh vksj ls Dyse izkFkZuki= bl vk'k; dk izLrqr fd;k x;k gS fd izkFkhZ dh fu;qfDr foi{kh ds fu;kstu dh
ekbal eksjoM esa bysfDVªf'k;u ds in ij fnukad 16-10-2014 dks 4000@&:i;s izfrekg ij gqbZA izkFkhZ dh lsok larks"kizn
jgus ds dkj.k le;≤ ij izkFkhZ ds osru esa c<ksrjh dh tkrh jgh vkSj izkFkhZ dk vafre osru 16]600@&:i;s izfrekg
FkkA fnukad 01-09-2019 dks og M;wVh ij x;k rks xsV can dj fn;k x;k vkSj dgk fd vki R;kxi= ns nksA mlus tc
R;kxi= nsus ls euk dj fn;k rks fueZy th us dgk fd vkidks ukSdjh ls Åij ds vkns'k ls fudky fn;k x;k gSA bl
ij izkFkhZ us Jheku lgk;d Je vk;qDr¼dsUnzh;½ vtesj ds ;gka izkFkZuki= is'k fd;k ftl ij foi{kh us le>kSrk dj izkFkhZ
dks ukSdjh ij ysus dh ckr dgh ysfdu izkFkhZ dks ukSdjh ij ugha fy;k x;k vkSj fnukad 13-11-2019 dks izkFkhZ dks lsok ls
i`Fkd djus ckcr uksfVl feykA izkFkhZ dks fcuk dksbZ lwpuk fn;s] fcuk dksbZ vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh fd;s] fcuk {kfriwfrZ
fn;s lsok ls i`Fkd dj fn;k x;k tks lsokeqfDr vkS/kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 25 ,Q ds fo:} gksus ls izkFkhZ dh
lsokeqfDr voS/k ,oa 'kwU; gSA izkFkhZ ds ckn okys Jfed vHkh Hkh foi{kh fu;kstu esa dk;Zjr gSA izkFkhZ dk vxLr o flrEcj
2019 dk osru 16]600@&:i;s izfrekg dh nj ls ,oa o"kZ 2018] 2019 dk cksul Hkh cdk;k gSA izkFkhZ us foi{kh ds
fu;kstu esa izR;sd dSys.Mj o"kZ esa 240 fnu ls Hkh vf/kd le; rd viuh lsok,sa nh gSA bu vk/kkjksa ij foi{kh }kjk izkFkhZ
ds lsokeqfDr vkns'k dks voS/k ?kksf"kr dj izkFkhZ dks fnukad 01-09-2019 ls fujUrj lsok esa ekurs gq, izkFkhZ dks iqu% lsok esa
fujarj osru] ofj;rk ,oa vU; ykHkksa lfgr iqufuZ;qfDr dk vkns'k fn;s tkus dk fuosnu fd;k gSA
foi{kh dh vksj ls bldk tcko is'k dj fy[kk x;k gS fd izkFkhZ dks foi{kh laLFkku }kjk fnukad 16-10-2004 dks
fu;kstu esa fy;k x;kA izkFkhZ }kjk vius dk;Z ds nkSjku dnkpj.k dkfjr fd;s x;s ysfdu foi{kh laLFkku }kjk izkFkhZ ds
izfr uje :[k viukrs gq, dksbZ vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh ugha dh xbZA izkFkhZ dk LFkkukarj.k dk;Z dh vko';drk dks ns[krs
gq, jktlean ls elkjks dh vkscjh] dslfj;kth esa fd;k tkdj izkFkhZ dks fnukad 27-08-2019 dks LFkkukarj.k vkns'k fn;k
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
679
x;k ftldks i<dj izkFkhZ us ysus ls badkj dj fn;k vkSj izkFkhZ us vxLr] 2019 lekIr gksus ds ckn ls dke ij vkuk can
dj fn;kA izkFkhZ blds ckn dHkh dk;Z ij mifLFkr ugha gqvkA le>kSrk okrkZ esa Hkh foi{kh laLFkku }kjk izkFkhZ dks dke ij
ysus dh bPNk tkfgj dh xbZ vkSj izkFkhZ ds fnukad 09-11-2019 dks dk;Z gsrq mifLFkr gksus dh ckr r; gqbZ ysfdu izkFkhZ
dHkh mifLFkr ugha gqvkA izkFkhZ dks dk;Z ij mifLFkr gksus gsrq uksfVl izsf"kr fd;s x;s tks izkFkhZ dks le; ij izkIr gks x;s
ysfdu blds mijkar Hkh izkFkhZ mifLFkr ugha gqvk] foi{kh laLFkku }kjk izkFkhZ dks dk;Z ij mifLFkr gksus gsrq uksfVl izsf"kr
fd;s x;s tks izkFkhZ dks le; ij izkIr gks x;s ysfdu izkFkhZ us fQj Hkh foi{kh laLFkku esa fu;kstu ij mifLFkr gksdj vius
drZO; dk ikyu ugha fd;k ftlls Li"V gS fd izkFkhZ dks dk;Z dh dksbZ vko';drk ugha gSA bl dkj.k foi{kh laLFkku
}kjk izkFkhZ dh lsok,a vkns'k fnukad 13-11-2019 ds tfj;s lekIr dj nh xbZA izkFkhZ dk vafre osru 16]600@&:i;s FkkA
izkFkhZ cksul ds ckcr cksul Hkqxrku vf/kfu;e esa jkf'k Dyse dj ldrk gSA ysfdu izkFkhZ cksul jkf'k izkIr djus gsrq
eligible ugha FkkA izkFkhZ }kjk fnukad 16-10-2004 ls fnukad 31-08-2019 rd foi{kh laLFkku esa fujarj lsok,sa ugha nh xbZA
vius fo'ks"k mRrj esa Hkh foi{kh dh vksj ls tcko esa vafdr rF;ksa dks gh nksgjk;k x;k gS ftl dkj.k mu rF;ksa dh
iqujko`fr fd;s tkus dh vko';drk izrhr ugha gksrh gSA foi{kh us ;g Hkh fy[kk gS fd izkFkhZ dks le>kb'k dj izkFkhZ dks
dk;Z ij mifLFkr gksus gsrq funsZf'kr djsA bu vk/kkjksa ij foi{kh laLFkku us izkFkhZ dk Dyse izkFkZuki= [kkfjt fd;s tkus dk
fuosnu fd;k gSA
izkFkhZ lk{; esa izkFkhZ Jfed xksikynkl us crkSj ,-M-1 vius c;ku djokdj viuh lk{; lekIr dhA izkFkhZ dh
vksj ls izn'kZ-,1 yxk;r izn'kZ- ,77 is'k dj iznf'kZr djok;s x;sA foi{kh dh vksj ls vuqjkx ikaMs ,u , MCY;q-1 ds
ekSf[kd dFku ys[kc} djok;s x;s rFkk nLrkosth lk{; esa izn'kZ ,e-1 yxk;r izn'kZ ,e-10 dh izfr is'k dj iznf'kZr
djokbZ xbZ gSA
vf/koDrk foi{kh dh vksj ls U;kf;d n`"Vkar 2005 0 Supreme¼Raj½ 1300 Maharaja Shree Umaid
Mills Ltd v The Judge Labour Court & ors. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4699/2001 is'k fd;k x;k
gSA
bl izdj.k esa eq[; :i ls fuEu fcUnq fu.khZr djus gS&
1-
D;k izkFkhZ Jfed xksikynkl dks foi{kh laLFkku }kjk 13-11-2019 dks lsokeqDr fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa U;k;laxr
gS\ ;fn ugha] rks izkFkhZ fdl fnukad ls fdl jkgr dks ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\
bl fcUnq ds laca/k esa mHk;i{k dh cgl lquh xbZA cgl esa mHk;i{k us ewy:i ls vius vfHkopuksa ds rF;ksa dh
iqujko`fr dh gS blfy;s rF;ksa o rdksZa dh iqujko`fr dh vkSipkfjdrk dj vuko';d le; dh cckZnh ugha dh tk jgh gSaA
bl ckcr izkFkhZ us vius eq[; ijh{k.k ds 'kiFki= esa vius izkFkZuki= esa of.kZr rF;ksa dh iqujko`fr dh gSA ftUgs
nksgjkus dh vkSipkfjdrk dj vuko';d :i ls le; dh cckZnh ugha dh tk jgh gSA izkFkhZ us nkSjkus izfrijh{k.k dFku
fd;k gS fd ;g lgh gS fd Hkqxrku cSad ds tfj;s gksrk Fkk vt[kqn dgk fd o"kZ 2014 ls cSad ls gksrk FkkA cSad ls
Mk;jsDV tek gksrk Fkk mlls iwoZ fyQkQs esa nsrs FksA xokg us ;g Lohdkj fd;k fd izn'kZ ,e-1 ij , ls ch esjs gLrk{kj gS
rFkk izn'kZ ,e-1 fu;qfDr dk gSA izn'kZ ,e-1 ij , ls ch esjs gh vaxzsth esa lkbu gSA fu;qfDr esa of.kZr 'krksZ ds vk/kkj ij
eq>s ukSdjh esa j[kk FkkA eSa vaxzsth ugha tkurk gwWA ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ,e-1 ij eSus LosPNk ls lkbu fd;k gSA izn'kZ ,e-
3 eq>s ugha feyk bl ij , ls ch lkbu dks eS igpkurk gwWA izn'kZ ,e-4 esjs }kjk Hkstk x;k ftl ij , ls ch esjs gLrk{kj
gSA izn'kZ ,e-4 ij izn'kZ ,e-3 dk gokyk gSA izn'kZ ,e-5] 6]7 eq>s ugha feysA izn'kZ ,e-8 feyk FkkA izn'kZ ,e-5 ls izn'kZ
,e-8 ij vuqjkx ikaMs ds lkbu gSA izn'kZ ,e-9 esjs }kjk fy[kk x;k i= gS ftl ij , ls ch esjs lkbu gSA izn'kZ ,e-6 o
7 dk izn'kZ ,e-9 esa gokyk gSA izn'kZ ,-17 ls izn'kZ ,-77 gktjh jftLVj o Hkqxrku i= gSA ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ,-7 o
izn'kZ,-5 ,d gh gSA blh rjg izn'kZ ,e-3 rFkk izn'kZ ,e-6 o izn'kZ ,e-9 ,d gh i= gSA xokg us ;g Hkh dFku fd;k fd
laLFkku us tcko esa dk;Z ij mifLFkr gksus dk izLrko fn;k FkkA vt[kqn dgk fd eSa vkns'kkuqlkj M;wVh ij x;k rFkk th
,e ls feyk rks mUgksus dgk fd rqEgs M;wVh ij ugha ysaxsA ,p vkj ls feyk rks mUgksus dgk fd rqEgs VfeZusV dj fn;k gSA
bl ckcr ,u , M-1 vuqjkx ikaMs us vius 'kiFki= esa rks dekscs'k tcko esa vafdr rF;ksa dh iqujko`fr gh dh gS
ftl dkj.k vc mu rF;ksa dks nksgjk;s tkus dh vko';drk izrhr ugha gksrh gSA xokg us vius izfrijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k
gS fd vkt eq>s ;kn ugha fd izkFkhZ }kjk dkSuls dnkpj.k dkfjr fd;s x;sA geus izkFkhZ ds fo:} vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh
ugha dh ,slh f'kdk;r vkus ij mldks cqykdj ckrphr dh tkrh gSA bl dsl esa izkFkhZ ls lEcfU/kr f'kdk;rs is'k ugha dh
gSA ;g lgh gS fd izkFkhZ }kjk lgk;d Je vk;qDr dsUnzh; ds le{k dh xbZ f'kdk;r ckcr gqbZ le>kSrk okrkZ esa eSus izkFkhZ
dks M;wVh ij ysus dh ckr dgh FkhA ;g lgh gS fd izkFkhZ dks uksfVl nsdj fnukad 13-11-2019 dks lsok ls i`Fkd dj fn;k
Fkk D;ksfd izkFkhZ M;wVh ij ugha vk jgk FkkA ;g lgh gS fd izkFkhZ us fnukad 22-11-2019 dks lsoki`Fkd djus dh f'kdk;r
Hkh lgk;d Je vk;qDr dsUnzh; vtesj dks FkhA ;g lgh gS fd geus izkFkhZ dks jktlean ls dslfj;kth esa LFkkukUrfjr
fd;k FkkA bldh lwpuk izn'kZ ,2- izkFkhZ dks mlh le; ckbZ gs.M nh xbZ FkhA ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ,e-2 ij jlhn ugha gS
D;ksfd izkFkhZ us ysus ls badkj dj fn;k FkkA ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ,e-2 ij izkFkhZ }kjk euk fd;s tkus dk ekdkZ ugha gSA
;g lgh gS fd bl ij fMLisp uEcj ugha gS D;ksfd ,slk jftLVj gekjs ;gka ugha gSA izkFkhZ ds }kjk ysVj ysus ls euk djus
ij geus mls fyf[kr esa dksbZ uksfVl ugha fn;k cfYd mls ekSf[kd :i ls dgk x;k FkkA izn'kZ ,e-3]5]6]7]8 Mkd ls Hkstk
Fkk bldh jlhn is'k ugh gSA ;g dguk lgh gS fd geus xksikynkl dh flrEcj ls fnlEcj] 2019 dh gktjh is'k ugha
680
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
dh gS tks ekaxh ugha blfy;s is'k ugha dhA ;g lgh gS fd izkFkhZ ds ckn mldh txg ij nwljk etnwj dke dj jgk gS
vt[kqn dgk fd vkt Hkh budh txg [kkyh gSA ;g dguk lgh gS fd geus izkFkhZ dks fudkyus ds igys uksfVl ugha
fn;kA ;g lgh gS fd izkFkhZ dks {kfriwfrZ jkf'k ugha nhA geus izkFkhZ dks izn'kZ ,e-8 fu"dklu i= fn;k FkkA izkFkhZ orZeku esa
dgkW dke djrk gS og eSa ugha crk ldrkA
bl izdkj tgka izkFkhZ foi{kh }kjk mldks fcuk dksbZ dk;Zokgh fd;s lsoki`Fkd fd;s tkus dk dFku djrk gS ogha
foi{kh dk xokg Hkh vius izfrijh{k.k esa ;g Lohdkj djrk gS fd mUgksus izkFkhZ ds fo:} vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh ugha dhA
bl dsl esa izkFkhZ ls lEcfU/kr f'kdk;rs is'k ugha dhA le>kSrk okrkZ ds nkSjku Hkh izkFkhZ dks M;wVh ij ysus dh ckr dgh
FkhA izkFkhZ dks geus uksfVl nsdj fnukad 13-11-2019 dks lsoki`Fkd dj fn;k D;ksfd og ukSdjh ij ugha vk jgk FkkA bl
izdkj tc foi{kh Lo;a dh vksj ls ;g Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS fd muds }kjk izkFkhZ ds fo:} dksbZ vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh
ugha dh xbZ] izkFkhZ ds fo:} f'kdk;rsa U;k;ky; esa is'k ugha dh xbZ vkSj le>kSrk okrkZ ds nkSjku Hkh izkFkhZ dks M;wVh ij
ysus dh ckr dgh FkhA foi{kh us tcko esa ;g Hkh fy[kk gS fd os vkt Hkh izkFkhZ dks M;wVh ij ysus dks rS;kj gSA foi{kh ds
xokg us nkSjkus izfrijh{k.k ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k gS fd izn'kZ ,e-2 ij fMLisp uEcj ugha gSA xokg us ;g Hkh Lohdkj
fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ dks fudkyus ls igys uksfVl ugha fn;k FkkA izkFkhZ dks {kfriwfrZ jkf'k ugha nh FkhA izkFkhZ ds ckn mldh
txg ij nwljk etnwj dke dj jgk gS vt[kqn dgk fd vkt Hkh bldh txg [kkyh gSA bl izdkj foi{kh Lo;a dh
LohdkjksfDr ls gh ;g rF; Li"V gks tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ ds fo:} muds }kjk dksbZ vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh ugha dh xbZ
vkSj mldks fdlh izdkj ls dksbZ naM Hkh ugha fn;k x;k rFkk ek= }kjk ukSdjh ij ugha vkus ds dkj.k mldks lsoki`Fkd
dj fn;k x;k gSA fdlh Hkh laLFkku esa fdlh Hkh deZpkjh dks lsoki`Fkd djus ds fy;s fu/kkZfjr fu;eksa ds vuqlkj dk;Zokgh
djds gh fdlh izkFkhZ dks lsoki`Fkd fd;k tk ldrk gS ysfdu gLrxr izdj.k esa u rks izkFkhZ ds f[kykQ dksbZ
vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh dh xbZ vkSj u gh fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ tkap dh tkdj izkFkhZ dks nks"kh ik;s tkus ij mldks
lsoki`Fkd fd;k x;k gSA bl izdkj foi{kh Lo;a dh nkSjkus lk{; dh xbZ LohdkjksfDr;ksa ls gh ;g rF; lkfcr gks tkrk gS
fd foi{kh }kjk izkFkhZ dks lsoki`Fkd fd;s tkus dk vkns'k vuqfpr ,oa voS/k gSA foi{kh dh vksj ls ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k
x;k gS fd izkFkhZ dk in vkt Hkh [kkyh gSA tc foi{kh }kjk izkFkhZ dks vuqfpr ,oa voS/k :i ls lsoki`Fkd fd;k x;k gS rks
izkFkhZ fuf'pr :i ls mldks lsoki`Fkd fd;s tkus dh fnukad ls lsokfuo`fr dh fnukad rd mldks feyus okys leLr ykHk]
ifjykHk tks lsok esa jgrs gq, feyrs] vkfn izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ik;k tkrk gSA
bl ckcr vf/koDrk foi{kh dh vksj ls izLrqr U;kf;d n`"VkUr ds rF; gLrxr izdj.k ds rF;ksa ls fHkUu gksus ds
dkj.k blls foi{kh dks dksbZ ykHk ugha fey ldrk gSA D;wfd U;kf;d n`"VkUr okys izdj.k esa foi{kh uEcj&2 }kjk lCth
dh nqdku pyk;s tkus dk dke djuk vihykFkhZ }kjk crk;k x;k Fkk ysfdu gLrxr izdj.k esa foi{kh dh vksj ls ,sls dksbZ
rF; ugha crk;s x;s gS fd foi{kh dksbZ dke /ka/kk djds vk; vftZr djrk gks ftl dkj.k og dksbZ jkf'k ikus dk vf/kdkjh
ugha gksA
gLrxr izdj.k esa pwWfd izkFkhZ us fnukad 01-09-2019 ls vc rd okLro esa foi{kh ds ;gka viuh lsok,sa ugha nh gSA
vr% izkFkhZ U;kf;d n`"VkUr 1999 ,y , ch vkbZ lh ist 619 ,e lh Mh cuke izoh.k dqekj tSu o vU; esa izfrikfnr
fl}kUr ds izdk'k esa fnukad 01-09-2019 ls lsokfuo`fr dh fnukad rd ds mldks lsok esa jgrs gq, feyus okys leLr osru]
HkRrksa o ifjykHkksa dk 50 izfr'kr fgLlk izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA izkFkhZ dks bl izdkj feyus okyh jkf'k ij fu;ekuqlkj
vk;dj Hkqxrku ds ckn gh izkFkhZ mDr jkf'k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA
mDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij
bl izdkj ikfjr fd;k tkrk gS fd&
izkFkhZ dks foi{kh }kjk fnukad 01-09-2019 ls voS/k :i ls lsoki`Fkd dj fn;k x;k gSA izkFkhZ dks iqu% lsok esa
cgky djus vkSj izkFkhZ dks fnukad 01-09-2019 ls lsokfuo`fr rd dh vof/k esa muds lsok esa jgrs gq, feyus okys osru]
HkRrs vkfn ifjykHk dk 50 izfr'kr fgLlk fnyk;k tkuk U;k;laxr ik;k tkrk gSA izkFkhZ dks bl izdkj feyus okyh leLr
jkf'k ij fu;ekuqlkj vk;dj dVkSrh ds i'pkr~ feyus okyh jkf'k izkFkhZ foi{kh ls izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA foi{kh]
izkFkhZ dks iqu% lsok esa cgky djs vkSj fnukad 01-09-2019 ls ysdj mldh fu;ekuqlkj lsokfuo`fr dh fnukad rd ns;
leLr osru] HkRrksa ifjykHk dh jkf'k dk 50 izfr'kr vnk djsA
iapkV izdk'kukFkZ Hkkjr ljdkj ds Je ,oa jkstxkj foHkkx dh vf/klwpuk fnukad 27-02-2020 ds rgr mi eq[;
vk;qDr Je ¼dsUnzh;½ vgenkckn fyad vkfQlj vtesj dks Hkstk tkosA
¼lq'khy dqekj tSu½
[email protected]; vkt fnukad 17-12-2024 dks [kqys U;k;ky; esa fy[kk;k tkdj lquk;k x;kA
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 223.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार जे. के. नेचुरल माबवल जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री बाबू ससह के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट
औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, ईदयृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 04/2020) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 14.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. tsM - 16025/04/2025- vkbZ vkj (एम)-4]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
681
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 223.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 04/2020) of the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court,
Udaipur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to J.K. Natural
Marble Limited and Shri Babu Singh which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 14.02.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025- IR (M)-4]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ihBklhu vf/kdkjh && lq'khy dqekj tSu ¼ ftyk U;k;k/kh'k laoxZ ½
ITR
ckcw flag firk dslj flag pq.Mkor] mez 44 o"kZ] fuoklh ckgjh Hkkx ik[kaM] rglhy ukFk}kjk ftyk jktlean ¼jkt-½
izca/kd vjksMkt ts-ds- uspqjy ekcZy] fyfeVsM] eksjoM] dk;kZy;&107 LVkj fgrkokyk dSEil] U;w fczt ds ikl iqyk]
mn;iqj ¼jkt-½
izkFkhZ dh vkSj ls %&Jh lqHkk"k Jhekyh vf/koDrkA
foi{kh dh vkSj ls %&Jh jktsUnz flag pkSgku] vf/koDrkA
Hkkjr ljdkj ds Je ,oa jkstxkj foHkkx dh vf/klwpuk fnukad 27-02-2020 ds tfj;s mi eq[; vk;qDr Je
¼dsUnzh;½ vgenkckn fyad vkfQlj vtesj }kjk fuEukafdr fookn bl U;k;ky; dks vf/kfu.kZ;kFkZ izsf"kr fd;k x;k&
^^Whether the action of the Management of Arora's J.K. Natural Marbles Limited Udaipur in terminating the
services of Shri Babu Singh ChundavatS/O shri Kesar Singh w.e.f. 12-12-2019 is legal & justified\ if not,
what relief the concerned workman is entitled and from which date?**
mDr vk”k; dk izlax izkIr gksus ij U;k;ky; }kjk izdj.k ntZ jftLVj fd;k x;k ,oa lEcfU/kr i{kdkjku dks
uksfVl tkjh fd;s x;sA ftl ij izkFkhZ dh vkSj ls Dyse o foi{khx.k dh vkSj ls tckc is'k fd;k x;k A
izkFkhZ dh vksj ls Dyse izkFkZuki= bl vk'k; dk izLrqr fd;k x;k gS fd izkFkhZ dh fu;qfDr foi{kh ds fu;kstu dh
ekbal eksjoM esa gkbMªk vkWijsVj ds in ij fnukad 01-01-2007 dks 4000@&:i;s izfrekg ij gqbZA izkFkhZ dh lsok
larks"kizn jgus ds dkj.k le;≤ ij izkFkhZ ds osru esa c<ksrjh dh tkrh jgh vkSj izkFkhZ dk vafre osru
14]000@&:i;s izfrekg FkkA fnukad 11-09-2019 dks og M;wVh ij x;k rks xsV can dj fn;k x;k vkSj dgk fd vki
R;kxi= ns nksA mlus tc R;kxi= nsus ls euk dj fn;k rks fueZy th us dgk fd vkidks ukSdjh ls Åij ds vkns'k ls
fudky fn;k x;k gSA bl ij izkFkhZ us Jheku lgk;d Je vk;qDr¼dsUnzh;½ vtesj ds ;gka izkFkZuki= is'k fd;k ftl ij
foi{kh us le>kSrk dj izkFkhZ dks ukSdjh ij ysus dh ckr dgh ysfdu izkFkhZ dks ukSdjh ij ugha fy;k x;k vkSj fnukad 12-
12-2019 dks izkFkhZ dks lsok ls i`Fkd djus ckcr uksfVl feykA izkFkhZ dks fcuk dksbZ lwpuk fn;s] fcuk dksbZ vuq'kklukRed
dk;Zokgh fd;s] fcuk {kfriwfrZ fn;s lsok ls i`Fkd dj fn;k x;k tks lsokeqfDr vkS/kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 25 ,Q
ds fo:} gksus ls izkFkhZ dh lsokeqfDr voS/k ,oa 'kwU; gSA izkFkhZ ds ckn okys Jfed vHkh Hkh foi{kh fu;kstu esa dk;Zjr gS
ftlls QLVZ de ykLV xks okys fl}kar ds fo:} gksus ls izkFkhZ dh lsokeqfDr voS/k ,oa 'kwU; gSA izkFkhZ us foi{kh ds
fu;kstu esa izR;sd dSys.Mj o"kZ esa 240 fnu ls Hkh vf/kd le; rd viuh lsok,sa nh gSA bl izdkj izkFkhZ dks fcuk fof/kd
izfdz;k viuk;s lsok ls i`Fkd dj fn;k x;k gS ftl dkj.k izkFkhZ dh lsokeqfDr voS/k ,oa 'kwU; gSA bu vk/kkjksa ij foi{kh
}kjk tkjh izkFkhZ ds lsokeqfDr vkns'k fnukad 12-12-09 dks voS/k ?kksf"kr dj izkFkhZ dks fnukad 01-09-2019 ls fujUrj lsok esa
ekurs gq, izkFkhZ dks iqu% lsok esa fujarj osru] ofj;rk ,oa vU; ykHkksa lfgr iqufuZ;qfDr dk vkns'k fn;s tkus dk fuosnu
fd;k gSA
foi{kh dh vksj ls bldk tcko is'k dj fy[kk gS fd izkFkhZ dks foi{kh laLFkku }kjk fnukad 01-01-2007 ls
fu;kstu esa ugha fy;k x;k cfYd izkFkhZ fnukad 08-08-2007 ls foi{kh laLFkku esa crkSj gkbMªk vkWijsVj dk;Zjr jgk gSA izkFkhZ
682
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
dk ekfld osru 4000@&:i;s FkkA izkFkhZ dk vafre osru 14]000@&:i;s ekfld ugha gksdj 13]855@&:i;s ekfld
FkkA izkFkhZ }kjk vius dk;Z ds nkSjku dnkpj.k dkfjr fd;s x;s ysfdu foi{kh laLFkku }kjk izkFkhZ ds izfr uje :[k viukrs
gq, dksbZ vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh ugha dh xbZA izkFkhZ dh tkudkjh esa ;g rF; vk x;k Fkk fd mldk LFkkukarj.k dk;Z dh
vko';drk dks ns[krs gq, jktlean ls elkjks dh vkscjh] dslfj;kth esa fd;k tkuk gSA foi{kh laLFkku }kjk izkFkhZ dks
fnukad 27-08-2019 dks LFkkukarj.k vkns'k fn;k x;k ftldks i<dj izkFkhZ us ysus ls badkj dj fn;kA izkFkhZ us fnukad 11-
09-2019 ls gh dk;Z ij vkuk can dj fn;kA izkFkhZ blds ckn dHkh dk;Z ij mifLFkr ugha gqvkA le>kSrk okrkZ esa Hkh
foi{kh laLFkku }kjk izkFkhZ dks dke ij ysus dh bPNk tkfgj dh xbZ vkSj dgk x;k fd izkFkhZ ;fn dke djuk pkgrs rks
foi{kh laLFkku izkFkhZ dks leku in ij dk;Z ij ysus dks rS;kj gS vkSj izkFkhZ pkgs rks dy ls gh vius dk;Z ij mifLFkr gks
ldrk gSA izkFkhZ ds fnukad 13-11-2019 dks dk;Z gsrq mifLFkr gksus dh ckr r; gqbZ ysfdu izkFkhZ blds i'pkr~ dHkh foi{kh
laLFkku esa mifLFkr ugha gqvkA izkFkhZ dks dk;Z ij mifLFkr gksus gsrq uksfVl izsf"kr fd;s x;s tks izkFkhZ dks le; ij izkIr gks
x;s ysfdu blds mijkar Hkh izkFkhZ mifLFkr ugha gqvk ftlls Li"V gS fd izkFkhZ dks dk;Z dh dksbZ vko';drk ugha gSA bl
dkj.k foi{kh laLFkku }kjk izkFkhZ dh lsok,a vkns'k fnukad 12-12-2019 ls lekIr dj nh xbZA izkFkhZ }kjk foi{kh laLFkku
esa izR;sd dSys.Mj o"kZ esa 240 fnol ls vf/kd dk;Z ugha fd;k x;kA foi{kh laLFkku }kjk izkFkhZ dh voS/kkfud vuqifLFkfr
ds lanHkZ esa ckj&ckj uksfVl fn;s x;s ijarq izkFkhZ mifLFkr ugha gqvk ftl dkj.k izkFkhZ dks lsokeqDr fd;k x;kA vius
fo'ks"k mRrj esa Hkh foi{kh dh vksj ls tcko esa vafdr rF;ksa dks gh nksgjk;k x;k gS ftl dkj.k mu rF;ksa dh iqujko`fr
fd;s tkus dh vko';drk izrhr ugha gksrh gSA foi{kh us ;g Hkh fy[kk gS fd izkFkhZ dks le>kb'k dj izkFkhZ dks dk;Z ij
mifLFkr gksus gsrq funsZf'kr djsA bu vk/kkjksa ij foi{kh laLFkku us izkFkhZ dk Dyse izkFkZuki= [kkfjt fd;s tkus dk fuosnu
fd;k gSA
izkFkhZ lk{; esa izkFkhZ Jfed ckcw flag us crkSj ,-M-1 vius c;ku djokdj viuh lk{; lekIr dhA izkFkhZ dh vksj
ls izn'kZ-1 yxk;r izn'kZ- 7 is'k dj iznf'kZr djok;s x;sA foi{kh dh vksj ls vuqjkx ikaMs ,u , MCY;q-1 ds ekSf[kd dFku
ys[kc} djok;s x;s rFkk nLrkosth lk{; esa izn'kZ ,e-1 yxk;r izn'kZ ,e-21 dh izfr is'k dj iznf'kZr djokbZ xbZ gSA
vf/koDrk foi{kh dh vksj ls U;kf;d n`"Vkar 2005 0 Supreme¼Raj½ 1300 Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd v
The Judge Labour Court & ors. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4699/2001 is'k fd;k x;k gSA
bl izdj.k esa eq[; :i ls fuEu fcUnq fu.khZr djus gS&
1-
D;k izkFkhZ Jfed ckcw flag dks foi{kh laLFkku }kjk 12-12-2019 dks lsokeqDr fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa U;k;laxr gS\
;fn ugha] rks izkFkhZ fdl fnukad ls fdl jkgr dks ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\
bl fcUnq ds laca/k esa mHk;i{k dh cgl lquh xbZA cgl esa mHk;i{k us ewy:i ls vius vfHkopuksa ds rF;ksa dh
iqujko`fr dh gS blfy;s rF;ksa o rdksZa dh iqujko`fr dh vkSipkfjdrk dj vuko';d le; dh cckZnh ugha dh tk jgh gSaA
bl ckcr izkFkhZ us vius eq[; ijh{k.k ds 'kiFki= esa vius izkFkZuki= esa of.kZr rF;ksa dh iqujko`fr dh gSA ftUgs
nksgjkus dh vkSipkfjdrk dj vuko';d :i ls le; dh cckZnh ugha dh tk jgh gSA izkFkhZ us nkSjkus izfrijh{k.k dFku
fd;k gS fd ;g lgh gS fd esjs ikl fnukad 01-01-2007 dks fu;qfDr gksus ds lEcU/k esa dksbZ nLrkost rFkk fu;qfDr i=
ugha gSA esjs dks Hkqxrku cSad ds }kjk gksrk FkkA ;g esjs dks irk ugha fd fnukad 06-01-2020 dks 11]799@&:i;s dk
Hkqxrku tfj;s pSd izkIr gqvk gks tks izn'kZ ,e-1 ds , ls ch Hkkx esa vafdr gksA ;g esjh tkudkjh esa ugh vk;k Fkk fd esjk
LFkkukarj.k ekbZUl esa dj fn;k gksA ;g xyr gS fd izn'kZ ,e-2 LFkkukarj.k vkns'k esjs dks fn;k gks ftls eSus i<dj ysus
ls badkj dj fn;k gksA izn'kZ ,e-3 i= esjs dks izkIr ugha gqvk FkkA izn'kZ ,e-4 ij , ls ch LFkku ij esjs gLrk{kj gSA
izn'kZ ,e-4 dh esjs dks tkudkjh gSA ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ,e-4 20-09-2019 ds izca/ku ds lnaHkZ esa gSA izn'kZ ,e-5] 6 o 7
esjs dks ugha feysA budh eq>s dksbZ tkudkjh ugha gSA izn'kZ ,e-8 ij , ls ch esjs gLrk{kj gS tks esjs }kjk fy[kokbZ xbZ Fkh
tc fgj.kexjh esa f'kdk;r djrs oDr fy[kok;k FkkA izn'kZ ,e-9 esjs dks izkIr gqvk ftldh tkudkjh eq>s gSA eSa fnukad
13-11-2019 dks dke ij x;k Fkk ml fnu esjh gktjh yxh Fkh ftldk esjs dks dksbZ Hkqxrku ugha fd;kA ;g lgh gS fd
izn'kZ 5 eSus foi{kh dks dks Hkstk mldh ikorh ;k iksLVy jlhn ugha gSA izkFkhZ dh mifLFkfr 'khV vizSy 2015 ls uoEcj]
2019 rd izn'kZ ,e-10 yxk;r izn'kZ ,e-20 rFkk Hkqxrku dh 'khV izn'kZ ,e-21 gS tks 51 i`"Bks esa gSA
bl ckcr ,u , M-1 vuqjkx ikaMs us vius 'kiFki= esa rks dekscs'k tcko esa vafdr rF;ksa dh iqujko`fr gh dh gS
ftl dkj.k vc mu rF;ksa dks nksgjk;s tkus dh vko';drk izrhr ugha gksrh gSA xokg us vius izfrijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k
gS fd vkt eq>s ;kn ugha fd izkFkhZ }kjk dkSuls dnkpj.k dkfjr fd;s x;sA geus izkFkhZ ds fo:} vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh
ugha dh ,slh f'kdk;r vkus ij mldks cqykdj ckrphr dh tkrh gSA bl dsl esa izkFkhZ ls lEcfU/kr f'kdk;rs is'k ugha dh
gSA ;g lgh gS fd 11-09-2019 dks ukSdjh ls fudkyus dh f'kdk;r izkFkhZ }kjk lgk;d Je vk;qDr dsUnzh; ds le{k dh
xbZA f'kdk;r ckcr gqbZ le>kSrk okrkZ esa eSus izkFkhZ dks M;wVh ij ysus dh ckr dgh FkhA ;g lgh gS fd izkFkhZ dks uksfVl
nsdj fnukad 12-12-2019 dks lsok ls i`Fkd dj fn;k Fkk D;ksfd izkFkhZ M;wVh ij ugha vk jgk FkkA ;g lgh gS fd izkFkhZ us
fnukad 12-12-2019 dks lsoki`Fkd djus dh f'kdk;r Hkh lgk;d Je vk;qDr dsUnzh; vtesj dks FkhA ;g lgh gS fd geus
izkFkhZ dks gkbMªk ls ok;jlk fMikVZesaV esa LFkkukUrfjr fd;k Fkk D;ksfd izkFkhZ ds ikl gkbMªk dk ykblsal ugha FkkA bldh
lwpuk izn'kZ ,e2- izkFkhZ dks mlh le; ckbZ gs.M nh xbZ FkhA ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ,e-2 ij jlhn ugha gS D;ksfd izkFkhZ us
ysus ls badkj dj fn;k FkkA ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ,e-2 ij izkFkhZ }kjk euk fd;s tkus dk ekdkZ ugha gSA ;g lgh gS fd
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
683
bl ij fMLisp uEcj ugha gS D;ksfd ,slk jftLVj gekjs ;gka ugha gSA izkFkhZ ds }kjk ysVj ysus ls euk djus ij geus mls
fyf[kr esa dksbZ uksfVl ugha fn;k cfYd mls ekSf[kd :i ls dgk FkkA izn'kZ ,e-3]5]6]7]9 Mkd ls Hkstk Fkk bldh jlhns
is'k ugh dh gSA ;g dguk lgh gS fd geus ckcw flag dh fnlEcj] 2019 dh gktjh is'k ugha dh gS tks ekaxh ugha blfy;s
is'k ugha dhA ;g lgh gS fd izkFkhZ ds ckn mldh txg ij nwljk etnwj dke dj jgk gS vt[kqn dgk fd vkt Hkh
budh txg [kkyh gSA ;g dguk lgh gS fd geus izkFkhZ dks fudkyus ds igys uksfVl ugha fn;kA ;g lgh gS fd izkFkhZ dks
{kfriwfrZ jkf'k ugha nhA geus izkFkhZ dks izn'kZ ,e-9 fu"dklu i= fn;k FkkA izkFkhZ orZeku esa dgkW dke djrk gS og eSa ugha
crk ldrkA
bl izdkj tgka izkFkhZ foi{kh }kjk mldks fcuk dksbZ dk;Zokgh fd;s lsoki`Fkd fd;s tkus dk dFku djrk gS ogha
foi{kh dk xokg Hkh vius izfrijh{k.k esa ;g Lohdkj djrk gS fd mUgksus izkFkhZ ds fo:} vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh ugha dhA
bl dsl esa izkFkhZ ls lEcfU/kr f'kdk;rs is'k ugha dhA le>kSrk okrkZ ds nkSjku Hkh izkFkhZ dks M;wVh ij ysus dh ckr dgh
FkhA izkFkhZ dks geus uksfVl nsdj fnukad 12-12-2019 dks lsoki`Fkd dj fn;k D;ksfd og ukSdjh ij ugha vk jgk FkkA bl
izdkj foi{kh Lo;a dh vksj ls ;g Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS fd muds }kjk izkFkhZ ds fo:} dksbZ vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh ugha
dh xbZ] izkFkhZ ds fo:} f'kdk;rsa U;k;ky; esa is'k ugha dh xbZ vkSj le>kSrk okrkZ ds nkSjku Hkh izkFkhZ dks M;wVh ij ysus
dh ckr dgh FkhA foi{kh us tcko esa ;g Hkh fy[kk gS fd os vkt Hkh izkFkhZ dks M;wVh ij ysus dks rS;kj gSA foi{kh ds
xokg us nkSjkus izfrijh{k.k ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k gS fd izn'kZ ,e-2 ij fMLisp uEcj ugha gSA xokg us ;g Hkh Lohdkj
fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ dks fudkyus ls igys uksfVl ugha fn;k FkkA izkFkhZ dks {kfriwfrZ jkf'k ugha nh FkhA izkFkhZ ds ckn mldh
txg ij nwljk etnwj dke dj jgk gS vt[kqn dgk fd vkt Hkh bldh txg [kkyh gSA bl izdkj foi{kh Lo;a dh
LohdkjksfDr ls gh ;g rF; Li"V gks tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ ds fo:} muds }kjk dksbZ vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh ugha dh xbZ
vkSj mldks fdlh izdkj ls dksbZ naM Hkh ugha fn;k x;k rFkk ek= izkFkhZ }kjk ukSdjh ij ugha vkus ds dkj.k mldks
lsoki`Fkd dj fn;k x;k gSA fdlh Hkh laLFkku esa fdlh Hkh deZpkjh dks lsoki`Fkd djus ds fy;s fu/kkZfjr fu;eksa ds vuqlkj
dk;Zokgh djds gh fdlh izkFkhZ dks lsoki`Fkd fd;k tk ldrk gS ysfdu gLrxr izdj.k esa u rks izkFkhZ ds f[kykQ dksbZ
vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh dh xbZ vkSj u gh fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ tkap dh tkdj izkFkhZ dks nks"kh ik;s tkus ij mldks
lsoki`Fkd fd;k x;k gSA bl izdkj foi{kh Lo;a dh lk{; ls gh ;g rF; lkfcr gks tkrk gS fd foi{kh }kjk izkFkhZ dks
lsoki`Fkd fd;s tkus dk vkns'k vuqfpr ,oa voS/k gSA foi{kh dh vksj ls ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS fd izkFkhZ dk in
vkt Hkh [kkyh gSA tc foi{kh }kjk izkFkhZ dks vuqfpr ,oa voS/k :i ls lsoki`Fkd fd;k x;k gS rks izkFkhZ fuf'pr :i ls
mldks lsoki`Fkd fd;s tkus dh fnukad ls lsokfuo`fr dh fnukad rd mldks feyus okys leLr ykHk] ifjykHk tks lsok esa
jgrs gq, feyrs] vkfn izkIr djus dk rFkk fnukad 01-09-2019 ls iqu% lsok cgkyh dk vf/kdkjh ik;k tkrk gSA
bl ckcr vf/koDrk foi{kh dh vksj ls izLrqr U;kf;d n`"VkUr ds rF; gLrxr izdj.k ds rF;ksa ls fHkUu gksus ds
dkj.k blls foi{kh dks dksbZ ykHk ugha fey ldrk gSA D;wfd U;kf;d n`"VkUr okys izdj.k esa foi{kh uEcj&2 }kjk lCth
dh nqdku pyk;s tkus dk dke djuk vihykFkhZ }kjk crk;k x;k Fkk ysfdu gLrxr izdj.k esa foi{kh dh vksj ls ,sls dksbZ
rF; ugha crk;s x;s gS fd foi{kh dksbZ dke /ka/kk djds vk; vftZr djrk gks ftl dkj.k og dksbZ jkf'k ikus dk vf/kdkjh
ugha gksA
gLrxr izdj.k esa pwWfd izkFkhZ us fnukad 11-09-2019 ls vc rd okLro esa foi{kh ds ;gka viuh lsok,sa ugha nh gSA
vr% izkFkhZ U;kf;d n`"VkUr 1999 ,y , ch vkbZ lh ist 619 ,e lh Mh cuke izoh.k dqekj tSu o vU; esa izfrikfnr
fl}kUr ds izdk'k esa fnukad 01-09-2019 ls vkt fnukad rd ds mldks lsok esa jgrs gq, feyus okys leLr osru]HkRrksa
ifjykHkksa dk 50 izfr'kr fgLlk izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA blh izdkj izkFkhZ dk lsokeqfDr vkns'k voS/k ,oa 'kwU; gksus ls
izkFkhZ iqu% lsokcgkyh dk vf/kdkjh gSA izkFkhZ dks bl izdkj feyus okyh jkf'k ij fu;ekuqlkj vk;dj Hkqxrku ds ckn gh
izkFkhZ mDr jkf'k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA
mDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij
bl izdkj ikfjr fd;k tkrk gS fd&
izkFkhZ dks foi{kh }kjk fnukad 12-12-2019 ls voS/k :i ls lsoki`Fkd dj fn;k x;k gS blfy;s foi{kh izkFkhZ dks
iqu% lsok esa cgky djs rFkk izkFkhZ dks fnukad 01-09-2019 ls vc rd dh vof/k esa mlds lsok esa jgrs gq, feyus okys
osru] HkRrs vkfn ifjykHk dk 50 izfr'kr fgLlk fnyk;k tkuk U;k;laxr ik;k tkrk gSA izkFkhZ dks bl izdkj feyus okyh
leLr jkf'k ij fu;ekuqlkj vk;dj dVkSrh ds i'pkr~ feyus okyh jkf'k izkFkhZ foi{kh ls izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA
foi{kh] izkFkhZ dks rqjar iqu% lsok esa cgky djs rFkk fnukad 01-09-2019 ls ysdj vkt fnukad rd dks] mlds lsok esa jgrs
gq, feyus okys osru] HkRrs rFkk feyus okys leLr ykHk] ifjykHk dh jkf'k dk 50 izfr'kr vnk djsA
iapkV izdk'kukFkZ Hkkjr ljdkj ds Je ,oa jkstxkj foHkkx dh vf/klwpuk fnukad 27-02-2020 ds rgr mi eq[;
vk;qDr Je ¼dsUnzh;½ vgenkckn fyad vkfQlj vtesj dks Hkstk tkosA
¼lq'khy dqekj tSu½
[email protected]; vkt fnukad 17-12-2024 dks [kqys U;k;ky; esa fy[kk;k tkdj lquk;k x;kA
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 224.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय सरकार
मेससव होिी जसक्योररटी आंजडया प्राआवेट जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री संदीृ कुिवाहा के बीच ऄनुबंध
में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हजदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- सीजीअइटी/एलटी/-
684
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
अरसी/56/2024) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के
साथ 14.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. tsM - 16025/04/2024- vkbZ vkj (एम)-156]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 224.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. CGIT/LC/-RC/56/2024) of the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to M/s Hoshi Security India Pvt. Ltd. and Sri Sandeep Kushwaha which was received along
with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 14.02.2025.
[No. L-16025/04/2024- IR (M)-156]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/56/2024
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..(Retd)
Sandeep Kushwaha
Adarsh Nagar, Nai Basti, Ward No. 13
Galla Mandi ke Pichhe, Satna
M.P. - 485005
Workman
Versus
M/s. Hoshi Security India Pvt. Ltd.
E-12A, M.B. Road
New Delhi.
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 11th day of November-2024)
As per letter dated 13/06/2024 by the Deputy Labur Commissioner (Central) Jabalpur, Ministry of Labour,
the reference is made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as per Notification No. J-
5(10)/2023-ALC dt. 13/06/2024. The dispute under reference relates to:
“Whether, the action of the employer M/s. Hoshi Security India Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi contractor of
Sangmaniya Line Stone Mines, Satna in terminating the services of Shri Sandeep Kushwaha is legal, valid &
justified ? If not, what relief the workman is entitled for ?”
After registering a case on the basis of the reference, notices were sent to the parties.
The workman appeared and filed an application with his photocopy of Aadhar Card as his identity proof,
stating that he has been employed by the management, hence no dispute remains to be decided. He requests that, the
reference be answered accordingly.
Since, the dispute has now ceased to exist between the parties, the reference has become in fructuous and is
answered accordingly.
DATE:- 11/11/2024
P. K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
685
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 225.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय सरकार स्ट्टील
ऄथॉररटी ऑफ़ आंजडया जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री ृफुल्ला कुमार से ी के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट
केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, भुबनेश्वर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 06/2022) को जजसा दक
ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 14.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ
था l
[सं. tsM - 16025/04/2025- vkbZ vkj (एम)-1]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 225.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 06/2022) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Steel Authority of India Limited and Shri Pafulla Kumar Sethi which was received along with soft copy
of the award by the Central Government on 14.02.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025- IR (M)-1]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 06/2022
Filed under Section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act
Date of Passing Order – 26th November, 2024
Between :-
Shri Pafulla Kumar Sethi,
At. Harishankarpur, Po. Jitanga,
Dist. Balasore, Odisha – 756 127
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The Chief General Manager (Mechanical),
Steel Authority of India Limited,
Rourkela Steel Plant, At. Rourkela,
Dist. Sundargarh.
…
Management.
Appearances:
Sri Nitish Kr. Mishra,
…
For the Applicant-Workman.
Advocate.
Sri Subrat Kumar Mishra, …
For the Management.
Advocate.
686
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ORDER
This is an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
(herein-after referred as an ―Act‖).
2. The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim in brief is as follows:-
That, he was working as Junior Controller in the Transport Department of the Rourkela Steel Plant and he
was removed from his services after being charge-sheeted by the Management with accusation of committing certain
acts of alleged misconduct like taking bribe and indulging in corrupt practice. The allegations in the charge dated
24.11.2019 are vague and have no ground. The action of the Management in terminating his services with effect from
09.11.2019 is illegal and unjustified. Such action of the management is an unfair labour practice. He approached the
Labour Enforcement Officer (Central), Paradip, but no result was yielded. Hence he has filed the present claim
petition. He has prayed to answer the present dispute in his favour by passing an award with direction for his
reinstatement into service and for payment of full back wages.
3. The 1st Party-Management has appeared and filed its written statement. The case of the 1st Party-Management in
brief is as follows:-
That, in the domestic enquiry the enquiry committee found that the documents submitted by the Management
before the enquiry were sufficient and conclusive to prove that the 2nd party-workman had committed the misconduct
of taking bribes and indulging in corrupt practices which amounts to the acts of misconduct under Clause 28(viii) of
the Management‘s Certified Standing Order as mentioned in the Charge-sheet. The applicant workman was afforded
ample opportunities to defend himself during enquiry which the applicant workman had availed of the same. The
disciplinary authority being satisfied that the enquiry had been conducted observing the principles of natural justice
fully agreed with the findings of the enquiry committee the applicant workman was removed from the services of the
Management as a disciplinary measure. The applicant-workman had filed an O.A. Case before the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench Cuttack which he has suppressed in his statement of claim. The punishment
of removal from service is neither a shocking and disproportionate.
A prayer has been made to dismiss the case of the applicant-workman.
4.
When the case was posted for evidence of the 1st Party-Management on the point of proving the fairness of
the domestic enquiry conducted against the workman learned lawyer for the 2nd party-workman has filed a petition
and submitted that the applicant had earlier filed O.A. No. 765/2019 before the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Cuttack challenging his termination and the said O.A. is still pending adjudication before the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, as such he do not want to further proceed with the case before this Tribunal. The
Management has raised no objection.
5.
On hearing of the parties and as the learned lawyer for the Management has raised no objection on the
petition filed by the applicant workman to withdraw his application the applicant-workman is permitted to withdraw
his application filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act.
6.
Hence the case is dismissed as withdrawn.
7.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 226.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार मेससव नालको जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और नालको एम्प्लाआज संघ के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट
केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, भुबनेश्वर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 04/2019) को जजसा दक
ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 14.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ
था l
[सं. tsM - 43011/04/2018- vkbZ vkj (एम)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
687
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2025
S.O. 226.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 04/2019) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s NALCO Limited and NALCO Employees Sangh which was received along with soft copy of the
award by the Central Government on 14.02.2025.
[No. Z-43011/04/2018- IR (M)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 04/2019
Date of Passing Order – 25th November, 2024
Between :-
The General Manager (S&P),
M/s. NALCO Ltd., P.O. Nalco Nagar,
District – Angul (Odisha) – 759 145
…
1st Party-Management.
(And)
The General Secretary, Nalco Employees
Sangh, Post – Nalco Nagar, District – Angul,
Odisha – 759 145.
…
2nd Party-Union.
Appearances:
None.
…
For the 1st Party-Management.
None.
…
For the 2nd Party-Union.
ORDER
In the present case, a reference was received from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry
of Labour & Employment, New Delhi vide order No. L-43011/4/2018 – IR(M), dated 28.12.2018 under clause (d) of
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of a dispute,
under the following schedule:-
―Whether the enquiry proceeding by the management of National Aluminium Co. Ltd., Odisha against
the workman Shri Krushna Singh Janka is vitiated? If yes, what relief the workman is entitled to?‖?‖
2.
In the reference order, the Under Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment, New
Delhi commanded the parties raising the dispute to file statement of claim, complete with relevant documents, list of
reliance and witnesses with this Tribunal within 15 days of receipt of the reference order and to forward a copy of
such statement of claim to each one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute.
3.
Despite directions so given, no statement of claim is received from the 2nd party-Union.
4.
On receipt of the above reference, notice was sent to the 2nd Party-Union on 12.09.2019, 31.12.2019,
27.04.2023 and lastly on dated 08.01.2024 for appearanceand for filing of statement of claim. Neither the postal
article sent to the 2nd Party-Union, referred to above, was received back nor was it observed by the Tribunal that
postal services remained unserved in the period, referred to above. Therefore, every presumption lies in favour of the
fact that the above notices were served upon the 2nd Party-Union. Despite service of the notice, the 2nd Party-Union
opted to abstain away from the proceedings. No claim statement was filed on its behalf. Thus, it is clear that the 2nd
Party-Union is not interested in adjudication of the reference on merits.
688
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
5.
Since the 2nd Party-Union has neither filed statement of claim nor has led any evidence so as to prove its
cause against the Management, it is presumed that there is no claim of workman against the Management.
6.
In view of such, no claim Order is passed by this Tribunal.
7.
Let this order be sent to the appropriate Government, as required under Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, for publication.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 14 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 227.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार सेंरल वेयर हाईससग कॉृोरेिन के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और सेंरल वेयर हाईससग कॉृोरेिन लेबर यूजनयन
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जयृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 05/1997) को जजसा दक
ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 14.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ
था l
[सं. ,y - 16025/04/2025- vkbZ vkj (एम)-8]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 14th February, 2024
S.O. 227.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 05/1997) of the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court,
Jaipur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to Central
Warehousing Corporation and Central Warehousing Corporation Labour Union which was received along with
soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 14.02.2025.
[No. L-16025/04/2025- IR (M)-8]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
Presiding Officer
:
Rekha Bhargava, RJS (DJ Cadre)
Central IT Case No.
:
05/1997
CIS No.
:
53/2014
Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh dk vkns'k dzekad
,y&42011@5@96& vkbZ-vkj-¼fofo/k½ fnukad 13-01-1997
lsUVªy os;j gkmflax dkWjiksjs'ku yscj ;wfu;u] 75] egkohj 'kksfiax lsaVj] Jhxaxkuxj ekQZr tujy lSdsVªh Jh n'kZu dkMkA
&&& izkFkhZ ;wfu;u
lsUVªy os;j gkmflax dkWjiksjs'ku tfj;s jhtuy eSustj] 92] fnikyh fcfYMax] usg: isysl] ubZ fnYyhA
&&& vizkFkhZ
izkFkhZ dh vksj ls %
Jh tqxyfd'kksj vxzoky
vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls
%
Jh eukst xks;y
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
689
Hkkjr ljdkj ds Je ea=ky; dh mijksDr vkKk dzekad ls fuEu vuqlwph dk fookn vf/kfu.kZ; gsrq bl vf/kdj.k
dks izkIr gqvk gS &
―Whether the 120 contract labourers (list enclosed) employed since many years at Central Warehousing
corporation at Sri Ganganagar & Hanumangarh are entitled for absorption in employment of Central
Warehousing corporation as Workman? If not, to what relief the workmen are entitled as they are employed
since many years through contractor and are denied wages and other facilities as provided to the workmen of
Central Warehousing corporation.‖
jSQjSal ds laca/k esa izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls LVsVeSaV vkWQ Dyse is'k dj vfHkdFku fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ ;wfu;u
,d jftLVMZ VsªM ;wfu;u gS] ftlesa lsUVªy os;jgkmflax dkWjiksjs’ku ds LokfeRo okys xaxkuxj ftys ds fofHkUu xksnkeksa esa
dke djus okyh deZpkjh 'kkfey gSA lsUVªy os;jgkmflax dkWjiksjs’ku [kk|kUu] moZjd vkSj ,slh vU; phtksa dk HkaMkj dj
leqnk; dks HkkSfrd lsok,a iznku djrk gSA ;g Hkkjr ljdkj dk ,d midze gS ysfdu bldh ,d Lora= bdkbZ Hkh gS] tks
vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu; dh /kkjk 2¼ts½ ds rgr m|ksx dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrk gSA vizkFkhZ laLFkku ds xksnkeksa esa yksfMax]
vuyksfMax vkSj LVsfdax dk dk;Z fu;fer :i ls gksrk gS] tks xksnke xfrfof/k;ksa dk vfHkUu vax gSA ;g dk;Z dqN Bsdsnkjksa
ds ek/;e ls Jfedksa }kjk fd;k tkrk gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k fiNys 10 o"kksZa ls vizkFkhZ fuxe esa dke dj jgs gSa rFkk izkFkhZ
Jfedx.k }kjk fd;k tk jgk dke vkdfLed izd`fr dk ugha gksdj LFkkbZ izd`fr dk gSA vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk dkuwuh
vf/kdkjh vkSj lsok ls oafpr djus ds fy;s Bsdsnkjksa dh fu;qfDr n'kkZbZ gqbZ gS] tks Jfedksa dk 'kks"k.k gSA bu Jfedksa dh
fLFkfr Hkkjrh; [kk| fuxe esa eky p<kus] mrkjus okys Jfedksa ds leku gS ftUgsa U;k;ky;ksa }kjk Hkkjrh; [kk| fuxe ds
izR;{k jkstxkj esa ?kksf"kr fd;k x;k gSA lafonk Je ¼mUewyu ,oa fu;ferhdj.k½ vf/kfu;e ,sls ekeys esa ykxw ugha fd;k tk
ldrk tgka dk;Z m|ksx dk ,d vfHkUu vax gks rFkk fu;fer o LFkkbZ izd`fr dk gSA var esa izkFkhZ Jfedx.k dks lsUVªy
os;jgkmflax dkWjiksjs'ku ds LFkkbZ fu;efr deZpkjh ?kksf"kr fd;k tkdj mUgsa osru] egaxkbZ HkRrk] vU; HkRrs] cksul NqV~Vh
ds lkFk&lkFk vU; lHkh ykHk fnyk;s tkosaA
vizkFkhZ fuxe dh vksj LVsVeSaV vkWQ Dyse dk tokc izLrqr dj dFku fd;k gS fd lsUVªy os;jgkmflax dkWjiksjs’ku
,d Hkkjr ljdkj dk midze gS] tks os;j gkmflax dkjiksjs'ku ,DV 1962 dh /kkjk 11 ds rgr lkSais x;s oS/kkfud dk;ksZa
dk fu"iknu djrk gSA fuxe ds ns’kHkkj esa 16 {ks=h; dk;kZy; gSa tks Hkkjr ds fofHkUu Hkkxksa esa yxHkx 480 xksnkeksa dks
fu;af=r dj jgs gSaA vizkFkhZ fuxe ds vius HkrhZ fu;e o lsok’krsZa gSa] ftUgsa lh0MoY;w0lh0¼deZpkjh½ fofu;e 1986 esa
'kkfey fd;k x;k gS] tks ljdkj }kjk vuqeksfnr gSA fuxe dk eq[; dk;Z O;fDr;ksa] lgdkjh lfefr;ksa vkSj vU; laLFkkuksa
}kjk izLrqr d`f"k mit] cht] [kkn] moZjd vkSj vU; vf/klwfpr oLrqvksa dk Hk.Mkj.k djuk gS vkSj ftlds fy;s HkaMkj
'kqYd fy;k tkrk gSA vizkFkhZ fuxe ,d tekdrkZ ,tsaV ds :i esa dk;Z djrk gSA fuxe ds ikl yksfMax] vuyksfMax dk;Z
djus ds fy;s ns’k esa dgha Hkh vius fu;fer deZpkjh ugha gS D;ksafd ;g dk;Z dHkh dHkkj vizR;kf'kr vkSj vfuf’pr gksrk gS]
tks ykblsal/kkjd Bsdsnkjksa }kjk Bsdk etnwjksa ds ek/;e ls fd;k tkrk gSA fuxe ds HkrhZ fu;eksa esa yksfMax] vuyksfMax
Jfedksa dh HkrhZ dk dksbZ izko/kku ugha gSA izkFkhZ ;wfu;u }kjk izLrqr LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse vf/kfu;e 1947 ds vUrxZr
iks"k.kh; ugha gS D;ksafd izkFkhZ Jfedx.k ,oa vizkFkhZ fuxe ds e/; fu;ksDrk&deZpkjh dk laca/k ugha gSA izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh
lafonkjr Jfedksa dh lek;kstu dh ekax vf/kfu;e ds izko/kku o dkWUVsªDV yscj ¼vkj ,.M ,½ vf/kfu;e 1970 ds foijhr
gS vkSj u gh vizkFkhZ fuxe ds HkrhZ fu;eksa esa bls lekfgr gh fd;k tk ldrk gSA vizkFkhZ fuxe esa yksfMax ,oa vuyksfMax
dk dk;Z fu;fer dk;Z ugh gS cfYd vko’;drk ds vuq:i Bsdsnkjksa ds ek/;e ls yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk;Z djk;k tkrk
gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk fu;ksftr ugha fd;s tkrs gSa cfYd Bsdsnkj }kjk mDr dk;Z gsrq Jfed miyC/k
djk;s tkrs gSa] tks muds gh v/khu ,oa fu;a=.k esa dk;Z djrs gSa rFkk ;g Bsdsnkjksa ij fuHkZj djrk gS fd og fdl Jfed
dks dk;Z ij HkstsA fdlh Hkh xksnke esa yksfMax ,oa vuyksfMax gsrq fu;fer deZpkjh ugha gSA tekdrkZvksa ds vuqjks/k ,oa
vko’;drk ds vk/kkj ij fuf’pr vof/k ds fy;s Bsdsnkjksa ls vuqca/k fd;k tkrk gSA Bsdsnkjksa }kjk vuqca/k Je ¼vkj ,.M ,½
vf/kfu;e 1970 ds rgr ykbZlsal izkIr djus ds ckn gh Jfed miyC/k djk;s tkrs gSaA Bsdsnkj gh Jfedksa dk fu;ksDrk gS
ftu ij fu;a=.k Hkh Bsdsnkj dk gksrk gSA vizkFkhZ fuxe ds dk;Z dh rqyuk ,QlhvkbZ ls ugha dh tk ldrh D;ksafd mudh
f=Lrjh; iz.kkyh gS ftlesa [kk|kuksa o vU; oLrqvksa ds HkaMkj.k ds vykok [kk|kuksa dh [kjhn ,oa forj.k dk dk;Z Hkh djrh
gSA tcfd vizkFkhZ fuxe dsoy laxzg.k dk dk;Z dj ,d tekdrkZ,tsaV ds :i esa dk;Z djrh gSA var esa izkFkhZ ;wfu;u }kjk
izLrqr Dyse [kkfjt fd;s tkus dh izkFkZuk dh gSA
izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls tokcqy tokc is’k dj vfHkdFku fd;k gS fd vizkFkhZ fuxe dk ,d ek= mn~ns’;
Hk.Mkj.k dk dk;Z djuk gS] tks izkFkhZ Jfedx.k }kjk fd;k tkrk gS] ;fn izkFkhZ Jfedx.k dks dk;Z ls gVk fn;k tk;s rks
foi{kh laLFkku dk vfLrRo gh ugha jgsxkA izkFkhZ Jfedksa ij iw.kZ fu;a=.k vizkFkhZ laLFkku ds fMiks eSustj] xksnke bapktZ
vFkok ckcw dk jgrk gSA foi{kh laLFkku }kjk Je dkuwuksa ls cpus ds fy;s rFkk vius pgsrksa o Bsdsnkjksa dks ykHk igqpkus ds
fy;s Bsdsnkjksa dks Hkqxrku fd;k tk jgk gSA izkFkhZ Jfex.k 15&20 o"kksZa ls foi{kh fuxe esa viuh lsok,a ns jgs gSa] tks LFkkbZ
izd`fr dh gSA var esa Jfedksa dks fu;qfDr frfFk ls LFkkf;Ro iznku djrs gq;s fiNys leLr osru] cksul] NqfV~V;ksa dk ykHk
vkfn fnyk;s tkus dh izkFkZuk dh xbZ gSA
izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls vius LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse ds leFkZu esa loZJh ';keyky] fot; flag] fljkt [kka]
tloar flag] dksj flag] cyoar flag] jruyky ,oa vtqZu ds 'kiFk i= is'k gq;s gSa] ftuls vizkFkhZ izfrfuf/k }kjk ftjg dh
690
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
xbZ gS rFkk vizkFkhZ fuxe dh vksj ls loZJh ';ke flag] tehr flag] txnh'k flag iqjkfgr] 'ksj txthr flag ,oa ts-ih-
;kno ds 'kiFk i= is’k gq;s gSa ftuls izkFkhZ izfrfuf/k }kjk ftjg dh xbZA
mHk; i{kksa dh lk{; dk ifj’khyu djsa rks izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls lfpo ';keyky us viuh lk{; ds eq[;
ijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k gS fd foi{kh laLFkku dk eq[; ,oa dsoy ek= dk;Z [kk|kUu] [kk| o vU; oLrqvksa ds Hk.Mkj.k dk
gS] ftlds ,ot esa pktsZt vFkok fdjk;k jkf'k vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk yh tkrh gSA ftlds fy;s vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk eSustj]
QLVZ]lSds.M eSustj] ckcw] xksnke bapktZ] dSf'k;j] pksdhnkj] lQkbZ deZpkjh] xksnkeksa esa nok fNM+dus okyk rFkk eky dks
,d LFkku ls nwljs LFkku ij j[kus ds fy;s Jfedx.k dh fu;qfDr dh tkrh gSA Jfedx.k dh fu;qfDr;ka Hkh foi{kh ds
vf/kdkjh djrs gSA bl izdkj djhc 200&250 O;fDr;ksa dk LFkkbZ LVkQ dk;Z djrk gSA foi{kh laLFkku esa eky dks yksfMax
o vuyksfMax dk dk;Z LFkkbZ izd`fr dk gS] tks izkFkhZ Jfedx.k }kjk fd;k tkrk gSA eky mrkjus ,oa p<kus dk dk;Z ;fn
ugha gjsxk rks rks foi{kh laLFkku dk vfLrRo lekIr gks tk;sxkA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k djhc 15&20 o"kksZa ls dk;Z dj jgs gSa rFkk
dbZ Jfed rks tc ls os;j gkml cuk rc ls dk;Z dj jgs gSaA foi{kh }kjk Bsdsnkj rks fopksfy;s ds :i esa izHkko'kkyh
O;fDr;ksa dks vkfFkZd ykHk igqapkus ds fy;s uke ek= ds cuk j[ks gSaA vizkFkhZ ds fnYyh] cEcbZ ,oa xqtjkr esa fLFkr xksnkeksa
,oa vkWfQl esa yksfMax ,oa vuyksfMax dk dk;Z djus okys fu;fer Jfed gS rFkk mudk ih-,Q-] bZ,lvkbZ Hkh dVrk gS]
lkykuk lwrh o xje onhZ feyrh gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k ij iw.kZ fu;a=.k vizkFkhZ fMiks eSustj] xksnke bapktZ vFkok ckcw dk
jgrk gSA Bsdsnkj dks Hkqxrku fd;s tkus okys jsV dk fu/kkZj.k gSM vkfQl ds }kjk r; fd;k tkrk gS mlesa czkap vkfQl
;k Bsdsnkj dk fdlh dk dksbZ gLr{ksi ugha gksrk gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k dHkh Hkh Bsdsnkj ds vkneh ugha jgs gSaA
izfrijh{k.k ds nkSjku dFku fd;k gS fd lsUVªy os;j gkml guqekux< esa 3&4 lky ls dke djus dk dksbZ izek.k
esjs ikl ugha gSA dk;Z djus dk fyf[kr vkns’k ugha nsrsA eq>s /;ku ugha gS fd xksnke esa izkbosV ikVhZ eky j[krh gS ;k
,QlhvkbZA oSls rks jkstkuk dke ij tkrs gSa ysfdu ;fn dke ls fudky nsrs gSa rks cqykus ij gh dke ij tkrs gSaA gekjs
lkFk LFkkbZ deZpkjh yksfMax ;k vuyksfMax dk;Z ugha djrsA NqV~Vh nsrs gS rks pys tkrs gSa]s nj[okLr ugha nsrsA lh-MoY;w-lh-
dh rjQ ls ikcanh gS fd ge dgha vkSj dke djus ugha tkrs ysfdu ,slk fyf[kr esa vkns’k ugha gSA T;knk dke gksrk gS rks
tYnh tkrs gSa vkSj T;knk dke djrs gSaA fyf[kr esa le>kSrk ugha gksrk] tqckuh gksrk gSA fuxe esa dksbZ Bsdsnkj dke ugha
djrsA etnwjh dk fcu eSustj o ckcw gh cukrs gSaA etnwjh dk Hkqxrku dHkh 15 fnu esa dHkh lIrkg esa vkSj dHkh jkstuk gks
tkrk gS tks Hkqxrku eSustj o ckcw yksx djrs gSaA
blh izdkj Jfedx.k ] fot; flag] fljkt [kka] tloar flag] dksj flag] cyoar flag] jruyky ,oa vtqZu }kjk
vius 'kiFk i= ds eq[; ijh{k.k esa xokg ';keyky }kjk eq[; ijh{k.k esa fn;s x;s dFkuksa dks nksgjk;rs gq;s vizkFkhZ fuxe
esa 15&20 o"kksZ ls dk;Z fd;k tkuk crk;k gSA
vizkFkhZ fuxe dh vksj ls izLrqr xokgku ';ke flag] tehr flag] txnh'k flag iqjkfgr] 'ksj txthr flag ,oa ts-
ih- ;kno us viuh lk{; ds eq[; ijh{k.k esa LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse esa ds tokc esa of.kZr rF;ksa dks nksgjks gq;s vizkFkhZ fuxe esa
fu;fer deZpkfj;ksa dh fu;qfDr lh-MoY;w-lh-¼LVkQ½ vf/kfu;e 1986 ds rgr gksuk rFkk yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk;Z gsrq
LFkkbZ deZpkjh fu;qDr ugha fd;s tkdj cfYd Bsdsnkj ds ek/;e ls yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk;Z ,d fuf'pr vof/k ds fy;s
vko';drk ds vuqlkj djk;k tkuk dFku fd;k gSA
mHk; i{kksa dh cgl lquh xbZA izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls fo}ku izfrfuf/k }kjk nkSjkus cgl dFku fd;k gS fd
Jfedx.k }kjk tks yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk dk;Z fd;k tkrk gS og LFkkbZ izd`fr dk gS] tks ges’kk gksus okyk dk;Z gS
D;ksafd vizkFkhZ fuxe [kk|kUu o vU; lkexzh dks HkaMkj djus dk dk;Z djrk gS ftlds ,ot esa mlds }kjk fdjk;s jkf'k ds
:i esa pktsZt fy;s tkrs gSaA vizkFkhZ fuxe Hkkjr ljdkj dk midze gS ysfdu mldh ;g Lora= bdkbZ gS ftl ij
vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu; dh /kkjk 2¼ts½ ds rgr m|ksx dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrk gSA vizkFkhZ laLFkku ds xksnkeksa esa yksfMax]
vuyksfMax vkSj LVsfdax dk dk;Z fu;fer :i ls gksrk gS] tks xksnke xfrfof/k;ksa dk vfHkUu vax gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k fiNys
20 o"kksZa ls vizkFkhZ fuxe esa dke dj jgs gSa vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk dkuwuh vf/kdkjh vkSj lsok ls oafpr djus ds fy;s Bsdsnkjksa
dh fu;qfDr n’kkZbZ gqbZ gS] tks Jfedksa dk 'kks"k.k gSA tcfd izkFkhZ Jfedx.k Hkkjrh; [kk| fuxe esa eky p<kus] mrkjus okys
Jfedksa ds leku gS ftUgsa U;k;ky;ksa }kjk Hkkjrh; [kk| fuxe ds izR;{k jkstxkj esa ?kksf"kr fd;k x;k gSA lafonk Je
¼mUewyu ,oa fu;ferhdj.k½ vf/kfu;e ,sls ekeys esa ykxw ugha fd;k tk ldrk tgka dk;Z m|ksx dk ,d vfHkUu vax gks
rFkk fu;fer o LFkkbZ izd`fr dk gSA vr% izkFkhZ Jfedx.k dks lsUVªy os;jgkmflax dkWjiksjs'ku ds LFkkbZ fu;efr deZpkjh
?kksf"kr fd;k tkdj mUgsa osru] egaxkbZ HkRrk] vU; HkRrs] cksul NqV~Vh ds lkFk&lkFk vU; lHkh ykHk fnyk;s tkosA izkFkhZ
izfrfuf/k }kjk vius rdksZa ds leFkZu esa fuEu U;kf;d n`"Vkar is’k fd;s x;s gSa &
1- 2011 ,vkbZvkj ,llhMoY;w 3455 nsosUnz flag cuke eqafufliy dkWjiksjs’kuA
2- ¼2003½6 lqizhe dksVZ dslst 528 Hkkjr gSoh bySDVªhdYl fyfeVsM cuke LVsV vkWQ ;w-ih- o vU;A
3- 2011¼131½ ,Q,yvkj 759 HkhyokM+k nqX/k mRiknd lgdkjh lfefr fyfeVsM cuke fouksn dqekj 'kekZ¼e`rd½ tfj;s
fof/kd okjhlku
4- vkj,yMoY;w 2004¼2½ jkt- 1312 pacy QVhZykbZtl ,.M dSehdYl fy0 cuke LVsV vkWQ jkt0 o vU;A
5- 2006¼1½ vkj,yMoY;w ist 210 czts’k ukjk;.k cuke jkt0 LVsV dksijsfVo cSad fyfeVsMA
6- 2023¼10½ osLVuZ ykW dslst ist 223 ¼jkt-½ lwjt izdk’k cuke yscj dksVZ ,.M b.MfLVª;y fVªC;quyA
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
691
7- 1993¼1½ MoY;w ,y ,u 439 fganqLrku e’khu VwYl fy0 vtesj cuke b.MfLVª;y fVªC;quy o vU;A
8- 2010 osLVuZ ykW dslst ¼jkt-½ ;wlh 395 jkt0 LVsV VsDLV cqd cksMZ cuke Jh dtksMey o vU;A
9- 2008¼118½ ,Q,yvkj 942 lsUVªy eSsustj vks,uthlh flYpkj cuke vks,uthlh dkWUVsªDpqvy odZlZ ;wfu;uA
10- 1990¼61½ ,Q,yvkj 253 ,QlhvkbZ odZlZ ;wfu;u cuke ,QlhvkbZ o vU;A
11- 2015 ysc vkbZ lh 2012 rfeyukMw ,yvkbZlh ,EiykbZt ,lksfl;s’ku cke ,yvkbZlh vkWQ bf.M;kA
12- 1994¼69½ ,Q,yvkj 256 vkj-ds- ikaMk cuke vkFkksZfjVh vkWQ bf.M;kA
13- 1960 kk ,y ,y ts lqizhe dksVZ 233 LVs.MMZ osD;we fjQkbZfuax daiuh vkWQ bf.M;k fy0 cuke Jfed o vU;A
14- 1967 kk ,y ,y ts lqizhe dksVZ 23 us’kuy vkbZju ,.M LVhy daiuh fy0 o vU; cuke LVsV vkWQ osLV caxky o
vU;A
15- , vkbZ vkj 1978 lqizhe dksVZ 1410 gqlSuHkkbZ cuke QSDVªh Vs>hykyh o vU;A
vizkFkhZ izfrfuf/k dh vksj ls nkSjkus cgl dFku fd;k gS fd vizkFkhZ fuxe Hkkjr ljdkj dk ,d midze gSA izkFkhZ
Jfedx.k ,oa fuxe ds e/; dHkh Hkh fu;ksDrk&deZpkjh dk laca/k ugha jgk gSA vizkFkhZ fuxe esa lh0MoY;w0lh0¼deZpkjh½
fofu;e 1986 dh fu;eksa ds rgr HkrhZ izfdz;k gksrh gSA fuxe }kjk d`f"k mit] cht] [kkn] moZjd vkSj vU; vf/klwfpr
oLrqvksa dk Hk.Mkj.k ,d tekdrkZ ,tsaV ds :i esa dk;Z djrk gSA fuxe ds ikl yksfMax] vuyksfMax dk;Z djus ds fy;s
ns’k esa dgha Hkh vius fu;fer deZpkjh ugha gS D;ksafd ;g dk;Z dHkh dHkkj vizR;kf’kr vkSj vfuf’pr gksrk gS] tks
ykblsal/kkjd Bsdsnkjksa }kjk Bsdk etnwjksa ds ek/;e ls fd;k tkrk gSA fuxe ds HkrhZ fu;eksa esa yksfMax] vuyksfMax Jfedksa
dh HkrhZ dk dksbZ izko/kku ugha gSA izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh lafonkjr Jfedksa dh lek;kstu dh ekax vf/kfu;e ds izko/kku o
dkWUVsªDV yscj ¼vkj ,.M ,½ vf/kfu;e 1970 ds foijhr gSA vizkFkhZ fuxe esa yksfMax ,oa vuyksfMax dk dk;Z fu;fer dk;Z
ugh gS cfYd vko';drk ds vuq:i Bsdsnkjksa ds ek/;e ls yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk;Z djk;k tkrk gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k
vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk fu;ksftr ugha fd;s tkrs gSa cfYd Bsdsnkj }kjk mDr dk;Z gsrq Jfed miyC/k djk;s tkrs gSa] tks muds
gh v/khu ,oa fu;a=.k esa dk;Z djrs gSaA fdlh Hkh xksnke esa yksfMax ,oa vuyksfMax gsrq fu;fer deZpkjh ugha gSA Bsdsnkj gh
Jfedksa dk fu;ksDrk gS ftu ij fu;a=.k Hkh Bsdsnkj dk gksrk gSA vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk Bsdsnkjksa dks gSaMfyax o VªkaliksVZ dk
Bsdk fn;k tkrk Fkk] tks Jfed miyC/k djkus dk ugha Fkk cfyd Bsdsnkj dks vius Jfedksa ls mDr dk;Z iw.kZ djk;s tkus
dk Bsdk FkkA var esa izkFkhZ ;wfu;u }kjk izLrqr Dyse [kkfjt fd;s tkus dh izkFkZuk dh gSA vizkFkhZ izfrfuf/k }kjk vius rdksZa
ds leFkZu esa fuEu U;kf;d n`"Vkar is’k fd;k x;k gS&
1- 2001¼7½ lqizhe dksVZ dslst 1 LVhy vkFkksZfjVh vkWQ bf.M;k cuke us'kuy ;wfu;u okVjQzaV odZlZ o vU;A
eSaus mHk; i{kksa }kjk fn;s x;s rdksZa ij euu fd;k rFkk mHk; i{kksa dh vksj ls izLrqr U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa dk
llEekuiwoZd voyksdu o ifj'khyu fd;kA
izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls ls vizkFkhZ lsUVªy os;j gkmflax dkWjiksjs'ku dh Jhxaxkuxj o guqekux< fLFkr xksnkeksa
esa dk;Zjr 120 Jfedksa ds vizkFkhZ fuxe esa lek;ksftr dj LFkkbZ deZpkfj;ksa ds leku osru o vU; ykHk fnyk;s tkus dh
ekax dh xbZ gSA izkFkhZ ;wfu;u }kjk eq[; :i ls ;g rdZ fy;k x;k gS fd vizkFkhZ fuxe esa yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk dk;Z
LFkkbZ izd`fr dk gS] ftlesa izkFkhZ Jfedx.kksa }kjk xr dbZ o"kkZsa ls dk;Z fd;k tk jgk gSA vr% izkFkhZ Jfedx.k dh
lek;kstu dh ekax mfpr ,oa oS/k gSA
U;k;kf/kdj.k dk loZizFke ;g ns[kuk gS fd dfFkr 120 Jfedx.k vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 2¼,l½ ds
vUrxZr Jfed dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrs gSa vFkok ugha\ bl laca/k esa izkFkhZ ;wfu;u }kjk izLrqr U;kf;d n`"Vkar 2011 ,vkbZvkj
,llhMoY;w 3455 nsosUnz flag cuke eqafufliy dkWjiksjs'ku esa ekuuh; iatkc ,oa gfj;k.kk mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;g
fofuf'pr fd;k gS fd va'kdkfyd deZpkjh] lafonk deZpkjh] vLFkkbZ ;k vkdfLed deZpkjh vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e dh
/kkjk 2¼,l½ ds vUrxZr deZdkj gSA /kkjk 2¼,l½ dh Li"V Hkk"kk esa ,slk dqN Hkh ugha gS ftlls ;g vuqeku yxk;k tk lds
fd dsoy fu;fer vk/kkj ij fu;ksftr O;fDr ;k iw.kZdkfyd ukSdjh djus ds fy;s fu;ksftr O;fDr gh deZdkj gS vkSj tks
O;fDr fuf'pr etnwjh ij vLFkkbZ] va'kdkfyd] ;k vuqca/k ds vk/kkj ij ;k vkdfLed jkstxkj ds :i esa ;k fuf'pr ?kaVksa
ds fy;s M~;wVh djus ds fy;s fu;ksftr O;fDr deZdkj ugha gSA ysfdu gLrxr ekeys esa vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk izkFkhZ Jfedx.k
dks iw.kZdkfyd] va'kdkfyd] vLFkkbZ] vkdfLed dk;Z ds fy;s lafonk ij j[kk x;k gks] bl laca/k esa dksbZ nLrkosth lk{;
izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls is'k ugha dh xbZ gS tcfd vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk laLFkku esa gSa.Mfyax ,oa VªkaliksVZ odZ ds fy;s
ykbZlsal/kkjh Bsdsnkjksa ls fd;s x;s ,xzhesaV] ykbZlsal vkfn dh izfr is’k dh xbZ gS] ftlesa muds }kjk ,d fuf'pr vof/k ds
fy;s laLFkku esa gS.Mfyax ,oa VªkaliksVZ odZ dk vuqca/k fd;k x;k gSA mDr vuqca/k ds rgr Bsdsnkj }kjk dkSu&dkSu ls
Jfedx.kksa }kjk vizkFkhZ fuxe esa fdruh vof/k ds fy;s dk;Z fd;k x;k] bl laca/k esa dksbZ lk{; izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls
is'k ugha dh xbZ gSA izkFkhZ ;wfu;u }kjk ,slk Hkh dksbZ nLrkost is'k ugha fd;k x;k gS fd dfFkr Bsdsnkjksa ds ek/;e ls
Jfedksa dh fu;qfDr vizkFkhZ fuxe esa dh xbZ gksA
692
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
U;kf;d n`"Vkar ¼2003½6 lqizhe dksVZ dslst 528 Hkkjr gSoh bySDVªhdYl fyfeVsM cuke LVsV vkWQ ;w-ih- o vU; esa
ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;g ekuk gS fd tgka fu;ksDrk }kjk Bsdsnkj ds ek/;e ls dkexkjksa dks fu;ksftr fd;k x;k
gks ysfdu mudh mifLFkfr dk fjdkMZ j[kk x;k gks vkSj muds dke dh fuxjkuh vius deZpkfj;ksa ds ek/;e ls dh xbZ gks
rks ,sls dkexkj fu;ksDrk ds deZpkjh ekus tk;saxs ysfdu gLrxr ekeys esa izkFkhZ Jfedx.kksa dh fu;qfDr Bsdsnkj ds ek/;e
ls vizkFkhZ fuxe esa dh xbZ gks vkSj vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk mudh mifLFkfr dk fjdkMZ j[kk x;k gks rFkk dke dh fuxjkuh Hkh
vizkFkhZ ds deZpkfj;ksa }kjk dh xbZ gks] bl laca/k esa dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; i=koyh ij miyC/k ugha gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k
}kjk vizkFkhZ fuxe esa yxkrkj dke fd;k x;k gks] bl laca/k esa Hkh dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; i=koyh ij miyC/k ugha gS
tcfd ;wfu;u dh vksj ls lfpo ';keyky us Lo;a lk{; ds nkSjku izfrijh{k.k esa Lohdkj fd;k gS fd dke ls fudkys
tkus ds ckn cqyokus ij gh dke ij tkrs gSaA vodk’k ds laca/k esa dksbZ nj[okLr ugha nsrs gSa] fyf[kr esa dksbZ le>kSrk
ugha gksrk gSA Jfedx.k us 15&20 o"kZ ls vizkFkhZ fuxe esa yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk dk;Z djuk crk;k gS] ysfdu izkFkhZ
Jfedx.k 15&20 o"kZ ls vizkFkhZ fuxe esa fu;ksftr gks vkSj muds }kjk ogka ij yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk dk;Z fd;k x;k
gS] bl laca/k esa dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; is'k ugha dh xbZ gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k dks Hkqxrku vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk fd;k x;k gks]
,slk Hkh dksbZ nLrkost vfHkys[k ij ugha gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k }kjk ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd fnYyh] cEcbZ ,oa xqtjkr esa
LFkr xksnkeksa esa ,oa vkfQl esa yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk dk;Z djus okys fu;fer Jfed gS ftudk bZ,lvkbZ o ih,Q Hkh
dVrk gS] ysfdu bl laca/k esa dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; vfHkys[k ij is’k ugha dh xbZ gSA Jfedx.k }kjk viuh lk{; ds nkSjku
vizkFkhZ fuxe ds deZpkfj;ksa }kjk muds dk;Z ij fu;a=.k j[kk tkuk dFku fd;k gS ysfdu bl laca/k esa fdlh Hkh deZpkjh
dk uke fooj.k mYysf[kr ugha fd;k x;k gS vkSj u gh dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; gh is'k dh xbZ gSA tcfd vizkFkhZ fuxe dh
vksj ls ykbZlsal/kkjh Bsadsnkjksa ds lkFk fd;s x;s vuqca/k ,oa ykbZlasl vkfn dh izfr is'k dh xbZ gS rFkk fcy etnwjh ds isVs
tks fcy cuk;s x;s gSa og Hkh lacaf/kr ykbZlsal /kkjh Bsdsnkjksa ds uke ls gSa] ftudh izfr Hkh vfHkys[k ij is'k dh xbZ gSA
lacaf/kr Bsdsnkjksa }kjk izkFkhZ Jfedx.kksa dks vizkFkhZ fuxe esa yksfMax o vuyksfMax dk;Z djus ds fy;s yxkrkj fu;qDr fd;k
x;k gks vkSj muds }kjk vizkFkhZ fuxe esa yxkrkj dke fd;k x;k gks] bl laca/k esa Hkh dksbZ nLrksot ;wfu;u dh vksj ls
is’k ugha fd;k x;k gSA vr% ;g lkfcr ugha gksrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jfedx.k }kjk vizkFkhZ fuxe esa 15&20 o"kZ ls yxkrkj
yksfMax@vuyksfMax dk dk;Z fd;k tk jgk gksA izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls dfFkr Bsdk etnwjksa esa ls dsoy 7 Jfed lk{;
esa ijhf{kr gq;s gSa ftuds }kjk Hkh vizkFkhZ fuxe esa 15&20 o"kZ ls yksfMax@vuyksfMax dk dk;Z fd;k tkuk crk;k gS] ysfdu
bl laca/k esa dksbZ nLrkost is’k ugha fd;k x;k gS fd muds }kjk vizkFkhZ fuxe esa yxkrkj fuxe ds v/khu dke fd;k x;k
gks vkSj u gh vU; Jfedx.kksa ds dke djus ds laca/k esa dksbZ nLrkost vfHkys[k ij ekStwn gSA
izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls tks U;kf;d n`"Vkar is'k fd;s x;s gSa muesa ;gh U;kf;d fofu'p; ikfjr fd;k x;k gS
tks ;fn dkexkj Bsdsnkj ds ek/;e ls eq[; fu;kstd dks miyC/k djk;k x;k gS vkSj mlds }kjk eq[; fu;kstd ds v/khu
yxkrkj dke fd;k x;k x;k gS rks og vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 2¼,l½ ds vUrxZr Jfed dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrk gS ysfdu
gLrxr ekeys esa eq[; fu;kstd vizkFkhZ fuxe }kjk Bsdsnkj ds ek/;e ls dkexkj dh fu;qfDr ugha dh xbZ gS cfYd
ykbZlsal/kkjh Bsdsnkjksa dks gS.Mfyax ,.M VªkaliksVZ odZ ds isVs vuqca/k fd;k tkdj dk;Z iw.kZ fd;s tkus dk vuqca/k fn;k x;k
gSA izkFkhZ Jfedx.k }kjk vizkFkhZ fuxe ds v/khu vuojr LFkkbZ :i ls yxkrkj dke fd;k x;k gks] bl laca/k esa dksbZ
nLrkost vfHkys[k ij miyC/k ugha gSA tcfd vizkFkhZ fuxe dh vksj ls izLrqr xokgku ,oa nLrkosth lk{; ls ,d fuf'pr
vof/k ds fy;s dk;Z dks iw.kZ djus ds fy;s ykbZlsal/kkjh Bsdsnkjksa ds ek/;e ls dk;Z iw.kZ djk; tkuk dFku fd;k gSA
Jfedx.kksa }kjk ,d dys.Mj o"kZ esa yxkrkj 240 fnol dk;Z fd;k x;k gks] bl laca/k esa Hkh dksbZ nLrkost i=koyh ij
miyC/k ugha gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa izkFkhZ ;wfu;u dh vksj ls izLrqr U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa esa izfrikfnr fl)kar gLrxxr izdj.k ds
rF;ksa ,oa ifjfLFkfr;ksa ls fHkUurk j[krs gSa] ftuls Jfedx.k dks dksbZ ykHk ugha igqaprk gSA mijksDr foospu ds QyLo:i
izkFkhZ Jfedx.k }kjk izLrqr LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha gSA fu"d"kZr% izdj.k esa fuEu vokMZ ikfjr
fd;k tkrk gS &
vokMZ
―The 120 contract labourers (list enclosed) employed since many years at Central Warehousing corporation at Sri
Ganganagar & Hanumangarh are not entitled for absorption in employment of Central Warehousing corporation as
Workman. The workmen are not entitled to get any relief.‖
jSQjsal rnuqlkj mRrfjr fd;k tkrk gSA
js[kk HkkxZo] U;k;k/kh'k
vf/kfu.kZ; vkt fnukad 13-12-2024 dks [kqys U;k;ky; esa fy[kk;k tkdj lquk;k x;k tks dsUnz ljdkj dks
izdk'kukFkZ fu;ekuqlkj Hkstk tkosA
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 228.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससव िाजतस प्रभाकर मौले सुरक्षा एजेंसी ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; भुवनेश्वर ds iapkV (a46/2021) izdkf”kr djrh
gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- vkbZ vkj (बी-I)-08]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
693
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 228.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.46/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of M/s. Shatis
Prabhakar Maule Security Agency their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-08]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-LabourCourt,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 46/2021
Date of Passing Order – 19th July, 2024
Between:
M/s. Shatis Prabhakar Maule Security Agency,
Contractor RBI, House No. 53,
Plot No. 1537/1538, 1st Floor, Moonlite City,
Kalarahanga, Patia, Bhubaneswar – 751 024.
…
1st Party-Management.
(And)
Shri Kshirod Chandra Parida,
P.O. Saicia, Dist. Jajpur, Pin – 754 292.
…
2nd Party-Workman.
Appearances:
None.
…
For the 1st Party-Management.
None.
…
For the 2nd Party-Workman.
ORDER
In the present case, a reference was received from the office of the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner
(Central), Bhubaneswar vide order No. 8(1)/2021-B.IV/Adj/2021-B.I, dated 19.04.2021 under clause (d) of sub-
section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of a dispute, under
the following schedule:-
―Whether the action of the management of M/s. Satish Prabhakar Mahule Security Agency by
terminating
the
services
of
Shri
Kshirod
Chandra
Parida
without
giving
termination
compensation/benefits is legal &/or justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to ?‖
2.
In the reference order, the Deputy chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Bhubaneswar commanded the parties
raising the dispute to file statement of claim, complete with relevant documents, list of reliance and witnesses with
this Tribunal within 15 days of receipt of the reference order and to forward a copy of such statement of claim to each
one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute.
3.
Despite directions so given, no statement of claim is received from the 2nd party-workman.
4.
On receipt of the above reference, notice was sent to the 2nd Party-Workman on 20.12.2021 and on dated
03.04.2023 for appearance and for filing of statement of claim. Neither the postal article sent to the 2nd Party-
Workman, referred to above, was received back nor was it observed by the Tribunal that postal services remained
unserved in the period, referred to above. Therefore, every presumption lies in favour of the fact that the above
notices were served upon the 2nd Party-Workman. Despite service of the notice, the 2nd Party-Workman opted to
abstain away from the proceedings. No claim statement was filed on its behalf. Thus, it is clear that the 2nd Party-
Workman is not interested in adjudication of the reference on merits.
5.
Since the 2nd Party-Workman has neither filed statement of claim nor has led any evidence so as to prove its
cause against the Management, it is presumed that there is no claim of workman against the Management.
6.
In view of such, no claim Order is passed by this Tribunal.
694
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
7.
Let this order be sent to the appropriate Government, as required under Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, for publication.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 229.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
यूनाआटेड बैंक ऑफ आंजडया ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; भुवनेश्वर ds iapkV (a53/2019) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 39025/01/2025- vkbZ vkj (बी-I)-01]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 229.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.53/2019) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of United Bank of
India their workmen
[No. L-39025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-01]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 53/2019
Filed under Section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act
Date of Passing Order – 30th September, 2024
Between :-
1. Assistant General Manager (D & IR),
United Bank of India, Head Office, 11,
Hemanta Basu Sarani, Kolkata,
West Bengal, Pin – 700 001.
2. Deputy General Manager, (Credit Monitoring),
United Bank of India, Head Office, 11, Hemanta Basu Sarani,
Kolkatta, West Bengal, Pin – 700 001.
…
1st Party-Managements.
(And)
Gajendra Kumar Mishra,
S/o. Late Baidyanath Mishra, Pravat Lane, Dutta Tota,
P.S. Kumbharapada, PO/Town/Dist. Puri
…
Applicant-Workman.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
695
Appearances:
None.
…
For the 1st Party-Managements.
None.
…
For the Applicant-Workman.
ORDER
This is an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
(herein-after referred as an ―Act‖).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working in the clerical cadre and subsequently in the year 2005 and he was promoted to the
cadre of Scale-I Officer in the Management-Bank. While he was working as Sr. Manager, Ahmedabad Branch, he was
placed under suspension on the alleged irregularities at Lanjiberna Branch. The Disciplinary Authority without
examining his explanation initiated disciplinary proceeding and in the said disciplinary proceeding he was found
guilty and he was dismissed from service. He raised a dispute before the labour commissioner and as no action was
taken he preferred this application under section 2-A(2) of the Act. Hence he has filed the present claim petition.
3.
A prayer has been made to answer the reference in his favour.
4.
The 1st Party-Management has appeared and filed its written statement.
5.
The case of the 1st party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the 2nd party is not a ―workman‖ within the definition of I.D. Act. The Management has also stated in
the written statement that the disciplinary Authority of the Management was conducted domestic enquiry as per the
principle of natural justice and after duly considered the inquiry report and reply of the 2nd party it has passed a
reasoned order in dismissing the 2nd party from service. The 2nd party preferred appeal before the appellate authority
and the appellate authority has confirmed the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority on the 2nd party.
6.
The 1st Party-Management has prayed that the statement of claim of the 2nd party-workman may be dismissed
as he is not entitled for any relief.
7.
When the case was fixed for filing of rejoinder by the applicant-workman and for framing of issues, the
2nd party remained absent and did not participate in the proceedings. It is also revealed from the order-sheet that the
applicant workman has not appeared and remained absent in all the dates from the filing of this applicant. However,
despite providing a number of opportunities, applicant-workman has not turned up to file rejoinder and to prove his
case. As the applicant-workman has not turned up for proving his case, his application filed under section 2-A(2) of
the I.D. Act stands dismissed and accordingly a no-dispute order is being passed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this Order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 230.—vkS?kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
LVsV cSad vkWQ bafM;k ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS?kksfxd fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS?kksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; dksydrk ds iapkV (a02/2020) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12012/32/2019- (बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 230.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 02/2020) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Kolkata as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/32/2019- IR (B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
696
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present : Justice K. D. Bhutia, Presiding Officer.
REF. NO. 02 OF 2020
Parties : Employers in relation to the management of
1. State Bank of India and
2. M/s. Favourite International
VS
Shri Dipankar Mondal, Workman.
Appearance:
On behalf State of Bank of India: Absent.
On behalf of M/s. Favourite International: Absent.
On behalf of Workman
: Mr. Somnath Mukherjee, Ld. Advocate.
Dated: 4th December, 2024
AWARD
By order No. L-12012/32/2019 –IR(B-I) dated 23-12-2019, the Central Government, Ministry of Labour in
exercise of power conferred under sub-section 1(d) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947
has referred the following disputes to this Tribunal for adjudication:-
―Whether the action of the management M/s. Favourite International, Service Provider of State Bank of India
in terminating the services of Shri Dipankar Mondal Ex-Housekeeping Employee is legal and/or justified? If not,
what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The facts necessary for determination of the present case in brief is that State Bank of India had engaged
M/s. Favourite International, a service provider, for supply of men power/ housekeeping staff at its establishment.
Accordingly, M/s. Favourite International, the service provider, engaged the concerned workman Shri Dipankar
Mondal and deputed him to work as Housekeeping staff at State Bank of India. That as per workman he was initially
deputed at R.B.O.-V, Sribridhi Bhavan as Housekeeping staff w.e.f. 13th May, 2015, but he was made to discharge the
duty similar to that of a Class-IV subordinate employees of the bank.
That he was transferred to R.B.O.-III at Sribridhi Bhawan on 29th November, 2016 and lastly to S.B.I.,
Nayabad Branch in South 24 Parganas on 17-04-2017.
That it is the contention of the concerned workman that he was a member of ESIC Scheme. That while
deputed at Nayabad Branch, he met with an accident and sustained injury on his left foot on 12-09-2017. That he was
treated at Ruby General Hospital and later at ESI Hospital at Sealdah. He was declared fit to join duty on 18-09-2017.
That when he went to join his duty, he was prevented. That he was served with a letter dt. 26-10-2017 by his
immediate employer imputing false allegations. He replied to such letter on 30-10-2017. Further, he received a letter
on 31-10-2017 where he was informed by his employer that his name was struck off from the wage register and his
service was terminated.
Thus, he alleged that he had been terminated from the service without giving him an opportunity of being
heard and in violation of principal of natural justice. That his termination being illegal he may be reinstated with back
wages. He has also prayed for regularisation of his service as an employee of State Bank of India and for other relief.
Record shows initially the case has been contested only by State Bank of India by filing written statement
and where it has categorically alleged that the present dispute is not maintainable against it as there exists no
relationship of employer and employee between it and the concerned workman. It has alleged that the concerned
workman was an employee of its contractor M/s. Favourite International, a service provider. That wages was paid to
the concerned workman by the contractor and concerned workman used to work under the control and supervision of
the contractor. Therefore, it has prayed for dismissal of the case against it.
The workman in its rejoinder reiterated what he has alleged in his claim application.
However, the bank has failed to pursue with the case and as such it has been proceeded exparte.
Record further shows that immediate contractor employer of the concerned workman failed to put
appearance and pursue with the dispute. Therefore, M/s. Favourite International too has been proceeded exparte.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
697
The workman to prove his case has examined himself as W.W.1 and he has produced the following
documents:-
1. Copy of conciliation failure report dt.09-10-2019 which has been marked as Exb.W-1.
2.
Copy of his transfer order dt.29-11-2016 and 07-04-2017 which have been marked as Exb.W-2 & W-3.
3. Copy of letter dt.26-10-2017 addressed to the workman by M/s. Favourite International which has been
marked as Exb.W-4.
4. Copy of show cause notice dt.31-10-2017 which has been marked as Exb.W-5.
5. Copy of reply of the concerned workman dt.30-10-2017 which has been marked as Exb.W-6.
6. Copy of wage slip for the month of May,2017 which has been marked as Exb.W-7.
7. Copy of Gate Pass issued by S.B.I., Zonal Office, South 24 Parganas which has been marked as Exb.W-8
and
8. Copy of letter issued by Regional Manager, SBI which has been marked as Exb.W-9.
The workman has filed written notes of argument and placed reliance on an order passed by the Hon‘ble
High Court, Karnataka in The Mysore Electrical Industrial Ltd. –vs- Engineering & General Workers Union, in writ
petition no.3788 of 2012 and judgement passed by Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. –vs-
Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers‘ Union, in Civil Appal No.4092-4093 of 2024.
Gone through the oral evidence of concerned workman and the documents produced by him.
The exhibited documents prima facie show that State Bank of India had outsourced the job of housekeeping
and maintenance to one M/s. Favourite International. That M/s. Favourite International had deputed the concerned
workman Sri Dipankar Mondal as a Housekeeping Staff to S.B.I. That from time to time the workman was transferred
to different branches of S.B.I. by his immediate employer M/s. Favourite International.
Thus, from those exhibited documents it is seen that the concerned workman was engaged by M/s. Favourite
International as one of its employees. That he was deputed by M/s. Favourite International, to work in the bank
sometime in the year 2016 to 2017. However, no documentary evidence whatsoever has been produced by the
concerned workman to corroborate his claim that he joined SBI as an employee of M/s. Favourite International in the
month of May, 2015.
However, from those exhibited documents it appear that the concerned workman was engaged by M/s.
Favourite International for more than 240 days in a calendar year.
Nothing has come on record to prove that concerned workman was engaged directly by S.B.I. against
permanent vacant post. In fact notices sent by M/s. Favourite International to the concerned workman prima facie
shows that M/s. Favourite International was the controlling and disciplinary authority of the concerned workman or
that M/s. Favourite International was his immediate employer. Therefore, it is appears that there exists no direct
employer and employee relationship in between the concerned workman and SBI. Thus, the prayer of the concerned
workman for absorption as a permanent employee of S.B.I. is not maintainable and tenable.
Be that as it may, as per the schedule of the order of reference this Tribunal is to adjudicate the issue,
whether the termination of service of the concerned workman by M/s. Favourite International, a service provider of
S.B.I. is legal or not?
That notices issued by M/s. Favourite International upon concerned workman shows that employer had
brought an allegation of manipulation of ESIC record and other records by the concerned workman a ground for his
termination. Unfortunately, no materials whatsoever have come on record to prove indulgence of concerned workman
in manipulation of ESIC records and other records as alleged in Exb.W-5. The conciliation failure report of the
Labour Commissioner too is silent with regard to the nature of manipulation and specific documents manipulated by
the concerned workman to substantiate the allegation brought by the immediate employer against the concerned
workman for his retrenchment. Interestingly, the bank nowhere in its written statement has brought any allegation
that while working either as a Housekeeping staff or as a Peon of the bank, the concerned workman had indulged or
made an attempt to tamper with the records of the bank.
Nevertheless, the concerned workman having worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year as an
employee of M/s. Favourite International, in SBI can be deemed to be in continuous service under M/s. Favourite
International, in view of section 25-B of I.D.Act. Therefore, in order to retrench or terminate the service of the
concerned workman, M/s. Favourite International ought to have served one month notice of retrenchment with reason.
Further, if the concerned workman had indulged in any misconduct and in violation of model standing orders, then
M/s. Favourite International ought to have charge sheeted him and ought to have initiated a domestic enquiry on the
alleged charge but in the present case M/s. Favourite International has failed to do so. Mere service of notice is not
sufficient. The concerned workman should have been given an opportunity of being heard before terminating him
from the service and which his immediate employer has failed to do so.
698
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Further, it appears that M/s. Favourite International has failed to comply with the provision of section 25-F
of I.D. Act, before termination of the concerned workman from the service. Therefore, the termination of the
concerned workman from the serviced by M/s. Favourite International held to be illegal and not justified.
In view of provision of section 25-F of the I.D. Act, the concerned workman is entitled to get compensation
from his immediate employer M/s. Favourite International.
Having regards to the discussion made above, M/s. Favourite International is hereby directed to pay
compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two Lakh) only to the concerned workman for his illegal termination within
three months from the date of publication of this award, i.d. the workman shall be at liberty to get the award executed
as per law.
Accordingly, Reference Case no.02 of 2020 is disposed of and an award to that effect is passed.
Justice K.D. BHUTIA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 231.—vkS?kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
iwoZ jsyos ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS?kksfxd fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
vkS?kksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; dksydrk ds iapkV (a47/2014) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 41012/07/2014- (बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 231.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 47/2014) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Kolkata as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Eastern Railway and
their workmen.
[No. L-41012/07/2014- IR (B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present : Justice K. D. Bhutia, Presiding Officer.
REF. NO. 47 OF 2014
Parties : Employers in relation to the management of
1. Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd.
2. Eastern Railway
VS
Md. Noorul Haque
Appearance:
On behalf of Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd.: Absent.
On behalf Eastern Railways : Mr. Abhijit Bhadra, Ld. Advocate.
On behalf of the Workman : Mr. Subhadip Bhattacharjee, Ld. Advocate.
Dated: 21st November, 2024.
AWARD
Ld. Counsels for workman and Eastern Railways are present. None appears from the side of contractor
employer Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd. Record shows the present case has been proceeded
exparte against Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd., the alleged immediate employer of
Md. Noorul Haque.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
699
The case is taken up for hearing on the point of maintainability of the present reference against Eastern
Railways. Heard Ld. Counsels for workman and Eastern Railways.
Ld. Counsel for Eastern Railways submits that Md. Noorul Haque was an employee of Shalimar Labour
Contract Co-operative Society Ltd. and not that of Eastern Railways. However, Md. Noorul Haque had filed a case
against Eastern Railways for absorption in a regular post in Eastern Railway before Central Administrative Tribunal
being No. O.A. 350/768/2020. The said case was disposed of in favour of the workman Md. Noorul Haque on 14-01-
2021. That D.R.M., Eastern Railways has been directed to issue order of his regularisation with appropriate benefits at
par with Parcel Porter who have been regularised within a period of four weeks form the date of receipt of the order.
Challenging the said order of CAT, Eastern Railways preferred an appeal before the Hon‘ble High Court at
Calcutta being W.P.C.T. No.47/2021. The Division Bench of Hon‘ble High Court has been pleased to affirm the order
passed by CAT in favour of Md. Noorul Haque and passed necessary direction upon Eastern Railway to comply with
the order of CAT within four weeks from the date of passing of the order on 11-10-2023.
Challenging the order of the Hon‘ble High Court, in W.P.C.T. No.47/2021, Railway Authority preferred a
Special Leave Appeal being No., 5164/2024 before the Hon‘ble Supreme Court. However, Hon‘ble Supreme Court
has been pleased to dismiss the Special Leave Petition, affirming the order passed by the Hon‘ble High Court,
Calcutta. Accordingly, Eastern Railways has absorbed the workman Md. Noorul Haque in a permanent regular post of
Postal Porter w.e.f.18-02-2024.
Ld. Counsel for Eastern Railways further submitted since Md. Noorul Haque has already been provided with
a regular service in Eastern Railways, and as such the present case is not maintainable against it. That Md. Noorul
Haque has suppressed the fact about his appointment against a regular post in Eastern Railways before this Tribunal
till the Eastern Railways raised an issue of the maintainability of present reference against Eastern Railway.
Therefore, he prays for dismissal of reference.
On the other hand Ld. Counsel for workman categorically submitted that the workman has not sought any
relief whatsoever against Eastern Railways in the present case. That it has impleaded Eastern Railways as a party as
because the then immediate employer of workman was Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd. a
contractor of Eastern Railway. He further submits that the contractor has failed to provide compensation in view of
provision of section 25-F when the workman was retrenched. The workman having worked for more than 240 days in
a calendar year his immediate employer failed to comply the provisions of section 25-F of the I.D. Act. Therefore, he
submits that contractor employer Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd. be directed to pay the back
wages to the workman for his illegal termination from the date of his termination till his regularisation in the service
with Eastern Railways.
Be that as it may, by order No. L-41012/07/2014 –IR(B-I) dated 27-05-2014, the Central Government,
Ministry of Labour in exercise of power conferred sub-section 1(d) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of Industrial
Dispute Act, 1947 has referred the following disputes to this Tribunal for adjudication:-
―Whether the action of the management of Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd. in
terminating the service of Md. Noorul Haque is legal and/or justified? If not, what relief the workmen are entitled to?‖
It is settled principle of law a Tribunal cannot travel beyond the four corners of the order of reference. It has
to confine its decision and judgment only in respect of the issue referred to it. The schedule of the order of reference,
already mentioned above, does not speak about the claim of back wages by the workman from its alleged erstwhile
employer, a Cooperative Society. Therefore, this Tribunal is not inclined to pass any order in respect of back wages as
prayed for by the workman and his Ld. Counsel.
Since Ld. Counsel for Md. Noorul Haque does not claim any relief against Eastern Railway and as such the
present case stand dismissed against Eastern Railways.
That as per order of reference only issue that need to be decided by the Tribunal is whether there was any
termination of service of Md. Noorul Haque by Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd. and whether
such termination was legal or illegal?
The share certificates of Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd. filed by Md. Noorul Haque
shows that he was one of the members of the Society. It is true the society is a separate legal entity distinct from its
members and if members work for wages for the society they are its employees.
The workman in his claim statement has stated that he worked for Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative
Society Ltd. a registered Society since 1996. That he was on leave and on returning from leave on 12-07-2008 he was
not allowed to resume his duty. That he was informed by the Secretary of the Society that his service was terminated
as per the advice of Howrah Parcel Mazdoor Panchayet President. He requested the authority of the society for
revocation of the termination order but in vain. Then he raised a dispute before the Labour Commissioner but could
not get any relief and hence this reference.
700
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
The Railway contested the claim of the workman by filing a written statement where it has alleged that it has
been wrongly impleaded as a party as it never engaged the workman as its employee. That workman was an employee
of Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd.
Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd., the alleged immediate employer, has failed to contest
the case and as such it has been proceeded exparte.
However, from the Exb.W-4 it is seen that workman had filed WPCT No.250/2010 before the Hon‘ble High
Court and Hon‘ble High Court was pleased to pass an order in favour of Md. Noorul Haque, Howrah Parcel Handling
Contractor Porter regarding permanent service in the Eastern Railway on 05-10-2010 and in view of the order passed
by the Hon‘ble High Court on 05-10-2010, Md. Noorul Haque was called to appear before screening committee on
27-04-2011 with a direction to produce certain documents mentioned in Exb.W-5. The correspondence Exb.W-13
shows that Railway did not select him for the post.
The other documents lying in the record show that in view of order passed by Hon‘ble Supreme Court in
W.P. no. 640/2007 and in W.P. No.121/2000 on 22-08-2003 and 10-09-200 has been pleased to pass an order for
constitution of a Screening Committee for screening of Parcel Handling Contractors whose names were forwarded by
the Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central). That name of Md. Noorul Haque was not listed in the list forwarded by
ALC (Central) and as such his case was not considered for absorption by Railway Board. That 312 labourers were
absorbed against regular post in view of the order of Hon‘ble Supreme Court.
That Md. Noorul Haque being aggrieved had filed another case before the Central Administrative Tribunal
being O.A. No.134/2014 and CAT was pleased to pass an order in his favour on 06-02-2014 and which was affirmed
by Division Bench of Hon‘ble High Court at Calcutta and lastly by Hon‘ble Supreme Court and as such at present he
has already been absorbed by Eastern Railway.
Be that as it may, Exb.W-4 shows Md. Noorul Haque to be a Parcel Handling Contractor Porter at Howrah.
If that be so, a Porter on contract basis cannot demand continuation of his service on expiry of contract and he cannot
alleged that he has been terminated or illegally retrenched from the service on expiry of his contract. The Identity
Cards issued by Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd. to him do not ipso facto prove that he was a
regular employee of the Society or he used to do porter job exclusively for Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative
Society Ltd. as its direct employee and not as its contract porter.
In view of the above, this Tribunal is of view the workman failed to prove his illegal retrenchment by
Shalimar Labour Contract Co-operative Society Ltd. and not entitled to get any relief as prayed for.
Accordingly, Reference Case no.47 of 2014 is disposed of and an award to that effect is passed.
Justice K.D. BHUTIA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 232— vkS?kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
एजक्सस बैंक जलजमटेड ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS?kksfxd fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj vkS?kksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; dksydrk ds iapkV (a17/2023) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- (बी-I)-09]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 232.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.17/2023) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Kolkata as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Axis Bank Ltd and
their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-09]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present : Justice K. D. Bhutia, Presiding Officer.
REF. NO. 17 OF 2023
Parties : Employers in relation to the management of
1. M/s. Orion Security Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
2. Axis Bank Ltd.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
701
VS
Their Workmen
Appearance:
On behalf of M/s. Orion Security Solutions Pvt. Ltd.: Absent.
On behalf of the M/s. Axis Bank Ltd. : Absent.
On behalf of Union
: Absent.
Dated: 20th November, 2024
AWARD
Today has been fixed for filing claim statement, list of documents and list of witnesses by workmen i.d. no
dispute award, but none appears from the side of the workmen as well as Axis Bank Ltd., like on the previous date.
Record shows the present case has been proceeded exparte against the contractor employer M/s. Orion Security
Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
Therefore, a presumption can be drawn that principal employer and workmen who have raised the present
dispute are no more interested to pursue with the dispute.
Be that as it may, the Dy. Labour Commissioner, Kolkata vide Order No. Kol-700020/09/2023-Dy. CLC (C )
dt. 24-08-2023 and in exercise of powers conferred u/s 12(5) read with u/s 10 (2A) of the I.D. Act has referred the
following dispute to this Tribunal for adjudication.
―Whether the demand raised by the workmen against the Management of Axis Bank Ltd. and their contractor
M/s. Orion Security Solutions Pvt. Ltd. for non-payment of terminal benefit and compensation is fair and justified? If
not, what relief the workmen are entitled to?‖
Unfortunately, there is nothing in the record save and except the order of reference to adjudicate the above
dispute referred by D.L.C., Kolkata. Further, nonappearance of the workmen who have raised the dispute, the
principal employer and contractor employer itself prove the matter is either amicably settled outside the Tribunal or
the workmen who have raised the dispute are no more interested to pursue with the same.
Under the circumstance this Tribunal has no other option but to pass a ―No Dispute Award‖. Accordingly,
Reference No. 17 of 2023 is disposed of by passing a ―No Dispute Award‖.
Justice K. D. BHUTIA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 233.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
एएससी सप्लाइ नारायण राजौरी केंर िाजसत प्रदेि जम्मू और कश्मीर ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds
chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-II ds
iapkV (40/2023) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- (बी-I) -10]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 233.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 40/2023) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-II as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of ASC Supply
Narain Rajouri UT of Jammu And Kashmir and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-10]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
In the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II, Chandigarh
(Presided over by Mr. Kamal Kant).
ID No. 40/2023
Registered on:-05.10.2023
Sh. Sanjay Kumar, C/o Kalar, Narain, Rajouri, Jammu and Kashmir-185151.
-------- Applicant
702
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Versus
ASC Supply Narain, Rajouri, UT of Jammu, Jammu and Kashmir.
----Respondents
Present:-
None for Workman
None for management.
Award : 06.11.2024
Central Government vide Notification No.08 (13)/online/RLC/Jmu Dated 04.10.2023, under sub-section 5
of Section 12 read with sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(hereinafter called the
Act), has referred the following Industrial dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal:-
―Whether the demand of Shri Sanjay Kumar C/o Narian, Rajouri, UT of Jammu and Kashmir for
regularization of his service w.e.f. 12.10.2004 in the ASC Supply, Narian, Rajouri, UT of Jammu and Kashmir
is legal and justified? If yes then to what relief the concerned workman is entitled to and from which date?‖
1.
On the receipt of the above reference, notice was sent to the workman as well as to the
respondents/managements on 21.11.2023 for 06.02.2024. The notice sent to the workman, referred above, was duly
delivered to the workman on 28.11.2023. But no one turned up on behalf of workman 06.02.2024 and reference was
adjourned for 04.07.2024. On 04.07.2024, notice was again issued to the workman for 06.11.2024 for appearance and
filing claim statement. The said notice was delivered to the workman. Today also no one turned up on behalf of the
workman. The workman has been given sufficient opportunities to file claim statement but none turned up in spite of
the opportunity afforded to file claim statement, which shows that the workman not interested in adjudication of the
matter on merit.
2.
Since the workman has neither put his appearance nor he has filed any statement of claim to prove his case
against the respondents/managements, as such, this Tribunal is left with no choice, except to pass a 'No Claim
Award'. Accordingly, 'No Claim Award' is passed in the present reference.
3.
Let copy of this award be sent to the Appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the Act for
publication.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 234.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
सतृुड़ा नमवदा क्षेत्रीय ग्रामीण बैंक ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक
fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds iapkV (a14/2013) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- (बी-I) -11]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 234.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 14/2013) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Satpuda Narmada
Kshetriya Gramin Bank and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-11]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/RC/14/2013
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..( Retd)
Sevak Ram S/o. Late Mani Ram Mehra
R/o. Jhalsir God, Tehsil – Bavai
District – Hoshangabad (MP)
Workman
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
703
Versus
The Branch Manager
Satpuda Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank,
Semri Harchand Branch
Tehsil – Sohagpur, Distt.- Hoshangabad (MP)
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 07th day of January-2025.)
The workman has filed this petition u/s. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment Act) 2010 against
termination of his services by the Bank.
After registering the case on the basis of the petition, notices were sent to management and were duly served
on them. They appeared and filed their statements of defense.
The case of the workman, in short, is that he was appointed as a Peon in the Bank on 19.08.2002 on daily
wage basis and worked continuously till 01.01.2012. His services were terminated by Bank without any notice or
compensation, hence in violation of Section 25-F & 25-G of the Act. He raised a dispute in this respect which could
not be conciliated, hence this petition. The workman has prayed that holding the workman entitled to be reinstated,
the petition be answered in his favour.
The case of the management, inter alia, is that the alleged workman was neither employed as permanent
employee nor attained permanent status. He worked as a casual worker for few hours in a day as and when required in
branch of the Bank and was paid for it. It is further the case of management that, no illegality was committed in
disengaging him.
In evidence, the workman has not filed any affidavit as his examination in chief. He filed certain photocopy
documents which are admitted by management. They are certificate of failure of conciliation reply of management
before conciliation, replies of Public Information Officer in RTI, denying information sought by him, all admitted by
management, marked as with W/1 to W/10.
The workman filed an application seeking direction to management to file payment register and vouchers
regarding payment to him. This application was allowed vide order dated 21.06.2016. On 03.02.2017, as the record
reveals, the attendance register from 2008 to May 2012 was produced by management before this Tribunal, but since
the name of the workman was not found, hence it was returned back to management. Management file as many as 11
payment vouchers, available with them, as stated by them in their affidavit.
Management did not file any other evidence.
None appeared for workman at the time of argument. Learned Counsel for management Shri Ashish Shroti
appeared. His arguments were heard and record has been perused by me. None of the parties filed any written
arguments.
The initial burden to prove the claim that he worked with the management and the number of days in every
year is on workman. He has not filed any affidavit. The payment vouchers indicate about daily payment to the
workman and are only 11 in number. On the other hand, there is no evidence by management. Hence, holding that the
workman could not successfully prove his claim, the petition deserves to be answered against the workman and is
answered accordingly.
ORDER
Petition dismissed. No order as to cost.
DATE: 07/01/2025
P. K.SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
704
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 235.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds iapkV (a139/2017) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12011/27/2016- (बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 235—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 139/2017) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12011/27/2016- IR (B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/139/2017
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..( Retd)
General Secretary
Dainik Vetan Bhogi Bank Karmachari Sangathan
F-1, Tripti Vihar, Indore Road
Ujjain (M.P.)-456010
Workman
Versus
The Chief General Manager
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office
2nd Floor, 228, Zone-1, MP Nagar
Bhopal (M.P.)-462011
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 23rd day of December-2024.)
As per letter dated 17/10/2017 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number L-12011/27/2016/IR(B-I) dt.
17/10/2017. The dispute under reference related to :-
“1. Whether the demand raised by the Union called Dainik Vetan Bhogi Bank Karmachargi Sangathan,
Ujjain for payment of Bonus in respect of Mr. Vijay Kaithwas (Daily Wage Worker) by the State
Bank of India, LHO, Bhopal for the period from September 2004 to March 2006 and April 2006 to
17.08.2012 is justified or not ? If so, how much bonus amount is actually payable by State Bank of
India to Mr. Vijay Kaithwas ?
2.
Whether the claim made by Union for payment of bonus to Mr. Vijay Kaithwas for the period from
September 2004 to March 2006 and April 2006 to 17.08.2012 is barred by limitation as per Section
21 of Payment of Bonus Act 1965 or not ? ”
After registering the case on the basis of the reference, notices were sent to the parties and were duly served
on them. They appeared and filed their respective statements of claim and defense.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
705
The case of the workman, in short, is that he was appointed as a Peon in the State Bank of Indore in
September 2004 and worked continuously till 17.08.2012. He is entitled to bonus for the period which he was not
paid. He raised a dispute in this respect which could not be conciliated, hence this reference. The workman union has
prayed that holding the workman entitled to bonus as claimed by him, the reference be answered their favour.
The case of the management, inter alia, is that the alleged workman was neither employed as permanent
employee nor attained permanent status. He worked as a casual worker for few hours in a day as and when required in
branch of the Bank and was paid for it. It is further the case of management that, the State Bank of Indore merged in
State Bank of India. According to Bank the claim is barred by Section 21 of Bonus Act.
In evidence, the workman union has not filed any affidavit as examination in chief.
Management has not filed affidavit of its witness as his examination in chief.
None appeared for the workman at argument stage, I have heard argument of learned Counsel Mr. Vijay
Tripathi for management.
The initial burden to prove the claim that he worked with the management and the number of days in every
year is on workman. He has not produced any evidence in this respect.
Section 21 of Bonus Act provides that any claim for payment of bonus is to be made within one year. Hence
the claim of bonus is barred by limitation.
Hence, holding the claim of the workman not tenable in law, he is entitled to no relief, the reference
stands answered accordingly.
No order as to cost.
DATE: 23/12/2024
P. K.SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 236.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds iapkV (a107/2015) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12012/110/2015- (बी-I) ]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 236.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.107/2015) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/110/2015- IR (B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/107/2015
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..( Retd)
General Secretary
Dainik Vetan Bhogi Bank Karmachari Sangathan
F-1, Karmabhoomi, Tripti Vihar,
Opp. Engg. College, Ujjain (M.P.)
Workman
706
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Versus
The Chief General Manager
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office – Hoshangabad Road
Bhopal (M.P.) - 11
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 23rd day of December-2024.)
As per letter dated 02/11/2015 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number L-12012/110/2015/IR(B-I) dt.
02/11/2015. The dispute under reference related to :-
“Whether, the demand of union claiming difference of wages in favour of Shri Vijay Kaithwas daily wage
employee from Sep. 04 to 17.08.2012 is justified or not ? If so, what relief the daily wager is entitled for ?”
After registering the case on the basis of the reference received, notices were sent to the parties and were
duly served on them. They appeared and filed their respective statements of claim and defense.
In short, the case of the workman side is that he has engaged in the Branch by the Branch Manager on
September 2004 as daily wager and worked till 17.08.2012 continuously. His services were terminated by Bank under
an oral order without any notice or compensation, which is against Section 25-F & 25-G of the Act, hence against
law. He has not paid the workman wages payable to the permanent peon inspite of the fact that the workman and the
permanent peon discharged same duties. He has requested that holding the action of management against law, he be
held entitled to the same wages admissible to permanent peon.
According to management, the workman was a daily wager who did not work continuously for 240 days in
the year preceding the date of his termination. He was a casual labour, engaged as and when required and was paid on
daily wages. He is not entitled to parity in wages with permanent staff. Management has requested that the reference
be answered against the workman.
In evidence, the workman union filed no affidavit. They did file some photocopy documents, which were
not admitted by management, but did not care to prove. Management filed affidavit of its witness as his examination
in chief. No cross examination was done by workman side.
None was present for workman side at argument stage. No written argument was filed. Management learned
Counsel Shri Vijay Tripathi submitted his oral argument.
I have gone through the record in the light of the arguments.
The reference itself is the issue for determination.
Management has referred to Judgment of Hon‘ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs.
Daya Lal and Others, (2011) 2 SCC 429, relevant paragraphs are being reproduced as follows :-
This extract is taken from State of Rajasthan v. Daya Lal, (2011) 2 SCC 429 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 340 : 2011 SCC
OnLine SC 172 at page 435
“12.
We may at the outset refer to the following well-settled principles relating to regularisation and
parity in pay, relevant in the context of these appeals:
(i)
The High Courts, in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution will not issue directions
for regularisation, absorption or permanent continuance, unless the employees claiming regularisation had
been appointed in pursuance of a regular recruitment in accordance with relevant rules in an open
competitive process, against sanctioned vacant posts. The equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 16
should be scrupulously followed and Courts should not issue a direction for regularisation of services of an
employee which would be violative of the constitutional scheme. While something that is irregular for want
of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the
process, can be regularised, back door entries, appointments contrary to the constitutional scheme and/or
appointment of ineligible candidates cannot be regularised.
(ii)
Mere continuation of service by a temporary or ad hoc or daily-wage employee, under cover of
some interim orders of the court, would not confer upon him any right to be absorbed into service, as such
service would be “litigious employment”. Even temporary, ad hoc or daily-wage service for a long number
of years, let alone service for one or two years, will not entitle such employee to claim regularisation, if he is
not working against a sanctioned post. Sympathy and sentiment cannot be grounds for passing any order of
regularisation in the absence of a legal right.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
707
(iii)
Even where a scheme is formulated for regularisation with a cut-off date (that is a scheme
providing that persons who had put in a specified number of years of service and continuing in employment
as on the cut-off date), it is not possible to others who were appointed subsequent to the cut-off date, to claim
or contend that the scheme should be applied to them by extending the cut-off date or seek a direction for
framing of fresh schemes providing for successive cut-off dates.
(iv)
Part-time employees are not entitled to seek regularisation as they are not working against any
sanctioned posts. There cannot be a direction for absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of
part-time temporary employees.
(v)
Part-time temporary employees in government-run institutions cannot claim parity in salary with
regular employees of the Government on the principle of equal pay for equal work. Nor can employees in
private employment, even if serving full time, seek parity in salary with government employees. The right to
claim a particular salary against the State must arise under a contract or under a statute.
See State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753], M. Raja v. CEERI
Educational Society [(2006) 12 SCC 636 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 334] , S.C. Chandra v. State of
Jharkhand [(2007) 8 SCC 279: (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897], Kurukshetra Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Mehar
Chand [(2007) 15 SCC 680 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 742] and Official Liquidator v. Dayanand [(2008)
10 SCC 1 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 943] .‖
Another case State of Haryana & Others Vs. Tilak Raj and Others, AIR 2007 2658, referred to from the
side of management, in which the same principle has been reiterated.
Hence, holding the case of the workman union not legal, the reference deserves to be answered against
the workman and is answered accordingly. No order as to cost.
DATE: 23/12/2024
P. K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 237.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds iapkV (a24/2018) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12011/35/2017-vkbZvkj (बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 237.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 24/2018) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12011/35/2017- IR (B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/24/2018
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..( Retd)
General Secretary
Dainik Vetan Bhogi Bank Karmachari Sangathan
F-1, Karmabhoomi, Tripti Vihar, Opp. Engg. College,
Ujjain (M.P.)
Workman
708
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Versus
The Chief General Manager
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office – Hoshangabad Road
Bhopal (M.P.)
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 23rd day of December-2024.)
As per letter dated 23/04/2018 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number L-12011/35/2017/IR(B-I) dt.
23/04/2018. The dispute under reference related to :-
“Whether, the action of the management of State Bank of India to deprive the workman Shri Satish
Goswami of permanent status by not issuing appointment letter, paying minimum wages etc. to him is
correct ? If not, what other relief he is entitled to ?”
After registering the case on the basis of the reference received, notices were sent to the parties and were
duly served on them. They appeared and filed their respective statements of claim and defense.
In short, the case of the workman side is that he has engaged in the Branch by the Branch Manager on
04.02.2005 as daily wager and worked till 24.01.2011 continuously. His services were terminated by Bank under an
oral order without any notice or compensation, which is against Section 25-F & 25-G of the Act, hence against law.
He has not paid the workman wages payable to the permanent peon inspite of the fact that the workman and the
permanent peon discharged same duties. He has requested that holding the action of management disengaging him
against law, he be held entitled to the same wages admissible to permanent peon.
According to management, the workman was a daily wager who did not work continuously for 240 days in
the year preceding the date of his termination. He was a casual labour, engaged as and when required and was paid on
daily wages. He is not entitled to parity in wages with permanent staff. Management has requested that the reference
be answered against the workman.
In evidence, the workman union filed no affidavit. They did file some photocopy documents, which were
not admitted by management, but did not care to prove. Management filed affidavit of its witness as his examination
in chief. No cross examination was done by workman side.
None was present for workman side at argument stage. No written argument was filed. Management learned
Counsel Shri Vijay Tripathi submitted his oral argument.
I have gone through the record in the light of the arguments.
The reference itself is the issue for determination.
Management has referred to Judgment of Hon‘ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs.
Daya Lal and Others, (2011) 2 SCC 429, relevant paragraphs are being reproduced as follows :-
This extract is taken from State of Rajasthan v. Daya Lal, (2011) 2 SCC 429 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 340 : 2011 SCC
OnLine SC 172 at page 435
“12.
We may at the outset refer to the following well-settled principles relating to regularisation and
parity in pay, relevant in the context of these appeals:
(i)
The High Courts, in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution will not issue directions
for regularisation, absorption or permanent continuance, unless the employees claiming regularisation had
been appointed in pursuance of a regular recruitment in accordance with relevant rules in an open
competitive process, against sanctioned vacant posts. The equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 16
should be scrupulously followed and Courts should not issue a direction for regularisation of services of an
employee which would be violative of the constitutional scheme. While something that is irregular for want
of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the
process, can be regularised, back door entries, appointments contrary to the constitutional scheme and/or
appointment of ineligible candidates cannot be regularised.
(ii)
Mere continuation of service by a temporary or ad hoc or daily-wage employee, under cover of
some interim orders of the court, would not confer upon him any right to be absorbed into service, as such
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
709
service would be “litigious employment”. Even temporary, ad hoc or daily-wage service for a long number
of years, let alone service for one or two years, will not entitle such employee to claim regularisation, if he is
not working against a sanctioned post. Sympathy and sentiment cannot be grounds for passing any order of
regularisation in the absence of a legal right.
(iii)
Even where a scheme is formulated for regularisation with a cut-off date (that is a scheme
providing that persons who had put in a specified number of years of service and continuing in employment
as on the cut-off date), it is not possible to others who were appointed subsequent to the cut-off date, to claim
or contend that the scheme should be applied to them by extending the cut-off date or seek a direction for
framing of fresh schemes providing for successive cut-off dates.
(iv)
Part-time employees are not entitled to seek regularisation as they are not working against any
sanctioned posts. There cannot be a direction for absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of
part-time temporary employees.
(v)
Part-time temporary employees in government-run institutions cannot claim parity in salary with
regular employees of the Government on the principle of equal pay for equal work. Nor can employees in
private employment, even if serving full time, seek parity in salary with government employees. The right to
claim a particular salary against the State must arise under a contract or under a statute.
See State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1: 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , M. Raja v. CEERI
Educational Society [(2006) 12 SCC 636 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 334] , S.C. Chandra v. State of
Jharkhand [(2007) 8 SCC 279 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897] , Kurukshetra Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Mehar
Chand [(2007) 15 SCC 680 (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 742] and Official Liquidator v. Dayanand [(2008) 10
SCC 1 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 943] .‖
Another case State of Haryana & Others Vs. Tilak Raj and Others, AIR 2007 2658, referred to from the
side of management, in which the same principle has been reiterated.
More ever, the Bipartite Settlements protect and apply only with respect to the regular staff with respect to
their pay and salary. The Bipartite Settlement does not provide issuing appointment letter to a casual labour/worker.
Since, the engagement of the workman was not against any sanctioned post/vacancy and also not after undergoing the
recruitment process as per rules, he cannot claim permanent status.
Hence, holding the case of the workman union not legal, the reference deserves to be answered against
the workman and is answered accordingly. No order as to cost.
DATE: 23/12/2024
P. K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 238.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdka vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds iapkV (a52/2012) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12012/06/2012- vkbZvkj (बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 238.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 52/2012) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/06/2012- IR (B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
710
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/52/2012
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..( Retd)
Shri Laxmi Narayan Yadav
S/o. Late Dauram Yadav
Murrahbhatthi Gandhi Nagar
Gudhiyari, Raipur (C.G.)
Workman
Versus
1. The Zonal Manager
State Bank of India
Byron Bazar, Raipur (C.G.)
2. The Assistant General Manager
State Bank of India,
Regional Office – Raipur (C.G.)
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 23rd day of December-2024.)
As per letter dated 22/03/2012 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number L-12012/06/2012/IR(B-I) dt.
22/03/2012. The dispute under reference related to :-
“Whether the action of management of Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, Regional Office,
Raipur in terminating the services of Shri Laxmi Narayan Yadav w.e.f. 15.02.2009 is legal and justified ?
To What relief the workman is entitled ?”
After registering the case on the basis of the references received, notices were sent to the parties and were
duly served on them. They appeared and filed their respective statements of claim and defense.
The case of the workman, in short, is that he was appointed as a Peon in the then State Bank of Indore at
Raipur in its Regional Office on 12.01.2001, as a peon and worked continuously till 12.02.2009. Thereafter, he was
terminated without notice or wages in lieu of one month notice and without payment of retrenchment compensation,
in violation of the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act, 1947). He had
worked more than 240 days as required under Section 25-B of the Act, 1947. He worked for 240 days and more in
every year continuously and has thus acquired the status of permanent employee. He requested that holding his
termination against law, he be held entitled to be reinstated with all back wages and benefits.
The case of the management, inter alia, is that the alleged workman was neither employed as permanent
employee nor attained permanent status. He worked as a casual worker for few hours in a day as and when required in
branch of the Bank and was paid for it. The provisions of the Section 25-F of the Act 1947 is not applicable and
therefore, the question of giving notice or payment of retrenchment compensation does not arise. It has been further
pleaded that the workman was a daily wager, engaged not on regular basis but subject to availability of work and also
that he was not appointed against any sanctioned vacancy following recruitment process. It was also pleaded that
since the engagement of the workman was on day to day basis, no formal appointment letter was required to be issued
to him. Accordingly, management has prayed that the reference be answered against the workman.
The workman has filed his rejoinder in which he has mainly reiterated his allegations in his statement of
claim.
In evidence, the workman has filed his affidavit as his examination in chief, he has been cross examined by
management. He has further filed photocopy documents which he did not care to prove. He also filed affidavit of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
711
another Co-worker Nand Lal Yadav as his examination in chief, but could not produced him for cross examination as
this witness was reported dead. Management has filed affidavit of its witness S.S. Lal as his examination in chief,
who has been cross examined by workman side. Management neither filed any document nor proved.
I have heard argument of Learned Counsel for workman Mr. Y.M. Tiwari and learned Counsel
Mr. V.K. Tripathi for management. Both the sides have filed written arguments which are part of record. I have gone
through the written arguments filed by management and the record as well.
On perusal of record in the light of rival arguments, following issues arise for determination :-
1)
Whether, the workman has successfully proved his continuous engagement for 240 days in an
year ?
2)
Whether, the disengagement of the workman is legal ?
3)
Whether, the workman is entitled to any benefit ?
Issue No.-1 :-
Before, entering into any discussion, Section 25-B of the Act is being reproduced as follows :-
25B. Definition of continuous service.—For the purposes of this Chapter,—
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer—
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than—
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than—
(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an
employer shall include the days on which—
(i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the
industrial establishment;
(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years;
(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment; and
(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave
does not exceed twelve weeks.
The initial burden to prove this issue is on the workman. Pleadings of the parties on this issue have been
elaborated earlier. The workman has corroborated his allegations in his statement of claim in his affidavit filed as his
examination in chief. In his cross examination, he has stated that he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange, he
did not appear in recruitment process, he was not a regular employee, he was paid on daily basis weekly. Also that his
services were terminated orally and that no appointment letter was issued to him.
Even if, the photocopy documents filed by workman are looked into though they are not proved as per law,
the first document payment details, which is 26 pages does not contain any seal or signature of the management Bank
or any other person it appears to be self created documents, hence cannot be relied upon. The second document bonus
details within the period 2002 to 2023, 2004 to 2005 and 2005 to 2006 all photocopy show that in none of these years,
the workman worked for 240 days. On the other hand, management witness has corroborated the pleadings of
management on this point that the workman did not work for 240 days in any year.
Learned Counsel for management has referred to following judgments to support his argument that the
burden is on workman to prove his claim that he worked continuously for 240 days in a year. These are :-
712
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Range Forest Officer Vs. S.T. Hadimani (2002) 3 SCC 25
This extract is taken from Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 : 2002 SCC (L&S)
367 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 226 at page 26
3.
For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the appellant is
an “industry” or not, though reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in State of
Gujarat v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar [(2001) 9 SCC 713 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 269 : JT (2001) 3 SC 326] .
In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining
on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding
his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the
appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in
the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that
cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman
had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or
record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone,
the award is liable to be set aside. However, Mr Hegde appearing for the Department states that the State is
really interested in getting the law settled and the respondent will be given an employment on compassionate
grounds on the same terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two months from
today.”
State of Uttarakhand v. Sureshwati, (2021) 3 SCC 108
This extract is taken from State of Uttarakhand v. Sureshwati, (2021) 3 SCC 108 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S)
434 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 34 at page 117
“25.
On the basis of the evidence led before the Labour Court, we hold that the School has established
that the respondent had abandoned her service in 1997, and had never reported back for work. The
respondent has failed to discharge the onus to prove that she had worked for 240 days in the preceding 12
months prior to her alleged termination on 8-3-2006. The onus was entirely upon the employee to prove
that she had worked continuously for 240 days in the twelve months preceding the date of her alleged
termination on 8-3-2006, which she failed to discharge.”
Learned Counsel has also referred to another judgment of Hon‘ble the Apex Court in Surendra Nagar
District Panchayat Vs. Dayabhai Amar Singh, (2005) 8 SCC 750. The referred paragraphs are being reproduced as
follows :-
This extract is taken from Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, (2005) 8 SCC 750 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 38 : 2005 SCC OnLine SC 1536 at page 759
“16. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 367] (SCC at p. 26, para
3) this Court held that:
“In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first
determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the
year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was
denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for
240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour
and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a
workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or
order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground
alone, the award is liable to be set aside.”
17. More recently, in Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161 : 2004
SCC (L&S) 1055] , Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1062]
and M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1092] this Court has reiterated the
principle that the burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days in
the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart from
examining himself to prove the factum of his being in employment of the employer.
18. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that
he had actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period of twelve calendar months
preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not
produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages
or any record or order in that regard was produced; no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by the
employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that the workman who claimed to have worked with the
appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
713
and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman
has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the
date of termination of his service. The courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non-production
of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only
12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in
the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25-B(1) of the
Act. In the facts and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the respondent workman is
not entitled to the protection or compliance with Section 25-F of the Act before his service was terminated by the
employer. As regards non-compliance with Sections 25-G and 25-H suffice it to say that witness Vinod Misra
examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily-wagers. In
the absence of regular employment of the workmen, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of
the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of
the seniority list and his so-called seniority, no relief could be given to him for non-compliance with provisions of
the Act. The courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved
to be in existence and then not produced before the court. In order to entitle the court to draw inference
unfavourable to the party, the court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved.”
Since, the initial burden to prove, the continuous employment for 240 days in a year as per Section 25-B of
the Act, is on workman, his self serving affidavit only cannot be held sufficient that too, when the documents
produced militate against the oral statement as mentioned above. Accordingly, the workman is held to have failed in
proving his continuous employment for 240 days in a year and issue no.-1 is answered accordingly.
Issue No.-2 :-
Before entering into any discussion on merit, Section 25-F & 25-G of the Act are being reproduced as
follows :-
25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.— No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month‟s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by
the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
25G. Procedure for retrenchment.— Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India,
is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any
agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman
who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches
any other workman.
Case of the workman is that he was not issued any notice of retrenchment nor was he paid compensation,
which he has corroborated in his evidence. It is not the case of management that he was paid any compensation or
given prior notice. Since, the workman is held to have failed in proving his continuous employment for 240 days in a
year, his termination is held not in violation of Section 25-F & 25-G of the Act and issue no.-2 is answered
accordingly.
Issue No.-3 :-
In the light of findings recorded above on issue no.-1 and 2, the workman is held entitled to no relief.
Issue no.-3 is answered accordingly.
AWARD
Holding the action of management of Assistant General Manager of State Bank of India, Regional
Office Raipur, in terminating the services of Laxmi Narayan Yadav w.e.f. 15.02.2009 legal and justified, he is
held entitled to no relief.
No order as to cost.
DATE: 23/12/2024
P. K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
714
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 239.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds iapkV (a54/2020 & 01/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12011/20/2020- vkbZvkj (बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 239.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 54/2020&01/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour
Court Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of
India and their workmen.
[No. L-12011/20/2020- IR (B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/54/2020
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..( Retd)
Nandram Kure
S/o. Pooran Lal Kure
R/o. 34, Kabirpura, Behind Durga
Mandir, Sahnabad, Bhopal (M.P.)
Workman
Versus
1. The Deputy General Manager (O&C)
State Bank of India,
Bhopal (M.P.)
2. The Assistant Manager
State Bank of India,
Main Branch, T.T. Nagar
Bhopal (M.P.)
Management
AND
CGIT/LC/A/01/2021
Nandram Kure
S/o. Pooran Lal Kure
R/o. 34, Kabirpura, Behind Durga
Mandir, Sahnabad, Bhopal (M.P.)
Workman
Versus
1. The Deputy General Manager (O&C)
State Bank of India,
Bhopal (M.P.)
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
715
2. The Assistant Manager
State Bank of India,
Main Branch, T.T. Nagar
Bhopal (M.P.)
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 23rd day of December-2024.)
As per letter dated 21/08/2020 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number L-12011/20/2020/IR(B-I) dt.
21/08/2020. The dispute under reference related to :-
1-
Rs.
Workman Nandram Kure has filed the petition against the same management seeking stay of his oral
termination by management on 01.09.2021, which was registered as R/01/2021.
After registering the case on the basis of the both the reference and petition, notices were sent to the parties
and were duly served on them. They appeared and filed their respective statements of claim and defense.
During hearing, R/01/2021 was merged with the file of R/54/2020.
The case of the workman, in short, is that he was appointed as a Sweeper in the State Bank of India on
01.12.1997, as a Sweeper and worked continuously till date. There was an understanding reached at between the
Union and management that, the wages for cleaning of Bank Campus which is more than 5000 sq.ft. shall be scale
wages paid to the regular sweepers. He submitted an application to the management requesting them to pay him scale
wages, but management did not consider his this demand. This is also case of the workman that, he is in continuous
and regular service of the Bank as cleaner/sweeper since 1997 till date and has worked for more than 240 days in
every year inspite of this, his services have not been regularized nor bonus as per Act paid by management. The
workman has thus prayed that he be held entitled to scale wages as claimed by him as well as bonus and other service
benefits admissible to regular employees.
The case of the management, inter alia, is that the alleged workman was neither employed as permanent
employee nor attained permanent status. He worked as a casual worker for few hours in a day as and when required in
branch of the Bank and was paid for it. It is further the case of management that since 26.06.2009, the work of
cleaning of the campus is been taken through outsourcing by different contractors as mentioned in para 6 of the
written statement. His wages have also been paid by the contractors and they are liable to pay bonus if any to the
workman.
The workman has filed his rejoinder in which he has mainly reiterated his allegations in his statement of
claim.
In evidence, the workman has not filed any affidavit as his examination in chief. He has filed some
photocopy documents which are Ex. W/1 to W/13. These documents are regarding proceedings before Assistant
Labour Commissioner at conciliation stage.
Management has filed affidavit of its witness as his examination in chief. This witness has not been cross
examined by workman.
None appeared for the workman at argument stage, I have heard argument of learned Counsel Mr. Praveen
Yadav for management.
The initial burden to prove the claim that he worked with the management and the number of days in every
year is on workman. He has not produced any evidence in this respect. The management witness has corroborated the
case of management in his uncross examined affidavit.
Hence, holding the claim of the workman not proved, he is entitled to no relief, the reference stands
answered accordingly.
No order as to cost.
DATE: 23/12/2024
P. K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
716
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 240.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj ,u
,Q jsyos ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; xqokgkVh ds iapkV (a09/2022) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2025- vkbZvkj (बी-I) -12]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2025
S.O. 240.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the
Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 09/2022) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court Guwahati as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of
N.F. Railway and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-12]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL -CUM- LABOUR COURT,
GUWAHATI
PRESENT:
Shri Ananda Kumar Mukherjee,
Presiding Officer / Link Officer,
C.G.I.T-cum-L.C., Guwahati.
REFERENCE CASE NO. 09 OF 2022
PARTIES: (1) Parash Balmiki, (2) Pintu Chandra Das, (3) Sumit Chandra Dey,
(4) Krishna Chandra Ghosh, and (5) Bapan Stephan.
Vs.
(1) Management of Northeast Frontier Railway,
(2) Divisional Railway Manager, N. F. Railway, Lumding Division, and
(3) Senior Section Engineer (Loco), N. F. Railway, Badarpur.
REPRESENTATIVES:
For the Workmen:
Mr. Parash Balmiki and 4 others (in person).
For the Opposite Parties:
Mr. Deepjyoti Das, Advocate (for OP No. 3).
INDUSTRY:
Railway.
STATE:
Assam.
DATED:
30.10.2024.
AWARD
In exercise of powers conferred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Ministry of Labour, Government of India through the Office of the
Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Guwahati, vide its Order No. G/R. 8(07)/2022-CGIT
dated 14.06.2022 has been pleased to refer the following dispute between the employer, that is the (1) Management of
Northeast Frontier Railway, (2) Divisional Railway Manager, N. F. Railway, Lumding Division, and (3) Senior
Section Engineer (Loco), N. F. Railway, Badarpur Vs. (1) Parash Balmiki, (2) Pintu Chandra Das, (3) Sumit Chandra
Dey, (4) Krishna Ch. Ghosh, and (5) Bapan Stephan, their employees for adjudication by this Tribunal.
SCHEDULE
“ Whether the action of Divisional Railway Manager, N.F. Railway, Lumding and SSE/Loco/Badarpur, N.F.
Railway, Badarpur in terminating the 05(five) non-contractual worker is legal and justified? If not, to what
relief the 05(five) terminated/retrench worker are entitled? ”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
717
1.
On receiving Order No. G/R. 8(07)/2022-CGIT dated 14.06.2022 dated 19.10.2020 from the Office of the
Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Guwahati, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, for adjudication
of the dispute, Reference case No. 09 of 2022 was registered on 27.07.2022 and an order was passed for issuing
notice to the parties through registered post, directing them to appear and submit their written statements along with
relevant documents in support of their claims and a list of witnesses.
2.
The aggrieved workmen filed their claim statement through Parash Balmiki on 27.09.2022. The same is
endorsed by Mr. Basanta Kumar Kalita, Secretary INTUC, though he was not a noticee in this case. In gist, the facts
giving rise to the Industrial Dispute is that the workmen named above were employed by the Senior Section Engineer
(Loco), N. F. Railway, Badarpur (hereinafter referred to as SSE(Loco)) for performing the work of Fuel Checker /
Fuel Helper as casual workers (non-contractual). They rendered work under the Indian Railways on fixed pay for
more than six years and in expectation to become permanent workers in the Indian Railways on fixed pay in terms
with Railway Circular No. E/NG/II-71 CL.46 dated 08.06.1981. It is inter-alia stated that the aforesaid workmen were
engaged against posts which became vacant due to death or retirement of the permanent railway personnel /
employees. The workmen were verbally engaged at a monthly wage of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) on
shifting duties. The payments were made in cash by Opposite Party No. 3. It is the further case of the workmen that
Parash Balmiki was employed under Northeast Frontier Railway (hereinafter referred to as N.F. Railway) since July,
2016 and Movement Pass was issued to him in January, 2020. Krishna Chandra Ghosh joined his service in January,
2018 and Movement Pass was issued to him in April, 2020. Pintu Chandra Das joined his service in May, 2016 and
Movement Pass was issued to him in July, 2020. Sumit Chandra Dey joined his service in April, 2016 and Movement
Pass was issued to him in March, 2020. Bapan Stephen joined his service in May, 2016 and Movement Pass was
issued to him in April, 2020. The said workmen were terminated from their service on 03.08.2021 without notice. The
terminated workmen have no employment at present and prayed for reinstatement in service with full back wages
fixed for casual workers by the Railway Board and Rs. 1,25,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty-five thousand only) as
cost of litigation.
3.
After service of Notice Mr. Tamal Sengupta, SSE(Loco) appeared as OP No. 3. In his written statement filed
on 09.12.2022 he has contended that he is not a necessary party in the proceeding and the Industrial Dispute is bad in
law due to mis-joinder of party. In respect of the claim made by the workmen, OP No. 3 has denied that the workmen
were deployed in shift duties under N. F Railway for several years. It is the case of OP No. 3 that he joined as Senior
Section Engineer (Loco), N. F. Railway, Badarpur in the month of January, 2020 and there is no record in their office
pertaining to the claim of the workmen that they were engaged as Fuel Checker / Fuel Helper as casual worker on a
consolidated pay of Rs. 6,000/- per month at various times. Management also denied that the workmen had worked in
the post of Fuel Checker / Fuel Helper for more than six years and was not aware about any Circular of the Indian
Railways for converting them as permanent employees. It is further denied that the workmen were deployed against
vacant posts on the death and retirement of permanent railway employees or were paid at the rate of Rs.6,000/- per
month as wages. The specific case of the management is that during the lockdown due to COVID-19, to meet
temporary contingency, entry passes were issued to the petitioners for maintaining public utility service of railway
operational. It is denied that the workmen were employed on a regular basis, as such their claim against retrenchment
is unsustainable. OP No. 3 stated that he is not vested with the authority to appoint any Fuel Checker / Fuel Helper as
claimed by the petitioners and he denied that the petitioners were terminated from employment of the Railway. The
management representative prayed for striking down his name as opposite party in this case.
4.
Several representations were made by the workmen for urgent hearing and the case was specially fixed on
19.09.2024 for evidence of workmen and management witnesses and hearing of argument. Parash Balmiki filed
an affidavit-in-chief on behalf of all the petitioners along with some documents which have been marked as Exhibit -1
to 1/6. In the affidavit-in-chief it is stated that in the conciliation proceeding the Assistant Labour Commissioner
(Central), Silchar, recorded that Mr. T. Sengupta, SSE(Loco) had stated that there was a shortage of Fuel Checker /
Fuel Helper and since no staff were deputed there was a compulsion to engage worker on daily wages to run the train
service and workers were hired only on a short-term basis as a daily wage earner. In Paragraph – 5 it is stated that the
Identity Cards in the name of the petitioners appeared to have been issued by the contractor firm but no such
contractor firm had engaged them or paid them any wages. It is inter-alia stated that the petitioners were terminated
by Mr. Tamal Sengupta, SSE(Loco) on and from 03.08.2021. In his evidence-in-chief the witness stated that passes
issued to them were prepared by Mr. Tamal Sengupta, SSE(Loco) for the purpose of entry in the Railway premises.
Copies of the passes have been marked as Exhibit – 1 series and one essential service pass has been marked as Exhibit
– 1/6. He further stated that all five of them are Fuel Checkers of Railway Engine and then went on to say that they
were helpers to Fuel Checkers and that except Krishna Chandra Ghosh, who worked as a helper from 2018, all of
them have worked for N. F. Railway from 2016 and received consolidated pay of Rs. 6,000/- per month. The witness
stated that SSE(Loco) made payment of consolidated wages per month in cash and received their signatures on the
Receipt Register. It is stated hat no Notice was served upon them for discontinuation of job for which they raised
Industrial Dispute at Silchar and thereafter this Reference has been made. None appeared for the Divisional Railway
Manager, N. F. Railway, Lumding Division to cross-examine the witness. The SSE(Loco) was represented by Mr.
Deepjyoti Das, learned advocate but declined to cross-examine the workmen witness on the plea that he has filed an
application for striking down the name of Tamal Sengupta as opposite party no.3.
718
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
5.
The short question for consideration is whether the termination of five non-contractual workers is legal and
justified? If not, to what relief the terminated / retrenched workmen are entitled.
6.
Though the case was fixed up for evidence and hearing of argument on 19.09.2024, after adducing evidence
by Parash Balmiki on behalf of the workmen the witness was not cross-examined on behalf of the management of N.
F. Railway. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the management of N. F. Railway and no argument was advanced
on behalf of any of the parties.
7.
Under the given situation it is necessary for this Tribunal to consider the pleadings of the parties and the
evidence on record. The Reference has bene made by the Government of India through Deputy Central Labour
Commissioner (Central), Guwahati, wherein the parties to the dispute have been mentioned in the Notice. There is no
scope of the Tribunal to go beyond the order of Reference and strike down any of the parties. The Tribunal is vested
with the jurisdiction only to consider the question referred to it and it would not be legally prudent to transcend the
dispute referred. In the claim statement the workmen have stated that they have been working under the management
No. 3 for more than 6 years in the post of Fuel Checker / Fuel Helper as casual worker (non-contractual) at a
consolidated monthly pay of Rs. 6,000/- and shifting duties were allotted to them verbally. It is an admitted position
which may be gathered from Paragraph - 5 of the claim statement that no order of employment was ever issued to
them. They were only provided working passes from their resident to work place during the pandemic period of
COVID–19 lockdown. In their evidence-in-chief respective date of appointment of the five aggrieved workmen have
not been sated. The witness failed to provide any document to substantiate the claim that Rs. 6,000/- was paid to them
by the management of N. F. Railway. Pleading of workman is absolute silence regarding performance of continuous
service for 240 days in a year by the workmen before their alleged date of termination on 03.08.2021.
8.
On perusal of Exhibit W-1, 1/1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 1/5 and 1/6, it appears that Movement Pass were issued to the
workmen involved as a Fuel Checker / Fuel Helper, Fueling Point / Helper at BB Loco Wing to perform their duties.
The passes were issued on various dates from 30.03.2020 to 14.05.2021. It may be gathered from the pleadings of
both the parties that the passes were issued to enable the petitioners to attend the emergency works at the Railway
Station Yard at Badarpur during the COVID-19 period. There is no evidence on record to establish that the workmen
performed continuous work for over six years or any particular year under the N. F. Railway. There is no order of
appointment, placement, disclosing any regular nature of work. Though the management has not come forward to
refute the case of the workmen about their engagement at the Railway Loco Yard to carry out the work of Fuel
Helper, the pleading and evidence of the workmen are found silent about performing continuous service by them
under the N. F. Railway. The petitioners who had worked as Fuel Checker/ Fuel Helper therefore were engaged as
daily wage casual labours. There is no evidence on record that they have been engaged against any sanctioned post of
the Railway. There is no evidence to prove that the attendance of the workmen was being recorded in the office of the
N.F. Railway, Badarpur. Discontinuation of work of the petitioners therefore does not give rise to any right of
retrenched workmen under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
9.
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 lays down the conditions precedent to retrenchment of
workmen. The provision may be reproduced as follows :
“ 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. - No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b)
the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette. ”
In the instant case the petitioners have not made any assertion in their pleading that they have rendered continuous
work, not less than one year under the employer. Therefore, discontinuation of work of such casual daily wage labour
does not create any right of retrenchment benefit or compensation in their favour. Though the management of N.F.
Railway has not contested the case by adducing evidence, the petitioners seeking reinstatement and litigation cost are
bound to prove their case by adducing positive evidence which is missing.
10.
In my considered view the petitioners have miserably failed to establish that they had been continuously
engaged by the N.F. Railway or any legal right exists in their favour for the purpose of their reinstatement in service
or to receive any retrenchment benefit / compensation. In view of my findings, I hold that the petitioners are not
entitled to any relief in this case and the Industrial Dispute is dismissed ex-parte against the OP No. 1 and 2 and on
contest against OP No. 3.
Hence,
ORDERED
that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief of reinstatement, retrenchment compensation or litigation
cost. The Industrial Dispute is dismissed ex-parte against the OP No. 1 and 2 and on contest against OP No. 3. Let an
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
719
Award be drawn up in the light of the above discussion. Let copies of the Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry
of Labour and Employment, Government of India, New Delhi for information and Notification.
ANANDA KUMAR MUKHERJEE, Presiding Officer / Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 18 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 241.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में,केन्रीय
सरकार भारतीय राष्ट्रीय राजमागव प्राजधकरण, बल्ली, हावड़ा; मेससव - ददनेिचंर अर. ऄग्रवाल आंफ्राकॉन प्रा. जलजमटेड,
नबाृल्ली, कोलकाता; मेससव-मौयव एंटरप्राआज़, बाघाजजतन, कोलकाता; श्री गौर गुचजत कंृनी, ृजिम मेददनीृुर और
मेससव- इगलदीृ कोलाघाट-हजल्दया, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और ृुरबा मेददनीृुर ज़ेला सुरक्षा सेवा और संबद्ध
श्रजमक संघ, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण-सह-श्रम न्यायालय, कोलकाता, ृंचाट (संदभव
सं्या. 25 Of 2019) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के
साथ 18.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 42011/156/2019 -अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 18th February, 2025
S.O. 241.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 25 Of 2019) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Kolkata, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to National Highways Authorities of India, Bally, Howrah; M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd.,
Nabapally, Kolkata ; M/s. Maurya Enterprise, Baghajatin, Kolkata ;Mr. Gour Guchait Co., Paschim
Medinipur and M/s. Eagledeep Kolaghat-Haldia, and Purba Medinipur Zela Security Service & Allied
Workers Union, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 18.02.2025.
[No. L-42011/156/2019 -IR (DU]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present : Justice K. D. Bhutia, Presiding Officer
REF. NO. 25 OF 2019
Parties : Employers in relation to the management of
1.National Highways Authorities of India, Bally, Howrah,
2.M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., Nabapally, Kolkata- 107.
3.M/s. Maurya Enterprise, Baghajatin, Kolkata- 92,
4.Mr. Gour Guchait Co., Paschim Medinipur and
5.M/s. Eagledeep Kolaghat-Haldia.
VS
Purba Medinipur Zela Security Service & Allied Workers Union.
Appearance:
On behalf National Highways Authorities of India, Bally, Howrah : Absent.
On behalf of M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., Nabapally, Kolkata- 107: Absent.
On behalf of M/s. Maurya Enterprise, Baghajatin, Kolkata- 92 : Mr.Affan Ali, Ld. Advocate.
On behalf of Mr. Gour Guchait Co., Paschim Medinipur : Mr. Affan Ali, Ld. Advocate.
On behalf of M/s. Eagledeep Kolaghat-Haldia : Absent.
720
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
And
On behalf of Purba Medinipur Zela Security Service & Allied Workers Union: Mr. Uddipan Banerjee, Ld. Advocate.
Dated: 6th February, 2025
AWARD
As per record, initially the Central Government, Ministry of Labour was pleased to refer the present case for
adjudication of dispute with regard to alleged termination of four workmen to this Tribunal vide order No.L-
42011/156/2019-IR (DU) dated 02-12-2019. Subsequently, the Ministry of Labour, by issuing corrigendum letter
dt.05-06-2023, amended the number of alleged terminated workmen from 4 to 7. The schedule of corrigendum
reference read as follows:-
―Whether action of the management of M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., contactor of
NHAI, Howrah in terminating the service of 7 workers (as per list attached), as raised by Purba Medinipur Zela
Security Service & Allied Workers Union, is proper, legal and justified? If not, what relief the disputant workers are
entitled to and what direction, if any, are necessary in the matter?‖
The facts that have been gathered from the pleadings of the parties and from both oral and documentary
evidence are, NHAI had engaged M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. for supply of men power for
surveillance over road accident or for accident management on the national highway in a stretch between Kolaghat to
Haldia during the relevant period.
It further appears that M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. instead of carrying out the
tendered job by itself had engaged a sub-contractor named M/s. Maurya Enterprise and who too in turned had
engaged another sub-contractor named Mr. Gour Guchait for discharging the tendered job. All the workmen were
engaged by Mr. Gour Guchait
That on expiry of contract period between NHAI and M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., the
former has engaged M/s. Eagledeep Kolaghat-Haldia, for operation and maintenance of national highway in between
Kolaghat and Haldia w.e.f. September, 2017. That on engagement of Eagledeep Kolaghat Haldia, for the concerned
tender work, it has refused to absorb those eight contractor employees engaged earlier by Mr. Gour Guchait. Such
facts appear to be the germination of the present dispute.
However, the union in its claim application has alleged it is a registered trade union affiliated with CITU and
it represents the Security Workers and Allied Workers in Security Service throughout the District of Purba Medinipur.
That seven workmen named in the list and Avijit Mal, since deceased, were engaged by Mr. Gour Guchait who was a
contractor engaged by National Highway Authority of India, M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. and
M/s. Maurya Enterprise to keep a watch on the National Highway from Kolaghat to Haldia on 01-01-2015. Their duty
was to assist the accident victims and shift them to the hospital and to remove carcass from the road.
Those workmen discharged their duty honestly, sincerely and diligently but they were not provided with any
basic facility to which an ordinary workman is entitled to. Thus, those workmen placed their demand for basic facility
before the concerned contractors. Surprisingly, the concerned employer suddenly stopped payment of their wages
w.e.f. 08-04-2016 and restrained them from attending their duty. That those workmen approached the union to
mitigate their grievances of illegal termination. The union took up the matter with the Assistant Labour Commissioner
(Central).
That at the time of hearing before the Labour Commissioner, the union has come to know that M/s.
Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. has verbally engaged M/s. Maurya Enterprise as its sub-contractor and
M/s. Maurya Enterprise, verbally handed over the concerned project work to Mr. Gour Guchait.
Somehow, the conciliation failed. Surprisingly, Conciliation Officer in his failure report failed to mention the
names of M/s. Maurya Enterprise and Mr. Gour Guchait. Therefore, the union moved the Hon‘ble High Court in writ
jurisdiction by filing writ petition no.1474 (W) of 2019 for insertion of the names of those two contractors namely
M/s. Maurya Enterprise and Mr. Gour Guchait. Such writ petition was disposed on 13-03-2019 with a direction to the
Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central) to consider the application of the petitioner for inserting the names of Opposite
Party no.3 and 4 named above, but Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central) failed and as such the union once again
moved another writ petition being No. 13043(W) of 2019 and which was disposed of on 19-07-2019 with a direction
to Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central) to consider the applications of the petitioners for incorporating the names of
two contractors. Accordingly, Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central) complied.
The workmen have alleged that they have been terminated from the service without issuing any show cause,
charge sheet, without holding any domestic enquiry and without complying the provisions of section 25-F of I.D.Act.
Therefore, they have prayed that the termination may be declared illegal and for reinstatement with full back wages.
The record shows principal employer, National Highway Authority of India, its contractors M/s.
Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Eagleddep Kolaghat Haldia OMT Project Pvt. Ltd. have failed
to appear and contest the case and as such the present case has been proceeded exparte against them.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
721
That M/s. Maurya Enterprise and Mr. Gour Guchait contested the claim by filing joint written statement
where they have alleged that each and every workman has a distinguish case and as such their individual case cannot
be raised by a union. Thus, the claim statement filed by the union is not maintainable.
That none of them have received any written work orders for executing the work of NHAI from their
immediate vendor. The work entrusted to them was controlled by M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd.
That they took the contract for a very limited period from August, 2015 to February, 2016 i.e. for less than six months
and engaged less than seven persons for execution of the job sourced out to them. Thus, they have alleged those
concerned workmen never worked for them for more than 240 days in a year. Those workmen cannot be considered
to be in continuous service under them/sub-contractors.
That those seven persons have worked for intermittent period during their contract period of six months and
question of retrenchment without notice and holding departmental enquiry do not arise and the question of
reinstatement with back wages will not arise. Therefore, they prayed for dismissal of the reference.
The union in its rejoinder has reiterated what it has alleged in its original claim statement.
Record shows, union has examined Sri Ashis Kumar Doloi, President of Union as W.W. No.1.
Unfortunately, those two contesting sub-contractor employers have failed to pursue with the case since 05-06-2024
and failed to examine W.W.1. Accordingly, they have been proceeded exparte.
Union has got the following documents as exhibit through W.W.1:-
1.
Copy of applications filed by workmen namely Sri Laltu Sarma, Sri Bijal Kumar Maity, Sri
Nilkanta Bera, Sri Nityananda Midya, Sri Dipanjan Maity, Sri Prasenjit Das Adhikary, Sri Abhijit
Mal and Sri Bikash Dhara before ALC (C), Kolkata with copy to all the employers and which have
been marked as Exb.W-1 to W-1/7.
2.
Copy of letters dt. 22/27-02-2017 and 10-03-2017 of A.L.C. (C ), Kolkata to Project Director,
NHAI, M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., Mr. Ramanand Maurya of M/s. Maurya
Enterprise and Mr. Gour Guchait and which have been marked as Exb.W-2 and 2/A.
3.
Copy of adjournment application dt. 20-03-2027 filed by Mr. Gour Guchait before ALC (C) and
which has been marked as Exb.W-3.
4.
Copy of letter dt.27-03-2016 of Project Director, Calcutta-Haldia Port Road Co. Ltd., a subsidiary
of NHAI to M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. in respect of termination of service
of Bikash Dhara, Prasenjit Das Adhikary and Abhijit Mal and which has been marked as Exb.W-4.
5.
Copy of letter of M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. to Asst. Labour Commissioner
(Central) dt.18-07-2017 informing the latter that workmen B. K. Maity, N. M. Midya, N. Bera, D.
Maity and L. Sarma were employees of its sub-contractor M/s. Marya Enterprise and which has
been marked as Exb.W-5.
6.
Copy of M/s. Maurya Enterprises‘ letter dt.24-07-2017 to Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central),
informing the latter that it took contract on and from 19-06-2015 to 31-05-2017 from M/s.
Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. verbally and which was subject to renewal every three
months and on the same term he handed over the work to Mr. Gour Guchait, another sub-contractor
and which has been marked as Exb.W-6.
7.
Copy of Union‘s letter to Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central) dt.01-09-2017 and where union had
alleged that contractors of NHAI may change but same set of workmen continue to discharge
perennial nature of job of NHAI and as such requested the latter to direct M/s. Eagle Infra India Ltd.
to absorb /reinstate the old workmen and to make M/s. Eagle Infra India Ltd. as a party to the
conciliation proceeding and which has been marked as Exb. W-7.
8.
Copy of letter of M/s. Eagledeep Kolaghat-Haldia OMT Projects Pvt. Ltd. to Asst. Labour
Commissioner (Central) dt.18-12-2017, informing that it is not possible for it to reinstate six
workers namely B. K. Maity, Bikash Dhara, Nityananda Midya, Abhijit Mal, Nilkanta Bera and
Dipanjan Maity, employees of ex-contractor M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. as it
has already employed its own workmen for the tendered job and which has been marked as Exb.W-
7/A.
9.
Copy of two failure reports of Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central) dt.09-04-2018 and 20-09-2019
forwarded to the Secretary, Ministry of Labour for necessary step and which have been marked as
Exb.W-8 and W-8/A.
10.
Two copy of letters of union dt.06-07-2018 and 01-10-2018 both addressed to Asst. Labour
Commissioner (Central) for corrigendum in the case No.5/44/2017/E-3 for inclusion of two service
providers namely Mr. Gour Guchait and Mr. Ramananda Marya of M/s. Marya Enterprise as parties
to the proceeding and which have been marked as Exb.W-9 and Exb.W-9/A.
Union has also filed written notes of argument.
722
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
It is necessary to mention here, that Mr. Affan Ali, Ld. Advocate of Mr. Gour Guchait and M/s. Marya
Enterprise, suddenly put his appearance on 05-02-2025 after 23-04-2024 and that too on the date, the case was fixed
for hearing exparte argument. Ld. Advocate on record for reasons best known to him or to his both clients have all on
a sudden stopped appearing before the Tribunal and pursue with the hearing from after 23-04-2024. That he had put
appearance almost ten months and wants to take the clock back and render him to cross examine the union‘s witness.
Such prayer not supported by sufficient cause has been rejected.
Now, let me see whether there was indeed illegal termination of service of the seven workmen by their
employer?
Except what has been stated with regard to the employment of those seven workmen in the project work of
NHAI by its contactors or sub-contractors in the claim statement nothing has come on record to corroborate the
statement made in the claim statement, such as their attendance sheet, wage slips or any such document from where it
can be ascertained their actual date of employment and actual date of termination as alleged or the nature of job for
which they were engaged, whether they were engaged to do perennial nature of job or seasonal nature of job or casual
nature of job as a daily wager. The union in its claim statement has stated their job was accident management on
national highway in between Kolaghat to Haldia i.e. to assist the accident victims and shift them to the hospital and to
remove carcass from the road. Such nature of job does not appear to be perennial in nature to this Tribunal.
Further, nothing has come on record to show their exact period of engagement either by the contractor or
sub-contractor of NHAI. From contents of Exb.W-7 andW-7/A written by the concerned union and M/s. Eagledeep
Kolaghat Haldia OMT Project Pvt. Ltd. to ALC (C), it appears that on engagement of M/s. Eagledeep Kolaghat
Haldia OMT Projects Pvt. Ltd. by NHAI for operation and maintenance of Kolaghat Haldia road upto 53.472 k.m., on
the expiry of tenure of agreement NHAI had with M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., then the
employees of M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., through their union, had requested M/s. Eagledeep
Kolaghat Haldia OMT Projects Pvt. Ltd. to take them in service and which was turned down by M/s. Eagledeep
Kolaghat Haldia OMT Projects Pvt. Ltd. as it had already employed its own employees for the awarded work.
It is the case of the union that those workmen worked under different contractors of NHAI engaged for same
nature of job, but the union has failed to produce any document to show engagement of the concerned workman by
different contractors of NHAI on different period of time for discharging same nature of job.
That apart, this Tribunal is of view a workman who is engaged in a project work by a contractor of principal
employer, then such workman is presumed to have knowledge that his job is only for the limited period or till the
completion of project, for which the contract was granted to his immediate employer and as such he cannot claim
right to continuity in the service or cannot say that his service has been terminated on the expiry of period of contract
or completion of project.
Further, this Tribunal is of view, if the contract of the immediate/contractor employer comes to an end on the
expiry of the period of contact, then service of the contractor‘s workmen too comes to an end in the establishment of
the principal employer. Therefore, employees of the contractor cannot say that they have been illegally retrenched or
terminated from the service in the establishment of the principal employer by their immediate employer, the
contractor whose contract has come to an end on the expiry of period of contract. Such facts stand corroborated by the
contents of Exb.W-7/A and which prove on expiry of contract between NHAI and its contractors M/s. Dineshchandra
R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., former has engaged another contractor named M/s. Eagledeep Kolaghat Haldia OMT
Projects Pvt. Ltd. for maintenance and operation of Kolaghat Haldia National Highway No.41 sometime in the year
2017.
The union in its claim statement has alleged that seven workmen were retrenched from the service by the
sub-contractors of M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd. by stopping payment of their wages and
preventing them from joining the duty on and from 08-04-2016. Unfortunately, such was not the case of the union
before the ALC (C), Kolkata in a conciliation proceeding raised by it sometime in the year 2017.
The contents of Exb.W-7, Exb.W-7/A already discussed above and Exb.W-8 and W-8/A, the two failure
reports submitted by the Conciliation Officer, invariably project demand of union for re-engagement of the employees
of sub-contractors of M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., erstwhile contractor of NHAI by new
contractor M/s. Eagledeep Kolaghat Haldia OMT Projects Pvt. Ltd. It was not the case of the union before ALC that
those seven workmen were retrenched by the sub-contractor of M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd.,
erstwhile contractor of NHAI in the month of April, 2016 by preventing them to join duty or stopping their wages.
Thus, it appears union has made out a case of termination in the year 2016 for the purpose of the present case.
In view of the above, this Tribunal holds that there was no termination of service of the seven workmen as
alleged by their immediate employer in the year 2016 rather the documents prove that on engagement of a new
contractor by NHAI, the new contractor refused to engage erstwhile employees of erstwhile contractor of NHAI. On
such refusal by new contractor to engage old employees then union has raised present industrial dispute by bringing a
baseless case of termination.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
723
Therefore, it is held that there was no termination of service of seven workmen by M/s. Dineshchandra R.
Agarwal Infracon Pvt. Ltd., a contractor of NHAI or by the sub-contractors of M/s. Dineshchandra R. Agarwal
Infracon Pvt. Ltd., rather their service period limited to the period of contract had come to an end on the expiry of
period of contract between the principal employer and its immediate contractor. Thus, the workmen are not entitled to
get any relief in the form of reinstatement, back wages or any compensation as stipulated u/s 25-F of the I.D. Act.
Accordingly, Reference Case no.25 of 2019 is dismissed and an award to that effect is passed.
Justice K. D.BHUTIA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 242.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
bafM;u बैंक ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;] चंडीगढ़- I ds iapkV (81/2019) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 39025/01/2024- vkbZvkj (बी-I) -51]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 242.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.81/2019) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Indian Bank
and their workmen.
[No. L-39025/01/2024- IR (B-I)-51]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH.
Present: Sh. Brajesh Kumar Gautam, Presiding Officer, Chandigarh.
ID No.81/2019
Registered On:-17.12.2019
Sandeep Kumar S/o Sh. Jai Pal R/o H.No.230 Village Bhabhat, Zirakpur, Mohali Punjab.
...........Workman
Versus
1. Indian Bank, Zonal Office, Vigilance Cell, SCO 190-192, Sector 7 C, Chandigarh through its
Zonal Manager.
2. Mr. Dinesh Kumar Zonal Manager, Zonal Office, Vigilance Cell, SCO 190-192, Sector 7 C,
Chandigarh.
........Respondents
Dr. Naresha Nand AR for Workman
Sh. Tribhavan Singh AR for Management
(Subsequently Management proceeded Ex-parte)
Judgment reserved on 19th November, 2024
Judgment Pronounced on 06th December, 2024
724
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
JUDGMENT/ AWARD
1.
Present Petition is an Industrial Dispute filed under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter called the Act) by the workman Sh. Sandeep Kumar, challenging his termination order dated- 30-11-2017
with a prayer to reinstate the workman with back wages.
2.
The case of Workman/ Petitioner- the brief facts of the case as unfolded from the claim statement are that
the workman joined the service of Indian Bank as Clerk on 24.06.2013 and was posted at Manimajra Branch
on 05.07.2013 and at the time of termination he was doing duty of Cashier with the Indian Bank, Manimajra
Branch, U.T. Chandigarh. The further case of petitioner is that he was charged by the disciplinary authority
that while performing duties as cashier at the Branch he misappropriated Rs.1000/- when one Mr. Santosh (an
employee of M/s Atul Jewelers) came to deposit Rs,.20,000/- on 07.06.2016. It was alleged that said Mr.
Santosh was pressurized by the petitioner to fill up a fresh pay in slip for Rs.19,000/- and counterfoil for
Rs.19,000/- was given after misappropriating Rs.1000/-. When the matter was reported to Branch Manager by
the customer the Branch Manager further reported same to Zonal Office, Chandigarh. It is alleged that CCTV
footage showed that misappropriated money blown up with the Air pressure of the fan and it was stuck near
the computer monitor and when the customer left the counter same was kept in cash drawer by the petitioner.
The further allegation against petitioner was that he did not report excess cash at the end of the day and
pocketed excess Rs.1000/- violating the guidelines and this way a loss to bank reputation was caused by the
petitioner. It was further alleged that ultimately petitioner refunded said Rs.1000/- when he was shown CCTV
footage. In response to above mentioned charges petitioner file its reply denying these charges. A vigilance
officer visited the Branch on 08.06.2016 and an investigation was done. The further case of petitioner is that
the disciplinary authority not being satisfied with the reply of petitioner initiated a departmental enquiry by
appointing Sh. S.K. Lahan Chief Manager, Zonal Office, Indian Bank, Chandigarh as Enquiry Officer and Sh.
Rajinder Kumar Manager, Zonal Office, Chandigarh was appointed as presenting officer. After completion of
departmental enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his enquiry report to the disciplinary authority vide its
report dated 16.06.2017. As per enquiry report submitted by enquiry officer all charges against the petitioner
were found proved. The Disciplinary authority thereafter issued a show cause notice to petitioner vide letter
dated 16.11.2017, proposing a penalty of removal from service. The petitioner was directed to appear in person
on 18.11.2017 before the disciplinary authority but the petitioner sought 15 days time for preparing and
submitting his reply to the show cause. No response to request for extension of time was received by
petitioner, however, he submitted his reply on 29.11.2017. Finally the disciplinary authority vide its order
dated 30.11.2017 imposed the punishment of dismissal without notice under Clause 6 (A) of the Memorandum
of Settlement on disciplinary action and procedure therefor dated 10.04.2002 as amended from time to time.
The dismissal order was sent to the petitioner vide letter No.ZO:CHD:VIG:SSA-1B/2017-18 dated 30.11.2017
by the Chief Manager (HRM) Zonal Office, Indian Bank, Chandigarh.
The petitioner preferred an Intra Bank Appeal before Appellate Authority Indian Bank, Corporate Office,
Chennai and requested for a personal hearing. A personal hearing was offered at the corporate office of the
bank at Chennai after a gap of about 10 months i.e. on 22.10.2018. Ultimately the Appellate Authority
confirmed the punishment passed by disciplinary authority without considering the facts and circumstances
and without application of Judicial mind and rejected the appeal vide order dated 09.01.2019. After rejection
of appeal by the disciplinary authority the petitioner approached Assistant Labour Commissioner, Kendriya
Sadan, Sector 9-A, Chandigarh for Conciliation Proceedings through Bank Employees Union President as an
Industrial Dispute between Indian Bank Employees Union and Disciplinary Authority Indian Bank, Zonal
Office, Chandigarh. The Indian Bank through its Deputy Zonal Manager, Chandigarh submitted its reply
before the Assistant Labour Commissioner justifying the orders of Disciplinary Authority and that of Appellate
Authority. Ultimately Conciliation proceedings resulted in failure and a certificate No.7(11)/2019/ACH/C.III
dated 16.09.2019 was issued enabling petitioner to file Industrial Dispute before this Court. The petition
raising present Industrial Dispute was Therefore filed on 17.12.2019 and was registered as ID No.81/2019.
4. The case of Management- In response to notice issued to the Respondent-Bank Management appeared and
filed its written statement/ reply to the petition of workman. It may be pointed out here that the respondents left
taking proper steps in the present proceeding and ultimately vide order dated 15.04.2024 the case was directed to
be proceeded ex-parte against the management as on repeated dates none turned up for cross examination of the
workman.
5. According to case of respondents because of apparent misconduct committed by workman/ applicant he was
dismissed from service of bank after holding a detailed departmental enquiry. According to further case of
respondents after appreciation of facts and based on enquiry report the disciplinary authority passed order of
dismissal which was confirmed in appeal before the Appellate Authority. According to the case of respondents
the conduct/ omission and commissions found proved against applicant were of very serious in nature
involving misappropriation of money and therefore the punishment awarded was correct and in accordance
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
725
with the legal provisions. It has been denied by management that applicant workman became aware about
blown currency note of Rs.1,000/- only when CCTV footage was shown to him. The workman himself has
admitted his guilt of misappropriating Rs.1000/- and there was no explanation as to why there was Rs.1000/- in
excess. According to respondents the CCTV Footage clearly shows that applicant-workman kept Rs.1000/-
currency note in cash drawer and thereafter, he did not report that there was an excess of amount and this
clearly shows malicious intention on the part of applicant workman. According to the case of the respondent
the punishment of dismissal has been passed as per clause 6 (A) of Memorandum of Settlement and
Disciplinary Action and procedure dated 10.04.2002. The applicant workman failed to uphold the integrity and
honesty expected form an employee of Public Sector Bank. The action of the workman was prejudiced to the
interest of bank. According to the case of management it is wrong to say that without giving proper opportunity
in the enquiry and without hearing the appellant workman he was dismissed from the service. The workman/
applicant could not brought any material or evidence calling for an interference at the appellate stage as well.
The Disciplinary authority has exercised its discretion judiciously and passed speaking order. The punishment
imposed upon the management is logical, rational and proportionate to the gravity of misconduct found proved
against applicant of the workman. According to respondents the petition of applicant-workman is liable to be
dismissed with cost.
6. Issues: On the basis of pleadings of the parties following issues are framed to be decided in the present case-
i. Whether in the departmental enquiry charges against the delinquent employee-workman/
applicant was proved and whether the departmental enquiry conducted was in violation of
principle of natural justice?
ii. Whether the dismissal of applicant-workman Sh. Sandeep Kumar is illegal and same has
been passed without application of Judicious mind?
iii. Whether workman-applicant is entitled for reinstatement with back wages?
iv. What other relief if any in the facts and circumstances of the case?
7. Evidence: During the trial proceedings of present case on behalf of petitioner/ workman, the petitioner
Sandeep Kumar himself has been examined as witness PW-1 and several documents are marked as exhibit P-1
to P-24 as follows:
Particulars
Exhibits
Copy of Charge-Sheet dated 16.09.2016
Ex.P-1
Copy of Letter dated 05.10.2016
Ex.P-2
Copy of Explanation Letter dated 02.07.2016
Ex.P-3
Copy of Reply dated 07.07.2016 to Explanation Letter
Ex.P-4
Copy of Enquiry Order dated 16.02.2017
Ex.P-5
Copy of CCTV Footage dated 07.06.2016
Ex.P-6
Copy of Enquiry Proceedings dated 27.02.2017
Ex.P-7
Copy of Enqiry Proceedings dated 03.03.2017
Ex.P-8
Copy of Written Brief of the Enquiry Proceedings dated 15.03.2017
Ex. P-9
Copy of Summing up of the Enquiry dated 07.04.2017
Ex.P-10
Copy of Findings of Enquiry Officer Sh. S.K. Lahan dated 16.06.2017
Ex.P-11
Copy of Representation Letter dated 22.06.2017
Ex.P-12
Copy of Letter dated 16.11.2017
Ex.P-13
Copy of Letter dated 17.11.2017
Ex.P-14
Copy of Letter dated 29.11.2017
Ex.P-15
Copy of Dismissal Order dated 30.11.2017
Ex.P-16
Copy of Appeal dated 26.12.2017
Ex.P-17
Copies of Submission by the For Workman dated 22.10.2018
Ex.P-18
726
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Copy of Proceedings of Personal Hearing dated 22.10.2018
Ex.P-19
Copy of Order of Appellate Authority dated 09.01.2019
Ex.P-20
Copy of conciliation proceedings dated 10.06.2019
Ex.P-21
Copy of Letter dated 23.08.2019
Ex. P-22
Copy of Letter dated 09.09.2019
Ex. P-23
Copy of Order 16.09.2019
Ex. P-24
8.
As stated here in above when no proper steps were being taken on behalf of Respondent-Bank Management,
ex-parte proceeding was directed against the respondent and on behalf of respondent neither oral nor documentary
evidence were produced.
9.
Argument on behalf of Workman-Applicant: It has been submitted by Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of
petitioner-workman that during the enquiry the customer who had deposited the money on 07.06.2016 was not
examined to support the allegation as to whether he had tendered Rs.20000/- for deposit or it was only Rs.19000/-
which was infact deposited. It is also argued that even no written complaint was there on behalf of customer Mr.
Santoshi an employee of M/s Atul Jewelers. It is specifically argued that in the dismissal order there is reference that
petitioner workman had appeared before disciplinary authority on 18.11.2017 but fact remains that he had sought a
time for preparation and appearance before the disciplinary authority on the later date. It is also argued that wrong fact
has been mentioned in the dismissal order that petitioner had accepted his guilt of misappropriation of Rs.1000/- on
the alleged date of occurrence and it is also wrongly stated that workman had apologized his mistake. The Ld.
Counsel for Workman has also placed his reliance on certain reported decisions which are- decision of Hon‘ble
Allahabad High Court dated 19.09.2021 in Civil Writ Petition No.53781 of 2011 titled as Anil Kumar Vs Assistant
General Manager, Judgment of Kerala High Court dated 04.12.2021 passed in WP (C No.13955 of 2017) titled as
State Bank of India Vs Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Ors. None turned up on behalf of respondent to
make any submission. It may be noticed that respondent is already proceeded ex-parte.
10.
Finding: Points No.(i)- Whether in the departmental enquiry charges against the delinquent employee-
workman/ applicant was proved and whether the departmental enquiry conducted was in violation of principle of
natural justice?
(ii) -Whether the dismissal of applicant-workman Sh. Sandeep Kumar is illegal and same has been passed without
application of judicial mind?
These two points for determination are interconnected and therefore, these are taken together. The enquiry report
has been brought on the record and same is exhibited as Ex.P-11/ PW-1. Perusal of this enquiry report shows that
during the enquiry Sh. A.K. Singh AGM/BM, Indian Bank, Manimajra has been examined as Management witness
and CCTV footage dated 07.06.2016 (the date of alleged incident) has been produced as documentary evidence
during the said enquiry. It further appears from the perusal of enquiry proceeding contained in Ex.P-7, Ex.P-8 that
certain queries were put up during the enquiry proceeding on 27.02.2017 in which charge sheeted employee (Sandeep
Kumar) admitted receiving charge sheet, enquiry order dated 16.02.2017 and one Sh. R.K. Gulati President of Indian
Bank Employees Union was permitted to work as defense representative on behalf of delinquent employee Sandeep
Kumar during further query put up the delinquent employee Sandeep Kumar has denied accepting the charges which
were served upon him.
Mr. Rajinder Kumar the presenting Officer had supplied list of witnesses and documents and as per the list only one
witness Sh. A.K. Singh was to be examined and as documentary evidence CCTV Footage of Branch Cash Cabin of
dated 07.06.2016 (date of incident) were proposed to be adduced during the enquiry. On 27.02.2017 during enquiry
proceeding Sh. A.K. Singh has been examined as management witness. Evidence of this witness is contained in Ex.P-
8/ PW1. He has deposed that he was present in the Branch on 07.06.2016. He has further stated that one Mr. Santosh
an Employee of M/s Atul Jeweler had made complain that he deposited Rs.20,000/- but cashier told that it was only
Rs.19,000/-. Here it is important to be noted that no any such complaint as stated by this witness Sh. A.K. Singh has
been brought on the record which was made before Sh. A.K. Singh AGM/BM of Manimajra Branch. It is also not
clear from the evidence of Sh. A.K. Singh as to whether said complaint was oral or it was in writing. If it was oral it
was required to be clearly stated in the evidence of Sh. A.K. Singh and if it was written complaint it was necessarily
to be produced during the enquiry. In further evidence Sh. A.K. Singh- the Management witness has stated that Mr.
Santosh (the Depositor of money) informed Sh. Raj Kumar the proprietor of M/s Atul Jewelers and Raj Kumar sent
his son to the Branch who handed over a complaint letter and CCTV Footage was replayed. In the said CCTV
Footage it was seen that a Rs.1000/- note had blown with the fan air pressure and had gone near the monitor that is
why there was shortage of Rs.1000/- and after sometime the same Rs.1000/- note was collected by cashier and kept in
the cash drawer. In further evidence Mr. A.K. Singh the then Branch Manager (Management witness) has stated that
on 08.06.2016 the CCTV Footage recording was again played before investigating officer from Zonal Office and
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
727
customer was called to the Branch and Rs.1000/- was refunded by Mr. Sandeep Kumar to the customer. In the cross
examination when management witness Sh. A.K. Singh was asked as to he himself had noticed delinquent employee
Sh. Sandeep Kumar pocketing any currency note on 07.06.2016, Mr. A.K. Singh the Management witness had replied
in negative. Remarkably the complaint letter which was handed over by son of Sh. Raj Kumar (the proprietor of M/s
Atul Jeweler) were not produced during the enquiry and even Mr. Santosh the employee of M/s Atul Jeweler who had
visited the Branch for depositing Rs.20,000/- on 07.06.2016 had not been examined to prove the allegation that he had
actually handed over Rs.20,000/- to the cashier but cashier reported that it was only Rs.19,000/-. So far as CCTV
Footage is concerned according to Management witness in the CCTV Footage it was seen that Rs.1,000/- note had
blown and stuck near the Monitor of Cash Cabin. Only because a Rs.1000/- note was seen blown by air and stuck
near the monitor in the cabin it cannot be taken to be proved that this single note was part of Rs.20,000/- which was
allegedly handed over by the Depositor in absence of further corroborative evidence. There is no evidence produced
during enquiry on the point that Santosh the Depositor of Money had actually handed over Rs.20,000/- to the cashier.
Even proprietor of M/s Atul Jeweler or his son who had handed over letter of complaint to Branch Manager have not
been also examined to prove the fact that they had sent Mr. Santosh an employee of M/s Atul Jeweler to deposit
Rs.20,000/- and in absence of substantive evidence on this point, it can‘t be said that it was proved that Mr. Santosh
had actually handed over Rs.20,000/- to the cashier (the delinquent employee) who told him it was only Rs.19,000/-
and had pressurized Mr. Santosh to fill up a new pay-in-slip/ deposit Challan for Rs.19,000/-. In the enquiry report
there is also no finding that how it was proved by enquiry officer that Sandeep Kumar the delinquent employee had
compelled Mr. Santosh the Depositor to fill up a revised deposit challan.
11.
The very genesis of the allegations against petitioner/ workman had been misappropriation of Rs.1,000/-
from the cash deposit of Rs.20,000/- by Mr. Santosh who was employee of M/s Atul Jewelers appears not proved for
the reason stated here in above. So far as argument on behalf of petitioner in not providing sufficient opportunity
during enquiry is concerned it may also be seen from the enquiry proceeding itself that soon after recording of
evidence of management witness it has been asked from defense side whether they want to produce any defense
witness and were upon defense side stated that I do not need to produce any witness. The another point which has
been raised by Ld. Counsel for petitioner that a wrong observation has been recorded in dismissal order dated
30.11.2017 (Ex.P-16) that delinquent Sandeep Kumar presented himself for personal hearing on 18.11.2017 but he
had not appeared on that date and infact he had prayed by filing an application before disciplinary authority seeking
extension of time on 17.11.2017. It is clear from the letter dated 16.11.2017 of Disciplinary Authority contained in
Ex.P-30/ PW-1 that after completion of Departmental Enquiry Sandeep Kumar the delinquent employee which served
with the show cause proposing punishment of removal from service with superannuation benefits and direction to
appear on 18.11.2017 for personal hearing was given. It is further clear that Sandeep Kumar had prayed 15 days time
for submitting his reply through his letter dated 17.11.2017 addressed to Disciplinary Authority contained in Ex.P-14.
There appears no communication in this regard as to what happened on application for extension of time filed by
Sandeep Kumar. Apparently the submission of Ld. Counsel for the workman is found correct that he did not present
himself before Disciplinary Authority for personal hearing on 18.11.2017 as directed in the letter dated 16.11.2017 of
the disciplinary authority and it has been wrongly observed in dismissal order dated 30.11.2017 that Sandeep Kumar
presented himself for personal hearing on 18.11.2017. The another anomaly which can be traced in the dismissal
order is regarding material difference between proposed punishment contained in letter dated 16.11.2017 and the
final punishment is passed without assigning any reason as to why proposed punishment for which a show cause
notice was given to Sandeep Kumar was changed from ―Removal from service with superannuation service‖ to
―dismissal without notice‖ under Clause 6 (A) of the Memorandum of Settlement on Disciplinary Action and
procedure therefor. On this account also the dismissal order appears not good in law and apparently has been passed
without analysis of enquiry report and without application of judicial mind over it. I have already stated here in above
in this Judgment that in absence of substantive evidence during the enquiry the charges that on the date of alleged
incident 07.06.2016 Sandeep Kumar the delinquent employee has misappropriated Rs.1000/- from the cash deposit
tendered by one Sh. Santosh and that he failed to refund and report the access cash to the Branch Manager, was not
found proved, therefore, the disciplinary action in dismissing the delinquent employee Sh. Sandeep Kumar from the
service based upon such departmental enquiry is bad in law and has been passed without application of judicial mind.
12.
Points (iii) Whether workman-applicant is entitled for reinstatement with back wages?
(iv) What other relief if any in the facts and circumstances of the case?
These two points are also interconnected and therefore these are taken together. While deciding Points No.(i) & (ii)
here in above in this Judgment a clear finding has been recorded that in the enquiry report charges were not proved for
want of substantive evidence and therefore the order of dismissal based on that Departmental Enquiry is bad in law.
Dismissal from service is a major punishment and it should not be passed lightly without there being strong
substantive evidence to support the allegation/ charge against a delinquent employee. Remarkably the management
bank has left defending its action during present proceeding before this Court and it appears that one of the reason
may be that management was unable to defend its action. Whatever evidence has been produced on the record on
behalf of workman-applicant Sh. Sandeep Kumar remained intact as respondent bank management could not
controvert the evidence produced before this Court during present proceeding. Consequently the petitioner/ workman
Sandeep Kumar is entitled for the relief prayed in the present case. The dismissal order dated 30.11.2017 passed by
728
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Disciplinary Authority Indian Bank Zonal Office, Chandigarh is liable to be set aside and petitioner Sandeep Kumar
is entitled for reinstatement will all consequential benefits.
13.
In the light of discussion made herein above and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is-
ORDERED
That the present ID No.81/2019 titled as Sandeep Kumar Vs Indian Bank & Anr. is allowed. The dismissal order
dated 30.11.2017 contained in Annexure A-15 (Ex.P-16/PW1) to claim petition is set aside. Order of Appellate
Authority contained in Annexure A-18 (Ex.P-20/PW1) dated 09.01.2019 to claim petition is also set aside. The
respondents are directed to reinstate the applicant-workman Sh. Sandeep Kumar with all consequential past benefits
from the date of his dismissal from service.
14.
Let copy of this award be sent to the Appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the Act for
publication.
Dated: 06.12.2024
B. K. GAUTAM, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 243—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
सेंरल बैंक ऑफ आंजडया ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds iapkV (a38/2016) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12012/23/2016- vkbZvkj (बी- II)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 243—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 38/2016) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Central Bank of
India and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/23/2016- IR (B- II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/38/2016
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..( Retd)
Deepak Bagdre
S/o. Anand Rao Bagdre
Mukan, PO: Jhallar, Tehsil - Bhainsadehi
Betul (M.P.)-460226
Workman
Versus
The Regional Manager
Central Bank of India
Regional Office – P.B. No. 13,
Narsinghpur Road, Chitnavisganj
Chhindwara (M.P.)-480002.
Management
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
729
AWARD
(Passed on this 31st day of December-2024.)
As per letter dated 31/03/2016 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number L-12012/23/2016/IR(B-II) dt.
31/03/2016. The dispute under reference related to :-
“Whether the action of the management of Central Bank of India in terminating the services of workman
Shri Deepak Bagdre C/o. Shri Anand Rao Bagdre w.e.f. 31.10.2008 without following the provisions of
I.D. Act, is justified ? If not, what relief the workman is entitled for ?”
After registering the case on the basis of the references received, notices were sent to the parties and were
duly served on them. They appeared and filed their respective statements of claim and defense.
The case of the workman, in short, is that he was appointed as a Sweeper in the then Central Bank of India
in its Jhallar Branch on 01.04.2004 and worked continuously till 31.01.2008. Thereafter, he was terminated without
notice or wages in lieu of one month notice and without payment of retrenchment compensation, in violation of the
provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act, 1947). He had worked more than 240
days as required under Section 25-B of the Act, 1947. He worked for 240 days and more in every year continuously
and has thus acquired the status of permanent employee. It has also been alleged that daily wagers later appointed
were absorbed by Bank. He requested that holding his termination against law, he be held entitled to be reinstated
with all back wages and benefits.
The case of the management, inter alia, is that the alleged workman was neither employed as permanent
employee nor attained permanent status. He worked as a casual worker for few hours in a day as and when required in
branch of the Bank and was paid for it. He never worked continuously for 240 days in any year. This is also the case
of management that the daily wagers who had worked for at least 45 days in a year were given opportunity to
participate in the recruitment process; the workman also participated in the recruitment process, but could not
succeed. The provisions of the Section 25-F of the Act 1947 is not applicable and therefore, the question of giving
notice or payment of retrenchment compensation does not arise. It has been further pleaded that the workman was a
daily wager, engaged not on regular basis but subject to availability of work and also that he was not appointed
against any sanctioned vacancy following recruitment process. It was also pleaded that since the engagement of the
workman was on day to day basis, no formal appointment letter was required to be issued to him. Accordingly,
management has prayed that the reference be answered against the workman.
The workman has filed his rejoinder in which he has mainly reiterated his allegations in his statement of
claim.
In evidence, the workman has filed his affidavit as his examination in chief; he has been cross examined by
management. He has further filed photocopy documents and proved which are Ex. W/1 letter by Branch Manager to
Regional Manager sent on 19.12.2011 by which the application and documents of the workman were forwarded. Ex.
W/2, W/3 are two certificates issued by management, certifying that the workman worked as daily wager in 2006,
2007, 2004 and 2005. Management has filed affidavit of its witness Manoj Kumar as his examination in chief, who
has been cross examined by workman side. Management neither filed any document nor proved.
I have heard argument of Learned Counsel for workman Mr. Ashok Shrivastava and none appeared for
management. I have gone through the record as well.
On perusal of record in the light of arguments, following issues arise for determination :-
1)
Whether, the workman has successfully proved his continuous engagement for 240 days in an
year ?
2)
Whether, the disengagement of the workman is legal ?
3)
Whether, the workman is entitled to any benefit ?
Issue No.-1 :-
Before, entering into any discussion, Section 25-B of the Act is being reproduced as follows :-
25B. Definition of continuous service.—For the purposes of this Chapter,—
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer—
730
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than—
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than—
(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an
employer shall include the days on which—
(i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the
industrial establishment;
(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years;
(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment; and
(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave
does not exceed twelve weeks.
The initial burden to prove this issue is on the workman. Pleadings of the parties on this issue have been
elaborated earlier. The workman has corroborated his allegations in his statement of claim in his affidavit filed as his
examination in chief. In his cross examination, he has stated that he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange, he
did not appear in recruitment process, he was not a regular employee, he was paid on daily basis weekly. Also that his
services were terminated orally and that no appointment letter was issued to him.
Even if, the photocopy documents filed and proved by workman are looked into they reveal that the
workman worked for 83 days in 2006, 74 days in 2007, 48 days in 2004 and 89 days in 2005 as it is disclosed from
Ex. W/2 & W/3. According to Ex. W/1 the workman worked for 134 days in 2011. On the other hand, management
witness has corroborated the pleadings of management on this point that the workman did not work for 240 days in
any year which is supported by the documents of workman himself as mentioned above.
Range Forest Officer Vs. S.T. Hadimani (2002) 3 SCC 25
This extract is taken from Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 : 2002 SCC (L&S)
367 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 226 at page 26
3.
For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the appellant is
an “industry” or not, though reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in State of
Gujarat v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar [(2001) 9 SCC 713 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 269 : JT (2001) 3 SC 326] .
In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining
on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding
his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the
appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in
the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that
cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman
had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or
record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone,
the award is liable to be set aside. However, Mr Hegde appearing for the Department states that the State is
really interested in getting the law settled and the respondent will be given an employment on compassionate
grounds on the same terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two months from
today.”
State of Uttarakhand v. Sureshwati, (2021) 3 SCC 108
This extract is taken from State of Uttarakhand v. Sureshwati, (2021) 3 SCC 108 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S)
434 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 34 at page 117
“25.
On the basis of the evidence led before the Labour Court, we hold that the School has established
that the respondent had abandoned her service in 1997, and had never reported back for work. The
respondent has failed to discharge the onus to prove that she had worked for 240 days in the preceding 12
months prior to her alleged termination on 8-3-2006. The onus was entirely upon the employee to prove that
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
731
she had worked continuously for 240 days in the twelve months preceding the date of her alleged termination
on 8-3-2006, which she failed to discharge.”
Surendra Nagar District Panchayat Vs. Dayabhai Amar Singh, (2005) 8 SCC 750. The relevant paragraphs
are being reproduced as follows :-
This extract is taken from Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, (2005) 8 SCC 750 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 38 : 2005 SCC OnLine SC 1536 at page 759
“16. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 367] (SCC at p. 26, para
3) this Court held that:
“In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first
determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the
year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was
denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for
240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour
and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a
workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or
order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground
alone, the award is liable to be set aside.”
17. More recently, in Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161 : 2004
SCC (L&S) 1055] , Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1062]
and M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1092] this Court has reiterated the
principle that the burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days in
the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart from
examining himself to prove the factum of his being in employment of the employer.
18. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that
he had actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period of twelve calendar months
preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not
produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages
or any record or order in that regard was produced; no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by the
employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that the workman who claimed to have worked with the
appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement
and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman
has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the
date of termination of his service. The courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non-production
of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only
12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in
the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25-B(1) of the
Act. In the facts and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the respondent workman is
not entitled to the protection or compliance with Section 25-F of the Act before his service was terminated by the
employer. As regards non-compliance with Sections 25-G and 25-H suffice it to say that witness Vinod Misra
examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily-wagers. In
the absence of regular employment of the workmen, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of
the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of
the seniority list and his so-called seniority, no relief could be given to him for non-compliance with provisions of
the Act. The courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved
to be in existence and then not produced before the court. In order to entitle the court to draw inference
unfavourable to the party, the court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved.”
Since, the initial burden to prove, the continuous employment for 240 days in a year as per Section 25-B of
the Act, is on workman, his self serving affidavit only cannot be held sufficient that too, when the documents
produced militate against the oral statement as mentioned above. Accordingly, the workman is held to have failed in
proving his continuous employment for 240 days in a year and issue no.-1 is answered accordingly.
Issue No.-2 :-
Before entering into any discussion on merit, Section 25-F & 25-G of the Act are being reproduced as
follows :-
25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.— No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month‟s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
732
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by
the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
25G. Procedure for retrenchment.— Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India,
is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any
agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman
who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches
any other workman.
Case of the workman is that he was not issued any notice of retrenchment nor was he paid compensation,
which he has corroborated in his evidence. It is not the case of management that he was paid any compensation or
given prior notice. Since, the workman is held to have failed in proving his continuous employment for 240 days in a
year, his termination is held not in violation of Section 25-F & 25-G of the Act and issue no.-2 is answered
accordingly.
Issue No.-3 :-
In the light of findings recorded above on issue no.-1 and 2, the workman is held entitled to no relief.
Issue no.-3 is answered accordingly.
AWARD
Holding the action of management of Central Bank of India in terminating the services of workman
Shri Deepak Bagdre S/o. Shri Anand Rao Bagdre w.e.f. 31.10.2008 legal and justified, he is held entitled to no
relief.
No order as to cost.
DATE: 31/12/2024
P. K .SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 244.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
vkWQ bafM;k ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds iapkV (a12/2021, 51/2020) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12011/11/2020- vkbZvkj (बी- II)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 244.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 12/2021,51/2020) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour
Court Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12011/11/2020- IR (B- II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT,
JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/RC/12/2021
NO. CGIT/LC/R/51/2020
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..( Retd)
1. CASE NO. CGIT/LC/RC/12/2018
Pankaj Badli Sepoy,
Bank of India, Branch Badnagar,
District Ujjain (M.P.)
Through: General Secretary,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
733
Dainik Vetanbhogi Bank Karamchari Sanghatan,
F-1, Trupti Vihar, Indore Road,
Ujjain (M.P.) - 456010
Workman
Versus
The Zonal Manager,
Bank of India,
2-C, Shipra Vihar, Nagzhiri,
Ujjain (M.P.)
Management
&
2. CASE NO. CGIT/LC/R/51/2020
The General Secretary,
Dainik Vetanbhogi Bank Karamchari Sanghatan,
F-1, Trupti Vihar, Indore Road,
Ujjain (M.P.) - 456010
Workman
Versus
The Zonal Manager,
Bank of India,
2-C, Shipra Vihar, Nagzhiri,
Ujjain (M.P.)
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 30thday of December-2024.)
Before the reference was received, the workman filed petition U/S. 2-A (2&3) of the Industrial Disputes
Act 1947 with regard to the same dispute. The management also appeared and filed its written statement of defense.
This case was registered as RC/12/2018.
In case no. R/51/2020, The Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment, vide Letter No L-
12011/11/2020 (IR(B-II) dt. 10/06/2020 has sent following reference for adjudication –
"Whether the demand of Dainik Vetan Bhogi Bank Karmachari Sangathan for reinstatement of Shri
Pankaj Singh, Daily Wage Employee, Badnagar Branch, Bank of India, Ujjain terminated from the
service on 11.07.2017 and for payment of bonus for the period from April, 2012 to 11.07.2017 is legal &
justified? If so, what relief the said daily wager is entitled for?"
Since parties in both the cases are one and same, also the facts/pleadings are identical in both the cases,
hence both the cases were consolidated by order dated 14.03.2022 and RC/12/2018 was made the leading case and
they are being disposed by common Judgment/award with the consent and concurrence from both the sides.
After registering the cases on the basis of the reference received, notices were sent to the parties and were
duly served on them. Parties appeared and have filed their respective statements of claim and defence.
Thereafter the workman appeared in the initial stages of the proceedings of this Tribunal but never turned up
to file any evidence in this Tribunal. Management also did not file any evidence.
I have perused the records. The reference is itself the issue. No evidence was ever produced by any of the
parties in this Tribunal.
The Initial burden to prove his claim is on the workman. Since the workman did not filed any evidence, in
the absence of any evidence in support of holding the claim of workman not proved the reference deserves to be
answered against the workman and is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In the light of this factual backdrop, holding that the claim of the workman is not proved, the
reference deserves to be answered against the Workman and is answered accordingly.
No order as to cost.
Let the copies of the award be sent to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment as per
rules.
P. K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
DATE: 30/12/2024
734
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 245.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
vkWQ bafM;k ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds iapkV (a112/2015, 06/2015) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12011/67/2015- vkbZvkj (बी-II)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 245.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.112/2015,06/2015) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour
Court Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of UCO Bank
and their workmen.
[No. L-12011/67/2015- IR (B-II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/112/2015
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..( Retd)
General Secretary
Dainik Vetan Bhogi Bank Karmachari Sangathan
F-1, ‗Karmabhoomi‘, In Front of Tripti Vihar Engg.
College, Ujjain (M.P.)
Workman
Versus
The Dy. General Manager
UCO Bank,
Regional Office – 380, Saket Nagar
Indore (M.P.)
Management
AND
CGIT/LC/RC/06/2015
Ravindra Raishwal
S/o. Madan Lal
53/5, Pardeshipura,
Indore (M.P.)
Workman
Versus
The Dy. General Manager
UCO Bank,
Regional Office – 380, Saket Nagar
Indore, (M.P.)
Management
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
735
AWARD
(Passed on this 06th day of January-2025.)
As per letter dated 05/11/2015 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number L-12011/67/2015/IR(B-II) dt.
05/11/2015. The dispute under reference related to :-
'k
"
"
The workman also filed a petition against termination of his services by the same management which was
registered as RC/06/2015.
After registering the case on the basis of the reference and petition, notices were sent to the parties and were
duly served on them. They appeared and filed their respective statements of claim and defense.
Since, pleadings and facts with respect to both the cases were one and same, also the cause of action was
same, hence both the cases were consolidated and proceeding were conducted in case R/112/2015.
The case of the workman, in short, is that he was appointed as a Peon in the UCO Bank on 23.06.2011 and
worked continuously till 18.11.2014. His services were terminated by Bank without any notice or compensation,
hence in violation of Section 25-F & 25-G of the Act. He raised a dispute in this respect which could not be
conciliated, hence this reference. The workman union has prayed that holding the workman entitled to be reinstated,
the reference be answered in his favour.
The case of the management, inter alia, is that the alleged workman was neither employed as permanent
employee nor attained permanent status. He worked as a casual worker for few hours in a day as and when required in
branch of the Bank and was paid for it. It is further the case of management that, no illegality was committed in
disengaging him.
In evidence, the workman has filed affidavit as his examination in chief. Management was given opportunity
to cross examined him, but did not avail. Workman side further filed certified statement of account of the workman
between 01.01.2011 to 31.12.2014.
Management has not filed affidavit of its witness as his examination in chief.
Learned Counsel for workman Shri Arun Patel submitted his arguments. None appeared for management.
The initial burden to prove the claim that he worked with the management and the number of days in every
year is on workman. He has filed his affidavit which is uncross examined by management. Contents of his affidavit
are further supported by certified statement of account of the workman admissible in law. On the other hand, there is
no evidence by management.
From the uncontroverted affidavit of the workman, corroborated by certified statement of account, prove the
fact of his continuous employment as mentioned in Section 25-B of the Act for 240 days in every year including the
year preceding the date of his termination. This evidence also supports his allegation that he was not paid any
compensation nor was issued any notice by management on his disengagement.
Hence, holding the allegations of the workman proved, the action of management in terminating his services
is held arbitrary and against law.
As regards, the relief admissible to him in the light of finding above noted, keeping in view the fact that he
was casual daily labour, not employed following recruitment procedure against any sanctioned vacancy/post, a lump
sum compensation quantified at Rs. 2,00,000/- in lieu of all his claims will meet the ends of justice.
In the light of above finding the reference as well the petition is answered as follows :-
AWARD
Holding the action of management of UCO Bank in terminating the services of Ravindra Raishwal
against law, he is held entitled to Rs. 2,00,000/- as lump sum compensation in lieu of all his claims to be paid to
him by management of UCO Bank within 60 days from the date of notification of Award, failing which interest
@ of 6% p.a. from the date of Award, till payment. No order as to cost.
Copy of this Judgment be placed on the file of RC/06/2015.
DATE: 06/01/2025
P. K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
736
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 246.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल, डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और सुश्री जी कुमारी, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम न्यायालय-
हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 5/2011) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार
को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/1/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 246.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No. 5/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil), M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and Ms.G.
Kumari, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/1/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 12th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 5/2011
Between:
Ms.G. Kumari,
D/o Shri B. Papa Rao,
D.No.8-4-76, Damampeta Street,
Itchapuram Post,
Srikakulam – 532312.
….. Petitioner
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/ 1/2010-IR(DU) dated 25.3.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
737
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer(Civil), BSNL, Civil Circle,
Visakhapatnam in terminating the services of Ms. G. Kumari w.e.f 01.09.2009 is legal and justified? If not,
what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 5/2011 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that under an application she was selected and appointed as Clerk cum Typist with the
employer w.e.f. 1.3. 1996 on wages of Rs.1200/- per month and that stand posted to work under the Sr. Divisional
Engineer, B.S.N.L, Sub-Visakhapatnam and the nature of duties were clerical that includes maintenance of all
records, registers and statements and further authorized to receive the salaries of the concerned, M.Os, registered
letters addressed to the divisional officer etc., and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. It is submitted
that the work that she was doing was perennial in nature and that while she was working uninterruptedly for more
than 240 days in a year in all those years continuously. It is further submitted that no smart practices were on her part
she was terminated from service unceremoniously w.e.f. 01.09.2009 under violation of the statutory provisions of
law relating to the industrial jurisprudence. Employer has maintained attendance register for the first two years of the
employment of the workman subsequently gave up the practice. It is submitted that during that period the workman
got so many employment opportunities but she remained back with the employer owing to the assurance given by the
concerned authority that her services could be absorbed and permanency be granted with higher benefits than the one
she could get elsewhere. The alleged name as "Contract Labour" is only sham and nominal. It is a camouflage to
prevent the workman from claiming the benefits of Labour Laws that are applicable in the circumstances. Ipso facto
there is no mediator in the matter of either appointment of the workman or her continuance of the service with the
employer. It is submitted that the workman is now age barred and ineligible for any other employment in any
statutory establishment and she is the bread winner to the large family. It is submitted that the workman in toto
rendered 14 years of unblemished service to the employer straining herself from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that
in all just and fairness that her services could be continued till she attains superannuation. But, services of workman
were uninterrupted It is further submitted that she raised an industrial dispute. Hence prayed to declare the alleged
contract employment as bogus, a sham and nominal and that the action taken by the employer is unjust, unfair, illegal,
arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair labour practice but also unreasonable and unsustainable under rule of law and direct the
employer to reinstate the workman with all consequential and attendant benefits., continuity of service with full back
wages for the period from date of arbitrary termination i.e. 01.09.2009 till date of actual reinstatement for the
workman has not been employed gainfully ever anywhere and that she is also entitled for absorption with the
employer in lieu of the nature and length of service she rendered.
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed and that the salary was fixed at Rs.1200/- per
month and that she worked for 10 to 12 hours per day is also denied. Suffice to state that the claimant was never
appointed hence the question of terminating does not arise and no piece of paper has been filed to establish the same.
That she worked for 240 days uninterruptedly and she was working w.e.f. 1.3.1996 to 1.9.2009 is also denied. That
Respondent had given any assurance to the claimant is denied. It is denied that identity card was issued to her and
issued service certificate also. It is submitted that the contention of claimant that she was shown a contract labour is
contradictory to her claim wherein she claims to have been appointed and no recruitments are done directly by the
department itself. The claimant was never employed and as such is not a workman of the Respondent and not entitled
to raise the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to dismiss the claim of the claimant.
4.
On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam Intermediate in
the services of Ms.G. Kumari w.e.f. 01.09.2009 is legal and justified?
II.
To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5.
Point No.I:-
As per claim of the Workman, she was selected and appointed as Clerk cum Typist with
the employer with effect from 1.3.1996 and she rendered continuous service. Further, it is submitted that while she
was working so in the office of the Senior Divisional Engineer (Civil), BSNL, Sub-Division, Srikakulam and
working on wages of Rs.1200/- per month. Further, the nature of duties were clerical that includes maintenance of all
records, registers and statements and further authorized to receive the salaries of the concerned, M.Os, registered
letters addressed to the divisional officer etc., and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. Further, it is
submitted that she was doing the work of perennial in nature and she was working uninterruptedly for more than 240
days in a year, in all those years, continuously. Further, it is submitted that Respondent in violation of the provisions
of I.D. Act, 1947 has terminated the Workman from service unceremoniously with effect from 01.09.2009 . She has
been working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days a year, in all these years.
738
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
6.
Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed, and it is also denied that salary of the Workman was Rs.1200/- per month and she worked
for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the appointment cannot be made by the
Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by the central office. It is also denied by
the Respondent that she worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. Respondent contended that claimant was neither
appointed nor terminated and that her salary was Rs.1200/- per month falsifies her contention. Hence the question of
terminating her services does not arise. Workman has not filed any piece of paper to establish the claim of her
appointment in the Respondent office. The procedure for appointment in the Respondent organization is governed by
the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment. As such the claim of the claimant has to
be rejected.
7.
Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as she was appointed by this Respondent and
she was shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to her claim, that she has been appointed. Further,
Respondent denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to
state that no documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged her service and paid
wages, which falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of
14 years. But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a
Workman of the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the
claim of the Workman be dismissed with costs.
8.
The workman has examined herself as WW1 and also filed the documents in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1 to
W7. On the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross examined
by the Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although the affidavit
of MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2 was not
produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of evidence.
9.
In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the
action of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated 01.09.2009 is justified. The
Workman herein Ms.G. Kumari has examined herself as WW1 and in her chief affidavit she has reiterated the
averments made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
“I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent management . I have not filed my educational
qualification certificate in support of proof in this case. I have not filed any application as mentioned in the chief
exam affidavit. I know the contractors of BSNL by name Mr Obul Reddy, Mr.Nagireddy, Madhav Reddy & Tanuja as
they are civil contractors. It is not true to say that they are labour contractors under BSNL company. It is true that I
have not filed any document to show that I worked with respondent from 1.3.1996 to 01.09.2009 . It is not true to say
that I was not working under BSNL and that this company has no link with mine. It is not true to say that I was
working under the contractor and getting salary from them. My name was there in attendance register and as well as
acquittence roll. It is not correct to say that my name was not there in attendance register and pay roll register. It is
not true to say that I only worked under the contractor and not under the BSNL management. It is not true to say that
I have no basis to file this case against the respondent and not entitled to get any relief as claimed in the claim
statement..”
10.
In support of her claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the service certificate.
Ex.W2 is the identity card. Ex.W3 is the. Authorization of Asst. Engineer, Ex.W4 is the post card from Dist. Emp.
Officer, Srikakulam. Ex.W5 is the representation of workman. Ex.W6 is the reply of the Respondent and Ex.W7 is
the minutes of meeting. Workman Ms. G. Kumari claims that she has been terminated from the service by the
Respondent with effect from 01.09.2009 and she had worked uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all
those years, continuously. Now, let us examine whether workman herein had worked in the Respondent employment
for 240 days continuously in a calendar year just preceding from the date of her termination, i.e., 01.09.2009 as per
requirement of provision under Section 25F of the ID Act.
11.
However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the
workman in the present matter. In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional
Manager, New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant
wherein Hon'ble Court have held,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
739
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
12.
Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of her termination, i.e., 01.09.2009 . Before appreciation of the evidence adduced
by the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the
retrenchment under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
740
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and she has to prove that she had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding her date of termination, i.e., 01.09.2009, in the employment of Respondent as she had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate her claims that she had worked for 240
days continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days continuous
service in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that she had worked 240 days in a
calendar year continuously just preceding from her date of termination, i.e., 01.09.2009 . In order to claim the
protection against illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove
mandatory requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has
utterly failed to prove her case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the
Workman failed to discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding her date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that she has been terminated in
contravention of provision of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
13.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it
has categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per
day and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of her termination
from service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman
has rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the
extract page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been
mentioned in that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and
Register of muster rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
14.
Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman
in the present matter has failed to establish her claim that her termination vide order dated 01.09.2009 was in
violation of the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in
terminating the services of Ms.G. Kumari is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
15.
Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish her claim of illegal
termination, therefore, she is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
741
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Ms.G. Kumari w.e.f. 01.09.2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any relief as
prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 12th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Ms.G. Kumari
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of service certificate
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of identity card
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of authorisaion of Asst. Engineer, SKLM
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of post card from DEO, SKLM
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL, V
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of reply of Respondent
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of minutes of meeting
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 247.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल,डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और श्री बी. ऄप्ृाला राजू, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम न्यायालय-
हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 7/2010) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार
को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/3/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 247.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No. 7/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil), M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and Shri B. Appala
Raju, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/3/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
742
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 6th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 7/2010
Between:
Shri B. Appala Raju,
S/o Sanyasi Rao,
D.No.2-8-2, Vijayaramaraju Peta,
Bobbilivari St., Anakapalli,
Visakhapatnam(A.P.)
….. Petitioner
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/ 3/2010-IR(DU) dated 19.4.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the contract between the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam and
their contractor with regard to employment of Sri B. Appala Raju is sham and bogus? If yes, whether the
action of the Management in terminating his services w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified? If not, what
relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 7/2010 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that he studied upto X class and under an application he was selected and appointed as Group
"D" Beldar cum Peon with the employer w.e.f. 5.5.1995 and working on wages of Rs.850/- per month and the nature
of duties were stitching of files, posting of letters at Post Office, carrying and handing over letters etc.,to different
units, taking Xerox copies, stapling files and estimateds, stitching estimates and NITs, supplying water and tea and
other works entrusted by the officers of the employer and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. It is
submitted that the work that he was doing was perennial in nature and that while he was working uninterruptedly for
more than 240 days in a year in all those years continuously. It is further submitted that no smart practices were on
his part, he was terminated from service unceremoniously w.e.f. 10.10.2009 under violation of the statutory
provisions of law relating to the industrial jurisprudence. The employer used to maintain an attendance register. Copy
of the attendance register for the period of May, 1996 is herewith annexed. As the services of the workman are
continuous in the same department the entire service of his be computed for all the purposes. It is submitted that the
workman is now age barred and ineligible for any other employment in any statutory establishment and he is the
bread winner to the large family. It is submitted that the workman in toto rendered 14 years of unblemished service
to the employer straining himself from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that in all just and fairness that his services
could be continued till he attains superannuation. It is further submitted that he raised an industrial dispute. Hence
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
743
prayed to declare the alleged contract employment as bogus, a sham and nominal and that the action taken by the
employer is unjust, unfair, illegal, arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair labour practice but also unreasonable and
unsustainable under rule of law and direct the employer to reinstate the workman with all consequential and attendant
benefits., continuity of service with full back wages for the period from date of arbitrary termination i.e. 10.10.2009
till date of actual reinstatement for the workman has not been employed gainfully ever anywhere and that he is also
entitled for absorption with the employer in lieu of the nature and length of service he rendered.
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed vide application with effect from
5.5.1995(5.7.1995) as Telecom Assistant and that the salary was fixed at Rs.1200/- per month and posted in the office
of Planning Administrative Wing (Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam that his nature of duties was typing works and
preparation of statements etc.. It is submitted that no such person has been appointed and no such appointment letter
has been filed by the claimant and it is submitted that the appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent
Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by the Central Office. It is also denied that the claimant
had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. It is submitted that the claimant was
neither appointed nor terminated as such the very fact that the claimant states that his salary was Rs.850 /- per month
falsifies his contention and suffice to state that the claimant was never appointed hence the question of terminating
does not arise and no piece of paper has been filed to establish the same. It is submitted that the procedure for
appointment is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment as such the
claim of the claimant has to be rejected. That Respondent had given any assurance to the claimant is denied. It is
submitted that the contention of claimant that he was shown a contract labour is contradictory to his claim wherein he
claims to have been appointed. It is submitted that whenever the Respondent took contract labour, the contract
between the Respondent and the labour contractor and Respondent never paid any amount directly to the labour, and
has no concern as to who would be engaged by the contractor. It is suffice to state that no documentary evidence has
been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged the service and paid the wages, which falsifies the claim of the
claimant. It is denied that claimant has rendered service of 14 years, as per records of the Respondent and the question
of sudden and surprise unceremonious action does not arise. It is submitted that the claimant had claimed at he was
appointed by Respondent on his application and now the claimant‘s claim that job works were carried by contractors.
It is submitted that odd jobs were given in contract to contractors and the amounts were paid to the contractors, and
the contention of the claimant that the same is sham and unfair is contrary to the record and suffice to state that the
claimant has not produced a single piece of paper to establish that he was employed by the Respondent and
terminated on 10.10.2009 and it is submitted that the appointments were done as per the rules by the Central Office
and no recruitments are done directly by the department itself. The claimant was never employed and as such is not a
workman of the Respondent and not entitled to raise the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to
dismiss the claim of the claimant.
4.
On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri B. Appala Raju w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified?
II.
To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5.
Point No.I:- As per claim of the Workman, he was selected and appointed as Group D part time Beldar cum
Peon with the employer with effect from 5.5.1995 and he rendered continuous service and working on wages of Rs.
850/- per month. Further, the nature of duties were stitching of files, posting of letters at post office, courier service,
carrying and handing over letters etc., to different units, taking Xerox copies, stapling files and stitching estimates and
NITs, supplying water and tea and other works entrusted by the officers of the employer. Further, it is submitted that
hours of duty per day were 10 to 12 hours and he was doing the work of perennial in nature and he was working
uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years, continuously. Further, it is submitted that
Respondent in violation of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 has terminated the Workman from service
unceremoniously with effect from 10.10.2009. Further, it is submitted that during 1996 attendance register had also
been maintained by the department.
6.
Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed vide application with effect from 5.5.1995 (5.7.1995) and it is also denied that salary of the
Workman was Rs. 850/- per month and he worked for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the
appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by
744
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the central office. It is also denied by the Respondent that claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and that he
worked for 240 days uninterruptedly from 5.5.1995 to 10.10.2009. Respondent contended that claimant was neither
appointed nor terminated and that his salary was Rs.1200/- per month falsifies his contention. Further, the claimant
was never appointed. Hence the question of terminating his services does not arise. Workman has not filed any piece
of paper to establish the claim of his appointment in the Respondent office. The procedure for appointment in the
Respondent organization is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment.
As such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected.
7.
Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as he was appointed by this Respondent and he
was shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to his claim, that he has been appointed. Further, Respondent
denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged his service and paid wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of 13 years.
But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a Workman of
the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the claim of the
Workman be dismissed with costs.
8.
The workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed the documents in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1
to W7. On the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross
examined by the Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although
the affidavit of MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2
was not produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of
evidence.
9.
In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the
action of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated 10.10.2009 is justified. The
Workman herein Sri B. Appala Raju has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief affidavit he has reiterated the
averments made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
“I have passed 10th class in the year 1992. I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent
management. I do not remember if I have filed my 10th class certificate in this case. I know the contractors of BSNL
by name Mr Obul Reddy, Mr.Nagireddy & Madhav Reddy. It is not correct to say that the above contractors have
engaged me and they used to pay monthly salary. My name was there in attendance register and as well as
acquaintance roll. It is not correct to say that my name was not there in attendance register and pay roll register. As
per Ex. W7, I was asked to attend the office of Respondent by the contractor from July 1995. It is not true to say that
Ex. W5 is a fabricated document. It is not true to say that I have not worked from 15.4.1996 to 10.10.2009 under the
respondent. It is not true to say that I only worked under the contractor and not under the BSNL management. It is not
true to say that I have no basis to file this case against the respondent and not entitled to get any relief as claimed in
the claim statement..”
10.
In support of his claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the attendance
register for the month of June, 1996. Ex.W2 is the service certificate. Ex.W3 is the letter of appreciation by
employer. Ex.W4 is the representation to ACL, Visakhapatnam. Ex.W5 is the reply of Respondent. Ex.W6 is the
minutes of meeting and Ex.W7 is lr. dated 5.7.95 wherein the Petitioner was directed to work as Beldar / Office Peon
through contractor. Thus, from Ex.W7 it is established that the Workman was engaged as Beldar /Office peon vide
order dated 5.7.1995 issued by Executive Engineer, Telecom, Civil Divison –II, Visakhapatnam. Ex.W1 contains the
photocopy of register of attendance pertaining to May,1996. It goes to show that the Workman Sri B. Appala Raju
along with other workmen Sri K.M. Priyadarishini, N. Lalitha, N. Padmavathi, P. Harinadha reddy , P. sreenivasa
Rao and P. Santhosh Kumar, has attended the duties in all working days in the Respondent office. Therefore,
according to preponderance of probability, these documents are taken into consideration for establishing the fact that
the Workman Sri B. Appala Raju had worked in the Respondent office during the years 1996.
10.
Workman Sri B. Appala Raju claims that he has been terminated from the service by the Respondent with
effect from 10.10.2009 and he had worked uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years,
continuously. Now, let us examine whether workman herein had worked in the Respondent employment for 240 days
continuously in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 10.10.2009 as per requirement of
provision under Section 25F of the ID Act.
11.
However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the
workman in the present matter. From the perusal of evidence of WWI and document Ex.W7, it is establihed that
Petitioner had worked as Beldar cum Peon in the Respondent management with effect from 5.7.1995. Therefore, as
a contract workman, Petitioner was in the employment of Respondent and he has right to file petition under the
provision of I.D. Act, 1947 for redressal of his grievances of termination. Therefore, the argument of Respondent in
this regard is not tenable.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
745
In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager, New India Assurance
Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant wherein Hon'ble Court have held,
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
12.
Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. Before appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the retrenchment
under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
746
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and he has to prove that he had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding his date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009, in the employment of Respondent as he had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate his claim that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days continuous service
in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that he had worked 240 days in a calendar year
continuously just preceding from his date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. In order to claim the protection against
illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove mandatory
requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has utterly failed to
prove his case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the Workman failed to
discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar year just preceding
his date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that he has been terminated in contravention of
provision of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
13.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it
has categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per
day and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination
from service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman
has rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the
extract page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been
mentioned in that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and
Register of muster rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
14.
Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman
in the present matter has failed to establish his claim that his termination vide order dated 10.10.2009 was in violation
of the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in terminating the
services of Sri B. Appala Raju is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
15.
Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish his claim of illegal
termination, therefore, he is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
747
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri B. Appala Raju w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any relief
as prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 6th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri B. Appala Raju
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of attendance register
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of service certificate
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of lr. of appreciation dt.28.12.2006
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL(C)
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of reply of Respondent
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Minutes of meeting dt.8.12.2009
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of lr. dt.5.7.1995 taking Petitioner into work
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 248.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल,डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और श्री ृी. श्रीजनवास राव, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम
न्यायालय- हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 8/2010) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,प्रकाजित करती हज जो
केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/4/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 248.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No. 8/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil), M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and
Shri P. Srinivasa Rao, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/4/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
748
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 8/2010
Between:
Sri P. Srinivasa Rao,
C/o G. Ramana,
D.No.58-24-40/1, Jayaprakashnagar,
Butchirajiupalem, N.A.D. Kotha Road,
Visakhapatnam(A.P.)
….. Petitioner
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/4/2010-IR(DU) dated 19.4.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the contract between the management of Superintending Engineer(Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam
and their contractor with regard to employment of Shri P. Srinivasa Rao is sham and bogus? If yes, whether
the action of the Management in terminating his services w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified? If not,
what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 8/2010 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that he studied upto X class and under an application he was selected and appointed as Group
"D" Beldar cum Peon with the employer w.e.f. 5.7.1995 and working on wages of Rs.850/- per month and the nature
of duties were stitching of files, posting of letters at Post Office, carrying and handing over letters etc.,to different
units, taking Xerox copies, stapling files and estimates, stitching estimates and NITs, supplying water and tea and
other works entrusted by the officers of the employer and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. It is
submitted that the work that he was doing was perennial in nature and that while he was working uninterruptedly for
more than 240 days in a year in all those years continuously. It is further submitted that no smart practices were on
his part, he was terminated from service unceremoniously w.e.f. 10.10.2009 under violation of the statutory
provisions of law relating to the industrial jurisprudence. The employer used to maintain an attendance register. Copy
of the attendance register for the period of April, 1996 is herewith annexed. As the services of the workman are
continuous in the same department the entire service of his be computed for all the purposes. It is submitted that the
workman is now age barred and ineligible for any other employment in any statutory establishment and he is the
bread winner to the large family. It is submitted that the workman in toto rendered 14 years of unblemished service
to the employer straining himself from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that in all just and fairness that his services
could be continued till he attains superannuation. It is further submitted that he raised an industrial dispute. Hence
prayed to declare the alleged contract employment as bogus, a sham and nominal and that the action taken by the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
749
employer is unjust, unfair, illegal, arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair labour practice but also unreasonable and
unsustainable under rule of law and direct the employer to reinstate the workman with all consequential and attendant
benefits., continuity of service with full back wages for the period from date of arbitrary termination i.e. 10.10.2009
till date of actual reinstatement for the workman has not been employed gainfully ever anywhere and that he is also
entitled for absorption with the employer in lieu of the nature and length of service he rendered.
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed vide application with effect from
5.7.1995(5.7.1995) as Telecom Assistant and that the salary was fixed at Rs.1200/- per month and posted in the office
of Planning Administrative Wing (Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam that his nature of duties was typing works and
preparation of statements etc.. It is submitted that no such person has been appointed and no such appointment letter
has been filed by the claimant and it is submitted that the appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent
Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by the Central Office. It is also denied that the claimant
had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. It is submitted that the claimant was
neither appointed nor terminated as such the very fact that the claimant states that his salary was Rs.850 /- per month
falsifies his contention and suffice to state that the claimant was never appointed hence the question of terminating
does not arise and no piece of paper has been filed to establish the same. It is submitted that the procedure for
appointment is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment as such the
claim of the claimant has to be rejected. That Respondent had given any assurance to the claimant is denied. It is
submitted that the contention of claimant that he was shown a contract labour is contradictory to his claim wherein he
claims to have been appointed. It is submitted that whenever the Respondent took contract labour, the contract
between the Respondent and the labour contractor and Respondent never paid any amount directly to the labour, and
has no concern as to who would be engaged by the contractor. It is suffice to state that no documentary evidence has
been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged the service and paid the wages, which falsifies the claim of the
claimant. It is denied that claimant has rendered service of 14 years, as per records of the Respondent and the question
of sudden and surprise unceremonious action does not arise. It is submitted that the claimant had claimed at he was
appointed by Respondent on his application and now the claimant‘s claim that job works were carried by contractors.
It is submitted that odd jobs were given in contract to contractors and the amounts were paid to the contractors, and
the contention of the claimant that the same is sham and unfair is contrary to the record and suffice to state that the
claimant has not produced a single piece of paper to establish that he was employed by the Respondent and
terminated on 10.10.2009 and it is submitted that the appointments were done as per the rules by the Central Office
and no recruitments are done directly by the department itself. The claimant was never employed and as such is not a
workman of the Respondent and not entitled to raise the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to
dismiss the claim of the claimant.
4. On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri P. Srinivasa Rao w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified?
II. To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5. Point No.I:- As per claim of the Workman, he was selected and appointed as Group D part time Beldar cum
Peon with the employer with effect from 5.7.1995 and he rendered continuous service and working on wages of Rs.
850/- per month. Further, the nature of duties were stitching of files, posting of letters at post office, courier service,
carrying and handing over letters etc., to different units, taking Xerox copies, stapling files and stitching estimates and
NITs, supplying water and tea and other works entrusted by the officers of the employer. Further, it is submitted that
hours of duty per day were 10 to 12 hours and he was doing the work of perennial in nature and he was working
uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years, continuously. Further, it is submitted that
Respondent in violation of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 has terminated the Workman from service
unceremoniously with effect from 10.10.2009. Further, it is submitted that during 1996 attendance register had also
been maintained by the department.
6.
Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed vide application with effect from 5.7.1995 (5.7.1995) and it is also denied that salary of the
Workman was Rs. 850/- per month and he worked for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the
appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by
the central office. It is also denied by the Respondent that claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and that he
750
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
worked for 240 days uninterruptedly from 5.7.1995 to 10.10.2009. Respondent contended that claimant was neither
appointed nor terminated and that his salary was Rs.1200/- per month falsifies his contention. Further, the claimant
was never appointed. Hence the question of terminating his services does not arise. Workman has not filed any piece
of paper to establish the claim of his appointment in the Respondent office. The procedure for appointment in the
Respondent organization is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment.
As such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected.
7.
Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as he was appointed by this Respondent and he
was shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to his claim, that he has been appointed. Further, Respondent
denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged his service and paid wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of 13 years.
But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a Workman of
the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the claim of the
Workman be dismissed with costs.
8. The workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed the documents in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1 to
W7. On the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross examined
by the Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although the affidavit
of MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2 was not
produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of evidence.
9. In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the action
of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated 10.10.2009 is justified. The Workman
herein Sri P. Srinivasa Rao has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief affidavit he has reiterated the averments
made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
“I have passed 10th class in the year 1992. I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent
management. I do not remember if I have filed my 10th class certificate in this case. I know the contractors of BSNL
by name Mr Obul Reddy, Mr.Nagireddy & Madhav Reddy. It is not correct to say that the above contractors have
engaged me and they used to pay monthly salary. My name was there in attendance register and as well as
acquaintance roll. It is not correct to say that my name was not there in attendance register and pay roll register. As
per Ex. W7, I was asked to attend the office of Respondent by the contractor from July 1995. It is not true to say that
Ex. W5 is a fabricated document. It is not true to say that I have not worked from 15.4.1996 to 10.10.2009 under the
respondent. It is not true to say that I only worked under the contractor and not under the BSNL management. It is not
true to say that I have no basis to file this case against the respondent and not entitled to get any relief as claimed in
the claim statement..”
10.
In support of his claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the attendance register
for the month of June, 1996. Ex.W2 is the service certificate. Ex.W3 is the letter of appreciation by employer.
Ex.W4 is the representation to ACL, Visakhapatnam. Ex.W5 is the reply of Respondent. Ex.W6 is the minutes of
meeting and Ex.W7 is lr. dated 5.7.95 wherein the Petitioner was directed to work as Beldar / Office Peon through
contractor. Thus, from Ex.W7 it is established that the Workman was engaged as Beldar /Office peon vide order
dated 5.7.1995 issued by Executive Engineer, Telecom, Civil Divison –II, Visakhapatnam. Ex.W1 contains the
photocopy of register of attendance pertaining to April,1996. It goes to show that the Workman Sri P. Srinivasa Rao
along with other workmen Sri K.M. Priyadarishini, N. Lalitha, N. Padmavathi, P. Harinadha reddy , P. sreenivasa
Rao and P. Santhosh Kumar, has attended the duties in all working days in the Respondent office. Therefore,
according to preponderance of probability, these documents are taken into consideration for establishing the fact that
the Workman Sri P. Srinivasa Rao had worked in the Respondent office during the years 1996.
11. Workman Sri P. Srinivasa Rao claims that he has been terminated from the service by the Respondent with effect
from 10.10.2009 and he had worked uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years, continuously.
Now, let us examine whether workman herein had worked in the Respondent employment for 240 days continuously
in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 10.10.2009 as per requirement of provision
under Section 25F of the ID Act.
12. However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the workman
in the present matter. From the perusal of evidence of WWI and document Ex.W7, it is establihed that Petitioner
had worked as Beldar cum Peon in the Respondent management with effect from 5.7.1995. Therefore, as a contract
workman, Petitioner was in the employment of Respondent and he has right to file petition under the provision of
I.D. Act, 1947 for redressal of his grievances of termination. Therefore, the argument of Respondent in this regard is
not tenable.
In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager, New India Assurance
Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant wherein Hon'ble Court have held,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
751
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
13. Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. Before appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the retrenchment
under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as April be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which April be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
752
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and he has to prove that he had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding his date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009, in the employment of Respondent as he had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate his claim that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days continuous service
in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that he had worked 240 days in a calendar year
continuously just preceding from his date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. In order to claim the protection against
illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove mandatory
requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has utterly failed to
prove his case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the Workman failed to
discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar year just preceding
his date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that he has been terminated in contravention of
provision of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
14.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it
has categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per
day and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination
from service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman
has rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the
extract page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been
mentioned in that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and
Register of muster rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
15. Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman in
the present matter has failed to establish his claim that his termination vide order dated 10.10.2009 was in violation of
the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in terminating the
services of Sri P. Srinivasa Rao is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
16. Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish his claim of illegal
termination, therefore, he is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri P. Srinivasa Rao w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any relief
as prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 7th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
753
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri P. Srinivasa Rao
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of attendance register
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of service certificate
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of lr. of appreciation dt.28.12.2006
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL(C)
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of reply of Respondent
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Minutes of meeting dt.8.12.2009
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of lr. dt.5.7.1995 taking Petitioner into work
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 249.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल,डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और श्री ृी. हररनाथ रेड्डी, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम न्यायालय-
हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 9/2010) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार
को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/5/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 249—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No. 9/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil), M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and
Shri P. Harinatha Reddy, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/5/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 9/2010
Between:
Sri P. Harinatha Reddy,
D.No.36-93-308/7, Indiranagar,
NH-5 Road, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam(A.P.)-530008.
….. Petitioner
754
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/5/2010-IR(DU) dated 19.4.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the contract between the management of Superintending Engineer(Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam
and their contractor with regard to employment of Shri P. Harinatha Reddy is sham and bogus? If yes,
whether the action of the Management in terminating his services w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified? If
not, what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 9/2010 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that he was under graduate but qualified in ITI (Civil) , while the technical qualifications are
concerned passed Higher Typewriting and conversant in System operations such as MS Word, MS Excel, WS and
while so under an application he was selected and appointed as Telecom Office Assistant (DOT) Sub-Divisional
Clerk (BSNL) with the employer w.e.f. 15.4.1996 and working on wages of Rs.1200/- per month and the nature of
duties were all typing works and as well as on the system in preparation of Comparative statements etc., and thus the
nature of duties entrusted by the officers of the employer and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. It is
submitted that the work that he was doing was perennial in nature and that while he was working uninterruptedly for
more than 240 days in a year in all those years continuously. It is further submitted that no smart practices were on
his part, he was terminated from service unceremoniously w.e.f. 10.10.2009 under violation of the statutory
provisions of law relating to the industrial jurisprudence. The employer used to maintain an attendance register. Copy
of the attendance register for the period of June, 1996 is herewith annexed. As the services of the workman are
continuous in the same department the entire service of his be computed for all the purposes. It is submitted that the
workman is now age barred and ineligible for any other employment in any statutory establishment and he is the
bread winner to the large family. It is submitted that the workman in toto rendered 13 years of unblemished service
to the employer straining himself from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that in all just and fairness that his services
could be continued till he attains superannuation. Hence, prayed to declare the alleged contract employment as bogus,
a sham and nominal and that the action taken by the employer is unjust, unfair, illegal, arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair
labour practice but also unreasonable and unsustainable under rule of law and direct the employer to reinstate the
workman with all consequential and attendant benefits., continuity of service with full back wages for the period from
date of arbitrary termination i.e. 10.10.2009 till date of actual reinstatement for the workman has not been employed
gainfully ever anywhere and that he is also entitled for absorption with the employer in lieu of the nature and length
of service he rendered.
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed vide application with effect from 15.4.1996 as
Telecom Assistant and that the salary was fixed at Rs.1200/- per month and posted in the office of Planning
Administrative Wing (Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam and that his nature of duties was typing works and preparation of
statements etc.. It is submitted that no such person has been appointed and no such appointment letter has been filed
by the claimant and it is submitted that the appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the
procedure of appointment of staff is decided by the Central Office. It is also denied that the claimant had worked 10 to
12 hours per day and worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. It is submitted that the claimant was neither appointed nor
terminated as such the very fact that the claimant states that his salary was Rs.1200 /- per month falsifies his
contention and suffice to state that the claimant was never appointed hence the question of terminating does not arise
and no piece of paper has been filed to establish the same. It is submitted that the procedure for appointment is
governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment as such the claim of the
claimant has to be rejected. That Respondent had given any assurance to the claimant is denied. It is submitted that
the contention of claimant that he was shown a contract labour is contradictory to his claim wherein he claims to have
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
755
been appointed. It is submitted that whenever the Respondent took contract labour, the contract between the
Respondent and the labour contractor and Respondent never paid any amount directly to the labour, and has no
concern as to who would be engaged by the contractor. It is suffice to state that no documentary evidence has been
filed to show that the Respondent has engaged the service and paid the wages, which falsifies the claim of the
claimant. It is denied that claimant has rendered service of 13 years, as per records of the Respondent and the question
of sudden and surprise unceremonious action does not arise. It is submitted that the claimant had claimed at he was
appointed by Respondent on his application and now the claimant‘s claim that job works were carried by contractors.
It is submitted that odd jobs were given in contract to contractors and the amounts were paid to the contractors, and
the contention of the claimant that the same is sham and unfair is contrary to the record and suffice to state that the
claimant has not produced a single piece of paper to establish that he was employed by the Respondent and
terminated on 10.10.2009 and it is submitted that the appointments were done as per the rules by the Central Office
and no recruitments are done directly by the department itself. The claimant was never employed and as such is not a
workman of the Respondent and not entitled to raise the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to
dismiss the claim of the claimant.
4.
On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri P. Harinatha Reddy w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified?
II.
To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5.
Point No.I:- As per claim of the Workman, he was selected and appointed as Telecom Office Assistant (DOT)
Sub-Divisional clerk (BSNL) with the employer with effect from 15.4.1996 and he rendered continuous service and
working on wages of Rs. 1200/- per month. Further, the nature of duties were all typing works and as well as on the
system in preparation of Comparative statements etc., and thus the nature of duties entrusted by the officers and other
works entrusted by the officers of the employer. Further, it is submitted that hours of duty per day were 10 to 12
hours and he was doing the work of perennial in nature and he was working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in
a year, in all those years, continuously. Further, it is submitted that Respondent in violation of the provisions of I.D.
Act, 1947 has terminated the Workman from service unceremoniously with effect from 10.10.2009. Further, it is
submitted that during 1996 attendance register had also been maintained by the department.
6.
Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed vide application with effect from 15.4.1996 and it is also denied that salary of the Workman
was Rs. 1200/- per month and he worked for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the
appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by
the central office. It is also denied by the Respondent that claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and that he
worked for 240 days uninterruptedly from 15.4.1996 to 10.10.2009. Respondent contended that claimant was neither
appointed nor terminated and that his salary was Rs.1200/- per month falsifies his contention. Further, the claimant
was never appointed. Hence the question of terminating his services does not arise. Workman has not filed any piece
of paper to establish the claim of his appointment in the Respondent office. The procedure for appointment in the
Respondent organization is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment.
As such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected.
7.
Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as he was appointed by this Respondent and he
was shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to his claim, that he has been appointed. Further, Respondent
denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged his service and paid wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of 13 years.
But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a Workman of
the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the claim of the
Workman be dismissed with costs.
8. The workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed the documents in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1 to
W6. On the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross examined
by the Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although the affidavit
of MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2 was not
produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of evidence.
9. In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the action
of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated 10.10.2009 is justified. The Workman
herein Sri P. Harinatha Reddy has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief affidavit he has reiterated the
averments made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
756
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent management. I do not remember if I have filed my
10h class certificate in this case. I do not know the contractors of BSNL by name Mr Obul Reddy, Mr.Nagireddy &
Madhav Reddy & Tanuja . I was appointed through my brother Srinivas Rao who was clerking as a clerk in BSNL. l
cannot say if I can examine him (Srinivas, my brother) It is not correct to say that I am deposing falsehood and that I
know the above contractors and that I was appointed through my brother i.e. Srinivas. It is true that I have not
mentioned in my. claim statement that I was appointed through my brother nor in my evidence affidavit. It is not true
to say that Ex. WI Attendence Register is a bogus one and fabricated document. It is not true to say that I was not
working under BSNL and that this company has no link with me. It is not true to say that I was working under the
contractor and getting salary from them. My name was there in attendance register and as well as acquittence roll. It
is not correct to say that my name was not there in attendance register and pay roll register. It is not true to say that I
have not worked from 15,4 1996 to 10.10.2009 under the respondent. It is not true to say that I only worked under the
contractor and not under the BSNL management. It is not true to say that I have no basis to file this case against the
respondent and not entitled to get any relief as claimed in the claim statement.”
10.
In support of his claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the attendance register
for the month of June, 1996. Ex.W2 is the is the service certificate. Ex.W3 is the letter of appreciation by employer.
Ex.W4 is the representation to ACL, Visakhapatnam. Ex.W5 is the reply of the Respondent. Ex.W6 is the minutes of
meeting. Ex.W1 contains the photocopy of register of attendance pertaining to June,1996. It goes to show that the
Workman Sri P. Harinatha Reddy along with other workmen Sri K.M. Priyadarishini, N. Lalitha, N. Padmavathi, B.
Appala Raju, and P. Santhosh Kumar, has attended the duties in all working days in the Respondent office. Therefore,
according to preponderance of probability, these documents are taken into consideration for establishing the fact that
the Workman Sri P. Harinatha Reddy had worked in the Respondent office during the year 1996.
10. Workman Sri P. Harinatha Reddy claims that he has been terminated from the service by the Respondent with
effect from 10.10.2009 and he had worked uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years,
continuously. Now, let us examine whether workman herein had worked in the Respondent employment for 240 days
continuously in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 10.10.2009 as per requirement of
provision under Section 25F of the ID Act.
11. However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the workman
in the present matter. From the perusal of evidence of WWI it is established that Petitioner had worked as Telecom
Office Assistant in the Respondent management with effect from 15.4.1996. Therefore, as a contract workman,
Petitioner was in the employment of Respondent and he has right to file petition under the provision of I.D. Act,
1947 for redressal of his grievances of termination. Therefore, the argument of Respondent in this regard is not
tenable.
In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager, New India Assurance
Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant wherein Hon'ble Court have held,
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
12. Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. Before appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the retrenchment
under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as June be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
757
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which June be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and he has to prove that he had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding his date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009, in the employment of Respondent as he had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate his claim that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days continuous service
in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that he had worked 240 days in a calendar year
continuously just preceding from his date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. In order to claim the protection against
illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove mandatory
requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has utterly failed to
prove his case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the Workman failed to
discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar year just preceding
758
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
his date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that he has been terminated in contravention of provision
of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
13. On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it has
categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per day
and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination from
service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman
has rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the
extract page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been
mentioned in that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and
Register of muster rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
14.
Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman in
the present matter has failed to establish his claim that his termination vide order dated 10.10.2009 was in violation of
the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in terminating the
services of Sri P. Harinatha Reddy is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
15.
Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish his claim of illegal
termination, therefore, he is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri P. Harinatha Reddy w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any
relief as prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 7th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri P. Harinatha Reddy
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of attendance register
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of service certificate
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of lr. of appreciation dt.28.12.2006
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL(C)
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of reply of Respondent
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Minutes of meeting dt.8.12.2009
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
759
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 250.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल, डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और श्रीमती एस. मंजुला रानी, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम
न्यायालय- हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 12/2010) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो
केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/6/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 250.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No. 12/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and
Smt. S. Manjula Rani, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/6/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 11th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 12/2010
Between:
Smt. S. Manjula Rani,
C/o B.N. Sai Kumar,
D.No.6-11-2, Near Flour Mill,
Main Road, China Waltair,
Visakhapatnam(A.P.)-17
….. Petitioner
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/6/2010-IR(DU) dated 19.4.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
760
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
SCHEDULE
―Whether the contract between the management of Superintending Engineer(Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam
and their contractor with regard to employment of Smt. S. Manjula Rani is sham and bogus? If yes, whether
the action of the Management in terminating her services w.e.f 10.10.2009 is legal and justified? If not, what
relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 12/2010 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that under an application she was selected and appointed as Telecom Office Assistant
(DOT)/Division Clerk with the employer w.e.f. 1.5.1997 on wages of rs.1200/- per month and that stand posted to
work under the control and commond of the officers of the Executive Engineer, B.S.N.L, Civil Division, Accounts
section, Visakhapatnam and the nature of duties were clerical that includes preparation of trial balance, comparative
statements, maintenance of all accounts registers, calculation of LS & pg and bank reconcilitiation statements,
progress statements and typing of accounts matters, eltters and other works entrusted by EE AO and other officers
and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. It is submitted that the work that she was doing was perennial
in nature and that while she was working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year in all those years
continuously. It is further submitted that no smart practices were on her part she was terminated from service
unceremoniously w.e.f. October, 2003 under violation of the statutory provisions of law relating to the industrial
jurisprudence. Employer maintained attendance registers for the first few years but subsequently given up the said
practice. It is submitted that during that period the workman got so many employment opportunities but she remained
back with the employer owing to the assurance given by the concerned authority that her services could be absorbed
and permanency be granted with higher benefits than the one she could get elsewhere. The alleged name as
"Contract Labour" is only sham and nominal. It is a camouflage to prevent the workman from claiming the benefits of
Labour Laws that are applicable in the circumstances. Ipso facto there is no mediator in the matter of either
appointment of the workman or her continuance of the service with the employer. It is submitted that the workman
is now age barred and ineligible for any other employment in any statutory establishment and she is the bread winner
to the large family. It is submitted that the workman in toto rendered 13 years of unblemished service to the
employer straining herself from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that in all just and fairness that her services could be
continued till she attains superannuation. But, services of workman were uninterrupted It is further submitted that
she raised an industrial dispute. Hence prayed to declare the alleged contract employment as bogus, a sham and
nominal and that the action taken by the employer is unjust, unfair, illegal, arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair labour
practice but also unreasonable and unsustainable under rule of law and direct the employer to reinstate the workman
with all consequential and attendant benefits., continuity of service with full back wages for the period from date of
arbitrary termination i.e. October, 2009 till date of actual reinstatement for the workman has not been employed
gainfully ever anywhere and that she is also entitled for absorption with the employer in lieu of the nature and length
of service she rendered.
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed vide application with effect from 1.5.1997 as
telecom Assistant, in the office of Executive Engineer, B.S.NL, Civil Division, A/c section and that the salary was
fixed at Rs.1200/- per month and that she worked for 10 to 12 hours per day is also denied. It is submitted that no
such person has been appointed and no such appointment letter has been filed by the claimant and it is submitted that
the appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided
by the Central Office. It is also denied that the claimant had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. It is submitted that
the claimant was neither appointed nor terminated as such the very fact that the claimant states that her salary was
Rs.1200/- per month falsifies her contention and suffice to state that the claimant was never appointed hence the
question of terminating does not arise and no piece of paper has been filed to establish the same. It is submitted that
the procedure for appointment is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of
appointment as such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected. It is suffice to state that the description of the said
employee does not tally with the Petitioner and the claim is now time barred. That Respondent had given any
assurance to the claimant is denied. It is submitted that the contention of claimant that she was shown a contract
labour is contradictory to her claim wherein she claims to have been appointed. It is submitted that whenever the
Respondent took contract labour, the contract between the Respondent and the labour contractor and Respondent
never paid any amount directly to the labour, and has no concern as to who would be engaged by the contractor. It is
suffice to state that no documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged the service and
paid the wages, which falsifies the claim of the claimant. It is denied that claimant has rendered services of 13 years,
as per records of the Respondent and the question of sudden and surprise un ceremonious action does not arise. It is
submitted that the claimant had claimed at he was appointed by Respondent on his application and now the claimant
claim that job works were carried by contractors. It is submitted that odd jobs were given in contract to contractors
and the amounts were paid to the contractors, and the contention of the claimant that the same is sham and unfair is
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
761
contrary to the record and suffice to state that the claimant has not produced a single piece of paper to establish that
she was employed by the Respondent and terminated on 10.10.2009 and it is submitted that the appointments were
done as per the rules by the Central Office and no recruitments are done directly by the department itself. The
claimant was never employed and as such is not a workman of the Respondent and not entitled to raise the disputes
under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to dismiss the claim of the claimant.
4. On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam Intermediate in the
services of Smt.S. Manjula Rani w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified?
II. To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5. Point No.I:- As per claim of the Workman, she was selected and appointed as Telecom Office Assistant
(DOT)/Division Clerk with the employer with effect from 1.5.1997 and she rendered continuous service. That she
was working so in the office of the Executive Engineer, M/s. BSNL, Civil Division, Visakhapatnam and working on
wages of Rs.1200/- per month. Further, the nature of duties were clerical that includes preparation of trial balance,
comparative statements, maintenance of all accounts registers, calculation of LS & pg and bank reconcilitiation
statements, progress statements and typing of accounts matters, eltters and other works entrusted by EE AO and other
officers of the employer. Further, it is submitted that hours of duty per day were 10 to 12 hours and she was doing the
work of perennial in nature and she was working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years,
continuously. Further, it is submitted that Respondent in violation of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 has terminated
the Workman from service unceremoniously with effect from 10.10.2009 and she has been working uninterruptedly
for more than 240 days a year, in all these years. Further, it is submitted that for some few years attendance registers
had also been maintained by the department.
6.
Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed vide application with effect from 1.5.1997 and it is also denied that salary of the Workman
was Rs.1200/- per month and she worked for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the
appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by
the central office. It is also denied by the Respondent that claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and that she
worked for 240 days uninterruptedly from 5.5.1997 to 10.10.2009. Respondent contended that claimant was neither
appointed nor terminated and that her salary was Rs.1200/- per month falsifies her contention. Further, the claimant
was never appointed. Hence the question of terminating her services does not arise. Workman has not filed any piece
of paper to establish the claim of her appointment in the Respondent office. The procedure for appointment in the
Respondent organization is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment.
As such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected.
7.
Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as she was appointed by this Respondent and she
was shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to her claim, that she has been appointed. Further, Respondent
denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged her service and paid wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of 13 years.
But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a Workman
of the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the claim of
the Workman be dismissed with costs.
8.
The workman has examined herself as WW1 and also filed the documents in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1 to
W2. On the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross examined
by the Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although the affidavit
of MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2 was not
produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of evidence.
9.
In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the action
of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated 10.10.2003 is justified. The Workman
herein Smt.S. Manjula Rani has examined herself as WW1 and in her chief affidavit she has reiterated the averments
made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
“. I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent management . I have not filed my educational
qualification certificate in support of proof in this case. I have not filed any application as mentioned in the chief
exam affidavit. I know the contractors of BSNL by name Mr Obul Reddy, Mr.Nagireddy, Madhav Reddy & Tanuja as
762
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
they are civil contractors. It is not true to say that they are labour contractors under BSNL company. It is true that I
have not filed any document to show that I worked with respondent from 1.5.1997 to 10.10.2009. I misplaced the
original of Ex. W1 i.e. service certificate. It is not true to say that Ex. W1 is a bogus one and it is fabricated for the
purpose of this case. It is not true to say that I was not working under BSNL and that this company has no link with
me. It is not true to say that I was working under the contractor and getting salary from them. My name was there in
attendance register and as well as acquittence roll. It is not correct to say that my name was not there in attendance
register and pay roll register. It is not true to say that I only worked under the contractor and not under the BSNL
management. It is not true to say that I have no basis to file this case against the respondent and not entitled to get
any relief as claimed in the claim statement.”
10.
In support of her claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the service certificate
and Ex.W2 is the representation. Workman Smt.S. Manjula Rani claims that she has been terminated from the service
by the Respondent with effect from 10.10.2009 and she had worked uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year,
in all those years, continuously. Now, let us examine whether workman herein had worked in the Respondent
employment for 240 days continuously in a calendar year just preceding from the date of her termination, i.e.,
10.10.2009 as per requirement of provision under Section 25F of the ID Act.
11.
However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the workman
in the present matter. In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager,
New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant wherein
Hon'ble Court have held,
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
12.
Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of her termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. Before appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the retrenchment
under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
763
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and she has to prove that she had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding her date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009, in the employment of Respondent as she had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate her claims that she had worked for 240
days continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days continuous
service in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that she had worked 240 days in a
calendar year continuously just preceding from her date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. In order to claim the
protection against illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove
mandatory requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has
utterly failed to prove her case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the
Workman failed to discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding her date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that she has been terminated in
contravention of provision of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
13. On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it has
categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per day
and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of her termination from
service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
764
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman
has rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the
extract page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been
mentioned in that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and
Register of muster rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
14.
Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman in
the present matter has failed to establish her claim that her termination vide order dated 10.10.2009 was in violation
of the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in terminating the
services of Smt. S. Manjula Rani is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
15.
Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish her claim of illegal
termination, therefore, she is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Smt. S. Manjula Rani w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any
relief as prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 11th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri S. Manjula Rani
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of service certificate
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL(C)23.1.2004
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 251.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल,डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और सुश्री एन. लजलताम्बा, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम न्यायालय-
हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 13/2010) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार
को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/7/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 251.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No.13/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
765
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil), M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and
Ms. N. Lalithamba, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/7/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 11th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 13/2010
Between:
Ms.N. Lalithamba,
C/o N. Venugopal,
D.No.38-30-138, Punjab Hotel,
Husain Nagar, Marripalem,
Visakhapatnam(A.P.)
….. Petitioner
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/7/2010-IR(DU) dated 19.4.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the contract between the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam and
their contractor with regard to employment of Ms. N. Lalithamba is sham and bogus? If yes, whether the
action of the Management in terminating her services w.e.f 10.10.2009 is legal and justified? If not, what
relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 13/2010 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that under an application she was selected and appointed as Clerk cum Typist with the
employer w.e.f. February, 1996 on wages of Rs.1200/- per month and that stand posted to work under the control
and command of the officers of the Executive Engineer, B.S.N.L, Civil, Visakhapatnam and the nature of duties were
clerical that includes maintenance of all records, registers and statements and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to
12 hours. It is submitted that the work that she was doing was perennial in nature and that while she was working
uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year in all those years continuously. It is further submitted that no smart
766
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
practices were on her part she was terminated from service unceremoniously w.e.f. 10.10.2009 under violation of the
statutory provisions of law relating to the industrial jurisprudence. It is submitted that during that period the workman
got so many employment opportunities but she remained back with the employer owing to the assurance given by the
concerned authority that her services could be absorbed and permanency be granted with higher benefits than the one
she could get elsewhere. The alleged name as "Contract Labour" is only sham and nominal. It is a camouflage to
prevent the workman from claiming the benefits of Labour Laws that are applicable in the circumstances. Ipso facto
there is no mediator in the matter of either appointment of the workman or her continuance of the service with the
employer. It is submitted that the workman is now age barred and ineligible for any other employment in any
statutory establishment and she is the bread winner to the large family. It is submitted that the workman in toto
rendered 13 years of unblemished service to the employer straining herself from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that
in all just and fairness that her services could be continued till she attains superannuation. But, services of workman
were uninterrupted It is further submitted that she raised an industrial dispute. Hence prayed to declare the alleged
contract employment as bogus, a sham and nominal and that the action taken by the employer is unjust, unfair, illegal,
arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair labour practice but also unreasonable and unsustainable under rule of law and direct the
employer to reinstate the workman with all consequential and attendant benefits., continuity of service with full back
wages for the period from date of arbitrary termination i.e. 10.10.2009 till date of actual reinstatement for the
workman has not been employed gainfully ever anywhere and that she is also entitled for absorption with the
employer in lieu of the nature and length of service she rendered.
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed and that the salary was fixed at Rs.1200/- per
month and that she worked for 8 hours per day is also denied. Suffice to state that the claimant was never appointed
hence the question of terminating does not arise and no piece of paper has been filed to establish the same. That
Respondent had given any assurance to the claimant is denied. It is submitted that the contention of claimant that she
was shown a contract labour is contradictory to her claim wherein she claims to have been appointed and no
recruitments are done directly by the department itself. The claimant was never employed and as such is not a
workman of the Respondent and not entitled to raise the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to
dismiss the claim of the claimant.
4.
On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam Intermediate in the
services of Ms.N. Lalithamba w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified?
II.
To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5.
Point No.I:- As per claim of the Workman, she was selected and appointed as Clerk cum Typist with the
employer with effect from February, 1996 and she rendered continuous service. Further, it is submitted that while she
was working so in the office of the Executive Engineer, M/s. BSNL, Civil Division, Visakhapatnam and working on
wages of Rs.1200/- per month. Further, the nature of duties were clerical that includes maintenance of all records,
registers and statements and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. Further, it is submitted that she was
doing the work of perennial in nature and she was working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all
those years, continuously. Further, it is submitted that Respondent in violation of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947
has terminated the Workman from service unceremoniously with effect from 10.10.2009. She has been working
uninterruptedly for more than 240 days a year, in all these years.
6.
Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed, and it is also denied that salary of the Workman was Rs.1200/- per month and she worked
for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent
Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by the central office. It is also denied by the Respondent
that she worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. Respondent contended that claimant was neither appointed nor
terminated and that her salary was Rs.1200/- per month falsifies her contention. Hence the question of terminating
her services does not arise. Workman has not filed any piece of paper to establish the claim of her appointment in the
Respondent office. The procedure for appointment in the Respondent organization is governed by the Constitution of
India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment. As such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected.
Further, Respondent denies that Petitioner has obtained order from ALC(C), under name of Ms.N. Lalithamba in her
representation dated 23.1.2004. But it is suffice to state that the description of this employee does not tally
with the Petitioner.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
767
7.
Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as she was appointed by this Respondent and she
was shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to her claim, that she has been appointed. Further, Respondent
denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged her service and paid wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of 13 years.
But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a Workman of
the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the claim of the
Workman be dismissed with costs.
8.
The workman has examined herself as WW1 and also filed the documents in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1 to
W3. On the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross examined
by the Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although the affidavit
of MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2 was not
produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of evidence.
9.
In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the action
of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated 10.10.2009 is justified. The Workman
herein Ms.N. Lalithamba has examined herself as WW1 and in her chief affidavit she has reiterated the averments
made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
“I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent management . I have not filed my educational
qualification certificate in support of proof in this case. I have not filed any application as mentioned in the chief
exam affidavit. I know the contractors of BSNL by name Mr Obul Reddy, Mr.Nagireddy, Madhav Reddy & Tanuja as
they are civil contractors. It is not true to say that they are labour contractors under BSNL company. It is true that I
have not filed any document to show that I worked with respondent from 1.2.1996 to 10.10.2009. It is not true to say
that I was not working under BSNL and that this company has no link with mine. It is not true to say that I was
working under the contractor and getting salary from them. My name was there in attendance register and as well as
acquittence roll. It is not correct to say that my name was not there in attendance register and pay roll register. It is
not true to say that I I only worked under the contractor and not under the BSNL management. It is not true to say tat
I have no basis to file this case against the respondent and not entitled to get any relief as claimed in the claim
statement..”
10.
In support of her claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the representation.
Ex.W2 is the reply of the Respondent. Ex.W3 is the minutes of the meeting. Workman Smt.S. Manjula Rani claims
that she has been terminated from the service by the Respondent with effect from 10.10.2009 and she had worked
uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years, continuously. Now, let us examine whether
workman herein had worked in the Respondent employment for 240 days continuously in a calendar year just
preceding from the date of her termination, i.e., 10.10.2009 as per requirement of provision under Section 25F of the
ID Act.
11.
However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the workman
in the present matter. In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager,
New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant wherein
Hon'ble Court have held,
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
12.
Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of her termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. Before appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the retrenchment
under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
768
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and she has to prove that she had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding her date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009, in the employment of Respondent as she had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate her claims that she had worked for
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
769
240 days continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days
continuous service in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that she had worked 240 days
in a calendar year continuously just preceding from her date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. In order to claim the
protection against illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove
mandatory requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has
utterly failed to prove her case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the
Workman failed to discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding her date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that she has been terminated in
contravention of provision of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
13.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it
has categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per
day and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of her termination
from service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman
has rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the
extract page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been
mentioned in that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and
Register of muster rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
14.
Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman in
the present matter has failed to establish her claim that her termination vide order dated 10.10.2009 was in violation
of the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in terminating the
services of Ms.N. Lalithamba is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
15.
Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish her claim of illegal
termination, therefore, she is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Ms.N. Lalithamba w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any relief
as prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 11th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Ms.N. Lalithamba
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL, Visakhapatnam
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL(C)
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of minutes of meeting
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
770
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 252.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल,डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और श्री अर. संतोष बाबू, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम न्यायालय-
हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 10/2010) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार
को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/8/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 252.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No.10/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil), M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and
Shri R. Santosh Babu, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/8/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 10/2010
Between:
Sri R. Santosh Babu,
D.No.10-21-4/2, Pithani Dibba,
Visakhapatnam(A.P.)
….. Petitioner
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/8/2010-IR(DU) dated 19.4.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
771
SCHEDULE
―Whether the contract between the management of Superintending Engineer(Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam
and their contractor with regard to employment of Shri R. Santosh Babu is sham and bogus? If yes, whether
the action of the Management in terminating his services w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified? If not,
what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 10/2010 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that he studied upto X class and under an application he was selected and appointed as Group
"D" Beldar cum Peon with the employer w.e.f. 1.2.1996 and working on wages of Rs.850/- per month and the nature
of duties were stitching of files, posting of letters at Post Office, carrying and handing over letters etc.,to different
units, taking Xerox copies, stapling files and estimates, stitching estimates and NITs, supplying water and tea and
other works entrusted by the officers of the employer and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. It is
submitted that the work that he was doing was perennial in nature and that while he was working uninterruptedly for
more than 240 days in a year in all those years continuously. It is further submitted that no smart practices were on
his part, he was terminated from service unceremoniously w.e.f. 10.10.2009 under violation of the statutory
provisions of law relating to the industrial jurisprudence. The employer used to maintain an attendance register. As
the services of the workman are continuous in the same department the his entire service be computed for all the
purposes. It is submitted that the workman is now age barred and ineligible for any other employment in any statutory
establishment and he is the bread winner to the large family. It is submitted that the workman in toto rendered 13
years of unblemished service to the employer straining himself from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that in all just
and fairness that his services could be continued till he attains superannuation. It is further submitted that he raised an
industrial dispute. Hence prayed to declare the alleged contract employment as bogus, a sham and nominal and that
the action taken by the employer is unjust, unfair, illegal, arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair labour practice but also
unreasonable and unsustainable under rule of law and direct the employer to reinstate the workman with all
consequential and attendant benefits, continuity of service with full back wages for the period from date of arbitrary
termination i.e. 10.10.2009 till date of actual reinstatement for the workman has not been employed gainfully ever
anywhere and that he is also entitled for absorption with the employer in lieu of the nature and length of service he
rendered.
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed vide application with effect from 1.2.1996 as
Builder cum Peon and that the salary was fixed at Rs.1200/- per month and posted in the office of Executive
Engineer (Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam and that his nature of duties was remittance of D.D. cash to the bank,
stitching of files posting of letters etc.. It is submitted that no such person has been appointed and no such
appointment letter has been filed by the claimant and it is submitted that the appointment cannot be made by the
Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by the Central Office. It is also denied
that the claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. It is submitted that the
claimant was neither appointed nor terminated as such the very fact that the claimant states that his salary was Rs.850
/- per month falsifies his contention and suffice to state that the claimant was never appointed hence the question of
terminating does not arise and no piece of paper has been filed to establish the same. It is submitted that the procedure
for appointment is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment as such
the claim of the claimant has to be rejected. That Respondent had given any assurance to the claimant is denied. It
is submitted that the contention of claimant that he was shown a contract labour is contradictory to his claim wherein
he claims to have been appointed. It is submitted that whenever the Respondent took contract labour, the contract
between the Respondent and the labour contractor and Respondent never paid any amount directly to the labour, and
has no concern as to who would be engaged by the contractor. It is suffice to state that no documentary evidence has
been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged the service and paid the wages, which falsifies the claim of the
claimant. It is denied that claimant has rendered service of 13 years, as per records of the Respondent and the question
of sudden and surprise unceremonious action does not arise. It is submitted that the claimant had claimed at he was
appointed by Respondent on his application and now the claimant‘s claim that job works were carried by contractors.
It is submitted that odd jobs were given in contract to contractors and the amounts were paid to the contractors, and
the contention of the claimant that the same is sham and unfair is contrary to the record and suffice to state that the
claimant has not produced a single piece of paper to establish that he was employed by the Respondent and
terminated on 10.10.2009 and it is submitted that the appointments were done as per the rules by the Central Office
and no recruitments are done directly by the department itself. The claimant was never employed and as such is not a
workman of the Respondent and not entitled to raise the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to
dismiss the claim of the claimant.
772
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
4.
On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri R. Santosh Babu w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified?
II.
To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5.
Point No.I:- As per claim of the Workman, he was selected and appointed as Group D part time Beldar cum
Peon with the employer with effect from 1.2.1996 and he rendered continuous service and working on wages of Rs.
850/- per month. Further, the nature of duties were stitching of files, posting of letters at post office, courier service,
carrying and handing over letters etc., to different units, taking Xerox copies, stapling files and stitching estimates and
NITs, supplying water and tea and other works entrusted by the officers of the employer. Further, it is submitted that
hours of duty per day were 10 to 12 hours and he was doing the work of perennial in nature and he was working
uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years, continuously. Further, it is submitted that
Respondent in violation of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 has terminated the Workman from service
unceremoniously with effect from 10.10.2009. Further, it is submitted that attendance register had also been
maintained by the department.
6. Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed vide application with effect from 1.2.1996 and it is also denied that salary of the Workman
was Rs. 850/- per month and he worked for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the
appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by
the central office. It is also denied by the Respondent that claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and that he
worked for 240 days uninterruptedly from 1.2.1996 to 10.10.2009. Respondent contended that claimant was neither
appointed nor terminated and that his salary was Rs.1200/- per month falsifies his contention. Further, the claimant
was never appointed. Hence the question of terminating his services does not arise. Workman has not filed any piece
of paper to establish the claim of his appointment in the Respondent office. The procedure for appointment in the
Respondent organization is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment.
As such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected.
7.
Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as he was appointed by this Respondent and he
was shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to his claim, that he has been appointed. Further, Respondent
denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged his service and paid wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of 13 years.
But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a Workman of
the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the claim of the
Workman be dismissed with costs.
8.
The workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed the document in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1. On
the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross examined by the
Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although the affidavit of
MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2 was not
produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of evidence.
9.
In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the action
of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated 10.10.2009 is justified. The Workman
herein Sri R. Santosh Babu has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief affidavit he has reiterated the averments
made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
“I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent management . I have not filed my educational
qualification certificate in support of proof in this case. I know the contractors of BSNL by name Mr Obul Reddy,
Mr.Nagireddy & Madhav Reddy & Tanuja. It is not correct to say that I am deposing falsehood. It is true that I have
not filed any document to show that I worked with respondent from 1.2.1996 to 10.10.2009. It is not true to say that I
was not working under BSNL and that this company has no link with me. It is not true to say that I was working under
the contractor and getting salary from them. My name was there in attendance register and as well as acquittence
roll. It is not correct to say that my name was not there in attendance register and pay roll register. It is not true to
say that I only worked under the contractor and not under the BSNL management. It is not true to say that I have no
basis to file this case against the respondent and not entitled to get any relief as claimed in the claim statement...”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
773
10.
In support of his claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the representation to
ACL, Visakhapatnam. Workman Sri R. Santosh Babu claims that he has been terminated from the service by the
Respondent with effect from 10.10.2009 and he had worked uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all
those years, continuously. Now, let us examine whether workman herein had worked in the Respondent employment
for 240 days continuously in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 10.10.2009 as per
requirement of provision under Section 25F of the ID Act.
11.
However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the workman
in the present matter. It appears that as a contract workman, Petitioner was in the employment of Respondent and he
has right to file petition under the provision of I.D. Act, 1947 for redressal of his grievances of termination.
Therefore, the argument of Respondent in this regard is not tenable.
In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager, New India Assurance
Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant wherein Hon'ble Court have held,
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
12.
Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand, whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. Before appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the retrenchment
under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as April be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which April be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
774
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and he has to prove that he had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding his date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009, in the employment of Respondent as he had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate his claim that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days continuous service
in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that he had worked 240 days in a calendar year
continuously just preceding from his date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009. In order to claim the protection against
illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove mandatory
requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has utterly failed to
prove his case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the Workman failed to
discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar year just preceding
his date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that he has been terminated in contravention of
provision of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
13.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it
has categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per
day and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination
from service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman
has rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the
extract page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been
mentioned in that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and
Register of muster rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
14.
Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman in
the present matter has failed to establish his claim that his termination vide order dated 10.10.2009 was in violation of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
775
the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in terminating the
services of Sri R. Santosh Babu is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
15. Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish his claim of illegal
termination, therefore, he is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri R. Santosh Babu w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any relief
as prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 7th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri R. Santosh Babu
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL(C)
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 253—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल,डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और श्रीमती डी. मीनाक्षी, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम न्यायालय-
हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 14/2010) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार
को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/9/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 253.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No.14/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil), M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and
Smt. D. Meenakshi, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/9/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
776
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 12th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 14/2010
Between:
Smt.D. Meenakshi,
D.No.46-9-57, Dondaparthy,
Kuppilivari Street,
Srikakulam – 532316.
….. Petitioner
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/ 9/2010-IR(DU) dated 19.4.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the contract between the management of Superintending Engineer(Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam
and their contractor with regard to employment of Smt. D. Meenakshi is sham and bogus? If yes, whether
the action of the Management in terminating his services w.e.f 10.10.2009 is legal and justified? If not,
what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 14/2010 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2. The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that under an application she was selected and appointed as Clerk with the employer
w.e.f. 08.03.1999 on wages of Rs.1200/- per month and that stand posted to work under the Superintending
Engineer, B.S.N.L, Civil Circle, Visakhapatnam (Planning and Administration) and that she graduated in Commerce
and that the nature of duties were clerical that includes maintenance of all records, registers and statements and the
hours of duty per day were of 8 to 10 hours. It is submitted that the work that she was doing was perennial in nature
and that while she was working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year in all those years continuously. It is
further submitted that no smart practices were on her part she was terminated from service unceremoniously
w.e.f. 10.10.2009 under violation of the statutory provisions of law relating to the industrial jurisprudence. It is
submitted that during that period the workman got so many employment opportunities but she remained back with the
employer owing to the assurance given by the concerned authority that her services could be absorbed and
permanency be granted with higher benefits than the one she could get elsewhere. The alleged name as "Contract
Labour" is only sham and nominal. It is a camouflage to prevent the workman from claiming the benefits of Labour
Laws that are applicable in the circumstances. Ipso facto there is no mediator in the matter of either appointment of
the workman or her continuance of the service with the employer. It is submitted that the workman is now age barred
and ineligible for any other employment in any statutory establishment and she is the bread winner to the large family.
It is submitted that the workman in toto rendered 10 years of unblemished service to the employer straining herself
from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that in all just and fairness that her services could be continued till she attains
superannuation. But, services of workman were uninterrupted It is further submitted that she raised an industrial
dispute. Hence prayed to declare the alleged contract employment as bogus, a sham and nominal and that the action
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
777
taken by the employer is unjust, unfair, illegal, arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair labour practice but also unreasonable
and unsustainable under rule of law and direct the employer to reinstate the workman with all consequential and
attendant benefits., continuity of service with full back wages for the period from date of arbitrary termination i.e.
10.10.2009 till date of actual reinstatement for the workman has not been employed gainfully ever anywhere and that
she is also entitled for absorption with the employer in lieu of the nature and length of service she rendered.
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed and that the salary was fixed at Rs.1200/- per
month and that she worked for 10 to 12 hours per day is also denied. Suffice to state that the claimant was never
appointed hence the question of terminating does not arise and no piece of paper has been filed to establish the same.
That she worked for 240 days uninterruptedly and she was working w.e.f. 8.3.1999 to 10.10.2009 is also denied.
That Respondent had given any assurance to the claimant is denied. It is denied that identity card was issued to her
and issued service certificate also. It is submitted that the contention of claimant that she was shown a contract
labour is contradictory to her claim wherein she claims to have been appointed and no recruitments are done directly
by the department itself. The claimant was never employed and as such is not a workman of the Respondent and not
entitled to raise the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to dismiss the claim of the claimant.
4.
On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam Intermediate in the
services of Smt.D. Meenakshi w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is legal and justified?
II. To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5.
Point No.I:-
As per claim of the Workman, she was selected and appointed as Clerk with the employer
with effect from 1.5.1999 and she rendered continuous service. Further, it is submitted that while she was working so
in the office of the Superintending Engineer (Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam and working on wages of Rs.1200/- per
month. Further, the nature of duties were clerical that includes maintenance of all records, registers and statements
and the hours of duty per day were of 8 to 10 hours. Further, it is submitted that she was doing the work of perennial
in nature and she was working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years, continuously.
Further, it is submitted that Respondent in violation of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 has terminated the Workman
from service unceremoniously with effect from 10.10.2009 . She has been working uninterruptedly for more than
240 days a year, in all these years.
6.
Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed, and it is also denied that salary of the Workman was Rs.1200/- per month and she worked
for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the appointment cannot be made by the
Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by the central office. It is also denied by
the Respondent that she worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. Respondent contended that claimant was neither
appointed nor terminated and that her salary was Rs.1200/- per month falsifies her contention. Hence the question of
terminating her services does not arise. Workman has not filed any piece of paper to establish the claim of her
appointment in the Respondent office. The procedure for appointment in the Respondent organization is governed by
the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment. As such the claim of the claimant has to
be rejected.
7.
Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as she was appointed by this Respondent and she
was shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to her claim, that she has been appointed. Further, Respondent
denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged her service and paid wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of 14 years.
But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a Workman of
the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the claim of the
Workman be dismissed with costs.
8.
The workman has examined herself as WW1 and also filed the documents in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1 to
W3. On the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross examined
by the Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although the affidavit
of MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2 was not
produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of evidence.
778
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9.
In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the action
of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated 10.10.2009 is justified. The Workman
herein Smt.D. Meenakshi has examined herself as WW1 and in her chief affidavit she has reiterated the averments
made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
“I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent management . I have not filed my educational
qualification certificate in support of proof in this case. I have not filed any application as mentioned in the chief
exam affidavit. I know the contractors of BSNL by name Mr Obul Reddy, Mr.Nagireddy, Madhav Reddy & Tanuja as
they are civil contractors. It is not true to say that they are labour contractors under BSNL company. It is true that I
have not filed any document to show that I worked with respondent from 1.5.1999 to 10.10.2009. It is not true to say
that I was not working under BSNL and that this company has no link with mine. It is not true to say that I was
working under the contractor and getting salary from them. My name was there in attendance register and as well as
acquittence roll. It is not correct to say that my name was not there in attendance register and pay roll register. It is
not true to say that I only worked under the contractor and not under the BSNL management. It is not true to say that
I have no basis to file this case against the respondent and not entitled to get any relief as claimed in the claim
statement..”
10.
In support of her claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the representation of
workman. Ex.W2 is the reply of the Respondent and Ex.W3 is the minutes of meeting. Workman Ms. G. Kumari
claims that she has been terminated from the service by the Respondent with effect from 10.10.2009 and she had
worked uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years, continuously. Now, let us examine
whether workman herein had worked in the Respondent employment for 240 days continuously in a calendar year just
preceding from the date of her termination, i.e., 10.10.2009 as per requirement of provision under Section 25F of the
ID Act.
11.
However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the workman
in the present matter. In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager,
New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant wherein
Hon'ble Court have held,
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
12.
Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of her termination, i.e., 10.10.2009 . Before appreciation of the evidence adduced
by the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the
retrenchment under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
779
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and she has to prove that she had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding her date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009, in the employment of Respondent as she had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate her claims that she had worked for 240
days continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days continuous
service in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that she had worked 240 days in a
calendar year continuously just preceding from her date of termination, i.e., 10.10.2009 . In order to claim the
protection against illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove
mandatory requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has
utterly failed to prove her case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the
Workman failed to discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding her date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that she has been terminated in
contravention of provision of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
13.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it
has categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per
day and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of her termination
780
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
from service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman
has rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the
extract page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been
mentioned in that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and
Register of muster rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
14.
Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman
in the present matter has failed to establish her claim that her termination vide order dated 10.10.2009 was in
violation of the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in
terminating the services of Smt.D. Meenakshi is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
15.
Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish her claim of illegal
termination, therefore, she is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Smt.D. Meenakshi w.e.f. 10.10.2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any relief
as prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 12th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Smt.D. Meenakshi
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL, V
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of reply of Respondent
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of minutes of meeting
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 254.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल,डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और श्री एम. िंकर गणेि, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम न्यायालय-
हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 11/2010) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्रीय सरकार
को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/11/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
781
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 254.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No.11/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil), M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and Shri M. Sankar
Ganesh, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/11/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 10th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 11/2010
Between:
Sri M. Sankar Ganesh,
C/o J. Seshagiri Rao (TV9 Reporter)
D.No.11-9-6, Nagavampsapu Veedhi,
Near Kalanaiadu Mandir,
Vizianagaram. (A.P.)
….. Petitioner
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/ 11/2010-IR(DU) dated 19.4.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the contract between the management of Superintending Engineer(Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam
and their contractor with regard to employment of Shri M. Sankar Ganesh is sham and bogus? If yes,
whether the action of the Management in terminating his services w.e.f. 01.09.2009 is legal and justified? If
not, what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 11/2010 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2. The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that under an application he was selected and appointed as Clerk with the employer
w.e.f. 18.8.2003 and working on wages of Rs.3200/-per month and posted under Senior Divisional Engineer(Civil),
BSNL., Sub-Division, Vizianagaram and the nature of duties were clerical that includes maintenance of all records,
registers and statements and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. It is submitted that the work that he
782
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
was doing was perennial in nature and that while he was working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year in
all those years continuously. It is further submitted that no smart practices were on his part, he was terminated from
service unceremoniously w.e.f. 31.08.2009 under violation of the statutory provisions of law relating to the industrial
jurisprudence. The employer used to maintain an attendance register. As the services of the workman are continuous
in the same department the his entire service be computed for all the purposes. It is submitted that the workman is
now age barred and ineligible for any other employment in any statutory establishment and he is the bread winner to
the large family. It is submitted that the workman in toto rendered 13 years of unblemished service to the employer
straining himself from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that in all just and fairness that his services could be continued
till he attains superannuation. It is submitted that he raised an industrial dispute. Hence prayed to declare the alleged
contract employment as bogus, a sham and nominal and that the action taken by the employer is unjust, unfair, illegal,
arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair labour practice but also unreasonable and unsustainable under rule of law and direct the
employer to reinstate the workman with all consequential and attendant benefits, continuity of service with full back
wages for the period from date of arbitrary termination i.e. 01.09.2009 till date of actual reinstatement for the
workman has not been employed gainfully ever anywhere and that he is also entitled for absorption with the employer
in lieu of the nature and length of service he rendered.
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed vide application with effect from 18.8.2003 as
Telecom Assistant and that the salary was fixed at Rs.2300/- per month and posted in the office of Sub-Divisional
Engineer (Civil), Vizianagaram and that his nature of duties was clerical, maintenance of all records, registers etc.. It
is submitted that no such person has been appointed and no such appointment letter has been filed by the claimant and
it is submitted that the appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment
of staff is decided by the Central Office. It is also denied that the claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and
worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. It is submitted that the claimant was neither appointed nor terminated as such
the very fact that the claimant states that his salary was Rs.850 /- per month falsifies his contention and suffice to state
that the claimant was never appointed hence the question of terminating does not arise and no piece of paper has been
filed to establish the same. It is submitted that the procedure for appointment is governed by the Constitution of India
and there cannot be any other mode of appointment as such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected. That
Respondent had given any assurance to the claimant is denied. It is submitted that the contention of claimant that he
was shown a contract labour is contradictory to his claim wherein he claims to have been appointed. It is submitted
that whenever the Respondent took contract labour, the contract between the Respondent and the labour contractor
and Respondent never paid any amount directly to the labour, and has no concern as to who would be engaged by the
contractor. It is suffice to state that no documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has
engaged the service and paid the wages, which falsifies the claim of the claimant. It is denied that claimant has
rendered service of 13 years, as per records of the Respondent and the question of sudden and surprise unceremonious
action does not arise. It is submitted that the claimant had claimed at he was appointed by Respondent on his
application and now the claimant‘s claim that job works were carried by contractors. It is submitted that odd jobs
were given in contract to contractors and the amounts were paid to the contractors, and the contention of the claimant
that the same is sham and unfair is contrary to the record and suffice to state that the claimant has not produced a
single piece of paper to establish that he was employed by the Respondent and terminated on 01.09.2009 and it is
submitted that the appointments were done as per the rules by the Central Office and no recruitments are done directly
by the department itself. The claimant was never employed and as such is not a workman of the Respondent and not
entitled to raise the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to dismiss the claim of the claimant.
4. On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri M. Sankar Ganesh w.e.f. 01.09.2009 is legal and justified?
II. To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5.
Point No.I:- As per claim of the Workman, he was selected and appointed as Clerk with the employer with
effect from 18.8.2003 and he rendered continuous service and working on wages of Rs. 3200/-per month. Further, the
nature of duties were clerical that includes maintenance of all records, registers and statements. Further, it is
submitted that hours of duty per day were 10 to 12 hours and he was doing the work of perennial in nature and he was
working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all those years, continuously. Further, it is submitted
that Respondent in violation of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 has terminated the Workman from service
unceremoniously with effect from 01.09.2009.
6.
Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
783
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed vide application with effect from 18.8.2003 and it is also denied that salary of the Workman
was Rs. 2300/-per month and he worked for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the
appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by
the central office. It is also denied by the Respondent that claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and that he
worked for 240 days uninterruptedly from 18.8.2003 to 01.09.2009. Respondent contended that claimant was neither
appointed nor terminated and that his salary was Rs.2300/- per month falsifies his contention. Further, the claimant
was never appointed. Hence the question of terminating his services does not arise. Workman has not filed any piece
of paper to establish the claim of his appointment in the Respondent office. The procedure for appointment in the
Respondent organization is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of appointment.
As such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected.
7.
Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as he was appointed by this Respondent and he
was shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to his claim, that he has been appointed. Further, Respondent
denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged his service and paid wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of 13 years.
But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a Workman of
the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the claim of the
Workman be dismissed with costs.
8. The workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed the documents in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1 to
Ex.W3. On the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross
examined by the Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although
the affidavit of MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2
was not produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of
evidence.
9. In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the action
of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated 01.09.2009 is justified. The Workman
herein Sri M. Sankar Ganesh has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief affidavit he has reiterated the averments
made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
“I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent management . I have not filed my educational
qualification certificate in support of proof in this case I have not filed any application mentioined in the chief exam
affidavit. I know the contractors of BSNL by name Mr Obul Reddy, Mr.Nagireddy & Madhav Reddy & Tanuja. It is
not correct to say that I know the contractors and I am deliberately denying the said fact. It is true that I have not
filed any document to show that I worked with respondent from 18.8.2003 to 31.08.2009. It is not true to say that I
was not working under BSNL and that this company has no link with me. It is not true to say that I was working under
the contractor and getting salary from them. My name was there in attendance register and as well as acquittence
roll. It is not correct to say that my name was not there in attendance register and pay roll register. It is not true to
say that I only worked under the contractor and not under the BSNL management. It is not true to say that I have no
basis to file this case against the respondent and not entitled to get any relief as claimed in the claim statement...”
10.
In support of his claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the representation to
ACL, Visakhapatnam. Ex.W2 is the reply of the Respondent. Ex.W3 is the minutes of the meeting held by ACL,
Visakhapatnam.Workman Sri M. Sankar Ganesh claims that he has been terminated from the service by the
Respondent with effect from 01.09.2009 and he had worked uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all
those years, continuously. Now, let us examine whether workman herein had worked in the Respondent employment
for 240 days continuously in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 01.09.2009 as per
requirement of provision under Section 25F of the ID Act.
11.
However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the workman
in the present matter. It appears that as a contract workman, Petitioner was in the employment of Respondent and
he has right to file petition under the provision of I.D. Act, 1947 for redressal of his grievances of termination.
Therefore, the argument of Respondent in this regard is not tenable.
In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager, New India Assurance
Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant wherein Hon'ble Court have held,
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
784
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
12.
Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand, whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., 01.09.2009. Before appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the retrenchment
under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as April be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which April be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
785
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and he has to prove that he had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding his date of termination, i.e., 01.09.2009, in the employment of Respondent as he had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate his claim that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days continuous service
in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that he had worked 240 days in a calendar year
continuously just preceding from his date of termination, i.e., 01.09.2009. In order to claim the protection against
illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove mandatory
requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has utterly failed to
prove his case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the Workman failed to
discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar year just preceding
his date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that he has been terminated in contravention of
provision of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
13. On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it has
categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per day
and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination from
service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman
has rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the
extract page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been
mentioned in that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and
Register of muster rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
14. Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman in
the present matter has failed to establish his claim that his termination vide order dated 01.09.2009 was in violation of
the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in terminating the
services of Sri M. Sankar Ganesh is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
15.
Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish his claim of illegal
termination, therefore, he is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri M. Sankar Ganesh w.e.f. 01.09.2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any
relief as prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 10th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
786
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri M. Sankar Ganesh
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL(C)
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of reply of Respondent
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of minutes of meeting held by ACL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 255.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऄधीक्षण ऄजभयंता (जसजवल), मेससव- बीएसएनएल,डाबागाडवन्स, जविाखाृत्तनम, के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों
और श्री एच.वी.एस. रघुनाथ, कामगार, के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण- सह-श्रम
न्यायालय- हजदराबाद ृंचाट (संदभव सं्या 15/2010) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो
केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 19.02.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. ,y - 40012/12/2010-अइअर (डीयू)]
ददलीृ कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 255—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. ID. No.15/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court– Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to The Superintending Engineer(Civil), M/s. BSNL, Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam, and
Shri H.V.S. Raghunath, Worker, which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 19.02.2025.
[No. L-40012/12/2010-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 12th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 15/2010
Between:
Sri H.V.S. Raghunath,
Plot No.7-91, Shipyard Layout,
P.M. Palem (Madhuravada)
Visakhapatnam. (A.P.)
….. Petitioner
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
787
AND
The Superintending Engineer(Civil),
M/s. BSNL,
Civil Circle, D.No.29-6-3, 2nd floor,
Lalitha Colony, Dabagardens,
Visakhapatnam -530 020.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. B. J. Krishna Mohan & N.V.S.S. Papa Rao, Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri K. Mohan, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L- 40012/ 12/2010-IR(DU) dated 19.4.2010
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of M/s. BSNL and their workman. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the contract between the management of Superintending Engineer(Civil), BSNL, Visakhapatnam
and their contractor with regard to employment of Shri H.V.S. Raghunath is sham and bogus? If yes,
whether the action of the Management in terminating his services w.e.f. August, 2009 is legal and justified?
If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 15/2010 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2. The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that under an application he was selected and appointed as Telecom Office Assistant (DOT)
Sub-Divisional Clerk (BSNL) with the employer w.e.f. 1.8.1996 and working on wages of Rs.1200/-per month and
posted under Executive Engineer Telecom (Civil Division -II), BSNL., Visakhapatnam and later on Executive
Engineer Telecom (Civil Division), BSNL., Visakhapatnam and the nature of duties were all typing works and any
other works entrusted by the officers, while in the SDO, typing on computers as well as type machine, preparation of
comparative statements etc.. and thus the nature of duties entrusted were of clerical that includes maintenance of all
records, registers and statements and the hours of duty per day were of 10 to 12 hours. It is submitted that the work
that he was doing was perennial in nature and that while he was working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a
year in all those years continuously. It is further submitted that no smart practices were on his part, he was terminated
from service unceremoniously w.e.f. 31.08.2009 under violation of the statutory provisions of law relating to the
industrial jurisprudence.though the workman got so many employment opportunities, he remained back with the
employer owing to the assurance given by the concerned authority that his services could be absorbed and
permanency be granted with high benefits. That the alleged name as ―contract Labour‖ is only sham and nominal. It
is submitted that the workman is now age barred and ineligible for any other employment in any statutory
establishment and he is the bread winner to the large family. It is submitted that the workman in toto rendered 13
years of unblemished service to the employer straining himself from dawn to dusk with a fond hope that in all just
and fairness that his services could be continued till he attains superannuation. It is submitted that he raised an
industrial dispute. Hence prayed to declare the alleged contract employment as bogus, a sham and nominal and that
the action taken by the employer is unjust, unfair, illegal, arbitrary, vindictive, an unfair labour practice but also
unreasonable and unsustainable under rule of law and direct the employer to reinstate the workman with all
consequential and attendant benefits, continuity of service with full back wages for the period from date of arbitrary
termination i.e. August, 2009 till date of actual reinstatement for the workman has not been employed gainfully ever
anywhere and that he is also entitled for absorption with the employer in lieu of the nature and length of service he
rendered.
3. Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
At the outset Respondent denied various allegations made by the Petitioner except those which are specifically
admitted. It is denied that the claimant was selected and appointed vide application with effect from 1.8.1996 as
Telecom Assistant and that the salary was fixed at Rs.1200/- per month and posted in the office of Executive Engineer
(Civil Divison-II), Visakhapatnam, Executive Engineer (Civil Division), Visakhapatnam and that his nature of duties
was clerical, maintenance of all records, registers etc.. It is submitted that no such person has been appointed and no
such appointment letter has been filed by the claimant and it is submitted that the appointment cannot be made by the
Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by the Central Office. It is also denied
that the claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and worked for 240 days uninterruptedly. It is submitted that the
claimant was neither appointed nor terminated as such the very fact that the claimant states that his salary was
788
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Rs.850 /- per month falsifies his contention and suffice to state that the claimant was never appointed hence the
question of terminating does not arise and no piece of paper has been filed to establish the same. It is submitted that
the procedure for appointment is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of
appointment as such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected. That Respondent had given any assurance to the
claimant is denied. It is submitted that the contention of claimant that he was shown a contract labour is contradictory
to his claim wherein he claims to have been appointed. It is submitted that whenever the Respondent took contract
labour, the contract between the Respondent and the labour contractor and Respondent never paid any amount
directly to the labour, and has no concern as to who would be engaged by the contractor. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged the service and paid the wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. It is denied that claimant has rendered service of 13 years, as per records of the
Respondent and the question of sudden and surprise unceremonious action does not arise. It is submitted that the
claimant had claimed at he was appointed by Respondent on his application and now the claimant‘s claim that job
works were carried by contractors. It is submitted that odd jobs were given in contract to contractors and the amounts
were paid to the contractors, and the contention of the claimant that the same is sham and unfair is contrary to the
record and suffice to state that the claimant has not produced a single piece of paper to establish that he was employed
by the Respondent and terminated on August, 2009 and it is submitted that the appointments were done as per the
rules by the Central Office and no recruitments are done directly by the department itself. The claimant was never
employed and as such is not a workman of the Respondent and not entitled to raise the disputes under the Industrial
Disputes Act. Hence, prayed to dismiss the claim of the claimant.
4.
On the basis of rival pleadings following points emerged for determination in the present matter:-
I.
Whether the action of the management of Superintending Engineer BSNL Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri H.V.S. Raghunath w.e.f. August, 2009 is legal and justified?
II.
To what relief the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
5. Point No.I:- As per claim of the Workman, he was selected and appointed as Telecom Office Assistant (DOT)
with the employer with effect from 1.8.1996 and he rendered continuous service and working on wages of Rs. 1200/-
per month. Further, under Executive Engineer Telecom (Civil Division -II), BSNL., Visakhapatnam and later on
Executive Engineer Telecom (Civil Division), BSNL., Visakhapatnam and the nature of duties were all typing
works and any other works entrusted by the officers, while in the SDO, typing on computers as well as type machine,
preparation of comparative statements etc.. and thus the nature of duties entrusted were of clerical that includes
maintenance of all records, registers and statements. Further, it is submitted that hours of duty per day were 10 to 12
hours and he was doing the work of perennial in nature and he was working uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in
a year, in all those years, continuously. He has filed office order dated 11/12-09-1996 issued by Executive Engineer,
Civil Division-II, Visakhapatnam relating to the allocation of the work to the workman along with other employees.
Further, it is submitted that Respondent in violation of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 has terminated the Workman
from service unceremoniously with effect from August, 2009.
6. Per contra, Respondent has filed counter wherein it is contended that the claim of the Petitioner is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts and liable to be dismissed. Further, it is denied that claimant Workman was an
employee of the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that as per record of the Respondent, the Petitioner was never
employed by the Respondent. Further, it is submitted that the Workman is not employee of the Respondent and
address of the Respondent given by the Petitioner is incorrect. Further, it is contended that the Workman was not
selected and appointed vide application with effect from 1.8.1996 and it is also denied that salary of the Workman
was Rs. 2300/-per month and he worked for 10 to 12 hours per day. Further, Respondent submitted that the
appointment cannot be made by the Superintendent Engineer as the procedure of appointment of staff is decided by
the central office. It is also denied by the Respondent that claimant had worked 10 to 12 hours per day and that he
worked for 240 days uninterruptedly from 1.8.1996 to August, 2009. Respondent contended that claimant was
neither appointed nor terminated and that his salary was Rs.1200/- per month falsifies his contention. Further, the
claimant was never appointed. Hence the question of terminating his services does not arise. Workman has not filed
any piece of paper to establish the claim of his appointment in the Respondent office. The procedure for appointment
in the Respondent organization is governed by the Constitution of India and there cannot be any other mode of
appointment. As such the claim of the claimant has to be rejected.
7. Further, Respondent contended that the claimant has claimed as he was appointed by this Respondent and he was
shown as a contract labour, which is contradictory to his claim, that he has been appointed. Further, Respondent
denies that the contract labour is a sham and that they always work under the Respondent. It is suffice to state that no
documentary evidence has been filed to show that the Respondent has engaged his service and paid wages, which
falsifies the claim of the claimant. Further, Respondent also denies that claimant has rendered service of 13 years.
But as stated supra, the claimant was never employed. Further, it is contended that the Workman is not a Workman of
the Respondent and not entitled to raise the dispute under the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, prayed that the claim of the
Workman be dismissed with costs.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
789
8. The workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed the documents in support of claim, i.e., Ex.W1 to
Ex.W4. On the other hand, Respondent has filed evidence affidavit of MW1 and MW2, and MW1 was cross
examined by the Counsel for workman and Respondent has also filed the documents i.e., 49 documents. Although the
affidavit of MW2 was filed by the Respondent, along with the aforesaid 49 documents, but as the witness MW2 was
not produced for cross examination, therefore, the evidence of the MW2 is not admissible as per rule of evidence.
9. In view of the submissions and evidence on behalf of rival parties, let us proceed to examine whether the action
of Respondent in terminating the services of the Workman vide order dated August, 2009 is justified. The Workman
herein Sri H.V.S. Raghunath has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief affidavit he has reiterated the averments
made in the claim statement. In cross examination WW1 states:-
“I have not received any appointment letter from the respondent management . I have not filed my educational
qualification certificate in support of proof in this case I have not filed any application mentioned in the chief exam
affidavit. I know the contractors of BSNL by name Mr Obul Reddy, Mr.Nagireddy & Madhav Reddy & Tanuja s they
are civil contractors. It is not true to say that they are labour contractors under BSNL Company. It is true that
ex.W1 does not mention the name H.V.S. Raghunath. It is true that I know the contractors and I am deliberately
denying the said fact. It is true that I have not filed any document to show that I worked with respondent from
1.8.1996 to 31.08.2009. It is not true to say that I was not working under BSNL and that this company has no link
with me. It is not true to say that I was working under the contractor and getting salary from them. My name was
there in attendance register and as well as acquittence roll. It is not correct to say that my name was not there in
attendance register and pay roll register. It is not true to say that I only worked under the contractor and not under
the BSNL management. It is not true to say that I have no basis to file this case against the respondent and not
entitled to get any relief as claimed in the claim statement...”
10. In support of his claim, Workman has also filed the documents in evidence. Ex.W1 is the representation to ACL,
Visakhapatnam. Ex.W2 is the reply of the Respondent. Ex.W3 is the minutes of the meeting held by ACL,
Visakhapatnam.Workman Sri H.V.S. Raghunath claims that he has been terminated from the service by the
Respondent with effect from August, 2009 and he had worked uninterruptedly for more than 240 days in a year, in all
those years, continuously. Now, let us examine whether workman herein had worked in the Respondent employment
for 240 days continuously in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., August, 2009 as per
requirement of provision under Section 25F of the ID Act.
11. However, Respondent has questioned the maintainability of the claim statement/ Petition filed by the workman
in the present matter. It appears that as a contract workman, Petitioner was in the employment of Respondent and
he has right to file petition under the provision of I.D. Act, 1947 for redressal of his grievances of termination.
Therefore, the argument of Respondent in this regard is not tenable.
In this context, the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager, New India Assurance
Company Limited Vs. A. Sankaralingam, AIR 2009 SC page 309 is relevant wherein Hon'ble Court have held,
―12. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforequoted passages that the observations made therein clearly suggest that
a workman employed on a part time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman in term
of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25F thereof, should the need so arise. The
fact that the workman was working under the control and supervision of the appellant employer is admitted on all
sides.
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the Workman herein who was
employed as a part time employee by Respondent is covered under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 and hence have right to file petition under provision of I.D. Act, 1947.
12. Now, we have to examine in the matter at hand, whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a calendar
year just preceding from the date of his termination, i.e., August, 2009. Before appreciation of the evidence adduced
by the Workman in this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant provision pertaining to the
retrenchment under I.D. Act, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
790
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as April be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service:-
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which April be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In the context, onus of proof to prove the plea of 240 days of continuous working by workman in a Calendar year
just preceding the date of termination, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Essen Deienki Vs. Rajiv Kumar
AIR 2003 SC page 38, have held:-
“The proof of working for 240 days is stated to be on the employee in the event of any denial of such a factum and it
is on this score that this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25) was pleased to state as
below :
" In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the
basis of cogent evidence that the Respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was
then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a
year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this
period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. ."
Further, in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex
Court held:
"It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Therefore, in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the onus of proof lies upon the
shoulder of the Workman herein and he has to prove that he had worked 240 days continuously in a calendar year
just preceding his date of termination, i.e., August, 2009, in the employment of Respondent as he had claimed. The
perusal of record reveals that workman herein has not filed any documentary evidence, i.e., any appointment letter,
salary slip or attendance register pertaining to the year 2009 to substantiate his claim that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in the employment of Respondent. Therefore, for the want of evidence of 240 days continuous service
in a calendar year, we are unable to accept the plea of the Petitioner that he had worked 240 days in a calendar year
continuously just preceding from his date of termination, i.e., August, 2009. In order to claim the protection against
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
791
illegal retrenchment under section 25 F of the ID Act, the onus of proof lies on workman to prove mandatory
requirement of continuous working of 240 days in employment of Respondent but the workman has utterly failed to
prove his case on this premise. Thus, in view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the Workman failed to
discharge the onus of proof to establish the claim of continuous working 240 days in a calendar year just preceding
his date of termination, therefore, the claim of the workman that he has been terminated in contravention of provision
of Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is not tenable.
13.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined MW1 in support of the contention made in counter wherein it
has categorically been stated by MW1 that the witness denies that the Petitioner was working for 10 to 12 hours per
day and had worked for 240 days uninterruptedly in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination
from service. Further, MW1 states that no such appointment of workman was made by the Respondent Corporation.
Further, Respondent contended that a writ petition was filed before the Hon‘ble High Court and while disposing the
writ petition, Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the present ID independently without being
influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed in I.A. for production of the documents and examining
the circumstances stated by the Respondent corporation as to the same is justified or not. Further, MW1 witness
states that as per rules the documents are/were destroyed after 5 years and the documents sought to be produced are
voluminous documents which having no relevance to the case. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner had stated
that they were appointed by the Respondent corporation initially and in their own claim statement they stated that
they were engaged as contract labour. Hence, Respondent corporation cannot produce said documents and the claim
of the claimant itself is speculative. In cross examination MW1 states that, it is not true to suggest that workman has
rendered 13 years service in Respondent management. The Respondent has also filed the photocopy of the extract
page of ―P T F.H.B. VOL.I‖ wherein it is mentioned that period of preservation of the record has been mentioned in
that extract, that provides, registers are maintained for the period of 5 years and muster Roll and Register of muster
rolls are also maintained upto 5 years.
14.
Thus, in view of fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above the Workman in
the present matter has failed to establish his claim that his termination vide order dated August, 2009 was in violation
of the provisions contained under Section 25 F. Therefore, action of the Respondent management in terminating the
services of Sri H.V.S. Raghunath is held legal and justified.
Thus, Point No.I is decided against the workman accordingly.
15.
Point No.II:- In view of the finding arrived at Point No.I, workman failed to establish his claim of illegal
termination, therefore, he is not entitled for any relief.
Thus, Point No.II is decided accordingly.
AWARD
The action of the management of Superintending Engineer, BSNL, Visakhapatnam in terminating the
services of Sri H.V.S. Raghunath w.e.f. August, 2009 is held legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any
relief as prayed for. Petition is dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 10th day of February, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri H.V.S. Raghunath
MW1: Sri Sunil Kumar Singh
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of representation to ACL(C)
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of reply of Respondent
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of minutes of meeting held by ACL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
792
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 256.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn
esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; ua 2 fnYyh ds iapkV (a03/2023) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2024- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-255]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 19 th February, 2025
S.O. 256.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 03/2023) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
No -II Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of CPWD and their
workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2024– IR(B-I) 255]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT NO-II, NEW DELHI
LCA No. 03/2023
Smt. Bal Kumari, Late Sh. Govind Singh,
Through- Sh. Satish Kumar, Authorised representative,
H. No. 4823, Gali No. 13, Balbir Nagar Extension,
Shahadra, New Delhi-110032.
Versus
The Executive Engineer,
Dehradun Civil Division, CPWD,
20, Subhash Road, Dehradun, Uttarakhand-248001.
Appearance:-
For Claimants: Sh. Sunil Dutt Sharma, Ld. AR for the claimant.
For Managements: Sh. Atul Bhardwaj, Ld. AR for the management.
AWARD
This is an application U/S 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (here in after is referred as an Act) filed by
the claimant.
Counsel of the workman submits that workman wants to withdraw the present claim. Statement of workman is
recorded separately.
In view of the above submission made by the claimant, claim stands dismissed as withdrawn. Award is
accordingly passed. A copy of this award is sent to appropriate government for notification under section 17 of the I.D. Act.
File is consigned to record room.
ATUL KUMAR GARG, Presiding Officer
Date: 25.09.2024
नइ ददल्ली, 19 फरवरी, 2025
का.अ. 257.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
जिनहान बैंक ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; ua 2 fnYyh ds iapkV (200/2019) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y - 12025/01/2024- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-256]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
793
New Delhi, the 19th February, 2025
S.O. 257.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 200/2019) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
No -II Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Shinhan Bank
and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2024– IR(B-I) 256]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
SH. ATUL KUMAR GARG, PRESIDING OFFICER, CENTRAL GOV. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM –
LABOUR COURT NO II, NEW DELHI
ID No. 200/2019
Sh. Vinay Kumar Rai Vs. Shinhan Bank & Ors.
Counsels:
For Applicant/ Claimant:
Sh. S.P. Dubey, Ld. AR For claimant.
For Management/ Respondent:
None for Shinhan Bank.
None for Cops Security & Allied Services.
AWARD
1. This is the claim petition filed by the claimant U/s 2 (A) of the industrial dispute act, 1947 after the failure report
issued by the appropriate government to that effect. Claimant in his statement stated that he had been performing his
duty for the last several years in the premises of management-1 through management-2 with the last drawn wages of Rs.
21,700 per month. He did his duty with diligence and honesty. Management had not got his ESI card while he was in
service, when he demanded the same, his service had been terminated without giving any cause in writing on
16.11.2016. He had given the written complaint through union to the labour office, Pushpa Bhawan, Pushp bihar,
New Delhi. Both the managements appeared therein, however, conciliation could not take place there, hence he filed
the present claim with the prayer that he be reinstated with full back wages. Notice of this petition had been issued to
both the managements. Both the managements had appeared herein. Management-1 had filed the short reply denying
employer-employee relationship between him and the claimant. It is the stand of management-1 that he had given
contract to M/s Cops Security and allied services for security of bank branches at Delhi. Management-1 does not
appoint any security guards nor it has any control over security guards/gunmen employed by M/s Cops Security and
Allied Services. Wages of security guards are paid by the security agency because management gives an annual tender
contract wherein the amount is negotiated and fixed on certain terms of management codified as per contract of
management of security. He submits that claim qua him be dismissed.
2. Management-2 had also filed the reply/written statement. He had taken various preliminary objections inter-alia
the claim is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed as statement of claim had not been filed within the time
prescribed; as there is no employer-employee relationship between above named claimant and management-1; claim
against respondent is misconceived and has been filed upon instigation of some vested interest where only intention is
to harass the respondent and blackmail in order to extort money; claim is liable to be dismissed as the workman is guilty
of suppression of material particular. On merit, respondent-2 had stated that there was a contract between management-
1 and management-2 for providing security services at the bank premises as per address mentioned in the work order
and as per the said contract; claimant was employed by management-2 at the place of management-1. Services of the
workman had never been terminated, it was workman himself who had left his services from management-2 after taking
his full and final amount. He had admitted the date of appointment. He denied that he had continuously taken the
service of overtime from workman and did not provide the payment and benefit of overtime services. Management-2
submits that he is still ready to take the workman on duty. He denied that performance of workman was satisfactory. He
submits that workman was engaged at the post of security guard with management-2 and he was posted at Shinhan
Bank as security guard with a gun to do the duty. However, he had not met the requirement of the duty and various
allegations were labeled by management-1. A letter was issued by management-1 to management-2 for his replacement.
On the demand of management-1, management-2 requested the workman for his replacement, but he had left the
service. He submits that claim of claimant be dismissed.
3. Rejoinder had also been filed by the claimant where he denied the averment made by both the managements and
affirmed the averment made in his claim statement.
794
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : FEBRUARY 22, 2025/PHALGUNA 3, 1946
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
4. After completion of the proceedings, following issues had been framed vide order dated 16.11.2021:
1. Whether the proceeding is maintainable.
2. Whether there exists employer and employee relationship between the claimant and management-1.
3. Whether the service of the claimant was illegally terminated by the management-2.
4. Whether the claimant is entitled to reinstatement into service with back wages and other benefits as claimed.
5. In order to prove his contention, workman himself had come to the witness box and filed his affidavit of evidence.
He had reiterated the facts mentioned in his claim statement. He had relied upon eight documents i.e. Copy of demand
letter, copy of postal receipts, complaint given to labour department, failure report, letter given by Cops Security and
Allied Services. Both the managements who had been appearing, stopped coming after framing of issues. Workman
evidence remained unchallenged because management had not cross-examined the workman witness, even both the
managements had been given opportunity to lead its evidence, however, they had chosen not to lead evidence.
6. In order to prove his case, the claimant firstly had to prove that he is a workman, he worked in an industry, an
industrial dispute arises and he was terminated for this reason. For this, section 2(S), 2 (J & K) and section 2 (OO) are
required to be reproduced.
Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines the workman, it reads as under:
“Workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual,
unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms
of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an
industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge, or retrenchment has led
to that dispute, but does not include any such person-
(i)
who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) or the Navy Act,
1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii)
who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii)
who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv)
who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding [ten thousand rupees] per mensem
or exercises, either by the nature of the duties, attached to the office by reason of the powers vested in him, functions
mainly of a managerial nature.]
Section 2 (j, k & oo) of the ID Act define the industry and industrial disputes respectively. It reads as under:
[(j)] “industry” means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any
calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen;
(k) “industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and
workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the
terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.
(oo) “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever,
otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-
(a)
Voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b)
Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between
the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
[(bb)] termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment
between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a
stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c)
termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;
7. From the facts and evidence produced herein, there is no doubt that the claimant is a workman because his job is of
manual nature and he stood posted as a security guard in the branch. As respondent-2 was the service provider so it has
come within the definition of industry. Now the workman was required to prove that his services were terminated and
industrial dispute had been apprehended. He was given the failure report by the conciliation officer, both the
managements appeared therein.
8. Now come to the question whether services of the workman had been terminated illegally or unjustifiably and in
violation of provision of section 25 (F) of Industrial Dispute Act. Here the workman though had sought the relief
against both the managements, however, he had not come with any evidence that he was ever appointed by respondent-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : फरवरी 22, 2025/ फाल् गुन 3, 1946
795
1. His claim is only that he had worked in the premises of respondent-1 through respondent-2 who was the service
provider. His contribution had been deducted for PF and ESI by respondent-2. Therefore, no relief can be given against
the respondent-1 who is the principal employer. Respondent-2 has taken the stand only that the workman had left the
services of his own because he had been asked for replacement due to various complaint received in writing from
respondent-1. However, in this respect, workman had not been cross-examined by any of the managements nor the
managements had led any evidence buttressing to the fact, therefore naturally, no question arises for compliance of
section 25 (F) for retrenching the services of the workman. Hence, workman has proved the case that his services were
illegally terminated by management-2. He has not been given any compensation or one month notice, therefore, issue-1
and 2 in regard to the maintainability and termination of the workman are concerned, the same are held in favor of
workman and against management-2.
9. In regard to Issue-3 & 4, Workman claims that he be given reinstatement of services with full back wages since his
date of termination by management-2 as he is jobless since then and has been facing financial hardship in keeping his
family.
10. Further workman had examined himself, WW1 remains unchallenged, unrebutted and uncontroverted, therefore,
there is no doubt left in the mind of this court/tribunal that the workman had got any job after his termination.
11. Admittedly, workman had worked for more than six years with management-2. Normally, when services of the
workman were terminated, naturally, reinstatement with full back wages would follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and long line of cases decided by the constitutional court that relief of reinstatement
with full back wages is not automatic and maybe fully inappropriate where the workman worked only for a year or two.
However, it depends upon case to case where the relief of reinstatement has to be given.
12. Here in the present case, workman at the time of filing the evidence was almost 50 years old, he had not given the
list of any family member dependent upon him. So, this tribunal is not inclined to give the relief of reinstatement. It
would be better if the lump sum amount is given to the workman in lieu of reinstatement. In these circumstances,
amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) is an appropriate relief in lieu of his illegal termination. Hence, this
award is passed against the respondent-2 for paying the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) in lieu of
his illegal termination. Award is accordingly passed. Copy of this award is sent to the appropriate government for
notification as required U/s 17 of the I.D. Act. This file is consigned to record room.
ATUL KUMAR GARG, Presiding Officer
Dated 14.06.2024.
Uploaded by Dte. of Printing at Government of India Press, Ring Road, Mayapuri, New Delhi-110064
and Published by the Controller of Publications, Delhi-110054. GORAKHA NATH
YADAVA
Digitally signed by GORAKHA NATH
YADAVA
Date: 2025.03.07 11:11:31 +05'30'