3702 GI/2025
(4349)
रजजस्ट्री सं. डी.एल. (एन) 04/0007/2003—05
REGD. NO. D. L. (N) 04/0007/2003—05
xxxGIDHxxx
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प्राजधकार से प्रकाजित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
साप् ताजहक
WEEKLY
सं. 23]
नई ददल् ली, जून 15—जून 21, 2025, िजनवार/ज् येष् ठ 25—ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
No. 23]
NEW DELHI, JUNE 15—JUNE 21, 2025, SATURDAY/JYAISTHA 25– JYAISTHA 31, 1947
इस भाग में जभन् न ृृष् ठ सं् या दी जाती हज जजससे दक यह ृृथक संकलन के प ृ में रखा जा सके
Separate Paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation
भाग II—खण् ड 3—उृ-खण् ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)
भारत सरकार के मंत्रालयों (रक्षा मंत्रालय को छोड़कर) द्वारा जारी दकए गए सांजवजधक आदेि और अजधसूचनाएं
Statutory Orders and Notifications Issued by the Ministries of the Government of India
(Other than the Ministry of Defence)
जवत्त मंत्रालय
(जवत्तीय सेवाएं जवभाग)
नई ददल्ली, 4 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1012.—केंद्रीय सरकार, सरकारी स्ट्थान (अप्राजधकृत अजधभोजगयों की बेदखली) अजधजनयम, 1971
(1971 का 40) की धारा 3 द्वारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए और भारत के राजृत्र, भाग-II, खंड 3, उृखंड (ii),
तारीख 30 जून, 1990 में प्रकाजित भारत सरकार के जवत्त मंत्रालय, आर्थथक कायय जवभाग (बैंककग प्रभाग) की
अजधसूचना सं्यांक का.आ. 1752(अ), तारीख 12 जून, 1990 को उन बातों के जसवाय अजधक्ांत करते हुए, जजन्हें से
अजधक्मण से ृूवय दकया गया हज या करने का लोृ दकया गया हज, नीचे दी गई सारणी के स्ट्तम्भ 2 में वर्थणत अजधकाररयों
को, उि अजधजनयम के प्रयोजन के जलए, सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया में संृदा अजधकारी के प ृ में जनयुि करती हज, जो उि
सारणी के स्ट्तम्भ 3 में यथाजवजनर्ददष्ट क्षेत्र के अधीन आने वाले सरकारी स्ट्थानों के संबंध में अृनी अजधकाररता की
स्ट्थानीय सीमाओं के भीतर, उि अजधजनयम के द्वारा या अधीन संृदा अजधकारी को प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग और उस ृर
अजधरोजृत कतयव्यों का ृालन करेंगे।
सी.जी.-डी.एल.-सा.-11072025-264521
CG-DL-W-11072025-264521
4350
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
सारणी
क्. सं.
अजधकारी का ृदनाम
सरकारी स्ट्थानों के प्रवगय और अजधकाररता की स्ट्थानीय सीमाएं
(1)
(2)
(3)
1.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, अहमदाबाद
गुजरात राज्य तथा दादर और नगर हवेली तथा दमण और दीव संघ
राज्यक्षेत्र में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण
के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए
ृररसर।
2.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, भोृाल
मध्य प्रदेि राज्य में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के प्रिासजनक
जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर
जलए गए ृररसर।
3.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, चंडीगढ़
हररयाणा, ृंजाब राज्यों और चंडीगढ़, जम्मू-कश्मीर तथा लद्दाख संघ
राज्यक्षेत्रों में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण
के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए
ृररसर।
4.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, चेन्न्ई
तजमलनाडु, केरल राज्यों और ृुदुचेरी, लक्षद्वीृ और अंदमान और जनकोबार
द्वीृसमूह संघ राज्यक्षेत्रों में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के
प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके
जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए ृररसर।
5.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, ददल्ली
जहमाचल प्रदेि, उत्तराखंड, राजस्ट्थान राज्यों और ददल्ली राष्ट्रीय राजधानी
राज्यक्षेत्र में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण
के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए
ृररसर।
6.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, गुवाहाटी
असम, मेघालय, अप णाचल प्रदेि, मजणृुर, जमजोरम, नागालजण्ड, जसदिम
और जत्रृुरा राज्यों में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के प्रिासजनक
जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर
जलए गए ृररसर।
7.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, हजदराबाद
तेलंगाना, आंध्र प्रदेि और कनायटक राज्यों में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ
इंजडया के प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या
उसके जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए ृररसर।
8.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, कोलकाता
ृजिमी बंगाल राज्य में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के
प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके
जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए ृररसर।
9.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, लखनऊ
उत्तर प्रदेि राज्य में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के प्रिासजनक
जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर
जलए गए ृररसर।
10.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, ृटना
जबहार और झारखंड राज्यों में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के
प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके
जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए ृररसर।
11.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
महाराष्ट्र (मुम्बई और थाने जजला के जसवाय) राज्य में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4351
इंजडया, ृुणे
बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके
द्वारा या उसके जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए ृररसर।
12.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, रायृुर
उड़ीसा और छत्तीसगढ़ राज्यों में अवजस्ट्थत तथा सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के
प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या उसके द्वारा या उसके
जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए ृररसर।
13.
उृ-महाप्रबंधक,
सेंरल
बैंक
ऑफ
इंजडया, मुम्बई
महाराष्ट्र राज्य के मुम्बई और थाने जजला और गोवा राज्य में अवजस्ट्थत तथा
सेंरल बैंक ऑफ इंजडया के प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रण के अधीन और से संबंजधत या
उसके द्वारा या उसके जनजमत्त ृट्टे ृर जलए गए ृररसर।
[फा. सं. 4/2/2013/बीओए-II]
अजनतेि कुमार, अवर सजचव
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
(Department of Financial Services)
New Delhi, the 4th June, 2025
S.O. 1012.—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (40 of 1971), and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India
in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) number. S.O.1752, dated the 12th
June, 1990 published in the Gazette of India, Part-II, section 3, sub-section (ii) , dated the 30th June, 1990, except as
respects things done or omitted to be done before such supersession, the Central Government hereby appoints the
officers mentioned in column (2) of the Table below to be estate officers in the Central Bank of India for the purpose
of said Act, who shall exercise the powers conferred and the duties imposed on estate officers by or under the said
Act, within the local limits of their jurisdiction in respect of the public premises falling under area as specified in
column (3) of the said Table .
TABLE
S.
No.
Designation of officer
Categories of public premises and local limits of jurisdiction
(1)
(2)
(3)
1.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central Bank of
India, Ahmedabad
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the State
of Gujarat and Union territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and
Diu.
2.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central Bank of
India Bhopal
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the State
of Madhya Pradesh.
3.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central Bank of
India, Chandigarh
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the
States of Haryana, Punjab and Union territories of Chandigarh, Jammu and
Kashmir and Ladakh
4.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central Bank of
India, Chennai
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the State
of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Union territories of Puducherry, Lakshadweep
and Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
5.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central Bank of
India, Delhi
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the
States of Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Rajasthan and National Capital
Territory of Delhi
6.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central
Bank of India,
Guwahati
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the
States of Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram
Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura.
4352
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
7.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central
Bank of India,
Hyderabad
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the States
of Telangana, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.
8.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central
Bank of India,
Kolkata
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the State
of West Bengal.
9.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central
Bank of India,
Lucknow
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the State
of Uttar Pradesh
10.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central
Bank of India, Patna
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the States
of Bihar and Jharkhand
11.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central
Bank of India, Pune
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the State
of Maharashtra (except Mumbai and Thane District)
12.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central
Bank of India,
Raipur
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in the
States of Orissa and Chhattisgarh
13.
The Deputy General
Manager, Central
Bank of India,
Mumbai
Premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, and under the
administrative control of the Central Bank of India and situated in Mumbai
and Thane District of State of Maharashtra and the State of Goa.
[F. No. 4/2/2013-BOA-II]
ANITESH KUMAR, Under Secy.
(राजस्ट्व जवभाग)
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1013.—केन्द्र सरकार, राजभाषा (संघ के िासकीय प्रयोजनों के जलए प्रयोग) जनयम, 1976 के जनयम 10
के उृ-जनयम (4) के अनुसरण में राजस्ट्व जवभाग के केन्द्रीय अप्रत्यक्ष कर एवं सीमािुल्क बोडय के अधीन जनम्नजलजखत
कायायलयों, जजनके 80 प्रजतित से अजधक अजधकाररयों एवं कमयचाररयों ने जहन्दी का काययसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर जलया हज, को
अजधसूजचत करती हज:
1. आयुिालय, सीमा िुल्क (आयात-I), मुंबई, अंचल-I
2. आयुिालय, सीमा िुल्क (आयात-II), मुंबई, अंचल-I
[फा. सं. ई-11017/3/2017- जहन्दी-2-अजधसूचना]
जिजिर िमाय, संयुि जनदेिक (रा.भा.)
(Department of Revenue)
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1013.—In pursuance of sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Languages (Use for Official Purpose of
the Union) Rules, 1976, the Central Government, hereby notifies, the following offices under Central Board of
Indirect Taxes and Customs, Department of Revenue where more than 80% staff has acquired the working knowledge
of Hindi:
1. Commissionerate of Customs (Import-I), Mumbai, Zone-I
2. Commissionerate of Customs (Import-II), Mumbai, Zone-I
[F. No E-11017/3/2017- Hindi-2-Notification]
SHISHIR SHARMA, Jt. Director (OL)
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4353
जवदेि मन्त्रालय
(सी.ृी.वी. प्रभाग)
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1014.—राजनजयक और कोंसुलीय अजधकारी (िृथ एवं फीस) के अजधजनयम, 1948 की धारा 2 के खंड
(क) के अनुसरण में वजधाजनक आदेि ।
एतद् द्वारा,सरकार भारत के दूतावास बगदाद मेेँ श्री रजव कुमार िमाय,सहायक अनुभाग अजधकारी,को जून 12,
2025 से सहायक कांसुलर अजधकारी के प ृ में कांसुलर सेवाओं का जनवयहन करने के जलए अजधकृत करती हज।
[फा. सं. टी. 4330/01/2025(29)]
नबा कुमार ृाल, जनदेिक (सीृीवी)
MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(CPV Division)
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1014.—Statutory Order in pursuance of the clause (a) of the Section 2 of the Diplomatic and Consular
Officers (Oaths and fees) Act, 1948 (41 of 1048), the Central Government hereby appoints Sh. Ravi Kumar Sharma,
Assistant Section Officer as Assistant Consular Officer in the Embassy of India, Baghdad to perform the consular
services as Assistant Consular Officer with effect from June 12, 2025.
[F. No. T. 4330/01/2025 (29)]
NABA KUMAR PAL, Director (CPV)
कार्थमक, लोक जिकायत तथा ृेंिन मंत्रालय
(कार्थमक और प्रजिक्षण जवभाग)
नई ददल्ली, 27 मई, 2025
का.आ. 1015.—केंद्रीय सरकार ददल्ली जविेष ृुजलस स्ट्थाृन अजधजनयम, 1946 (1946 का केंद्रीय अजधजनयम
25) की धारा 5 की उृधारा (1) सृरठत धारा 6 द्वारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, अजधसूचना सं. जी.ओ.(2डी)
सं. 71, ददनांक 15.03.2025 गृह (नागररकता) जवभाग के माध्यम से जारी तजमलनाडु राज्य सरकार की सम्मजत से
तत्कालीन उृायुि, सीमा िुल्क आयुिालय-VII (एयर कागो), चेन्नई तथा अब संयुि आयुि, वस्ट्तु एवं सेवा कर और
केंद्रीय उत्ृाद िुल्क के हजदराबाद जोन में ृदस्ट्थाजृत लोक सेवक सुश्री के. िर्थमला (कमयचारी आईडी. 8594) के जवप द्ध
प्राथजमक जांच/अन्वेषण के संचालन हेतु ददल्ली जविेष ृुजलस स्ट्थाृन के सदस्ट्यों की िजियों और क्षेत्राजधकार का जवस्ट्तार
समस्ट्त तजमलनाडु राज्य में करती हज।
[फा. सं. 228/13/2025-एवीडी-II]
सत्यम श्रीवास्ट्तव, अवर सजचव
MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES AND PENSIONS
(Department of Personnel and Training)
New Delhi, the 27th May, 2025
S.O. 1015.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 5 read with section 6 of the
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (Central Act 25 of 1946), the Central Government with the consent of
the State Government of Tamil Nadu, issued vide Notification No. G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 15.03.2025 Home
(Citizenship) Department, hereby extends the powers and jurisdiction of members of the Delhi Special Police
4354
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Establishment in the whole of the State of Tamil Nadu to conduct a preliminary enquiry / investigation against the
public servant Ms. K. Sharmila (Emp. Id. 8594), the then Deputy Commissioner at Customs Commissionerate-VII
(Air Cargo), Chennai, now, the Joint Commissioner posted at Hyderabad Zone of GST & Central Excise Directorate.
[F. No. 228/13/2025-AVD-II]
SATYAM SRIVASTAVA, Under Secy.
नई ददल्ली, 11 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1016.—केंद्रीय सरकार, भारतीय नागररक सुरक्षा संजहता, 2023 (2023 का 46) की धारा 18 की
उृधारा (8) द्वारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, श्री सेवांग नामग्याल, अजधविा को, गंगटोक, जसदिम के जविेष
न्यायाधीि, भ्रष्टाचार जनवारण अजधजनयम, के न्यायालय में ददल्ली जविेष ृुजलस स्ट्थाृन (केंद्रीय अन्वेषण ब्यूरो) द्वारा
संजस्ट्थत, मामला सं्या आरसी 2172023ए0012/सीबीआई/एसी-II नई ददल्ली, के अजभयोजन का और उि मामले से
उद्भूत दकसी अृील, ृुनरीक्षण या अन्य मामलों का जवजध द्वारा स्ट्थाजृत दकसी अृील या ृुनरीक्षण न्यायालय में संचालन
करने हेतु, मामले का जनृटान होने तक या अगले आदेि तक, जो भी ृूवयतर हो, जविेष लोक अजभयोजक के प ृ में जनयुि
करती हज ।
[फा. सं. 225/12/2025-एवीडी-II]
सत्यम श्रीवास्ट्तव, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 11th June, 2025
S.O. 1016.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (8) of section 18 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), the Central Government hereby appoints Shri Tsewang Namgyal, Advocate as
Special Public Prosecutor for conducting the prosecution of case number RC 2172023A0012/CBI/AC-II/New Delhi,
instituted by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (Central Bureau of Investigation) in the Court of Special Judge,
Prevention of Corruption Act, Gangtok at Sikkim and any appeal, revision or other matters arising out of the said case
in any appellate or revisional court established by law, till the disposal of the case or until further orders, whichever
is earlier.
[F. No. 225/12/2025-AVD-II]
SATYAM SRIVASTAVA, Under Secy.
जवजध
और न् याय मंत्रालय
(जवधायी जवभाग)
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1017.—राष्ट्रृजत, राजभाषा जनयम, 1976 के जनयम 10 के उृजनयम (2) में दी गई ृररभाषाओं और
मानकों के अनुसार जवधायी जवभाग, जवजध और न्याय मंत्रालय के अजधकाररयों/कमयचाररयों द्वारा हहदी का काययसाधक ज्ञान
प्राप्त कर लेने के आधार ृर, इस जवभाग अथायत जवधायी जवभाग, जवजध और न्याय मंत्रालय को राजभाषा जनयम, 1976 के
जनयम 10 के उृजनयम (4) के अधीन अजधसूजचत करते हैं।
[फा. सं. ई-11025/1/2023-रा.भा.(जव.जव.)]
डॉ. ब्रजेि कुमार हसह, संयुि सजचव
MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE
(Legislative Department)
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1017.—The President hereby notifies this Department, namely, the Legislative Department, Ministry of
Law and Justice, under sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Languages Rules, 1976 on the basis of the
officers/employees of the Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice having been acquired a working
knowledge of Hindi, as per standards and definitions given in sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of the Official Language
Rules, 1976.
[F. No. E-11025/1/2023-O.L.(L.D.)]
Dr. BRAJESH KUMAR SINGH, Jt. Secy.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4355
ृेरोजलयम और प्राकृजतक गजस मंत्रालय
नई ददल्ली, 16 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1018.—केंद्रीय सरकार ने ृेरोजलयम और खनीज ृाइृलाइन (भूजम मे उृयोग के अजधकार के आजयन)
अजधजनयम, 1962 (1962 का 50) की धारा 2 के खंड (क) के अनुसरण में, तजमलनाडु राज्य क्षेत्र के भीतर तक अजधजनयम
के अधीन, कोची सेलम ृाइृलाइन प्राइवेट जलजमटेड (केएसृीृीएल ) की कोची कोयम्बटूर सेलम एल ृी जी ृाइृलाइन
के जलए, केरल राज्य में सक्षम प्राजधकारी के कृत्यों का ृालन करने के जलए केएसृीृीएल ने प्रजतजनयुजि ृर का आ 1885
(अ ) ददनांक 11/06/2020 भारत के राजृत्र सं्या 1682 ददनांक 15/06/2020 के अंतगयत अजधसूजचत सक्षम प्राजधकारी
श्री ृी अजनलकुमार, जडप्टी कलक्टर, के स्ट्थान ृर श्री जेग्गी ृॉल, जडप्टी कलक्टर, जजनकी जनयुजि नोडल अजधकारी
कोची सेलम ृाइृलाइन प्रोजेक्ट कोयम्बटूर हज, को प्राजधकृत करती हज ।
यह अजधसूचना जारी होने की तारीख से लागू होगी ।
[फा. सं आर-12031/196/2017-ओआर-I/ई-19746]
िजि िेखर हसह, अवर सजचव
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS
New Delhi, the 16th June, 2025
S.O. 1018.— in pursuance of clause (a) of section 2 of the petroleum and mineral pipelines (acquisition of
right of user in land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962), the Central Government hereby authorizes Shri Jeggy Paul, Deputy
Collector, in place of earlier notified competent authority Shri P Anilkumar, Deputy Collector Vide S.O. No. 1885 (E)
dated 11/06/2020 published in Gazette of India No. 1682 dated 15/06/2020 on deputation to Kochi Salem Pipeline
Private Limited (KSPPL), who is appointed as Nodal Officer for Kochi Salem Pipeline Project, to perform the
functions of the Competent authority, in the state of Kerala for Kochi Salem Pipeline Private Limited's Kochi-
Coimbatore-Salem LPG Pipeline under the said act.
This notification will be effective from the date of its issue.
[F. No. R-12031/196/2017-OR-I/E-19746]
SHASHI SHEKHAR SINGH, Under Secy.
श्रम और रोजगार मंत्रालय
नई ददल्ली, 21 मई, 2025
का.आ. 1019.— vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj एयर इंजडया जलजमटेड ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd
fookn esa
-
सह
-
] मुंबई-Ids iapkV (
26/1999) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-11012/125/98-
-(
-I)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT
New Delhi, the 21st May, 2025
S.O. 1019.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 26/1999) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Mumbai-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
Air India Ltd. and their workmen received by the Central Government on 25/03/2025.
[No. L-11012/125/98– IR (C-I)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
4356
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVT.INDUSTRIALTRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, MUMBAI
Present
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
Presiding Officer
REFERENCE CGIT -26 of 1999
Parties:
For the first party management : Mrs. Geeta Raju, Adv
For the second party workman : Absent.
State : Maharashtra
Mumbai, dated the 11th day of Feb‘ 2025.
AWARD
1.. The present reference has been made by the Central Government by its order dated 24.5.2012 passed in exercise of
the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute
Act 1947. The terms of reference as per the schedule to the said order are as under:
―Whether the action of the management of M/s.Air India Ltd., Mumbai in terminating the services of Shri
S.V.Godambe, w.e.f.01.12.1997 is justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled?‖.
Perusal of the record reveals that the second party workman has not put his presence before this Tribunal since
08.09.2022. This shows that the workman is not interested in pursuing his case. Accordingly, the matter is dismissed
for want of prosecution.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 27 मई, 2025
का.आ. 1020.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj ई.सी.एल. ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सह
–
]आसनसोल ds iapkV (सन्दभय सं्या
/
) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22013/01/2025-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th May, 2025
S.O. 1020.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award ( Reference.I.D. No. 01/2021) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,Asansol as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management
of E.C.L. and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 05/05/2025.
[No. L-22013/01/2025 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL -CUM- LABOUR COURT,
ASANSOL.
PRESENT:
Shri Ananda Kumar Mukherjee,
Presiding Officer,
C.G.I.T-cum-L.C., Asansol.
L. C. APPLICATION NO. 01 OF 2021
PARTIES: Sarat Kora
Vs.
1. General Manager, Sodepur Area, ECL
2. Agent, Chinakuri Mine No. II, ECL
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4357
REPRESENTATIVES:
For the Union/Workmen: Mr. Rakesh Kumar, President, Koyala Mazdoor Congress.
For the Management:
Mr. P. K. Das, Advocate.
INDUSTRY:
Coal.
STATE:
West Bengal.
Dated:
16.04.2025
AWARD
1.
Instant application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was filed by Sarat Kora, ex-
employee of Chinakuri Mine No. II of Eastern Coalfields Limited, praying for setting aside the impugned order of
dismissal and reinstatement in service.
2.
Mr. P. K. Das, learned advocate for the management of Chinakuri/Sodepur Group of Mines, Eastern
Coalfields Limited is present. The case is fixed up today for appearance of the workman and his evidence, in default,
the case is to be dismissed. Mr. Rakesh Kumar, union representative appeared along with Sarat Kora, ex-employee of
Eastern Coalfields Limited.
3.
It is submitted that though this application has been filed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, which relates to recovery of amount due to the workman from the employer, this application has been
wrongly filed seeking relief for setting aside order of dismissal of Sarat Kora and for his reinstatement.
4.
The L. C. Application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is ‗not pressed‘ by Sarat
Kora. Considered. I find that this case has wrongly been filed by the petitioner against the General Manager, Sodepur
Area and the Agent, Chinakuri Mine No. II. Relief sought for in this case is for setting aside order of dismissal is not
maintainable unless an Industrial Dispute is referred to the Tribunal under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 or an application is filed under sub-section 2A of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on failure of
reconciliation before the Conciliation Officer. The L. C. Application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 is therefore dismissed for non-prosecution. Let an Award be drawn up in light of my above findings.
Hence,
ORDERED
Let an Award be passed in view of the above findings. Let copies of the Award in duplicate be sent to the
Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, New Delhi under Section 33C(4) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 for information and Notification.
ANANDA KUMAR MUKHERJEE, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 9 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1021. —vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj बीबीएमबी ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
]चंडीगढ़-I ds iapkV (
30/2021) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-23012/01/2021-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 9th June, 2025
S.O. 1021.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 30/2021) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-LabourCourt, Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
Ms. BBMB and their workmen received by the Central Government on 16/05/2025.
[No. L-23012/01/2021– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
4358
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I, CHANDIGARH.
Presiding Officer: Sh. Brajesh Kumar Gautam, H.J.S.
ID No.30/2021
Registered on:-21.01.2022
General Secretary, Nangal Bhakra Mazdoor Singh (INTUC), H.O-
Nangal Township, Labour Recreation Centre (BBMB) Near DD Block
(Water Tank), Tanki, Ropar (Punjab)-14001.
....... Workman/ Unions
Versus
1. The Chairman Bhakra Beas Management Board, Madhya Mark,
Sector 19-B, Chandigarh-160019.
2.The Chief Engineer, Bhakra Beas Management Board, BSL Project,
Sundernagar-175038.
3.The Chief Engineer, Bhakra Dam, BBMB, Nangal Township, Distt.
Ropar (Punjab)-140001.
4.The Chief Engineer, Beas Dam, BBMB Talware Township, Distt.
Hoshiarpur (Punjab)-146001.
…...Management
AWARD
Passed On:-05.05.2025
Central Government vide Notification No. L-23012/01/2021-IR (CM-II) dated 04.01.2022, under clause (d)
of Sub-Section (1) sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act), has
referred the following Industrial dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal:-
" Whether action of the M/s Bhakra Beas Management Board in not giving the post of Hoist Operator
instead of Jr. Hoist Operator as there was no such post of Jr. Hoist Operator in the BBMB Regulation
1994 to S/ Shri Malkiat Chand S/o Shri Prem Singh, Ajay Kumar S/o Shri Hukam Chand and Hans
Raj S/o Shri Sonju Ram joined at Sunder Nagar under Chief Engineer, BSL Project, BBMB Sunder
Nagar, Mandi (HP) on 21.05.1997, 13.05.1997 and 15.07.1997 respectively is just, fair and legal? If not, to what
relief is the contract workers entitled?"
1. During the pendency of the proceedings before this Tribunal the case was fixed for cross examination of Workman.
Through emails of applicants- Malkiat Chand, Hans Raj, two withdrawal applications on their behalf have been
received in the office of this Tribunal with a prayer that they do not want to initiate the proceeding further and they
may be permitted to withdraw the case. Similarly one copy of withdrawal application on behalf of co-applicant Ajay
Kumar has been provided by Sh. Sandeep Sharma (Law Officer) appearing on behalf of BBMB. In the said
application also the applicant Ajay Kumar had prayed for withdrawal of the case.
2. The present Industrial Dispute has been registered on the basis of reference No.L-23012/01/2021 (IR(CM-II)) dated
04.01.2022 received from the Ministry of Labour, Government of India and presently the case was running at the
stage of cross examination of workmen. Since prayer on behalf of all the applicants has been made for withdrawal of
the case and closing the proceeding through above referred applications received before this Tribunal. The proceeding
in the present case is closed and the ID Case is disposed of as withdrawn, without any adjudication on merit in terms
of reference of the Labour Ministry.
3. Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17 of the
ID Act, 1947.
B.K. GAUTAM, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4359
नई ददल्ली, 9 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1022.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj बीबीएमबी ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
]चंडीगढ़-I ds iapkV (
39/2019) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-23012/27/2019-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 9th June, 2025
S.O. 1022.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 39/2019) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
Ms. BBMB and their workmen received by the Central Government on 16/05/2025
[No. L-23012/27/2019– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR
COURT-I, CHANDIGARH.
Present: Sh. Brajesh Kumar Gautam, Presiding Officer,
Chandigarh.
ID No. 39/2019
Registered On: 21.06.2019
Sukh Ram S/o Sh. Nant Ram, Village Dhar PO Chuhar Police Station, Tehsil
Sundernagar, Mandi (HP)-175001.
...........Workman
Versus
1.The Chairman Bhakra Beas Management Board, Madhya Mark, Sector 19-B, Chandigarh-160001.
2.The Chief Engineer, Bhakra Beas Management Board, BSL Project, Sundernagar-175018.
.......Managements
AWARD
Passed On: 05.05.2025
Present Industrial Dispute was registered on the basis of reference order received from the Government of
India, Ministry of Labour vide notification No. L-23012/27/2019-IR(CM-II) dated 31.05.2019, under clause (d) of
Sub-Section (1) sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (hereinafter called
the Act), has referred the following Industrial dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal:-
―Whether the action of management of BBMB is not accepting the demand of Shri Sukh Ram S/o Shri Nant
Ram for deeming/ considering him in continuous service upto age of superannuation and resultantly entitled
for consequential benefits is legal, just and valid? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled to
and from which date?‖
1.During the pendency of the proceedings before this Tribunal the case was fixed for filing affidavit/ adducing
evidence by workman but none is responding on behalf of workman. It is submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the
management that workman is not turning up since long and prayed for dismissal of the present claim petition.
2. Perused the file and it is found that since 01.03.2024 till now none is appearing on behalf of Workman. Several
opportunities have already been given to the workman to file affidavit/ adduce evidence but of no use. It denotes that
the workman is not interested in adjudication of the matter on merits as such, this Tribunal is left with no choice
4360
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
except to pass a ‗No Claim Award‘. Accordingly, no claim award is passed in the present case for the non-
prosecution of workman. File after completion be consigned in the record room.
3. Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17 of the
ID Act, 1947.
B.K. GAUTAM, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 9 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1023.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj एजडिनल डायरेक्टर सेंरल गोवेमेंट हेल्थ स्ट्कीम ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdaksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp]
vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
]चंडीगढ़-I ds
iapkV (
129/2014) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk
FkkA
[सं.
-42012/136/2014-
-(डीयू)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 9th June, 2025
S.O. 1023.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 129/2014) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
Ms. Additional Director, Central Govt. Health Scheme and their workmen received by the Central Government
on 15/04/2025
[No. L-42012/136/2014-IR (DU)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH.
Presiding Officer: Sh. Brajesh Kumar Gautam (H.J.S.)
ID No. 129/2014
Registered on 18.11.2014
Jindal S/o Sh. Satpal C/o Sh. R.K. Gautam, H.No.1460, Sector 61,
Chandigarh-160061.
...........Workman
Versus
The Additional Director, Central Government Health Scheme,
Fourth Floor, Kendriya Sadan, Sector 9-A, Chandigarh-160009.
........Respondent
Sh. R.K. Gautam AR for Workman
Sh. Brijeshwar Singh Kanwar AR for Management
Judgment reserved on 21st March, 2025
Judgment Pronounced on 3rd April, 2025
JUDGMENT/ AWARD
1.Central Government vide Notification No. L-42012/136/2014-IR(DU) dated 11.11.2014, under clause (d) Sub-
Section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act), had
referred the following Industrial dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal:- ―
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4361
Whether the action of the management of Additional Director, Central Govt. Health Scheme, Chandigarh in
terminating the services of Sh. Jindal S/o Sh. Satpal w.e.f. 02.06.2014 is valid, just and legal? If not to what
relief the concerned workman is entitled to and from which date?
2. The case of Workman/Petitioner- In pursuance of above Reference the workman filed his statements of claim
which unfolded following facts revealing the present industrial dispute. The applicant-workman was appointed as
computer operator on 07.03.2008 on daily wages basis by the Management after taking interview in a regular process
of selection in response to the public notice for appointment. He was posted in the office of Central Government
Health Scheme, Sector 34, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred as CGHS) and later on, in the year of 2011 the office was
shifted to Kendriya Sadan Building, Sector 9, Chandigarh. The applicant worked continuously without any break
from 07.03.2008 and management had passed various orders for extension in his service from time to time w.e.f.
07.03.2008 up to 2014 and his services were illegally terminated on 02.06.2014 without passing any written order.
The applicant-workman had rendered 240 days of his service before terminating his services illegally by the
management. The applicant workman is a Muster Roll employee and was engaged on daily wage basis and the
attendance of the applicant-workman was recorded alongwith the other staff namely Sh. R.K. Sikroria, V.P. Singh,
Gurtej Singh, Deepak Chandra, Yog Raj Mahajan and Dharam Singh of the Department. The applicant was also
performing the duties of LDC and field works as assigned by the management from time to time and other
miscellaneous works. It is stated that the work and conduct of the applicant-workman was very good and no
complaint or explanation was taken against the workman within his tenure of service w.e.f. 07.03.2008 to 31.05.2014.
There was a Sunday on 01.06.2014 and from 02.06.2014 the applicant was not permitted to perform his duty. That the
junior persons namely Sh. Deepak and Mrs. Babita Rana and various other persons were retained at the time of
terminating the service of the workman by way of unfair labour practice. The workman was working under the
supervision of management from more than six years. The impugned order directly hit by the provisions of Section
25-F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. That the work of the
workman is of permanent in nature. No notice, no pay in lieu of notice, no charge sheet was issued to the workman
and no enquiry was conducted and no retrenchment compensation was given to the workman. During the conciliation
proceedings of demand notice workman was willing to join the duty but management did not agree to do so. The
workman has become over age and could not get job anywhere and he is not gainfully employed. The workman was
not paid his salary as per the D.C. rates nor as per the rates notified by the Central Government in the official Gazette.
The workman had worked for the month of May, 2014 but the management only paid Rs.9342/- for 18 days only
through a cheque No. 699911 dated 03.09.014 during the pendency of conciliation proceedings. The workman also
prepared a calculation sheet of illegal deductions from the salary on the basis of D.C. Rates including the salary of
13 days for the month of May, 2014. The management had withheld the amount of Rs.1,43,446.84/- as per calculation
chart to which workman is entitled. That on 05.02.2015 an amount of Rs.16,608/- was paid as arrears of salary for the
period from November, 2013 to January, 2014 which was accepted by the workman. Since 2008 no regular
appointment was made by the management but the management has kept Ex. Servicemen from Defence and retiree
from State Govt./ Central Govt. on contractual basis by way of unfair labour practice. That the persons namely Sh.
Dharam Singh (Sweeper) and Sh. Vijay Pal Singh (UDC) are above 60 years and retained in service in the
Management and the regular sanctioned post is lying vacant and same is not filling as per rules and has adopted noble
method to keep person on contract. The management is competent to make regular appointment in the Department for
all types of posts as per circular dated 13.09.203 issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, New Delhi.
The termination of services of applicant-workman w.e.f. 02.06.2014 is illegal unjust, unwarranted, arbitrary and in
violation of mandatory provisions of ID Act which may be set aside and workman may be reinstated with back wages
by adjudicating the reference in favor of workman.
3. The case of Respondent-Management-In response to notice issued the Respondent-Management appeared
and filed its written statement/ reply to the claim petition of workman. According to case of management CGHS
Department is not an Industry as defined in Section 2 (j) of Industrial Dispute Act. It is performing duty of Welfare of
Health of the Employees of Central Government which is a Sovereign Function. The function of department is not
connected with generation of revenue for Industrial purpose and there is no work profile where any kind of labour
force is employed. Providing Health Services does not constitute an Industry. The further case of the Respondent has
been that the reference of Ministry was challenged before Hon‘ble Punjab & Haryana High Court by filing CWP
No.14047 of 2015 which was disposed of by the Hon‘ble High Court and it was observed in its order dated
20.07.2015 that labour court had to decide the question/ objection viz-a-viz the management being an Industry or not.
According to respondent the basic condition for raising an Industrial Dispute- Employer-Employee relationship is
missing in present case. It is stated by respondent in its written statement that averments made in claim petition of
workman Jindal are misleading and not correct. It has been pointed out giving details of the sanctioned staff position
and working staff positions in Paragraph 4 of the written statement. According to respondent there was no sanctioned
post for computer operator. Additional Director has no power of creation of any post. The claimant has never been
appointed and assigned any type of duties as is being claimed by him as a computer operator. It is also stated that date
of birth of claimant is 17.09.1980and he had already completed 28 years when he got registered himself with
Regional Employment Exchange, Chandigarh. It is stated that claimant used to come with Ex-Additional Director as
his personal peon and was working for the same and was never engaged in any kind of official work of the
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Department. The workman Jindal was never appointed on any contract basis or on any other sanctioned post. It is also
stated that no advertisement or any interview was ever issued for appointment to the post of computer operator and no
such appointment letter was issued and given to complainant. It is specifically stated that the office of respondent had
got no power of any financial or any kind of sanction for the post of computer operator and if any payment or any
record of attendance was marked it was understanding between the then Ex-Additional Director and the claimant and
the office of respondent had no relationship with the workman and his engagement if any was purely personal to the
then Ex-Additional Director. According to respondent payment made were from the head of miscellaneous Financial
Powers assigned to Additional Director. In further reply the respondent has completely denied the claim of workman.
According to respondent Ms. Babita Rani was engaged through outsourcing by Ministry of Information and
Technology, National Informatic Center, Delhi not by the Department and her salary was also been paid by the
outsourcing agency not by this office. Deepak Chandra an Ex-Servicemen was contractually appointed on the post of
Peon against vacant sanctioned post arise due to resign of Sh. MS. Negi the Ex-Peon through Zila Sainik Board. The
department never gave any assurance to the workman for appointment or regularization and also had not debarred him
to apply for any other job. There is no sanctioned post of computer operator and no public notice/ advertisement was
given by these office, no interview was conducted, no appointment letter was issued. According to respondent the
claim petition of workman Jindal deserves to be dismissed.
4.Issues: On the basis of pleadings of the parties following issues were framed vide order dated 25.04.2018 to be
decided in the present case-
i.Whether there is no relationship of employer and employee
between the parties?
ii.Whether the management does fall within the definition of the
industry as defined under Section 2-J of the Act. Whether the
reference is not legally maintainable?
iii.In terms of reference.
5.During hearing of the case the workman Jindal himself has got examined
as Witness No.1 and during his evidence certain documents were brought
on record and were marked as Exhibits as follows:
Sr.
No.
Documents
Exhibit
1.
Copy of True photocopies of details of wages paid to the workman for the
month of February 2014 and March 2014.
Ex. W-1 &
2.
Copy of Order of Ministry of Health & Welfare dated 07.04.2014
Ex. W-2
3.
Copy of part paid salary to workman on
Ex. W-3
16.09.2014
4.
Copy of Failure Report dated 26.09.2014
Ex. W-5
5.
Copy of Attendance record for the
period from 01.06.2013 to 30.04.2014
Ex. W-6 to
Ex.W-16
6.
Copy of Appointment Letter of Sh.
Mohan Singh
Ex. W-17
7.
Copy of Appointment Letter of Sh.
Deepak Chandra
Ex. W-18
8.
Copy of Letter dated 24.11.2015 for
implementation of Judgment dated
10.03.2015 of CWP No.4196 of 2014
Ex.W-19
9.
Copy of Civil Writ Petition vide CWP
No.4196 of 2014
Ex.W-20
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4363
6.During hearing of the case of the For Management one witness namely Gurteg Singh, LDC (CC), CGHS,
Chandigarh got examined as Management Witness No.1 and during his evidence certain documents were brought on
record and were marked as Exhibits as follows:
Sr.
No.
Documents
Annexure/
Exhibits
1.
Copy of Order dated 11.11.2014
Ex. M-1
2.
Copy of Order dated 20.07.2015
Ex. M-2
3.
Copy of Letter dated 16.11.2001
Ex. M-3
4.
Copy of Letter dated 06.05.2015
Ex. M-4
5.
Copy of Resignation Card 28.03.2008
Ex. M-5
6.
Copy of Order 28.02.2014
Ex. M-6
7.
Copy of Letter 06.02.2014
Ex. M-7
8.
Copy of Letter 27.08.2014
Ex. M-8
9.
Copy of Circular dated 06.05.2015
Ex. M-9
10.
Copy of Rules
Ex. M-10
11.
Copy of Guidelines 07.04.2016
Ex. M-11
12.
Copy of Memorandum dated
13.01.1981
Ex. M-12
13.
Copy of Office Order dated 28.08.2017
Ex. M-13
14.
Copy of Report dated 30.08.2016
Ex. M-14
15.
Copy of Office Order 15.04.2014
Ex. M-15
16.
Copy of Office Order 31.07.2014
Ex. M-16
17.
Copy of Office Order 31.07.2014
Ex. M-17
18.
Copy of Salary/ Wages Register for the
Period of July 2013-2014
Ex. M-18
19.
Copy of Attendance Record for the
period of 2013-15
Ex. M-19
7. Arguments on behalf of Parties: It has been submitted by Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner-
workman that the workman worked continuously without any break since 07.03.2008 till 31.05.2014 but all of sudden
he was not permitted to perform his duties from 02.06.2014. The workman had already completed 240 days of service
and thus his termination is against the provisions of Section 25 F, ID Act as neither he has been paid any retrenchment
compensation nor any notice was given before terminating his services. It is also argued that the management has kept
fresh persons on daily wages which is against the provision of Section 25 H of ID Act. It is further argued that other
employees Junior to workman specifically Sh. Deepak, Ms. Babita Rana have been retained and this way the order of
termination is further violative of provisions contained in Section 25 G of the ID Act. It is argued that termination of
services is an example of unfair labour practice. No opportunity was given before terminating his services, no
enquiry, no charge sheet has been served and no retrenchment compensation has been paid or offered. It is also argued
that the specific contention raised by workman vide Paragraph 7 of his claim petition that the nature of engagement of
workman was permanent and same is still in existence, has not been denied in the written statement/ Reply of
Management. It is also argued that only in order to evade legal responsibility and to justify illegal termination of
services management has taken a wrong plea that workman was personal staff of the then Additional Director and that
the respondent CGHS Department is not an Industry. It has been argued that if workman was personal staff why and
how payment has been made from management account. It is further argued by Ld. Counsel for Workman that the
witness of management Sh. Gurteg Singh had contradicted himself in the cross examination as he stated against his
own case and therefore, he was not trustworthy or credible. It is also argued that deliberately the management
withheld a relevant documents which were asked by filing an application and a false pretext was taken by the
management that those documents are weeded out. The action on the part of management in illegally terminating
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
services of workman is against the settled principle of law and same is liable to be corrected by ordering the
management to reinstate the workman on the same post with back wages and all consequential reliefs. Ld. Counsel for
the workman has placed his reliance on following case laws reported as- 1978 (2) SCC 213 titled as Bangalore Water
Supply Versus A. Rajappa & Ors, 2005 (5) SCC 1 titled as State of U.P. Versus Jai Bir Singh, 2008 (13) SCC 248
titled as Rajasthan Lalit Kala Academy Versus Radhey Sham, 2009 (5) SLR 329 titled as Municipal Council Samana
Versus Radha Rani & Ors. (Judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court), 2010 (3) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma
Versus Executive Engineer Public Health Division, 2012 (4) S.C.T. 645 titled as The Principal Chief Conservator of
Forest & Anr. Versus Ram Karan & Anr., 2017 (2) CLR 733 titled as HP State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.
Versus Presiding Judge & Anr.
8. Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party (CGHS) Chandigarh submitted that a false claim has been set up
by the workman without any supporting document according to him there was no sanction post of Computer Operator
and at no point of time any public notice of vacancy against computer operator post was ever advertised or any
selection process conducted. The workman has not filed any document showing any interview letter or his selection or
appointment to the said post. It is further argued that the calculation sheet for claiming certain amount is self created
sheet prepared by workman and that cannot be relied upon no payment has been made by the CGHS Department
officially to workman. It is also argued that opposite party CGHS Department is not an Industry. It is argued that in
the replication the workman vide his paragraph 2 of replication has contradicted his own claim statement when he
states that his name was sponsored by Employment Exchange, whereas in the claim petition he has stated that he was
selected in a regular process of selection against the computer operator post. It is argued that there cannot be
comparison between other staffs namely Ms. Babita as said Babita is an outsourced employee and her salary is paid
by I.T. Ministry, while arguing on a document which shows deferment of payment of workman alongwith other
employees it has been pointed out that the letter is only a noting or nothing more than that the documents are not
official documents and these have not been proved by calling the authority It is also argued that even the document
purported to be muster roll attendance is not official one and it is self created which is denied by the opposite party.
According to Ld. Counsel for the aforesaid party (the Management) a letter dated 07.04.2014 which is Ex.W-3 was
got signed by Additional Director as a result of certain concealment and misrepresentations by officials which upon
detection of misrepresentation was cancelled vide another letter dated 15.04.2014 (Ex.M-15). According to Ld.
Counsel the order dated 15.04.2014 was not challenged anywhere whereby the appointment made by misleading the
Additional Director was cancelled. It is also pointed out that the claim of workman is not based upon appointment
letter dated 07.04.2014 and even the employee who had mislead in getting signed that letter dated 07.04.2014 was
also dispensed with the official duty on 31.07.2014. It has been also argued that the Exhibit M-18 series are pay bill
documents and these documents are related to those employees who were working at the relevant time at CGHS
Department and in these documents name of workman Jindal does not figure. So, it is clear that the workman Jindal
was neither an employee of the Department nor he was at any point of time was given appointment. The Ld. Counsel
has argued that merely because a reference has been sent for an adjudication before this Tribunal does not mean that
there was an appointment of the workman and only termination aspect has to be examined, according to Ld. Counsel
a reference has to be decided on each and every factual aspect including whether the workman was an employee of
the Department at any point of time or not, according to Ld. Counsel since there has been no sanctioned post for
Computer operator there was no question of any appointment given to workman on this post. It is also argued that
document Ex.M-5 shows that a renewal with exchange employment office of the workman was done and if the
workman was already employed as is being claimed there was no occasion to renewal of registration with exchange
employment office. Ld. Counsel for the opposite party has placed his reliance upon following decisions- 2001 (9)
SSC 713 titled as State of Gujrat Versus Pratamsing Narsinh Parmar, 2005 (5) SCC 1 titled as State of U.P. Versus Jai
Bir Singh, CWP-13557 of 2019 titled as Satbir Singh Versus Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Ors., 2004 (8) SSC
195 titled as Municipal Corporation Faridabad Versus Siri Niwas, Civil Appeal No.4468 of 2005 titled as Ranip
Nagar Palika Versus Babuji Gabhaji Thakore and Ors., 2016 (1) SCT 392 titled as Satinder Kumar Sharma Versus
State of Haryana and Ors., 2006 (4) SCT 284 titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University Lucknow U.P. Versus
Akhilesh Kumar Khare and Anr., 2022 (1) SCT 626 titled as Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation Versus Kalawati Pandurang Fulzele, 1992 (4) SCC 432 Union of India Versus Deep Chand Pandey.
According to Ld. Counsel for the management no case has been made for any relief as is prayed in the claim petition
and the present reference may be decided againstthe workman and his claim may be rejected.
FINDINGS
9. As noted hereinabove three issues- on the point of relationship of employer-employee, on the point whether
opposite party falls in the definition of Industry and the terms of reference itself were framed vide order dated
25.04.2018. The issue No.I and Issue No.III are interconnected and therefore these are taken together for adjudication
first. As per the claim statement of workman he was appointed as a computer operator and has worked as such since
07.03.2008 on daily wage basis. The workman has claimed that his appointment was on the basis of a regular process
of selection after taking his interview and this was done in pursuance of a public notice of appointment but it may be
noticed that in the entire proceeding the workman has failed to produce any letter of appointment or any interview call
letter or any public advertisement to the post of computer operator which was duly applied and a regular selection
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4365
process was conducted by the opposite parties CGHS Department. A document which has been marked as Ex.W-3
produced on behalf of workman is a letter dated 07.04.2014 which shows that Sh. Jindal (the workman) alongwith
one Sh. Yog Raj Mahajan were engaged w.e.f. 01.04.2014 for the work of computer operator and bill clerk
respectively, in pursuance of Deputy Commissioner order dated 18.07.2013. Barely after a week of this letter another
letter dated 15.04.2014 has been issued by the office of Additional Director CGHS, Chandigarh cancelling order
dated 07.04.2014, which has been brought on the record on behalf of management as Ex.M-15. This letter shows that
the letter dated 07.04.2014 (Ex.W-3) was got issued because the establishment Branch Incharge (RKS) mislead the
additional director without placing of relevant record as there was no sanctioned post of Bill Clerk and Computer
Operator in the office of Additional Director CGHS, Chandigarh. Consequent upon letter dated 15.04.2014 the
services of Sh. Y.R. Mahajan and Sh. Jindal were came to an end from the month of May, 2014. The establishment
Branch was also directed not to put any file without supporting document. The case of management has been that in
the Chandigarh Office no post for computer operator were sanctioned and the workman Sh. Jindal was not an
employee of the CGHS Office. The workman Sh. Jindal was a personal staff of Ex. Additional Director and if any
payment or record of attendance has been marked these are only an interse agreement and understanding between the
workman and the Ex. Additional Director the claimant. The workman could not produce any document which may
show that post of Computer Operator is a sanctioned post and he had participated in selection process when the said
post was advertised. In the replication against the written statement the workman has himself contradicted in
Paragraph 2 when he states that he was engaged as Computer Operator since 07.03.2008 on daily wage basis after his
name was sponsored by Employment Exchange. In the main claim petition selection through a regular process of
selection after holding any interview is stated. These two contradictory statements creates doubt so far as claim of
initial appointment of workman Sh. Jindal is concerned. Remarkably after appointment through official letter dated
07.04.2014 and its cancellation vide another letter dated 15.04.2015 the order of cancellation was never challenged
anywhere. It may be understood that certain financial powers are vested with the post of additional director and he is
empowered to pay some amount exercising his miscellaneous financial power. Only because some payment have
been received by Workman Sh. Jindal through Ex. Additional Director, he cannot be treated as appointee of the
CGHS Office. The CGHS Office is a public office run and controlled by Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and
any appointment in that office should always be done through public advertisement, otherwise the appointment shall
be considered as back door entry. In the case in hand it appears that because of acquaintance of Sh. Jindal with Ex.
Additional Director of the office he made his route to the office and is claiming so called appointment but without any
supporting document. Although in support of engagement and duty performed by workman some of the document
which are marked as Ex.W-1 , Ex. W-2, Ex.W-6 to Ex,.W-16 have been brought on record on behalf of workman.
Ex.W-1 & Ex.W-2 are two documents are certain notings which shows that due to paucity of funds named staff
appointed on daily wages were paid for less amount than to what they entitled but these two documents are
vehemently denied by the opposite party on the ground that this is neither official bill for payment nor it has been sent
anywhere and it is only official note created by the office which is not authentic document. So far as Ex.W-6 to
Ex.W-16 are concerned these are those documents which appears extract of Muster Roll in respect of daily attendance
but none of this document appears signed by office incharge or by the workman Sh. Jindal and only a remark of some
verification is there but who was the person who verified these attendance is not clear. These documents only show
that Mr. Jindal the workman has been given some illegitimate support by these documents although there is no proof
for his initial appointment on the post as he is claiming. The two other documents which have been brought on record
as Ex.W-17 and Ex.W-18 or those letters issued to one Sh. Mohan Singh and Sh. Deepak Chandra intimating them
appointment on contractual basis after holding interview. These two letter cannot be helpful in any way to the
workman Jindal as Jindal could not produced any such letter of appointment on the basis of which he was given
appointment in the year 2008 as he claims. It further appears that some of the employees who were appointed on
contractual basis had filed Writ Petition before Hon‘ble Punjab & Haryana High Court and Hon‘ble High Court has
directed consideration of regularization of those contractual staff as per relevant rules but remarkably in the list of
petitioners there are seven persons but the workman Jindal has not been anyone of those 7 petitioner or there is no
record to show that he had filed any separate Writ Petition before the Hon‘ble High Court claiming his regularization.
Had Mr. Jindal being also one of the appointee, akin to other petitioners, certainly he would have filed Writ Petition
alongwith 7 petitioners but there is no such claim on behalf of workman Jindal. On the prayer of workman Sh. Jindal
management has produced documents related to payment of salary to the employees of CGHS Office which are
marked as Exhibit for M-18 Series in these pay bills name of workman Mr. Jindal does not appear, meaning thereby
alongwith other employees he was not getting any remuneration from the CGHS Office. A part from it one document
being Ex.M-5 is also produced on the record and this document is not denied by workman. This document Ex.M-5 is
copy of registration card of workman Sh. Jindal with Regional Employment Exchange, Chandigarh. It shows that
initial registration was in the year 2002 and same has been renewed on 28.03.2008. If workman Sh. Jindal was
already appointed as Computer Operator on 07.03.2008, there appears no need to get the registration renewed on
28.03.2008 as normally a person who is employed need not to get renew his registration with employment exchange
office. Apart from it I have already mentioned that in the replication to the written statement of management the
workman has contradicted his claim by stating that he got the job as sponsored by Employment Exchange but again
no document is filed supporting this claim. If this was the fact there was no need to get the registration with
employment exchange as renewed which is done only for an unemployed person recommended by Regional
4366
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Exchange Office. A point of not providing any opportunity before terminating the services has been raised
vehemently on behalf of workman but in the present case the workman has failed to prove that infact he was an
employee of the opposite party CGHS Office and in above view of the matter it is held that there was no relationship
of employer and employee between the workman and the opposite party. If a person is not appointed there is no
question of his termination and thus it is held that the workman Sh. Jindal is not entitled for any relief.
10. While dealing the Issue No.I & III, it has been held that there was no relationship between employee and
employer between the parties and the workman is not entitled to any relief and therefore, issue No.II as to whether the
opposite party CGHS Office comes within definition of Industry or not need not to be decided separately.
11. In the light of discussion made hereinabove and in the facts and circumstances of the present case the Reference
No. L-42012/136/2014-IR(DU) dated 11.11.2014 is decided against the workman Sh. Jindal and it is held that he is
not entitled for any relief.
12.It is therefore-
ORDERED
That the present ID No.129/2014 titled as Jindal Vs CGHS arising out of Reference No. L-42012/136/2014-IR(DU)
dated 11.11.2014 is dismissed and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
13.Let copy of this award be sent to the Appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the Act
for publication.
Dated: 03.04.2025 B.K. GAUTAM, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 9 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1024.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947(1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa]
dsUnzh; ljdkj बीबीएमबी ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
]चंडीगढ़-2 ds iapkV
(
81/2018) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk
FkkA
[सं. एल-23012/160/2018-vkbZ-vkj-lh-एम-II]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 9th June, 2025
S.O. 1024.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 81/2018) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh-2 as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
Ms. BBMB and their workmen received by the Central Government on 22/04/2025
[No. L-23012/160/2018-IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
In the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II, Chandigarh
(Presided over by Mr. Kamal Kant).
ID No.81/2018
Registered on:-11.12.2018
Smt. Sunki Devi Wd/o Sh. Devi Singh and Others (LRs of the deceased workman Devi Singh S/o Sh. Negi
Ram) R/o Village Durghat, PO Jejwin, Tehsil Jhandutta, Distt. Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh.
------------- Applicants
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4367
Versus
1. The Chairman, Bhakra Beas Management Board, Madhya Marg, Sector 19-B, Chandigarh, 160019.
2. The Chief Engineer, Bhakra Beas Management Baord, BSL Project, Sundernagar, 175038.
-----------Respondents
Present:-
Mr. S C Gupta, AR for Workman.
Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Law Officer for respondent no.1 and 2.
Award : 03.04.2025
Central Government vide Notification No.L-23012/160/2018(IR(CMII) dated 22.11.2018 under clause (d) of
sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(hereinafter called the Act), has referred the
following industrial dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal:-
"Whether the action of management of BBMB in not accepting the demands of Smt. Sunki Devi &
Others Wd/o Late Devi Singh for declaringhisretrenchment/ termination as illegal and considering
him in continuous service upto age of superannuation resulting in entitlement of consequential
benefits is legal, just and valid. If not, to what relief the legal heirs/legal representatives of late
workman are entitled to and from which date?"
1.
The matter is fixed for filing affidavit by the applicants since 16.10.2024. However, the same was not
filed despite availing several opportunities. Today also, no affidavit of applicants has been filed.
2.
Since the applicants, despite availing several opportunities, have not filed their affidavit to prove their
case against the respondents, this Tribunal is left with no choice, except to pass a 'No Claim Award'. Accordingly, 'No
Claim Award' is passed in the present reference.
3.
Let copy of this award be sent to the Appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the ID Act
for publication.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 9 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1025.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागृुर ds iapkV (
11/2019-20) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/37/2019-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 9th June, 2025
S.O. 1025.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 11/2019-20) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
M/s. WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/04/2025.
[No. L-22012/37/2019– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
4368
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOURT COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/11/2019-20 Date: 07.04.2025.
Party No.1:
The Area General Manager,
Western Coalfields Limited,
Chandrapur Area,
Chandrapur(MS)- 442 401.
:
The Sub Area Manager,
Durgapur Open cast Mines,
Western Coalfields Ltd., Post: Urjanagar,
Distt.- Chandrapur-442401.
Versus
Party No.2:
Shri Pravin Homdas Upare
Ex-security guard (Trainee),
Bhatadi, Post: Bhatadi, Tah & Distt.
Chandrapur(MS)- 442401.
AWARD
(Dated: 07th April, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of Western coalfields Limited and their workman, Shri
Pravin Homdas Upare, for adjudication, as per letter No.L-22012/37/2019-IR (CM) dated 08.05.2019, with the
following schedule:-
―Whether the action of the management of WCL through the Area General Manager, Chandrapur
Area Chandrapur and the Sub Area Manager WCL, Durgapur Open Cast Mines, Post. Urjanagar,
Distt. Chandrapur in terminating the services of the applicant Shri Pravin Homdas Upare, Ex-security
guard w.e.f. 18.12.2017 is just, fair and legal? If not whether the demand of applicant that he should
be reinstate on the post of trainee security guard with continuity of services alongwith the full back
wages from the date of termination i.e. 18.12.2017 is just fair and legal? If yes to what relief the
applicant is entitled to?‖
2.
On receipt of the reference, parties were noticed to file their respective statement of claim and written
statement, in response to which, the workman Shri Pravin Homdas Upare, (―the workman‖ in short) filed the
statement of claim and the management of Westen coalfields Limited (―party no.1‖ in short) filed the written
statement. Workman filed his rejoinder as well as evidence on affidavit.
3. Meanwhile, today learned counsel for the petitioner filed an application for taking the case on today‘s board.
Though, the case was listed on 13.06.2025, but looking the facts and circumstances of the case and being
compromise in between the parties the case is taken on today‘s board and considered for passing the award.
Both parties have settled the dispute amicably in terms and conditions mentioned in the memo of
compromise signed by both the parties.
Hence, it is ordered:-
ORDER
―The reference is answered in favour of the workman in terms of the settlement mentioned in the
memo of compromise. The memo of settlement dated 07.04.2025 is made part of the award.‖
Justice (Retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4369
नई ददल्ली, 9 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1026.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागृुर ds iapkV (
19/2019-20) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/60/2019-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 9th June, 2025
S.O. 1026.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 19/2019-20) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/04/2025
[No. L-22012/60/2019– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/19/2019-20
Date: 03.04.2025.
Party No.1:
The Mines Manager,
Western Coalfields Limited,
Saoner Mine No.2, Tah. Saoner, Distt
Nagpur-441107
V/s.
Party No.2:
1) Shri Suresh Purushottam
R/o WCL Saoner Mine, Shakti Nagar,
Qtr. No. 92/6, Tah. Saoner,
Distt – Nagpur – 441107.
2) The General Secretary,
Lal Zanda Coal Mines Mazdoor Union (CITU),
Branch: Saoner, Nagpur Area, Tah. Saoner,
Nagpur - 441107
AWARD
(Dated: 03rd April, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of Western Coalfields Limited and their workman Shri
Suresh Purushottam for adjudication, as per letter No. L-22012/60/2019 (IR(CM-II)) dated 10.07.2019, with the
following schedule:-
―Whether the action of the management of Western Coalfields Ltd., Saoner Mine No. 2, Tah. Saoner,
Distt. Nagpur in dismissing the service of the workman Shri Suresh Purushottam is just fair &
legal ? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
4370
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
2. Case is called out. Both the parties are absent. Both parties are not responding and attending the Court since
21.11.2019. No statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner till date. No other evidence has been adduced by
the petitioner to prove his case. Petitioner is not coming to the Court since long back. It appears that he is not
interested to contest the case further more. Claim of the petitioner is not proved. So, it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
ORDER
The action of the management of Western Coalfields Ltd., Saoner Mine No. 2, Tah. Saoner, Distt.
Nagpur in dismissing the service of the workman Shri Suresh Purushottam is just fair & legal. The workman is
not entitled to any relief.
Justice (Retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 9 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1027.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागृुर ds iapkV (
36/2016-17) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/81/2016-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 9th June, 2025
S.O. 1027.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 36-2016-17) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
M/s. WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/04/2025
[No. L-22012/81/2016– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/36/2016-17
Date: 01.04.2025.
Party No.1:
1) The General Manager,
Western Coalfields Limited,
Wani North Area of WCL, Post-Ukni,
Tehsil-Wani, Distt. Yavatmal,
Yavatmal (M.S)-445304.
2) The Sub Area Manager,
Pimpalgaon O/c Mines, Wani North Area of WCL
Post-Ukni, Tehsil-Wani, Distt. Yavatmal,
Yavatmal (M.S)-445304.
V/s.
Party No.2:
Shri Surendra Nilkant Khutemate,
Ex-Employee, R/o Pimpir(De), Tahsil-Bhadrawati,
Distt. Chandrapur,
Chandrapur (M.S)-442902.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4371
AWARD
(Dated: 01st April, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of Western Coalfields Limited. and their workman Shri
Surendra Nilkanth Khutemate for adjudication, as per letter No. L-22012/81/2016 (IR(CM-II)) dated 07.03.2017, with
the following schedule:- ―
―Whether the action of the Management of WCL through its Sub Area Manager, Pimpalgaon
O/c Mines, Wani North Area, Western Coalfields Limited, Post Ukni, Tah: Wani, Dist: Yavatmal in
termination of service w.e.f. 26/12/2000 and demand in reinstatement with continuity of service
alongwith back wages of the Applicant Shri Surendra Nilkanth Khutemate, Ex-Worker is fair, just or
legal ? If not, what relief the concerned workman is entitled to?‖
2. Case is called out. Shri Pushkar Ghare, Learned Counsel has filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of respondent
today in Court, which is taken on record. But none is present on behalf of petitioner. Only today, Learned Counsel for
the respondent is present before the Court. Earlier before, since 23.03.2020, both the parties are not responding and
attending the Court. Although statement of claim and written statement have been filed by the parties respectively and
petitioner has filed his affidavit in support of the contents of claim. But petitioner has not come before the Court to
support the contention alleged in the statement of claim as well as affidavit filed by him. No other evidence has been
filed by the petitioner till today. Petitioner is not attending the Court since long back. It appears that petitioner is not
interested to contest the case further more. Claim of the petitioner is not proved. So, it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
ORDER
The action of the Management of WCL through its Sub Area Manager, Pimpalgaon O/c Mines, Wani
North Area, Western Coalfields Limited, Post Ukni, Tah: Wani, Dist: Yavatmal in termination of service w.e.f.
26/12/2000 is fair, just & legal and demand in reinstatement with continuity of service alongwith back wages of
the Applicant Shri Surendra Nilkanth Khutemate, Ex-Worker is unfair, unjust or illegal. The workman is not
entitled to any relief.
(Justice (Retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 9 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1028.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागृुर ds iapkV (
04/2023-24) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/28/2023-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 9th June, 2025
S.O. 1028.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 04/2023-24) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/04/2025.
[No. L-22012/28/2023– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
4372
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/04/2023-24
Date: 07.04.2025.
Party No.1:
The General Manager,
Majri Area of WCL,
PO – Kuchna, Tah,
Bhadrawati, Distt.
Chandrapur – 442503.
V/s.
Party No.2:
The Rashtriya Koyla Khadan Mazdoor Sangh,
WCL Hq Complex, Talankhedi Road,
Civil Lines, Nagpur – 440001.
AWARD
(Dated: 07th April, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of WCL, and their applicant Shri. Kuldip S Gadge Son
of deceased employee Sangita S. Gadge for adjudication, as per letter No. L-22012/28/2023 (IR(CM-II)) dated
31.03.2023, with the following schedule:-
―Whether action of the management of Western Coalfields Limited in not providing dependent
employee to Shri Kuldip S. Gadge Son of deceased employee Sangita S. Gadge, Ex.Clerk is legal and
justified . If not, what relief the union/applicant is entitled to?‖
2.
Case is called out. Both parties are absent. Petitioner has filed application under Section 36(4) of the ID Act,
which is pending for disposal. But none is present to press on this application. Therefore, this application dated
15.05.2023 is hereby rejected being not pressed. Petitioner as well as respondent have not filed their statement of
claim and written statement respectively till today. Petitioner has not filed any evidence to prove his case. Petitioner is
not coming to the Court since long back. It appears that he is not interested to contest the case further more. Claim of
the petitioner is not proved. So, it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered.
ORDER
The action of the management of Western Coalfields Limited in not providing dependent employee to
Shri Kuldip S. Gadge Son of deceased employee Sangita S. Gadge, Ex.Clerk is legal and justified. The union/
applicant is not entltled to any relif.
Justice (Retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 9 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1029.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागृुर ds iapkV (
01/2023-24) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/25/2023-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4373
New Delhi, the 9th June, 2025
S.O. 1029.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 01/2023-24) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
M/s. WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/04/2025
[No. L-22012/25/2023– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/01/2023-24
Date: 17.04.2025.
Party No.1:
1. The General Manager,
Wani Area of WCL,
PO-Urjagram, Distt.
Chandrapur – 442406.
2. The General Manager,
Wani North Area of WCL,
PO- Bhalar, Tah. – Wani,
Distt. – Yavatmal – 445304.
V/s.
Party No.2:
The Secretary,
Rashtriya Koyla Khadan Mazdoor Sangh,
(INTUC), B-143, WCL Durgapur Colony,
PO – Urjanagar, Chandrapur – 442404.
AWARD
(Dated: 17th April, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of WCL, Wani Area, and their workman Shri. Jatindar
Singh, for adjudication, as per letter No. L-22012/25/2023-IR(CM-II) dated 28.03.2023, with the following schedule:-
―Whether action of the management of WCL (General Manager, Wani Area) in terminating services
of their workman Shri Jatindar Singh, Ex-General Mazdoor is legal and justified . If yes, what relief
the concerned workman is entitled to?‖
2.
Case is called out. Both parties are absent. Both parties are not responding and attending the Court since
31/01/2024. Although, statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner but no written statement has been filed by
the respondent till today. Petitioner has not filed any evidence to prove his claim. Petitioner is not coming to the Court
since long back. It appears that he is not interested to contest the case further more. Claim of the petitioner is not
proved. So, it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered.
ORDER
The action of the management of WCL (General Manager, Wani Area) in terminating services of their
workman Shri Jatindar Singh, Ex-General Mazdoor is legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any
relief.
Justice (Retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
4374
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नई ददल्ली, 11 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1030.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
डीजल लोको आधुजनकीकरण वक्सय ृरटयाला ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V
औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़- I ds iapkV (142/2018) izdkf”kr djrh
gSA
[सं.
-41012/31/2018-
-(बी-I)]
सलोनी, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 11th June, 2025
S.O. 1030.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 142/2018) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Diesel Loco
Modernization Works Patiala and their workmen.
[No. L-41012/31/2018– IR (B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I, CHANDIGARH.
Present: Sh. Brajesh Kumar Gautam, Presiding Officer, Chandigarh.
ID No.142/2018
Registered On: 22.01.2019
Jagdev Singh R/o H.No.272/10, Aman Nagar, Opp. Railway, DMW, Patiala (Punjab)-147001.
...........Workman
Versus
1.
The Chief Personnel Officer, Diesel Loco Modernization Works, Patiala (Punjab)-147001.
2.
Chief Administrative Officer (R), Diesel Loco Modernization Works, Patiala (Punjab)-147001.
........Managements
AWARD
Passed On: 23.05.2025
Present Industrial Dispute was registered on the basis of reference order received from the Government of
India, Ministry of Labour vide notification No. L-41012/31/2018-IR(B-I) dated 24.12.2018, under clause (d) of Sub-
Section (1) sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the
Act), has referred the following Industrial dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal:-
―Whether the action of the management of Diesel Loco Modernization Works, Patiala in termination
the workman Shri Jagdev Singh w.e.f. 23.08.2010 is legal, fiar and justified? If not, what relief the
workman is entitled to and from which date?‖
1.
During the pendency of the proceedings before this Tribunal the case was fixed for filing replication by
workman but none is responding on behalf of workman. It is submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the management that
workman is not turning up since long and prayed for dismissal of the present claim petition.
2.
Perused the file and it is found that since 29.10.2024 till now none is appearing on behalf of Workman.
Several opportunities have already been given to the workman for filing replication but of no use. It denotes that the
workman is not interested in adjudication of the matter on merits as such, this Tribunal is left with no choice except to
pass a ‗No Claim Award‘. Accordingly, no claim award is passed in the present case for the non-prosecution of
workman. File after completion be consigned in the record room.
3.
Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17 of the
ID Act, 1947.
B.K. GAUTAM, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4375
नई ददल्ली, 11 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1031.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
एफ
.
ओ
.
एल
.
जडृो
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
II
ds iapkV (a45/2017) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं.
12025/01/2025-
-(बी-I)-66]
सलोनी, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 11th June, 2025
S.O. 1031.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.45/2017) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
No. II Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of F.O.L. Depot and
their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025– IR (B-I)-66]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM – LABOUR COURT NO. II, NEW DELHI
ID No. 45/2017
Sh. Shiv Singh & 3 Ors. vs. F.O.L. Depot and Others
Sh. Shiv Singh & 3 others
Through Hindustan Engineering & General Mazdoor Union
(Regd. 4479) Head Office: D-2/24, Sultanpuri, Delhi
…Applicants/Claimants
Versus
1. Union of India,
Through Secretary
Ministry of Defence, South Block
New Delhi-01
2. Director General
Army Supply Corporation (A.S.C.)
Sena Bhawan, P.O. Delhi Headquarters
New Delhi-11
3. Commandant, 210, F.O.L. Depot,
A.S.C., Delhi Cantt, New Delhi
… Managements/respondents
Counsels:
For Applicant/ Claimant:
Sh. Kailash Jonwal, Ld. AR.
For Management/ Respondent:
Sh. Atul Bhardwaj, Ld. AR.
Award
30.04.2025
Item No.- 33
I.D. No. 45/2017
30th April 2025
Present:
The claimants in person.
Sh. Atul Bhardwaj, Ld. AR for the management.
All the claimants have filed their affidavits stating that they don‘t want to proceed further with the present
case, as they have been reinstated in their jobs by the management. Their statements have been recorded separately.
4376
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Record perused. The present application has been filed on behalf of Sh. Shiv Singh & 3 other claimants
under section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, where the claimants alleged that their services were
terminated by the management during the pendency of the case bearing I.D. no. 71/2013 titled Sh. Titu Ram &
39 Ors. vs. Ministry of Defense & Ors.
Record perused. It is noted that an award had been passed in the main I.D. no. 71/2013. The AR for the
management admitted that they have filed a writ petition challenging the said award. He also admitted that the
claimants have been reinstated in their jobs after six years.
In view of the statements on record, the application stands dismissed as withdrawn. A copy of this award is
sent to the appropriate government for notification, as required under section 17 of the ID act 1947. The file is
consigned to record room.
ATUL KUMAR GARG, Presiding Officer
Dated 30.04.2025
नई ददल्ली, 11 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1032.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj बी सी सी एल izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सह
–
नंबर 1, धनबाद ds iapkV (
/
) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-20012/73/2010-
-(सी. एम-I)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 11th June, 2025
S.O. 1032.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 21/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court No.1, DHANBAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management
of BCCL, and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 10/06/2025.
[No. L-20012/73/2010 – IR (CM-I)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1,DHANBAD
In the matter of reference U/S 10 (1) (d)& (2A) of I.D.Act. 1947.
Reference Case No. 21/2011
Employer in relation to the management of P.B. Area of M/s. BCCL, Kusunda, Dhanbad.
AND.
Their workman.
Present: Shri Sachindra Kumar Pandey
Presiding Officer
Appearances:
For the Employers :- Smt. Sanchita De, Ld. Advocate.
For the workman. :- None.
State : Jharkhand.
Industry:- Coal
Dated 30/05/2025
AWARD
In exercise of powers conferred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub –section (2A) of Section 10 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),Government Of India through the Ministry of Labour, vide its Order
No.L-20012/73/2010-(IR(CM-I)) dated 05/04/2011 has been pleased to refer the following dispute between the
employer i.e. management of P.B. Area of M/s. BCCL and their workman through Organizing Secretary, Rashtriya
Colliery Mazdoor Sangh, Dhanbad for adjudication by this Tribunal:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4377
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of management of Bhagandh Colliery of M/s BCCL in not regularizing Sri
Amresh Kumar Singh as Accountant is fair and justified? To what relief the concerned workman
areentited?‖
2. On receiving order no. L-20012/73/2010-(IR(CM-I)) dated 05/04/2011 Government of India, Ministry of Labour,
New Delhi for adjudication of the dispute, Reference case no. 21 of 2011 was registered on 25.4.2011 and thereafter
the notices were sent to the parties with a direction to appear and submit their written statements along with relevant
documents in support of their claims and the witnesses.
3. After issuance of notice, though none appeared from both sides previously but Smt. Sanchita De, Ld. Advocate
on 30.05.2025 appeared from the side of the employer and furnished the death certificate of the workman Amresh
Kumar Singh.
4. On perusal of the Xerox copy of death certificate of the workman Amresh Kumar Singh it transpires that the
workman has died on 03.11.2024.
5. It further transpires that the relief as per the reference is personal in nature and therefore the case cannot be
proceeded with due to the death of the workman and therefore, for the ends of justice, this case deserves to be
dismissed.
7. Hence,
ORDERED
that this case is hereby dismissed and a ―No Dispute Award‖ be drawn up in respect of the above reference case.
Let the copies of Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India,
New Delhi for information and notification.
SACHINDRA KUMAR PANDEY, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1033.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय ददनेि कुमार स्ट्वजन जसक्योररटी एजेंसी; मेससय एसआईएस जसक्योररटी एजेंसी; मेससय बीृीसीएल के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री कान्ू चरण ृाइकराय के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक
अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-23/2020) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,
प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं.
-30012/2/2020-आईआर(एम)]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1033.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 23/2020) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s. Dinesh Kumar Swain, Security Agency; M/s. SIS Security Agency; M/s. BPCL and Shri Kanhu
Charan Paikaray which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 12.06.2025.
[No. L-30012/2/2020-IR(M)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT
BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-LabourCourt,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 23/2020
Date of Passing Order – 10th March, 2025
Between :-
1. M/s. Dinesh Kumar Swain, Security Agency,
HIG-194, Kanan Vihar, Patia, Phase-2,
Chanasekharpur, Bhubaneswar, Odisha – 751 031.
4378
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
2. M/s. SIS Security Agency, K-9A, Kalinga Vihar,
Post – Patrapada, P.S. Khandagiri, Khurda,
Odisha – 751 019.
3. The Manager (Operation),
M/s. BPCL, LPG Filling Plant,
Industrial Estate, Khurda, Odisha – 752 057
…
1st Party-Managements.
(And)
Shri Kanhu Charan Paikaray,
S/o. Sh. JudhistiraPikaray, At. Kumar Khatia,
Post – Jatni, Dist. Khurda, Odisha – 752 050.
…
2nd Party-Workman.
Appearances:
None.
…
For the 1st Party-Managements.
None.
…
For the 2nd Party-Workman.
ORDER
In the present case, a reference was received from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry
of Labour & Employment, New Delhi vide order No. L-30012/2/2020 – IR(M), dated 22.07.2020 under clause (d) of
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of a dispute,
under the following schedule:-
―Whether the action of the management of M/s. Dinesh Kumar Swain, Security Agency, Contractor of
BPCL, LPG Plant, Industrial Estate, Khurda by not redeploying Shri Kanhu Charan Paikaray, Security
Guard in his old assignment and without adhering to Section 25-H of the I.D. Act, 1947 is legal and/or
justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
2.
In the reference order, the Under Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment, New
Delhi commanded the parties raising the dispute to file statement of claim, complete with relevant documents, list of
reliance and witnesses with this Tribunal within 15 days of receipt of the reference order and to forward a copy of
such statement of claim to each one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute.
3.
Despite directions so given, no statement of claim is received from the 2nd Party-Workman.
4.
On receipt of the above reference, notice was sent to the 2nd Party-Workman on 05.09.2023 for appearance
and for filing of statement of claim. Neither the postal article sent to the 2nd Party-Workman, referred to above, was
received back nor was it observed by the Tribunal that postal services remained unserved in the period, referred to
above. Therefore, every presumption lies in favour of the fact that the above notices were served upon the 2nd Party-
Workman. Despite service of the notice, the 2nd Party-Workman opted to abstain away from the proceedings. No
claim statement was filed on its behalf. Thus, it is clear that the 2nd Party-Workman is not interested in adjudication of
the reference on merits.
5.
Since the 2nd Party-Workman has neither filed statement of claim nor has led any evidence so as to prove its
cause against the Managements, it is presumed that there is no claim of workman against the Managements.
6.
In view of such, no claim Order is passed by this Tribunal.
7.
Let this order be sent to the appropriate Government, as required under Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, for publication.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH,Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1034.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससय नारायणी जमनरल्स; मेससय ृेंगुइन रेहडग एंड एजेंसीज जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और सुंदरगढ़ माइंस
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4379
एंड रांसृोटय वकयसय यूजनयन के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर,
ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-77/2018) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं.
-26011/12/2018-आईआर(एम)]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1034.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 77/2018) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s. Narayani Minerals; M/s. Penguin Trading & Agencies Ltd. and Sundargarh Mines &
Transport Workers Union which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No. L-26011/12/2018-IR(M)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT
BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 77/2018
Date of Passing Order – 10th March, 2025
Between :-
1. M/s. Narayani Minerals, Contractor,
C/o. Raikela& Tantra iron Mines of
M/s. Penguin Trading & Agencies Ltd.,
At. Raikela, Po. Dengula, District – Sundargarh (Odishha).
2. The Director, M/s. Penguin Trading & Agencies Ltd.,
Raikela& Tantra Iron Mines, At. Raikela,
P.O. Dengula, Dist. Sundargarh, Odisha.
…
1st Party-Managements.
(And)
The General Secretary,
Sundargarh Mines & Transport Workers Union,
At./Po. Koira, Dist. Sundargarh – 770 043.
…
Managements.
Appearances:
None
…
Applicant-Workman.
None
…
For the Managements.
In the present case, a reference was received from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry
of Labour New Delhi vide order No. L-26011/12/2018 – IR(M), dated 30.10.2018 under clause (d) of sub-section (1)
and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of a dispute, under the
following schedule:-
4380
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
―Whether the action of the management of M/s. Naaraayani Minerals, contractor of M/s. Penguin Trading &
Agencies Ltd. at Raikela and Tantra Iron Mines in refusing employment to the workman Shri Gura Munda
is proper, legal & justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
2.
Though the 2nd Party-Union has not appeared before the Tribunal but statement of claim has been filed on
behalf of his behalf on 18.12.2019.
3.
The case of the 2nd party-Union as per the statement of claim is as follows:-
That the disputant Sri Gura Munda joined as a Driver under M/s. Narayani Minerals a Contractor of M/s.
Penguin Trading & Agencies Ltd. with effect from 27.05.2015. He has completed 240 days work in each calendar
year from 27.05.2015 to 25.10.2017, but because of his involvement in union activities he was refused employment
verbally with effect from 25.10.2017 by the Managements. He was neither served with any charge-sheet nor the letter
of termination by the Management. After his termination he approached the Management through Union several
times, but the Managements have not considered the request. Thereafter the Union approached the Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central), Rourkela and on failure of the conciliation proceedings the present reference has been sent
to this Tribunal for adjudication.
He has prayed to answer the present dispute in his favour by passing an award with direction of his
reinstatement into service and for payment of full back wages.
4.
The 1st Party-Management No. 1 & 2 have appeared and took several adjournments for filing of written
statements, but they have not filed their written statements.
5.
When the case was posted for filing of written statement by the Managements the disputant-workman
appeared on 12.06.2024 and filed a petition with a prayer to drop the proceeding as he is not interested to proceed
with the case and to pass necessary orders in closing the case.
6.
Now in this case there is nothing on record except the statement of claim filed on behalf of the 2nd party-
workman, so the workman has failed to prove his own case.
7.
In view of such the reference is answered against the 2nd party-workman
8.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of
the I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH,Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1035.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
भारत ृेरोजलयम कॉृोरेिन जलजमटेड; ृंजाब एक्स-सर्थवसमजन कॉृोरेिन; हरहृदर ृाल हसह जसक्योररटी एजेंसी के प्रबंधतंत्र
के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री सुखदेव हसह के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1,
चंडीगढ़, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-19/2020) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को
सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड -16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-70]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1035.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government
hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 19/2020) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour
Court-1, Chandigarh as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Ltd.; Punjab Ex-Servicemen Corporation; Harpinder Pal Singh Security Agency and
Shri Sukhdev Singh which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 12.06.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-70]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4381
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I, CHANDIGARH.
Presiding Officer: Sh. Brajesh Kumar Gautam.
ID No.19/2020
Registered On:-29.12.2020
Sukhdev Singh S/o Sh. Joginder Singh R/o Village Bathuha, Tehsil Dhuri District Sangrur-148034.
...........Workman
Versus
1.
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Marketing Division Kandla, Jind Road, Jind Orad, Sangrur, Punjab
148001 through its Depot Manager.
2.
Punjab Ex-Servicemen Corporation (PESCO) SCO 89-90, Sector 34-A, Chandigarh 160022 through its
Director.
3.
Harpinder Pal Singh Security Agency, Office: Cabin No.1, 2nd Floor SCO 830, NAC, Manimajra,
Chandigarh (U.T.)-160101 through its Managing Director.
........Respondents
AWARD
Passed On:-23.05.2025
1.
The workman Sh. Sukhdev Singh has directly filed statement of claim under Section 2-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947(hereinafter called the Act), with a prayer to reinstate the workman with back wages.
2.
During the pendency of the proceedings before this Tribunal the case was fixed for submitting service report
of respondent No.3 by Workman but workman is not responding from several dates which denotes that the workman
is not interested in adjudication of the matter on merits.
3.
Since the workman has neither put his appearance since long i.e. from 01.11.2024 till 19.03.2025 and nor he
has led any evidence to prove his cause against the management as such, this Tribunal is left with no choice except to
pass a ‗No Claim Award‘. Accordingly, no claim award is passed in the present case for non-prosecution of the case.
File after completion be consigned in the record room.
4.
Let copy of this award be sent to CentralGovernment for publication as required under Section 17 of the
ID Act, 1947.
B.K. GAUTAM, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1036.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार कमांड गजस एजेंसी के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री चदाराम ईश्वर राव के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय
सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हजदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-59/2015) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं.
-30012/19/2015-आईआर(एम)]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1036.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 59/2015) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Command Gas Agency and Sri Chadaram Eswara Rao which was received along with soft copy of the
award by the Central Government on 12.06.2025.
[No. L-30012/19/2015-IR(M)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
4382
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present:
Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 24th day of April, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No.59/2015
Between:
Sri Chadaram Eswara Rao,
D.No.38-40-68/1m,
Main Road, Marripalem,
Visakhapatnam - 530018.
….. Petitioner
AND
1.
The Commanding Officer,
INS Circars, Naval Base (Post),
(Chief Patron and President of Command
Gas Agency-II, 104 Area)
Visakhapatnam – 530 014.
2.
The Officer-in-Charge,
Command Gas Agency No.II,
Sri Vijayanagar Colony, 104 Area,
Marripalem Post,
Visakhapatnam – 530 018.
…. Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Rapeti Srinivasa Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent: Sri D. Ramesh, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-30012 / 19/ 2015 -IR(M) dated 21.7.2015
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between
the management of INS Circars, Naval Base (Post) and their workman. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of Command Agency-II, Sri Vijayanagar Colony, 104 Area,
Visakhapatnam in terminating the services of Shri Chadaram Eswara Rao, Ex-Clerk is legal and justified?
If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 59/2015 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
The averments made is the claim statement are as follows:
The workman submits that he was appointed as clerk at Command Gas Agency-II, 104 Area, Visakhapatnam under
management and control of commanding officer being conducted an interview on 28.6.2000 and selected by duly
construed selection committee on 1.7.2000 on an Honorarium of Rs.l800/- per month. Ever since then he has been
worked uninterruptedly under various officers stood posted as in-charge command gas agency-ll, 104 area,
Visakhapatnam straining every nerve of him for the efficient administration and courted not even a simple warning.
The Command Gas Agency -II, 104 Area Visakhapatnam have got its own standing orders and in pursuance of which
the Petitioner had also been given an appointment order on dt. 01-07-2000. Further, it is submitted that the nature of
duties concerned are, 1. Booking orders from customers, 2. preparation of bills, 3. Assigning delivery schedule to
delivery boys with instructions from Manager of Command Gas Agency-ll, 4. receiving collection from delivery
boys, 5. Performing bank transaction, 6. Depositing cash in bank jointly by manager, 7. preparing closing balance of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4383
stock, 8. Scheduling the day with BPCL software, 9. Preparing reports to BPCL on fortnightly basis. It is submitted
that while so, the workman suffered from high malaria fever with headreeling along with back-ache since December,
2012. Though suffering with pain, the workman served with the Interest of Command gas Agency-ll (CGA I) and
when the Problem comes to unbearable, the applicant sent a letter of sick intimation to the Officer-in-Charge (O /C)
of Command Gas Agency II, and also informed the Manager of CGA Il regarding the health problem. Upon which the
O I/C of CGA-II sent a sailor (Vikas Verma CHSWA No 193630 -W) to workman‘s house and confirmed the same
with a letter to the Workman on 21.1.2013. Further, it is submitted that the O I/c issued a letter by hand to the
workman to give necessary medical documents in proof of health. The workman submitted by hand the necessary
medical documents to the O I/C Dr. Satish K Yadav. Then, O I/c has issued two cryptic show cause notices to the
workman with false statements on workman, even though fulfilled the documentations as well as replied to show
cause notices on 26.3.2013. On 1.3.2013 obeying the order of O I/C the workman approached the O I/C to resume his
duties, the O I/C categorically told the workman that "already one employee workman of CGA-II is proceeded to
Court and you also proceed to court" Then the workman returned. The workman submits that on 10.4.2013 the O I/C
sent a letter to Workman to report to duty with medical fitness certificate, upon which the workman reported to duty
on 1.6.2013, then the O I/C has started harassment to the workman with various methods i.e., not assigning work in
previous post and make him stand outside, and telling/ humiliating that he should make salute every three times to
other fellow NPF employee and manager, and to Secretary O I/C also recorded the conversation of workman without
his consent and also making statements with other NPF-employees as the workman should wait out like a "watch dog
". Also the O I/C informed that he was not at all interested to rejoin the workman and allowed only on humanitarian
grounds and started humiliation / harassment in several ways. When the harassment was at high peak and unbearable
the workman was stopped attending office since 11.6.2013 without taking salary and then the O I/C issued
termination notice to the Workman on 31.7.2013. The workman replied to this on 2.8.2013 and the same was
informed to the higher authorities. Further, it is submitted that there no enquiry was held, no service benefits have
been paid and that the applicant has not been gainfully employed ever, right from the day one he was kept out of
employment till today. Further, it is submitted that the action of the Respondent Management is arbitrary, unlawful,
wrongful illegal, illogical , capricious, vindictive, an unfair labor practice, an act contrary to fair play in action against
the Principles of Natural Justice, void ab- initio, and is therefore liable to be set aside and consequently Management
be advised to reinstate the worker with all consequential benefits including back Wages in full and continuity of
service etc.,
3.
Respondent filed counter denying the averments of the Petitioner as under:
It is submitted that the Command Gas Agency is a Non-Public Fund organization and no Government funds are either
allocated or spent for the purpose of the agency. The Command Gas Agency supplies cooking Gas (LPG) for the
benefit of Naval personnel residing in and around SVN Colony, Marripalem. The agency is run from the
commission given by BPCL on sale of cooking Gas. As such the Command Gas Agency is a Non Public Fund
managed by an Officer-in-Charge of the area and the Government has nothing to do with the appointment and
employment of the agency. Therefore the Non-Public Fund agency will not come under the purview of the Industrial
Disputes Act. As such the application before this Tribunal is not maintainable under law. The Command Agency I,
SVN Colony, 104 Area, Visakhapatnam constitutes an essential service for the supply of LPG cylinders to about
2300-2400 families of Defence service personnel staying in and around SVN Colony, Marripalerm. Five in number
civilians are employed on consolidated honorarium basis and are paid through the financial yields earned by the gas
agency alone. They are to look after day-to-day functioning of the agency. Being a Non-Governmental agency, no
Government funds are authorized /accorded sanction hitherto. It is submitted that Sri Eswararao, was appointed on
6.11.1998 as a billing clerk. He remained absent from duty without prior intimation/ approval administrative
authorities/ management of Command Gas Agency 4, SVN Colony w.e.f 1.12.2012 to 30.6.2013. His absence caused
substantial inconvenience to the Customers and embarrassment to the management of the Command Gas Agency II.
The manager of gas agency visited his house on 12.12.2012 to enquire about his well being and also requested him to
join the duty as customers were facing severe problems for getting their LPG cylinders. A letter dated 13.12.2012
from the said employee was received on 19.12.2013 intimating about his sickness. Subsequently a letter dated
21.1.2013 was issued from Respondent‘s office directing the individual to produce medical documents and rejoin the
duty. Further, it is submitted that the individual neither reported for duty nor responded to the letter till 31.1.13.
Accordingly when there was no response by the Petitioner nor submission of any medical documents with respect to
his absence, a Show Cause Notice dated 1.2.2013, was issued by the Officer-in-Charge Command Gas Agency, which
the refused to accept. Further, it is submitted that the show Cause Notice was sent by registered post with
acknowledgement on 7.2.2013 for which no receipt has been acknowledged and notice was returned to Respondent
office on 25.2.13. Subsequently on 25.2.2013, sick intimation was received from the workman along with medical
documents. When the workman failed to reply to the Show Cause Notice, nor reported for duties, he was served with
another show cause notice dated 28.2.13. Further, it is submitted that workman replied to the said Show Cause
Notice vide letter dated 26.3.2013, the administrative authorities in order to afford him another chance, advised him
to join his duty. It is submitted that the administrative authorities vide letter dated 10.4.2013 advised the Petitioner to
report on duty along with his medical fitness documents. Accordingly, the Petitioner reported to duty after a break of
07 months on 1.7.2013. Subsequently he stopped coming to duty from 11.7.2013 without citing any verbal/written
4384
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
intimation/reasons. The presence of the individual was deemed detrimental to the interest of organization since he was
also misguiding other employees in addition to his frequent and prolonged absence. Despite various warnings to the
Petitioner with respect to his absence, the individual did not redeem upon his conduct. Thereafter the employment of
Sri Chadaram Eswararao was terminated on 31.7.2013 in accordance with Naval Headquarters New Delhi Letter No.
Hon‘ble Apex Court/NPF/Civilian dated 29.5.2002. It is submitted that in accordance with Para 19 of NHQ letter
refereed ibid the employees paid out of Non-Public Fund shall not be entitled to any kind of pensionary/retirement
benefits. Therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to any kind of pensionary/retirement benefits. In the light of the
reasons stated above, it is just and necessary that this Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to dismiss the application, in
the interest of justice.
4.
On the basis of averments made in the claims statement and contention made in the counter by the
Respondent following points emerge for determination:-
I.
Whether the action of the Respondent management in terminating the services of Petitioner Sri
Chadaram Eswara Rao vide order dated 31.7.2013 is legal and justified?
II.
To what relief if any the Petitioner is entitled for?
Findings:-
5.
Points No.I & II:- In support of his claim statement, Petitioner has examined witness WW1. In his chief
statement of affidavit witness has deposed that,
“5) I respectfully submits that While So, I was suffered With high malaria fever with headreeling along with back
ache Since December 2012 Even though With the pain, I served with the Interest of Command gas Agency-ll (CGA I)
and when the Problem Comes to unbearable to me to sent a letter of sick intimation to the Officer-in-Charge (O I/C)
of Command Gas Agency- |Il, before that I informed the Manager of CGA-|l regarding the health problem. Upon
which the O I/C of CGA-I| Sent a sailor (VIkas Verma CHSWA No 193630 -W) to my house and conformed the same
With a letter to me on 21-jan 2013 the O I/C issued a letter by hand to the workman to give necessary medical
documents in proof of health, I submitted by hand the necessary medical documents to the O I/C Cdr Satish K Yadav
After which the O I/C' is Issued two cryptic show cause notices (on 01 Feb 2013 and 28 Feb 2013) With false
statements to me. Even though I fulfilled the documentations as well as reply to show cause notices on. 26-03 2013.
On 1 Mar 2013 In obeying the order of O /C I was approached the O/C to resume my duties. The O I/C categorically
told to me that "already one employee of CGA-I| is proceeded to Court and yoU also proceed to court" Then I returns
to my house.
6) I respectfully submits that On 10 Apr 2013 the O I/C sent a letter to me to report to duty with medical fitness
certificate Upon which I reported to duty on 1st Jun 2013, then the O /C has started harassment to me with various
methods like not assigning work in previous post and make me Stand outside, and telling/ humiliating that I should
make salute every 3 times to other fellow NPF employee and manager, and to Secretary O I/C also recorded the
conversation of me Without my consent and also making statements With other NPF-employees as the I should wait
out like a "watch dog ". Also the O I/C Informed that he was not at all interested to rejoin me and allowed only on
humanitarian grounds. And started humiliation / harassment in several ways. When the harassment was at high peak
and unbearable to me was stopped attending office since 11 Jun "2013 without taking salary (Then the O VC was
issued termination notice to the' me 31 Jul 2013 and I replied to this on 02- 08-2013 and the same Was Informed to
the higher authorities.”
Further, the WW1 has deposed that the Respondent has issued the termination order dated 31.7.2013 illegally,
arbitrarily against the principles of natural justice and void ab initio. Further, witness WW1 by his evidence has also
exhibited the photocopies of documentary evidence Ex.W1 to W13, in support of his claim. Ex.W1 is the
appointment letter issued by the Respondent in the name of Petitioner Sri Ch.Eswara Rao, dated 1.7.2000 for the post
of clerk. Ex.W2 is sick intimation dated 13.12.2012 sent by Petitioner to the officer in charge gas agency. Ex.W3 is
the report. Ex.W4 again is the report dated 21.1.2013 submitted by the commander gas agency. Ex.W5 consists two
show cause notices issued by officer in charge dated 1.2.2013 and 28.2.2013 to the Petitioner. Ex. W6 is the reply to
show cause notice sent by the Petitioner to the officer in charge and Ex.W7 is the report to work dated 10.4.2013
wherein it is mentioned that the Petitioner was requested by the Management to resume his duty at an early date. It is
also mentioned therein that the Respondent officer has not stopped Petitioner in attending his work and Petitioner
himself has stopped to join the work on his own due to sickness. Further, Petitioner was advised to report for duty
with medical fitness. Document Ex. W8 is letter dated 24.6.2013 which shows that the Petitioner was permitted to
resume the work at command gas agency II along with joining letter of Petitioner. Ex.W9 is the termination letter
dated 31.7.2013 of the Petitioner issued by officer in charge, Command Gas Agency. The contents of said letter
Ex.W9 are reproduced hereunder:-
―1. Refer to this office Show Cause notice issued vide letter 103/2/CGA/104 A dated 01 Feb & 28 Feb 13 and your
reply to the Show Cause notice vide your letter dated 26 Mar 13.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4385
2. The issue has been examined by the competent authority and your reply to the Show Cause notice has been found
untenable.
3. Further, you reported on duty after 7 months of break on 01 Jul 13 in response to directives issued by this office
vide letter 103/2/CGA/104 A dated 10 Apr, 24 May & 24 Jun 13. Subsequently, you have stopped coming to office
from 11 Jul 13 without any verbal / written intimation.
4. Having considered all aspects, the Appointing Authority in accordance with Naval Headquarters letter AC / NPF/
Civilian dated 29 May 2002, terminates your services with immediate effect.‖
Thus, from the above oral and documentary evidence it is evident that Respondent Management has not conducted
any departmental enquiry against Petitioner for his alleged absence from duty before issuing the termination order,
i.e., Ex.W9. Respondent was provided sufficient opportunity to cross examine witness WW1, but none appeared
from Respondent‘s side to cross examine the witness WW1. Therefore, the opportunity to cross examine the witness
was closed by this court vide order dated 29.7.2019. Thus, the deposition of the WW1 regarding his illegal
termination from service and the documentary evidence produced by him remained uncontraverted and liable to be
admitted in evidence.
6.
However, the co0py of that the Terms and Conditions of Civilian Employees through Non Public Fund, of
the Respondent has been filed on record whereby the terms and conditions of the service of the Petitioner is regulated.
The relevant para of said terms and conditions are mentioned hereunder:-
Section 33 and 34 of the said Terms And Conditions Of Civilian Employees Through Non Public Fund
provides as follows:-
―33.
Procedure for with case of Misconduct: Before awarding to an employee any of the punishments mentioned
in Para 20(b)(v) and 31 above, the following procedure shall be followed by the Disciplinary Authority:-
(a)
The employee is to be served with charge sheet, clearly stating the imputation og misconduct
against him and calling upon him to show cause as to why one or more of the punishments included in these
guidelines should not be awarded to him.
(b)
The reply to the chargesheet, if any, is to be duly considered by the Disciplinary Authority.
(c)
If the employee so desires, he/she is to be heard in person and is also to be allowed to cross examine
witnesses against him/her or produce witnesses in his/her defence.
34.
The following disciplinary procedure shall be adopted for dismissal/discharge of an employee on account of
misconduct or disciplinary grounds in accordance with the principles of natural justice as applicable on case to case
basis:-
(a)
Issuance of charge sheet.
(b)
Appointment of Inquiry Officer.
(c)
Holding of an inquiry.
(d)
Perusal of the Report of Inquiry Officer by the Disciplinary Authority
(e)
Issuance of show cause notice
(f)
Issuance of Order of punishment.‖
Undisputedly, in the present case no disciplinary proceeding has been conducted by r against the Petitioner before
issuing his termination order dated 31.7.2013. Whereas by the impugned termination order Petitioner has been
inflicted the major penalty of dismissal from the service without conducting any disciplinary proceeding which is in
gross violation of principles of natural justice.
In this context, I would like to make reference of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandeep
Kumar vs. GB Pant Institute of Engineering and Technology, Ghurdauri & Ors. dated 16th April 2024 wherein,
Hon'ble Supreme Court have held:-
“19. In this background, we are of the firm view that the termination of the services of the appellant without holding
dehors the disciplinary enquiry was totally unjustified and requirements of law and in gross violation of principles of
natural justice. Hence, the learned Division Bench of the High Court fell in grave error in dismissing the writ petition
filed by the appellant on the hypertechnical ground that the minutes of 26th meeting of the Board of Governors dated
16th June, 2018 had not been placed on record.”
Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court, the Petitioner herein has
been terminated from service by the Respondent vide Ex.W9 without conducting any Disciplinary Enquiry which is
illegal and not justified. Therefore, termination order dated 31.7.2013 passed by Respondent of the Petitioner being
in gross violation of Rules, Terms and Conditions of Civilian Employees Through Non-Public Fund and principles of
4386
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
natural justice, hence, is liable to be set aside and the Petitioner is entitled for reinstatement into the service with back
wages.
Thus, Points No. I & II are decided accordingly.
AWARD
The termination order dated 31.7.2013 of the Petitioner Sri Chadaram Eswara Rao, Ex.Clerk passed by the
Respondent Command Gas Agency-II, Sri Vijayanagar Colony, 104 Area, Visakhapatnam held illegal and not
justified, hence, is here by set aside. Respondent is directed to reinstate the Petitioner Sri Chadaram Eswara Rao into
service within one month after receipt of this award. Petitioner shall also be entitled for half of back wages from the
date of termination till his reinstatement.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 24th day of April, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri Chadaram Eswara Rao
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1: Photostat copy of appointment order dt.1.7.2000
Ex.W2: Photostat copy of sick intimation dt.13.12.2012
Ex.W3: Photostat copy of report of CHSWA dt.21.12.12
Ex.W4: Photostat copy of letter to O I/c dt.21.1.13
Ex.W5: Photostat copy of show cause notice dt.1.2.13 & 28.2.13
Ex.W6: Photostat copy of reply to show cause notice dt.26.3.13
Ex.W7: Photostat copy of lr.to O I/c to report work dt. 10.4.13 & 24.6.13
Ex.W8: Photostat copy of joining report by workman dt.1.6.13
Ex.W9: Photostat copy of termination notice dt.31.7.13
Ex.W10: Photostat copy of reply to termination notice dt.2.8.13
Ex.W11: Photostat copy of RLC(C) report dt.31.7.14
Ex.W12: Photostat copy of RLC(C) report dt.24.4.15
Ex.W13: Photostat copy of reference order dt.21.7.15
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1037.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मजक्स लाइफ इंश्योरेंस, श्री लक्ष्मी गोल्डन प्लाजा के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और सुश्री गौजसया बेगम के बीच अनुबंध
में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हजदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-25/2024) को जजसा
दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त
हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-71]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4387
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1037.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 25/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Max Life Insurance, Sri Lakshmi Golden Plaza and Ms. Gowsia Begum which was received along with
soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 12.06.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-71]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT
AT HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 22nd day of April, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 25/2024
Between:
Ms. Gowsia Begum,
D/o Late Anwar Basha,
D.No. 73-7-6, Narayanapuram,
Sattammatalli Veedhi, Rajahmundry,
East Godavari, Andhra Pradesh-533101.
..….Petitioner
AND
Max Life Insurance,
Sri Lakshmi Golden Plaza,
D.No. 46-7-12, Damavaopeta,
Rajahmundry, East Godavari,
Andhra Pradesh-533101. ….Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
None
For the Respondent: G Nagesh, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.7/3/2024-B1 dated 29.05.2024 referred the
following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between the
management of M/s Max Life Insurance and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of Max Life Insurance, Rajahmundry in terminating the services of
its workman Ms.Gowsia Begum, D/o Late Anwar Basha, Rajahmundry is justified or not? If not, what relief
the workman is entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No 25/2024 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
Petitioner absent. Record shows that, on previous date, notice issued to petitioner served but
petitioner is absent. Petitioner is not present today also and did not filed any claim statement. It seems that petitioner
is not interested in pursuing his case. In absence of Claim Statement and absence of petitioner, a ‗No-Claim‘ award is
passed.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Shri Vinay Panghal, LDC corrected and signed by me on this the 22nd day of
April, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
4388
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1038.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय गंट्याडा, हॉर्टटकल्चर सोसाइटी जलजमटेड; आरआईएनएल, जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
जनयोजकों और श्रीमती देवारा अप्ृलाकोंडाम्मा के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम
न्यायालय, हजदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-45/2024) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो
केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-72]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1038.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 45/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s Gantyada, Horticulture Society Ltd; RINL, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant and Smt. Devara
Appalakondamma which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 12.06.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-72]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 17th day of December, 2024
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 45/2024
Between:
Smt. Devara Appalakondamma,
W/o Devara Ramana, D.No. 22-33-7,
Viyyapuvanipalem Village,
Peda Gantyada, Visakhapatnam-530044.
..….Petitioner
AND
1. M/s Gantyada, Displaced Persons
Horticulture Society Ltd.,
18-31-1, Balacheruvu, R.H. Colony,
Pedagantyada, Viskhapatnam-530044.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4389
2. The Chairman-Cum-Managing Director,
RINL, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Ukkanagaram, Visakhapatnam-530031.
….Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
None
For the Respondent: None
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.8/27/2024-B1 dated 27.09.2024 referred the
following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between the
management of M/s RINL & Others and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of M/s Gantyada Displaced Persons Horticulture Society, contractor
of RINL, Viskhapatnam in terminating Smt. Devara Appalakondamma ex- workman from the services on
the grounds of attaining the age of superannuation is justified? If not, what relief the concerned workman is
entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No 45/2024 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
Petitioner absent. Petitioner is not present today also and did not filed any claim statement. It seems
that petitioner is not interested in pursuing his case. In absence of Claim Statement and absence of petitioner, a ‗No-
Claim‘ award is passed.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Shri Vinay Panghal, LDC corrected and signed by me on this the 17th day of
December, 2024.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1039.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार हहदुस्ट्तान ृेरोजलयम कॉृोरेिन जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और लोहडग अनलोहडग वकयसय वेलफेयर
एसोजसएिन के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हजदराबाद, ृंचाट
(ररफरेन्स न.-52/2024) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी
के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-73]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
4390
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1039.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 52/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Loading Unloading Workers Welfare Association which
was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 12.06.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-73]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR
COURT AT HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 28th day of April, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 52/2024
Between:
The President,
Loading Unloading Workers Welfare Association,
C/o LPG Terminal HPCL Petro Park
Port Connectivity Road Opp INS Dega,
Visakhapatnam, Andra Pradesh-530019.
..…. Petitioner
AND
The DGM-Installation,
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Visakh LPG Terminal, HP Petro Park,
Port Connectivity Road,
Visakhapatnam-530009.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
None
For the Respondent: GVS Ganesh, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.8/33/2024-B1 dated 27.11.2024 referred the
following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between the
management of M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the demands as listed below raised by the President, Loading Unloading Workers Welfare
Association, Viskhapatnam against the management of Hindustan petroleum Corporation Limited, Visakh
LPG Terminal, Visakhapatnam is fair, legal and justified?
1. Rate per 14.2 Kg cylinder Rs. 2/-
2. Agreement for the 5 years as per Tender from 16.12.2022 to 15.12.2027.
3. Entry passes should be issued on the Association Name.
4. All workmen should enter like Countract Labour.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4391
If not, to what relief the Loading Unloading Workers Welfare Association, Visakhapatnam is entitled to?
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No 52/2024 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
Petitioner absent. Record shows that, on previous date, notice issued to petitioner served but
petitioner is absent. Petitioner is not present today also and did not filed any claim statement. It seems that petitioner
is not interested in pursuing his case. In absence of Claim Statement and absence of petitioner, a ‗No-Claim‘ award is
passed.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Shri Vinay Panghal, LDC corrected and signed by me on this the 28th day of
April, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1040.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय जसक्योररटी
सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री भगवती प्रसाद के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक
अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-13/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,
प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-74]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1040.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 13/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security Services
and Shri Bhagwati Prasad which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-74]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 13 of 2011
Bhagvati Prasad S/o Sri Chandra Pal
R/o Village - Pure Basant Singh, PO-Sultanpur Khera
District Rae-bareli
.......Applicant/Workman
4392
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged on 16.01.2009 by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S.
Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the
workman had been continuously working till his oral termination on 19.03.2010 in the department of
carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 19.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as L.D.
Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4393
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 19.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 19.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
4394
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the provisions
of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
The workman was initially engaged as casual labour on 16.01.2009 and in the said capacity he worked and discharged
his duties till 19.03.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered
is to the effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had
been working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4395
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section
10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
4396
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4397
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 19.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
4398
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4399
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
4400
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4401
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
4402
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Bhagwati Prasad was engaged as casual employee on 16.01.2009 and his services were
terminated/retrenched on 19.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled
for reinstatement in services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees
Fifty Thousand only) to the workman/applicant against the respondents.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees
Fifty Thousand only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the
respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1041.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय
जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री ृंकज वमाय के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-14/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-75]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1041.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 14/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security Services
and Shri Pankaj Verma which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-75]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 14 of 2011
Pankaj Verma S/o Sri Bharat Lal Verma
R/o Village - Ratapur, Mill Area
District Rae-bareli
.......Applicant/Workman
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4403
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged in the month of March, 2009 but the same has been shown on
03.04.2009 by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S. Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries
Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the workman had been continuously working till his
oral termination on 08.03.2010 in the department of carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 08.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as L.D.
Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 08.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 08.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4405
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered
into with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security
Services came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent
no.4 i.e. M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment
by the said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel
for the respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the
exigency of work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather
they are the workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the
Hon‘ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of
the establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the provisions
of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
Sri Tribhuvan Singh was initially engaged as casual labour and his date of engagement in the establishment is
mentioned as 03.04.2009 and in the said capacity he worked and discharged his duties till 08.03.2010 when his
services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered is to the effect that if the workman
had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had been working and discharging his
duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances whether the respondent no.1 falls
within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4407
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 08.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4409
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
4410
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4411
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
4412
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4413
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Sri Pankaj Verma was engaged as casual employee in the month of March, 2009 and his services were
terminated/retrenched on 08.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled
for reinstatement in services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees
Fifty Thousand only) to the workman/applicant against the respondents.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees
Fifty Thousand only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the
respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1042.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय जसक्योररटी
सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री रमेि यादव के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक
अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-15/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज,
प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-76]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1042.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 15/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security Services
and Shri Ramesh Yadav which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-76]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 15 of 2011
4414
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ramesh Yadav S/0 Sri Dhannu Yadav
R/o Village - Kaptan Ka Purva, PO-Matih
District Rae-bareli
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged on 21.04.2005 by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S.
Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the
workman had been continuously working till his oral termination on 20.03.2010 in the department of
carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 20.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to
as L.D. Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4415
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 20.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 20.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
4416
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the
provisions of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
The workman was initially engaged as casual labour on 21.04.2005 and in the said capacity he worked and discharged
his duties till 20.03.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered
is to the effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had
been working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4417
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section
10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
4418
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4419
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 20.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
4420
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4421
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
4422
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4423
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
4424
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman RAmesh Yadav was engaged as casual employee on 21.04.2005 and his services were
terminated/retrenched on 20.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled
for reinstatement in services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 2.50 Lakhs (Rupees
Two Lakh Fifty Thousand only) to the workman/applicant against the respondents.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 2.50 Lakhs (Rupees
Two Lakh Fifty Thousand only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by
the respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1043.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय
जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री जवजय बहादुर यादव के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय
सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-16/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-77]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1043.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 16/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security Services
and Shri Vijay Bahadur Yadav which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-77]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 16 of 2011
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4425
Vijai Bahadur Yadav S/o Late Sukh Lal
R/o Village - Kodar, PO-Munshiganj
District - Raibareli.
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
Judgment
Heard Sri R. K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R. K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged on 01.02.2006 by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S.
Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the
workman had been continuously working till his oral termination on 20.03.2010 in the department of
carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 20.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as L.D.
Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
4426
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 20.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 20.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4427
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the provisions
of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
The workman was initially engaged as casual labour on 01.02.2006 and in the said capacity he worked and discharged
his duties till 20.03.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered
is to the effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had
been working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
4428
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4429
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
4430
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 20.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4431
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
4432
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4433
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
4434
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4435
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Vijai Bahadur Yadav was engaged as casual employee on 01.02.2006 and his services were
terminated/retrenched on 20.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled
for reinstatement in services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 2 Lakhs (Rupees
Two Lakhs only) to the workman/applicant against the respondents.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 2 Lakhs (Rupees
Two Lakhs only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the
respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1044.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1940 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय
जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री जगदीि प्रसाद के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-17/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-78]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1044.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 17/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security Services
and Shri Jagdish Prasad which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-78]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 17 of 2011
Jagdish Prasad S/o Late Bhagwati Prasad
R/o Village - Bhitaha, Majre - Jamalpur Karaundi, PO - Lodhawamau
District Rae-bareli
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged in the month of October, 2007 but the same has been shown on
01.01.2008 in E.S.I. card by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S. Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village &
Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the workman had been continuously
working till his oral termination on 04.01.2010 in the department of carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 04.01.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred
to as L.D. Act).
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4437
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 04.01.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 04.01.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the
provisions of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no. 3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
Sri Jagdish Prasad was initially engaged as casual labour and his date of engagement in the establishment is
mentioned as 01.01.2008 in the ESI Card issued to him and in the said capacity he worked and discharged his duties
till 04.01.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered is to the
effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had been
working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4439
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section
10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4441
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 04.01.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
4442
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4443
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
4444
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4445
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
4446
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Sri Jagdish Prasad was engaged as casual employee in the month of December, 2007 and his services were
terminated/retrenched on 04.01.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled
for reinstatement in services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) to the workman/applicant against the respondents.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the respondents
from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1045.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय
जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री राकेि कुमार के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-18/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-79]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1045.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 18/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security
Services and Shri Rakesh Kumar which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-79]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4447
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 18 of 2011
Rakesh Kumar, S/o Sri Vinod Kumar
R/o Village - Deeh, PO - Bagidhar
Distt. - Almora.
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged on 19.12.2004 by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S.
Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the
workman had been continuously working till his oral termination on 11.03.2010 in the department of
carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 11.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
4448
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to
as L.D. Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein as under
:-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 11.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4449
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 11.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the
provisions of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
The workman was initially engaged as casual labour on 19.12.2004 and in the said capacity he worked and discharged
his duties till 11.03.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered
is to the effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had
been working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
4450
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4451
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4452
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 11.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4453
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
4454
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4455
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma,
M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335,
paras 7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4457
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Rakesh Kumar was engaged as casual employee on 19.12.2004 and his services were terminated/retrenched
on 11.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled for reinstatement in
services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs (Rupees Three Lakhs only) to the
workman/applicant against the respondents.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs (Rupees
Three Lakhs only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the
respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1046.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय
जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री दलवीर हसह के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-19/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-80]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1046.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 19/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security
Services and Shri Dalveer Singh which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-80]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 19 of 2011
Dalveer Singh S/o Late Balvant Singh
R/o Village - Kundi, PO-Dhurma
Distt. Chamoli (Uttrakhand)
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged on 14.03.2002 by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S.
Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the
workman had been continuously working till his oral termination on 03.03.2010 in the department of
carding, Daffer and blowroom.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4459
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 03.03.2010without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as L.D.
Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 03.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 03.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the
provisions of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
The workman was initially engaged as casual labour on 14.03.2002 and in the said capacity he worked and discharged
his duties till 03.03.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered
is to the effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4461
been working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
4462
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4463
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 03.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4465
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4467
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Dalveer Singh was engaged as casual employee on 14.03.2002 and his services were terminated/retrenched
on 03.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled for reinstatement in
services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs (Rupees Three Lakhs only) to the
workman/applicant against the respondents.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs (Rupees
Three Lakhs only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the
respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1047.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय
जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री जत्रभुवन हसह के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4469
औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-20/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-81]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1047.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 20/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security Services
and Shri Tribhuvan Singh which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-81]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 20 of 2011
Tribhuvan Singh, S/o Late Ram Sagar Singh,
R/o Village Tikraval, P.O. Jitwa,
District Rae-bareli
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
4470
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
―1.
The workman was initially engaged in the month of December, 2007 but the same has been shown
on 02.01.2008 in E.S.I. card by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S. Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village
& Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the workman had been continuously
working till his oral termination on 16.03.2010 in the department of carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 16.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to
as L.D. Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 16.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4471
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 16.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the
provisions of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
4472
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
Sri Tribhuvan Singh was initially engaged as casual labour and his date of engagement in the establishment is
mentioned as 02.01.2008 in the ESI Card issued to him and in the said capacity he worked and discharged his duties
till 16.03.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered is to the
effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had been
working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4473
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section
10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
4474
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4475
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 16.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
4476
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4477
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
4478
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4479
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Sri Trihuvan Singh was engaged as casual employee in the month of December, 2007 and his services were
terminated/retrenched on 16.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled
for reinstatement in services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) to the workman/applicant against the respondents.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the respondents
from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
4480
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1048.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय
जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री राजेंद्र यादव के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-21/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-82]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1048.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 21/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security
Services and Shri Rajendra Yadav which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 12.06.2025.
[No Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-82]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 21 of 2011
Rajendra Yadav S/o Sri Ram Milan
R/o Village - Pindari Khurd, PO - Rasehta
Distt. - Raibareli.
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4481
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged on 04.02.2008 by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S.
Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the
workman had been continuously working till his oral termination on 13.03.2010 in the department of
carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 13.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as L.D.
Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
4482
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 13.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 13.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the
provisions of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4483
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
The workman was initially engaged as casual labour on 04.02.2008 and in the said capacity he worked and discharged
his duties till 13.03.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered
is to the effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had
been working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded
as under:-
4484
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section
10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4485
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
4486
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 13.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4487
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
4488
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4489
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
4490
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Rajendra Yadav was engaged as casual employee on 04.02.2008 and his services were
terminated/retrenched on 13.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled
for reinstatement in services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 2 Lakhs (Rupees
Two Lakhs only) to the workman/applicant against the respondents.
Award
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 2 Lakhs (Rupees
Two Lakhs only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the
respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4491
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1049.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय
जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री कामता प्रसाद ृाण्डेय के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय
सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-22/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-83]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1049.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 22/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security Services
and Shri Kamata Prasad Pandey which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 12.06.2025.
[No Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-83]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 22 of 2011
Kamata Prasad Pandey S/o Late Subedar Pandey
R/o E-15, Jawahar Vihar, Malik Mau
Distt. - Raibareli.
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
4492
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged in the month of December, 2001 by the employer ie. Project
Manager, M/S. Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and
since then the workman had been continuously working till his oral termination on 04.03.2010 in the
department of carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 04.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as L.D.
Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4493
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 04.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 04.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the
provisions of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
The workman was initially engaged as casual labour in December, 2001 and in the said capacity he worked and
discharged his duties till 04.03.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be
considered is to the effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and
he had been working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that
circumstances whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal
Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4495
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4497
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 04.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of
R.M. Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4499
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4501
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Kamta Prasad was engaged as casual employee In December, 2001 and his services were
terminated/retrenched on 04.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled
for reinstatement in services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 4 Lakhs (Rupees
Four Lakhs only) to the workman/applicant against the respondents.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 4 Lakhs (Rupees
Four Lakhs only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the
respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
4502
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1050.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससय सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससय ब्लजक हाउंड जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज प्राइवेट जलजमटेड; मेससय मासय नेटवकय
जसक्योररटी सर्थवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री सत्य देव के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनऊ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-25/2011) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-आईआर(एम)-85]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1050.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 25/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security Services
and Shri Satya Dev which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 12.06.2025.
[No Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-85]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 25 of 2011
Satya Dev S/o Sri Shyam Bihari
R/o Village - Kaptan Ka Purva, PO-Matiha
District Rae-bareli
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4503
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged on 08.04.2004 by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S.
Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since then the
workman had been continuously working till his oral termination on 17.03.2010 in the department of
carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 17.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as L.D.
Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
4504
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 17.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 17.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the provisions
of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4505
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
The workman was initially engaged as casual labour on 08.04.2004 and in the said capacity he worked and discharged
his duties till 17.3.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered
is to the effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had
been working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers’ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor’s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
4506
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4507
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.”
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
4508
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 17.3.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4509
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
4510
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days’ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4511
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
4512
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Satya Dev was engaged as casual employee on 08.04.2004 and his services were terminated/retrenched on
17.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled for reinstatement in
services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs (Rupees Three Lakhs only) to the
workman/applicant against the respondents.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4513
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs (Rupees
Three Lakhs only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by the
respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1051.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार हरदेि ओसय प्राइवेट जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और उनके कमयचारी के बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट
केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, मुंबई, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-27/2005) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक
में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल-26011/7/2005-आईआर(एम)]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1051.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 27/2005) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-1, Mumbai as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd. and their workmen which was received along with soft copy of the award by
the Central Government on 12.06.2025.
[No L-26011/7/2005-IR(M)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1
Mumbai
Present
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
Presiding Officer
REFERENCE NO. CGIT-27 OF 2005
Employers in relation to the management of
Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd.
And
Their workmen
Appearances:
For the management
:
Mr. G.Kamat, Adv.
For the Union
: Mr.Nilesh H.Velip.
President of the Union
Mumbai, dated the 19TH day of May, 2025.
4514
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AWARD
Both the parties were present today and submits that the controversy which is involved in the present case has already
been settled between them by way of Memorandum of Understanding entered /executed at Panjim on 14.01.2025.
Copy of which have been filed by the parties on 23.4.2025. Accordingly, a request has been made by the parties that
the present reference to be disposed of in terms of the Memorandum of Settlement entered between them on
14.01.2025. copy of which have been filed by the parties on 23.4.2025.
Accordingly, a request has been made by the parties that the present reference may kindly be disposed of in terms of
the Memorandum of Settlement entered between them on 14.01.2025.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the reference dated 09.11.2005 is disposed of in terms of Memorandum of
Understanding dated 14.1.2025. the terms of he said Memorandum of Understanding is binding on both the parties.
JusticE ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1052.—औद्योजगक जववाद अजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार ह्यूमन ररसोसेज, हहदुस्ट्तान ृेरोजलयम कॉृोरेिन जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और उनके कमयचारी के
बीच अनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक अजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, धनबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-
36/2003) को जजसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ
12.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल -30012/6/2003-आईआर(एम)]
ददलीृ कुमार, अवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1052.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 36/2003) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-1, Dhanbad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Human Resources, Hindustan Petroleum Corp., Ltd. and their workman which was received along
with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 12.06.2025.
[No L-30012/6/2003-IR(M)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1,DHANBAD
In the matter of reference U/S 10 (1) (d)& (2A) of I.D.Act. 1947.
Reference Case No. 36/2003
Employer in relation to the management of Human Resources, Hindustan Petroleum Corp., Ltd.
AND.
Their workman.
Present: Shri Sachindra Kumar Pandey
Presiding Officer
Appearances:
For the Employers :- Sri N.K. Trivedi, Ld. Advocate.
For the workman. :- None.
State : Jharkhand.
Industry:- Petroleum & Natural Gas
Dated 30/05/2025
AWARD
In exercise of powers conferred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub –section (2A) of Section 10 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),Government Of India through the Ministry of Labour, vide its Order
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4515
No. L-30012/6/2003-(IR(M)) dated 22/04/2003, has been pleased to refer the following dispute between the employer
i.e. management of Human Resources, Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. and their workman through concerned
workman namely Sri Manikant Bhagat for adjudication by this Tribunal:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of management of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn., Purnea in terminating the
services of Sh. Manikant Bhagat justified? If not, to what relief he is entitled to?‖
2. On receiving order no. L-30012/6/2003-(IR(M)) dated 22/04/2003 Government of India, Ministry of
Labour, New Delhi for adjudication of the dispute, Reference case no. 36 of 2003 was registered on 20.5.2003 and
thereafter the notices were sent to the parties with a direction to appear and submit their written statements along
with relevant documents in support of their claims and the witnesses.
3. After receiving notice, Sri Ashwini Kumar, Senior Manager appeared from the side of
HPCL/Employer and filed authority letter whereas Sri Manikant Bhagat, the workman appeared in person and
prayed for time for filing statement of claim that was allowed but thereafter the workman never appeared before
the Tribunal.
4. On perusal of the entire case record it is transpired that the workman appeared only once in this case
and thereafter absented himself and has neither made any pairvi nor filed any statement of claim which shows that
the workman has lost his interest in this case and therefore, for the ends of justice, this case deserves to be
dismissed.
7. Hence,
ORDERED
that this case is hereby dismissed and a ―No Dispute Award‖ be drawn up in respect of the above
reference case. Let the copies of Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government
of India, New Delhi for information and notification.
SACHINDRA KUMAR PANDEY, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1053.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj डब्ल्यू.सी.एल..ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सह
–
] जबलृुर dsiapkV(एलसी/आर-16/2014
) dks izdkf”kr
djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/173/2013-vkbZ-vkj- (सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1053.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Reference.LC/R/16/2014) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
Management of W.C.L, and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 07/05/2025.
[No L-22012/173/2013 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/16/2014
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..(Retd)
Zonal Mahamantri,
C-Mewa, Zonal Branch – WCL,
Palachouri,
Chhindwara
Workman
4516
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Vs
The Chief General Manager,
Western Coalfields Limited,
Tansi Khan, Kanhan region,
Chhindwara
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 21thday of February -2025)
As per letter dated 10/02/2014 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‗Act‘) as per Notification No. L-
22012/173/2013-IR(CM-II) dt.10/02/2014. The dispute under reference relates to:
"
”
”
”
After registering a case on the basis of reference, notices were sent to the parties.
Case of the Applicant as taken by him in his statement of claim is that his father Roshan was appointed by
Management on 11.10.1975, he died on 17.03.1999 while in service. Information of his death was given to
Management by his widow on 07.05.1999. She also applied for compassionate appointment being widow of the
Workman Roshan after fulfilling all the formalities and filing documents. Management informed her vide its
communication dated 27.05.1999 to file the Death Certificate of the Workman Roshan in original and also to file
Succession Certificate for receiving Gratuity Provident Fund Amount. The Widow filed the Succession Certificate on
02.11.2005 and 12.11.2005 after she got it from Court on 20.10.2005 but even after that the widow of Workman
Roshan ie; the mother of the Applicant, was not given the gratuity as well Provident Fund of her deceased husband
nor was granted appointment on compassionate basis. She made another representation to Management on various
dates that is 26.05.2006 and 23.09.2006, but of no avail. Thereafter, the applicant made a representation before
Management for his appointment on compassionate ground as dependant of his father which was also refused.
Hence,this reference.
The applicant has thus prayed that he be held entitled for compassionate appointment as dependant of his
deceased father Roshan.
Case of the Management, as taken by them in their written statement of defense is that the Workman
Roshan died on 17.03.1999 leaving behind him his widow Jamuna Bai, and six children who are Suresh and
Applicant Ramesh, his sons and four daughters. One another women Sevanti Bai also claimed herself to be wife and
widow of the deceased Workman and put her claim on his retiral and death benefits of Roshan. Sevanti Bai filed an
application for Succession Certificate of the Workman Roshan before Civil Court at Chhindwara which was Case No.
54/2000. A succession certificate was issued by Court in her favour. Jamuna Bai also filed a Case No. 19/2001 before
Civil Court, and succession certificate was issued in her favour also vide order dated 20.10.2005. Sevanti Bai filed
Appeal No. 33/2006 against the order of Civil Court issuing Succession Certificate in favour of Jamuna Bai, which
was dismissed. She further approached Hon‘ble High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur against the order. In the meanwhile,
the Applicant Ramesh submitted his application for dependant appointment without submitting no objection
certificate form of the other dependants, also the name of his father was recorded as Sumerlal in his transfer certificate
filed by him.
According to the Management, as per Clause 9.3.4. of NCWA the age of dependant seeking dependant
appointment should not exceed 35 years at the time of seeking appointment whereas the Applicant Ramesh had
exceeded the age limit hence was not entitled for compassionate appointment.
Management has further contended that Jamuna Bai, who is the widow of the Workman and mother of
the Applicant was given gratuity and other dues of her deceased husband under order of the competent Authority in
this respect passed on 24.07.2006.
Management has thus requested the reference be answered against the Applicant.
Both the sides have filed affidavits as their examination-in-chief and have been cross-examined before
opposite party.
The applicant side has filed Death Certificate of the Workman, certificate of Mines Manager, Letter of
Management to Jamuna Bai requiring succession certificate from her, and other letter of Management to Jamuna Bai
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4517
requiring her to file original death certificate of the deceased husband, letter of Jamuna Bai to Mines Manager by
which she filed succession certificate, three other letters of Jamuna Bai to Mines Manager seeking both benefit and
dependant appointment for her son applicant Ramesh, succession certificate in favour of Jamuna Bai issued by Court,
petition of Civil Revision No. 277/2006 filed by Sevanti Bai before Hon‘ble High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur and order
passed dismissing the Revision, letter of applicant sent to Management providing clarification, another letter of
Jamuna Bai with respect to dependant appointment to applicant which are marked as Exhibit W-1 to W-12.
Management has filed judgement of Civil Judge in succession Case No. 09/2001, transfer certificate of the applicant
and payment of gratuity certified Exhibit M-1 to M-3.
None was present at the time of argument. No written arguments have been filed by any of the parties.
I have gone through the record.
The reference itself the issue for determination in the Case in hand.
Clause 9.3.4. of the National Coal Wage Agreement, relevant for the case is being reproduced as
follows:
―the dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and
aged not more than 35 years. Provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years
as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concern, there will be no age limit regarding provision of
employment.”
As it is the case of the Management that claim of the Applicant for dependant appointment was not
considered because he had crossed 35 years of age. The Management witness has also stated that there is no record
with them seeking dependant appointment by Jamuna Bai. As it comes out from perusal of record that first proved
application of Jamuna Bai seeking dependant appointment for the applicant was filed on 02/12.11.2005. The
Management has filed copy of transfer certificate of the Applicant in which his date of birth was recorded as
01.07.1967 this document is Exhibit M-2. The applicant has not filed any document to show that he was below 35
years of age at the time of filing of application for seeking dependant appointment to him. Hence, the case of
Management is that the Applicant Ramesh Pawar was not illegible to be considered for dependant appointment
because he had crossed 35 years of age on the date of the prayer held proved.
As regards the second ground taken by Management that no objection certificate by other dependants of
the deceased workman were also not produced is also held proved in absence to the contrary.
In the light of above discussion and findings, the reference is answered as follows.
AWARD
The action of Management of SECL in not granting Dependant Appointment to the Applicant on the
death of his father Roshan is held justified in law and the Applicant is held entitled to no relief.
No order as to cost.
DATE:-21/02/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1054.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj जनदेिक (ए एंड बी), आर.डी. सेल डीजी स्ट्वास्ट््य सेवा जनमायण भवन,ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds
deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सह
–
]
जबलृुर dsiapkV(एलसी/आर-19/2018
) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks
izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22013/01/2025-vkbZ-vkj- (सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1054.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Reference.LC/R/19/2018) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
4518
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Management of Director(A&B),R.D.Cell DG Healht Service Nirman Bhawan, and their workmen, received by the
Central Government on 30/05/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/RC/19/ 2018
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..(Retd)
Deepak Tripathi,
S/o Shri Ramkrishan Tripathi,
Aged about 39 Years,
R/o House No. 40 Shivlok Phase – 3,
Khajuri Kala Road S.O.S near Balgram ,
Piplani Bhopal (M.P.)
.
Workman
Vs
1. Director (Administration & Bing)
R.D. Cell Director General of Health
Services Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi –
110108
2. Regional Director
Govt. Of India Health Ministry,
Regional Office Health and Family Welfare,
28, Vidyanagar,
Axis Bank ke Piche,
Hoshangabad Bhopal
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 01thday of April - 2025)
The Applicant Workman has filed petition under Section 2A (2&3) of the Industrial Disputes Act (in
short the ‗Act‘) with the case that he was appointed by the Director of the Management establishment against
vacancy in Group C on the Post of Data Entry Operator after vide order of management dated 22.08.2013 on a
consolidated salary of Rs. 10,000/-. He worked continuously till 15.06.2017 and from 15.06.2017, his services were
transferred to the Outsourcing Agency which amounted to termination of his services by the Management
establishment which is illegal, arbitrary and unjust being in violation of Section 25(F) and 25(G) of the Act.
According to the Applicant Workman, the job for which he was engaged by management is of permanent and
perennial nature, now been taken through Outsourcing Agency which is in violation of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. The Applicant has thus prayed that setting aside his termination, he be held
entitled to be reinstated with back wages and benefits.
Notices were sent to the opposite party Management and were duly served. Management did not contest the
claim and did not file any written statement of defense. Since none was appearing for Management, the case
proceeded Ex-parte against them vide order dated 23.11.2011.
In evidence, the Workman filed his affidavit as his examination-in-chief, he also filed and proved
documents which are Exhibit W-1 Offer of his Appointment issued by Management on 20.08.2013, Office Order
dated 22.08.2013 appointing the Workman which is Exhibit W-2. He has also filed and proved documents
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4519
Exhibit W-3 to W-10 different Office Orders between 10.12.2015 to 16.06.2017 issued by Management assigning
him different duties.
I have heard arguments of Learned Counsel Mr. Ashok Shrivastava for Workman. None appeared for
Management at any stage. Workman has filed written arguments also. I have gone through the written arguments and
the records.
Before entering into any discussion, certain provisions of the Act are being reproduced as follows:
1. 25B. Definition of continuous service.—For the purposes of this Chapter,— (1) a workman shall be said
to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one
year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer—
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to—
(a) an undertaking in which—
(i) less than fifty workmen are employed, or
(ii) less than fifty workmen were employed on an average per working day in the preceding twelve months,
(b) an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other
construction work or project.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the appropriate Government may, if it is
satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the
employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that provisions of sub-section (1) shall not
apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order.
2. 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month‟s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
3. 25 (G) - Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the
employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category,
unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.
The Workman has proved his case as stated above in his affidavit which is uncontroverted. His case is further
supported by documents Exhibit W-1 which goes to show that he was selected by the Management on the post of
Date Entry Operator on the basis of Walk in Interview and on conditions mentioned in the offer, which directed that
this appointment was purely temporary along with other conditions, he was offered appointment. Exhibit W-2 is the
Office Order which shows that the applicant has given a undertaking that he will not claim any right in Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. As stated above, Exhibit W-3 to
W-10 are different office orders allotting him various duties.
From the above noted material as well uncontroverted affidavit it is established that the Workman was appointed
on purely temporary basis by Management of the Department after a Walk-in-Interview on consolidated salary and he
continued to work as such till 15.06.2017.
This is also established that he was not given any notice or compensation on termination of his services by
the Management of Department on 15.06.2017.
As regards the undertaking given by the Applicant Workman that he will not claim any right or benefit in
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act, 1970 it has no legal significance
because, the rights are accrued to him on the basis of a legislation which are legal rights, cannot be forfeited or
4520
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
waived, thus the termination of his services by the Management of the department is nothing but in violation of
Section 25 (F) and 25 (G) of The Industrial Disputes Act 1947
It also comes out that, from the date of his services were terminated by Management, the job was given to
outsourcing agency and the Workman started working as an employee of Outsourcing Agency.
Thus it is a clear case of change in source of employment without changing the nature of employment ie;
post and jobs assigned which is changing one set of employer with other employer though in the case in hand the
employee is one and same.
Section 10 & 5 of the Contract Labour and Regulations Act, 1970 prohibited engagement of Contractor
for workers of permanent and perennial nature. From the above discussion, it has been established that the work
which the Applicant Workman was doing when he was an employee of the Management and when was an employee
of Contractor is one and same with respect to its nature and duties. Thus, this action of Management is held to be
unfair labour practice as defined under Section 2 (ra) of the Act adopted by the Management of the Department.
As regards the relief to which the Workman is entitled, has Learned Counsel has referred to judgment of
Hon‟ble M.P. High Court in the Case of State of Madhya Pradesh V.s. Amit Gautam MP No. 4189/2021. In the
case in hand, in similar circumstances the Award of reinstatement with 50% back wages, granted by Tribunal was
confirmed.
Learned Counsel has further relied on another judgment Hon‟ble High Court of MP in MP No. 6329/2022
Goverdhan Vs. Chief Municipal Officer which establishes the same principle. Furthermore, in the case of CIVIL
APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.5580 of 2024) JAGGO V.s. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.same
principle has been laid down.
On the basis of above discussion and findings the Applicant Workman is held to be entitled to be reinstated
within 4 months from the date of this judgment as Temporary employee of Management Department, from the date of
his disengagement by Management on 15.06.2017 but without back wages as there is no evidence on record that he
was not gainfully employed during this period. He is also held to be entitled for consideration of service benefits
regarding permanency of service and regularization as per rules.
Petition stands disposed accordingly.
No order as to cost.
DATE:-01/04/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1055.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj एम्स भोृाल ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सह
–
] जबलृुर
dsiapkV(एलसी/आर-57/2020
) dks
izdkf'kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-42012/12/2020-vkbZ-vkj- (डीयू)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1055.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Reference.LC/R/57/2020) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
Management of AIIMS Bhopal and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 07/05/2025.
[No. L-42012/12/2020 – IR (DU)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4521
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/57/2020
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.(Retd.)
1. Smt. Manuradha Dhaiya
W/o Sh. Manoj Dhaiya,
321, 9 B , Saket Nagar,
Bhopal (M.P.) – 462024
2. Sh. Ajeet Singh Chandel,
H.No. 53, Raj Samrat Colony,
Phase – 2,
Minal J.K. Road,
Bhopal (M.P.0 - 462041
Workman
Vs
Director,
Akhil Bhartiya Ayurvigyan Sansthan (AIIMS)
Bhopal (M.P.0 - 462001
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 11thday of March-2025)
As per letter dated 24/08/2020 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‗Act‘)as per Notification No.L-
42012/12/2020(IR(DU)) dt. 24.08.2020. The dispute under reference relates to:
―D;k Jhefr Ekuqjk/kk nfg;k ,oe Jh vftr flag pansy lafonk deZdkjksa dks muds lsok i`Fkdhdj.k ij] muds
[kkrs esa “ks’k vftZr vodk'k (Earned Leave) dk udnhdj.k (Encashment of Balance Earned Leave) muds fu;ksDrk &
,El] Hkksiky }kjk fn;k tkuk pkfg,\ ;fn gkWa] rks fdruh jkf'k mUgs i`Fkd & i`Fkd ns; gksxh\‖
1. Facts in this case are almost undisputed, the Workman Smt. Manuradha Dhaiya and Ajeet Singh Chandel
were appointed by the Management of AIIMS Bhopal on contract basis, on 04.12.2013 for one year, their
contract was to expire after one year, but was extended on yearly basis till 25.09.2018. The Management,
did not extend their Work Contract further and they were disengaged.
They have prayed for amount to which the claimed to be entitled on account of encashment of balance of
their Earned Leave.
Case of the Management is that, they were disengaged because their service contract was not extended
further after 25.09.2018 they had preferred agent file the petition before Central Administration Tribunal, seeking
permanent status and regularization which was dismissed and this order was confirmed by Hon‘ble High Court of
M.P. No. 970/2019 and 1009/2019, they have been paid their salary under the order of Hon‘ble High Court and
nothing remains to be paid.
These workman have filed affidavits as their examination in chief in which they have corroborated their case
and claim. These affidavits are uncross-examined. Management has not filed any affidavit.
I have heard argument of Learned Counsel Mr. K.B. Singh for the workman and Mr. Gopi Chourasia for
Management. I have gone through the record as well.
The first objection taken by Management is that, under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, the
Central Government has issued a notification on 22.06.2017 extending the application of the Act, on the AIIMS
including AIIMS Bhopal, hence the dispute is not cognizable by this Tribunal.
4522
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
I am not inclined to accept this argument of Learned Counsel for Management because it is not disputed that
the Management is industry as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act, and in the light of law laid down by Hon‘ble the
Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply Board V.s. Rayappa
Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, mentions that notwithstanding the provisions of Section
28 and Section 14 the Industrial Tribunal and Supreme Court will still have jurisdiction to decide the disputes. The
relevant provisions is being reproduced as follows:
28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts except the Supreme Court under article 136 of the Constitution. - On and from
the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in
relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service matters concerning
members of any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post, [no Court except-
(a)the Supreme Court; or
(b)any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947(14 of 1947) or any other corresponding law for the time being in force, shall have], or be entitled to exercise
any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such
service matters.
Hence, in the light of above discussion, the dispute held cognizable by this Tribunal.
Learned Counsel for workman has referred to the DOPT OM No. 12016/3/84-Estt. (L) dated 12.04.1985 as
amended by DOPT OM No. 12016/2/1999/ Estt. (L) dated 12.07.1999, DOPT OM No. 12016/3/2009-Estt. (L) dated
31.01.2011 and DOPT OM No. 14028/1/2019- Estt. (L) dated 20.06.2019, the entitlement of the employees appointed
on contract basis with regard to encashment of leave in their credit on termination of contract
Period of contract Maximum EL encashment‟
2 years or less No encashment
More than 2 years upto 5 years 50 days
More than 5 years upto 10 years 100 days
More than 10 years upto 15 years 150 days
More than 15 years upto 20 years 200 days
More than 20 years upto 25 years 250 days
More than 25 years 300 days
Hence, in the light of these office memoranda, these workmen are entitled to be leave encashment, accrued to
them within the period of their Contract Appointment from 2013 to 2018. Learned Counsel for Management has
further stated that the dues of the Workman have been paid to them, as directed by Hon‘ble High Court in the
aforesaid writs. The copy of order writs is on record. Hon‘ble High Court has directed the Management to pay any
salary arising their, which is unpaid to the Workman and further direct to pay this unpaid salary within 30 days. It is
clear that there is no direction to pay the amount in leave encashment. Hence, argument from the side of Management,
fails on this point also.
AWARD
In the light of above discussions and findings, the Workman Manuradha Dhaiya and Ajeet Singh Chandel
are held entitled to payment of amount accrued to them by way of encashment of their earned leave within the
period of their contract of services i.e. from 04.12.2013 to 25.09.2018 on the rates as mentioned in the Office
Memorandum referred to above. They are further held entitled to interest at the rate of 8% per annum on this
amount from the date of termination of their services that is 25.09.2018 till payment.
The reference stand answered accordingly.
DATE:- 11/03/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4523
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1056.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj भारतीय खाद्य जनगम ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd
fookn esa
–
सह
–
] जबलृुर dsiapkV(एलसी/आर-58/2019
)
dks izdkf'kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22011/41/2019-vkbZ-vkj- (सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1056.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Reference.LC/R/58/2019) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
Management of Food Corporation of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30/05/2025.
[No. L-22011/41/2019 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/58/2019
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.(Retd.)
Shri Manoj Kumar Mahilang & 28 Others,
R/o Village – Sonpari, Post – Godi,
Thana – Mandirhasound,
Raipur (Chhattisgarh) - 492101
Workmen
Vs
The General Manager,
Food Corporation of India,
Regional Office, Kapa,
Raipur, Distt. Raipur (Chhattisgarh) - 492005
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 14th day of May - 2025)
As per letter dated 10/07/2019 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‗Act‘)as per Notification
No. L-22011/41/2019 (IR(CM-II)) dt. 10/07/2019. The dispute under reference relates to:
“Whether the Applicants are eligible for relaxation in terms of upper age limit and academic qualification
for recruitment to the post of watchman against the advertisement no. Estt.IV.DR-Watchman/01/2017 or
any subsequent recruitment, in the establishment of Food Corporation of India, on the plea that they have
rendered continuous service and were engaged through the contractors against the duly sanctioned
vacancies/posts, or to any other better scheme of relief?”
The case of the Workmen, as taken by them in their statement of claim, is that, they were appointed as
Watchman with the Food Corporation of India in the year 2008-09 as a Contract Labour and were removed on
01.08.2014 without following procedure established by law in this respect. Vide Circular of the Management
Corporation dated 16.05.2013 it was provided that, the Contractual watch and ward personnel & Security Guards,
who were working in the Corporation, will have given preference by giving relaxation in the upper age limit and
4524
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
academic qualification other than technical qualification at the time of recruitment. The Workmen filed representation
and requested for their regularization but the representation was refused. They filed a writ petition No. 4168/2017,
before Hon‘ble High Court of Chhattisgarh which was decided after hearing both the sides vide order dated
04.09.2017 with following direction
―if the Corporation had not taken any decision on the representation of the Workmen that representation will be
decided within period of 2 months also that in case the grievances raised in the representation is not redressed. The
Workmen shall be at liberty of reviving the petition.‖
It is further the case of the Workmen that they made a representation before Corporation in their Regional
Office at Raipur, with a copy of order of Hon‘ble High Court and requested to consider their claim in light of Circular
of Corporation dated 16.05.2013, but their representation was wrongly dismissed by the Corporation vide order dated
31.10.2017. Thereafter, they again filed Writ Petition No. 479/2018 before Hon‘ble High Court, which was withdrawn
by them on 12.01.2018 with a liberty to make a representation before General Manager, Regional Corporation Office
at Raipur. They filed representation before the General Manager at Raipur which was also dismissed wrongly, vide
order dated 08.05.2018. Thereafter, as it is the case of the Workmen, they filed the Writ Petition No. 4872/2018,
which was withdrawn by then with liberty to seeking remedy before this Tribunal under provisions of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 which was granted. Thereafter they raised a dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner
Central, Raipur. After failure of conciliation, the dispute was referred to this Tribunal.
According to the Workmen, the action of General Manager of the Corporation in rejecting the
representations of the Workmen vide order dated 31.10.2017 and 08.05.2018 is unjust, illegal and arbitrary, because it
was passed without complying with the directions of Hon‘ble High Court dated 04.09.2017, passed in the W.P. No.
4168/2017, also the impugned orders were in violation of principles of natural justice and on extraneous consideration
as well oblique motives as well mala fide, hence, bad in law. The Workmen have thus prayed that they be held entitled
to be given preference with respect to upper age limit and academic qualification other than technical qualification, at
the time of recruitment/ appointment in the light of the Circular of the Corporation dated 16.05.2013, necessary
direction be issued to Management to comply this Circular.
Management has taken a case in their written statement of defense that, these workmen were engaged
through contractors and not by the Corporation. There was no employer and employee relationship between the
Corporation and the Workmen, also that the names of the Workmen are not attached with the reference. Hence, it is
not established that the Workmen who fided the statement of claim are those Workmen who had raised the Industrial
Dispute. According to the Management Corporation, it started to appointment on Security Guards and advertisement
in this respect was published, which is advertisement 01/2017 (Para 8 of the WS). The guidelines dated 16.05.2013
relied upon by the Workmen are not in existence as it is clarified letter of Headquarter, dated 08.11.2017, hence,
recruitment was to be made in accordance with the Circular of the Food Corporation of the Management dated
09.08.2016.
The Management has accordingly prayed that, the reference be answered against the Workmen.
In evidence, the Workmen have filed photocopy of reference, photocopy of their petition before Labour
Commissioner, Photocopy of petition, photocopy of Order dated 04.09.2017 passed by Hon‘ble High Court of
Chhattisgarh in W.P. No. 4168/2018, photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court of Chhattisgarh passed in W.P. No.
479/2018, photocopy of order of General Manager passed on 31.10.2017 and 08.05.2018, photocopy of recruitment
notification No. 01/2017 all admitted by Management side, marked as Exhibit W-1 to W-8.
They have further filed affidavits of the Workmen Manoj Kumar, Raj Kumar, P. Subba Rao, Dinesh Sahu,
as their examination in chief, they have been cross-examined by Management.
The Management has filed affidavit of its witness Trilok Singh Rana Assistant General Manager, he has
not been put to cross-examination. Management has filed photocopy documents which are photocopy of reference,
tender documents, order of Management dated 31.10.2017 and recruitment notification of these documents are
already filed by Workmen side. I have heard argument of Learned Counsel for the Workmen Mr. Sunil Mishra and Mr.
Shailendra Pandey Learned Counsel for Management. I have gone through the record as well.
On the perusal of record in the light of rival arguments, the reference itself arises to be the issue for
determination.
An argument has been made by Learned Counsel for Management, and he has also filed an application on
20.02.2024 for passing no dispute Award on the ground that the recruitment notification No. 01/2017 in which the
Workmen are seeking entitlement in the light of the Circular of Management dated 16/17.05.2013 has been
withdrawn, hence in the light of dispute referred in the reference, there remains no dispute. This application has been
heard and decided vide order dated 25.06.2024 with a finding that in the light of reference, the dispute is still alive
because the reference mentions further recruitments also.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4525
The reference has been reproduced earlier in this judgment, a bare perusal of the reference makes it clear
that the dispute is whether the Workmen are entitled to benefit of the Circular dated 16/17.05.2013 with respect to the
recruitment under recruitment notification No. 01/2017 or any subsequent recruitment in the Corporation for the post
of Security Guard. Hence, after the recruitment Notification No. 01/2017, has been withdrawn, the dispute does not
fully subsidise because it still remains with respect to the subsequent recruitments.
Both the sides have filed affidavit and documents as mentioned above .
On perusal of order of General Manager of the Corporation dated 31.10.2017, reveals that, the representation was
filed by Workmen in the light of order of Hon‘ble High Court of Chhattisgarh seeking preference from Corporation to
the petitioners in recruitment of Security Guards on the pleading that they were engaged as Contractual Security
Guards in Office of the Corporation. This order further discloses that Hon‘ble High Court had passed a direction on
04.09.2017 that the General Manager of the Corporation shall take appropriate decision on the claim of the
petitioners.
The General Manager has recorded a finding that the persons were Contract Workers, engaged by
Contractors, also that, the Circular dated 16/17.05.2013 was with respect to the recruitment process in the year 2013
but it was kept in abeyance by Headquarter vide its letter dated 04.07.2013, and hence, the entire process of
recruitment of Security Guards come to halt. Also it has been observed that, this Circular of 16/17.05.2013 had no
specific reference to the petitioners, and was further replaced by letter of Headquarter dated 19.08.2016, Clause (iv) of
this letter provides preference only to this because contractual security guards in whose favour any order or judgment
of any Court of Law passed which had attained finality. Thus according to this letter dated 19.08.2016 relaxations
were admissible only to Contractual Security Guards having any Court order in their favour. The General Manager
further observed that, even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that, a Circular dated 16/17.05.2013 was in
operation, even though claim of the petitioners did not have merit on the ground that though the Circular cast an
obligation to give preference only to erstwhile contractual Security Guards, by giving relaxation in age and
qualification, where after the legal obligation is cast upon the Corporation pursuant to Court Judgments which may
have attained finality. Since the petitioners were never engaged as employee with the Corporation rather they were
engaged by contractors, this Circular was not applicable to them.
Similarly, order dated 08.05.2018, passed by the General Manager of the Corporation, it deal with the
representation of the Workmen dated 09.04.2018, 06.04.2018, 12.04.2018 and 23.04.2018 relying on the order dated
12.01.2018 passed by Hon‘ble High Court of Chhattisgarh in W.P. No. 479/2018 directing the Corporation to take
decision on the claim of the petitioners within two months. This order further refers to order dated 31.10.2017
(mentioned above) and disposes these representations in the light of that order.
As mentioned above, the ground for rejection of representation of the Workmen and finding that Circular
dated 16/17.05.2013 could not benefit these Workmen is mainly that firstly, in the light of guidelines issued by
headquarter on 19.08.2016, Clause (iv), relaxations and benefits were admissible only to ex-contractor Security
Guards which had any Court judgment in their favour who had attend finality and secondly, that the Workmen were
not engaged by the Corporation. Hence, they were not entitled to any benefit of this Circular particularly, in the light
of Clause 3(1) of this Circular.
For the sake of convenience, the Circular of 16/17.05.2013 (relevant portion) is being reproduced follows:
“the ex-contractual security guards who were working in FCI and wherever there is obligation cast upon
FCI pursuant to Court Judgments (which have attained finality). FCI will give preference to such erstwhile
contractual Watch & Ward personnel by giving relaxation in respect of upper age limit and the academic
qualification other than technical qualification at the time of recruitment. The field officers shall ensure strict
compliance of such Court Orders.”
A perusal of this Circular discloses that, it provides that the preference of such Contractual Security
Personnel by giving relaxations in respect of upper age limit, and academic qualification, other than technical
qualification at the time of recruitment shall be given to ex-contractual Security Guards who were working with the
Corporation and whether there is obligation cost upon the Corporation persuade of Court judgments, which have
attend finality. In the case in hand, this fact is undisputed for these Workmen were Security Guards working with the
Corporation as contract workers. Thus they are in the first category of Workers the second category of the Workers is
those who have Court Judgments in their favours which had attend finality. In the light of these finding, the
observations and findings recorded by the General Manager in his order dated 31.07.2017 and 08.05.2018 that, these
Workers are not entitled to benefit of the Circular because they did not have any Court Judgment in their favour is
held to be recorded by misreading of the Circular which is incorrect in law. The Workmen are thus held entitled to
benefit of the Circular dated 16/17.05.2013 with respect to relaxation of their upper age limit and academic
qualification other than technical qualification at the time of recruitment of Security Guards by the
Corporation whenever the recruitments takes place because of being ex-contractual security guards working
with the Corporation.
In the light of above discussion the reference is answered as follows.
4526
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AWARD
The Workmen are held entitled to benefit of the Circular dated 16/17.05.2013 with respect to
relaxation of their upper age limit and academic qualification other than technical qualification at the time of
recruitment of Security Guards by the Corporation whenever the recruitments takes place because of being ex-
contractual security guards working with the Corporation.
No order as to cost.
DATE:- 14/05/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1057.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj एस.ई.सी.एल. ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn
esa
–
सह
–
] जबलृुर dsiapkV(एलसी/आर-70/2011
) dks
izdkf‖kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/83/2011-vkbZ-vkj- (सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1057.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Reference.LC/R/70/2011) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
Management of S.E.C.L, and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30/05/2025.
[No. L-22012/83/2011 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/70/2011
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.(Retd.)
The Secretary,
Samyukta Koyla Mazdoor Sangh (AITUC),
Branch – New Amlai, PO: Amlai,
Distt. Shahdol (MP)
Shahdol
Workman
Vs
1. The CGM,
Sohagpur Area of SECL,
PO : Dhanpuri,
Distt. Shahdol (MP)
Shahdol
2. The Sub-Area Manager,
Amali-Bangwar Sub-Area,
PO – Bemhouri, Distt. Shahdol (MP)
Shahdol
Management
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4527
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 07th day of May - 2025)
As per letter dated 14/07/2011 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‗Act‘)as per Notification No. L-
22012/83/2011 (IR(CM-II)) dt. 14/07/2011. The dispute under reference relates to:
“Whether the action of the Management of the Sohagpur Area of SECL not making granting pay
protection to Smt. Munni Bai, Security Guard, New Amlai Mine is legal and justified? To what relief the
claimant is entitled for and from which date?”
The undisputed facts relating to the case are that, the Workman Munni Bai, was first appointed as General
Mazdoor Category- I in New Amlai Mines in 1998. She was performing duties of Security Guardin spite of being a
General Mazdoor, applied and was selected on the post of Woman Security Guard under order of Management dated
14.02.2005. She was nominated for six months training vide order 19/20/01/2005 and after successful training she
was given a regular appointment as Security Guard. She was placed at the Lowest Scale of the Pay-scale admissible to
the Security Guard though she was working as a General Mazdoor Category-I in pay scale admissible to the post of
General Mazdoor Category-I hence, her salary was reduced from Rs. 3649.36/- to Rs. 3457/-. She made the
representation to the Management against this reduction and requested for protection of pay on dated 02.07.2005 and
04.11.2005. No action was taken by Management, hence she approached the Union who raised a dispute before the
Assistant Labour Commissioner Central, Shahdol and after failure of conciliation the dispute was referred to this
Tribunal.
Case of the Management is mainly that, the Cadre of Security Guards and Cadre of General Mazdoor are
two different Cadres with different pay structure and different Cadre schemes. Since, there are two different cadre
schemes, pay protection is not available to a person who is selected on a post in a different cadre scheme. Thus
according to Management, their action is just, legal and proper.
In evidence, the Workman has filed Photocopy of her representation seeking opportunity to appear for the
post of Lady Security Guard filed on 30.05.2000, Representation dated 24.07.2001, Interview Letter dated 01.04.2004
issued by the Management to the Workman informing her to appear for the selection of Security Guard. Order of
Management dated 14.02.2005 appointing the workman on the post of Security Guard, order of Management dated
14/20/1/2005 regarding regularization of the Workman as Security Guard and order dated 30/31/08/2005,
representation of the Workman seeking pay protection, promotion order of the Workman dated 03/04/02/2009 on
Security Guard, Representation of the Workman dated 16.09.2009, letter of Management dated 14.09.2009, Internal
Communication between Headquarter and Area Headquarter, all admitted by Management and marked Exhibit W-1 to
W-14 to be referred to as and when required.
In evidence, the Workman has filed her affidavit as her examination-in-chief. She had been cross-
examined by Management.
Management has also filed photocopy documents which are mainly documents filed by Workman. All
these documents are admitted by Workman, they are marked Exhibit M-1 to M-10 to be referred to as and when
require. Management has filed affidavit of its witness as his examination-in-chief. He has been cross-examined by
Workman side.
I have heard argument of Learned Counsel for the Workman Mr. R.K. Soni and Learned Counsel Mr.
Neeraj Kevat for the Management. I have gone through the record as well.
The reference itself is the issue for determination in the case in hand.
Case of Management in defense for not granting pay protection to the Workman is that, the Cadre of
General Mazdoor and the Cadre of Security Guard are two different Cadres, guarded by two different Cadre Schemes.
Employees are permitted to appear in selection process conducted by Management from time to time for appointment
in different Cadres, they get selected and are posted at the lowest Pay Scale fixed for the Cadre in which they are
selected. It is further submitted by Management Learned Counsel that in the case in hand also, the Workman was a
General Mazdoor. For better prospects, she applied for selection of Security Guard which is a different Cadre. She
was selected for the post of Security Guard and was granted pay scale admissible to the Security Guard placing her at
the lowest scale. Also it is submitted that there is no role or understanding between employees and Management to
grant pay protection if an employee Working in one cadre joins in other separate cadre.
Learned Counsel for Workman has relied upon letter No. SECL/BSP/IR/Pay-Protection/22/129 dated
22.06.2022 sent by the General Manager (P&A) SECl Bilaspur to the Personnel Manager Jamuna Kotma Area on the
subject of pay protection to the employees of Jamuna Kotma area selected to the post of Mining Sirdar. According to
this letter, in the backdrop of order dated 31.08.2021 passed by Hon‘ble High Court in W.P. (s) No. 6632/2011 filed
against SECL by Shri Tanmay Das Gupta and 23 Others seeking Court pay protection. It is there further
mentioned in this letter that, the benefit of pay protection and payment of arrears has been extended to such
4528
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
employees who had approached Court of Law and also to such employees who had not approached Court of Law but
whose names were on the roll of the company on 08.03.2022 and were selected to the post of Mining Sirdar and DEO
in the year 2006 and 2007. Reference of order of Coal India order No. CIL/C-5B/Admn.Order/272 dated
14.04.2016 with respect to pay protection which permitted that any workman selected on higher post could not be
granted wage protection and this resolution be circulated for uniform implementation in all the subsidiaries of the
Coal India Limited.
Learned Counsel for Management has countered the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman, who has
sought pay protection on the basis of this circular, with a submission that this circular deals with pay protection to an
employee in a cadre after he gets promotion in the cadre, and is placed at higher pay-scale. Learned Counsel further
submits that this circular does not mention that pay protection should pay to those employees also who leave one
cadre and join another separate cadre with the Management. Since the circular does not provide so, and also the cadre
of General Mazdoor and Security Guard are two different and distinguished Cadres having different pay structures, I
am inclined to accept the argument from side of Management that in the case in hand the Workman is not entitled to
pay protection after she leave cadre of General Mazdoor and joined the cadre of Security Guard on fresh selection.
AWARD
Holding the action of the Management of the Sohagpur Area of SECL not making granting pay
protection to Smt. Munni Bai, Security Guard, New Amlai Mine legal and justified, she is held entitled to no
relief.
No order as to cost.
DATE:- 07/05/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1058.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj एस.ई.सी.एल. ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn
esa
–
सह
–
] जबलृुर dsiapkV(एलसी/आर-74/2011
) dks
izdkf‖kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/88/2011-vkbZ-vkj- (सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1058.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Reference.LC/R/74/2011) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
Management of S.E.C.L, and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30/05/2025.
[No. L-22012/88/2011 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/74/2011
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.(Retd.)
The Secretary
Janta Mazdoor Sangh (HMS)
B-3/6, Store Complex, Amradandi
PO : Amlai Colliery, Distt. Shahdol (MP)
Workman
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4529
Versus
1. The Chief General Manager
SECL, Korba Area,
Distt.-Korba (CG)
2. The Sub Area Manager/Mines Supdt.,
Bagdeva Project, Korba Sub Area
Distt.- Korba (CG)
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 11th day of February-2025)
As per letter dated 22/07/2011 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under Section -10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as per Notification
No. L-22012/88/2011/IR(CM-II) dt. 22/07/2011. The dispute under reference relates to:
“Whether the action of the management of Dy. General Manager Dhelwadih Singhali Bagdeva Sub-Area
of Korba Area, District Korba (CG) in termination of services of Shri Neelkanth Sinha, Ex. General
Mazdoor, Category-II, at Bagdeva Project w.e.f. 29.06.2004 is legal, proper and justified ? To what relief
the workman concerned is entitled to and from which date ?”
After registering a case on the basis of the reference, notices were sent to the parties and were served. Parties
appeared and file their respective Statement of Claims and Defense.
According to the workman union, Neelkanth Sinha was working as General Mazdoor, Category-II. Being
involved and in jail with respect to some criminal cases against him, he was unable to attend his duties and was not in
a condition to infrom the management about his arrest and detention. Her was issued a charge-sheet dated 22.07.2003,
he could not submit any reply, because he was in Jail. The management conducted a departmental inquiry against him
without giving any opportunity of hearing and terminated his services w.e.f. 29.06.2004, which is unjust, illegal and
arbitrary.
Rebutting the allegations of the workman, management has taken a case in their written statement of defense
that, the workman was a habitual absentee without informing management and without getting any leave sanctioned.
His attendance was 180 days in 1999, 161 days in 2000, 137 in 2001, 152 days in 2002, 111 in 2003 and 37 upto June
2004. He was issued a charge-sheet on 22.07.2003 with respect to his unauthorized absence from duty since
07.05.2003 till date. On his request, is sought permission to resume his duties which was allowed and a departmental
inquiry was setup by management to inquire into the charges of willful and unauthorized absence, as mentioned
above. On the date of inquiry on 13.01.2004, he was present in person before Inquiry Officer and admitted the
charges with a defense that, he was sick during the period. No evidence justifying his absence was produced and
charges were held proved. After considering his reply on show cause notice issued on the inquiry report, the
Disciplinary Authority Awarded the punishment of his dismissal from service, which is not disproportionate to the
charges.
Following preliminary issue was framed vide order dated 19.09.2024:-
1. Whether the departmental enquiry conducted was legal and proper?
Parties adduced their evidence on this preliminary issue the copy of enquiry papers was filed by
management, admitted by workman.
Preliminary issue was decided holding the departmental enquiry legal and proper. This order is part of this
award.
Following additional issues were also framed:-
2. Whether the charges are proved from the enquiry papers ?
3. Whether the punishment is disproportionate to the charge ?
4. Relief to which the workman is entitled ?
Parties were directed to file their evidence on these additional issues in form of documents/affidavit. None
of the parties filed any evidence on additional issues.
No oral argument was submitted by workman union. I have heard argument of learned Senior Counsel Shri
Anoop Nair for management and have gone through the record.
4530
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Issue No.-2 :-
The settled proposition of law is that the charges need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt in a
departmental enquiry. Following judgments are being referred to in this respect.
Scope of disciplinary proceedings and scope of criminal proceedings are quite distinct, exclusive and
independent of each other. Standards of proof in the two proceedings are also different. Ref. T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. vs.
K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255
Standard of proof in a departmental enquiry which is quasicriminal/quasi-judicial in nature: Disciplinary
proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although
the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all
reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasijudicial function, who
upon analyzing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to
prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any
irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject
the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. Ref: (i) Nirmala J. Jhala Vs.
State of Gujarat & Another, AIR 2013 SC 1513 (paras 10 , 11, 12 & 13). (ii) M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India,
(2006) 5 SCC 88 (Para 25)
In the cases of (i) NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association Vs NOIDA & others, AIR 2007 SC 1161 (i4i) State
Bank of India Vs. R.B. Sharma, (2004) 7 SCC 27 (iii) Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. T. Srinivas, (2004) 7
SCC 442 (iv) Depot Manager, APSRTC Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699 (v) Captain M. Paul Anthony
Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Limited (1999) 3 SCC 679 and (vi) State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417
(vi) Pratap Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 (vii) Jang Bahadur Singh Vs. Baij Nath, AIR 1969 SC 30,
it has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that "the purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are
two different and distinct aspects. Departmental Enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of
public service. Crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The enquiry in a
departmental proceeding relates to the conduct or breach of duty by the delinquent officer to punish him for his
misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. It is the settled legal position that the strict standard of
proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded in a departmental proceeding. Criminal Proceedings and
the departmental proceeding under enquiry can go on simultaneously."
In the case of T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd. Vs. K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255, it has been held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that the scopes of the disciplinary proceedings and of criminal proceedings are quite distinct,
exclusive and independent of each other. Standards of proof in the two proceedings are also different.
In the cases of Mohd. Saleem Siddiqui Vs. State of UP & others, (2011) 2 UPLBEC 1575 (Allahabad High
Court) and Ajeet Kumar Naag Vs. General Manager Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Haldia, JT 2005 (8) SC 425, the
distinction between departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings has been drawn as under: "The two proceedings
i.e. criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. The
object of criminal proceedings is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender and the purpose of enquiry
proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance service rules the rule
relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law burden of proof is on
the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubts, he cannot
be convicted by a court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent
officer on a finding recorded on the basis of preponderance of probability. Procedure with respect to standard of
proof in criminal case and departmental enquiry are different. In the case of departmental enquiry the technical rules
of evidence have no application and the doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has also no application in the departmental
enquiry. Criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society or for
breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of
commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the
service and efficiency of public service. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry
and trial of criminal case. "
Perusal of enquiry papers filed and proved by management shows that the defense for absence taken by the
workman during inquiry was that, he was sick during the period, but did not file any sufficient documentary evidence
in form of medical certificate with respect to the effect that, he was advised bed rest by the Doctors and hence could
not attend the office. Hence, the finding of the Inquiry Officer holding the charge proved is held to have been
recorded correctly.
Issue No.2 is answered accordingly.
Issue No.-3 :-
The settled proposition of law is that the punishment can be interfered by this Tribunal only when it is so
disproportionate to the charge that it shocks the conscience of this Tribunal. Following judgments are being referred
to in this respect.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4531
Hon‘ble Apex Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 while discussing about the
scope of judicial review, in disciplinary matters, has observed as under:
“The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its
own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mold the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, imposed appropriate
punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”
In DG, RPF vs. Sai Babu (2003) 4 SCC 331, Hon‘ble Apex Court has observed that:
“6…………. Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the
High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the
punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors
including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of
duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of an discipline required to be
maintained, and the department/establishment which the delinquent person concerned works.”
In United Commercial Bank vs. P.C. Kakkar (2003) 4 SCC 364 Hon‘ble Apex Court on review of a long
line of cases and the principles of judicial review of administrative action under English law summarized the legal
position in the following words:
“11.
The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere
with the administrators‟ decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was
shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards.
In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the
choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the
administrator. The scope of judicial review is judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-
making process and not the decision.
12.
To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to
shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording
cogent reasons in support thereof.‖
In Union of India vs. S.S. Ahluwalia (2007) 7 SCC 257 Hon‘ble Supreme Court reiterated the legal position
as follows:
“8.
……… The scope of judicial review in the matter of imposition of penalty as a result of
disciplinary proceedings is very limited. The court can interfere with the punishment only if it
finds the same to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to be proved.”
In State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak (2008) 7 SCC 580 Hon‘ble Supreme Court stated that:
“The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless
shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review.
Hon‘ble Apex Court in Administrator, UnionTerritory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli vs. Gulbhia M. Lad
(2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 101 has observed that
“The legal position is fairly well settled that while exercising the power of judicial review, the
High Court or a Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary
authority, and/or on appeal the appellate authority with regard to the imposition of punishment
unless such discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity or that would
shock the conscience of the court/tribunal. The exercise of discretion in imposition of
punishment by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority is dependent on host of factors
such as gravity of misconduct, past conduct, the nature of duties assigned to the delinquent,
responsibility of the position that the delinquent holds, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline
required to be maintained in the department or establishment he works. Ordinarily the court or
the tribunal would not substitute its opinion on reappraisal of facts.
This extract is taken from State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 :
(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721 : 2011 SCC OnLine SC 416 at page 587
7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the
4532
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of
the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in
departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental
enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to
find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or
finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters,
if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] , Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] , Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana [(1999) 5
SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036] and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [(2000) 1
SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144] .)
In Air India Corporation Bombay vs. V.A. Ravellow 1972 (25) FLR 319 (SC) it has been observed that:
“Once the employer has lost the confidence in the employee and the bona fide loss of
confidence is affirmed, the order of punishment must be considered to be immune from
challenge, for the reason that discharging the office of trust and confidence requires
absolute integrity, and in a case of loss of confidence, reinstatement cannot be directed.‖
In Knhaiyalal Agarwal and others vs. Factory Manager, Gwaliar Sugar Co. Ltd. AIR 2001 SC 3645
Hon‘ble Apex Court laid down the test for loss of confidence to find out as to whether there was bona fide loss of
confidence in the employee, observing that:
“Loss of confidence cannot be subjective, based upon the mind of the management.
Objective facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the
management, regarding trust worthiness or reliability of the employee, must be alleged and
proved.”
Management has proved that the workman is habitual offender with respect to unauthorized absence. Details
of his absence from 1999 to June 2004 have been mentioned above. In these facts, the punishment of dismissal of the
workman from service is not disproportionate to the charge.
Issue no.-3 is answered accordingly.
Issue No.-4 :_
On the basis of findings recorded above, the workman is held entitled to no relief.
Accordingly, the Reference is answered as follows :-
AWARD
Holding the action of the management of Dy. General Manager Dhelwadih Singhali Bagdeva Sub-
Area of Korba Area, District Korba (CG) in termination of services of Shri Neelkanth Sinha, Ex. General
Mazdoor, Category-II, at Bagdeva Project w.e.f. 29.06.2004 legal, proper and justified, the workman
concerned is entitled to no relief.
No order as to cost.
DATE:- 11/02/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 12 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1059.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj एस.ई.सी.एल. ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn
esa
–
सह
–
] जबलृुर dsiapkV(एलसी/आर-37/2022
) dks
izdkf‖kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22013/01/2022-vkbZ-vkj- (सी.एम-II)]
मजणकंदन.एन, उृ जनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4533
New Delhi, the 12th June, 2025
S.O. 1059.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Reference.LC/R/37/2022) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
Management of S.E.C.L, and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30/05/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/37/2022
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.(Retd.)
Jagdish Chouhan
S/o. Late Shri Shyam Lal Chouhan
Village Turda, PO – Tarda
Tehsil-Kartala, Distt.- Korba (C.G.)
Workman
Versus
The Chairman-cum-Managing Director
South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL)
Seepat Road, Bilaspur, Distt.-Bilaspur (C.G.)
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 05th day of May-2025)
As per letter dated 26.08.2022 / 30.08.2022 by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) Raipur,
Ministry of Labour & Employment, New Delhi, the reference is made to this Tribunal under Section -10 of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 as per Notification No. RP-2(1-1)/2022-ES.III dt. 26.08.2022 / 30.08.2022. The dispute under
reference relates to:
“Whether the action on the part of management of South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL), Bilaspur
(C.G.) in terminating the services of workman Sh. Jagdish Chouhan S/o. Late Shri Shyamlal Chouhan,
General Mazdoor, Category-I is legal and justified ? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to ?”
After registering a case on the basis of the reference, notices were sent to the parties and were served. Parties
appeared and file their respective Statement of Claims and Defense.
According to the workman, he was initially appointed in 2002 and after requisite training, was made
permanent. While working with management he was issued a charge-sheet dated 15.04.2010 leveling against him a
charge of misconduct as defined u/s. Clause 26.24 and 26.30 of the Certified Standing Orders, by way of
unauthorizedly absenting himself from workplace without notice since 19.11.2009 till date of charge-sheet. He
submitted a reply to the charge-sheet and denied the charges stating that he was suffering from critical illness and was
admitted in District Hospital for treatment. He also submitted his medical certificates. The management decided to
conduct an inquiry which was conducted against established Rules and Procedures, also in violation of principles of
natural justice and he was wrongly held guilty of misconduct by the inquiry officer in the inquiry report submitted. He
was issued a show cause notice by the Disciplinary Authority on the inquiry report. He did submit his reply on the
show cause notice which was turned down by the Disciplinary Authority who wrongly agreed with the findings of
Inquiry Officer and passed the impugned punishment of his dismissal from service on 30.08.2010. The Appellate
Authority also wrongly dismissed his appeal. According to the workman, no charge was proved against him, because
his absence was not willful and also the punishment was disproportionate to the charge proved. It is further the case of
workman that he preferred a writ petition before Hon‘ble High Court of Chhattisgarh which was WP No. 2551/2015
finally decided by Hon‘ble High Court vide order dated 17.07.2015 with an observation the workman was at liberty to
seek remedy before proper Forum. Thereafter, he raised a dispute in this respect before the Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central). On failure of conciliation, the dispute was referred to this Tribunal. The workman has
4534
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
prayed that holding the order of management dated 23.08.2010 and 11.09.2015 terminating his services bad in law, he
be held entitled to be reinstated with back wages and benefits.
Countering the allegations, the management taken a case in their written statement of defense that the
Workman has been habitual absentee who absented himself in the previous years also. His total attendance was
25 days in 2005, 150 days in 2006, 102 days in 2007, 89 days 2008 and 29 days in 2009. He was given opportunities
to improve his attendance but he failed. He was issued charge-sheet no. 336 dated 22.07.2006. He admitted his
misconduct and was allowed to work. He filed similar undertakings to improve his attendance on 01.01.2008 and
29.10.2009. He was issued a charge-sheet of alleging misconduct on his part as defined in Clause 26.24 and 26.30 of
the Certified Standing Orders by way of unauthorizedly and habitually absenting himself from workplace since
19.11.2009 till date of charge-sheet i.e. 15.04.2010. A departmental inquiry was conducted as per Rules and
Procedures. The workman was found guilty of the misconduct and after taking his reply on show cause notice issued
to him on the basis of inquiry report, he was terminated from service by way of punishment by the Disciplinary
Authority. An appeal was preferred against the termination order which was heard and dismissed by the Appellate
Authority. According to management, the punishment is not disproportionate keeping in view his previous
misconducts of same nature as mentioned above. Management has prayed that the reference be answered against the
workman.
Following preliminary issue was framed vide order dated 08.10.2024 on the basis of pleadings:-
1. Whether the departmental enquiry conducted is legal and proper or not?
The Preliminary Issue was decided vide order dated 26.11.2024. The departmental inquiry was held just,
legal and proper. This order is part of this judgment.
Following additional issues were framed on the basis of pleadings-
2. Whether the charges are proved by the evidence in the inquiry?
3. Whether the punishment is proportionate to the misconduct proved ?
4. Whether the workman is entitled to any relief?
Parties were directed to file their evidence on remaining issues in form of documents/affidavit. The workman
filed his affidavit. Management has filed authenticated copy of inquiry proceedings, admitted by the workman.
I have heard argument of learned Counsel Mr. Arun Patel for workman and learned Counsel Mr. Amit
Kumar Jaiswal for management. I have gone through the record as well.
Issue No.-2 :-
Learned Counsel for management has referred to the enquiry papers, in support of his argument that the
charge was rightly held proved by the Enquiry Officer.
Learned Counsel has submitted that the standard of proof required for charge to be proved in a departmental
enquiry is not the same as it is in a criminal trial.
The settled proposition of law is that the charges need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt in a
departmental enquiry. Following judgments are being referred to in this respect.
Scope of disciplinary proceedings and scope of criminal proceedings are quite distinct, exclusive and
independent of each other. Standards of proof in the two proceedings are also different. Ref. T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. vs.
K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255
Standard of proof in a departmental enquiry which is quasicriminal/quasi-judicial in nature: Disciplinary
proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although
the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all
reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasijudicial function, who
upon analyzing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to
prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any
irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject
the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. Ref: (i) Nirmala J. Jhala Vs.
State of Gujarat & Another, AIR 2013 SC 1513 (paras 10, 11, 12 & 13). (ii) M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India,
(2006) 5 SCC 88 (Para 25)
In the cases of (i) NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association Vs NOIDA & others, AIR 2007 SC 1161 (i4i) State
Bank of India Vs. R.B. Sharma, (2004) 7 SCC 27 (iii) Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. T. Srinivas, (2004) 7
SCC 442 (iv) Depot Manager, APSRTC Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699 (v) Captain M. Paul Anthony
Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Limited (1999) 3 SCC 679 and (vi) State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417
(vi) Pratap Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 (vii) Jang Bahadur Singh Vs. Baij Nath, AIR 1969 SC 30,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4535
it has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that "the purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are
two different and distinct aspects. Departmental Enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of
public service. Crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The enquiry in a
departmental proceeding relates to the conduct or breach of duty by the delinquent officer to punish him for his
misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. It is the settled legal position that the strict standard of
proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded in a departmental proceeding. Criminal Proceedings and
the departmental proceeding under enquiry can go on simultaneously."
In the case of T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd. Vs. K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255, it has been held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that the scopes of the disciplinary proceedings and of criminal proceedings are quite distinct,
exclusive and independent of each other. Standards of proof in the two proceedings are also different.
In the cases of Mohd. Saleem Siddiqui Vs. State of UP & others, (2011) 2 UPLBEC 1575 (Allahabad High
Court) and Ajeet Kumar Naag Vs. General Manager Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Haldia, JT 2005 (8) SC 425, the
distinction between departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings has been drawn as under: "The two proceedings
i.e. criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. The
object of criminal proceedings is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender and the purpose of enquiry
proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance service rules the rule
relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law burden of proof is on
the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubts, he cannot
be convicted by a court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent
officer on a finding recorded on the basis of preponderance of probability. Procedure with respect to standard of
proof in criminal case and departmental enquiry are different. In the case of departmental enquiry the technical rules
of evidence have no application and the doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has also no application in the departmental
enquiry. Criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society or for
breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of
commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the
service and efficiency of public service. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry
and trial of criminal case. "
As mentioned above, charge against the workman is of unauthorized absent from workplace for the period
19.11.2009 till date of charge-sheet as mentioned in the charge.
Learned Counsel for workman has submitted that an unauthorized absence should also be proved willful to
constitute a misconduct. He has referred to following decisions in this respect.
1. Krushnakant B. Parmar vs Union Of India & Anr, 2012 (3) SCC 178,
The relevant portion of the judgment is being reproduced as follows :-
“16.
In the case of the appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority
alleged that he failed to maintain devotion to duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a
government servant. The question whether “unauthorised absence from duty” amounts to failure of
devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant cannot be decided without
deciding the question whether absence is wilful or because of compelling circumstances.
17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report
or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application
or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There
may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling
circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the
employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a
government servant.
18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the
disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding,
the absence will not amount to misconduct.
19. In the present case the inquiry officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant
was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence was wilful; the disciplinary
authority as also the appellate authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant
guilty.
20. The question relating to jurisdiction of the court in judicial review in a departmental proceeding
fell for consideration before this Court in M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [(2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 919] wherein this Court held: (SCC p. 95, para 25)
4536
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“25.
It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary
proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the
charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a
criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer
performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion
that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on
record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to
consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant
testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the
allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.”
21. In the present case, the disciplinary authority failed to prove that the absence from duty was
wilful, no such finding has been given by the inquiry officer or the appellate authority. Though the
appellant had taken a specific defence that he was prevented from attending duty by Shri P.
Venkateswarlu, DCIO, Palanpur who prevented him to sign the attendance register and also brought
on record 11 defence exhibits in support of his defence that he was prevented to sign the attendance
register, this includes his letter dated 3-10-1995 addressed to Shri K.P. Jain, JD, SIB, Ahmedabad,
receipts from STD/PCO office of telephone calls dated 29-9-1995, etc. but such defence and evidence
were ignored and on the basis of irrelevant fact and surmises the inquiry officer held the appellant
guilty.
22. Mr P. Venkateswarlu, DCIO, Palanpur, who was the complainant and against whom the
appellant alleged bias refused to appear before the inquiry officer in spite of service of summons. Two
other witnesses, Shri Jivrani and Shri L.N. Thakkar made no statement against the appellant, and
one of them stated that he had no knowledge about the absence of the appellant. Ignoring the
aforesaid evidence, on the basis of surmises and conjectures, the inquiry officer held the charge
proved.
23. Though the aforesaid facts were noticed by the appellate authority but ignoring such facts giving
reference of extraneous allegations which were not the part of the charge, it dismissed the appeal with
the following uncalled for observation:
“The appellant even avoided the basic training required for the job and asked JAD, Ahmedabad
to send all the training papers for his training at IB Training School, Shivpuri (Madhya Pradesh) to
his residence at Ahmedabad. „An untrained officer is of no worth to the department‟.”
24. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of dismissal passed by the disciplinary
authority, affirmed by the appellate authority; the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High
Court are set aside. The appellant stands reinstated.”
This proposition of law has been followed in following judgments:-
1. W. P. No. 34432 of 2024 Inayat Khan Vs The State Of Msdhya Pradesh & Others, decided by
Hon‟ble High Court of M.P. on 26.11.2024.(D.B.)
2. S V Panchal vs State Of Gujarat & 2 Others, Special Civil Application No. 1146 of 2010, decided by
Hon‟ble High Court of Gujarat.(D.B.)
Perusal of inquiry papers reveals that the workman stated during the inquiry that he was ill during the period
from 19.11.2009 till 27.06.2010 and was admitted in District Hospital Korba for treatment. The inquiry proceedings
also reveal that he filed a medical certificate issued by the Doctor under whose treatment he was, who certified that
the workman Jagdish Chouhan was under his treatment for Chronic Cirrhosis of Lever and Mental Depression, was
advised rest from 19.11.2009 to 27.06.2010.
Also it comes out from perusal of inquiry proceedings that the workman was asked to produce papers
regarding his treatment and prescriptions by the Inquiry Officer and he stated that he be given to time to file these
documents. He also explained the reason behind his treatment in District Hospital instead of Colliery Hospital and
also the reason behind not informing the management. The reasons according to him where that he had been living in
his village and he was admitted by his family members in Govt. Hospital at District Head Quarter when his condition
deteriorated. The Inquiry Officer has nowhere held or recorded a finding that the medical certificate filed was not
genuine.
Since, the workman had explained the reasons behind his absence from workplace; his absence could not be
held willful, though undoubtedly it was unauthorized because it was without getting any leave sanctioned or without
prior intimation to management.
Hence, in the light of the principle of law laid down in the cases above referred, since the absence of the
workman for the period mentioned in the charge-sheet was not willful, it cannot constitute a misconduct under the
Certified Standing Orders.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4537
On the basis of above discussion, holding the finding of the Inquiry Officer regarding proof of charge
perverse, the additional issue is answered accordingly.
Issue No.-3 :-
The settled proposition of law is that the punishment can be interfered by this Tribunal only when it is so
disproportionate to the charge that it shocks the conscience of this Tribunal. Following judgments are being referred
to in this respect.
Hon‘ble Apex Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 while discussing about the
scope of judicial review, in disciplinary matters, has observed as under:
“The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its
own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mold the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, imposed appropriate
punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”
In DG, RPF vs. Sai Babu (2003) 4 SCC 331, Hon‘ble Apex Court has observed that:
“6…………. Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the
High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the
punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors
including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of
duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of an discipline required to be
maintained, and the department/establishment which the delinquent person concerned works.”
In United Commercial Bank vs. P.C. Kakkar (2003) 4 SCC 364 Hon‘ble Apex Court on review of a long
line of cases and the principles of judicial review of administrative action under English law summarized the legal
position in the following words:
“11.
The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere
with the administrators‟ decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was
shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards.
In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the
choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the
administrator. The scope of judicial review is judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-
making process and not the decision.
12.
To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference.
Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment
by recording cogent reasons in support thereof.‖
In Union of India vs. S.S. Ahluwalia (2007) 7 SCC 257 Hon‘ble Supreme Court reiterated the legal position
as follows:
“8.
……… The scope of judicial review in the matter of imposition of penalty as a result of
disciplinary proceedings is very limited. The court can interfere with the punishment only if it finds the
same to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to be proved.”
In State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak (2008) 7 SCC 580 Hon‘ble Supreme Court stated that:
“The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless
shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review.
Hon‘ble Apex Court in Administrator, UnionTerritory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli vs. Gulbhia M. Lad
(2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 101 has observed that
“The legal position is fairly well settled that while exercising the power of judicial review, the
High Court or a Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority,
and/or on appeal the appellate authority with regard to the imposition of punishment unless such
discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity or that would shock the conscience of
the court/tribunal. The exercise of discretion in imposition of punishment by the disciplinary authority or
appellate authority is dependent on host of factors such as gravity of misconduct, past conduct, the nature
of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the position that the delinquent holds, previous
penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment he works.
Ordinarily the court or the tribunal would not substitute its opinion on reappraisal of facts.
4538
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
This extract is taken from State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 :
(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721 : 2011 SCC OnLine SC 416 at page 587
7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in
the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record.
If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in
departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived
at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the
findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated
or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.
(Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44]
, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] , Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana [(1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036] and High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [(2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144] .)
In Air India Corporation Bombay vs. V.A. Ravellow 1972 (25) FLR 319 (SC) it has been observed that:
“Once the employer has lost the confidence in the employee and the bona fide loss of confidence
is affirmed, the order of punishment must be considered to be immune from challenge, for the reason that
discharging the office of trust and confidence requires absolute integrity, and in a case of loss of
confidence, reinstatement cannot be directed.‖
In Knhaiyalal Agarwal and others vs. Factory Manager, Gwaliar Sugar Co. Ltd. AIR 2001 SC 3645
Hon‘ble Apex Court laid down the test for loss of confidence to find out as to whether there was bona fide loss of
confidence in the employee, observing that:
“Loss of confidence cannot be subjective, based upon the mind of the management. Objective
facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the management, regarding
trust worthiness or reliability of the employee, must be alleged and proved.”
The finding of the Inquiry Officer holding the charge of misconduct proved has been held perverse. Hence,
the punishment order also cannot be allowed to sustain. Hence, the punishment order as mentioned above is held
unjust and illegal.
Issue no.-3 is answered accordingly.
Issue No.-4 :_
Learned Counsel for the workman has referred to following decision of Hon‘ble the Apex Court, the relevant
paragraphs are being reproduced as follows:-
Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC
(L&S) 184 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 719 at page 354
36. We may now deal with the judgment in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal [(2007) 2 SCC 433 : (2007) 1
SCC (L&S) 651] in detail. The facts of that case were that the respondent was dismissed from service on
the basis of inquiry conducted by the competent authority. The Labour Court held that the inquiry was not
fair and proper and permitted the parties to adduce evidence on the charges levelled against the
respondent. After considering the evidence, the Labour Court gave benefit of doubt to the respondent and
substituted the punishment of dismissal from service with that of stoppage of increments for two years. On
an application filed by the respondent, the Labour Court held that the respondent was entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages for the period of unemployment. The learned Single Judge dismissed
the writ petition and the Division Bench declined to interfere by observing that the employer had wilfully
violated the order of the Labour Court. On an application made by the respondent under Section 6(6) of
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Labour Court amended the award. This Court upheld the
power of the Labour Court to amend the award but did not approve the award of full back wages.
37. After noticing several precedents to which reference has been made hereinabove, the two-Judge Bench
observed : (J.K. Synthetics case [(2007) 2 SCC 433 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 651] , SCC pp. 448-50,
paras 17-21)
“17. There is also a misconception that whenever reinstatement is directed, „continuity of service‟ and
„consequential benefits‟ should follow, as a matter of course. The disastrous effect of granting several
promotions as a „consequential benefit‟ to a person who has not worked for 10 to 15 years and who does
not have the benefit of necessary experience for discharging the higher duties and functions of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4539
promotional posts, is seldom visualised while granting consequential benefits automatically. Whenever
courts or tribunals direct reinstatement, they should apply their judicial mind to the facts and
circumstances to decide whether „continuity of service‟ and/or „consequential benefits‟ should also be
directed. …
18.
Coming back to back wages, even if the court finds it necessary to award back wages, the
question will be whether back wages should be awarded fully or only partially (and if so the percentage).
That depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Any income received by the employee during
the relevant period on account of alternative employment or business is a relevant factor to be taken note
of while awarding back wages, in addition to the several factors mentioned in Rudhan Singh [Haryana
Roadways v. Rudhan Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 591 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 716] and Uday Narain Pandey [U.P.
State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 250] .
Therefore, it is necessary for the employee to plead that he was not gainfully employed from the date of
his termination. While an employee cannot be asked to prove the negative, he has to at least assert on oath
that he was neither employed nor engaged in any gainful business or venture and that he did not have any
income. Then the burden will shift to the employer. But there is, however, no obligation on the terminated
employee to search for or secure alternative employment. Be that as it may.
19.
But the cases referred to above, where back wages were awarded, related to
termination/retrenchment which were held to be illegal and invalid for non-compliance with statutory
requirements or related to cases where the Court found that the termination was motivated or amounted to
victimisation. The decisions relating to back wages payable on illegal retrenchment or termination may
have no application to the case like the present one, where the termination (dismissal or removal or
compulsory retirement) is by way of punishment for misconduct in a departmental enquiry, and the court
confirms the finding regarding misconduct, but only interferes with the punishment being of the view that
it is excessive, and awards a lesser punishment, resulting in the reinstatement of employee. Where the
power under Article 226 or Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (or any other similar provision) is
exercised by any court to interfere with the punishment on the ground that it is excessive and the
employee deserves a lesser punishment, and a consequential direction is issued for reinstatement, the
court is not holding that the employer was in the wrong or that the dismissal was illegal and invalid. The
court is merely exercising its discretion to award a lesser punishment. Till such power is exercised, the
dismissal is valid and in force. When the punishment is reduced by a court as being excessive, there can
be either a direction for reinstatement or a direction for a nominal lump sum compensation. And if
reinstatement is directed, it can be effective either prospectively from the date of such substitution of
punishment (in which event, there is no continuity of service) or retrospectively, from the date on which
the penalty of termination was imposed (in which event, there can be a consequential direction relating to
continuity of service). What requires to be noted in cases where finding of misconduct is affirmed and
only the punishment is interfered with (as contrasted from cases where termination is held to be illegal or
void) is that there is no automatic reinstatement; and if reinstatement is directed, it is not automatically
with retrospective effect from the date of termination. Therefore, where reinstatement is a consequence of
imposition of a lesser punishment, neither back wages nor continuity of service nor consequential
benefits, follow as a natural or necessary consequence of such reinstatement. In cases where the
misconduct is held to be proved, and reinstatement is itself a consequential benefit arising from imposition
of a lesser punishment, award of back wages for the period when the employee has not worked, may
amount to rewarding the delinquent employee and punishing the employer for taking action for the
misconduct committed by the employee. That should be avoided. Similarly, in such cases, even where
continuity of service is directed, it should only be for purposes of pensionary/retirement benefits, and not
for other benefits like increments, promotions, etc.
20.
But there are two exceptions. The first is where the court sets aside the termination as a
consequence of employee being exonerated or being found not guilty of the misconduct. Second is where
the court reaches a conclusion that the inquiry was held in respect of a frivolous issue or petty
misconduct, as a camouflage to get rid of the employee or victimise him, and the disproportionately
excessive punishment is a result of such scheme or intention. In such cases, the principles relating to back
wages, etc. will be the same as those applied in the cases of an illegal termination.
21.
In this case, the Labour Court found that a charge against the employee in respect of a serious
misconduct was proved. It, however, felt that the punishment of dismissal was not warranted and
therefore, imposed a lesser punishment of withholding the two annual increments. In such circumstances,
award of back wages was neither automatic nor consequential. In fact, back wages was not warranted at
all.”
38. The propositions which can be culled out from the aforementioned judgments are:
38.1.
In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back
wages is the normal rule.
38.2.
The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the
adjudicating authority or the court may take into consideration the length of service of the
4540
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the
financial condition of the employer and similar other factors.
38.3.
Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of
getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating
authority or the court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser
wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead
cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal
to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that
the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment
about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore,
once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and
prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar
emoluments.
38.4.
The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the
employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if any,
but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the
discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the
employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false
charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages.
38.5.
The cases in which the competent court or tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross
violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimising the
employee or workman, then the court or tribunal concerned will be fully justified in directing payment of
full back wages. In such cases, the superior courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of
the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc. merely because there is a
possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back
wages or the employer's obligation to pay the same. The courts must always keep in view that in the cases
of wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the
employee/workman and there is no justification to give a premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by
relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages.
38.6.
In a number of cases, the superior courts have interfered with the award of the primary
adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalisation of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in
majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is
the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised.
It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because
there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of
reinstatement. The courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an
advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for
prolonging the agony of the sufferer i.e. the employee or workman, who can ill-afford the luxury of
spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to
adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees [Hindustan Tin Works (P)
Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] .
38.7.
The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal [(2007) 2 SCC 433 : (2007) 1 SCC
(L&S) 651] that on reinstatement the employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of right is
contrary to the ratio of the judgments of three-Judge Benches [Hindustan Tin Works (P)
Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] , [Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt.
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] referred to hereinabove
and cannot be treated as good law. This part of the judgment is also against the very concept of
reinstatement of an employee/workman.
The workman has filed an affidavit that he has not been in any gainful employment since the date of his
termination from service. It has been submitted that since his termination has been held unjust and illegal, he requires
to be reinstated with back wages and benefits. Management has submitted that keeping in view the past conduct of the
workman and the fact that he has been in the habit of unauthorizedly absenting himself from workplace in the
previous years also, his reinstatement that too with back wages will not be interest of justice.
As regards, his previous misconducts, it could be a relevant point in determining the quantum of punishment
when the charge levelled in the charge-sheet would have been found proved. When the present charges have been
found not proved, the previous conduct of the workman becomes irrelevant.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, particularly the fact that he first agitated
against his termination in 2015 and in the light of findings recorded above as well the settled proposition of law laid
down as above, the reinstatement of the workman with 25% wages payable to him within 30 days from the date of the
publication of the Award, failing which interest @ of 6% per annum from the date of Award till payment. and other in
service as well post retiral benefits will meet the ends of justice to which the workman is held entitled.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4541
Issue no.-4 is answered accordingly.
Accordingly, the Reference is answered as follows :-
AWARD
Holding the action of management of South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL) in imposing the
penalty of termination of the workman Jagdish Chouhan from service vide order dated 23.08.2010 against law
and unjust, the workman is held entitled to be reinstated from the date of termination of his services with 25%
back wages payable to him within 30 days from the date of the publication of the Award, failing which interest
@ of 6% per annum from the date of Award till payment and all in service as well post retiral benefits.
No order as to cost.
DATE:- 05/05/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 13 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1060.—vkS?kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
'
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS?kksfxd fookn esa
vkS?kksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a10 (C ) of 2018) izdkf''kr djrh gSA
[सं.
-12011/50/2018-vkbZ-vkj- (बी-II)]
सलोनी, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th June, 2025
S.O. 1060.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 10 (C ) of 2018) of the Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Patna
as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Punjab National Bank and
their workmen.
[No. L-12011/50/2018- IR(B-II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
Reference Case No.:-10 (C) of 2018
Before The Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal, Patna.
Reference Case No.:-10 (C) of 2018
Between the management of (1) The Manager, Punjab National Bank, Station
Road, Madhubani, Distt. Madhubani-847211(2) The Circle Head, Punjab National Bank, Circle Office, G.M. Road,
P.O Lalbagh, Darbhanga-846004 and their workman Sri Sajan Ram, (PTS) represented through the President, Bank
Employees Federation, Bihar, Saboo Complex, 2nd Floor, Behind Republic Hotel, Patna (BIHAR)-800001..
For the management:-
Sri Nand Mohan Das, Sr. Manager
Mrs Preeti, Dy Manager, HRD.
For the workman:-
Sri B. Prasad, President, Bank Employees Federation, Bihar.
Present:-
Manoj Kumar Sinha
Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal, Patna.
AWARD
Patna, dt- 23rd May, 2025.
By the adjudication order no.-L-12011/50/2018-IR(B-II) New Delhi, dated- 14.11.2018 the Govt. of India
Ministry of Labour New Delhi has referred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of section 10 of
the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, (hereinafter to be referred to as ― the Act‖) the following dispute between the
management of the (1) The Manager, Punjab National Bank, Station Road, Madhubani, Distt. Madhubani-847211 (2)
The Circle Head, Punjab National Bank, Circle Office, G.M. Road, P.O Lalbagh, Darbhanga-846004 and their
workman Sri Sajan Ram, (PTS)
Reference Case No.:-10 (C) of 2018
represented through the President, Bank Employees Federation, Bihar, Saboo Complex, 2nd Floor, Behind
Republic Hotel, Patna (BIHAR)-800001 for adjudication to this tribunal.
SCHEDULE
― Whether the action of the management of Punjab National bank, in not regularizing service of Shri Sajan
Ram, Part Time Sweeper alleged to be working from 25.05.2008 at Madhubani Branch, Distt. Madhubani is
justified? If not, what relief the workman concerned are entitled to?
2.
On receiving the reference notification on 20.11.2018 notice were issued to both the sides and the case was
fixed on 31.12.2018 for their appearance, the proceeding were adjourned several time and after lapse of fifteen dates,
President, Bank Employees Federation filed statement of claim on behalf of the workman on 06.07.2020. On the other
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
hand management authorised Sri Nand Mohan Das, Sr. Manager and Mrs. Preeti, Dy. Manager HRD through
represented the management bank. Record shows that on 07.04.2022 management filed Reply / written statement and
subsequently both sides were directed to furnished list of witnesses and documents and several opportunities were
given to the workman for filing for the same.
3.
The record reflects that the workman Sajan Ram for whom dispute is raised by the President, Bank
Employees Federation, Bihar appeared before this tribunal and did not furnished any documents for representation to
be placed the same before this tribunal. The representative of workman has submitted that the
Reference Case No.:-10 (C) of 2018
workman is not in his contact since last a few years and perhaps he has no grievance and he has lost his
interest in the instant case. So necessary order may kindly be passed. It has also been asserted by the representative of
the management, since workman is evading his appearance and did not file any documents inspite of knowledge of
the proceeding which suggest that he has no grievance at all so ― No Dispute Award‖ may kindly be passed.
4.
Considering all the facts along with circumstances of the case and on scrutinizing the proceeding as well as
the submissions as advanced on behalf of the both the sides, this tribunal finds and hold that this reference is related to
the grievance of workman Sajan Ram regarding denial of his regularization of service and threat of termination by the
management bank (Punjab National Bank). This reference is received on 20.11.2018. Workman once appeared on
22.06.2020 and put his signature on the verification details of his statement of claim and the same were filed before
tribunal on 06.07.2020 by the representative Sri B. Prasad, President, Bank Employees Federation Association, Bihar
workman himself present on 23.12.2021 and filed hazari with his signature and since then the workman never turned
up before this tribunal and did not filed any documents and list of witness. Ultimately the representative of the
workman reported to this tribunal that he has no contact with the workman Sajan Ram perhaps he has no grievance at
all so necessary order may kindly be passed.
Thus taking note of these facts and continuous absence of the workman from 01.02.2021 itself denotes that
the workman has no grievance at all with the management bank. Therefore this tribunal has left with no option then
to pass a ― No Dispute Award‖ and accordingly
Reference Case No.:-10 (C) of 2018
― No Dispute Award‖ is passed in this case. Which shall be effected after date of publication in gazette.
Awarded accordingly.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
MANOJ KUMAR SINHA Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 13 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1061.— vkS?kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
इलाहाबाद बैंक
)
जवलय के बाद अब इंजडयन बैंक
(
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS?kksfxd fookn esa vkS?kksfxd vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (11 (C ) of 2016) izdkf‖kr djrh gSA
[सं.
-12011/2/2016-vkbZ-vkj- (बी-II)]
सलोनी, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th June, 2025
S.O. 1061.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 11 (C ) of 2016) of the Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Patna
as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Allahabad Bank (now Indian
Bank after merger) and their workmen.
[No. L-12011/2/2016- IR(B-II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
Reference Case No.:- 11 (C) of 2016
Before The Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal, Patna.
Reference Case No.:- 11 (C) of 2016
Between the management of The Zonal Manager, Allahabad Bank ( now Indian Bank after merger ), Zonal
Office, Om Shanti Complex, Opp. Zila School, Muzaffarpur-842003 (Bihar) and the General Secretary, Allahabad
bank Karamchari Sangh, C/O Allahabad Bank, Patna University, Patna (Bihar)
For the management:-
Mr. Ranjan Ghoshrave, Advocate.
For the workman:-
Sri B. Prasad, President, Bank Employees
Federation, Bihar.
Present:-
Manoj Kumar Sinha
Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal, Patna.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4543
AWARD
Patna, dt- 30th May, 2025.
By the adjudication order no.- L-12011/2/2016-IR(B-II) New Delhi, dated- 15.03.2016 the Govt. of India
Ministry of Labour New Delhi has referred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of section 10 of
the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, ( hereinafter to be referred to as ― the Act‖) the following dispute between the
management of the Zonal Manager, Allahabad Bank ( now Indian Bank after merger ) , Zonal Office, Om Shanti
Complex, Opp. Zila School, Muzaffarpur-842003 (Bihar) and the General Secretary, Allahabad bank Karamchari
Sangh, C/O Allahabad Bank, Patna University, Patna (Bihar)for adjudication to this tribunal.
Reference Case No.:- 11 (C) of 2016
SCHEDULE
―Whether the workman has earned right of absorption having been engaged for a considerable period of time
regularly even though on daily wages? And whether the management of Allahabad Bank should given him a
permanent regular employee status with immediate effect?‖
2.
On receiving the reference notification on 05.04.2016 notice were issued to both the sides and the case was
fixed on 21.06.2016 for their appearance and after adjournment of nine dates, President, Bank Employees Federation,
Bihar filed statement of claim on behalf of the workman on 19.07.2018. On the other hand management authorised
Sri Manish Kumar, Law Officer to represent the management bank. Record shows that on 20.08.2018 management
filed written statement and subsequently both sides were directed to furnish list of witnesses and documents
accordingly and several opportunities were given to the workman for filing the same. The record also shows that list
of witnesses and documents were not filed by the workmen or by representative before this tribunal. The workmen
showed no interest in the instant case and as such his representative apprised this tribunal in writing on 24.11.2022
that workmen are not interested in contesting this case, the workmen perhaps has no grievance at all,so necessary
order may kindly be passed. It is also asserted that by the representative of the management since workmen is evading
their appearance and did not file any list of witnesses and documents inspite of knowledge of the proceeding
Reference Case No.:- 11 (C) of 2016
so it is clear indication that they have no grievance at all so ― No Dispute Award‖ may kindly be passed.
3.
Considering all the facts along with circumstances of the case and on careful scrutinizing the proceeding of
this case and the submissions as advanced on behalf of the both the sides, this tribunal finds and hold that this
reference is related to the grievance of workmen mentioned in the aforesaid schedule. This reference were received to
this tribunal on 05.04.2022. Workmen never appeared physically before this tribunal even after issuance of several
notices though their Statement of claim was filed by their representative Sri B. Prasad, President, Bank Employees
Federation Association, Bihar on 19.07.2018. Ultimately the representative of the workmen reported to this tribunal
that workmen are not interested in contesting the dispute perhaps they have no grievance at all so necessary order may
kindly be passed.
Taking note of aforesaid facts specially long & continuous absence of the workmen denotes that they have no
grievance at all with the management bank. So this tribunal has left with no option then to pass a ― No Dispute
Award‖. Therefore ― No Dispute Award‖ is passed in this case. This award shall be effected after date of publication
in gazette.
Award accordingly.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
MANOJ KUMAR SINHA, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 13 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1062.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़- I ds iapkV (03/2011) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं.
-12012/2/2011-vkbZ-vkj- (बी-II)]
सलोनी, उृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 13th June, 2025
S.O. 1062.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.03/2011) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Union Bank of
India and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/2/2011 – IR (B-II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
4544
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I, CHANDIGARH.
Presiding Officer: Sh. Brajesh Kumar Gautam, H.J.S.
ID No.03/2011
Registered on 28.04.2011
Ramesh Chand S/o Sh. Suba Ram, R/o H.No.185, Village Dhanas, Chandigarh.
...........Workman
Versus
Divisional Manager, Union Bank of India, Regional Office 64-65-A, Bank Square, Sector 17-B, Chandigarh.
........Management/ Respondent
Sh. Rajesh Kumar AR for Workman
Sh. Jaipal Singh AR for Management
Judgment reserved on 01st May, 2025
Judgment Pronounced on 26th May, 2025
JUDGMENT/ AWARD
1.
Instant Industrial Dispute has been registered for adjudication on the basis of a Reference vide Notification
No. L-12012/2/2011-IR(B-II) dated 15.04.2011 under clause (d) of Sub-Section (1) sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act), of the Ministry of Labour- Government of
India as follows:-
―Whether the action of the management of Union Bank of India, Sector 17-B, Chandigarh in
terminating the services of Sh. Ramesh Chand, Ex-Armed Guard w.e.f. 24.11.2008 is legal and
justified? What relief the concerned workman is entitled to.‖
2.
The case of Workman/ Petitioner- The workman is an ex- service man and had rendered services for
17 years in the Indian Army. After serving for 17 years the workman was discharged from army in the month of June,
2003 and at the time of discharging of workman from the service his name was registered with the Sainik Board so he
can get the service in the Civil and serve the citizens of the country. Thereafter, the workman was engaged as
Security Guard in the Bank of India through Private Security Service. It is said that when the workman was serving
with the Bank of India he received a letter from Sainik Board for the vacancies in the opposite party department on
regular basis as Security Guard. It is further said that the applicant workman received a letter bearing
No.1583-1621-2008 dated 17.09.2008 (wrongly mentioned as 17.09.2009) for the interview on 03.10.2008 and he
appeared with necessary documents for interview. Thereafter, the workman undergone a requisite selection process
conducted by the management and he was selected for the post of security guard and his medical was also conducted
by the prescribed doctor and was issued the appointment letter bearing No.1921-2008 dated 06.11.2008 and joined
the services on 08.11.2008. Unfortunately on 24.11.2008 the bank official refused to take him on duty and also taken
back appointment letter and due to this reason the workman was not allowed to do the duty. The workman requested
the management to allow him to join the duty but Bank refused. In the month of December, 2008 the workman was
directed to submit a letter that he will pass 8th class examination in the year 2009 and will accordingly produce said
certificate and the said letter was taken by the concerned official and stated that until and unless the workman will not
submit the said letter he will not allowed to join the duty but inspite of it the Management have not taken him on
duty. A representation dated 07.10.2009 was made by the workman but nothing was done on said representation by
the opposite party. At the time of retrenchment/ termination the workman was drawing Rs.8,500/- per month. The
services of applicant workman has been illegally terminated without any notice and without any pay, retrenchment
compensation etc. A new person has been employed in place of workman. It is prayed that the workman be reinstated
to his job with continuity of service and with full back wages.
3.
The case of Management- That the present Industrial Dispute is an abuse of the process of law as the
claimant/ alleged workman has not approached this Tribunal with clean hands and has suppressed the material facts.
It is said by the Management that present case is not of termination of services but of cancellation of the order of
appointment and it is mentioned that termination and cancellation of appointment are distinct concepts. The stand of
management in its reply/ written statement has been that the applicant workman has concealed the fact that he was
lacking essential qualification required for applying the post of Security Guard. According to the case of Management
the minimum qualification was 8th Standard pass whereas the workman was only 6th Standard passed. His candidature
was considered on the basis that he had the requisite qualification and appointment letter was issued but soon
thereafter the mistake was discovered and workman was informed that he was not eligible for the post as he was not
having requisite minimum qualification and his appointment was rightfully cancelled. According to the Management
it is settled law that any recruitment made in violation of rules or regulations relating to recruitment is illegal and
liable to be set aside. In para wise reply to the claim petition the management has denied the claim and according to
management appointment has rightly been cancelled. In the last the respondent management has prayed that claim
petition of workman may kindly be dismissed.
4.
On the basis of pleadings of both the parties and on the basis of reference of the Ministry of Labour,
Government of India following issue arises for adjudication in the present Industrial Dispute-
“Whether the action of respondent-management of Union Bank of India, Sector 17-B, Chandigarh in terminating the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4545
service/ cancelling the appointment of Sh. Ramesh Chand, Ex-Armed Guard w.e.f. 24.11.2008 is legal and justified?
What relief the concerned workman is entitled to.”
5.
During hearing of the case the workman Ramesh Chand got himself examined as Witness No.1 and
during his evidence following documents have been brought on record:
Sr. No.
Particulars
Annexure/ Exhibit
1.
Copy of Affidavit dated 20.03.2014
W-1
2.
Copy of Letter dated 17.09.2009 (should be read dated 17.09.2008)
W-2
3.
Copy of Letter dated 08.12.2008
W-3
4.
Copy of Letter dated 07.10.2009
W-4
5.
Copy of Postal Receipt dated 07.10.2009
W-5
6.
Copy of Letter dated 29.10.2009
W-6
7.
Copy of Postal Receipt dated 20.11.2009
W-7
6.
During hearing of the case on behalf of Respondent-Management one witness namely Navneet Chauhan,
Chief Manager Law, Union of India, Sector 17-B, Chandigarh has been got examined as Management Witness
No.1 and during his evidence certain documents were brought on record and were marked as Exhibits as follows:
Sr. No.
Particulars
Annexure/ Exhibit
1.
Copy of Letter dated 17.09.2009 (should be read as dated 17.09.2008)
Ex. P-1
2.
Copy of Letter dated 08.12.2008
Ex. P-2
3.
Copy of Letter with Postal Receipt dated 07.10.2009
Ex. P-3 & P-4
4.
Copy of Letter with Postal Receipt dated 29.10.2009
Ex. P-5 & P-6
7.
Arguments of Parties: According to Ld. Counsel for the claimant-workman he was duly selected and
appointed on the post of Security Guard on the basis of an interview conducted on 03.10.2008 and he also joined his
job on 08.11.2008. According to Ld. Counsel further without any notice or opportunity of hearing his appointment
was cancelled by terminating his services w.e.f. 24.11.2008 and even no written termination order has been passed.
The workman was prevented from doing his duty on the post of Security Guard w.e.f. 24.11.2008. The Ld. Counsel
has pointed out that the workman claimant had served the country for 17 years in Army and in capacity of an ex-
servicemen his appointment was made through Sainik Board. It is also argued that although the claimant-workman is
not 8th Standard pass but that minimum requisite qualification does not apply in a case where the applicant is an ex-
servicemen. The act of management of Union Bank of India in cancelling the appointment and terminating the
services after joining is arbitrary, illegal and against the provisions contained in Industrial Dispute Act. It is urged by
Ld. Counsel that respondent management may be directed to reinstate the claimant workman on the post of Security
Guard with all back wages.
8.
Per Contra Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent management it has been argued that there has
been active concealment on behalf of claimant-workman that he was not having requisite minimum qualification of
8th Standard Pass. According to the Ld. Counsel further this lacunae was traced out soon after joining the claimant
workman on the post of Security Guard his appointment was cancelled. During the argument the Ld. Counsel has
placed on record copy of notification of vacancies under Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of
Vacancies) Act, 1959 and attempted to convince this Court that as per said notification minimum qualification
required for the post of arm guard in bank is 8th standard pass or its equivalent. Another letter dated 17.04.2010 issued
from Regional Office, Chandigarh has also been brought on record which is addressed to Assistant General Manager
(IR) CO Mumbai mentioning the notice of ALC(C) received regarding the dispute raised by the workman. In the said
letter detailed facts are mentioned and it is stated that matter has been discussed with Advocate and workman Ramesh
Chand was not eligible for his appointment as Armed Guard and due to certain lapses/ oversight he was selected and
was permitted to join the bank service. According to Ld. Counsel for the management since the claimant workman
was not having minimum requisite qualification of having passed 8th standard are equivalent his appointment was
rightly cancelled, therefore no relief should be given to the claimant workman and claim petition may be rejected.
FINDINGS
9.
From the perusal of claim statement and the reply of opposite party Management of Union Bank of India
there appears no dispute as to the fact that claimant workman Ramesh Chand was selected and given appointment to
the post of Armed Guard in the bank and he also joined as such on 08.11.2008. The only controversy between the
party is that admittedly Ramesh Chand the claimant is not 8th Standard passed as is requisite qualification as per the
case of management and therefore his selection and appointment was cancelled. A notification dated 17.11.2008 as is
issued by Senior Manager (Personal) under Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act,
1959 has been made available by the Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of management of the bank, wherein required
qualification for the post of Armed Guard in Bank is prescribed. The said required qualification is as follows:
“Should have passed 8th Standard or its equivalent but the candidate should have not passed 10+2 Examination or its
equivalent. However an Ex-Serviceman who has put in not less than 3 years continuous service in the Armed Forces
of the Union, shall be exempted from the minimum educational qualification prescribed for the post”.
The above noted required qualification itself is very much clear that in case of Ex-Servicemen who has served not
less than 3 years continuous service in Armed Forces of the Union, the minimum requisite educational qualification
4546
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
for the post shall be exempted. In other words if a person is Ex-Servicemen having continuous 3 years of service in
Armed Forces need not required to have passed 8th standard or its equivalent to be appointed to the post of Armed
Guard in the bank.
10.
It is admitted fact that the claimant-workman is an Ex-Servicemen having served in Armed forces for 17
years and he had received information of vacancy of Armed Guard on 08.11.2008 in the opposite party bank and he
participated in the selection process/ interview as held on 03.10.2008 and was duly selected. It is also not in dispute
that he even joined the bank service on the post of Armed Guard on 08.11.2008. One handwritten application by
claimant workman Ramesh Chand has also been brought on record as Document W-3 on behalf of workman and
same letter is also brought on record as Ex. P-2 on behalf of management, wherein Ramesh Chand has requested that
he had to clear 8th Standard examination and he would submit the 8th Standard pass certificate in year 2009, but
despite this application and exemption in minimum qualification given in the notification of vacancy itself, his
services have been terminated arbitrarily. It is very much surprising to notice that even in the letter dated 17.04.2010
sent from Regional Office, Chandigarh to Assistant General Manager (IR) CO Mumbai, it is mentioned that
minimum qualification as prescribed by bank for the post of Armed Guard was lacking in the case of claimant
Ramesh Chand. Even in the said letter there is reference that matter was discussed with bank Advocate who had also
gave an opinion that minimum required qualification for the post is 8th standard passed. It appear that neither the
Advocate of Bank nor the Bank Authorities themselves perused the complete required qualification where an Ex-
Servicemen is completely exempted from the qualification of having passed 8th standard or its equivalent. This kind
of action ignoring the exemption given in the notification itself is nothing but an arbitrary act on the part of
management, which cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Not only this even no required one month notice or
payment in lieu of notice or any retrenchment compensation under the provisions of ID Act was given to claimant
workman before cancelling/ terminating his service as Armed Guard in the bank, this is against the principle of
natural justice as well.
11.
In the light of discussion made hereinabove and in the facts and circumstances of the present case the present
reference No. 12012/2/2011-IR(B-II) dated 15.04.2011 is decided in favor of workman namely Sh. Ramesh Chand
and it is held that the action of management Union Bank of India, Sector 17-B, Chandigarh in terminating the
services/ cancelling the appointment of Ramesh Chand Ex-Servicemen on the post of Armed Guard w.e.f. 24.11.2008
is illegal, unjustified and against the provisions of law. The claimant workman namely Sh. Ramesh Chand is entitled
for the relief prayed by him i.e. Reinstatement to his job with continuity of service and with full back wages in the
interest of justice.
12.
It is therefore-
ORDERED
That the present ID No.03/2011 titled as Ramesh Chand Versus Union Bank of India arising out of reference
12012/2/2011-IR(B-II) dated 15.04.2011 is allowed and decided in favor of workman namely Sh. Ramesh Chand. It
is held that the action of management Union Bank of India, Sector 17-B, Chandigarh in terminating the services/
cancelling the appointment of Ramesh Chand Ex-Servicemen on the post of Armed Guard w.e.f. 24.11.2008 is
illegal, unjustified and against the provisions of law and same is set aside. The claimant workman namely Sh.
Ramesh Chand is entitled for the relief prayed by him i.e. Reinstatement to his job with continuity of service and with
full back wages in the interest of justice. The opposite party Management Union Bank of India, Sector 17,
Chandigarh is directed to reinstate claimant-workman namely Sh. Ramesh Chand on the same post of Security Guard/
Armed Guard on which he was selected and working on or before 24.11.2008, with all back wages and continuity of
service.
13.
Let copy of this award be sent to the Appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the Act for
publication.
Dated: 26.05.2025
B.K. GAUTAM, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4547
नई ददल्ली, 13 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1063.—औद्योगिक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17
ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj lSUVªy cSad vkWQ bf.M;k ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks
vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योगिक fookn esa औद्योगिक
vf/kdj.k@JeU;k;ky;
ds iapkV ¼dsUnzh;½&11@2009¼lhvkbZ,l&91@2014½
¼lh,uvkj&vkjtsdsVh060001742009½ izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y–12011/53/2009- vkbZ vkj (ch-II)]
सलोनी, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 13th June, 2025
S.O. 1063.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.11/2009(CIS-91/2014) (CNR- RJKT 060001742009) of the
Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Kota as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management
Central Bank of India and their workmen.
[No. L-12011/53/2009- IR(B.II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
U;k;k/kh'k] vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k ¼dsUnzh;½ dksVk] ¼jkt-½
ihBklhu vf/kdkjh& lanhi dqekj 'kekZ] vkj-,p-ts-,l- ¼ftyk tt laoxZ½
funsZ'k izdj.k dzekad%vkS-U;k-¼dsUnzh;½&11@2009¼lhvkbZ,l&91@2014½
¼lh,uvkj&vkjtsdsVh060001742009½
fnukad LFkkfir%14-09-2009
izlax% Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh ds vkns'k dz-
,y&12011@53@2009¼vkbZvkj¼ch&kk½½ fn-%03-08-2009
funsZ'k@fookn vUrxZr /kkjk 10¼1½¼?k½ ,oa mi/kkjk 2¼d½
vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e]1947
e/;
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4548
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
,oa
{ks=h; izca/kd] lSUVªy cSad vkWQ bf.M;k] dksVk
&&vizkFkhZ fu;kstd
mifLFkr
izkFkhZ Jfed dh vksj ls izfrfuf/k%&
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"Whether Shri Pradeep Kumar Bhargava has completed 240 days or more
service continously w.e.f. 01/03/2002 to 01/05/2008 in the Central Bank of
India, Kota Branch. If so, whether the action of the management in
terminating the services of workman w.e.f. 01/05/2008 is legal and justified?
What relief the concerned workman is entitled to?"
2&
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izLrqr dj laf{kIrr% ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd mls vizkFkhZ {ks=h; izca/kd] lsaVªy cSad vkWQ bf.M;k dksVk us
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fu;ksftr fd;k FkkA izkFkhZ dks fn- 01-05-2007 ls 'kk[kk <ksye rg- NhikcM+kSn esa dk;Z djus gsrq yxk fn;k]
tgka ls izkFkhZ dks fn- 02-05-2008 dks ukSdjh ls gVk fn;k gS] tks voS/k gSA izkFkhZ ls prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh dk
dk;Z fy;k x;k gS ftlesa lkQ lQkbZ djuk] QkbZy o dkxtkr dk dk;Z djuk] cpr [kkrs dk dk;Z Hkh
fy;k x;k gSA izkFkhZ ls ,aVªht Hkh djkbZ xbZ vkSj tks Hkh dk;Z 'kk[kk izca/kd us crk;k] og Hkh dk;Z fd;k gSA
izkFkhZ us fu;kstd ds v/khuLFk 'kk[kk NhikcM+kSn o 'kk[kk xzke <ksye esa fn- 01-03-2002 ls fn- 01-05-2008
rd fujarj 240 fnu ls dkQh vf/kd le; rd dk;Z dj fy;k gSA izkFkhZ ;g fookn vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 2
¼vks-vks-½ ds varxZr NaVuh dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrk gSA fu;kstd }kjk izkFkhZ dks ukSdjh ls gVkrs le; uksfVl] uksfVl
osru o NaVuh eqvkotk ugha nsdj vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 25 ,Q] izkFkhZ dks gVkrs le; mlls dfu"B Jfedksa dks fu;kstu esa
j[kdj vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 25 th ,oa izkFkhZ dks gVkdj o izkFkhZ ds LFkku ij u, Jfedksa dks fu;ksftr dj vf/kfu;e dh
/kkjk 25 ,p dh vogsyuk dh gS vkSj fu;kstd dk ;g d`R; vUQs;j yscj izsfDVl dh ifjHkk"kk esa Hkh vkrk gS vkSj izkFkZuk
dh gS fd izkFkhZ dks fiNys lEiw.kZ osru lfgr e; leLr fiNys ykHkksa ds lsok ij cgkyh dk vuqrks"k iznku fd;k tkosA
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4549
3&
vizkFkhZ fu;kstd dh vksj ls mDr Dyse dk tokc izLrqr dj ;g izfrokn fd;k x;k gS fd izfri{kh
}kjk izkFkhZ dks fu;ksftr ugha fd;k x;k gS] uk gh muds }kjk izkFkhZ dks dHkh gVk;k x;k gSA nSfud osru Jfedksa dks
lacaf/kr 'kk[kk izca/kd gh vkdfLed vk tkus ij mDr vkdfLed dk;Z ds fy, ml fnu dh nSfud etnwjh ij dk;Z djk
ldrs gSA mldk izfri{kh {ks=h; izca/kd] lsaVªy cSad vkWQ bafM;k dksVk ls fdlh izdkj dk fu;kstu lacaf/kr ugha gksrk gSA
lacaf/kr 'kk[kk izca/kd gh mDr nSfud osru Jfed dks etnwjh ij j[krk gS o etnwjh dk Hkqxrku djrk gS ,oa i`Fkd&izFkd
'kk[kkvksa ds 'kk[kk izca/kd dk ,d&nwljs ls vkdfLed@nSfud osru Jfedksa ls fdlh Hkh izdkj dk laca/k ;k tqM+ko ugha
gksrk gSA izkFkhZ us muds ;gka dHkh Hkh fuajrj 240 fnu dk;Z ugha fd;k x;k gS ,oa bl izdj.k esa vf/kfu;e ds izko/kku Hkh
ykxw ugha gksrs gS vkSj izkFkZuk dh gS fd izkFkhZ dk Dyse izkFkZuk i= lO;; [kkfjt fd;k tkosA
4&
lk{; esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls Lo;a o vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls lq'khy dqekj ds 'kiFk&i= izLrqr gq, ftuls
ijLij ftjg dh x;hA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls nLrkosth lk{; Hkh izLrqr dh x;h ftldk ;Fkkle; mYys[k fd;k
tkosxkA
5&
lquk x;k] i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA ;|fi vizkFkhZ izfrfuf/k dh vksj ls {ks=kf/kdkj ds fcUnw
ds ij dksbZ vkifRr ugha dh xbZ gS fdUrq U;k;ky; dks izdj.k esa loZizFke Lor% ;g ns[kuk gS fd D;k ;g
izdj.k U;k;kf/kdj.k ds {ks=kf/kdj esa vkrk gS ;k ughaA mDr LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse izLrqr dj izkFkhZ dks
lsok ls gVkus dh fn-02-05-2008 vafdr dh xbZ tcfd izkIr jsQzsUl vkns'k fuEukuqlkj
gS%&"Whether Shri Pradeep Kumar Bhargava has completed 240 days or more service continously
w.e.f. 01/03/2002 to 01/05/2008 in the Central Bank of India, Kota Branch. If so, whether the
action of the management in terminating the services of workman w.e.f. 01/05/2008 is legal and
justified? What relief the concerned workman is entitled to?" bl izdkj Li"V gS fd
jsQjsal@fookn vf/klwpuk esa izkFkhZ dh lsok i`Fkdrk fn- 01-05-2008 vafdr gS tcfd LVsVesaV
vkWQ Dyse o 'kiFk i= esa 02-05-2008 gSA ,sls esa ;g fLFkfr Li"V ugha gS fd ;g U;k;ky;
dkSulh lsok i`Fkdrk fnukad ekudj jsQjsal dk fuLrkj.k djsxkA D;k ;g U;k;ky; izkFkhZ i{k
}kjk crk;h xbZ frfFk ds vk/kkj ij izdj.k dk xq.kkoxq.k ij fuLrkj.k dj ldrk gS vFkok ugha\
bl ckcr ekuuh; jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; ^^egkohj d.MDVj cuke uUn fd'kksj&2003
McY;w,ylh¼jkt-½ ;w-lh- i`"B 424^^ ds isjk uEcj 12 esa ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds }kjk fuEu vfHker izdV fd;k
x;k gS%&"Thus, in view of the above, I reach the inescapable conclusion that the Labour Court has
no competence to correct/modify/amend/alter the terms of the reference or mention the date of
termination etc., or proceed with the reference and accepting the date of termination as suggested
by the workman and in case it does so the award becomes nullity, being without jurisdiction,
4550
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
based on the bad reference."
6&
blh fu.kZ; ds isjk la[;k 11 esa ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; ds }kjk ^^enuiky flag cuke mRrjizns'k
jkT; ,oa vU;&,vkbZvkj 2000 lqizhe dksVZ i`"B 537^^ dk mYys[k Hkh fd;k x;k gS ftlesa ekuuh; mPpre
U;k;ky; ds }kjk ;g er O;Dr fd;k x;k gS fd Je U;k;ky; dk {ks=kf/kdkj jsQzsUl esa vafdr fcUnq rd
gh lhfer gksrk gS vkSj mls jQzsUl ls ijs tkdj i{kdkjksa ds ukeksa ;k frfFk;ksa esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dksbZ
ifjorZu ;k la'kks/ku djus dh vf/kdkfjrk ugha gSA ukeksa o frfFk;ksa esa dksbZ ifjorZu ;k la'kks/ku djokuk gS
rks i{kdkjksa dks leqfpr ljdkj ds le{k viuk i{k j[kdj bl ckcr dk;Zokgh djokuh gksxhA
7&
vr% mDr fu.kZ;ksa ds izdk'k esa ;g Li"V gS fd jsQzsUl@vf/klwpuk esa izkFkhZ dh lsok i`Fkdrk fn-01-05-2008 ,oa
LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse o 'kiFk i= esa lsok i`Fkdrk fn-02-05-2008 fHkUu gksus ls U;k;ky; Dyse esa vafdr lsok i`Fkdrk fnukad
dks vk/kkj ekudj fu.kZ; ikfjr ugha dj ldrk gS D;ksafd ,slk fu.kZ; {ks=kf/kdkj ds vHkko dk gksxk vkSj 'kwU; gksxkA ysfdu
;g U;k;ky; tc rd fd jsQjsal esa la'kks/ku u gks tk, rc rd vfxze dk;Zokgh ugha dj ldrkA fygktk bl n`f"V ls
pwWfd gLrxr jsQzsUl vkns'k ,oa LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse esa mls gVkus dh frfFk;ka vyx&vyx gS ,sls esa fQygky ;g izdj.k
bl U;k;ky; ds {ks=kf/kdkj dk gksuk ugha ik;k tkrk gS] ijUrq i{kdkj ;fn leqfpr ljdkj ls bl ckcr jsQzsUl vkns'k esa
la'kks/ku djokdj U;k;ky; esa is'k djrs gSa rks U;k;ky; ,sls jQzsUl vkns'k ij fof/k vuqlkj dk;Zokgh dj ldrk gSA
ifj.kker% Je ea=ky;] Hkkjr ljdkj }kjk viuh izklkafxd vf/klwpuk fn- 03-08-2009 ds tfj;s
lEizsf"kr funsZ'k@fookn dks blh vuq:i mRrfjr fd;k tkrk gS fd of.kZr jsQzsUl vf/klwpuk ,oa LVsVesaV
vkWQ Dyse esa izkFkhZ dh lsok i`Fkdrk frfFk;ka vyx&vyx gS vkSj LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse esa vafdr frfFk dks
U;k;ky; vk/kkj ekudj fu.kZ; ikfjr ugha dj ldrk gS D;ksafd bl jsQzsUl vkns'k esa vf/kfu.kZ; ikfjr fd;k
tkuk 'kwU; ,oa {ks=kf/kdkj ds vHkko dk gksxkA i{kdkj ;fn leqfpr ljdkj ls izkFkhZ dh lsok ls gVkus dh
frFkh ckcr jsQzsUl vkns'k esa la'kks/ku djokdj is'k djsa rks izdj.k esa fof/k vuqlkj fuLrkj.k dh dk;Zokgh dh
tk ldsxhA
vf/kfu.kZ; vkt fnukad 25-02-2025 dks [kqys U;k;kf/kdj.k esa lquk;k tkdj gLrk{kfjr fd;k x;k
ftls fu;ekuqlkj leqfpr ljdkj dks izdk'kukFkZ fHktok;k tkosA
lanhi dqekj 'kekZ] U;k;k/kh'k
नई ददल्ली, 16 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1064.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa]
dsUnzh; ljdkj ससगरेनी कोनलएररस कंपनी नलनमटेड,ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds
chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सह
–
] हैदराबाद ds iapkV (पहचान
/
) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-
/01/2025-
]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4551
New Delhi, the 16th June, 2025
S.O. 1064.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (ID. No. 62/2022) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, HYDERABAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
Singareni Collieris Company Ltd, and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 13/06/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 11th day of February, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 62/2022
Between:
Sri Burugu Devavaram,
Ex-Coal Filler,
C/o Smt. A.Sarojana, Flat No. G7,
Ground Floor, Opp: Badruka jr.
College for Girls, Kachiguda,
Hyderabad.
..….Petitioner
AND
The General Manager,
M/s. Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.,
Sreerampur Area, Mancherial District.
…Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : K. Vasudeva Reddy, Advocate
For the Respondent: Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order F. No.1/10/2022-B1 dated 21.06.2022 referred the
following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between the
management of M/s. Singareni Collieries Company Ltd., , and their workmen. The reference is,
THE SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the General Manager, M/s. Singareni Collieries Company Ltd., Sreerampur
Area in terminating the services of Sri Burugu Devavaram, Ex-Coal Filler, SCCLtd., sreerampur Area with
effect from 26.02.1998 is legal and justified or not? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?
4552
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No 62/2022 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
Petitioner absent. Case is fixed for implead LRs of the deceased petitioner since 3 July 2024.
Despite sufficient opportunity accorded, petitioner didn‘t take any steps to file any claim statement. Therefore, the
case is decided as ‗Nil-Award‘.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Shri Vinay Panghal, LDC corrected and signed by me on this the 11th day of
February, 2025
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नई ददल्ली, 16 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1065.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947(1947 dk 14)dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa]
dsUnzh; ljdkj रेनपड प्रोटेक्शन फोसस प्राइवेट.नसक्योररटीज और मैनपावर कंसल्टेंसी,ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks
vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सह
–
] हैदराबाद ds iapkV (पहचान
/
) dks izdkf”kr
djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-
/01/2025-
(सी.एम-II)]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 16th June, 2025
S.O. 1065.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (ID. No. 6/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, HYDERABAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
Raipid Protection Force Pvt.Securities & Manpower Consultance, and their workmen, received by the Central
Government on 13/06/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 24th day of January, 2025
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4553
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 6/2024
Between:
The State General Secretary,
AP Security Guards & Contract
Workers Union (CITU),
24-24-14 Citu State Party
Office Rajaka Veedhi Durgapuram
Vijayawada (Urban), AP-520003
..….Petitioner
AND
1. M/s RAPID PROTECTION FORCE
Pvt. Securities & Manpower Consultance,
Sri Nilayam H.No: 52-3-2A/2/1B,
Road No.3, NTR Colony,
Vijayawada-520008.
2. The director & CEO,
All India Institute of Medical Sciences,
Admin Building, AIIMS Campus,
Mangalagiri, Guntur-522502.
…Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : K. pardha Sarathi, Advocate
For the Respondent: None
A W A R D
1. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.8/3/2024-B1 dated 31.01.2024 referred the
following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between the
management of M/s RAPID PROTECTION FORCE Pvt. Securities & Manpower Consultance, and their
workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
1. ―Whether the action of the management of M/s Rapid Protection Force Private Securities & Manpower
Consultance, Vijayawada contractor of All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Mangalagiri denying
payment of bonus to their 59 workmen (list attached) for the period of June 2021 to March 2022 and April
2022 to February 2023 is justified or not? It not, what relief the workmen are entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No 6/2024 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
Petitioner absent on the date fixed for filing of claim statement and documents. Record reveals
that notice served on Petitioner but none present on behalf of Petitioner. Therefore, in absence of Petitioner and
non-filing of claim statement by the Petitioner, the case is ‗No Claim‘ award is passed.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Shri Vinay Panghal, LDC corrected and signed by me on this the 24th day of
January, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
4554
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नई ददल्ली, 16 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1066.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa]
dsUnzh; ljdkj नशवाजी नडटेनक्टव नसक्योररटी सर्ववसेज,ds izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds
chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
–
सह
–
] हैदराबाद ds iapkV (पहचान
/
) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-
/01/2025-
(सी.एम-II)]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 16th June, 2025
S.O. 1066.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (ID. No. 7/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, HYDERABAD as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
Sivaji Detective Security Services, and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 13/06/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025 – IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 24th day of January, 2025
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 7/2024
Between:
The State General Secretary,
AP Security Guards & Contract
Workers Union (CITU),
24-24-14 Citu State Party
Office Rajaka Veedhi Durgapuram
Vijayawada (Urban),
..….Petitioner
AND
1. M/s Sivaji Detective Security Services,
1-274, Shop No. 7, Saptagiri Complex,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4555
Behind Hero Honda Showroom,
Balaji Nagar, Sri Krishna Grand Hotel,
Miyapur X Road, Hyderabad-500049.
2. The director & CEO,
All India Institute of Medical Sciences,
Admin Building, AIIMS Campus,
Mangalagiri, Guntur-522502.
…Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner
: K. pardha Sarathi, Advocate
For the Respondent
: None
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.8/4/2024-B1 dated 31.01.2024 referred the
following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between the
management of M/s Sivaji Detective Security Services & another, and their workmen. The reference is,
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of M/s Sivaji Detective Security Services, Hyderabad, contractor of
All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Mangalagiri denying payment of bonus to their 44 workmen (list
attached) for the period of 2019-2020, 2020-2021 and April & May, 2021 is justified or not? If not, what
relief the workmen are entitled to?‖
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No 7/2024 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2.
Petitioner absent on the date fixed for filing of claim statement and documents. Record reveals
that notice served on Petitioner but none present on behalf of Petitioner. Therefore, in absence of Petitioner and
non-filing of claim statement by the Petitioner, the case is ‗No Claim‘ award is passed.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Shri Vinay Panghal, LDC corrected and signed by me on this the 24th day of
January, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
4556
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नई ददल्ली, 16 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1067.—औद्योगिक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V औद्योगिक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योगिक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़- I ds iapkV
(13/2020) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y– 12025/01/2025-vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-67]
सलोनी, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 16th June, 2025
S.O. 1067.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.13/2020) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2025- IR (B-I)-67]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH.
Presiding Officer: Sh. Brajesh Kumar Gautam.
ID No.13/2020
Registered On:-12.10.2020
Chander Ket S/o Sh. Jaminder Singh R/o H.No.50, 2nd Floor, Ganesh Vihar, Dhakoli, Zirakpur,
Mohali, Punjab.
...........Workman
Versus
1. State Bank of India through its Regional Manager, SCO 43-48, Bank Square, Sector 17-B,
Chandigarh.
2. M/s Upender Gupta & Co. through its Proprietor/ Occupier and Manager, H.No.3257,
Sector 47-D, Chandigarh.
........Respondents
AWARD
Passed On:-05.06.2025
1.
The workman Chander Ket has filed the present claim petition under Section 2-A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4557
2.
Since 10.11.2021 to 08.01.2024 the workman remained absent and from 27.08.2024 neither any step is
being taken nor the AR of the workman is appearing. During the pendency of the proceedings before this
Tribunal on 05.06.2025, the case was fixed for submitting correct address of Respondent No.2 by the workman
but none is turning up on behalf of workman. Learned AR of the management has submitted that the workman
is not turning up for submitting correct address of Respondent No.2 since long and several opportunities have
already been granted to the workman. Workman has been given sufficient opportunities for submitting correct
address of Respondent No.2 but none turned up in spite of several opportunities afforded for submitting correct
address of Respondent No.2. This shows that the workman is not interested in adjudication of the case on
merit.
3.
Since the workman has neither put his appearance for long, nor is taking steps to prove his cause against
the respondents/ managements. As such, the present claim petition is dismissed for want of prosecution. File
after completion be consigned in the record.
4. Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17 of the
ID Act, 1947.
B. K. GAUTAM, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1068.—औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओ एस एस पी ए आर सी) एम पी ई डी ए हाउस, केरल
के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध ननयोजकों और श्री डम्बुरू बेहरा, ओनडशा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय
सरकार औद्योनगक अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट(संदभस संख्या 49/2016) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया है, प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 10.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-133- आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार,अवर सनचव
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1068.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No.49/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to The
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House, Kerala and
Sri Damburu Behera, Odisha which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on
10.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-133-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 49/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
4558
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Date of Passing Order – 19th March, 2025
Between :-
Sri Damburu Behera,
S/o. Late Dasarathi Behera,
At./Po. Damodarpur,
Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
ORDER
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 01.05.1989 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2009 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules
and as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be confirmed.
As per the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there was no such
provision for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option for VR
Scheme was unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was forced to sign
the format for VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of the Management
was neither legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C. (C) Bhubaneswar on dated
28.11.2013 and when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the Act with a
prayer to pass an order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable in
the eye of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special VR
Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme. After
that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section 2A(2) of
the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement on
31.03.2009 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received all the
benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2009 by the Management is false,
frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted for the
benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge, dismissal,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4559
retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three years of such
alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant
has filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant
that he was relieved from service on 31.03.2009.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D.
Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made
to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or
otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1069.—औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओएसएसपीएआरसी), केरल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
ननयोजकों और श्री पुरुषोत्तम दाश, ओनडशा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योनगक
अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट (संदभस संख्या 50/2016) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है,
प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 16.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-134- आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार,अवर सनचव
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1069.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No.50/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to The
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC), Kerala and Sri
Purshootam Dash, Odisha workmen which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 16.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-134-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
4560
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 50/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Date of Passing Order – 19th March, 2025
Between :-
Sri Purshootam Dash,
S/o. Late Kamalochana Das,
At. Pudamari, Brahman Street,
Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
ORDER
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 11.04.1987 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2010 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules
and as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be
confirmed. As per the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there
was no such provision for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option
for VR Scheme was unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was
forced to sign the format for VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of
the Management was neither legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C.(C)
Bhubaneswar on dated 28.11.2013 and when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-
A(2) of the Act with a prayer to pass an order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable in the eye
of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special VR
Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme. After
that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section 2A(2)
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4561
of the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement on
31.03.2010 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received all
the benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2010 by the Management is
false, frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted
for the benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three
years of such alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant
has filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant
that he was relieved from service on 31.03.2010.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D.
Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be
made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment, or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1070.—औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओएसएसपीएआरसी) केरल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
ननयोजकों और श्री चक्रपानि बेहरा, ओनडशा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योनगक
अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट (संदभस संख्या 51/2016) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है,
प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 16.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-135- आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार, अवर सनचव
4562
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1070.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 51/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to The
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC), Kerala and Sri
Chakrapani Behera, Odisha which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on
16.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-135-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 51/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Date of Passing Order – 19th March, 2025
Between :-
Sri Chakrapani Behera,
S/o. Sri B iswambar Behera,
At. Haripur, P.O. Gopalpur-on-sea,
Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
O RD E R
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 11.04.1988 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2009 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules and
as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be confirmed. As
per the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there was no such
provision for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option for VR Scheme
was unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was forced to sign the
format for VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of the Management was
neither legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C.(C) Bhubaneswar on dated 28.11.2013
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4563
and when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the Act with a prayer to pass
an order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable in
the eye of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special VR
Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme. After
that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section 2A(2) of
the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement on
31.03.2009 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received all the
benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2009 by the Management is false,
frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted for the
benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three years of such
alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant has
filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant that he
was relieved from service on 31.03.2009.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D. Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to
the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or
otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
4564
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1071.—औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओएसएसपी एआरसी) केरल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
ननयोजकों और श्री भास्कर पानिग्रही, ओनडशा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योनगक
अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट(संदभस संख्या 52/2016 ) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है,
प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 16.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-136- आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार, अवर सनचव
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1071.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No.52/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to the
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC), Kerala and Sri Bhaskar
Panigrahi, Odisha workmen which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on
16.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-136-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 52/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Date of Passing Order – 19th March, 2025
Between :-
Sri Bhaskar Panigrahi,
S/o. Late Khetrabasi Panigrahi,
At. Gopalpur-on-Sea, Revu Street,
Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
ORDER
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4565
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 31.03.1988 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2009 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules
and as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be
confirmed. As per the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there
was no such provision for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option
for VR Scheme was unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was
forced to sign the format for VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of
the Management was neither legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C.(C)
Bhubaneswar on dated 28.11.2013 and when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-
A(2) of the Act with a prayer to pass an order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable
in the eye of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special
VR Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme.
After that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section
2A(2) of the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement
on 31.03.2009 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received
all the benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2009 by the Management is
false, frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted
for the benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three
years of such alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant
has filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant
that he was relieved from service on 31.03.2009.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D.
Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be
made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment, or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
4566
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1072.—औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओएसएसपीएआरसी) केरल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
ननयोजकों और श्री एस.एन. पाधी, ओनडशा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योनगक
अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट(संदभस संख्या 53/2016 ) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है,
प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 16.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-137- आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार, अवर सनचव
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1072.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 53/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to The
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre, (OSSPARC) Kerala and Sri S.N. Padhi,
Odisha, workmen which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 16.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-137-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 53/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Date of Passing Order – 19th March, 2025
Between :-
Sri S.N. Padhi,
S/o. Late Jagannath Prasad Padhi,
At. College Road, Gopalpur-on-Sea,
Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4567
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
ORDER
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 31.03.1988 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2009 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules
and as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be
confirmed. As per the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there
was no such provision for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option
for VR Scheme was unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was
forced to sign the format for VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of
the Management was neither legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C.(C)
Bhubaneswar on dated 28.11.2013 and when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-
A(2) of the Act with a prayer to pass an order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable in the eye
of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special VR
Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme. After
that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section 2A(2)
of the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement on
31.03.2009 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received all
the benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2009 by the Management is
false, frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted
for the benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three
years of such alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant
has filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant
that he was relieved from service on 31.03.2009.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D.
Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be
made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment, or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
4568
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1073.— औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओएसएसपीएआरसी), केरल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
ननयोजकों और श्री प्रफुल्ल कुमार साहू, ओनडशा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योनगक
अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट (संदभस संख्या 54/2016) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है,
प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 16.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-138-आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार, अवर सनचव
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1073.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 54/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to The
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC), Kerala and Sri Prafulla
Kumar Sahu, Odisha , workmen which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 16.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-138-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 54/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Date of Passing Order – 21st April, 2025
Between :-
Sri Prafulla Kumar Sahu,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4569
S/o. Krushna Chandra Sahu, Big Street,
Gopalpur-on-Sea,
Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
ORDER
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 09.08.1993 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2009 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules
and as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be
confirmed. As per the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there
was no such provision for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option
for VR Scheme was unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was
forced to sign the format for VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of
the Management was neither legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C.(C)
Bhubaneswar on dated 28.11.2013 and when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-
A(2) of the Act with a prayer to pass an order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable
in the eye of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special
VR Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme.
After that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section
2A(2) of the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement
on 31.03.2009 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received
all the benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2009 by the Management is
false, frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted
for the benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three
years of such alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4570
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant
has filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant
that he was relieved from service on 31.03.2009.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D.
Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be
made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment, or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1074.— औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओएसएसपीएआरसी), केरल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
ननयोजकों और श्री लक्ष्मि कुमार बेहरा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योनगक
अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट (संदभस संख्या- 55/2016) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है,
प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 16.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-139- आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार, अवर सनचव
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1074.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. 55/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to The
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) , Kerala and Sri Laxman
Kumar Behera which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 16.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-139-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4571
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 55/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Date of Passing Order – 21st April, 2025
Between :-
Sri Laxman Kumar Behera,
S/o. Tankadhar Behera, Village: Haripur,
Gopalpur-on-Sea,
Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
ORDER
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 11.04.1988 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2009 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules
and as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be
confirmed. As per the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there
was no such provision for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option
for VR Scheme was unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was
forced to sign the format for VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of
the Management was neither legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C.(C)
Bhubaneswar on dated 28.11.2013 and when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-
A(2) of the Act with a prayer to pass an order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable
in the eye of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special
VR Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme.
After that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section
2A(2) of the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement
4572
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
on 31.03.2009 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received
all the benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2009 by the Management is
false, frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted
for the benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three
years of such alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant
has filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant
that he was relieved from service on 31.03.2009.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D.
Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be
made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment, or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1075.—औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओएसएसपीएआरसी), केरल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
ननयोजकों और श्री बी. पूिस चंर पात्रा, ओनडशा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योनगक
अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट (संदभस संख्या 57/2016) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है,
प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 16.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-141- आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार, अवर सनचव
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4573
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1075.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No.57/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to The
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) , Kerala and Sri B. Purna
Chandra Patra, Odisha workmen which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 16.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-141-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 57/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Date of Passing Order – 21st April, 2025
Between :-
Sri B. Purna Chandra Patra,
S/o. B. Balaram Patra, Subash Nagar,
Near Sabat Bunglow, Lanjipalli,
Berhampur, Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
ORDER
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 01.05.1993 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2010 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules and
as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be confirmed. As per
the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there was no such provision
for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option for VR Scheme was
unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was forced to sign the format for
VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of the Management was neither
legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C.(C) Bhubaneswar on dated 28.11.2013 and
4574
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the Act with a prayer to pass an
order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable
in the eye of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special
VR Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme.
After that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section
2A(2) of the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement
on 31.03.2010 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received
all the benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2010 by the Management is
false, frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted
for the benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three
years of such alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant
has filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant
that he was relieved from service on 31.03.2010.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D.
Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be
made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment, or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated &Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4575
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1076.—औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओएसएसपीएआरसी), केरल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
ननयोजकों और श्री आर. कृष्िा राव, ओनडशा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योनगक
अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट (संदभस संख्या 58/2016) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है,
प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 16.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-142- आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार, अवर सनचव
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1076.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No.58/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to The
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) , Kerala and Sri R. Krishna
Rao, Odisha workmen which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on
16.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-142-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 58/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Date of Passing Order – 21st April, 2025
Between :-
Sri R. Krishna Rao,,
S/o. Late R. Arkeya, Near Andhra Bank,,
Gopalpur-on-Sea,
Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
4576
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ORDER
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 10.08.1993 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2009 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules and
as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be confirmed. As per
the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there was no such provision
for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option for VR Scheme was
unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was forced to sign the format for
VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of the Management was neither
legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C.(C) Bhubaneswar on dated 28.11.2013 and
when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the Act with a prayer to pass an
order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable in
the eye of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special VR
Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme. After
that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section 2A(2) of
the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement on
31.03.2009 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received all the
benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2009 by the Management is false,
frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted for the
benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three years of such
alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant
has filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant
that he was relieved from service on 31.03.2009.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D.
Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made
to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or
otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4577
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1077.—औद्योनगक नववाद अनधननयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरि में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
अध्यक्ष, उडीसा झींगा बीज उत्पादन आपूर्वत एवं अनुसंधान केंर (ओएसएसपीएआरसी), केरल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
ननयोजकों और श्री प्रशांत कुमार मांधाता पटनायक,ओनडशा के बीच अनुबंध में ननर्ददष्ट औद्योनगक नववाद में केन्द्रीय
सरकार औद्योनगक अनधकरि- सह-श्रम न्द्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर पंचाट (संदभस संख्या 59/2016) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया है, प्रकानशत करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 16.06.2025 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. एल- 42025-07-2025-143- आईआर-(डीयू)]
ददलीप कुमार, अवर सनचव
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1077.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No.59/2016) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour–Bhubaneswar, as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to The
President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) , Kerala and Sri Prasanta
Kumar Mandhata Patnaik, Odisha workmen which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 16.06.2025.
[No. L-42025-07-2025-143-IR (DU)]
DILIP KUMAR, Under Secy.
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 59/2016
Filed under section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Date of Passing Order – 21st April, 2025
Between :-
Sri Prasanta Kumar Mandhata Patnaik,
S/o. Biswanath Mandhata Patnaik,
At. Nityananda Nivas, Zanana Hospital Road,
4578
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Berhampur, Dist. Ganjam, Odisha.
…
Applicant-Workman.
(And)
The President, Orissa Shrimp Seed Production
Supply & Research Centre (OSSPARC) MPEDA House,
Panampilly Avenue, Kochi – 682 036, Kerala.
…
Management-Opp. Party.
Appearances:
Mr. Amar Shoo, Advocate.…
For the 1st Party-Management.
Mr. Kailah Chandra Mishra…
For the Applicant-Workman.
ORDER
This order is being passed on an application of applicant-workman filed under section 2-A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act (herein-after referred as an Act).
2.
The case of the applicant-workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That he was working under the 1st Party-Management since 13.02.1987 and he was illegally relieved from
service on 31.03.2010 by the 1st Party-Management, whereas he had been assured by the 1st Party-Management for
disbursement of his arrear dues as well as his rehabilitation. The 1st Party-Management has formulated Service Rules
and as per the said rule on successful completion of probation on first appointment every employee shall be
confirmed. As per the rules formulated by the Management the date of retirement from service was 60 years and there
was no such provision for voluntary retirement scheme, but calling the workman by the Management to submit option
for VR Scheme was unconstitutional. Though, he did not opt for VR Scheme floated by the Management he was
forced to sign the format for VR Scheme and he was assured for rehabilitation for his livelihood. Since, the action of
the Management was neither legal nor justified the 2nd party-workman raised a dispute before the R.L.C.(C)
Bhubaneswar on dated 28.11.2013 and when the matter was not resolved he had filed this application under section 2-
A(2) of the Act with a prayer to pass an order of his reinstatement of his service with full back wages.
3.
The case of the 1st Party-Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the present proceeding filed by the applicant under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable
in the eye of law as the same is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily opted for Special
VR Scheme floated by the Management and the workman has received all the benefits under Special V.R. scheme.
After that the applicant-workman in an afterthought and with ill intention had raised industrial dispute under section
2A(2) of the I.D. Act which is grossly barred by limitation. The applicant workman has voluntarily taken retirement
on 31.03.2010 from his service by way of opting special V.R. Scheme floated by the Management and also received
all the benefits accrued to him, so the allegation of illegal removal from service on 31.03.2010 by the Management is
false, frivolous and baseless. In the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 Section 2(A)(2) & (3) are inserted
for the benefits of the workman to raise his dispute with the management connected with or arising out of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination, directly before Labour Court or Tribunal within a specific period of three
years of such alleged dispute, but the applicant has filed his application much after three years.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4579
A prayer has been made to reject the application of the applicant-workman on the ground of limitation.
4.
After going through the pleadings of both the parties it is quite apparent that the 2nd party-workman/applicant
has filed this application under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act on 28.06.2016 whereas it is the claim of the applicant
that he was relieved from service on 31.03.2010.
5.
At this stage the Tribunal thinks it proper to discuss here the provisions of the Section – 2(A)(3) of the I.D.
Act:-
Section 2-A(3) of the Act specifically provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be
made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment, or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section(1).
6.
In the instant case the applicant-workman has raised the dispute under section 2-A(2) of the Act after expiry
of more than seven years of his alleged termination/retrenchment, so the petition filed by the applicant is not within
the prescribed period provided under the provisions of the I.D. Act.
7.
After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal finds and holds that the application
filed under section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act is not maintainable as it is time barred. Hence, the application filed under
section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is rejected and the case is dismissed.
8.
Order is passed accordingly.
9.
A copy of this order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1078.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947(1947 dk 14)dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa]
dsUnzh; ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागपुर ds
iapkV (
06/2020-21) dks izdkf'kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22013/01/2025-
-
-एम-II]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1078.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 06/2020-21) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
4580
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/Appl/06/2020-21
Date: 07.04.2025.
Party No.1:
1)
Rashtriya Koyla Kamgar Sangharsh Sangh,
Through its President
Plot No. 49, C-2, Nandodaya Appartment,
Hill Road, Gokulpeth Nagar,
2)
Shri Ramdas S/o Banduji Matte,
R/o Baranj Mokosa, Post Jena,
Tahasil Bhadrawati, Distt. Chandrapur
& 416 others, as per list
V/s.
Party No.2:
Nilesh Shivram Singh Thakur,
Aged 33 years, Occ.: Nil,
R/o, Gittikhadan, Panchasheel Nagpur,
Plot No. 111-A, Katol Road, Nagpur-13
AWARD
(Dated: 07th April, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section (2) & (3) of Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes (Amendment)
Act, 2010 (―the Act‖ in short), the applicant filed an industrial dispute between the employers, in relation to the
management of Sub-Area Manager Saoner, Sub-Area WCL and the applicant Shri Bhola Matru Harde, for
adjudication, vide case no. CGIT/NGP/Appln/06/2020-21, with the following issues framed:-
―Whether the action of the Management/Sub Area Manager Saoner, Sub-Area WCL in
superannuating their workman Shri Bhola Matru Harde instead of 30.09.2016 to 01.07.2016 is legal, fair &
justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled?‖
2.
Case is called out. Both parties are absent. Both parties are not responding and attending the Court since
23.03.2022. Although, petitioner has filed his statement of claim but no written statement has been filed on behalf of
respondent till today. Petitioner has not filed any evidence to prove his case. Petitioner is not coming to the Court
since long back. It appears that petitioner is not interested to contest the case further more. Claim of the petitioner is
not proved. So, it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
ORDER
The action of the Management/Sub Area Manager Saoner, Sub-Area WCL in superannuating their
workman Shri Bhola Matru Harde instead of 30.09.2016 to 01.07.2016 is legal, fair & justified. The workman
is not entitled to any relief.
Justice (Retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1079.— vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k
esa] dsUnzh; ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागपुर
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4581
ds iapkV (
06/2023-24) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22013/01/2025-
-
-एम-II]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1079.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 06/2023-24) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/06/2023-24
Date: 08.04.2025.
Party No.1:
1. The General Manager,
Chandrapur Area of WCL
Distt.-Chandrapur – 442404.
2. M/s GRN Constructions Pvt. Ltd.,
Plot No. 23, Door No. 2-48TN/31/3&4,
Telecom Nagar, Gachibowli, Hyderabad.
Pin – 500032.
V/s.
Party No.2:
The Prajoyt Punekar, Secretary,
Shoshit Bharat General Mazdoor Union,
Samrat Ashok Square, Ward No. 2, Durgapur,
Chandrapur, Maharashtra – 442402.
AWARD
(Dated: 08th April, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of WCL, M/s GRN Const Pvt Ltd and their
union/Shoshit Bharat General Mazdoor Union, for adjudication, as per letter No.NGP/8(01)/2023-ID(ALCCHP)
dated 03.05.2023, with the following schedule:-
―Whether demand of the Union (Shoshit Bharat General Mazdoor Union) for reinstatement of Shri
Mahesh Pandurang Parkhi & 06 other workmen / contract labour by M/s GRN Constructions Private Limited,
Contractor, Bhatadi OCM, Chandrapur Area of WCL, is fair, legal and justified? If yes, to what relief the
union/workmen are entitled to?‖
2.
Case is called out. Learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 Shri Rutej Pimpalkhute and Learned Counsel
for respondent no. 2 A.R. Kalele are present before the Court. But despite service of notice, no one is present on
behalf of petitioner since very beginning. No statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner till today. Likewise,
no written statements have been filed by the respondents. No other evidence has been filed by the petitioner to prove
his case. Petitioner is not coming to the Court since very beginning of the case. It appears that he is not interested to
contest the case further more. Claim of the petitioner is not proved. So, it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered.
ORDER
The demand of the Union (Shoshit Bharat General Mazdoor Union) for reinstatement of Shri Mahesh
Pandurang Parkhi & 06 other workmen / contract labour by M/s GRN Constructions Private Limited,
4582
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Contractor, Bhatadi OCM, Chandrapur Area of WCL, is unfair, illegal and unjustified. The union/workmen
are not entitled to any relief.
Justice (retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1080. —vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947(1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds
vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh; ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa
ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागपुर ds iapkV (
04/2014-15) dks izdkf”kr
djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22013/01/2025-
-
-एम-II]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1080.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 04/2014-15) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/Appln/04/2014-15
Date: 06.03.2025.
Party No.1:
Shri Rajesh D. Leader,
R/O Ghuggus Complex,
WCL Qtr. No. 238, Ramnagar Colony,
Post: Ghuggus, Distt. Chandrapur – 442505.
V/s.
Party No.2:
1) The Chairman-cum-M.D.
Western Coalfields Ltd.,
Civil Lines, Nagpur.
2) The Chief General Manager,
WCL, Wani Area, Urja Gram,
Post: Tadali, Distt. Chandrapur.
3) The Dy. General Manager (Mines),
Ghuggus Complex, WCL, Wani Sub Area,
Post: Ghuggus, Distt. Chandrapur.
AWARD
(Dated: 06th February, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section (1) & (2) of Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes (Amendment)
Act, 2010 (―the Act‖ in short), the applicant filed an industrial dispute between the employers, in relation to the
management of Western Coalfields Ltd. and the applicant, Shri. Rajesh D. Leader for adjudication, vide case no.
CGIT/NGP/Appln/04/2014-2015, with the following issues framed:-
―Whether the action of the management/ Western Coalfields Ltd. in terminating the workman is legal,
fair and justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4583
2.
Case called out. Both the parties are absent. Both the parties are not responding and attending the Court
since 24/11/2020. Only on 12/02/2021 Advocate for the management was present but nobody for the petitioner was
present on that date. This Court has passed an order dated 23/10/2020, in which, it is directed to the petitioners to file
fresh substitution application which is IA No. 01 but no such application has been filed till date on behalf of the
petitioners. Copy of IA No. 01 is attached to this file, in which, it has been stated that Rajesh Dasharath Leader
breathed his last on 24/08/2015. In support of this content, death certificate issued by Municipal Corporation Nagpur
is attached, which is also a photo copy. If these photo copies of substitution application as well as death certificate
taken into consideration then it is apparent that substitution application dated 22/12/2015 is moved by petitioners
beyond time i.e. near about 3 months 28 days after death of the sole petitioner Shri Rajesh D. Leader. Meaning
thereby substitution application is time-barred. None is present to press this application even after the order of this
Court dated 23/10/2020 has not been complied with as yet. So in the interest of justice, this case is abated against
petitioner.
ORDER
The action of the management/ Western Coalfields Ltd. in terminating the workman is legal, fair and
justified. The workman is not entitled to any relief.
Justice (retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1081. —vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947(1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa]
dsUnzh; ljdkj मेससस कनासटक ईएमटीए कोल माइन नलनमटेड, d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds
deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-सह-
] नागपुर ds iapkV (
02/2015) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj
dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22013/01/2025-
-
-एम-II]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1081.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 02/2015) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
Karnataka EMTA Coal Mine Ltd, and received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/Appl/02/2015
Date: 03.04.2025.
Party No.1:
1. Rashtriya Koyla Kamgar Sangharsh Sangh,
Through its President
Plot No. 49, C-2, Nandodaya Appartment,
Hill Road, Gokulpeth Nagar,
2. Shri Ramdas S/o Banduji Matte,
R/o Baranj Mokosa, Post Jena,
Tahasil Bhadrawati, Distt. Chandrapur
& 416 others, as per list
4584
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
V/s.
Party No.2:
Nilesh Shivram Singh Thakur,
Aged 33 years, Occ.: Nil,
R/o, Gittikhadan, Panchasheel Nagpur,
Plot No. 111-A, Katol Road, Nagpur-13
AWARD
(Dated: 03rd April, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section (2) & (3) of Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes (Amendment)
Act, 2010 (―the Act‖ in short), the applicant filed an industrial dispute between the employers, in relation to the
management of Karnataka EMTA Coal Mine Ltd. and the applicants, for adjudication, vide case no.
CGIT/NGP/Appln/02/2015, with the following issues framed:-
1) Whether the demand of the union to declare the management of Karnataka EMTA Coal Mine Ltd.,
engaged in Unfair Labour practices, for dismissing their 417 workmen is just, legal and justified? If
not, to what relief the 417 applicants are entitled to?
2) Whether there is any relationship of employer and employee between the parties?
2.
Case is called out. Learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 Shri R.E. Moharir is present before the Court
but none is present on behalf of petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner Shri R.N. Sen has filed pursi s, wherein, it has
mentioned that party no. 2 has not contacted to his Counsel since long time. He withdrawn his power from present
proceedings.
From perusal of order sheet, it is apparent that both the parties are not responding and attending the Court
since 24.04.2020. Accidently, today as well as on the last date 12.11.2024, Learned Counsel for the management Shri
R.E. Moharir is present before the Court. Although statement of claim and written statement have been filed by the
parties respectively but no documentary as well as oral evidence has been filed by the petitioner to establish the
contents of the statement of claim. Petitioner is not coming to the Court since long back. It appears that he is not
interested to contest the case further more. Claim of the petitioner is not proved. So, it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
ORDER
The demand of the union to declare the management of Karnataka EMTA Coal Mine Ltd., engaged in
Unfair Labour practices, for dismissing their 417 workmen is unjust, illegal and unjustified. The applicants are
not entitled to any relief.
Justice (retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1082.— vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k
esa] dsUnzh; ljdkj डब्लल्यू.सी.नलनमटेड,, d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp]
vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
]
नागपुर ds iapkV (
19/2024) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22013/01/2025-
-
-एम-II]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1082.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 19/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
W.C.Ltd, and received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025
[No. L-22013/01/2025– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4585
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/19/2024
Date: 17.04.2025.
Party No.1:
1. The Sub Area Manager,
Durgapur Sub Area of WCL,
Post – Durgapur, Distt. -Chandrapur,
Pin – 442404.
2. M/s Gaurav Contracts,
C/o Sub Area of WCL,
Post – Durgapur, Distt. Chandrapur,
Pin – 442404.
V/s.
Party No.2:
The President,
Shramjivi Koyla Kamgar Sangharsh Sangh,
Rayatwari Colliery, BMT Square, Near Mata
Mandir, Chandrapur – 442401.
AWARD
(Dated: 17th April, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of Durgapur Sub Area of Western Coalfields Ltd.,
Durgapur, Distt. Chandrapur, and their Union Shramjivi Koyla Kamgar Sangharsh Sangh, Chandrapur, for
adjudication, as per letter No.NGP/1(04)/2024-ID(ALCCHP) dated 28.03.2024, with the following schedule:-
―Whether the action of the Management of the Western Coalfields Limited in not ensuring that Shri
Angu Sonkar & 15 other workmen engaged by the outgoing contractor M/s Mann Engineering, have been
given preference in employment, as per the condition of exemption granted vide notification no. So 800(E)
dated 18/02/2022, is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the union/workmen are entitled to?‖
2.
Case is called out. Shri Sanjay Madhukar Duryodhan, Manager Personal is present on behalf of respondent
but none is present on behalf of petitioner.
From perusal of record, it is apparent that both parties are not appearing before the Court since 12/08/2024.
Today only, Shri. Sanjay Madhukar Duryodhan is present to represent the respondent. No statement of claim has been
filed by the petitioner till today. No other evidence has been filed by the petitioner to prove his case. Petitioner is not
coming to the Court since last three dates i.e. 12/08/2024, 17/09/2024 & 21/11/2024. It appears that petitioner is not
interested to contest the case further more. Claim of the petitioner is not proved. So, it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered.
ORDER
The action of the Management of the Western Coalfields Limited in not ensuring that Shri Angu
Sonkar & 15 other workmen engaged by the outgoing contractor M/s Mann Engineering, have been given
preference in employment, as per the condition of exemption granted vide notification no. So 800(E) dated
18/02/2022, is legal and justified. The union/workmen are not entitled to any relief.
Justice (retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
4586
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1083.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa]
dsUnzh; ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागपुर
ds iapkV (
16/2018-19) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/13/2017-
-
-एम-II]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1083.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 16/2018-19) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025
[No. L-22012/13/2017– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/16/2018-19
Date: 27.02.2025.
Party No.1:
The Sub Area Manager,
Durgapur Rayatwari Colliery, WCL,
Post. Rayatwari,
Dist. Chandrapur (M.S.).
V/s
Party No.2:
The Jt. General Secretary,
Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Congress,
C/o CR Tembhre, Near Ayyappa Mandir,
Tukum Ward No. 2, Tukum,
Chandrapur (M.S.).
AWARD
(Dated: 27th February, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of Western Coalfields Limited and their workman,
Shri. Arun Pocham Yemlawar the dependant son of Late Yemla Pocham Yankati through the union, Rashtriya
Colloery Mazdoor Congress for adjudication, as per letter No.L-22012/13/2017 (IR(CM-II)) dated 23.04.2018, with
the following schedule:-
1) ―Whether the alleged action for denial of employment to Shri Arun Pocham Yemlawar the dependent
son of the late Yemla Pocham Yankati by the management of Western Coalfields Ltd. Durgapur
Rayatwari Colliery is just fair legal?‖
2) If so whether the action of the management is violation of Para 9.4.4 of NCWA?
3) If yes, what relief Shri Arun Pocham Yemlawar is entitled to and from which date?
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4587
2. Case is called out. Both the parties are absent. Petitioner is not responding and attending the court
since 11/07/2019. Counsel for the respondent was only present on 19/11/2019 and 05/03/2021. Excluding two dates
Both the parties are not attending the court since long back. Although petitioner has filed his statement of claim but
the respondent has not filed their written statement till date. Petitioner has not filed any evidence to prove the contents
of the claim. Petitioner is not attending the court long back. It appears that, he is not interested to contest the case.
Claim of the petitioner is not proved. So it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
ORDER
The action of the management of Western coalfields Limited, for denial of employment to Shri. Arun
Pocham Yemlawar the dependent son of the late Yemla Pocham Yankati is just fair & legal. The workman is
not entitled to any relief.
Justice (retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1084.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k
esa] dsUnzh; ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागपुर
ds iapkV (
13/2020-21) dks izdkf‖kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/31/2020-
-
-एम-II]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1084.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 13/2020-21) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025
[No. L-22012/31/2020–IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/13/2020-21
Date: 28.02.2025.
Party No.1:
The Sub Area Manager,
Western coalfields Limited,
Umrer Sub Area,
Post & Tah. Umrer, Distt
Nagpur - 441204
V/s
Party No.2:
The Secretary,
Lal Zanda Coal Mines Mazdoor Union (CITU),
Branch: Umrer Sub Area, QTR. No. 1B/156,
Tah: Umrer, Distt.
Nagpur – 441204
4588
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AWARD
(Dated: 28th February, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of Western Coalfields Limited and their workman,
Shri. Ramesh Bapurao Nandekar through the union, The secretary, Lal Zanda Mines Mazdoor Union(CITU) for
adjudication, as per letter No.L-22012/31/2020 (IR(CM-II)) dated 21.08.2020, with the following schedule:-
―Whether the action of the Management of Western coalfields Ltd., Umrer Sub Area, Post & Tah.
Umrer, Distt Nagpur through the Sub Area manager in denying for payment of Basic Pay of Loader as
deducted by the Management of WCL Umrer Sub Area i.r.o Shri Ramesh Bapurao Nandekar, Pump Khalasi
Cat. V along with interest is just fair and legal? If not, to what relief the concerned workman/ union is entitled
to?‖
2. Case is called out. Both the parties are absent. Both parties are not attending and responding the court
since 17/12/2021. No Statement of Claim and written statement have been filed by petitioner as well as respondent
respectively till date. No other evidence have been filed by the Petitioner to prove his claim. Petitioner is not
attending the court since long back. It appears that he is not interested to contest the case. Claim of the petitioner is
not proved. So it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
ORDER
The action of the Management of Western coalfields Ltd., Umrer Sub Area, Post & Tah. Umrer, Distt Nagpur
through the Sub Area manager in denying for payment of Basic Pay of Loader as deducted by the
Management of WCL Umrer Sub Area i.r.o Shri Ramesh Bapurao Nandekar, Pump Khalasi Cat. V along with
interest is just fair and fair and legal. The workman is not entitled to any relief.
Justice (retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1085.— vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k
esa] dsUnzh; ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागपुर
ds iapkV (
43/2015-16) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/79/2015-
-
-एम-II]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1085.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 43/2015-16) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025
[No. L-22012/79/2015– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4589
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/43/2015-16
Date: 20.03.2025.
Party No.1:
Manager,
Western Coalfields Limited, Kanhan Area,
Mohan Colliery, PO : Ambada, The. Junardev,
Distt. Chindwara(MP)
Chindwara
V/s.
Party No.2:
Mohd. Naseem Siddki,
Zonal Mahamantri, Coal Mines Engg. Workers Assocsi
Ward. No. 10, Guddi. Palachouri,
Distt. Chindwara.
AWARD
(Dated: 20th March, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of Western Coalfields Ltd. and their workman Shri
Vinay Kumar S/o Kariya for adjudication, as per letter No. L-22012/79/2015 (IR(CM-II)) dated 18.12.2015, with
the following schedule:-
D;k izca/kd] eksgu dkWyjh oSLVuZ dksyfQYMl fyfeVsM] dUgku {ks=] iksLV vackMk] rglhy tqUukjnso] ftyk
fNanokMk ¼e/; izns’k½ }kjk ,ulhMCY;w,&AA ds izko/kku 10-4-4 o ,ulhMCY;w,&AAA ds izko/kku 9-4-4 ds vuqlkj
fnukad 30-06-2012 dks lsokfuo`Rr gq, iwoZ dkexkj Jh dfj;k oYn uRFkw ds vkJhr iq= fou; dqekj dks jkstxkj u
nsuk U;k;laxr gS \ ;fn ugh rks dkexkj D;k vuqrks”k ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA
2.
Case called out. Both the parties are absent. This case is pending since 05/01/2016. In the meantime, only
statement of claim and written statement have been filed by the parties respectively but petitioner has not filed his
evidence to prove the contents of the statement of claim. Petitioner is also failed to attend the Court today and earlier
before on several dates. It appears that petitioner is not interested to contest the case further more. Claim of the
petitioner is not proved. So, it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
ORDER
izca/kd] eksgu ekWyjh oSLVuZ dksyfQYMl fyfeVsM] dUgku {ks=] iksLV vackMk] rglhy tqUukjnso] ftyk
fNanokMk ¼e/; izns’k½ }kjk ,ulhMCY;w,&AA ds izko/kku 10-4-4 o ,ulhMCY;w,&AAA ds izko/kku 9-4-4 ds vuqlkj
fnukad 30-06-2012 dks lsokfuo`Rr gq, iwoZ dkexkj Jh dfj;k oYn uRFkw ds vkJhr iq= fou; dqekj dks jkstxkj u
nsuk U;k;laxr gSA dkexkj fdlh Hkh jkgr dk gdnkj ugh gSA
Justice (retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1086.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa]
dsUnzh; ljdkj डब्लू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागपुर
4590
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ds iapkV (
53/2018-19) dks izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/119/2018-
-
-एम-II]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1086.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 53/2018-19) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025
[No. L-22012/119/2018– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/53/2018-19
Date: 20.03.2025.
Party No.1:
Western Coalfields Ltd.,
Through its Chief General Manager,
Pench Area, Parasiya, Dist-Chindwada.
V/s.
Party No.2:
Lochan Prasad, Vice President,
Lalzanda Coal Mines, Majdoor Union (CITU)
Eklhara, Dist.-Chindwada.
AWARD
(Dated: 20th March, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has Western Coalfields Ltd.
through its Chief General Manager and their workmen Shri Shakiluddin S/o Jaliluddin, Shri Nafees Ahmad S/o
Jaliluddin and Smt. Rajawanti W/o Jagannath Yadao for adjudication, as per letter No. L-22012/119/2018 (IR(CM-
II)) dated 26.11.2018, with the following schedule:-
“क्या मुख्य महाप्रबंधक, वेकोनल, पेंच क्षेत्र को परानसया, नजला सिंदवाडा द्वारा श्री शकील उददीन, श्री नफीस एंव श्रीमती
रजवंती को ददनांक 10.06.1998 से कायस से बंद दकया जाना उनचत है? यदद नही तो उक्त कामगार अपने पूवस के कायस पर उसी नस्थती
में, ननयोजन तथा संबंनधत अनुतोश के अनधकारी है।”
2.
Case called out. Both the parties are absent. Today case is fixed for adducing evidence from the side of
petitioners and it was a last chance for the petitioners to adduce their evidence but petitioners only on 11/11/2024 and
02/04/2024 were present before the Court. Earlier before and today itself, petitioners are not attending the Court since
07/05/2021. Parties have filed their statement of claim and written statement respectively but petitioners have not
filed any evidence to prove the contents of the claim. Today, petitioners are not present before the Court. It appears
that they are not interested to contest the case. Claim of the petitioner is not proved. So it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
ORDER
eq[; egkizca/kd] osdksfy] isap {ks= dks ijkfl;k] ftyk fNanokMk }kjk श्री शकील उददीन] Jh uQhl ,ao Jherh
jtoarh dks fnukad 10-06-1998 ls dk;Z ls can fd;k tkuk mfpr gSA dkexkj fdlh Hkh jkgr dk gdnkj ugh gSA
Justice (retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4591
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1087.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj डब्ललू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागपुर ds iapkV (
19/2020-21) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
-22012/37/2020-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1087.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.19/2020-21) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of M/s.
WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025.
[No. L-22012/37/2020– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/19/2020-21
Date: 28.02.2025.
Party No.1:
1)
The Sub Area Manager,
Western Coalfields Limited,
Umrer Sub area,
Post: Umrer Project, Tah. Umrer,
Distt Nagpur - 441204
V/s.
Party No.2:
The Secretary,
Lal Zanda Coal mines Mazdoor Union (CITU),
Branch: Umrer Sub area, Qtr. No 1B/156,
Nagpur - 441204
AWARD
(Dated: 28th February, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub- section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) ("the Act" in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the Management of Western Coalfields Limited., and their workmen,
Shri Lala Bakaram Naukarkar Through the The Secretary, Lal Zanda Coal Mines Mazdoor Union (CITU), for
adjudication, as per letter No..L-22012/37/2020 (IR(CM-II)), dated 21/08/2020 with the following schedule:-
"Whether the action of the management of Western Coalfieds Ltd., Umrer Sub Area, Post & Tah.
Umrer, Distt Nagpur through the Sub Area Manager in denying promotion which is demoted by the
management and denied to give financial benefits to Shri Lala Bakaram Naukarkar is just fair & legal? If not,
to what relief the concerned workman/union is entitled to"
2. Case called out. Both the parties are absent. Both the parties are not attending and responding the court
since 17/12/2021. No Statement of claim and written statement have been filed by Petitioner as well as Respondent
respectively till date. No other evidence have been filed by petitioner to prove his claim. Petitioner is not attending the
court since long back. It appears that he is not interested to contest the case. Claim of the petitioner is not proved. So
it is closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
4592
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ORDER
The action of the management of Western Coalfieds Ltd., Umrer Sub Area, Post & Tah. Umrer, Distt
Nagpur through the Sub Area Manager in denying promotion which is demoted by the management and
denied to give financial benefits to Shri Lala Bakaram Naukarkar is just fair & legal. The workman is not
entitled to any relief.
Justice (Retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 17 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1088.—vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa] dsUnzh;
ljdkj डब्ललू सी एल d
izca/kra= ds lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp] vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V vkS|ksfxd fookn esa
-
सह
-
] नागपुर ds iapkV (
12/2012-13) dks
izdkf”kr djrh gS] tks dsUnzh; ljdkj dks
dks izkIr gqvk FkkA
[सं.
- 22012/62/2012-
-(सी.एम-II)]
मनिकंदन.एन, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 17th June, 2025
S.O. 1088.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 12/2012-13) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Nagpur as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the Management of
M/s. WCL and their workmen received by the Central Government on 28/05/2025.
[No. L-22012/62/2012– IR (CM-II)]
MANIKANDAN. N, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE SHRI SHIV SHANKER PRASAD PRESIDING OFFICER,
CGIT-CUM-LABOUR COURT, NAGPUR
Case No.CGIT/NGP/12/2012-13
Date: 07.03.2025.
Party No.1:
The Sub Area Manager,
Padmapur O/c Mines of Chandrapur Area of WCL.
Post Padmapur, Distt-Chandrapur,
Maharashtra.
V/s.
Party No.2:
The Joint General Secretary,
Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Congress,
Vaidhay Nagar, Near Ayyapa Mandir,
Tukum Ward No. 2, Distt-Chandrapur,
Maharashtra.
AWARD
(Dated: 07th March, 2025)
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (―the Act‖ in short), the Central Government has referred the industrial
dispute between the employers, in relation to the management of Padmapur Open Cast Sub Area of Chandrapur Area
of Western Coalfields Ltd. and their workman Shri. Pawankumar for adjudication, as per letter No. L-22012/62/2012
(IR(CM-II)) dated 24.07.2012, with the following schedule:-
―Whether the action of management of Padmapur Open Cast Sub Area of Chandrapur Area of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4593
Western Coalfields Ltd., in denying employment to Shri Pawankumar the dependent son of Shri
Ramayya Laxamayya Racchawar, Ex-Employee who retired on 31.05.2011 after putting in 35 years
service, which is contrary to the provisions of Para 9.4.4 of NCWA is legal and justified? To what
relief is the workman entitled to?‖
2.
Case called out. Representative Shri Sanjay Madhukar Duryodhan is present on behalf of respondent but
none is present on behalf of the petitioner. Both the parties are not responding and attending the Court since
11/01/2021. This case is pending since 16/10/2012. Several opportunities have been given to the petitioner to file his
statement of claim but petitioner failed to file his statement of claim. That‘s why on 08/04/2013, due to non-filing of
statement of claim reference has been decided and treated as ―no dispute‖ and it is also hold by the Court that
petitioner is not entitled to any relief .Being aggrieved by this order petitioner has filed his restoration application
which is also rejected by this Court on 20/03/2014. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner has preferred writ petition
no. 6124/2014 in which Hon‘ble High Court set aside the Award passed by this Court dated 08/04/2013 and directed
to take on record the statement of claim which is already been filed along with the application, for setting aside the
ex-parte award and the CGIT Court to decide reference in accordance with law. After that, several opportunities have
been given to the petitioner as well as respondent to appear before the Court and cooperate in the proceedings but
both the parties are not attending the Court since 11/01/2021. Today accidently representative of management Shri
Sanjay Madhukar Duryodhan is present before the Court. Petitioner has not filed any evidence to prove his claim.
Petitioner is not coming to the Court since long back. It appears that he is not interested to contest the case further
more. Claim of the petitioner is not proved. So, it is again closed.
Hence, it is ordered:
ORDER
The action of management of Padmapur Open Cast Sub Area of Chandrapur Area of Western
Coalfields Ltd., in denying employment to Shri Pawankumar the dependent son of Shri Ramayya Laxamayya
Racchawar, Ex-Employee who retired on 31.05.2011 after putting in 35 years service, which is contrary to the
provisions of Para 9.4.4 of NCWA is legal and justified. The workman is not entitled to any relief.
Justice (Retd.) SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 18 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1089.—औद्योनगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
स्टेट बैंक ऑफ बीकानेर एंड जयपुर ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योनगक
fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योनगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a34/2003) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y–12012/290/2002- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)]
सलोनी, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 18th June, 2025
S.O. 1089.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.34/2003) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
No.1 Dhanbad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of
Bikaner & Jaipur and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/290/2002- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1,DHANBAD
In the matter of reference U/S 10 (1) (d)& (2A) of I.D.Act. 1947.
Reference Case No. 34/2003
Employer in relation to the management of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Patna.
AND.
Their workman.
4594
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Present: Shri Sachindra Kumar Pandey
Presiding Officer
Appearances:
For the Employers :- None.
For the workman. :- None.
State : Jharkhand.
Industry:-Bank
Dated 06/06/2025
AWARD
In exercise of powers conferred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub –section (2A) of Section 10 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),Government Of India through the Ministry of Labour, vide its Order
No.L-12012/290/2002-(IR(B-I)) dated 28/03/2003 has been pleased to refer the following dispute between the
employer i.e. management of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Patna and their workman through General Secretary,
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Workers Orgn., Patna for adjudication by this Tribunal:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Patna, Bihar in not
regularising and instead in terminating the services of Sri Raman Kant Choudhary, Sub-ordinate staff
by stating that as per order No. F-3/3/104/87-IR dated 16-08-1990 and Circular No. P/REC/TEMP/6
dated 22-10-1990 does not apply to his case is justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled?‖
2. On receiving order no. L-12012/290/2002-(IR(B-I)) dated 28/03/2003 Government of India, Ministry of Labour,
New Delhi for adjudication of the dispute, Reference case no. 34 of 2003 was registered on 20.05.2003 and thereafter
the notices were sent to the parties with a direction to appear and submit their written statements along with relevant
documents in support of their claims and the witnesses.
3. After service of notice, Sri Ashok Kumar, General Secretary of the Sponsoring Union appeared from the side of
the workman and filed W/S and subsequently rejoinder also and Sri G.K. Mukherjee, Advocate appeared from the
side of the employer and filed written statement from the management side. It further appears that they also led some
evidence from their side but later on, a registered notice was sent on 16.08.2021 for appearance of the parties for
further proceeding, none appeared from either side. The registered notice sent to the Assistant General Manager, State
Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Patna, returned with endorsement ―Left‖ and the workman also did not appear and since
the year 2021, the case record is running in dark which shows that the workman has lost his interest in this case and
therefore, this Tribunal is of the opinion that the case deserves to be dismissed due to non prosecution.
4. Hence,
ORDERED
that this case is hereby dismissed and a ―No Dispute Award‖ be drawn up in respect of the above reference case.
Let the copies of Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India, New
Delhi for information and notification.
SACHINDRA KUMAR PANDEY, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 18 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1090.—औद्योनगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
सेंट्रल बैंक ऑफ इंनडया ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योनगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योनगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a95/2006) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y–12011/75/2006- vkbZ vkj (ch-II)]
सलोनी, उप ननदेशक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4595
New Delhi, the 18th June, 2025
S.O. 1090.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.95/2006) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
No.1 Dhanbad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Central Bank
of India and their workmen.
[No. L-12011/75/2006- IR(B-II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1,DHANBAD
In the matter of reference U/S 10 (1) (d)& (2A) of I.D.Act. 1947.
Reference Case No. 95/2006
Employer in relation to the management of Central Bank of India, Patna.
AND.
Their workman.
Present: Shri Sachindra Kumar Pandey
Presiding Officer
Appearances:
For the Employers :- Sri R.R. Prasad, Panel Advocate
For the workman. :- None.
State : Jharkhand.
Industry:-Bank
Dated 06/06/2025
AWARD
In exercise of powers conferred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub –section (2A) of Section 10 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),Government Of India through the Ministry of Labour, vide its Order
No.L-12011/75/2006-(IR(B-II)) dated 13/11/2006 has been pleased to refer the following dispute between the
employer i.e. management of Central Bank of India, Patna and their workman through General Secretary, Bihar State
Central Bank Employees Association, Patna for adjudication by this Tribunal:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of Central Bank of India, Zonal Office, Patna/RO Office
Saharsa in not regularising the services of Sh. Kartik Jha as sub-staff in subordinate cadre who has
claimed to have been working for more than 1700 days in seven Block years is legal and or justified? If
not, what relief Shri Kartik Jha is entitled to?‖
2. On receiving order no. L-12011/75/2006-(IR(B-II)) dated 13/11/2006 Government of India, Ministry of Labour,
New Delhi for adjudication of the dispute, Reference case no. 95 of 2006 was registered on 28.11.2006 and thereafter
the notices were sent to the parties with a direction to appear and submit their written statements along with relevant
documents in support of their claims and the witnesses.
3. Even after issuance of notice none appeared from either side though on 06.06.2025, Sri R.Ranjan, Panel Advocate
of management appeared. The case record shows that the registered notice that was sent to the workman returned with
endorsement ―Left‖ and thereafter no step was taken to ensure the presence of the workman in this case. The case
record shows that this case is of the year 2006 and since then no step has been taken from the side of the workman
which shows that he has no interest in this case and therefore, this Tribunal is of the opinion that this case deserves to
be dismissed for non prosecution.
4. Hence,
ORDERED
that this case is hereby dismissed and a ―No Dispute Award‖ be drawn up in respect of the above reference case.
Let the copies of Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India, New
Delhi for information and notification.
SACHINDRA KUMAR PANDEY, Presiding Officer
4596
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : JUNE 21, 2025/JYAISTHA 31, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नई ददल्ली, 18 जून, 2025
का.आ. 1091.—औद्योनगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
bZ lh jsyos ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योनगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
औद्योनगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a86/2014) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y–41011/67/2014- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)]
सलोनी, उप ननदेशक
New Delhi, the 18th June, 2025
S.O. 1091.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.86/2014) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
No.1 Dhanbad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of E. C. Railway
and their workmen.
[No. L-41011/67/2014- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALNO.1,DHANBAD
In the matter of reference U/S 10 (1) (d)& (2A) of I.D.Act. 1947.
Reference Case No. 86/2014
Employer in relation to the management of E.C. Railway, Danapur.
AND.
Their workman.
Present: Shri Sachindra Kumar Pandey
Presiding Officer
Appearances:
For the Employers :- None.
For the workman. :- None.
State : Jharkhand.
Industry:- Railway
Dated 03/06/2025
AWARD
In exercise of powers conferred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub –section (2A) of Section 10 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Government Of India through the Ministry of Labour, vide its Order
No.L-41011/67/2014-(IR(B-I)) dated 17/09/2014, has been pleased to refer the following dispute between the
employer i.e. management of E.C. Railway and their workman through General Secretary, E.C. Railway Mazdoor
Union, Patna for adjudication by this Tribunal:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management to stop the increment of workmen Madan Kumar Singh,
Lalman, Chunilal, and AK Asthana, for 35 months and transfer of Aswini Kumar, Kamendra Prasad,
and Dinesh Kumar was correct? If not, what relief the workmen were entitled for?‖
2. On receiving order no. 41011/67/2014-(IR(B-I)) dated 17/09/2014 Government of India, Ministry of Labour,
New Delhi for adjudication of the dispute, Reference case no. 86 of 2014 was registered on 29.09.2014 and thereafter
the notices were sent to the parties with a direction to appear and submit their written statements along with relevant
documents in support of their claims and the witnesses.
3. After issuance of notice, the registered post was returned with remarks ―Addressee cannot be located‖ and
thereafter no further step was taken whereas Sri S.K. Sinha appeared from the side of the management but the
workmen never appeared before the Tribunal since 29.09.2014.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : जून 21, 2025/ज् येष् ठ 31, 1947
4597
4. On perusal of the entire case record it is transpired that the workmen never appeared before this Tribunal for a
period of 11 years which shows that the workmen have no interest in this case and therefore, for the ends of justice,
this case deserves to be dismissed.
5. Hence,
ORDERED
that this case is hereby dismissed and a ―No Dispute Award‖ be drawn up in respect of the above reference case.
Let the copies of Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India, New
Delhi for information and notification.
SACHINDRA KUMAR PANDEY, Presiding Officer
Uploaded by Dte. of Printing at Government of India Press, Ring Road, Mayapuri, New Delhi-110064
and Published by the Controller of Publications, Delhi-110054. GORAKHA NATH
YADAVA
Digitally signed by GORAKHA
NATH YADAVA
Date: 2025.07.11 12:05:24 +05'30'