5807 GI/2025
(6009)
रजजस्ट्री सं. डी.एल. (एन) 04/0007/2003—05
REGD. NO. D. L. (N) 04/0007/2003—05
xxxGIDHxxx
xxxGIDExxx
प्राजधकार से प्रकाजित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
साप् ताजहक
WEEKLY
सं. 35]
नइ ददल् ली, जसतम् बर 7—जसतम् बर 13, 2025, िजनवार/भाद्र 16—भाद्र 22 1947
No. 35]
NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 7––SEPTEMBER 13 , 2025, SATURDAY/BHADRA 16– BHADRA 22, 1947
आस भाग में जभन् न ृृ् सं् या दी जाती हज जजससे दक यह ृृथक संकलन के प ृ में रखा जा सके
Separate Paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation
भाग II—खण् ड 3—ईृ-खण् ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)
भारत सरकार के मंत्रालयों (रक्षा मंत्रालय को छोड़कर) द्वारा जारी दकए गए सांजवजधक अदेि और ऄजधसूचनाएं
Statutory Orders and Notifications Issued by the Ministries of the Government of India
(Other than the Ministry of Defence)
स्ट्वास्ट््य और ृररवार कल्याण मंत्रालय
(दंत ऄनुभाग)
नइ ददल्ली, 30 जुलाइ, 2025
का.अ. 1616.—केन्द्रीय सरकार, दंत जचदकत्सक ऄजधजनयम, 1948 (1948 का 16) की धारा 10 की
ईृधारा (2) द्वारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, भारतीय दंत जचदकत्सा ृररषद के ृरामिश के ृश् चात, ईि
ऄजधजनयम की ऄनुसूची के भाग-I में एतदद्वारा जनम्नजलजखत संिोधन करती हज, ऄथाशत् :-
ऄटल जबहारी वाजृेयी जचदकत्सा महाजवद्यालय, लखनउ द्वारा कररयर ृोस्ट्ट ग्रेजुएट आंजस्ट्टट्यूट ऑफ डेंटल साआंसेस
एण्ड हॉजस्ट्ृटल, लखनउ के एमडीएस छात्रों को प्रदान की गइ दंत जचदकत्सा जडग्री की मान्यता से संबंजधत दंत जचदकत्सक
ऄजधजनयम, 1948 (1948 का 16) की ऄनुसूची के भाग- I में क्रम सं्या 156 के सामने कॉलम 2 और 3 की मौजूदा
प्रजवजियों में जनम्नजलजखत प्रजवजियां ऄंत:स्ट्थाजृत की जाएंगी, ऄथाशत्:
सी.जी.-डी.एल.-सा.-22092025-266288
CG-DL-W-22092025-266288
6010
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
कररयर ृोस्ट्ट ग्रेजुएट आंजस्ट्टट्यूट ऑफ डेंटल साआंसेस एण्ड हॉजस्ट्ृटल, लखनउ
ओरल एण्ड मजससलोफेजियल ृजथोलॉजी एण्ड ओरल
माआक्रोबायोलॉजी
(5 सीटों के साथ, यदद 10.04.2025 को या ईसके बाद स्ट्वीकृत
की जाती हज)।
एमडीएस (ओरल एण्ड मजससलोफेजियल ृजथोलॉजी एण्ड
ओरल माआक्रोबायोलॉजी)
ऄटल जबहारी वाजृेयी जचदकत्सा महाजवद्यालय, लखनउ
[फा. सं. वी.12017/17/2025-डीइ]
ऄजमत कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE
(Dental Section)
New Delhi, the 30th July, 2025
S.O. 1616.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Dentists Act, 1948
(16 of 1948), the Central Government, after consultation with the Dental Council of India, hereby, makes the
following amendments in Part-I of the Schedule to the said Act, namely:-
In the existing entries of column 2 & 3 against Serial No. 156, in Part-I of the Schedule to the Dentists
Act, 1948 (16 of 1948) pertaining to recognition of Dental Degrees awarded by Atal Bihari Vajpayee Medical
University, Lucknow in respect of MDS students of Career Post Graduate Institute of Dental Sciences &
Hospital, Lucknow the following entries shall be inserted, namely:
Career Post Graduate Institute of Dental Sciences & Hospital, Lucknow
Oral & Maxillofacial Pathology and Oral Microbiology
(with 5 seats, if granted on or after 10.04.2025)
MDS (Oral & Maxillofacial Pathology and Oral
Microbiology)
Atal Bihari Vajpayee Medical University, Lucknow
[F. No. V.12017/17/2025-DE]
AMIT KUMAR, Under Secy.
(दंत ऄनुभाग)
नइ ददल्ली, 30 जुलाइ, 2025
का.अ. 1617.—केन्द्रीय सरकार, दंत जचदकत्सक ऄजधजनयम, 1948 (1948 का 16) की धारा 10 की ईृधारा
(2) द्वारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, भारतीय दंत जचदकत्सा ृररषद के ृरामिश के ृश्चात, ईि ऄजधजनयम की
ऄनुसूची के भाग-I में एतदद्वारा जनम्नजलजखत संिोधन करती हज, ऄथाशत् :-
ृजसदफक मेजडकल यूजनवर्ससटी, ईदयृुर द्वारा ृजसदफक डेन्टल कॉलेज एण्ड ररसचश सेंटर, ईदयृुर के एमडीएस
छात्रों को प्रदान की गइ दंत जचदकत्सा जडग्री की मान्यता से संबंजधत दंत जचदकत्सक ऄजधजनयम, 1948 (1948 का 16) की
ऄनुसूची के भाग-I में क्रम स्या 139 के सामने कॉलम 2 और 3 की मौजूदा प्रजवजियों में जनम्नजलजखत प्रजवजियां
ऄंत:स्ट्थाजृत की जाएंगी, ऄथाशत्:
ृजसदफक डेन्टल कॉलेज एण्ड ररसचश सेंटर, ईदयृुर
ओरल मेजडजसन एण्ड रेजडयोलॉजी
(2 सीटों के साथ, यदद 25.09.2024 को या ईसके बाद
स्ट्वीकृत की जाती हज)।
एमडीएस (ओरल मेजडजसन एण्ड रेजडयोलॉजी)
ृजसदफक मेजडकल यूजनवर्ससटी, ईदयृुर
कंजवेरटव डेंरटस्ट्री एण्ड एंडोडोंरटसस
(3 सीटों के साथ, यदद 28.09.2024 को या ईसके बाद
स्ट्वीकृत की जाती हज)।
एमडीएस (कंजवेरटव डेंरटस्ट्री एण्ड एंडोडोंरटसस)
ृजसदफक मेजडकल यूजनवर्ससटी, ईदयृुर
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6011
ृेररयोडॉन्टोलॉजी
(2 सीटों के साथ, यदद 28.09.2024 को या ईसके बाद
स्ट्वीकृत की जाती हज)।
एमडीएस (ृेररयोडॉन्टोलॉजी)
ृजसदफक मेजडकल यूजनवर्ससटी, ईदयृुर
प्रोस्ट्थोडोंरटसस एण्ड क्राईन एंड जिज
(3 सीटों के साथ, यदद 25.09.2024 को या ईसके बाद
स्ट्वीकृत की जाती हज)।
एमडीएस (प्रोस्ट्थोडोंरटसस एण्ड क्राईन एंड जिज)
ृजसदफक मेजडकल यूजनवर्ससटी, ईदयृुर
[फा. सं. वी.12017/17/2025-डीइ]
ऄजमत कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
(DENTAL SECTION)
New Delhi, the 30th July, 2025
S.O. 1617.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Dentists Act, 1948
(16 of 1948), the Central Government, after consultation with the Dental Council of India, hereby, makes the
following amendments in Part-I of the Schedule to the said Act, namely:-
In the existing entries of column 2 & 3 against Serial No.139, in Part-I of the Schedule to the Dentists
Act, 1948 (16 of 1948) pertaining to recognition of Dental Degrees awarded by Pacific Medical University, Udaipur
in respect of MDS students of Pacific Dental College & Research Centre, Udaipur the following entries shall be
inserted, namely:
Pacific Dental College & Research Centre, Udaipur
Oral Medicine and Radiology
(with 2 seats, if granted on or after 25.09.2024)
MDS (Oral Medicine and Radiology )
Pacific Medical University, Udaipur
Conservative Dentistry & Endodontics
(with 3 seats, if granted on or after 28.09.2024)
MDS (Conservative Dentistry & Endodontics)
Pacific Medical University, Udaipur
Periodontology
(with 2 seats, if granted on or after 28.09.2024)
MDS (Periodontology)
Pacific Medical University, Udaipur
Prosthodontics and Crown & Bridge
(with 3 seats, if granted on or after 25.09.2024)
MDS (Prosthodontics and Crown & Bridge)
Pacific Medical University, Udaipur
[F. No. V.12017/17/2025-DE]
AMIT KUMAR, Under Secy.
नइ ददल्ली, 18 ऄगस्ट्त, 2025
का.अ. 1618.—केंद्रीय सरकार, दंत जचदकत्सक ऄजधजनयम, 1948 (1948 का 16) की धारा 10 की ईृधारा
(2) द्वारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए भारतीय दंत ृररषद के ृरामिश के ृश्चात, ईि ऄजधजनयम की ऄनुसूची के
भाग-I में एतद्द्वारा जनम्नजलजखत संिोधन करती हज, ऄथाशत्:-
ऄटल मेजडकल एंड ररसचश यूजनवर्ससटी, जहमाचल प्रदेि द्वारा एचृी गवनशमेंट डेंटल कॉलेज एंड हॉजस्ट्ृटल, जिमला
के एमडीएस छात्रों को प्रदान की गइ दंत जडग्री की मान्यता से संबंजधत दंत जचदकत्सक ऄजधजनयम, 1948 (1948 का 16)
की ऄनुसूची के भाग-I में क्रम सं्या 155 के सामने कॉलम 2 और 3 की मौजूदा प्रजवजियों में जनम्नजलजखत प्रजवजियां
ऄंतःस्ट्थाजृत की जाएंगी, ऄथाशतः
6012
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
एचृी गवनशमेंट डेंटल कॉलेज एंड हॉजस्ट्ृटल, जिमला
प्रोस्ट्थोडोजन्टसस एंड क्राईन एंड जिज
(3 सीटों के साथ, यदद 13.12.2024 को या ईसके बाद स्ट्वीकृत
की जाती हैं)
एमडीएस (प्रोस्ट्थोडोजन्टसस एंड क्राईन एंड जिज)
ऄटल मेजडकल एंड ररसचश यूजनवर्ससटी, जहमाचल प्रदेि
[फा. सं. वी.12017/17/2025-डीइ (भाग)]
ऄजमत कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 18th August, 2025
S.O. 1618.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Dentists Act, 1948
(16 of 1948), the Central Government, after consultation with the Dental Council of India, hereby, makes the
following amendments in Part-I of the Schedule to the said Act, namely:-
In the existing entries of column 2 & 3 against Serial No. 155, in Part-I of the Schedule to the Dentists
Act, 1948 (16 of 1948) pertaining to recognition of Dental Degrees awarded by Atal Medical & Research
University, Himachal Pradesh in respect of MDS students of H.P Government Dental College & Hospital,
Shimla the following entries shall be inserted, namely:
H.P Government Dental College & Hospital, Shimla
Prosthodontics and Crown & Bridge
(with 3 seats, if granted on or after 13.12.2024)
MDS (Prosthodontics and Crown & Bridge)
Atal Medical & Research University, Himachal Pradesh
[F. No. V.12017/17/2025-DE(Pt.)]
AMIT KUMAR, Under Secy.
नइ ददल्ली, 20 ऄगस्ट्त, 2025
का.अ. 1619.—केन्द्रीय सरकार, दंत जचदकत्सक ऄजधजनयम, 1948 (1948 का 16) की धारा 10 की ईृधारा
(2) द्वारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, भारतीय दंत जचदकत्सा ृररषद के ृरामिश के ृश्चात, ईि ऄजधजनयम की
ऄनुसूची के भाग-I में एतद द्वारा जनम्नजलजखत संिोधन करती हज, ऄथाशत् :-
कलोजी नारायण राव स्ट्वास्ट््य जवज्ञान जवश्वजवद्यालय,वारंगल, तेलंगाना द्वारा जतरुमाला दंत जचदकत्सा जवज्ञान
संस्ट्थान एवं ऄनुसंधान केंद्र, जनजामाबाद, तेलंगाना के बीडीएस छात्रों को प्रदान की गइ दंत जचदकत्सा जडग्री की मान्यता से
संबंजधत दंत जचदकत्सक ऄजधजनयम, 1948 (1948 का 16) की ऄनुसूची के भाग-I में क्रम सं्या 141 के सामने कॉलम 2
और 3 की मौजूदा प्रजवजियों में जनम्नजलजखत प्रजवजियां ऄंत:स्थाजृत की जाएंगी, ऄथाशत्:
जतरुमाला दंत जचदकत्सा जवज्ञान संस्ट्थान एवं ऄनुसंधान केंद्र, जनजामाबाद, तेलंगाना
बजचलर ऑफ डेंटल सजशरी
(100 सीटों के साथ, यदद 05.02.2025 को या ईसके बाद
स्ट्वीकृत की जाती हज)।
बीडीएस,
कलोजी नारायण राव स्ट्वास्ट््य जवज्ञान जवश्वजवद्यालय,
वारंगल, तेलंगाना
[फा. सं. वी.12017/15/2025-डीइ ]
ऄजमत कुमार, ऄवर सजचव
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6013
New Delhi, the 20th August, 2025
S.O. 1619.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Dentists Act, 1948
(16 of 1948), the Central Government, after consultation with the Dental Council of India, hereby, makes the
following amendments in Part-I of the Schedule to the said Act, namely:-
In the existing entries of column 2 & 3 against Serial No. 141, in Part-I of the Schedule to the Dentists
Act, 1948 (16 of 1948) pertaining to recognition of Dental Degrees awarded by Kaloji Narayan Rao University of
Health Sciences, Warangal, Telangana in respect of BDS students of Tirumala Institute of Dental Sciences &
Research Centre, Nizamabad, Telangana, the following entries shall be inserted, namely:
Tirumala Institute of Dental Sciences & Research Centre, Nizamabad, Telangana
Bachelor of Dental Surgery
(With 100 seats if granted on or after 05.02.2025)
BDS,
Kaloji Narayan Rao University of Health Sciences,
Warangal, Telangana
[F. No. V.12017/15/2025-DE]
AMIT KUMAR, Under Secy.
कोयला मंत्रालय
नइ ददल्ली, 3 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1620.—केंद्रीय सरकार एतद्दवारा राजभाषा (संघ के िासकीय प्रयोजनों के जलए प्रयोग) जनयम, 1976
(1987 में यथा संिोजधत) के जनयम 10 के ईृ जनयम (4) के ऄनुसरण में, कोयला मंत्रालय के जनयंत्रणाधीन कायाशलय
‘कोयला जनयंत्रक संग न (सीसीओ)’, स्ट्कोृ मीनार, ृॉंचवीं मंजजल, कोर-।, लक्ष्मी नगर, ददल्ली-110092, जजसके
80% से ऄजधक कमशचाररयों ने हहदी का कायशसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर जलया हज, को ऄजधसूजचत करती हज।
[फा. सं. 13012/1/2017-हहदी]
अस्ट्था जजन, संयुस त जनदेिक
MINISTRY OF COAL
New Delhi, the 3rd September, 2025
S.O. 1620.—In pursuance of sub Rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Languages (Use for Official purposes of
the Union) Rules, 1976 (as amended in 1987), Central Government hereby notifies the Office ‗Coal Controller's
Organisation (CCO)‘, Scope Minar, Fifth Floor, Core-I, Lakshmi Nagar, Delhi-110092 under the control of Ministry
of Coal located at Delhi, wherein more than 80% of the staff have acquired working Knowledge of Hindi.
[F. No. 13012/1/2017-HINDI]
AASTHA JAIN, Jt. Director
नइ ददल्ली, 3 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1621.—केंद्रीय सरकार एतद्दवारा राजभाषा (संघ के िासकीय प्रयोजनों के जलए प्रयोग) जनयम, 1976
(1987 में यथा संिोजधत) के जनयम 10 के ईृ जनयम (4) के ऄनुसरण में, कोयला मंत्रालय के जनयंत्रणाधीन नॉदशनश
कोलफील््स जलजमटेड के दो क्षेत्रीय कायाशलयों नामत: ब्लॉक-बी क्षेत्रीय कायाशलय एवं कृ्णजिला क्षेत्रीय कायाशलय, जजनके
80% से ऄजधक कमशचाररयों ने हहदी का कायशसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर जलया हज, को ऄजधसूजचत करती हज।
[फा. सं. 13012/1/2017-हहदी]
अस्ट्था जजन, संयुस त जनदेिक
6014
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 3rd September, 2025
S.O. 1621.—In pursuance of sub Rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Languages (Use for Official purposes of
the Union) Rules, 1976 (as amended in 1987), Central Government hereby notifies the two Regional Offices namely
the ‗Block-B Regional Office and the Krishnashila Regional Office‘ of Northern Coalfields Limited under the control
of Ministry of Coal, wherein more than 80% of the staff have acquired working Knowledge of Hindi.
[F. No. 13012/1/2017-HINDI]
AASTHA JAIN, Jt. Director
ईृभोिा मामले, खाद्य और सावशजजनक जवतरण मंत्रालय
(खाद्य और सावशजजनक जवतरण जवभाग)
नइ ददल्ली, 1 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1622.—केन्द्रीय सरकार राजभाषा (संघ के िासकीय प्रयोजनों के जलए प्रयोग) जनयम, 1976 के जनयम
10 के ईृ जनयम (4) के ऄनुसरण में ईृभोिा मामले, खाद्य और सावशजजनक जवतरण मंत्रालय (खाद्य और सावशजजनक
जवतरण जवभाग) के प्रिासजनक जनयंत्रणाधीन जनम्नजलजखत कायाशलयों, जजनके 80 प्रजतित या ईससे ऄजधक कमशचारीवृन्द ने
जहन्दी का कायशसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर जलया हज, को राजृत्र में ऄजधसूजचत करती हज:-
क्र.सं.
ऄजधसूजचत दकए जाने वाले कायाशलय
1.
भारतीय खाद्य जनगम, मंडल कायाशलय, मोजतहारी
2.
भारतीय खाद्य जनगम, मंडल कायाशलय, बससर
3.
भारतीय खाद्य जनगम, मंडल कायाशलय, श्रीनगर (जम्मू एवं कश्मीर)
4.
केन्द्रीय भंडारण जनगम, क्षेत्रीय कायाशलय, चेन्नइ
5.
केन् द्रीय भंडारण जनगम, क्षेत्रीय कायाशलय, जयृुर के ऄधीनस्ट्थ सेंरल वेयरहाईस- (1) ईदयृुर (2) श्रीमाधोृुर और (3)
सूरतगढ़
6.
भांडागारण जवकास और जवजनयामक प्राजधकरण, नइ ददल्ली
[फा. सं. इ-11011/1/2008-हहदी(321924)]
राजेन्द्र कुमार, संयुस त सजचव
MINISTRY OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, FOOD AND PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION
(Department of Food and Public Distribution)
New Delhi, the 1st September, 2025
S.O. 1622.—In pursuance of sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Language (use for official purpose of the
Union) Rules, 1976, the Central Government hereby notifies the following offices under the administrative control of
the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution (Department of Food & Public Distribution), whereof
80% or more staff have acquired the working knowledge of Hindi:
S. No.
Offices to be notified
1.
Food Corporation of India, Divisional Office, Motihari
2.
Food Corporation of India, Divisional Office, Buxar
3.
Food Corporation of India, Divisional Office, Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir)
4.
Central Warehousing Corporation, Regional Office, Chennai
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6015
5.
Central Warehouses under Central Warehousing Corporation, Regional Office, Jaipur- (1) Udaipur (2)
Srimadhopur and (3) Suratgarh
6
Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority, New Delhi
[F. No. E-11011/1/2008-Hindi (321924)]
RAJENDER KUMAR, Jt. Secy.
ृेरोजलयम और प्राकृजतक गजस मंत्रालय
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1623.—केंद्र सरकार, भारतीय ृेरोजलयम और ईजाश संस्ट्थान ऄजधजनयम, 2017 की धारा 5(1) (क) के
ऄंतगशत प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए तथा भारतीय ृेरोजलयम और ईजाश संस्ट्थान, 2018 के प्रथम संजवजध के खंड12
के ऄनुसरण में प्रो. (डॉ.) ृररतोि कांसा बजनक को 18 ऄिूबर 2024 से तीन वषश की ऄवजध ऄथवा ऄगले अदेि तक जो
भी ृहले हो, के जलए भारतीय ृेरोजलयम और ईजाश संस्ट्थान (अइअइृीइ) के गवनशर बोडश (बीओजी) के ऄध्यक्ष के प ृ में
एतद्द्वारा जनयुि करती हज।
[फा. सं. सीए-31037/11/2022-सीए/एफृी-ृीएनजी भाग (1) (इ-45361)]
राजीव कुमार, ईृ सजचव
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1623.—In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5(1)(a) of the Indian Institute of Petroleum and
Energy Act, 2017 and in pursuance of Clause 12 of the First Stautes of Indian Institute of Petroleum and Energy,
2018, the Central Government hereby appoints Prof. (Dr.) Paritosh Kansa Banik as the President, Board of Governors
(BoG), Indian Institute of Petroleum and Energy (IIPE), Visakhapatnam for a period of three years with effect from
18th October 2024 or until further orders, whichever is earlier.
[F. No. CA-31037/11/2022-CA/FP-PNG Part (1) (E-45361)]
RAJEEV KUMAR, Dy. Secy.
श्रम एवं रोजगार मंत्रालय
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1624.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
एलअइसी ऑफ़ आंजडया के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और कुमारी अिा एल के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, बैंगलोर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-18/2018) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
जेड-16025/04/2025-अइ अर (एम)-106]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
MINISTRY OF LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1624.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 18/2018) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bangalore as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to LIC of India and Kum. Asha L which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-106]
SALONI, Dy. Director
6016
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIUBNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT
―Shram Sadan‖,
G G Palya, Tumkur Road,
Yeswanthpur, Bangalore – 560 022.
DATED
:
17th JULY 2025
PRESENT :
SMT. K P INDIRA
Presiding Officer
I D No. 18/2018
I Party
II Party
Kum. Asha L,
D/o Lakshman Naik,
Post : Hoasabelvanur,
Tal & Dist : DAVANGERE 577 002.
The Senior Divisional Manager,
LIC of India, Divisional Office,
100th Feet Road,
Gopalagowda Road,
SHIVAMOGGA - 577 205.
Appearances
I Party :
Shri M Rama Rao
Authorized Representative
II Party :
Shri Rajesh Shetty
Advocate
1.
This is a Petition filed under Section 2A of the ID act. The claim set forth by the 1st party workman is that
she was appointed as an Assistant by the 2nd Party in a clear vacancy of Office Assistant w.e.f. 18.07.2013 by
obtaining an Application and she has attended the interview conducted by the II Party; she was also assured with
regularization of her services for the services rendered by her and that she was doing the duties of regular staff; that
she was not paid with minimum scales as applicable to the Assistants and took work for more than eight hours per day
without paying her overtime wages; inspite of repeated requests to absorb her to the permanent post she was deprived
with the benefits of the permanent employees; that she was not provided with Provident Fund, Bonus Benefits though
other employees were extended with the same; that she was suddenly retrenched from the services of the II Party
orally from 16.12.2017 in the morning hours by the Branch Manager without notice, without payment of notice pay /
retrenchment compensation though there were no allegations against her. She was retrenched from the services
without prior intimation or paying her retrenchment compensation and without following due process of law and that
the II Party has retrenched more than 20 workmen without filing approval application seeking permission from the
appropriate Government to retrench their services as mandated under Section 25N of the Act; that due to the
retrenchment she is facing irreparable hardship, agony and unable to run her family and that she does not know any
other work than the Assistant job; that the II Party has employed fresh entrants in her place and the nature of work
done by her is perennial in nature and taking the new entrants is illegal and malafide; that she raised an industrial
dispute since no settlement was arrived she preferred to file the present petition requesting this Tribunal to declare the
retrenchment of service by the II Party as not in accordance with the provisions of ID Act; reinstate her into service
with full back wages and other benefits, regularization with continuity of service and ancillary benefits from the date
of her appointment 18.07.2013 with cost.
2.
The 2nd Party in their Counter Statement rebutted the Claim Statement stating that all the averments made are
false; that LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 are not applicable to the temporary employees appointed by the II
Party; that the I Party is put to strict proof of the above averments; that she was doing some unspecified job on daily
wages on need basis and that they were paying wages as per the notification issued by the Government of Karnataka
from time to time and therefore the question of extending Provident Fund Benefits does not arise. As the specified
job was completed, her services were disengaged as per law and the question of issuing notice, retrenchment
compensation or notice pay does not arise and that the II Party has not contravened the provisions of ID Act and the
question of reinstatement with the back wages and other benefits does not arise. The Respondent has prayed for
dismissal of the Petition with cost.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6017
3.
On the rival pleadings the following points arise for consideration:
―01. Whether the I Party has succeeded in proving that she was appointed by the II Party as Assistant
on temporary basis in a clear vacancy as contended?
02. Whether the disengagement of the I Party from job by the II Party is illegal as contended by the I
Party?
03. Whether the I Party is entitled for the reliefs prayed for?
04. What is the proper order to be passed?‖
4.
The I party has got examined herself as WW 1 and Ex W-1 to Ex W-9 are got marked. From the side of the
II Party MW 1 is examined and Ex M-1 is marked.
5.
Heard the arguments advanced by both sides. Written notes of Arguments are also submitted by both sides.
6.
POINTS NO. 1 TO 3 : Since the matter to be considered and adjudicated on these points are intertwined
and interwoven, all these points are discussed together.
7.
The I Party WW 1 claimed herself as a temporary employee / Assistant in Class III Category in a clear
vacancy of Office Assistant under the II Party LIC of India since 18.07.2013 at its Davanagere II Branch and
continued to work for Four years till 16.12.2017. Her case is that she has put in an application before the II Party and
she was interviewed by the officials of the LIC at the Branch Office. According to her she was appointed with an
assurance of regularization of her service within a few years coupled with the benefits applicable to permanent
Assistants. The above claim of the I Party is stoutly denied by the II Party on the precincts that the I Party was
engaged by the LIC purely on daily wages to perform some unspecified jobs and she has been paid daily wage for the
days of her engagement. Such payment according to the II Party has never been meant as ―SALARY‖.
8.
Among the documents produced and proved by WW 1, there is nothing indicting her to have been called for
an interview for the post of Office Assistant. She did not produce copy of application said to have been submitted by
her before the II Party to the said post. Though she claimed that the II Party did publish notification calling for
applications on their notice board, she could not specify the date of notification or its exhibition on the notice board.
She was not issued with any appointment letter by the II Party. On meticulous cross-examination she testified that
she was appointed on temporary basis as daily wager. She was given wages for the period she served in the II Party.
Ex W-1 series are a voucher dated 18.12.2017 and its corresponding receipt produced by the I Party to prove the
payment received by her from the II Party LIC. The voucher reflects the wage received by the I Party and similarly
placed other workers. This voucher would never improve her case, much less it substantiates her contention that she
was appointed in a clear vacancy by undergoing regular recruitment process. This voucher would never indicate
continuous and uninterrupted service of the I Party under the II Party for Four years as contended by her.
9.
MW 1 the Divisional Manager of the II Party specifically deposed that there is no particular notification for
LIC separately for daily wage employees and such daily wagers were engaged based on need and requirements and
there is no prescribed recruitment procedure for engaging them. Their wages were paid monthly in cash, debited from
imprest Cash Account No. 111772. This fact stood revealed from Ex W-1 series vouchers. MW 1 reiterated that no
order is issued to such persons for engaging them on daily wage. So without getting an appointment order from the
management the I Party worker cannot qualify for herself to be entitled for permanency or rather regularization in the
job. There is no basis for the so called assurance alleged to have been given by the II Party that she would be given
permanency in service along with equivalent other benefits.
10.
The purpose of production of Ex W-2 by the I Party, the confidential communication issued by the Regional
Manager (P&IR) to all SDM under South Central Zones dated 25.11.2017 alerting the divisions to disengage all the
daily wagers who are continued without any court case and calling for the number of daily wagers continuing by
virtue of court cases pursuant to the decision of the competent authority is not profitably explained by the I Party. It
is also not properly explained as to how the I Party / WW 1 happened to be in custody of Ex W-2, the confidential
communication addressed to the SDM by its higher-up. Anyhow Ex W-2 is not of any help to the I Party to establish
her case.
11.
Ex W-3 dated 25.12.2017 is the representation made by the I Party to the Senior Divisional Manager seeking
regularization of her service being aggrieved by stoppage of her service w.e.f. 23.08.2009 stating the same as
retrenchment. In Ex W-3 she grieved before the authority that she was pulled out from job without notice and without
payment of notice pay / retrenchment compensation despite having no allegations against her.
12.
On 27.12.2017 she took up the matter for conciliation before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C), Hubli
under Ex W-4. Ex W-5 is the reply submitted by the II Party before the ALC(C), Hubli, in response to the Ex W-4
representation. All along, the II Party has adopted a firm defence that the I Party was engaged only as a daily wager
on need basis due to office exigencies and she was neither recruited not given any appointment letter by any authority.
Her engagement was purely on daily wages for carrying out work on peace meal basis depending upon the needs of
6018
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the office and not as a temporary employee. Her pay of wages was as per the Government of Karnataka Gazette
Notification revised from time to time. MW 1 during her evidence precisely testified that since the I Party was paid
wages counting the number of days she worked, no deduction was made from her wage towards Provident Fund and
payment of bonus to her also did not arise for consideration. The circumstances explained by MW 1 substantiates the
contention raised by the II Party that the I Party was engaged only as a daily wager without there being any assurance
of permanency of service and such alleged assurance being out of place.
13.
Ex W-6 is the application filed by the I Party before the ALC(C) calling for documents from the II party
during the conciliation proceedings. As per Ex W-7 the Assistant Labour Commissioner(C) conducted Joint
Discussion on 05.02.2018 notifying further joint discussion to another date. Ex W-8 is also a similar application filed
by the I Party before the Conciliation Officer calling for some more documents from the II party during the
conciliation proceedings. Ex W-9 is the letter issued by the ALC(C) to LEO for collection of photocopies of
documents from various branches.
.
None of the above documents produced and relied upon by the I Party renders any proof to the core point of
controversy as to the status of employment at the time of her engagement under the II Party. Indeed, had it been an
engagement as Daily Wager, she does not get entitled for any of the benefits sought in the Petition. The II Party
Management to buttress its contention that the I Party was simply disengaged as there existed no further requirement
of her service and she has not been a temporary employee capable of claiming any of the benefits sought for, relied
upon various judicial pronouncements of the Hon‘ble Apex Court. At the threshold it has to be observed that the I
Party failed in showing any Rule, Law or Regulation nor any administrative order on the basis of which she claims
reinstatement and regularization with continuity of Service and other monetory benefits. In order to high light the
said aspect the II Party has relied upon the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Subedar Singh and others vs. District Judge,
Mirzapur and another 2001 1 SCC 37.
15.
It is contextually significant to follow the dictum laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in State of Haryana
vs. Jasmer Singh (1996 (11) SCC 77) which reads :
―The respondents, therefore in the present appeals who are employed on daily wages cannot be treated
as on a par with persons in regular service of the State of Haryana holding similar posts. Daily-rated
workers are not required to possess the qualifications prescribed for regular workers, nor do they have
to fulfil the requirement relating to age at the time of recruitment. They are not selected in the manner
in which regular employees are selected. In other words the requirements for selection are not as
rigorous. There are also other provisions relating to regular service such as the liability of a member of
the service to be transferred, and his being subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the authorities as
prescribed, which the daily-rated workmen are not subjected to. They cannot, therefore, be equated
with regular workmen for the purposes for their wages. Nor can they claim the minimum of the regular
pay-scale of the regularly employed‖
Referring to the said legal position the Hon‘ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and another vs. Tilak Raj and
others (2003 (6) SCC 123) held that a scale of pay is attached to a definite post and in case of a daily wager, he holds
no posts. The I Party neither in her pleadings nor in evidence has made out the particular works she performed under
the II Party, much less any material is placed by her as to the nature of the duties for which she was engaged by the II
Party. The contention of the II Party in its Statement of Objection that the engagement of the I Party was for meeting
the office exigencies to attend some unspecified jobs on payment of daily wage for the work performed is thus well
founded.
16. In Mohammed Ashif and others vs. State of Bihar and others (2010 (5) SCC 475), the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court held that the question of regularization of services of an Employee may arise only in situations where against an
available clear vacancy an appointment is made on adhoc or on-daily wage basis by an authority competent to do so
without any artificial break in service. The second situation in which the regularization could be granted is held to be
where the initial entry of the employee against an available vacancy was found suffering from some flaws in the
procedure in making the appointment though the person appointing was competent to make such initial recruitment
and had otherwise followed the procedure prescribed for such recruitment. It is equally held that ―the all-important
condition precedent for such regularization is that the initial entry of such employee must be made against the
Sanctioned vacancy and by following the Rules and Regulations governing such entry‖.
17.
Similarly the constitution bench of the Hon‘ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (2006 (4)
SCC 1) held that ―If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it
were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is
discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of
appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is
continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or
made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a
due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment
at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6019
by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right.‖ Here in the instant case the I party is claiming
permanency and seeks for regularization mainly on the so called ―long duration of work‖ (emphasis supplied) and not
on any other valid ground. The dictum quoted above defeats her claim as it is bereft of valid support and devoid of
merit
18.
Most of the rulings placed by the I party are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The Verdict of
the Hon‘ble High Court of Madras in V Muthukumarasamy and others vs. The Chairman, LIC, Zonal Office
dated 21.01.2007 also does not get any application in view of the fact involved in that case as the Petitioners therein
were sponsored by the Employment Exchange and have been appointed on temporary basis from shortlisted
candidates. As already observed, the I Party herein was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor her engagement
was in a clear vacancy by undergoing the Regular Recruitment process.
19.
The I party further relied upon on the ruling of the Hon‘ble High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru in
R V Mohan Reddy vs. The Chairman, Karnataka Grameena Bank in WP No. 1944/2022 (L-RES)
dated 10.02.2025 awarding 60% of Backwages to the Employee from the date of his termination reckoning the two
decades of service he had under the management as a Peon on daily wage. As against that, the principle laid down by
the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in a plethora of rulings aforementioned consistently hold that the Casual Employment
terminates when the same is discontinued, and merely because a temporary or casual worker has been engaged
beyond the period of his employment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed into regular service or made
permanent, if the original appointment was not in terms of the process envisaged by the relevant rules. So the legal
position settled at rest by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court disentitles the I party to put forth any claim of reinstatement,
regularization, continuity of service or back wages with consequential benefits.
20.
To sum up, the solitary materials viz., Ex W-1 vouchers show only pay for a single month in the respective
years and there is no valid material proving that her engagement was continuous in nature and she performed duties
under the II Party continuously till the date of her disengagement so as to show that her tenure of service at a time was
more than 240 days in a calendar year and her disengagement was in violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the
ID Act. So on legal principle and on factual matrix the I Party failed to establish a case on merit justifying the relief
sought for in the instant Industrial Dispute. Eventually her Claim Petition fails and the same is liable to be dismissed.
With this view Points No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
21.
POINT NO. 4: In view of the above discussion, the I party is held as not entitled for any relief.
22.
In the result, the following Award is passed
AWARD
The Claim Petition is Dismissed. No order as to cost.
(Dictated to Secretary to Court, transcribed by him, corrected and signed by me on 17.07.2025)
K P INDIRA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1625.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार श्री
ओम हसह राजावत ृुत्र श्री कल्याण हसह, माआंस ऑनर के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री कजलाि, जहन्द मजदूर सभा
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, कोटा, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-(केन्द्रीय) 07/2011
(सीअइएस-97/2014)) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी
के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
,y-29012/31/2005- vkbZ vkj (एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1625.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. (Central) 07/2011 (CIS-97/2014)) of the Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Kota as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Shri Om Singh Rajawat son of Shri Kalyan Singh, Mine Owner and Shri Kailash, Hind Mazdoor
Sabha which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-29012/31/2005-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
6020
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ऄनुलग्नक
U;k;k/kh'k] vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k¼dsUnzh;½dksVk]¼jkt-½
ihBklhu vf/kdkjh& lanhi dqekj 'kekZ] vkj-,p-ts-,l- ¼ftyk tt laoxZ½
funsZ'k izdj.k dzekad%vkS-U;k-¼dsUnzh;½&07@2011¼lhvkbZ,l&97@2014½
¼lh,uvkj&vkjtsdsVh060001312011½
fnukad LFkkfir%03-05-2011
izlax% Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh ds vkns'k dz-
,y&29012@31@2005 ¼vkbZvkj¼,e½½ fn-% 25-04-2011
funsZ'k@fookn vUrxZr /kkjk 10¼1½¼?k½ ,oa mi/kkjk 2¼d½
vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e]1947
e/;
dSyk'k iq= Jh ekuk] }kjk egkea=h] fgUn etnwj lHkk] caxkyh
dkWyksuh] Nkouh] dksVk
&&izkFkhZ Jfed
,oa
vkseflag jktkor iq= Jh dY;k.k flag] ekbZUl vkWuj ldriqjk] dksVk
&&vizkFkhZ fu;kstd
mifLFkr
izkFkhZ Jfed dh vksj ls izfrfuf/k%&
Jh iq:"kksRre nk/khp
vizkFkhZ fu;kstd dh vksj ls izfrfuf/k%&
Jh ,e-,l- 'kDrkor
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fn-%30-04-2025
Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh ds izklkafxd vkns'k fnukad 25-04-2011 ds tfj;s funsZ'k fookn] vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e]
1947 ¼ftls vkxs **vf/kfu;e** ls lEcksf/kr fd;k tkosxk½ dh /kkjk 10¼1½¼?k½ ,oa mi/kkjk 2¼d½ ds vUrxZr bl U;k;kf/kdj.k dks vf/kfu.kZ;kFkZ
izkIr gqvk gS%&
"Whether the claim of Shri Kailash S/o Shri Mana for Rs. 44000/- from Shri om Singh Rajawat S/o Shri
Kalayan Singh Mines contractor, Sakatpuri, Distt. Kota, Mines situated at Village Rajapur, in lieu of his duty from 25-
03-2000 to 05-07-2001 is legal and just? If yes, to what relief Sh. Kailash S/o Shri Mana is entitled?"
2&mDr fookn] U;k;kf/kdj.k esa jsQj gksus ij iathc) dj i{kdkjksa dks mifLFkfr ckcr uksfVl tkjh fd, x,A uksfVl dh ikyuk esa izkFkhZ Jfed
}kjk mifLFkr gksdj LVsVesUV vkWQ Dyse U;k;kf/kdj.k ds le{k izLrqr dj laf{kIrr% ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd mls vizkFkhZ vkse flag jktkor
ekbZUl yht gksYMj jktiqjk] ftykcwanh] fuoklh ldriqjk] dksVk us fn- 25-03-2000 ls jktiqjk ekbZUl ij LVksu dVj dk dk;Z djus gsrq lsok esa
fu;ksftr fd;kA Jfed ftruk dke jkstkuk djrk Fkk] fu;kstd dk eqa'kh jkstkuk mldh iphZ;k fy[kdj nsrk Fkk muesa ls vf/kdka'k iphZ;k
Jfed ds ikl ekStwn gS] blds vfrfjDr fu;kstd us Jfed dks 3750@&:- ekfld osru nsuk r; fd;k gqvk FkkA Jfed efgus ds var esa osru
dh ekax djrk Fkk ijUrq Jfed dks fu;kstd ;g dgrk Fkk fd fglkc ckn esa dj ysaxs] xqtkjs ds fy, iSls ysrs jgks] Jfed dks 1000@&:- izfr
efgus xqtkjs [kpsZ dk fn;k tkrk FkkA Jfed o mlds HkkbZ us tc osru dk fglkc djus dh ekax dh rks fu;kstd Lo;a us o blds }kjk ikys gq,
vlkekftd rRo j?kqukFk eqa'kh o vU; nks O;fDr;ksa us Jfed o Jfed ds HkkbZ ds lkFk ekjihV dh vksj dke ls Hkxk fn;kA Jfed o mldk HkkbZ
fnukad 16-10-2004 dks iqfyl v/kh{kd cwanh dks iqfyl v/kh{kd cwanh dks fu;kstd o mlds }kjk ikys gq, vlkekftd rRoksa ds fo:) dk;Zokgh
dh] ftldh tkap gsrq iqfyl LVs'ku Mkch] ftyk cwanh esa izkFkZuk i= Hkstk x;k rks fu;kstd us iqfyl esa xyr c;kuh dj nh fd Jfed o mldk
HkkbZ xr 4 ekg ls Qjkj gS] tcfd Jfed o mldk HkkbZ jktiqjk ekbZUl ls 5 fdyksehVj jkT;k dk rkykc esa fuokl dj jgs gS] D;ksafd fu;kstd
o mlds ikys gq, vlkekftd rRo vk, fnu muls ekjihV djrs gS] bl dkj.k jktiqjk ekbZUl o blds vkl&ikl Jfed o mlds HkkbZ dk dk;Z
djuk eqf'dy gks x;k rFkk fu;kstd Jfed o mlds HkkbZ dks fdlh nwljh txg Hkh dke ugha djuk nsrk gSA Jfed us fn- 18-11-2004 dks iqu%
iqfyl v/kh{kd cwanh dks f'kdk;r dh gS ftldh tkap fopkjk/khu gSA fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd dk osru :i;s 3750@& izfrekg ls
50000@&:- curk gS ftlesa ls fu;kstd us Jfed dks 1000@&:- izfrekg ds fglkc ls 16000@&:- [kpkZ pykus ds fy, fn, gS
44000@&:- dh jkf'k osru ysuk 'ks"k gS] ftls fu;kstd us ckotwn rdktksa ds ugha fn;k gS vkSj ekjihV djus ij vkeknk gSA Jfed dk osru
3750@&:- izfrekg gksus ds dkj.k Jfed dk Dyse osru Hkqxrku vf/kfu;e 1936 ds vUrxZr ugha fd;k tk ldrk gS D;ksafd vf/kfu;e ds
vUrxZr 1600@&:- izfrekg osru izkIr djus okyk deZpkjh gh Dyse dj ldrk gS] blls vf/kd osru izkIr djus okyksa ds fy, bl U;k;ky;
dks Jo.kkf/kdkj izkIr ugha gSA vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 33 lh¼2½ ds vUrxZr Hkh Je U;k;ky; vFkok vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k osru laca/k Dyse dks
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6021
tc rd ugha ysrs gS tc rd fd bl laca/k esa fdlh U;k;ky; ls vokMZ ikfjr ugha gks tkrk D;ksafd Jfed dk osru fu;kstd ds ;gka
fooknxzLr gks x;k gS vkSj fookn dk fuiVkjk vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr Je U;k;ky; vFok fVªC;wuy dks jsQjsal ds ek/;e ls ikfjr djds gh fd;k
tk ldrk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 33 lh ¼2½ ds vUrxZr Jfed ds osru dk Dyse lquus dk vf/kdkj Je U;k;ky; vFkok
vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k dks ugha gS] bl laca/k esa ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; E;wfufliy dkWiksZjs'ku cuke x.ks'k] jtkd o vU; 1995¼1½
,y-,y-ts- 395 gS vkSj izkFkZuk dh gS fd izkFkhZ dks fu;kstd ls fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd dk 'ks"k osru 44000@&:- e; [kpkZ eqdnek
fnyok;k tkosA
3&vizkFkhZ fu;kstd dh vksj ls mDr Dyse dk tokc izLrqr dj ;g izfrokn fd;k x;k gS fd izfri{kh dh ekbZUl esa izkFkhZ }kjk fu;fer rkSj ij
dksbZ dk;Z ugha fd;k gS crkSj etnwjh dk;Z ds fy, izfri{kh ds eqa'kh ds ikl ftl fnu Hkh og dk;Z djrk gS] mldh leqfpr jkf'k izfri{kh ds
eqa'kh }kjk mlh fnu lka;dkyhu Hkqxrku dj nh tkrh gS] izkFkhZ dh fdlh izdkj ls dksbZ Hkh jkf'k izfri{kh ij ns; ugha curh gS vkSj u gh
izfri{kh }kjk izkFkhZ dks ekbZUl ij dk;Z djus gsrq fu;ksftr fd;k x;k] u gh fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd izkFkhZ }kjk dk;Z fd;k gS]
blfy, izfri{kh ls izkFkhZ fdlh Hkh izdkj ls dksbZ Hkh jkf'k dks izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gS vkSj izkFkZuk dh gS fd izkFkhZ dk Dyse izkFkZuk i=
lO;; [kkfjt fd;k tkosA
4&lk{; esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls Lo;a o vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls vkse flag ds 'kiFk&i= izLrqr gq, ftuls ijLij ftjg dh x;hA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls
nLrkosth lk{; Hkh izLrqr dh x;h ftldk ;Fkkle; mYys[k fd;k tkosxkA
5&mHk;i{k dh cgl vafre lquh xbZ tks dh muds }kjk izLrqr U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa ds vuq:i gh jgh gSA
6&gLrxr izdj.k esa U;k;ky; dks ;g ns[kuk gS fd D;k izkFkhZ Jfed dks vizkFkhZ fnukad 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd dh dk;Z vof/k ds 'ks"k
osru 44000@&:- dk Hkqxrku ugha fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa oS/k gS vFkok ugha\
7&bl izdkj mijksDr lk{; ds foospu ls ;g izdV gks jgk gS fd izkFkhZ }kjk 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd fujarj vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa dk;Z
djus ,oa vizkFkhZ }kjk mDr vof/k ds cdk;k osru 44000@&:- dk Hkqxrku ugha djus dk dFku fd;k x;k gSA blds foijhr vizkFkhZ dh vksj
ls izkFkhZ ds mDr dFkuksa dk [k.Mu fd;k x;k gS vkSj ;g Li"V fd;k x;k gS fd izkFkhZ muds ;gka fu;fer rkSj ij dksbZ dk;Z ugha djrk Fkk
cfYd crkSj etnwjh dk;Z ds fy, izfri{kh ds eqa'kh ds ikl ftl fnu Hkh dk;Z djrk] mldh leqfpr jkf'k izfri{kh ds eqa'kh }kjk mlh fnu ns nh
tkrh Fkh ,oa izkFkhZ us muds ;gka fnukad 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-20001 rd dk;Z ugha fd;k gSA gLrxr izdj.k esa izkFkhZ }kjk tks lk{; is'k dh xbZ
gS mlesa izn'kZ MCY;w 1 ,oa MCY;w 2 izkFkhZ dks vizkFkhZ }kjk Hkqxrku djus dk fjdkWMZ] izn'kZ MCY;w 3 izkFkhZ dk lgk;d Je vk;qDr ds le{k is'k
izkFkZuk i= fn- 10-01-2005] izn'kZ MCY;w 4 vizkFkhZ dk tokc izkFkZuk i=] izn'kZ MCY;w 5 izkFkhZ dk izR;qRrj] izn'kZ MCY;w 6 vlQy okrkZ izfrosnu
gSA
izkFkhZ us fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd vizkFkhZ ds ;gka dk;Z djus laca/k esa vius LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse esa dFku fd;k gS fd ^^Jfed
ftruk jkstkuk dke djrk Fkk] fu;kstd dk eqa'kh jkstkuk mldh ifpZ;k fy[kdj mls nsrk Fkk muesa ls vf/kdka'k ifpZ;ka Jfed ds ikl ekStwn
gS^^ fdUrq izkFkhZ }kjk i=koyh ij tks nLrkosth lk{; is'k dh xbZ gS mlesa izn'kZ MCy;w 1 yxk;r MCY;w 6 esa izkFkhZ }kjk vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa
dk;Z djus laca/k dksbZ iphZ ugha gS ,oa izkFkhZ }kjk is'k izn'kZ MCY;w 1 ,oa MCY;w 2 vizkFkhZ }kjk izkFkhZ dks Hkqxrku djus dk fjdkWMZ gS ftlds laca/k
esa vizkFkhZ }kjk nkSjkus ftjg Lohdkj fd;k gS fd izn'kZ MCY;w 1 o MCY;w 2 ij mlds gh gLrk{kj gS ,oa izkFkhZ }kjk nkSjkus ftjg vius LVsVesaV
vkWQ Dyse esa fd, x, dFku fd dk;Z dh ifpZ;ka Jfed ds ikl gS] ds foifjr dFku fd;k x;k gS fd ^^tks geus dke fd;k Fkk mldh iphZ
mlds ikl u gksdj eqa'kh ds ikl gSA^^ bl izdkj izkFkhZ Jfed }kjk Lo;a gh dk;Z ds fjdkWMZ ds laca/k esa fojks/kkHkk"kh dFku fd, x, gSA blds
vfrfjDr izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr izn'kZ MCY;w 4 tks fd vizkFkhZ }kjk lgk;d Je vk;qDr ds le{k izLrqr tokc izkFkZuk i= dh izfr gS mlesa vizkFkhZ us
, ls ch Hkkx easa ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS ^^izkFkhZ 24-03-2000 ls izfri{kh ds fu;kstu esa Fkk^^ fdUrq bZ ls ,Q Hkkx esa ;g dFku fd;k gS fd ^^ftrus
fnuksa ds fglkc ls QlhZ QkM+us dk;Z fd;k] mldk cuus okyk osru izkFkhZ dks] izfri{kh }kjk vnk dj fn;k gS^^A izn'kZ MCY;w 4 esa vizkFkhZ ds }kjk
fd, x, dFkuksa ls Hkh ;g Li"V ugha gksrk gS fd izkFkhZ us vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd fdrus fnu dk;Z fd;k x;k
gS ,oa izkFkhZ }kjk vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa 3750@&:- ekfld osru gksus ds laca/k esa dksbZ lk{; is'k ugha fd, x, gS ftlls izkFkhZ dk osru
3750@&:- gksuk Hkh fooknxzLr gks tkrk gSA okafNr vuqrks"k izkIr djus ds fy, izkFkhZ Jfed dks viuh lk{; ls ;g fl) djuk vko';d gS fd
izkFkhZ us mlds }kjk of.kZr dk;Z vof/k fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-20001 rd vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa dk;Z fd;k gks ,oa mldk ekfld osru
3750@&:- gks] fdUrq izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr mijksDr lk{; ls ;g fl) ugha gksrk gS fd izkFkhZ us fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd vizkFkhZ ds
fu;kstu esa dc ls dc rd dk;Z fd;k gSA izdj.k esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls gktjh jftLVj] eLVjksy] is&fLyi@osru iphZ bR;kfn nLrkost Hkh
izLrqr ugha fd, x, gSA izkFkhZ Jfed ij dke djus ds rF; dks lkfcr djus dk tks Hkkj gS] mlesa izkFkhZ i{k }kjk dsoy ek= vius 'kiFk&i= esa
;g fy[k nsuk fd izkFkhZ Jfed us fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd yxkrkj dke fd;k ,oa mldk osru vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa 3750@:-
ekfld gks] i;kZIr ugha gksxk] vfirq mUgsas fdlh Bksl ekSf[kd ,oa izys[kh;@nLrkosth lk{; ls bl rF; dks lkfcr djuk gksxk ftlls fd ;g
rF; lEiq"V gks ldsA ijUrq gLrxr izdj.k esa i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ls izkFkhZ Jfed ;g rF; lkfcr djus esa iw.kZr;k vlQy jgk gS fd
mlds }kjk crkbZ xbZ dk;Z vof/k fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd dc ls dc rd fdrus dk;Z fd;k gS ,oa mldk osru 3750@&:- izfrekg
ds fglkc ls 44]000@&:- osru cdk;k gksA blds foijhr i=koyh miyC/k lk{; izn'kZ MCY;w 1 o MCY;w 2 ,oa izkFkhZ ds ftjg ds nkSjku fd,
x, dFkuksa ls vizkFkhZ i{k ds dFku vf/kd fo'oluh; izrhr gksrs gSa fd izkFkhZ us ftrus fnu vizkFkhZ ds ;gka dk;Z fd;k gS mldk Hkqxrku vizkFkhZ
}kjk mlh le; izkFkhZ dks dj fn;k x;k gSA ,sls esa izkFkhZ Jfed] vizkFkhZ ls dksbZ vuqrks"k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ?kksf"kr gksus ;ksX; ugha gS ,oa
jsQ~jsal Hkh blh vuq:i mRrfjr fd;k tkrk gSA
8&ifj.kker% Je ea=ky;] Hkkjr ljdkj }kjk viuh izklkafxd vf/klwpuk fn- 25-04-2011 ds tfj;s lEizsf"kr funsZ'k@fookn dks blh vuq:i
mRrfjr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jfed dSyk'k ;g fl) dj ikus esa vlQy jgk gS fd izkFkhZ] vizkFkhZ vkseflag jktkor iq= Jh
6022
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
dY;k.k flag] ekbZUl vkWuj ldriqjk] dksVk ds fu;kstu esa fn- 25-03-2000 ls 05-07-2001 rd fujarj vFkok dc ls dc
rd dk;Zjr jgk gS ,oa dk;Z djus ds mijkar izkFkhZ dk vizkFkhZ ds ;gka 44]000@&:- osru 'ks"k gks] blfy, izkFkhZ Jfed]
vizkFkhZ ls fdlh izdkj dk vuqrks"k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gSA
¼lanhi dqekj 'kekZ½
U;k;k/kh'k
vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k¼dsUnzh;½]dksVk¼jkt-½
vf/kfu.kZ; vkt fnukad 30-04-2025 dks [kqys U;k;kf/kdj.k esa lquk;k tkdj gLrk{kfjr fd;k x;k ftls fu;ekuqlkj leqfpr ljdkj
dks izdk'kukFkZ fHktok;k tkosA
¼lanhi dqekj 'kekZ½
U;k;k/kh'k
vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k¼dsUnzh;½]dksVk¼jkt-½
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1626.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससश सुकेत लाआम स्ट्टोन के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री गोरधन लाल, ृत्थर खान कामगार यूजनयन के बीच
ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, कोटा, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-(केन्द्रीय) 11/2007 (सीअइएस-
68/2014)) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ
08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
,y-29011/9/2007-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1626.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. (Central) 11/2007 (CIS-68/2014)) of the Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Kota as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s Suket Limestone and Shri Gordhan Lal, Stone Mines Workers Union which was received along
with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-29011/9/2007-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
U;k;k/kh'k] vkS|ksfxd U;kk;f/kdj.k ¼dsUnzh;½ dksVk ¼jkt-½
ihBklhu vf/kdkjh% lanhi dqekj 'kekZ] vkj-,p-ts-,l- ¼ftyk tt laoxZ½
funsZ'k izdj.k dzekad% vkS-U;k-&11@2007¼lhvkbZ,l&68@2014½
¼lh,uvkj&vkjtsdsVh0600001982007½
fnukad LFkkfir% 17-09-2007
izlax%
Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh ds vkns'k dz- ,y&29011@9@2007
vkbZvkj¼,e½ fnukad 16-07-2007
funsZ'k@fookn vUrxZr /kkjk 10¼1½¼?k½ ,oa mi/kkjk 2¼d½ vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e]1947
e/;
xksj/ku yky iq= Jh vkSadkj yky] }kjk egkea=h] iRFkj [kku dkexkj ;wfu;u] caxkyh dkWyksuh] Nkouh] dksVk ¼jkt-½
--------izkFkhZ Jfed
,oa
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6023
izca/kd] eSllZ vfrdqjZgeku iq= Jh gkth vCnqy xQwj] lqdsr ykbZe LVksu ihik[ksM+h] rglhy jkexate.Mh] ftyk dksVk
--------vizkFkhZ fu;kstd
mifLFkr
izkFkhZ Jfed dh vksj ls izfrfuf/k%&
Jh iq:"kksRre nk/khp
vizkFkhZ fu;kstd dh vksj ls izfrfuf/k%&
Jh yfyr ukxj
%vf/kfu.kZ;%
fn% 04-06-2025
Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh ds izklkafxd vkns'k fnukad 16-07-2007 ds tfj;s funsZ'k fookn] vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e]
1947 ¼ftls vkxs ^^vf/kfu;e^^ ls lEcksf/kr fd;k tkosxk½ dh /kkjk 10¼1½¼?k½ ds vUrxZr bl U;k;kf/kdj.k dks vf/kfu.kZ;kFkZ lEizsf"kr fd;k x;k
gS%&
"Whether the action of the management of Sh. Attiquer Rehman S/o. Sh. Hazi Abdul Gafur, Lime Store
Mines, Owner Pipakhedi, Ramganjmandi distt. Kota in terminating the service of Sh. Gordhan Lal ex Munshi, w.e.f.
01-02-2006 and denying the payment of wage from June, 2005 to 31-01-2006 is legal and just ? If not what relief the
concerned workman, shri Gordhan Lal is entitled to ?"
2&mDr fookn ds U;k;ky; esa jsQj gksus ij iathc) dj i{kdkjksa dks mifLFkfr ckcr uksfVl tkjh fd, x,A uksfVl dh ikyuk esa izkFkhZ Jfed
}kjk mifLFkr gksdj viuk la'kksf/kr LVsVesUV vkWQ Dyse U;k;ky; ds le{k izLrqr dj laf{kIrr% ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd mls çfri{kh
fu;kstd us vius ;gka eqa'kh ds fjä in ij fn- 01-12-1984 lsok esa fu;ksftr fd;k FkkA fu;kstd us Jfed dks twu 2005 ls osru dk Hkqxrku
ugha fd;k x;k] osru dh ekax djrk Fkk rks mls ckn esa Hkqxrku djus dh ckr dgha tkrh jghA tuojh 2006 esa Jfed us p<+s gq, osru dk
Hkqxrku djus ckcr rdktk fd;k vkSj fuosnu fd;k fd mldks mlds ifjokj dk ikyu iks"k.k djus esa cgqr dfBukb;ka vk jgh gS lkFk gh
Jfed dks fnukad 01-02-2006 ls M~;wVh ij ysus ls bUdkj dj fn;kA Jfed fnukad 01-02-2006 ls fu;kstd ds ;gka fujUrj M~;wVh gsrq iz;kl
dj jgk gS rFkk osru Hkqxrku dk rdktk dj jgk gS ijarq u rks p<+s gq, osru dk Hkqxrku fd;k vkSj u Jfed dks M~;wVh ij fy;k] bl ckcr
Jfed us fnukad 22-05-2006 dks jftLVMZ Mkd ls i= izsf"kr fd;k ftldk dksbZ tokc ugha fn;k x;k uk gh M~;wVh ij fy;k uk gh Hkqxrku
fd;kA fu;kstd us Jfed dks fnukad 01-02-2006 ls voS/k izdkj ls ukSdjh ls gVk fn;k gS] tks fd NaVuh dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrk gS] ukSdjh ls
fudkys tkus ls iwoZ uk rks ,d ekg dk uksfVl fn;k uk gh uksfVl osru fn;k uk vkWQj fd;k vkSj bl izdkj vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 25 ,Q dk
mYya?ku fd;k x;k gSA Jfed us fu;kstd ds ;gka ij fnukad 01-12-1984 ls 31-01-2006 rd fujUrj dk;Z djds 240 fnu ls vf/kd le; rd
dk;Z fd;k gSA var esa izkFkZuk dh xbZ fd Jfed dks fu;sktd ls laiw.kZ fiNys osru lfgr lsok esa cgky fd;s tkus rFkk twu 2005 ls 31-01-
2006 rd ds p<+s gq, osru dk Hkqxrku e; C;kt ls djk;k tkosA
3&vizkFkhZ fu;kstd dh vksj ls LVsVesUV vkWQ Dyse dk tokc izLrqr dj ;g izfrokn fd;k x;k gS fd fnukad 01-02-2006 ls izkFkhZ us Lo;a gh
cxSj fdlh izdkj dh lwpuk fn;s rFkk dkj.k crk;s M~;wVh ij vkuk can dj fn;k rc vizkFkhZ }kjk fnukad 19-05-2006 dks ,d uksfVl vius
vf/koDrk ds ek/;e ls izkFkhZ dks izsf"kr fd;k tks mls izkIr gks x;k bl uksfVl ds }kjk gh vizkFkhZ }kjk izkFkhZ dh lsok,sa lekIr dh xbZ Fkh blls
iwoZ lsok lekfIr ds laca/k esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugah dh xbZ tks dk;Zokgh lsok lekfIr dh djh xbZ mldh izkFkhZ dks iw.kZ tkudkjh gS rFkk mDr
uksfVl ds ek/;e ls gh mldh cdk;k osru dks izkIr dj ysus ds laca/k esa lwpuk izsf"kr dh x;h Fkh ijarq Jfed dk;kZy; esa mifLFkr ugha gqvk
tcfd vizkFkhZ lnSo gh izkFkhZ dh cdk;k jkf'k vnk djus ds fy, rS;kj o rRij jgk gS tcfd izkFkhZ vius cdk;k osru dk Hkqxrku izkIr djus
dks rS;kj ugha gSA izkFkhZ }kjk Lo;a gh vizkFkhZ ds ;gka dk;Z ij vkuk can dj fn;k Fkk ftl dkj.k ls izkFkhZ dh lsok,sa uksfVl ds ek/;e ls lekIr
dh xbZ gS D;ksafd izkFkhZ }kjk M~;wVh ij uk vkus ds laca/k esa vizkFkhZ ds ;gka dksbZ lwpuk ugha nh xbZ Fkh uk gh blds laca/k esa dksbZ dkj.k cryk;k
x;k FkkA var esa izkFkhZ dk LVsVesasV vkWQ Dyse lO;; [kkfjt fd;s tkus dk fuosnu fd;kA
4&lk{; esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls Lo;a dk ‘kiFk i= izLrqr fd;k x;k ftlls vizkFkhZ vf/koDrk us ftjg dh xbZ] vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls ckotwn volj
lk{; izLrqr djuk ugha pkgk ftl ij vizkFkhZ lk{; can dh x;hA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls nLrkosth lk{; Hkh izLrqr dh xbZ gS ftldk ;Fkkle;
mYys[k fd;k tkosxkA
5&mHk;i{k dh cgl lquh xbZ tks mudh vksj ls izLrqr vius&vius vH;kosnuksa ds vuq:i gh jgh gS izkFkhZ izfrfuf/k dk eq[; :i ls ;gh rdZ
jgk gS fd vizkFkhZ }kjk mls fnukad 01-02-2006 ls M~;wVh ij ysus ls bUdkj dj fn;k vkSj izkFkhZ }kjk vizkFkhZ fu;sktd ds ;gka fnukad 01-12-1984
ls mldh lsok lekfIr ls iwoZ 240 fnol ls vf/kd vof/k rd dk;Z fd;k gS vkSj vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls izkFkhZ dks fnukad 19-05-2006 dks dksbZ
uksfVl M~;wVh ij vkus ds fy, rFkk cdk;k osru ds fy, uksfVl izsf"kr ugha fd;k x;k gSA
izkFkhZ ds rdksaZ ds [k.Mu esa vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls dFku jgk gS fd izkFkhZ }kjk fnukad 01-06-2006 ls M~;wVh ij ugha vkus ij fnukad 19-
05-2006 dks uksfVl izsf"kr fd;k x;k tks fd mls izkIr gks x;k fQj Hkh izkFkhZ u rks M~;wVh ij vk;k uk gh mlds }kjk mldk cdk;k osru izkIr
fd;k x;kA blds vfrfjDr tks nLrksoth lk{; izn'kZ MCy;w- 1 ij vizkFkhZ ds gLrk{kj ugha gS rFkk izn'kZ MCy;w- 3 tks iznf'kZr djok;s x;s gSa
ml ij vizkFkhZ ds gLrk{kj ugha gS lkFk gh vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls tks tokc izLrqr fd;k tkuk crk;k x;k gS og vizkFkhZ dh tkudkjh esa ugha gS uk
gh ml ij vizkFkhZ ds gLrk{kj gS D;ksafd vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls tks odkyrukek izLrqr fd;k x;k gS mlesa vkSj izLrqr tokc esas gLrk{kjksa esa fHkUurk
gSA ,sls esa izkFkhZ dksbZ vuqrks"k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gSA
6&gLrxr izdj.k esa U;k;ky; dks ;g ns[kuk gS fd vizkFkhZ }kjk izkFkhZ dks fnukad 01-02-2006 ls lsok ls i`Fkd djuk mfpr ,oa oS/k gS
6024
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
vFkok ugha\
bl lanHkZ esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls lk{; esa Lo;a dk ‘kiFki= izLrqr fd;k gS ftuesa mlus LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse esa of.kZr rF;ksa dh iqujko`fRr dh gS
rFkk ftjg esa ;g dFku fd;k gS fd og ukSdjh ls NwVus ds ckn dqN ugh djrk gSA lu~ 2006 esa mldh mez 50 o"kZ ds yxHkx FkhA ;g lgh gS
fd mlus lu~ 2006 ds ckn dgh ij Hkh nwljh txg dke djus dh dksf'k'k ugh dh Fkh vkSj uk gh mlus fdlh vU; laLFkku esa dke djus ds
fy, vkosnu fd;kA mlus ukSdjh ds fy, vkosnu blfy, ugh fd;k fd 50 lky dh mez esa ukSdjh ij dkSu yxk;sxkA mldks vU; laLFkku esa
dk;Z djus ds fy, 50 lky mez gks tkus ds dkj.k euk ugh fd;k x;k D;ksafd og dk;Z ds fy, fdlh vU; laLFkku esa x;k gh ughA mls 8
eghus dh lSysjh ugh nh xbZ gS mlds iwoZ dk osru mls çkIr gks pqdk gSA ;g dguk xyr gS fd vçkFkhZ us mls dke ij vkus ds fy, uksfVl
fn;k gksA og eqa'kh dk dke djrk FkkA ;g lgh gS fd eqa'kh ds in ij dke djrk Fkk ,slk nLrkost i=koyh esa is'k fd;k gS tks QksVks çfr gSA
çn'kZ MCY;w 1 ij vçkFkhZ ds gLrk{kj ugh gS ijUrq dsoy mlds gLrk{kj gSA mlus dksbZ çkFkZuk i= fnukad 01-02-2006 dks MîwVh ij ysus ds
lEcU/k esa dksbZ is'k ugh fd;k FkkA vt[kqn dgk fd vçkFkhZ us ekSf[kd :i ls euk dj fn;k FkkA ekSf[kd :i ls MîwVh ij ysus ds fy, mls
fnukad 31-01-2006 dks euk dj fn;k Fkk] blds ckn mlus dke ij ysus ds fy, dksbZ çkFkZuk i= ugh fn;k Fkk vkSj uk gh cdk;k osru ds fy,
dksbZ i= ugh fn;k FkkA mldh mifLFkfr yh tkrh FkhA ;g lgh gS fd mifLFkfr dk dksbZ nLrkost ;k jftLVj i=koyh esa is'k ugh fd;k gSA
;g lgh gS fd 1 o"kZ esa 240 fnu vçkFkhZ ds ;gk dke djus ds lEcU/k esa nLrkost is'k ugh fd;k gSA mlds ikl nLrkost miyC/k ugh gSA ;g
lgh gS fd mlus mä nLrkost vçkFkhZ ls ekaxs Hkh ugh gSA ;g lgh gS fd mldks gVkus ds ckn mlls dfu"B deZpkfj;ksa dks MîwVh ij j[k
fy;k gks ,oa ,slh dksbZ lwph mlus is'k ugh dh gS vkSj uk gh mls ,sls dfu"B deZpkfj;ksa ds uke ;kn ugh gSA
7&gLrxr izdj.k esa loZizFke vizkFkhZ dh bl vkifRr dk fuLrkj.k fd;k tkuk vR;ar vko';d gS fd izkFkhZ }kjk tks Dyse dk tokc izLrqr
fd;k x;k gS] tks vf/kdkj i= iwoZ esa fn;k x;k gS rFkk ,Mh izn'kZ 3 ij tks gLrk{kj gS og mlds ugha gS uk gh og mlds Kku esa gS vkSj mDr
lHkh nLrkostksa ij vafdr gLrk{kj mlds odkyrukek ftlesa mlds }kjk yfyr ukxj dks izfrfuf/k fu;qDr fd;k gS] esa vafdr gLrk{kj esy ugha
[kkus dk dFku fd;k gS] blds vfrfjDr le>kSrk vf/kdkjh ds le{k tks tokc izLrqr fd;k x;k gS] mlij mlds gLrk{kj ugha gksus dk dFku
fd;k gS] ,sls esa mDr leLr nLrkostkr esa vafdr rF;ksa dks fjdkMZ ij ugha j[kk tkos vkSj mls vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls fd;s x;s vfHkopuksa ds :i esa
ugha ekuk tkos] tcfd bl laca/k esa vkt fnukad rd dksbZ vkifRr fyf[kr :i esa vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr ugha dh x;h gS fd mldh vksj ls
mDr mDR leLr nLrkostkr ftlesa tokc LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse] jftLVMZ ,-Mh- ij mlds gLrk{kj ugha gSA vizkFkhZ }kjk Jh nhid dyokj dks
fnukad 17-03-2008 dks vf/kdkj i= fn;k tkdj gLrxr izdj.k esa iSjoh djus gsrq vf/kd`r fd;k x;k gS ftl ij Loa; ds gLrk{kj vafdr fd;s
gSa] ftlds vuqdze esa fnukad 31-08-2012 dks LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse dk tokc izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA blls iwoZ le>kSrk vf/kdkjh ds ;gka Hkh mldh
vksj ls tokc izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA ;fn vizkFkhZ dh bl rjg dh vkifRr jgh gS fd mlds tokc LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse esa vafdr gLrk{kj] ,Mh
izn'kZ 3 ij vafdr gLrk{kj odkyrukek ij vafdr gLrk{kj ls esy ugha [kkrs gSa rFkk og gLrk{kj mlds gS gh ugha rks bl laca/k esa vizkFkhZ ds
}kjk le; jgrs vkifRr dh tkuh pkfg, Fkh ;k mu gLrk{kjksa dks feyku djok;s tkus gsrq ;k gLrfyfi fo'ks"kK ls feyku djok;s tkus gsrq
izkFkZuk i= U;k;ky; esa izLrqr fd;k tkuk pkfg, Fkk ijarq ,slh dksbZ izkFkZuk izkFkhZ dh vksj ls ugah dh x;h gSA blds vfrfjDr ;fn vizkFkhZ dk
;gh dFku jgk gS fd mDr nLrksot ij mlds gLrk{kj ugha gS vkSj Jh nhid dyokj }kjk fcuk mldh tkudkjh ds feyhHkxr dj mldh vksj
ls U;k;kf/kdj.k esa tokc izLrqr dj fn;k x;k rks lacaf/kr izfrfuf/k Jh nhid dyokj ds fo:) lE;d dk;Zokgh fd;s tkus gsrq izkFkZuk i=
mi;qDr vFkkWfjVh dks izLrqr fd;k tkuk pkfg, Fkk ijarq ,slk Hkh dksbZ dne vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls ugha mBk;k x;k vkSj izdj.k dh vfUre LVst ij
bl rjg dh vkifRr tkfgj dh gS fd mldh vksj ls izLrqr tokc o ,Mh ij vafdr gLrk{kj mlds ugha gS] ,sls esa ;fn gj dksbZ izfri{kh vius
}kjk izLrqr tokc ,oa vU; nLrkost ij vafdr gLrk{kj ls eqdj tk, rks fdlh Hkh izdj.k dk fuLrkj.k lE;d :i ls fd;k tkuk laHko ugha
gks ik;sxkA blds vfrfjDr vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls tks uohu odkyrukek fnukad 04-03-2025 dks Jh yfyr ukxj dks izfrfuf/k fu;qDr fd;s tkus
gsrq izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ml ij vizkFkhZ }kjk fdl :i esas iwoZ gLrk{kjksa tks fd o"kZ 2012 rFkk mlls iwoZ ds gSa] ls fdl :i esa fHkUurk ykrs gq,
gLrk{kj fd;s gSa rkfd og vkxs pydj bl rjg dh vkifRr U;k;kf/kdj.k ds le{k j[k ldsa] bl laHkkouk ls Hkh bUdkj ugha fd;k tk ldrkA
blds vfrfjDr vizkFkhZ }kjk izkFkhZ ls dh x;h ftjg esa Hkh vius tokc LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse rFkk jftLVMZ ,Mh ij fd;s x;s gLrk{kjksa ds laca/k esa
fdlh izdkj dh vkifRr ntZ djrs gq, ftjg ugha dh x;h gS vfirq 240 fnol ds laca/k esa rFkk vU; lkFkh deZpkfj;ksa ds uke bR;kfn ds laca/k
esa gh ftjg dh x;h gS tcfd vizkFkhZ }kjk izkFkhZ ls ftjg fd;s tkus dk le; og mRre le; Fkk tc og bl rjg dh vkifRr ds laca/k esa
ftjg dj bl rF; ds laca/k esa Li"Vrk U;k;kf/kdj.k ds le{k yk ldrk FkkA ,sls esa LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse dk tokc vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr
ugha fd;k x;k gks vkSj ml ij mlds gLrk{kj u gks rFkk jftLVMZ ,Mh izn'kZ MCy;w- 3 ij mlds gLrk{kj u gks rFkk le>kSrk vf/kdkjh ds
le{k mlds }kjk dksbZ tokc izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gks vFkok mDr ds lac/k esa vizkFkhZ dks dksbZ Kku u gks] ekus tkus ;ksX; dFku ugah gSA
i=koyh ij vk;h lk{; ds vuqdze esa izkFkhZ }kjk viuh nLrkosth lk{; esa izn'kZ MCy;w- 1 izLrqr gqvk gS ftlesa ekfyd dk uke
eSllZ vfrdqjZgeku iq= gkth v-xQwj lqdsr ykbe LVksu ihik[ksM+h vafdr gS tks fd Lo;a vizkFkhZ gS] ftlesa izkFkhZ crkSj deZpkjh ds :i esa vafdr
gS tks fd eqa'kh ds :i esa dk;Zjr gS rFkk LFkkbZ deZpkjh gS rFkk fnukad 01-12-1984 ls vizkFkhZ ds fu;sktu esa dk;Zjr gksuk vafdr gSA mDr
nLrkost ls izekf.kr gS fd izkFkhZ vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa fnukad 01-12-1984 ls eqa'kh ds in ij dk;Zjr jgk gSA blds vfrfjDr izn'kZ MCY;w- 2
i= fnukad 22-05-2006 tks fd izkFkhZ }kjk vizkFkhZ dks izsf"kr jftLVMZ i= gS ftlesa fnukad 01-02-2006 ls M~;wVh ij ysus ls euk djus rFkk twu
2005 ls tuojh 2006 rd dk osru Hkqxrku djus ckcr vadu gS vkSj M~;wVh ij fy;s tkus o cdk;k osru fn;s tkus dk fuosnu fd;k x;k gS
tks fd izn'kZ MCY;w- 3 ds rgr vizkFkhZ dks izkIr gksus dk izek.k gSA tgka rd vizkFkhZ dk ;g dFku fd izkFkhZ ds mDr izn'kZ 1 o 3 ij vizkFkhZ ds
gLrk{kj ugha gS] ekus tkus ;ksX; ugha gS D;ksafd izn'kZ 1 [kku foHkkx ds izk:i ds vuqlkj tkjh fooj.kh gS ftlesa vizkFkhZ QeZ dk uke vafdr gS
vkSj os leLr fooj.k vafdr gS tks izkFkhZ }kjk vius Dyse esa vafdr fd;s gSa rFkk vizkFkhZ }kjk ftudk [k.Mu ugha fd;k gSA tgka rd izn'kZ 3
ij vizkFkhZ ds gLrk{kj ugha gksus dk vadu gS rks mDr Mkd jftLVMZ Mkd gS tks fd iksLV vkWfQl ds foHkkx }kjk fu;r LFkku o irs ij igqapkbZ
tkrh gS vkSj ,Mh ikofr Lo:i izs"kd dks fHktok;h tkrh gS ftl ij fdlh izdkj dk lansg fd;k tkuk mfpr izrhr ugah
gksrk gSA
izkFkhZ }kjk vius LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse ds isjk la[;k 1 esa vizkFkhZ fu;sktd ds ;gka fnukad 01-12-1984 ls eqa'kh DydZ ds :i esa
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6025
fu;ksftr gksus dk dFku fd;k gS] ftlds laca/k esa tokc Dyse esa vizkFkhZ }kjk mDr dFkuksa dks Lohdkj djrs gq, vizkFkhZ ds fu;sktu esa izkFkhZ dh
lsok fnukad 01-12-1984 ls izkjEHk gksuk Lohdkj dh x;h gSA blds vfrfjDr izkFkhZ dh vksj ls LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse ds isjk la[;k 2 esa twu 2005
ls tuojh 2006 rd dk osru ugha fn;k tkuk rFkk vizkFkhZ }kjk fnukad 01-02-2006 ls M~;wVh ij ysus ls euk djus dk vadu gS ftlds tokc
esa vizkFkhZ }kjk ;g fn;k x;k gS fd 1 tuojh 2006 dks izkFkhZ Lo;a ukSdjh NksM+dj x;k gS vkSj ftlds laca/k esa 19-05-2006 dks ,d uksfVl
vf/koDrk ds ek/;e ls izsf"kr djok;k x;k gSA gkykfd izkFkhZ }kjk viuh ftjg esa vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa lsok i`Fkdrk fnukad ls iwoZ 240 fnol
rd dk;Z djus dk dksbZ nLrkost izLrqr ugha djus dk dFku fd;k gS ijarq mDr tokc ls ;g Li"V gS fd izkFkhZ us vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa crkSj
DydZ fnukad 01-12-1984 ls dk;Z djuk vkjEHk fd;k tks fd fnukad 01-02-2006 dks can fd;k] ftlls ;g rF; izekf.kr jgrk gS fd izkFkhZ us
mldh lsok i`Fkdrk fnukad 01-02-2006 ls iwoZ vizkFkhZ ds fu;sktu esa 12 dSys.Mj ekgksa esa 240 fnol ls vf/kd vof/k rd dk;Z fd;k gS vkSj
mDr rF; vizkFkhZ ds Lo;a ds }kjk fn;s x;s tokc ds vfHkopuksa ls lkfcr gks jgk gS] ftlds izek.ku ds fy;s i`Fkd ls fdlh izdkj dh
nLrksoth lk{; dh vko';drk ugha jgrh gSA ,sls esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr nLrkosth o ekSf[kd lk{; ls izkFkhZ dk mldh lsok i`Fkdrk fnukad
01-02-2006 ls iwoZ fnukad 01-02-2005 ls 31-01-2006 rd dh vof/k esa 12 dSys.Mj ekgksa esa vizkFkhZ ds fu;sktu esa 240 fnu rd yxkrkj dk;Z
djuk izekf.kr gksrk gS] fygktk vizkFkhZ }kjk vf/kfu;e ds vkKkid izko/kkuksa dh vogsyuk dj izkFkhZ dks gVk;k tkuk NaVuh dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrk
gS tks vuqfpr o voS/k gksus ls izkFkhZ dk LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse Lohdkj djus ;ksX; ik;k tkrk gSA
blds vfrfjDr izkFkhZ }kjk fnukad 02-06-2006 dks le>ksrk vf/kdkjh ds le{k izfrosnu izLrqr fd;k x;k ftldk izfrmRrj vizkFkhZ
}kjk vius Dyse ds tokc vuq:i izLrqr dj dFku fd;k x;k fd mlus tfj;s vf/koDrk fnukad 19-05-2006 ds izkFkhZ dks uksfVl izsf"kr fd;k
x;k vkSj M~;wVh ij okil vkus rFkk viuk fglkc djus dk vadu fd;k x;kA tc ge i=koyh dk lexz :i ls voyksdu djrs gSa rks ,slk
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6026
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1627.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
बोकारो स्ट्टील प्लांट सेल और ऄन्य के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और ईनके कमशचारी के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय
सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, धनबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-08/2019) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
,y-26011/31/2018-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1627.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 08/2019) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-1, Dhanbad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Bokaro Steel Plant of SAIL and others and Their workman which was received along with soft copy of
the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-26011/31/2018-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1,DHANBAD
In the matter of reference U/S 10 (1) (d)& (2A) of I.D.Act. 1947.
Reference Case No. 08/2019
Employer in relation to the management of Bokaro Steel Plant of SAIL and others.
AND.
Their workman.
Present: Shri Sachindra Kumar Pandey
Presiding Officer
Appearances:
For the Employers :- Sri D.K. Verma, Ld. Advocate.
For the workman. :- Sri D.C. Gohain, Representative
For Manoj Enterprises:- Sri Manoj Upadhayay, In person
State : Jharkhand.
Industry:-Steel Plant
Dated 21/07/2025
AWARD.
In exercise of powers conferred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub –section (2A) of Section 10 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),Government Of India through the Ministry of Labour, vide its Order
No.L-26011/31/2018-IR(M) dated 07/01/2019 has been pleased to refer the following dispute between the employer
i.e. management of M/s Bokaro Steel Plant of SAIL and other and their workman through General Secretary,
Jharkhand Krantikari Mazdoor Union, B.S. City, Bokaro for adjudication by this Tribunal:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of M/s Manoj Enterprises for retrenchment of 45 contract
workers (Annexure-A) engaged in the Stores Department of Bokaro Steel Plant of SAIL, Bokaro
without notice/payment of notice pay and retrenchment compensation and denial to reinstate contract
workers, is proper and justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workers are entitled to?
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6027
LIST OF WORKMEN
Sl. No.
Name
Father‘s Name
Permanent Address
1.
Manoj Kumar Gorain
Sri Prasad Ram Gorain
Vill-Kalapathar,
P.O-Chiksita,
PS, Chas, Distt- Bokaro
2.
Mahto Anath
Late. Hakim Mahto
Vill-Kalapathar,
P.O-Chiksita,
PS, Chas,
Distt- Bokaro
3.
Devi Lal Mahto
Late Malku Mahto
Vill-Kalapathar,
P.O-Chiksita,
PS, Chas, Distt- Bokaro
4.
Rup Lal Gorain
Sri. Banshi Gorain
Vill-Kalapathar,
P.O-Chiksita,
PS, Chas, Distt- Bokaro
5.
Mukund Gope
Late Bhadari Gope
Vill-Kalapathar,
P.O-Chiksita,
PS, Chas, Distt- Bokaro
6.
Raj Kishore Rai
Late Dashrath Rai
Vill-Purasakura, P.O-Chainpur,
PS-Gariakoti, Distt- Siwal
7.
Abhi Singh
Sri. Pran Singh
Vill-Tiro,
P.O-Pathuria, PS-Jaridih, Distt-
Bokaro
8.
Budhan Singh
Late Bhadru Singh
Vill-Tiro,
P.O-Pathuria, PS-Jaridih, Distt-
Bokaro
9.
Faku Kramkar
Late Haradhan Kramkar
Vill-Tiro,
P.O-Pathuria, PS-Jaridih, Distt-
Bokaro
10.
Dubraj Singh
Late Fagu Singh
Vill-Tiro,
P.O-Pathuria, PS-Jaridih, Distt-
Bokaro
11.
Azadi Kumar
Late Moti Singh
Vill-Amyua,
P.O-Kajlsari,
PS+Distt-
Jahanabad, Bihar
12.
Yamuna Singh
Late Roshan Singh
Vill-Tiro,
P.O-Pathuria, PS-Jaridih, Distt-
Bokaro
13.
Shibu Singh
Sri Aghanu
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
14.
Kishun Singh
Late Banshi Singh
Vill-Bhandargora,
P.O-Jainamore,
PS-Jaridih,
Distt- Bokaro
15.
Josaph Lakara
Late Bishram Lakara
Vill-Jamgai,
P.O-Jamgai, PS-Bandara, Distt-
Bokaro
16.
Amrit Singh
Sri Sarju Singh
Vill-Bhandargora,
P.O-Jainamore,
PS-Jaridih,
Distt- Bokaro
6028
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
17.
Ravi Singh
Newa Singh
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
18.
Bishu Singh
Late Jagu Singh
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
19.
Pedku
Late Lalu Singh
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
20.
Ajay Kumar Ghatwar
Dhrub Singh
Vill-Tiro,
P.O-Pathuria, PS-Jaridih, Distt-
Bokaro
21.
Sampat Singh
Late Darshan Singh
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
22.
Dileshwar Singh
Late Panu Singh
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
23.
Bigan Singh
Late Panu Singh
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
24.
Arjun Manjhi
Hari Manjhi
Vill-Khutari Rangachutu,
PS-Jaridih, Distt- Bokaro
25.
Kartik
Late Bhakur Singh
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
26.
Bhrigu Nath Verma
Sri Ramprit Verma
Vill-Baijnath Chhapra,
P.O-Raniganj, PS-Bairiya, Distt-
Balia
27.
Jyotilal Singh
Late Khudu Singh
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
28.
Basudeo Hasda
Late Ganesh Manjhi
Vill-Partand,
P.O-Bandhdih,
PS-Jaridih,
Bokaro
29.
Kanhai Singh
Late Bholu Singh
Vill-Bhandargora,
P.O-Jainamore,
PS-Jaridih,
Distt- Bokaro
30.
Mothan Manjhi
Vill-Khadari,
Rangughutu,
PS-Jaridih,
Bokaro
31.
Mahabir Manjhi
Adhnu Manjhi
Vill-Banddih Kochagora,
P.O-Bandhdih,
PS-Jaridih,
Distt-Bokaro, Jharkhand
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6029
32.
Raj Kumar Singh
Sri Kailash Singh
Vill-Dharampura,
P.O-Radhanaga,
PS-Balidih,
Distt- Bokaro
33.
Shaileshtine Guria
Late Niral Guria
Vill-Bhendra,
P.O-Barda, Distt- Khuti
34.
Santoshi Lakra
Josaph Lakra
Kurmidih
Kabin
Toli,
P.O-
Railway
Colony,
P.S-Balidih,
Distt-Bokaro
35.
Kapra Devi
Shrigunath Verma
Gaiman
Colony
Fabrication
Road,
Bangali
Hotel,
P.S.-
Marafari, Distt-Bokaro
36.
Dulari Devi
Late Ganesh Manjhi
Vill-Partand,
P.O-Bandhdih,
PS-Jaridih,
Distt- Bokaro
37.
Nirmala Devi
Vill-Birsadam,
P.O-Gangiari, PS-Jaridih, Distt-
Bokaro
38.
Shaktipad Gorain
Sri Nivaran Gorain
Vill-Harila Goda,
P.O-Dudhigajar,
PS-Chas(M),
Distt- Bokaro
39.
Sahdeo Hasda
Sri Ratan Manjhi
Vill-Baradih,
P.O-Bandhdih,
P.S.-Jaridih, Distt-Bokaro
40.
Sukhdeo Pal
Naayan Pal
Vill-Dubara,
P.O-Dubara,
PS-Para,
Distt-
Purulia
41.
Dilip Singh
Sri Jagat Singh
Vill-Tiro,
P.O-Pathuria, PS-Jaridih, Distt-
Bokaro
42.
Dhiran Kumar Singh
Late Kapil Singh
Vill+P.O-Karharia, P.S-Balidih,
Distt-Bokaro
43.
Shambhu Singh
Sri Panchu Singh
Vill-Bhandargora,
P.O-Jainamore,
PS-Jaridih,
Distt- Bokaro
44.
Bhola Singh
Late Ledu Singh
Vill-Bhandargora,
P.O-Jainamore,
PS-Jaridih,
Distt- Bokaro
45.
Ajit Marandi
Late Amin Marandi
Vill-Asansol, Simultand, P.O-
Jagidih,
P.S-Chandankiyari,
Distt-Bokaro
2. The case of the workman is that the union raised an Industrial Dispute vide its statement of demand dated
29.11.2016 for which the issues pertaining to the unlawful retrenchment of 45 contract workers working in Stores
Department of SAIL, Bokaro Steel Plant were raised before the Asstt. Labour Commissioner(Central) & Conciliation
Officer, Dhanbad and on receipt of the same the Conciliation Officer took up the issue with the General Manager
(P&A) SAIL, Bokaro Steel Plant vide letter dated 26.12.2016 whereby the management was asked to furnish their
comments in respect of letter dated 29.11.2016 and at the same time some information was sought from the union as
well for holding conciliation proceedings on the date fixed but even after several sittings the settlement could not be
arrived accordingly the Conciliation Officer sent a Conciliation failure report u/s 12(4) of the I.D. Act to the Ministry
of Labour & Employment, Govt. of India on 31.10.2018 and thereafter the Appropriate Govt. vide
6030
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
No. L-26011/31/2018-IR(M) dated 07.01.2019 referred the dispute to Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal cum Labour
Court No.1, Dhanbad for adjudication with the following schedule:-
―Whether the action of the management of M/s Manoj Enterprises for retrenchment of 45 contract workers
(Annexure-A) engaged in the Stores Department of Bokaro Steel Plant of SAIL, Bokaro without notice/payment of
notice pay and retrenchment compensation and denial to reinstate contract workers, is proper and justified? If not, to
what relief the concerned workers are entitled to?‖
It is further case of the workman that all the 45 said contract workers continued to work under the contractor
M/s. Manoj Enterprises from the year 2004 to 2010 and thereafter they were deployed with M/s. Anil Kumar, a
contractor from the period April 2010 to 2013 carrying out the same job on the same place of work. The contract
workers got engaged again with M/s. Manoj Enterprises from the year 2013 till their services were dispensed with the
contractor while the validity of work order was till 17.08.2016. The services of the listed workmen were terminated
even when their Gate Passes were valid and before termination no notice was served to them by the contractor
violating Section 25(N) & 25(F) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 which otherwise led to illegal retrenchment. In
addition to the above, M/s Manoj Enterprises was also to comply the provisions contained under section 25(N)(1) (a),
(b), (c) and 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947.
3.
On the other hand the management filed W/S cum rejoinder on 27.11.2019 submitting that the
present reference is not maintainable and the management of Bokaro Steel Plant never appointed the workmen
concerned, hence question of termination of their services by Bokaro Steel Plant does not arises. There is no
employer-employee relationship exists between the parties. The job contracts are awarded to contractors for carrying
out jobs of non-core nature at various departments of BSL, Bokaro through tendering process and the contractor who
has been awarded contract used to deploy their workmen according to the requirement for execution of the job
awarded to them and the workmen employed by them used to work under direct supervision of the contractor and
therefore the contractors concerned are liable to payment of wages to their workmen.
4. On perusal of the record it further transpires that a reply dated 27.11.19 has also been filed on behalf of Manoj
Enterprises submitting therein that M/s. Manoj Enterprises is a registered contractor of SAIL, Bokaro Steel Plant, and
they are associated with Stores Deptt. of SAIL, Bokaro Steel Plant through various loading and unloading of materials
from one point to another as per the requirement of department and they engaged the contract workers under the
purview of The Contract Labour (regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 and they are bound to pay the statutory dues as
per the provisions under said Act and the Factories Act, 1948. These contract workers are governed by the Contract
Labour (regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 and they do not fall within the purview of Section 25F of Industrial
Dispute Act, 1947. The workers who have left the organization without information and kept the Gate Passes of the
SAIL, Bokaro Steel Plant with them only, Manoj Enterprises is not in a position to pay the notice pay or retrenchment
benefit as they had left as per their choice and willingness and they also did not inform either in writing or in verbal.
Those workers have already been paid their earned leave wages and bonus in their individual account. As per the FOC
report M/s. Manoj Enterprises has no objection to pay the notice pay as per the norms and practice in the industry to
only 16 persons whose names are notified in the notice dated 11.02.2016 but they cannot pay anything to the workers
who left the organization without information other than earned leave and bonus that they already paid. It has further
been submitted that in the period of 2010 to 2014, M/s. Manoj Enterprises did not work continuously as the work
order issued was for different period and after completion of the work order the entire salary and other statutory dues
as per the applicability has already been paid to the concerned workers. From April 2010 to 2013, the workers were
engaged with some M/s. Anil Kumar, for which they have no idea or knowledge. As on date M/s. Manoj Enterprises
has no objection to pay the 16 workers as per notice dated 11.02.2016 and any of the work order the cost of
retrenchment of notice period is not included as the work order is being issued for the fixed term and the employed
person is aware of their job as per validity of the Gate Passes. The work order is issued on the JOB CONTRACT
basis or tonnage basis directly linked with plant production.
5.
It further transpires that a settlement was arrived at between the parties that was prepared in black and white
and has been submitted before this Tribunal in FORM-H which has been placed on record on 23.02.2022 and hearing
was made on the same on 10.07.2025 in the presence of the parties concerned. The recital of the settlement is as
under:-
(A) The contractor Manoj Enterprises agreed to pay the notice period for 15 contract workers out of listed
45 whose names are mentioned below at the rate of wages as per skill applicable in 2016.
(B) Regarding re-employment of left over 30 contract workers, M/s. Manoj Enterprises agreed to provide
employment as and when required as per skills activity in work order received from SAIL, BSL only in future if any.
If the employment is available in future the requirement will be fresh request to fulfillment of all pre-employment
editions as per norms of the Principal employer.
The other party, General Secretary of, JMKU, Bokaro consented in writing for No Objection. It further
transpires that both the parties put their respective signatures below the written settlement and two witnesses have
also signed the same.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6031
6.
Now, as the issues have been settled between the parties and written settlement under Section 2(p)
of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 is available on record, this case is hereby allowed in terms of settlement between
the parties and the written settlement shall form part of the award. The case is disposed of. Consign the record in the
record room. Let the copies of Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of
India, New Delhi for information and notification.
SACHINDRA KUMAR PANDEY, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1628.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससश बोकारो स्ट्टील प्लांट, सेल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और ईनके कमशचारी के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय
सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, धनबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-38/2012) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
,y-29012/11/2012-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1628.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 38/2012) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-1, Dhanbad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s Bokaro Steel Plant, SAIL and Their workman which was received along with soft copy of the
award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-29012/11/2012-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1,DHANBAD
In the matter of reference U/S 10 (1) (d) & (2A) of I.D.Act. 1947.
Reference Case No. 38/2012
Employer in relation to the management of M/s. Bokaro Steel Plant, SAIL, Bokaro.
AND.
Their workman.
Present: Shri Sachindra Kumar Pandey
Presiding Officer
Appearances:
For the Employer :- Sri D.K. Verma, Ld. Advocate.
For the workman. :- Sri C.P. Agrawal (in person)
State : Jharkhand.
Industry:-Steel Plant
Dated 28/07/2025
AWARD.
In exercise of powers conferred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub –section (2A) of Section 10 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),Government Of India through the Ministry of Labour, vide its Order
No.L-29012/11/2012-(IR(M)) dated 04/06/2012, has been pleased to refer the following dispute between the
employer i.e. management of M/s Bokaro Steel Plant of SAIL and their workman through General Secretary, Bokaro
Karmachari Panchayat, B.S. City, Bokaro for adjudication by this Tribunal:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of Bokaro Steel Plant, SAIL in deducting penal rent for
occupation of Qr. No. VIIIA-2255 w.e.f. Dec. 1986 to October 1990 from the wages of
6032
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Shri C.P. Agarwal, Staff No. 075855 is proper and justified? And whether the action of the
management of Bokaro Steel Plan, SAIL in allegedly wrong fixing the scales of the said workman from
21/6/1979 till the date of VRS is proper and justified? What relief the workman is entitled to?‖
2. The case of the applicant/workman in short as per his WS is that he was appointed on 24.11.1970 and one
residential Qr. No. VIII-A 2255 D type was allotted to him and he occupied the same and started residing therein
along with his family members but the management illegally started making deduction of penal rent from the wages
of workman @ Rs. 477/- per month w.e.f. June 1986 without consent of workman or without any reason. The
workman protested against the same but even thereafter the deduction continued and then he filed a case under
Section 15(2) and (3) of the payment of wages Act before the State Labour Court, B.S. City which was awarded in
favour of workman and the management was directed to refund the amount deducted from the wages of the workman.
But inspite of that the management continued to deduct penal rent per month till Oct.1990 total Rs.21996/-His appeal
against the said order was also dismissed. He also filed another case under Section 33A of the I.D. Act, 1947 before
the State Labour Court, Bokaro raising allegations of change of service conditions by way of denial of promotion,
supersession by juniors etc. which was numbered as Misc. Case No. 10/1986 and the Labour Court, Bokaro passed
award in favour of the workman granting promotion to construction supervisor Gr-1 from 6.06.77, additional
divisional engineer from 21.06.79, divisional engineer from 17.02.83 and zonal engineer from30.06.87 with all
consequential benefits. The management filed a writ petition against that order being CWJC No. 1485 of 1991 before
the Hon‘ble Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench and prayed to stay the operation of the award but he was refused and
thereafter the management implemented the award and he was given promotion but illegally reduced the basic wages
from Rs.881/- to Rs.850/-per month causing the workman heavy loss. As per the award, the basic wages should be
Rs.950/-per month in E-1 as on 21.06.79. The workman concerned retired on VRS on 31.03.2004 and the
management paid him less compensation under the VRS. He is entitled to receive total Rs. 2,28,524.82/-as well as
refund of Rs.21969/-with interest from the management.
3. On the other hand the case of the management as per the written statement dated 18.01.2013 is that the present
reference is not maintainable. The concerned workman is not a ‗workman‘ under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, 1947.
The concerned workman is holding the post of Executive and performing managerial job, as such, the present dispute
is not maintainable. He is not covered under the provision of I.D. Act, 1947. The applicant C.P Agarwal also
submitted V.R.S as per the Scheme of the management which was accepted and he had received all the benefits under
the V.R.S Scheme as such no dispute can be raised by the concerned workman after the acceptance of the benefits.
The workman was originally appointed as Construction Supervisor w.e.f. 24.11.1970. During the tenure of his service
Sri C.P. Agarwal filed an application u/s 33A of the I.D. Act claiming promotion on different grades. Under Section
33A of the I.D. Act workman can file an application if his service is changed during the pendency of the reference
case in which he is involved/connected and the Labour Court or Tribunal has no power to pass order/award for
promotion of a workman. Surprisingly enough the Labour Court Bokaro passed an order in Misc.case No. 10/86 filed
under Section 33A of the I.D. Act by Sri C.P. Agarwal wherein and whereby directed the management to promote the
applicant C.P. Agarwal to the post of Construction Supervisor Grade-I w.e.f. 06.06.1977, Addl. Divisional Engineer
w.e.f. 21.6.1979, Divisional Engineer w.e.f. 17.02.1983 and Zonal Engineer w.e.f. 30.06.1987. The illegal order of the
Labour Court Bokaro was challenged before the Hon‘ble High Court by the management in CWJC No. 1485/91.
During the pendency of the writ petition the management implemented the award fully and Sri C.P. Agarwal was
given all the benefits as per award including promotion and difference of wages. The Hon‘ble High Court ultimately
quashed the award/order of the Labour Court and then C.P. Agarwal filed SLP before the Hon‘ble Supreme Court
against that order but the Hon‘ble Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the applicant C.P Agarwal but taking into
consideration of promoting the concerned workman during the pendency of the writ petition, the management was
directed not to revert him to the lower post. The workman also received his wages and other benefits more than he
was entitled but still he has filed the present case being emboldened by previous facts mentioned above. The
workman is a litigant officer. He also filed M.J. Case No. 05/89 for refund of penal rent deducted by the management
from December, 1986 to April, 1989 but the Labour court dismissed the same and then C.P. Agarwal preferred a writ
petition being W.P.(L) No. 281/2003 which was dismissed by the Hon‘ble High Court by order dated 06.11.2007. The
same issue of deducting penal rent is again being raised. Sri C.P. Agarwal has accepted V.R.S. Scheme and he now
retired from service and received all his benefits and therefore no claim can be preferred by him after receiving the
same and the action of the management of deducting penal rent for occupying the quarter illegally is legal, proper and
justified. The wages of the workman was never wrongly fixed from 21.06.1979 till the date of his V.R.S. The award
of the Labour Court was quashed by the Hon‘ble High Court and at last it was prayed to dismiss the reference case of
the applicant.
A rejoinder dated 18/01/2013 was also filed to the w/s of the management in which the workman has denied all
the claims and statement of the management submitting that the deduction of penal rent was illegal and his pay was
wrongly fixed after his promotion.
4. In support of his case the workman namely Chandrika Prasad Agarwal has examined himself as WW-1.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6033
The workman has also got Exhibited the following documents in favour of his case:-
Exhibit W-1- Xerox copy of order of P.W. Case No. 22 of 1986 of Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City
dated 21.12.1988.
Exhibit W-2- Xerox copy of Judgment of Misc. Appeal No. 65 of 1989 of the 1st Addl. Disctrict Judge,
Bokaro dated 13.04.2000.
Exhibit W-3- Xerox copy of Award of Misc. Case No. 10 of 1986 of the Labour Court, Bokaro Steel
City dated 17.01.1991.
Exhibit W-4- Xerox copy of order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench, Ranchi
in CWJC No. 1485 of 1991(R) dated 23.09.1991.
Exhibit W-5- Xerox copy of office order dated 17/18.02.1992 issued by Bokaro Steel Plant, Personnel
Department Organisation Development Section regarding pay fixation of Sri C.P Agarwal after promotion.
Exhibit W-6- Xerox copy of Allotment Order dated 23.03.1979 of Quarter No. VIII-A/2255 to C.P.
Agarwal.
Exhibit W-7- Xerox copy of Circular dated 16.07.1982 of Bokaro Steel Plant, Personnel Department
(Recruitment Section) for filling up the post of Assistant Divisional Engineer.
5.
On the other hand the management in support of his case, has examined Ranodip Banerjee as MW-1.
The Management has also got Exhibited the following documents in favour of his case.
Exhibit M-1- Allotment Order dated 23.3.79.
Exhibit M-2- Order passed in M.J. Case No. 5/89 by the Learned Labour Court, Bokaro.
Exhibit M-3- Acceptance of VRS of the concerned workman, C.P. Agarwal.
Exhibit M-4- Office Order dated 17/18.02.1992.
Exhibit M-5- Hon‘ble High Court‘s Order dated 5.11.2007 passed in W.P. (L) No. 2881/2003.
Exhibit M-6 –Photo copy of Office Order of Delegation of Powers of Bokaro Steel Plant
6. Heard both sides and perused the evidences on record.
7. The workman Sri C.P. Agarwal has submitted that he was appointed on 24.11.1970 and since then he was
working sincerely. He was allotted a residential quarter by the management in which he started residing alongwith his
family members but the management started illegally deducting penal rent from his wages @ Rs. 477/- per month
w.e.f. June 1986 and thereafter he filed a case u/s 15(2) and (3) of the Payment of Wages Act for refund of the same
that was allowed by the Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City but even thereafter the management continued to deduct the
same. The management also filed an appeal against the said order but the same was dismissed by the Ld. A.D.J,
Bokaro. The workman also filed a case u/s 33 A of the I.D. Act, 1947 before the Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City that
was allowed in his favour and the management was directed for his promotion with all consequential benefits and full
back wages. That order was challenged before the Hon‘ble High Court but in the meantime he was promoted and
Award was implemented by the management but the management illegally reduced the basic wages of the workman
from Rs. 881/- to Rs. 850/- per month w.e.f. 21.06.1979 and due to which he suffered heavy financial loss. As per the
award his basic wages should be Rs. 950/- per month in Grade E-I as on 21.06.1979. He is entitled to receive total Rs.
2,28,524.82/-as well as refund of Rs.21969/-with interest from the management.
8. On the other hand the Ld. Counsel of the management submitted that the present reference is not maintainable
because the applicant C.P. Agarwal is not a ‗workman‘ u/s 2(s) of the I.D. Act, 1947. He was appointed as a
Construction Supervisor and he was working at Managerial Post. He further submitted that the applicant‘s pay has
been legally fixed and penal rent was deducted because he had illegally occupied the quarter. After his taking VRS, he
has been paid entire dues amount and nothing is outstanding to the management and prayed to dismiss the reference
case.
9. It is important to mention that this case was decided by this Tribunal vide Award dated 27.01.2017 in favour of the
workman but when the award was challenged by the management before the Hon‘ble Jharkhand High Court the
award was set aside vide his Lordship‘s order dated 06.05.2024 in W.P. (L) No. 2771 of 2017 and the case was
remitted to this Tribunal again for passing fresh award and in Paragraph-16 of the Order, the Hon‘ble Court has very
clearly stated that whether the workman was a workman or not within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial
Dispute Act, 1947 was a jurisdictional issue which requires to be decided on the basis of materials available on
record. Accordingly this case was remitted back before this Tribunal for passing fresh award.
10. On hearing both sides and perusing the entire materials on record this Tribunal finds that there are three issues to
be decided by this Tribunal which are as follows:-
6034
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(i) Whether the applicant C.P. Agarwal is a workman u/s 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947?
(ii) Whether the action of the management of Bokaro Steel Plant, SAIL in deducting penal rent for occupation of
Qr. No. VIIIA-2255 w.e.f. Dec. 1986 to October, 1990 from his wages is proper and justified?
(iii) Whether the management of Bokaro Steel Plant, SAIL has wrongly fixed the scales of C.P. Agarwal from
21.06.1979 till the date of VRS and if not what relief the workman is entitled to?
11. As regards the first issue, as to whether the applicant C.P. Agarwal is a workman u/s 2(s) of the I.D. Act,
1947 or not, this is a jurisdictional issue and most important to be decided first.
On this point the applicant has stated in his written statement that he was appointed on 24.11.1970 and
since then he was working sincerely, honestly, efficiently without any blemish or spot all through out his service
career till his retirement under VRS but he has stated nothing in the entire W/S regarding the nature of his work i.e.
what work he was doing during his service period.
As regards the oral evidence, Sri C.P. Agarwal has examined himself as WW-1 and in his testimony he
has deposed that he was appointed in the services of SAIL, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro Steel City w.e.f. 24.11.1970 as
Construction Supervisor Grade-III and the post of Construction Supervisor is a technical post for which the minimum
qualification required was 3 years full time diploma in any branch of engineering which he possessed on the date of
his entry in service and he was allocated the job of Technical/Engineering Work by the management and the channel
of promotion was also on technical job line as per company‘s seniority & Promotion Rules. He was doing the
Technical Job on shifts in the plant and he was neither given any power to appoint/dismiss any workman of the plant
nor he was given any power to demote any workman, sanction leave as also to take any disciplinary action against
any workman or the junior staff till the date of his retirement. The power of delegation as has been filed by the
management in this case is only a myth having no authoritative force and was not in existence and was never acted
upon during the entire period of his service. He has further deposed that he was given promotion to the post of
Construction Supervisor Grade-II/Grade-I and thereafter to the Grade E-1, E-2, E-3, E-4 on technical line and when
he was not given promotion in accordance with seniority, he filed a case bearing no. 10/86 before the Ld. Labour
Court, Bokaro Steel City u/s 33A of the I.D. Act, 1947 and he was allowed promotion namely Construction
Supervisor Grade-I w.e.f. 6.6.1977, Additional Divisional Engineer w.e.f. 21.06.1979, Divisional Engineer w.e.f.
17.02.1982 and Zonal Engineer w.e.f. 30.06.1987. He has denied that at the time of his retirement he had full power
to sanction advance for purchase of conveyance, to approve TA/LTC/LLTC/Medical Bills to sanction advance for
construction/purchase of lands etc, sanction payment of gratuity, reimbursement of bills, to issue show cause
notice/warning imposing minor punishment for non-executives working in the department under the management
company. He further stated that he worked on technical job on shifts and it was neither managerial nor administrative
or supervisory.
In the cross-examination he has admitted that though he was appointed as Construction Supervisor, he
was supervising and also working in construction works.
12. On perusal of the pleadings and oral evidence of the applicant Sri C.P. Agarwal it is evident that he has admitted
in his testimony that he was appointed as Construction Supervisor on 24.11.1970 and later on by the order of the
Court he was promoted at the post of Construction Supervisor Grade-I w.e.f. 6.6.1977, Additional Divisional
Engineer w.e.f. 21.6.1979, Divisional Engineer w.e.f. 17.2.1982 and Zonal Engineer w.e.f. 30.6.1987.
As regards the documentary evidence, the applicant has not adduced any documentary evidence showing his actual
work done by him.
Thus the applicant has no where disclosed in his pleading or evidence as to what was the nature of his work
and what work he was doing during his service period. Though he has submitted that he started his job on the post of
Construction Supervisor and he was promoted to Zonal Engineer at the time of his VRS.
13. On the other hand the management in his W/S has stated that C.P. Agarwal is not a workman u/s 2(s) of the
I.D. Act 1947 as he was holding the post of executive and was performing managerial job. He was originally
appointed as Construction Supervisor w.e.f. 24.11.1970. He has also admitted that by the order of the Labour court,
CP Agrawal was promoted lastly up to the post of Zonal Engineer.
The witness of the management that is MW-1, Ranodip Banerjee has stated in his testimony that Sri
C.P. Agarwal was appointed as Construction Supervisor we.f. 24.11.1970 and he also admitted that the Labour Court,
Bokaro Steel City in Misc. Case No. 10/86 gave direction to the management for promotion of C.P. Agarwal to the
post of Constructor Supervisor Grade-I w.e.f. 6.6.1977, Additional Divisional Engineer w.e.f. 21.6.1979, Divisional
Engineer w.e.f. 17.02.1982 and Zonal Engineer w.e.f. 30.6.1987. He has further deposed that at the time of retirement
under VRS Sri C.P. Agarwal was holding the managerial and supervisory post and he was holding E-5 Grade at the
time of his retirement and as such he had full power for all non-executive employees working under him in the matter
of approve/confirmation of probationary period, to sanction advance for purchase of conveyance, to approve
TA/LTC/LLTC/Medical Bills, to sanction advance for construction/purchase of land etc, sanction payment of
gratuity, reimbursement of bills, issue show cause notice/warning imposing minor punishment. He has further stated
that Sri C.P. Agarwal was not a workman.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6035
In the cross-examination he has stated that the workman was Technical Personnel for which the
candidates must have 3 years minimum experience after completing diploma, in any engineering stream. There is a
line of promotion to that post and he was given power to take disciplinary action against certain staff, as per
delegation. He has further deposed that the concerned workman joined in B.S. L as Construction Supervisor in the
year 1970 the minimum qualification of the said post is Diploma Engineer. It is a technical post and in that line
promotion is given. Post of Zonal Engineer is also a technical post.
The management has filed the separation order of Sri C.P. Agarwal which has been marked as Exhibit
M-3 and on its perusal it is evident that the designation of Sri C.P. Agarwal is Sr. Manager (M/M), GU and it
transpires that he was released w.e.f. 31.03.2004 from service under VRS. On perusal of the back page of this
document further it transpires that the designation of C.P. Agarwal is Senior Manager, his department is
GU(M/M)(505), his date of joining is 24.11.1970, his date of release is 31.03.2004 and his pay scale/grade is 18500-
23900-E5 and his basic pay is Rs. 21650/-. On perusal of Exhibit M-6 which is document related to Delegation of
Powers, Bokaro Steel Plant, it is evident that the employee with Senior Manager designation/equivalent (E-5) has full
power for all non-executive employees regarding approval or confirmation to make arrangements for employees
working under them against leave/tour, to approve reimbursement bills of photographs, uniform, stitching charges etc,
to sanction advance of pay including Festival Advance, TA/LTC/LLTC etc, grant of sanction advance for
construction/purchase of land/house/flat, Show cause notice/warning.
14. The applicant C.P. Agarwal, in claim of his being a workman, has also cited the judgment of the case of S.K.
Sharma Vs. Mahesh Chandra and Another in which the Hon‘ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that the
designation or name of the post is not decisive and the nature of work is also to be considered while deciding the
workman.
In the present case the applicant C.P. Agarwal has claimed/deposed that he is a workman and he was
initially appointed as Construction Supervisor and was last promoted to the post of Zonal Engineer which is also a
technical post and he was not holding any supervisory or managerial post but in his entire evidence/pleading he has
no where stated as to what work he was doing and what was the nature of his work.
In recent case of Lenin Kumar Ray Vs. Express Publication (Madurai) Ltd. reported in 2024 SCC
Online SC 2987), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the law is well settled that the
determinative factor for workman covered under section 2(s) of the I D Act is the principal duties and functions
performed by an employee in the establishment and not merely the designation of his post and the onus of proving the
nature of employment rests on the person claiming to be a workman within the definition of Section 2(s) of the I.D.
Act.
Here in the instant case admittedly the employee C.P. Agarwal was appointed as Construction
Supervisor and was promoted upto the post of Zonal Engineer which is purely a Managerial Post but the employee
has no where disclosed as to what duty he was performing he has only stated generally that he was doing technical
work which cannot be believed.
Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act 1947 defines workman which reads as follows:-
―workman‖ means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual,
unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of
employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial
dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a
consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not
include any such person-
(i)
who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy
Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a person, or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per
mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in
him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
15. Evidently, the employee was appointed as Construction Supervisor-III, and he was promoted to the post of
Construction Supervisor Grade-I, Additional Divisional Engineer, Divisional Engineer and Zonal Engineer at the time
of his Voluntary Retirement. As per Exhibit M-3 which is Separation Order (Release Order) of the employee C.P.
Agarwal, he was working at the designation of Senior Manager at the time of VRS and his basic pay was Rs. 21650/-
and he was enjoying Grade E-5 which is a Managerial Category Job as per Exhibit M-3 & Ext. M-6 and in the present
case there is no specific document adduced by the applicant relating to the actual work and function performed by him
and in the absence of any concrete material to demonstrate the nature of duties discharged by the applicant, this
6036
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Tribunal is bound to take into consideration Exhibit M-3 and Exhibit M-6 adduced from the side of the employer and
as per the same, the applicant was holding the designation of Senior Manager in Grade E at the time of his retirement
under VRS which is a managerial and Administrative post and secondly, even otherwise, the applicant was admittedly
employed in supervisory capacity and as per Ext W-5, Ext.M-3 and Ext.M-4 it is evident that he was drawing wages
more than Rs. 1600 per month at the time of his retirement under VRS.
16. On the basis of above appreciation of materials on record it is held that the applicant is not a workman as
defined u/s 2(s) of the I.D. Act 1947 and so the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 are not applicable to him.
17. Now as regards the other two issues, as this Tribunal has held that the employee is not a workman u/s 2(s) of
the I.D. Act, 1947, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the other two issues.
18. Considering above facts, circumstances and appreciation of evidence on record this Tribunal comes to the
conclusion that the reference of the applicant C.P. Agarwal is not maintainable before this tribunal and is accordingly
hereby dismissed on contest. Let the copies of Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry of Labour & Employment,
Government of India, New Delhi for information and notification.
SACHINDRA KUMAR PANDEY, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1629.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससश मंगलम सीमेंट जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री भजरु के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण
एवं श्रम न्यायालय, कोटा, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-(केन्द्रीय) 03/2012 (सीअइएस-72/2014)) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
,y-29012/16/2011-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1629.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. (Central) 03/2012 (CIS-72/2014)) of the Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Kota as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s Mangalam Cement Limited and Shri Bhairu which was received along with soft copy of the award
by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-29012/16/2011-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
U;k;k/kh'k] vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k¼dsUnzh;½dksVk]¼jkt-½
ihBklhu vf/kdkjh& lanhi dqekj 'kekZ] vkj-,p-ts-,l- ¼ftyk tt laoxZ½
funsZ'k izdj.k dzekad%vkS-U;k-¼dsUnzh;½&03@2012¼lhvkbZ,l&72@2014½
¼lh,uvkj&vkjtsdsVh060000962012½
fnukad LFkkfir% 17-04-2012
izlax% Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh ds vkns'k dz-
,y&29012@16@2011¼vkbZvkj¼,e½½ fn-%23-02-2012
funsZ'k@fookn vUrxZr /kkjk 10¼1½¼?k½ ,oa mi/kkjk 2¼d½
vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e]1947
e/;
HkS: iq= Jh iqjhyky es?koky] xzke eksMd] jkexate.Mh] dksVk
&&izkFkhZ Jfed
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6037
,oa
QSDVªh eSustj] eS- eaxye lhesaV fy-] eksMd] dksVk
&&vizkFkhZ fu;kstd
mifLFkr
izkFkhZ Jfed dh vksj ls izfrfuf/k%&
Jh iq:"kksRre nk/khp
vizkFkhZ fu;kstd dh vksj ls izfrfuf/k%&
Jh lqjs'k ekFkqj
%%vf/kfu.kZ;%%
fnukad%25-03-2025
Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh ds izklkafxd vkns'k fnukad 23-02-2012 ds tfj;s funsZ'k fookn] vkS|ksfxd fookn
vf/kfu;e] 1947 ¼ftls vkxs **vf/kfu;e** ls lEcksf/kr fd;k tkosxk½ dh /kkjk 10¼1½¼?k½ ,oa mi/kkjk 2¼d½ ds vUrxZr bl U;k;kf/kdj.k dks
vf/kfu.kZ;kFkZ fuEukuqlkj izkIr gqvkA
"Whether the action of the management of M/s Manglam Cement Limited, Morak, Kota in teminating the
services of Shri Bheru S/o Puri Lal w.e.f.6/1/2005 is legal and justified? What relief the workman in entitled
to?"
2&mDr fookn] U;k;kf/kdj.k esa jsQj gksus ij iathc) dj i{kdkjksa dks mifLFkfr ckcr uksfVl tkjh fd, x,A uksfVl dh ikyuk esa izkFkhZ Jfed
}kjk mifLFkr gksdj LVsVesUV vkWQ Dyse U;k;kf/kdj.k ds le{k izLrqr dj laf{kIrr% ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd mls vizkFkhZ us twu] 1983 esa
LFkk;h :i ls ukSdjh ij fu;qDr fd;kA izkFkhZ Jfed ml le; ls gh izca/kd eaxye lhesaV fy-] jkexate.Mh ds ;gka Hkyh izdkj ,oa lqpk: :i
ls drZO;fu"Bk ls viuh M~;wVh dj jgk FkkA Jfed vkjaHk ls gh vuq'kklu esa jgdj rFkk viuh M~;wVh ds izfr ,oa izca/kd oxZ ds fgr dks /;ku
esa j[krs gq, dk;Z dj jgk FkkA izca/kd oxZ }kjk fn- 14-12-2004 dks izkFkhZ Jfed dks vkjksi i= fn;k x;k rFkk izca/kd oxZ }kjk fcuk fof/kor
tkap fd, >wBh dk;Zokgh dh >wBh fjiksVZ rS;kj djds izkFkhZ Jfed dks fn- 06-01-2005 dks lsok ls i`Fkd dj fn;kA izca/kd oxZ }kjk tkap
vf/kdkjh fu;qfDr fd;k x;k] ftlds }kjk tkap dh dk;Zokgh dh xbZ gS og izca/kd oxZ ds ncko esa jgdj fu"i{k dk;Zokgh ugha djds Jfed ds
fo:) dk;Zokgh dh xbZ gSA fu"i{k tkap djus ds fy, izca/kd oxZ }kjk Lora= vf/kdkjhs }kjk tkap djokbZ tkuh pkfg, Fkh tks izca/kd oxZ }kjk
ugha dh xbZ gS vr% Jfed ds fo:) tks tkap dh xbZ gS og fu"i{k ugha gSA izca/kd oxZ }kjk Jfed dks fn- 14-12-2004 ds }kjk tks vkjksi i=
fn, x, gS og vkjksi i= >wB ij vk/kkfjr gSA vkjksi i= esa lc rF; eux<+ar vkSj xyr gSA izkFkhZ Jfed dks bu vkjksiksa dh drbZ tkudkjh
ugha nh xbZ rFkk izkFkhZ Jfed dks fn- 14-12-2004 dks tks uksfVl fn;k x;k gS og uksfVl QthZ gS ml ij izkFkhZ Jfed ds gLrk{kj ugha gS rFkk
izkFkhZ Jfed us fdlh Hkh uksfVl ij gLrk{kj ugha fd, gSA izca/kd oxZ }kjk fdlh vU; O;fDr ds gLrk{kj izkFkhZ Jfed ds uke ls djok, x, gSaA
izkFkhZ Jfed ds gLrk{kj tks uksfVl ij fd, x, gS mu gLrk{kjkasa dk feyku gLrk{kj fo'ks"kK ls djk, tk,A izkFkhZ Jfed tks [kpkZ gks gksxk og
vnk djus dks rS;kj gSA izc/akd oxZ }kjk izkFkhZ ds vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh djus fy, tks fooj.k fn- 04-09-1983 ls 15-12-2004 rd izkFkhZ Jfed
ds fo:) izLrqr fd;k gS og drbZ xyr gS rFkk xyr rF;ksa ij vkf/kkfjr gSA mlesa lgh fooj.k izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA ;g lkjh dk;Zokgh
izca/kd oxZ ds v/khu jgdj rS;kj dj izLrqr dh xbZ gSA mDr dk;Zokgh ds izkFkhZ Jfed ds gLrk{kj ugha djk, gS tcdh izR;sd xSj gktjh ij
Jfed ds gLrk{kj gksuk vaR;ar vko';d gSA fnukad 01-12-2004 ls 15-12-2004 rd izkFkhZ Jfed dh iRuh dh rch;r cgqr T;knk [kjkc gksus
ds dkj.k izkFkhZ Jfed fn- 01-12-2004 ls 15-12-2004 rd vodk'k ij jgk FkkA mDr vodk'k dh tkap dk;Zokgh ds fy, fn- 15-12-2004 dks gh
tkap vf/kdkjh dh fu;qfDr izca/kd oxZ }kjk nh xbZ rFkk tkap djrs le; izca/kd oxZ }kjk dksbZ fu"i{k ,oa Lora= xokg ugha j[kk x;kA tkap
djrs le; tkap vf/kdkjh dEiuh ds gh deZpkjh Fks tcfd tkap vf/kdkjh dEiuh ds ckgj ds gksus pkfg, FksA tkap djrs le; lquhy dqekj
Vkbe dhij ,oa ih,l nk/khp foHkkx bapktZ ekStwn FksA tkap dk;Zokgh esa izkFkhZ Jfed dh vuqifLFkfr ds ckjs esa psrkouh nh xbZ rFkk fuyafcr
fd;kA ;g nksuksa i= izca/kd oxZ }kjk izLrqr ugha fd, gS rFkk fn- 14-12-2004 dks tkap djus ds fy, tks vksn'k izca/kd }kjk fn;k x;k gS ml
vkns'k fn- 15-12-2004 dh izfr izca/kd oxZ }kjk izLrqr ugha dh xbZ gSA ftlds }kjk tkap vf/kdkjh dh fu;qfDr dh xbZ gSA blds vykok lquhy
dqekj Vkbe dhij rFkk ih,l nk/khp foHkkx bapktZ ds c;ku fy, x, gS bu c;kukas ij izkFkhZ Jfed ds gLrk{kj ugha gSA izkFkhZ Jfed ds tkyh
gLrk{kj djk, x, gSA izkFkhZ Jfed ds bu gLrk{kjksa dh Hkh gLrk{kj fo'ks"kK ls tkap djkuk pkfg, ftlesa ;g Li"V gks lds fd gLrk{kj okLro
esa izkFkhZ Jfed ds gSaA izkFkhZ Jfed ds le{k dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha dh xbZ gS lkjh dk;Zokgh xyr gSA izkFkhZ Jfed ds LoxxhZ; firk Jh iwjhyky
dh 20 ch?kk dk'r dh d`f"k ;ksX; Hkwfe eaxye lhesaV QSDVªh }kjk ysus ds ,ot esa ;g le>kSrk iwoZ fo/kk;d Jh gfj'k 'kekZ ,oa vU; x.kekU;
yksxksa ds chp gqvk Fkk ml le>kSrs ds QyLo:i izkFkhZ Jfed dks izca/kd] eaxye lhesaV fy- }kjk izkFkhZ dks LFkkbZ in ij ukSdjh yxk;k x;k
FkkA ;fn fdlh dkj.k o'k izca/kd oxZ }kjk izkFkhZ Jfed dks lsok esa ysus dks rS;kj ugha gksrs gS rks izkFkhZ Jfed dks o"kZ 2005 ls izkFkhZ dh vk;q
lsokfuo`fRr dh vk;q 58 o"kZ rd dk osru ,oa vodk'k dk ykHk Hkh lsok fu;eksa ds varxZr ns; gks] og Hkh ykHk feykdj lHkh ykHkksa dh jkf'k
rknknh 40 yk[k :i;ksa dk Hkqxrku djus dh frfFk rd 12 izfr'kr C;kt dh nj ls fnyk, tkus dk dk vuqrks"k iznku fd;k tkosA
3&vizkFkhZ us tokc LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse izLrqr dj izkFkhZ ds dFkuksa dk izfrokn fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ dks fn- 18-12-83 dks etnwj bZ xzse vkWijsfVo
dsVsxjh esa fu;qfDr nh xbZ FkhA izkFkhZ ges'kk viuh M~;wVh ls xSj gkftj jgk Fkk rFkk viuh M~;wVh ds izfr ykijokg FkkA bl dkj.k ls izca/kd oxZ
}kjk izkFkhZ dks fn- 14-12-2004 dks ,d vkjksi i= fn;k x;kA izca/kd oxZ }kjk dkfeZd dks fn- 14-12-2004 dk tks vkjksi i= fn;k x;k Fkk o
vkjksi yxk, x, Fks mudh fof/kor tkap izkd`frd U;k; ds fl)kar dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, foHkkxh; tkap djkbZ xbZ Fkh ftlsa izkFkhZ Jfed dks
lquokbZ dk iwjk ekSdk fn;k x;k FkkA tkap vf/kdkjh us Jfed ij yxk, x, vkjksiksa dks lgh ik;k rFkk tkap vf/kdkjh dh fjiksVZ ds vk/kkj ij
Jfed dh lsok,a lekIr dh xbZ gSA tkap vf/kdkjh us tkap izkd`frd U;k; ds izko/kkuksa dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, dh xbZ gSA vxj U;k;ky; bl
fu"d"kZ ij igwaps fd foHkkxh; tkap eas Jfed dks lquokbZ dk iwjk ekSdk ugha fn;k x;k gS rks vizkFkhZ foHkkxh; tkap U;k;ky; esa djokus dks rS;kj
6038
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
gSA Jfed fcuk NqV~Vh dk izkFkZuk i= fn,] fcuk dksbZ lwpuk fn, fcuk NqV~Vh eatwj djk, vius dk;ZLFky ls vuqifLFkr jgus dh vknr lh cu
xbZ gS ftlls izca/kd dks vius laLFkku dks pykus esa o izca/ku djus esa dkQh fnDdr vkrh gSA Jfed dks bl ckcr dkQh le>k;k x;k ysfdu
Jfed viuh vknr ls ckt ugha vkrk gSA bl dkj.k ls izca/kd dks etcwj gks dj Jfed ds fo:) mDr foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh djuh iM+h ftlds
fy, Jfed Lo;a ftEesnkj gSA Jfed us fn- 01-12-2004 ls 14-12-2004 rd dh vuqifLFkfr dk dkj.k viuh ifRu dh rch;r [kjkc gksu crk;k
gS ysfdu viuh ifRu dh rch;r [kjkc gksus ckcr Jfed us dksbZ MkWDVj dk izek.k i= dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; vkfn izLrqr ugha fd, gSA Jfed
ds fo:) tks dk;Zokgh dh xbZ Fkh oks 2004 esa dh xbZ Fkh Jfed us tks fookn mBk;k gS oks 2010 eas mBk;k gSA brus le; ds i'pkr fookn
mBkus dk dksbZ dkj.k Jfed us ugha crk;k gS ,slh fLFkfr esa Jfed dk fookn pyus ;ksX; ugha gSA Jfed ds fo:) tks foHkkxh; tkap dh xbZ
gS oks izkd`frd U;k; ds fl)karksa dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, dh xbZ gSA Jfed dks lquokbZ dk iwjk ekSdk fn;k x;k gS mlds i'pkr gh tkap
vf/kdkjh us viuh foHkkxh; tkap esa Jfed ij yxk, x, vkjksiksa dks lgh ik;k x;k gSA Jfed us foHkkxh; dk;Z esa tkap vf/kdkjh ds le{k tks
c;ku fn, gS mlesa Jfed us ml ij yxk, x, vkjksiksa dks Lohdkj fd;k gSA foHkkx;h tkap ds vk/kkj ij gh Jfed dh lsok,a lekIr dh xbZ gS
vkSj izkFkZuk dh gS fd mDr vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ dk Dyse izkFkZuk i= lO;; [kkfjt fd;k tkosA
5&;gkW ;g mYysf[kr fd;k tkuk lehphu gksxk fd U;k;ky; }kjk fn-13-04-2022 dks izkFkhZ Jfed ds fo:) dh x;h ?kjsyq tkWp dks uSlfxZd
U;k; ds fl)karksa ds vuqlkj fof/klEer mfpr gksuk ekuk x;k gS] ,sls esa vc mlesa fn;s x;s fu"d"kksZa dh iqujko`fRr dh vko';drk ugha gSA
6&mHk;i{k dh cgl lquh xbZ tks mudh vksj ls izLrqr vius vius vH;kosnuksa ds vuq:i gh jgh gSA blds vfrfjDr vizkFkhZ i{k dh vksj ls
fuEu U;kf;d n`"Vkar izLrqr fd, x, gS&
1. M/s L&T Komutsu Ltd. Bangalore Vs. N.Udaya Kumar-2008(116) FLR 1139(SC),
2. North Eastern Karnataka R.T.Corpn. Vs. Ashappa & anr-2006(110) FLR 80 (SC),
3. Larsen and Toubro Grahak Sahakar Sanstha Maryadeet, Bombay Vs. Tanaji Kashinath Vishwe & Ors.-
2006(2006)108 FLR 367 (Bombay HC),
4. Rasik Govind Mankar Vs. Oberoi Towers-2006(110) FLR 965 (Bombay HC),
5. Mahesh Kumar Narottambhai Kantharia Vs. Administrative Officer, Nakar Prathmik Shikshan samiti, Surat
& anr- 2002 (92) FLR 215) Gujrat HC),
7&gLrxr izdj.k esa U;k;ky; dks ;g ns[kuk gS fd D;k izkFkhZ Jfed ds fo#) fn;k x;k n.Mkns’k fn- 06-01-2005 mfpr ,oa oS/k gS vFkok ugha
vkSj ;fn mfpr gS rks D;k fn;k x;k n.M mlds d`R; dh rqyuk esa lekuqikrh (Proportionate) gS vFkok ugha\
bl izdj.k esa izkFkhZ dks vkjksi i= fnukad 14-12-2004 izkFkhZ ds ^^fnukad 01-12-2004 ls vkt fnukad rd fcuk iwoZ lwpuk ,oa fcuk
vodk'k Lohd`r djk, vius dk;Z ls vukf/kd`r :i ls vuqifLFkr^^ jgus ckcr fn;k x;k FkkA mDr nks"kkjksi.k dk tokc izLrqr dj vuqifLFkr
dk dkj.k izkFkhZ us crk;k fd fn- 01-12-2004 ls 15-12-2004 rd NqV~Vh ij jgus dk dkj.k mldh iRuh dh rch;r [kjkc gksuk Fkk ,oa og
foHkkx esa VkbZe ij lwpuk u djds NqV~Vh ij pyk x;kA mDr nks"kkjksi.k dk tokc larks"ktud ugha ik, tkus ds dkj.k vizkFkhZ }kjk vkjksi i=
fn- 14-12-2004 dh tkap ds fy, fu;kstd }kjk ,y-ds-'kekZ] lhfu;j vkWfQlj dks tkap vf/kdkjh fu;qfDr fd;k x;k gSA
nkSjkus foHkkxh; tkap fu;kstd i{k dh vksj ls lqfuy dqekj rFkk ds-,l-nk/khp ds c;ku ys[kc) djok, x, gS vkSj izkFkhZ us Hkh viuh izfrj{kk
esa Lo;a ds c;ku ys[kc) djok, gSaA i{kdkjku dh vksj ls izLrqr lk{; ds vk/kkj ij tkap vf/kdkjh us vkjksih izkFkhZ ds fo#) yxs vkjksi dks
izekf.kr ik;k gSA mDr vkjksi ds laca/k esa fu;kstd i{k dh vksj ls tkap esa izLrqr xokgksa lqfuy dqekj ,oa ds-,l-nk/khp us viuh xokgh esa ;g
rF; crk;k gS fd o"kZ 2004 dk esa HkS:yky dh 12 ,l,y o 6½ lh-,y- rFkk 113½ vuqifLFkr jgk rFkk 4 fnu ,y-MCY;w-ih- jgk gS ,oa fcuk
lwpuk ds fn- 01-12-2004 ls vuqifLFkr FkkA
izkFkhZ dh vksj ls nkSjkus foHkkxh; tkap Lo;a ds c;ku ys[kc) djok, x, gS ,oa viuh vuqifLFkfr dh lwpuk ugha Hkstus ds rF; dks
Lohdkj fd;k gSA
8&;gka bl rF; dks n`f"Vxr j[kk tkuk mfpr gksxk fd lk{; nkSjkus vizkFkhZ ds xokgksa ds c;ku eq[; fcUnqvksa ij v[kf.Mr jgs gS vkSj izkFkhZ us
nkSjkus foHkkxh; tkap esa gq, vius c;ku ,oa vkjksi i= ds tokc esa esa ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd og fcuk lwpuk ds fn- 01-12-2004 ls fn- 15-12-
2004 rd vuqifLFkr gS ,oa vizkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr dh xbZ izkFkhZ dh o"kZ 2004 dh izQksesaZl fjiksVZ ls Li"V gS fd izkFkhZ o"kZ 2004 esa 38 fnu lLisaM
jgk gS ,oa vizkFkhZ }kjk izkFkhZ dk foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh dk fooj.k izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ftlesa og o"kZ 2000 ls ysdj 2004 rd 20 ckj fcuk iwoZ
lwpuk ds vuqifLFkr jgk gS ftlesa mls fuyafcr fd, tkus ds n.M ls nf.Mr fd;k tk pqdk gSA bl izdkj tkap vf/kdkjh us i=koyh ij
miyC/k lk{; ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ ds fo:) yxk, x, vkjksiksa dks izekf.kr ik;kA bl izdkj mijksDr foospu o fo'kys"k.k ls ;g
izdV gks jgk gS fd bl izdj.k esa vkjksih izkFkhZ ds fo#) yxk, x, vkjksi ds laca/k esa fu;kstd i{k }kjk
vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh dh xbZ vkSj tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk mDr vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh esa izkFkhZ vkjksih ds
fo#) vkjksi izekf.kr ik;k x;k gS ,oa mDr lk{; ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ dks vkjksihr vkjksiksa esa nks"kh ik, tkus dk fu"d"kZ fn;k x;k
gSA tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk izkFkhZ vkjksih ds fo#) yxk, x, vkjksiksa dh fof/k vuqlkj tkap dh xbZ] xokgksa ds
c;ku ys[kc) dj izLrqr lk{; ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ vkjksih ds fo:) yxk, x, vkjksi dks izekf.kr ik;k gS
tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk mDr vkjksi ds laca/k esa tks fu"d"kZ fn;k x;k gS og ;qfDr;qDr ,oa mfpr gS] D;ksafd
izkFkhZ }kjk mldh ifRu ds fnukad 01-12-2004 ls fn 14-12-2004 ds chekj gksus dk fjdkWMZ uk rks tkap
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6039
vf/kdkjh ds le{k is'k fd;k x;k gS vkSj uk gh bl U;k;ky; esa] ftlls fd izkFkhZ ds dFkuksa ij fo'okl
fd;k tk lds ,oa izkFkhZ ds o"kZ 2000 ls 2004 rd 20 vuqifLFkr jgus ds fjdkWMZ ls Li"V gS fd izkFkhZ
vknru fcuk iwoZ lwpuk fn, vuqifLFkr jgus dk vkfn gS] vr% tkap ds fu"d"kZ ls ;g U;k;ky; Hkh lger
gSA tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk vkjksi izekf.kr ik, tkus ij viuh fjiksVZ vfxze dk;Zokgh gsrq QSDVªh eSustj dks
izsf"kr dh xbZ gS ftuds }kjk mDr tkap fjiksVZ ds vk/kkj ij n.Mkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k gSA
9&tgka rd n.Mkns'k dk iz'u gS tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk vkjksi izekf.kr ik, tkus ij viuh fjiksVZ QSDVªh
eSustj dks izLrqr dh xbZ gS rnqijkUr QSDVªh eSustj }kjk vkjksih izkFkhZ ds fcuk iwoZ lwpuk ds vuqifLFkfr ds
nqjkpj.k dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa ij fopkj djus ds i'pkr~ izkFkhZ vkjksih dks fnukad 06-01-2005 ls mldh lsokvksa
ls c[kkZLr ¼Dismiss½ fd;k x;k gS izdj.k dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, mDr vkns'k fdlh Hkh izdkj
ls vuuqikfrd (Disproportionate) vuqfpr o voS/k ugha gS cfYd iw.kZr;k mfpr ,oa oS/k gS vkSj mlesa U;k;ky; dh jk; esa fdlh Hkh
izdkj ls gLr{ksi fd;k tkuk U;k;ksfpr ugha gS vkSj izkFkhZ fdlh vuqrks"k dk vf/kdkjh ik;s tkus ;ksX; ugha gS ,oa lEizsf"kr funsZ'k@jsQzsUl blh
vuq:i mRrfjr gksus ;ksX; gSA
ifj.kkeLo:i Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh }kjk izklkafxd vkns'k fnukad 23-02-2012 ds tfj;s lEizsf"kr funsZ'k@fookn dks
blh vuq:i mRrfjr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jfed HkS: iq= iqjhyky dks vizkFkhZ fu;kstd QSDVªh eSustj] eaxye lhesaV fy- }kjk fnukad 06-01-
2005 }kjk fn;k x;k lsokvksa ls c[kkZLr ¼Dismiss½ dk n.M mfpr ,oa oS/k gS ftlesa fdlh izdkj ls gLr{ksi ;k ifjorZu dh vko';drk
ugha gS] QyLo:i izkFkhZ] vizkFkhZ ls dksbZ vuqrks"k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gSaA
¼lanhi dqekj 'kekZ½
U;k;k/kh'k
vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k¼dsUnzh;½]dksVk¼jkt-½
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नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1630.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससश गुरदीृ स्ट्टोन वससश के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और ईनके कमशचारी के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, धनबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-86/2004) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया
गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
,y-29011/58/2004-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1630.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 86/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-1, Dhanbad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s Gurdeep Stone Works and Their workman which was received along with soft copy of the award
by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-29011/58/2004-IR(M]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1,DHANBAD
In the matter of reference U/S 10 (1) (d)& (2A) of I.D.Act. 1947.
Reference Case No. 86/2004
Employer in relation to the management of M/s Gurdeep Stone Works, Pakur.
AND.
Their workman.
Present: Shri Sachindra Kumar Pandey
6040
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Presiding Officer
Appearances:
For the Employers :- None.
For the workman. :- None.
State : Jharkhand.
Industry:-Stone Works
Dated 01/08/2025
AWARD.
In exercise of powers conferred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub –section (2A) of Section 10 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),Government Of India through the Ministry of Labour, vide its Order
No.L-29011/58/2004-(IR(M)) dated 16/08/2004 has been pleased to refer the following dispute between the employer
i.e. management of M/s Gurdeep Stone Works, Pakur and their workman through the Talbaria Branch Secretary,
Bihar Mines Quarry Workers Union, Pakur for adjudication by this Tribunal:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of M/s Gurdeep Stone Works, Pakur in terminating the
services of Sh. Dulal Ghosh without complying Section 25-F of ID Act w.e.f. 01/04/03 is legal and or
justified? If not, to what relief Sh. Ghosh is entitled?‖
2. On receiving order no. L-29011/58/2004-(IR(M)) dated 16/08/2004 Government of India, Ministry of Labour,
New Delhi for adjudication of the dispute, Reference case no. 86 of 2004 was registered on 30.08.2004 and thereafter
the notices were sent to the parties with a direction to appear and submit their written statements along with relevant
documents in support of their claims and the witnesses.
3. After service of notice, both parties appeared previously and filed their authorities, W/S and subsequently
rejoinder. It further appears that after 2006 this case was put up after a long gap on 20.12.2021 and registered notices
were issued to both the parties but neither the workman nor management appeared before this Tribunal. The
registered notice sent to the both the parties returned with endorsement ―Insufficient Address kindly provide Receiver
Name‖ and ―अधूरा ऩता रहने के कारण वाऩस ककया गया”. It transpires from the case record that both the parties did not
appear since the year 2021 which shows that they have lost their interest in this case and therefore, this Tribunal is of
the opinion that the case deserves to be dismissed due to non prosecution.
4. Hence,
ORDERED
that this case is hereby dismissed for non prosecution and a ―No Dispute Award‖ be drawn up in respect of the
above reference case. Let the copies of Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry of Labour & Employment,
Government of India, New Delhi for information and notification.
SACHINDRA KUMAR PAndey, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1631.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससश बलदा ब्लॉक अयरन माआंस मेससश सेराजुद्दीन एंड कंृनी के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री खेतराबासी ृररदा
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स
न.-05/2019) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के
साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
,y-26012/2/2018-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1631.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 05/2019) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6041
relation to M/s Balda Block Iron Mines M/s Serajuddin & Co. and Shri Khetrabasi Parida which was received
along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-26012/2/2018-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 05/2019
Date of Passing Order – 21st July, 2025
Between :-
The Mines Manager,
M/s. Balda Block Iron Mines,
M/s. Serajuddin & Co.
At./Po. Balda, District – Keonjhar, (Odisha)
…
1st Party-Managements.
(And)
Shri Khetrabasi Parida,
At. Dullavapur, Post. Akul,
District – Keonjhar, Odisha.
…
2nd Party-Workman.
Appearances:
Sri Somanath Mishra,
…
For the 1st Party-
Advocate.
Management.
None.
…
For the 2nd party-
Workmen.
AWARD
In the present case, a reference was received from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry
of Labour & Employment, New Delhi vide order No. L-26012/2/2018 – IR(M), dated 07.01.2019 under clause (d) of
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of a dispute,
under the following schedule:-
―Whether the demand of Shri Khetrabasi Parida, Ex-Challan Clerk that his services have been terminated
illegally w.e.f. 30.11.2011 by the management of Balda Balock Iron Mines of M/s. Serajuddin & Co. is legal
& justified? If yes, what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
2.
In the reference order, the Under Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment, New
Delhi commanded the parties raising the dispute to file statement of claim, complete with relevant documents, list of
reliance and witnesses with this Tribunal within 15 days of receipt of the reference order and to forward a copy of
such statement of claim to each one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute.
3.
The case of the 2nd Party-Workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That, he was initially appointed on 01.01.2005 as Challan Clerkwith prescribed pay scale and posted at Balda Block
Iron Ore Mines of the Management which is an industrial establishment functioning as per the Memorandum and
Articles of Association of the company. However, all of a sudden on 30.11.2011 he was retrenched by the
6042
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Management from service without any written order and without any domestic enquiry conducted against him by the
establishment. He had made representation before the Management for his reinstatement, and when no action was
taken by the Management on his representation, he raised a dispute before the Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central), Rourkela, and on failure of conciliation proceeding before the labour machinery, the present reference has
been made.
The 2nd party-workman prays that a direction be given to the Management for his reinstatement in service with full
back wages, compensation, cost and consequential service benefits.
4.
The 1st Party-Management has appeared and filed its written statement. The case of the 1st party-
Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the dispute raised by the 2nd party-workman after eight years of cause of action is not maintainable. The
Management had floated Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the 2nd party-workman had opted for Voluntary
Retirement Scheme with acceptance of all dues under the Scheme, as such, the present reference is also not
maintainable. In order to down-size the establishment the Management had floated a V.R. Scheme for all the
employees including regular and daily wage employees and in pursuance to the same the 2nd party-workman
submitted application on 12.11.2011 to avail V.R. Scheme. The application of the applicant was considered and a
total V.R. amount of Rs. 4,29,858/- was deposited on 28.08.2012 in his Bank Account and also an amount of Rs.
13,138/- was paid towards Bonus to the workman in his Bank Account. In view of acceptance of V.R. Scheme by
the 2nd party-workman his allegation of illegal termination by the Management on 30.11.2011 is false and
consequently the reference is not maintainable.
The 1st Party-Management has prayed that the statement of claim of the 2nd party-workman may be dismissed as not
maintainable.
5.
When the case was fixed for filing of rejoinder by the 2nd Party-workman and for framing of issues, the
2nd party-workman remained absent and did not participate in the proceedings. It is also revealed from the order-sheet
that the 2nd Party-workman has not appeared and remained absent in all the dates after filing of written statement by
the Management. However, despite providing a number of opportunities, 2nd Party-workman has not turned up to file
rejoinder and to prove his case. As the 2nd party-workman has not turned up for proving his case, an order of
exparte was passed against the 2nd party-workman on dated 02.01.2024.
6.
The 1st Party-Management has examined one witness namely Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo as M.W.-1 and he has
proved certain documents which are as follows:-
Ext.-1 is the copy of an Office Order dated 14.05.2011 for availing of VR Scheme floated by the Management.
Ext.-2 is the copy of an application of the concerned workman for availing of V.R. Scheme.
Ext.-3 is the copy of the Bank Statement showing payment of V.R.S. amount Rs. 4,29,858/- and Bonus Rs. 13,138/-.
Ext.-4 is the copy of the reply filed by the Management before the R.L..C© Rourkela.
7.
The Management Witness No. 1 Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo has deposed that the management had floated a
Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the workman had submitted an application for availing V.R. Scheme which was
accepted by the Management. He has also deposed that the concerned workman was paid Rs. 4,29,858/- towards
V.R.S amount and Bonus Rs. 13,138/-, so all the dues had been paid to the 2nd party-workman under V.R.S. Scheme
and the case is not maintainable. In the cross examination of M.W.-1 by Court he has stated that the 2nd party-
workman was working since 2006 under the Management and there was no minimum period prescribed for taking
VRS.
8.
It appears from the record that the 2nd party workman was given ample opportunity to appear before this
Tribunal but he failed to do so.
9.
After analysing all the oral and documentary evidence of the 1st Party-Management the Tribunal finds that
the 2nd party-workman had availed voluntary retirement scheme and had subsequently received the amount of Rs.
4,29,858/- under V.R. Scheme and Bonus Rs. 13,138/- by the 1st Party-Management so the 2nd party-workman was
not pursuing this case.
10.
In view of the such the Tribunal comes to conclusion that the services of the 2nd party-workman has not been
illegally terminated by the management rather he had accepted voluntary retirement under V.R. Scheme floated by the
Management. Hence he is not entitled for any relief.
11.
Order is passed accordingly.
12.
A copy of this Order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6043
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1632.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससश बलदा ब्लॉक अयरन माआंस मेससश सेराजुद्दीन एंड कंृनी के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री रजत कुमार से ी
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-
09/2019) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ
08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. एल-26012/5/2018-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1632.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 09/2019) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s Balda Block Iron Mines M/s Serajuddin & Co. and Shri Rajat Kumar Sethy which was received
along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-26012/5/2018-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT
BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 09/2019
Date of Passing Order – 21st July, 2025
Between :-
The Mines Manager,
M/s. Balda Block Iron Mines,
M/s. Serajuddin & Co.
At./Po. Balda, District – Keonjhar, (Odisha)
…
1st Party-Managements.
(And)
Shri Rajat Kumar Sethy,
At./Post - Sarei,
District – Keonjhar, Odisha.
…
2nd Party-Workman.
Appearances:
Sri Somanath Mishra,
…
For the 1st Party-
Advocate.
Management.
None.
…
For the 2nd party-
Workmen.
AWARD
In the present case, a reference was received from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry
of Labour & Employment, New Delhi vide order No. L-26012/5/2018 – IR(M), dated 24.01.2019 under clause (d) of
6044
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of a dispute,
under the following schedule:-
―Whether the termination of Shri Rajat Kumar Sethy, Ex-Security Guard w.e.f. 30.11.2011 by the
management of Balda Block Iron mines of M/s. Serajuddin & Co. is proper and legally justified? If no, what relief
Shri Rajat Kumar Sethy is entitled to? What directions, if any, are necessary in the matter?‖
2.
In the reference order, the Under Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment, New
Delhi commanded the parties raising the dispute to file statement of claim, complete with relevant documents, list of
reliance and witnesses with this Tribunal within 15 days of receipt of the reference order and to forward a copy of
such statement of claim to each one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute.
3.
The case of the 2nd Party-Workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That, he was initially appointed on 01.03.2004 as Security Guard (Gunman) with prescribed pay scale and
posted at Balda Block Iron Ore Mines of the Management which is an industrial establishment functioning as per the
Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company. However, all of a sudden on 30.11.2011 he was retrenched
by the Management from service without any written order and without any domestic enquiry conducted against him
by the establishment. He had made representation before the Management for his reinstatement, and when no action
was taken by the Management on his representation, he raised a dispute before the Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central), Rourkela, and on failure of conciliation proceeding before the labour machinery, the present reference has
been made.
The 2nd party-workman prays that a direction be given to the Management for his reinstatement in service
with full back wages, compensation, cost and consequential service benefits.
4.
The 1st Party-Management has appeared and filed its written statement. The case of the 1st party-
Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the dispute raised by the 2nd party-workman after eight years of cause of action is not maintainable.
The Management had floated Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the 2nd party-workman had opted for Voluntary
Retirement Scheme with acceptance of all dues under the Scheme, as such, the present reference is also not
maintainable. In order to down-size the establishment the Management had floated a V.R. Scheme for all the
employees including regular and daily wage employees and in pursuance to the same the 2nd party-workman
submitted application on 26.08.2011 to avail V.R. Scheme. The application of the applicant was considered and a
total V.R. amount of Rs. 4,08,212/- was deposited on 31.10.2011 in his Bank Account and also an amount of Rs.
8,954/- was paid towards Bonus to the workman in his Bank Account. In view of acceptance of V.R. Scheme by the
2nd party-workman his allegation of illegal termination by the Management on 30.11.2011 is false and consequently
the reference is not maintainable.
The 1st Party-Management has prayed that the statement of claim of the 2nd party-workman may be dismissed
as not maintainable.
5.
When the case was fixed for filing of rejoinder by the 2nd Party-workman and for framing of issues, the 2nd
party-workman remained absent and did not participate in the proceedings. It is also revealed from the order-sheet
that the 2nd Party-workman has not appeared and remained absent in all the dates after filing of written statement by
the Management. However, despite providing a number of opportunities,
2nd Party-workman has not turned up to file rejoinder and to prove his case. As the 2nd party-workman has not turned
up for proving his case, an order of exparte was passed against the 2nd party-workman on dated 02.01.2024.
6.
The 1st Party-Management has examined one witness namely Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo as M.W.-1 and he has
proved certain documents which are as follows:-
Ext.-1 is the copy of an Office Order dated 14.05.2011 for availing of VR Scheme floated by the Management.
Ext.-2 is the copy of an application of the concerned workman for availing of V.R. Scheme.
Ext.-3 is the copy of the Bank Statement showing payment of V.R.S. amount Rs. 4,08,212/- and Bonus Rs. 8,954/-.
Ext.-4 is the copy of the reply filed by the Management before the R.L..C© Rourkela.
7.
The Management Witness No. 1 Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo has deposed that the management had floated a
Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the workman had submitted an application for availing V.R. Scheme which was
accepted by the Management. He has also deposed that the concerned workman was paid Rs. 4,08,212/- towards
V.R.S amount and Bonus Rs. 8,954/-, so all the dues had been paid to the 2nd party-workman under V.R.S. Scheme
and the case is not maintainable. In the cross examination of M.W.-1 by Court he has stated that the 2nd party-
workman was working since 2006 under the Management and there was no minimum period prescribed for
taking VRS.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6045
8.
It appears from the record that the 2nd party workman was given ample opportunity to appear before this
Tribunal but he failed to do so.
9.
After analysing all the oral and documentary evidence of the 1st Party-Management the Tribunal finds that
the 2nd party-workman had availed voluntary retirement scheme and had subsequently received the amount of Rs.
4,08,212/- under V.R. Scheme and Bonus Rs. 8,954/- by the 1st Party-Management so the 2nd party-workman was not
pursuing this case.
10.
In view of the such the Tribunal comes to conclusion that the services of the 2nd party-workman has not been
illegally terminated by the management rather he had accepted voluntary retirement under V.R. Scheme floated by
the Management. Hence he is not entitled for any relief.
11.
Award is passed accordingly.
12.
A copy of this Award is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of
the I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1633.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससश बलदा ब्लॉक अयरन माआंस मेससश सेराजुद्दीन एंड कंृनी के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और मोहम्मद सौकत
ऄल्लाम के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स
न.-10/2019) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ
08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
एल-26012/4/2018-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1633.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 10/2019) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s Balda Block Iron Mines M/s Serajuddin & Co. and Md. Saukat Allam which was received along
with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-26012/4/2018-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT
BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 10/2019
Date of Passing Order – 21st July, 2025
Between :-
The Mines Manager,
M/s. Balda Block Iron Mines,
M/s. Serajuddin & Co.
At./Po. Balda, District – Keonjhar, (Odisha)
…
1st Party-Management.
(And)
Md. Saukat Allam,
At./Post. - Balda,
District – Keonjhar, Odisha.
…
2nd Party-Workman.
Appearances:
Sri Somanath Mishra,
…
For the 1st Party-
6046
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Advocate.
Management.
None.
…
For the 2nd party-
Workmen.
AWARD
In the present case, a reference was received from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry
of Labour & Employment, New Delhi vide order No. L-26012/4/2018 – IR(M), dated 24.01.2019 under clause (d) of
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of a dispute,
under the following schedule:-
―Whether the termination of the services of Md. Saukat Allam, Ex-Driver w.e.f. 30.11.2011 by the management
of Balda Block Iron mines of M/s. Serajuddin & Co. is proper and legally justified? If no, what relief Md. Saukat
Allam is entitled to? What directions, if any, are necessary in the matter?‖
2.
In the reference order, the Under Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment, New
Delhi commanded the parties raising the dispute to file statement of claim, complete with relevant documents, list of
reliance and witnesses with this Tribunal within 15 days of receipt of the reference order and to forward a copy of
such statement of claim to each one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute.
3.
The case of the 2nd Party-Workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That, he was initially appointed on 01.01.2004 as Driver with prescribed pay scale and posted at Balda Block
Iron Ore Mines of the Management which is an industrial establishment functioning as per the Memorandum and
Articles of Association of the company. However, all of a sudden on 30.11.2011 he was retrenched by the
Management from service without any written order and without any domestic enquiry conducted against him by the
establishment. He had made representation before the Management for his reinstatement, and when no action was
taken by the Management on his representation, he raised a dispute before the Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central), Rourkela, and on failure of conciliation proceeding before the labour machinery, the present reference has
been made.
The 2nd party-workman prays that a direction be given to the Management for his reinstatement in service
with full back wages, compensation, cost and consequential service benefits.
4.
The 1st Party-Management has appeared and filed its written statement. The case of the 1st party-
Management as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the dispute raised by the 2nd party-workman after eight years of cause of action is not maintainable. The
Management had floated Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the 2nd party-workman had opted for Voluntary
Retirement Scheme with acceptance of all dues under the Scheme, as such, the present reference is also not
maintainable. In order to down-size the establishment the Management had floated a V.R. Scheme for all the
employees including regular and daily wage employees and in pursuance to the same the 2nd party-workman
submitted application to avail V.R. Scheme. The application of the applicant was considered and a total V.R. amount
of Rs. 4,64,994/- was deposited on 28.08.2012 in his Bank Account and also an amount of Rs. 13,138/- was paid
towards Bonus to the workman in his Bank Account. In view of acceptance of V.R. Scheme by the 2nd party-workman
his allegation of illegal termination by the Management on 30.11.2011 is false and consequently the reference is not
maintainable.
The 1st Party-Management has prayed that the statement of claim of the 2nd party-workman may be dismissed
as not maintainable.
5.
When the case was fixed for filing of rejoinder by the 2nd Party-workman and for framing of issues, the 2nd
party-workman remained absent and did not participate in the proceedings. It is also revealed from the order-sheet
that the 2nd Party-workman has not appeared and remained absent in all the dates after filing of written statement by
the Management. However, despite providing a number of opportunities, 2nd Party-workman has not turned up to file
rejoinder and to prove his case. As the 2nd party-workman has not turned up for proving his case,
an order of exparte was passed against the 2nd party-workman on dated 02.01.2024.
6.
The 1st Party-Management has examined one witness namely Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo as M.W.-1 and he has
proved certain documents which are as follows:-
Ext.-1 is the copy of an Office Order dated 14.05.2011 for availing of VR Scheme floated by the Management.
Ext.-2 is the copy of an application of the concerned workman for availing of V.R. Scheme.
Ext.-3 is the copy of the Bank Statement showing payment of V.R.S. amount Rs. 4,64,994/- and Bonus Rs. 13,138/-.
Ext.-4 is the copy of the reply filed by the Management before the R.L..C© Rourkela.
7.
The Management Witness No. 1 Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo has deposed that the management had floated a
Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the workman had submitted an application for availing V.R. Scheme which was
accepted by the Management. He has also deposed that the concerned workman was paid Rs. 4,64,994/- towards
V.R.S amount and Bonus Rs. 13,138/-, so all the dues had been paid to the 2nd party-workman under V.R.S. Scheme
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6047
and the case is not maintainable. In the cross examination of M.W.-1 by Court he has stated that the 2nd party-
workman was working since 2006 under the Management and there was no minimum period prescribed for taking
VRS.
8.
It appears from the record that the 2nd party workman was given ample opportunity to appear before this
Tribunal but he failed to do so.
9.
After analysing all the oral and documentary evidence of the 1st Party-Management the Tribunal finds that
the 2nd party-workman had availed voluntary retirement scheme and had subsequently received
the amount of Rs. 4,64,994/- under V.R. Scheme and Bonus Rs. 13,138/- by the 1st Party-Management so the 2nd
party-workman was not pursuing this case.
10.
In view of the such the Tribunal comes to conclusion that the services of the 2nd party-workman has not been
illegally terminated by the management rather he had accepted voluntary retirement under V.R. Scheme floated by
the Management. Hence he is not entitled for any relief.
11.
Award is passed accordingly.
12.
A copy of this Award is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of
the I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
Presiding Officer, CGIT-cum-Labour Court, BBSR.
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1634.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
मेससश बलदा ब्लॉक अयरन माआंस मेससश सेराजुद्दीन एंड कंृनी के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री जसबा चरण ृररदा
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-
11/2019) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ
08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
एल-26012/1/2018-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1634.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 11/2019) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s Balda Block Iron Mines M/s Serajuddin & Co. and Shri Siba Charan Parida which was received
along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-26012/1/2018-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT
BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 11/2019
Date of Passing Order – 21st July, 2025
6048
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Between :-
The Mines Manager,
M/s. Balda Block Iron Mines,
M/s. Serajuddin & Co.
At./Po. Balda, District – Keonjhar, (Odisha)
…
1st Party-Management.
(And)
Shri Siba Charan Parida,
At. – Dullavapur, Post – Akuli,
District – Keonjhar, Odisha.
…
2nd Party-Workman.
Appearances:
Sri Somanath Mishra,
…
For the 1st Party-
Advocate.
Management.
None.
…
For the 2nd party-
Workman.
AWARD
In the present case, a reference was received from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of
Labour & Employment, New Delhi vide order No. L-26012/1/2018 – IR(M), dated 24.01.2019 under clause (d) of
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of a dispute,
under the following schedule:-
―Whether the termination of Shri Siba Charan Parida, Ex-L.M.V. Operator w.e.f. 30.11.2011 by the management of
Balda Block Iron mines of M/s. Serajuddin & Co. is proper and legally justified? If no, what relief Shri Siba Charan
Parida is entitled to? What directions, if any, are necessary in the matter?‖
2.
In the reference order, the Under Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment,
New Delhi commanded the parties raising the dispute to file statement of claim, complete with relevant documents, list
of reliance and witnesses with this Tribunal within 15 days of receipt of the reference order and to forward a copy of
such statement of claim to each one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute.
3.
The case of the 2nd Party-Workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That, he was initially appointed on 01.01.2000 as L.M.V. Operator with prescribed pay scale and posted at Balda Block
Iron Ore Mines of the Management which is an industrial establishment functioning as per the Memorandum and
Articles of Association of the company. However, all of a sudden on 30.11.2011 he was retrenched by the Management
from service without any written order and without any domestic enquiry conducted against him by the establishment.
He had made representation before the Management for his reinstatement, and when no action was taken by the
Management on his representation, he raised a dispute before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Rourkela,
and on failure of conciliation proceeding before the labour machinery, the present reference has been made.
The 2nd party-workman prays that a direction be given to the Management for his reinstatement in service with full
back wages, compensation, cost and consequential service benefits.
4.
The 1st Party-Management has appeared and filed its written statement. The case of the 1st party-Management
as per its written statement is as follows:-
That the dispute raised by the 2nd party-workman after eight years of cause of action is not maintainable. The
Management had floated Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the 2nd party-workman had opted for Voluntary Retirement
Scheme with acceptance of all dues under the Scheme, as such, the present reference is also not maintainable. In order
to down-size the establishment the Management had floated a V.R. Scheme for all the employees including regular and
daily wage employees and in pursuance to the same the 2nd party-workman submitted application on 12.11.2011 to
avail V.R. Scheme. The application of the applicant was considered and a total V.R. amount of Rs. 4,56,426/- was
deposited on 28.08.2012 in his Bank Account and also an amount of Rs. 13,138/- was paid towards Bonus to the
workman on 09.10.2013 in his Bank Account. In view of acceptance of V.R. Scheme by the 2nd party-workman his
allegation of illegal termination by the Management on 30.11.2011 is false and consequently the reference is not
maintainable.
The 1st Party-Management has prayed that the statement of claim of the 2nd party-workman may be dismissed as not
maintainable.
5.
When the case was fixed for filing of rejoinder by the 2nd Party-workman and for framing of issues, the
2nd party-workman remained absent and did not participate in the proceedings. It is also revealed from the order-sheet
that the 2nd Party-workman has not appeared and remained absent in all the dates after filing of written statement by the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6049
Management. However, despite providing a number of opportunities, 2nd Party-workman has not turned up to file
rejoinder and to prove his case. As the 2nd party-workman has not turned up for proving his case,
an order of exparte was passed against the 2nd party-workman on dated 02.01.2024.
6.
The 1st Party-Management has examined one witness namely Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo as M.W.-1 and he has
proved certain documents which are as follows:-
Ext.-1 is the copy of an Office Order dated 14.05.2011 for availing of VR Scheme floated by the Management.
Ext.-2 is the copy of an application of the concerned workman for availing of V.R. Scheme.
Ext.-3 is the copy of the Bank Statement showing payment of V.R.S. amount Rs. 4,56,426/- and Bonus Rs. 13,138/-.
Ext.-4 is the copy of the reply filed by the Management before the R.L..C© Rourkela.
7.
The Management Witness No. 1 Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo has deposed that the management had floated a
Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the workman had submitted an application for availing V.R. Scheme which was
accepted by the Management. He has also deposed that the concerned workman was paid Rs. 4,56,426/- towards V.R.S
amount and Bonus Rs. 13,138/-, so all the dues had been paid to the 2nd party-workman under V.R.S. Scheme and the
case is not maintainable. In the cross examination of M.W.-1 by Court he has stated that the 2nd party-workman was
working since 2006 under the Management and there was no minimum period prescribed for taking VRS.
8.
It appears from the record that the 2nd party workman was given ample opportunity to appear before this
Tribunal but he failed to do so.
9.
After analysing all the oral and documentary evidence of the 1st Party-Management the Tribunal finds that the
2nd party-workman had availed voluntary retirement scheme and had subsequently received
the amount of Rs. 4,56,426/- under V.R. Scheme and Bonus Rs. 13,138/- by the 1st Party-Management so the 2nd party-
workman was not pursuing this case.
10.
In view of the such the Tribunal comes to conclusion that the services of the 2nd party-workman has not been
illegally terminated by the management rather he had accepted voluntary retirement under V.R. Scheme floated by
the Management. Hence he is not entitled for any relief.
11.
Order is passed accordingly.
12.
A copy of this Order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1635.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससश बलदा ब्लॉक अयरन माआंस मेससश सेराजुद्दीन एंड कंृनी के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री संतोष
साहू के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, भुवनेश्वर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स
न.-12/2019) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ
08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
,y-26012/3/2018-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
6050
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1635.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 12/2019) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s Balda Block Iron Mines M/s Serajuddin & Co. and Shri Santosh Sahu which was received along
with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-26012/3/2018-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR
Present:
Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 12/2019
Date of Passing Order – 21st July, 2025
Between :-
The Mines Manager,
M/s. Balda Block Iron Mines,
M/s. Serajuddin & Co.
At./Po. Balda, District – Keonjhar, (Odisha)
…
1st Party-Management.
(And)
Shri Santosh Sahu,
At. – Dullavapur, Post – Akul,
District – Keonjhar, Odisha.
…
2nd Party-Workman.
Appearances:
Sri Somanath Mishra,
…
For the 1st Party-
Advocate.
Management.
None.
For the 2nd party-
Workman.
AWARD
In the present case, a reference was received from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry
of Labour & Employment, New Delhi vide order No. L-26012/3/2018 – IR(M), dated 22.01.2019 under clause (d) of
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of a dispute,
under the following schedule:-
―Whether the termination of the services of Shri Santosh Sahu, Ex-Crusher Operator w.e.f. 30.11.2011 by the
management of Balda Block Iron mines of M/s. Serajuddin & Co. is proper and legally justified? If no, what
relief Shri Santosh Sahu is entitled to? What directions, if any, are necessary in the matter?‖
2. In the reference order, the Under Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment, New
Delhi commanded the parties raising the dispute to file statement of claim, complete with relevant documents, list of
reliance and witnesses with this Tribunal within 15 days of receipt of the reference order and to forward a copy of
such statement of claim to each one of the opposite parties involved in the dispute.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6051
3. The case of the 2nd Party-Workman as per his statement of claim is as follows:-
That, he was initially appointed on 01.01.2006 as Crusher Operator with prescribed pay scale and posted at Balda
Block Iron Ore Mines of the Management which is an industrial establishment functioning as per the Memorandum
and Articles of Association of the company. However, all of a sudden on 30.11.2011 he was retrenched by the
Management from service without any written order and without any domestic enquiry conducted against him by the
establishment. He had made representation before the Management for his reinstatement, and when no action was
taken by the Management on his representation, he raised a dispute before the Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central), Rourkela, and on failure of conciliation proceeding before the labour machinery, the present reference has
been made.
The 2nd party-workman prays that a direction be given to the Management for his reinstatement in service with full
back wages, compensation, cost and consequential service benefits.
4. The 1st Party-Management has appeared and filed its written statement. The case of the 1st party-Management as
per its written statement is as follows:-
That the dispute raised by the 2nd party-workman after eight years of cause of action is not maintainable. The
Management had floated Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the 2nd party-workman had opted for Voluntary
Retirement Scheme with acceptance of all dues under the Scheme, as such, the present reference is also not
maintainable. In order to down-size the establishment the Management had floated a V.R. Scheme for all the
employees including regular and daily wage employees and in pursuance to the same the 2nd party-workman
submitted application on 15.07.2011 to avail V.R. Scheme. The application of the applicant was considered and a
total V.R. amount of Rs. 3,89,308/- was deposited on 31.10.2011 in his Bank Account and also an amount of Rs.
9,248/- was paid towards Bonus to the workman on 19.10.2012 in his Bank Account. In view of acceptance of V.R.
Scheme by the 2nd party-workman his allegation of illegal termination by the Management on 30.11.2011 is false and
consequently the reference is not maintainable.
The 1st Party-Management has prayed that the statement of claim of the 2nd party-workman may be dismissed as not
maintainable.
5. When the case was fixed for filing of rejoinder by the 2nd Party-workman and for framing of issues, the 2nd party-
workman remained absent and did not participate in the proceedings. It is also revealed from the order-sheet that the
2nd Party-workman has not appeared and remained absent in all the dates after filing of written statement by the
Management. However, despite providing a number of opportunities, 2nd Party-workman has not turned up to file
rejoinder and to prove his case. As the 2nd party-workman has not turned up for proving his case, an order of exparte
was passed against the 2nd party-workman on dated 02.01.2024.
6.
The 1st Party-Management has examined one witness namely Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo as M.W.-1 and he has
proved certain documents which are as follows:-
Ext.-1 is the copy of an Office Order dated 14.05.2011 for availing of VR Scheme floated by the Management.
Ext.-2 is the copy of an application of the concerned workman for availing of V.R. Scheme.
Ext.-3 is the copy of the Bank Statement showing payment of V.R.S. amount Rs. 3,89,308/- and Bonus
Rs. 9,248/-.
Ext.-4 is the copy of the reply filed by the Management before the R.L..C© Rourkela.
7.
The Management Witness No. 1 Sri Anjan Kumar Sahoo has deposed that the management had floated a
Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the workman had submitted an application for availing V.R. Scheme which was
accepted by the Management. He has also deposed that the concerned workman was paid Rs. 3,89,308/- towards
V.R.S amount and Bonus Rs. 9,248/-, so all the dues had been paid to the 2nd party-workman under V.R.S. Scheme
and the case is not maintainable. In the cross examination of M.W.-1 by Court he has stated that the 2ndparty-
workman was working since 2006 under the Management and there was no minimum period prescribed for taking
VRS.
8.
It appears from the record that the 2nd party workman was given ample opportunity to appear before this
Tribunal but he failed to do so.
9.
After analysing all the oral and documentary evidence of the 1st Party-Management the Tribunal finds that
the 2nd party-workman had availed voluntary retirement scheme and had subsequently received the amount of Rs.
3,89,308/- under V.R. Scheme and Bonus Rs. 9,248/-by the 1st Party-Management so the 2nd party-workman was not
pursuing this case.
10.
In view of the such the Tribunal comes to conclusion that the services of the 2nd party-workman has not been
illegally terminated by the management rather he had accepted voluntary retirement under V.R. Scheme floated by the
Management. Hence he is not entitled for any relief.
6052
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
11.
Order is passed accordingly.
12.
A copy of this Order is sent to the appropriate government for notification as required under section 17 of the
I.D. Act, 1947. File is consigned to record room.
Dictated & Corrected by me.
DINESH KUMAR SINGH, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1636.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार इएसअइ; मेससश हाआजिड फ्लीट मजनेजमेंट प्राआवेट जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और सुश्री रजश्म ृांडे
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जबलृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स
न.-42/2023) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ
08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-130]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1636.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 42/2023) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to ESI; M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Limited and Ms. Rashmi Pandey which was received along with
soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025- IR(M)-130]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/42/2023
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.(Retd.)
Ms. Rashmi Pandey,
D/o Rakesh Pandey,
1396/1, University Road, Pachpedi,
Jabalpur (M.P.)- 482001
Workman
Vs
1. The Regional Director,
ESI, Indore (MP), Panchdeep Bhavan, Nanadanagar,
Indore, Madhya Pradesh-452011
2. The Managing Director,
M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Limited,
AC-7. 1st Floor, Tagore Garden,
New Delhi- 110027
Management
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6053
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 23rd day of July- 2025)
As per letter dated 22/06/2023 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‗Act‘)as per Notification
No. 24(16)2023-IR dt. 22/06/2023. The dispute under reference relates to:
―Whether the action of management of ESI Indore to terminate the services of Ms. Rashmi Pandey,
Workman through M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Ltd., a sham contractor, without complying the
statutory Provision of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, is illegal and unjustified in the eye of law or not?
If yes, what other relief workman is entitled to?‖
Case of the Workman is mainly that, the Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) had invited
application for appointment of I.T. Assistant on contract basis. She applied for it and after interview, was selected. She
was appointed as I.T. Assistant vide order dated 10.06.2016 w.e.f., 09.06.2016 on contract basis for a period of one
year and was posted in the ESCI, Model Hospital, Nanda Nagar, Indore. Her contract was extended for another one
year vide order dated 08.06.2017 on the same condition and salary she was transferred to Gwalior office in the year
2020-21. The management of ESIC had engaged the outsourcing company which is respondent No. 2. Accordingly,
from the year 2020-21 onwards, she worked with the ESIC in same capacity but as an outsourcing employee supplied
by the outsourcing company (respondent No. 2). Her contract was extended up to 2022-23 on yearly basis. She was
informed by the respondent No. 2 vide communication dated 31.01.2023 that her job contract had expired on
31.12.2022 and another person has been taken on job in her place.
According to the applicant/workman she had been working on a vacant post under the management of ESIC.
This was a permanent post and of perennial nature, the management adopted unfair labour practice in engaging her on
contract basis as outsourced employee on year to year basis, thus action of management is in violation of section
25(F), 25(G) and 25(H) of the Act.
It is further the case of the applicant/workman that, she is the ‗workman‘ as defined under section 2(s) of the
Act, the managements are industry‘ as defined under section 2(j) of the Act and her disengagement is ‗retrenchment‘
as defined under section 2(oo) of the Act. She has sought a relief of her reinstatement with full back wages and
benefits holding the action of the managements in terminating her service against law.
In its written statement of defense, the management of ESIC has taken the case that she was appointed by
them on contract basis for a period of one year w.e.f., 09.06.2016, this was later extended on same terms and
conditions on a mutual agreement for one year i.e., till 08.06.2018 which was further extended on same terms and
conditions on mutual agreement till 30.11.2018. Thereafter the policy of engaging I.T. Manager and I.T. Assistants
was changed by the ESIC, Head Quarter vide its letter I-20/14/01/2016-ICT in (IT Man Power) dated 10.08.2018 and
it was decided to hire man power through NICSI empanelled agencies. It is in pursuance of this policy change, M/s
Silvertouch Technologies Ltd. was authorized by NICSI to provide man power in M.P. Region of ESIC. The
applicant/workman was selected by the outsourcing agency i.e., M/s Silvertouch Technologies Ltd. and was appointed
by them she was posted with the ESIC as an outsourced employee of the outsourcing company M/s Silvertouch
Technologies Ltd.
It is further the case of the management that the policy of hiring man power is again changed vide letter
I-20/14/01/2016-ICT in (IT Man Power)dated 03.08.2020 and it was directed to take service of I.T. man power
through GeM and empanelled agencies as per qualification and experience approved earlier.
It is in pursuance of this policy the change, M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Limited was hired through
GeM Portal to provide the man power to ESIC. They hired services of the applicant/workman and she was posted as
outsourced employee with the ESIC at Gwalior thus after the policy change in 2018, she was never the employee of
ESIC rather she was outsourced employee of the outsourcing agency posted with ESIC. Hence, there is no occasion of
her disengagement by management of ESIC because there is no relation of employer or employee between the
applicant/workman and ESIC. Also it has been pleaded that she is not a ‗workman‘ as defined under the Act. Thus,
according to management of ESIC, their action is not questionable they have requested that the reference be answered
against the workman.
The outsourcing agency which is M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Ltd. has pleaded in their written
statement of defense that they had appointed her purely on contract basis on year to year basis and provided her
services to ESIC as outsourced employee under the contract of man power supply awarded to them by ESIC. Her
contract was for a fixed term which expired and was not renewed by them.
According to them, her non renewal of service contract is not a case of retrenchment as defined under section
2 (oo) of the Act. They have also prayed that the reference be answered against the workman.
In evidence, the Workman has filed her affidavit, as her Examination-in-chief. She has also filed her letter
of termination of her appointment on expiry of her tenure issued on 31.01.2023, letter of appointment
6054
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
dated 30.12.2021 issued by M/s Hybrid Fleet Management, admitted by management of M/s Hybrid Fleet
Management man power.
Management has not filed any documentary evidence.
I have heard argument of Learned Counsel for the applicant/workman Mr. Aditya Ahiwasi, Mr. Sanjeev Tuli
for ESIC and Mr. Ravindra Gupta for M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Limited and I have gone through the
record.
The main argument of Learned Counsel for the workman is that, there is vacancy of I.T. Assistant with
the management of ESIC, this vacancy is of permanent and perennial nature, the management has been adopting
unfair labour practice by engaging contract labour for a job of permanent nature. The workman was first appointed on
contract by the management of ESIC for a fixed term extended on year to year basis and thereafter her services were
transferred to outsourcing companies and she worked with ESIC as outsourcing employee, she is qualified for the post
and the work is still being taken by other outsourcing employee by ESIC. Thus, the action of management in
continuing her as out sourced employee by way of extending her service contract year by year is bad in law and she is
entitled to be reinstated as employee of ESIC.
On the other hand, Learned Counsel for ESIC has submitted that they had appointed the workman for a
fixed term of one year in 2016 which was extended for another one year up to 2018 (details mentioned earlier) and
thereafter they had no relation with her as an employer and employee because her service contract was not extended
further and it expired due to completion of tenure in the service agreement, thereafter she worked with them as
outsourced employee through outsourcing agency. Hence, they have nothing to do with her termination and cannot be
held liable for it.
It has been submitted on behalf of the outsourcing agency that her service agreement was for a fixed term
which was not renewed after expiry of the term, this is not retrenchment, hence there is no illegality.
The Learned Counsel for workman has relied on judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sudarshan Rajpoot v/s U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (2015) II, SCC 317.
On perusal of record in the light of rival arguments, the reference itself appears to be the issue for
determination.
Before entering into any discussion some relevant provision are required to be reproduced which are as
follows:-
2(j) ―industry‖ means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes
any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen;
2(k) ―industrial dispute‖ means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between
employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-
employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;
2 (oo) ―retrenchment‖ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include—
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between
the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment
between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a
stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;
11A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of
discharge or dismissal of workmen.—Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a
workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of
the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that
the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal
and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief
to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of
the case may require: Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in
relation to the matter.
2(ra) ―unfair labour practice‖ means any of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule;
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6055
THE FIFTH SCHEDULE See section 2(ra) UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES I.—On the part of
employers and trade unions of employers
1. To interfere with, restrain from, or coerce, workmen in the exercise of their right to organise, form, join or
assist a trade union or to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, that is to say:— (a) threatening workmen with discharge or dismissal, if they join a trade union;
(b) threatening a lock-out or closure, if a trade union is organised;
(c) granting wage increase to workmen at crucial periods of trade union organisation, with a view to
undermining the efforts of the trade union organisation.
2. To dominate, interfere with or contribute support, financial or otherwise, to any trade union, that is to
say:—
(a) an employer taking an active interest in organising a trade union of his workmen; and
(b) an employer showing partiality or granting favour to one of several trade unions attempting to organise
his workmen or to its members, where such a trade union is not a recognised trade union. 3. To establish employer
sponsored trade unions of workmen.
4. To encourage or discourage membership in any trade union by discriminating against any workman, that
is to say:—
(a) discharging or punishing a workman, because he urged other workmen to join or organise a trade
union;
(b) discharging or dismissing a workman for taking part in any strike (not being as trike which is deemed to
be an illegal strike under this Act);
(c) changing seniority rating of workmen because of trade union activities;
(d) refusing to promote workmen to higher posts on account of their trade union activities;
(e) giving unmerited promotions to certain workmen with a view to creating discord amongst other
workmen, or to undermine the strength of their trade union;
(f) discharging office-bearers or active members of the trade union on account of their trade union
activities.
5. To discharge or dismiss workmen—
(a) by way of victimisation;
(b) not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise of the employer's rights;
(c) by falsely implicating a workman in a criminal case on false evidence or on concocted evidence;
(d) for patently false reasons;
(e) on untrue or trumped up allegation of absence without leave;
(f) in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of domestic enquiry or with undue
haste; for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to the nature of the particular
misconduct or the past record or service of the workman, thereby leading to a disproportionate punishment.
6. To abolish the work of a regular nature being done by workmen, and to give such work to contractors as a
measure of breaking a strike.
7. To transfer a workman mala fide from one place to another, under the guise of following management
policy.
8. To insist upon individual workmen, who are on a legal strike to sign a good conduct bond, as a pre-
condition to allowing them to resume work.
9. To show favouritism or partiality to one set of workers regardless of merit.
10. To employ workmen as ―badlis‖, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with
the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.
11. To discharge or discriminate against any workman for filing charges or testifying against an employer in
any enquiry or proceeding relating to any industrial dispute.
12. To recruit workmen during a strike which is not an illegal strike.
13. Failure to implement award, settlement or agreement.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
14. To indulge in acts of force or violence.
15. To refuse to bargain collectively, in good faith with the recognised trade unions.
16. Proposing or continuing a lock-out deemed to be illegal under this Act.
25T. Prohibition of unfair labour practice.—No employer or workman or a trade union, whether registered
under the Trader Unions Act, 1926 (18 of 1926), or not, shall commit any unfair labour practice.
25U. Penalty for committing unfair labour practices.—Any person who commits any unfair labour practice
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to
one thousand rupees or with both.
As regards to the issue that whether the applicant is a workman as defined under the Act or not,
Hon‘ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Union Carbide (India) Ltd. V.s. Ramesh Kumbla and Others
reported in MANU/MH/0073/1999 and another judgment of the same High Court in the case of Union Carbide
(India) Ltd. V.s. D. Samuel and Others reported in MANU/MH/1713/1998, may be referred in this respect. In these
two cases, after analyzing the judgment of various High Courts and Hon‘ble Supreme Court, the Single Bench of
Hon‘ble Bombay High Court has summarized the principles on the basis of which it is to be decided whether the
Applicant is in supervisory capacity or not. These tests mentioned in Para 34 and 35 of the Judgment are being
reproduced as follows:
Para-34. In so far as the Apex Court is concerned, some of the tests laid down are:
(1) Designation is not material but what is important is the nature of work.
(2) Find out the dominant purpose of employment and not any additional duties the employee may be
performing.
(3) Can he bind the Company/employer to some kind of decisions on behalf of the Company/employer.
(4) Has the employee power to direct or oversee the work of his subordinates.
(5) Has the power to sanction leave or recommend it; and
(6) Has he the power to appoint, terminate or take disciplinary action against workmen.
Para-35.From the judgment of this Court and the other High Courts some of the tests apart from what the
Apex Court has stated are:
(a) Whether the employee can examine the quality of work and whether such work is performed in
satisfactory manner or not;
(b) Does the employee have powers of assigning duties and distribution of work;
(c) Can he indent material and distribute the same amongst the workmen;
(d) Even though he has no authority to grant leave does he have power to recommend leave;
(e) Are there persons working under him;
(f) Has he the power to supervise the work of men and not merely machines;
(g) Dos he mark the attendance of other employees;
(h) Does he write the confidential reports of his subordinates.
The judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Maini vs. M/s. Carona Sahu Company, (1994)
3 SCC 510. Para 9, 10 & 11 of this judgment are being reproduced as follows :-
―9. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made
by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that whether or not an employee is a workman under
Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be determined with reference to his principal nature
of duties and functions. Such question is required to be determined with reference to the facts and
circumstances of the case and materials on record and it is not possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula
which can decide the dispute as to the real nature of duties and functions being performed by an employee in
all cases. When an employee is employed to do the types of work enumerated in the definition of workman
under Section 2(s), there is hardly any difficulty in treating him as a workman under the appropriate
classification but in the complexity of industrial or commercial organisations quite a large number of
employees are often required to do more than one kind of work. In such cases, it becomes necessary to
determine under which classification the employee will fall for the purpose of deciding whether he comes
within the definition of workman or goes out of it. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision
of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. Burmah Shell Management
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6057
Staff Assn. [(1970) 3 SCC 378 : (1971) 2 SCR 758 : (1970) 2 LLJ 590] In All India Reserve Bank
Employees' Assn. v. Reserve Bank of India [(1965) 2 LLJ 175 : AIR 1966 SC 305 : (1966) 1 SCR 25] it has
been held by this Court that the word ‗supervise‘ and its derivatives are not words of precise import and must
often be construed in the light of context, for unless controlled, they cover an easily simple oversight and
direction as manual work coupled with the power of inspection and superintendence of the manual work of
others. It has been rightly contended by both the learned counsel that the designation of an employee is not of
much importance and what is important is the nature of duties being performed by the employee. The
determinative factor is the main duties of the employee concerned and not some works incidentally done. In
other words, what is, in substance, the work which employee does or what in substance he is employed to do.
Viewed from this angle, if the employee is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally or for a fraction of
time also does some manual or clerical work, the employee should be held to be doing supervisory works.
Conversely, if the main work is of manual, clerical or of technical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory
or other work is also done by the employee incidentally or only a small fraction of working time is devoted to
some supervisory works, the employee will come within the purview of ‗workman‘ as defined in Section 2(s) of
the Industrial Disputes Act.
10. In Mcleod and Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal, W.B. [AIR 1958 Cal 273] P.B. Mukharji, J. of the Calcutta
High Court as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed that whether a person was a workman within the
definition of the Industrial Disputes Act would be the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Tribunal. The court further observed that in order to determine the categories of service indicated by the use
of different words like ‗supervisory‘, ‗managerial‘ and ‗administrative‘, it was not necessary to import the
notions of one into the interpretation of the other. The words such as ‗supervisory‘, ‗managerial‘ and
‗administrative‘ are advisedly loose expressions with no rigid frontiers and too much subtlety should not be
used in trying to precisely define where supervision ends and management begins or administration starts. For
that would be theoretical and not practical. It has to be broadly interpreted from a common sense point of view
where tests will be simple both in theory and in their application. The learned Judge further observed that a
supervisor need not be a manager or an administrator and a supervisor can be a workman so long as he did
not exceed the monetary limitation indicated in the section and a supervisor irrespective of his salary is not a
workman who has to discharge function mainly of managerial nature by reasons of the duties attached to his
office or of the powers vested in him. The aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court was noted with
approval by this Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan Bhageria [1988 Supp SCC 82 :
1988 SCC (L&S) 428 : AIR 1988 SC 329] .
11. It may be noted in this connection that in view of the amendment of Section 2(s) enlarging the ambit of the
classification of various types of workmen except managerial force, entire labour force has been included
within the definition of workman under Section 2(s) as has been indicated by this Court in S.K.
Verma v. Mahesh Chandra [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510 : (1983) 3 SCR 799] . But if the
principal function is of supervisory nature, the employee concerned will not be workman only if he draws a
particular quantum of salary at the relevant time as indicated in Section 2(s). In the instant case, it, however,
appears to us that Shri Maini as Manager/In-charge of the shop was made responsible and liable to make
good such amount of credit whether such sale on credit had been made by him or by any other member of the
staff in employment under him with or without his knowledge. Under the terms and conditions of service, he
was asked to take charge of the shop to which his service was transferred. Mr Maini, under the terms and
conditions of service, was required to be held responsible and liable for any loss suffered by the Company due
to deterioration of the quality of the stock or any part thereof and loss of any of the other articles lying in the
shop caused by reason of any act of negligence and/or omission to take any precaution by the employees. Mr
Maini was also required to notify the Company by trunk call and/or telegram not later than three hours after
the discovery in the said shop of any fire, theft, burglary, loot or arson. He was required to investigate into the
matter immediately and get the cause and amount of loss established by local authorities. Mr Maini as in-
charge of the shop was required to keep and maintain proper accounts as approved by the Company indicating
the exact amount to be paid from the receipts from the respective staff. Under Clause XIII of the terms and
conditions of the service, Mr Maini would remain fully responsible to the Company for damages or loss
caused by acts or commission of the loss of the employees of the shop. Under Clause XV of the terms and
conditions of service, the shop in-charge was required to keep himself fully conversant with all the regulations
in force which may come into force from time to time with regard to Octroi, Sales Tax and Shops and
Commercial Establishments Act and/or any other local regulation applicable to the shop. Clause XXI indicates
that non-compliance with any of the local or State Acts or Central Acts would be viewed seriously and
Manager would be held responsible for any fine/penalty imposed and/or prosecution launched against the
Company. It also appears that in the event of a salesman being absent, the shop in-charge is empowered to
appoint temporary helper for the said period to work as acting salesman. Similarly, in the event of helper
being absent, the shop manager is also empowered to appoint part-time sweeper and to entrust the work of a
helper to a sweeper. Such functions, in our view, appear to be administrative and managerial. By virtue of his
being in-charge of the shop, he was the principal officer-in-charge of the management of the shop. We
6058
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
therefore find justification in the finding of the High Court that the principal function of the appellant was of
administrative and managerial nature. It is true that he himself was also required to do some works of clerical
nature but it appears to us that by and large Shri Maini being in-charge of the management of the shop had
been principally discharging the administrative and managerial work. A manager or an administrative officer
is generally invested with the power of supervision in contradistinction to the stereotype work of a clerk. This
Court in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Panna Lal Gupta [(1961) 1 LLJ 18 : AIR 1967 SC 428] has indicated that a
manager or administrator generally occupies a position of command or decision and is authorised to act in
certain matters within the limits of his authority without the sanction of his superior. In the instant case within
the authority indicated in the terms and conditions of his service, Shri Maini was authorised to take decisions
in the matter of temporary appointments and in taking all reasonable steps incidental to the proper running of
the shop. Precisely for the said reason, Shri Maini had signed the statutory forms as an employer. It should be
borne in mind that an employee discharging managerial duties and functions may not, as a matter of course,
be invested with the power of appointment and discharge of other employees. It is not unlikely that in a big set-
up such power is not invested to a local manager but such power is given to some superior officers also in the
management cadre at divisional or regional level. The unit in a local shop may not be large but management
of such small unit may fulfil the requirements and incidences of managerial functions. On a close scrutiny of
the nature of duties and functions of the Shop Manager with reference to the admitted terms and conditions of
service of Shri Maini, it appears to us that the High Court was justified in holding that the appellant was not a
workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the aforesaid facts, it is not necessary to go into
the question as to whether or not domestic enquiry had been properly conducted or the Enquiring Officer had
acted with bias. It is also not necessary to decide for the purpose of the disposal of the appeal as to whether or
not the Company was entitled to lead fresh evidence in support of the domestic enquiry before the Labour
Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed without, however, any order as to cost.‖
In another case of Vandana Joshi vs. Standard Charter Bank MANU/MH/1391/2010, decided by Hon‘ble
High Court of Bombay it has been laid down that the question as to whether the employee is a applicant or not must
be decided with reference to the dominant nature of the duties and responsibilities performed by employee.
In the case of Arkal Govind Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 371, it was held that the
person concerned would not cease to be a applicant if he performs some supervisory duty but he must be a person
engaged in supervisory duty and the test to be employed is what was the primary, basic or dominant nature of
duties for which the person whose status is under inquiry was employed.
Now analyzing the evidence in the case in hand on the basis of tests laid down in the aforesaid Judgments,
it comes out that the role and duties of the Applicant/Petitioner have not been defined in his letter of service contract.
There is nothing on record to show that the workman was working in any managerial or supervisory capacity. Hence
the applicant is held to be a workman as defined under section 2(s) of the Act.
It is undisputed that when the service of the workman was terminated, she was working on contract basis
which was for one year, expired on 30.12.2022. The termination letter filed by the workman shows that it was issued
by the outsourcing agency and ground of termination was expiry of her tenure. Since the termination of her service
was on the ground of expiry of tenure and a fixed term service contract, it does not qualify to be a retrenchment as
defined under section 7 (oo) of the Act.
Since the termination of service of the workman is held not retrenchment, she is held not entitled to the
benefit of section 25(F), 25(G) and 25(H) of the Act because they are applied in case of retrenchment only.
The second argument of learned counsel for the workman is that the outsourcing agreement itself is bad in
law and is sham agreement because it is a prohibited agreement under Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition)
Act, 1970, he has referred to section 10 of the Act which is being reproduced as follows:-
―10. Prohibition of employment of contract labour.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the appropriate Government may, after consultation with
the Central Board or, as the case may be, a State Board, prohibit, by notification in the Official Gazette,
employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment.
(2) Before issuing any notification under sub-section (1) in relation to an establishment, the appropriate
Government shall have regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour that
establishment and other relevant factors, such as-
(a) whether the process, operation or other work is incidental to, or necessary for the industry, trade,
business, manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the establishment ;
(b) whether it is of perennial nature, that is to say, it is so of sufficient duration having regard to the nature
of industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation carried on in that establishment;
(c) whether it is done ordinarily through regular workmen in that establishment or an establishment similar
thereto;
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6059
(d)
whether
it
is
sufficient
to
employ
considerable
number
of
whole-time
workmen.
Explanation.- If a question arises whether any process or operation or other work is of perennial nature, the
decision of the appropriate Government thereon shall be final.‖
The learned counsel further submits that it is established that there is a vacancy of permanent nature with the
ESIC, hence, contract labour could not be engaged for it, secondly, there is nothing to show that ESIC are registered
as a principal employer, hence, not authorized to engage contract manpower on outsourcing basis through outsourcing
agency, also that she has been working firstly as contract employee of ESIC for two years and thereafter as
outsourcing employee through outsourcing agency on the same post for another five years.
Learned counsel also submits that engaging Badli, Casual or Temporaries employees on permanent post is
unfair labour practice as defined in the Act and is prohibited in the Act, hence, outsourcing agreements are sham
contracts and contractors are sham contractors engaged just to flout law in this respect infact, outsourcing agreements
itself are sham agreement. Learned counsel also submits that it has to be kept in mind that she has been working at the
site of ESIC and under direction as well control of ESIC officers.
Learned counsel as further referred to following paragraphs of the judgment referred Sudarshan Rajpoot v/s
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (2015) II, SCC 317 which are being reproduced as follows:-
11. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant workman that the High Court has erred in
placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006)
4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , which was distinguished inasmuch as the said case is not applicable to the
case on hand for the reason that the appellant workman is a ―workman‖ as defined under Section 2(z) of the
UPID Act and the respondent is the statutory corporation which is an undertaking of the State Government and
therefore, as it is an instrumentality of the State Government, it will come within the definition of ―industry‖ as
defined under Section 2(k) of the UPID Act. Therefore, the said provisions of the UPID Act are applicable to the
appellant workman as he is a ―workman‖ as defined under Section 2(z) of the UPID Act and Section 2(s) of the
ID Act, 1947.
12. Further, it is contended that the High Court has failed to consider the ―unfair labour practice‖ as defined
under Section 2(ra) of the ID Act, 1947 read with Sections 25-T and 25-U and Schedule V of the ID Act. Item 10
of Schedule V of the ID Act prohibits the employer to employ workmen as badlis, casuals or temporaries and to
continue them as such for years in the Corporation, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges
of permanent workmen is prohibited. It is further contended that the respondent Corporation is liable for penal
action under the provisions of Section 25-U of the ID Act. In support of the above contention, reliance was
placed on the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti
Kondhare [Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
500] .
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Corporation sought to justify
the correctness of the finding and reasons recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment [U.P.
SRTC v. Sudarshan Rajpoot, Writ-C No. 21553 of 2005, order dated 5-3-2008 (All)] . Alternatively, it is
contended that even if the order of termination is bad in law, the workman who is working on the contract basis
is not entitled for reinstatement with full back wages as per the view taken by this Court in several decisions.
Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation submits that the impugned judgment [U.P.
SRTC v. Sudarshan Rajpoot, Writ-C No. 21553 of 2005, order dated 5-3-2008 (All)] and order need not be
interfered with by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
14. With reference to the abovesaid rival legal contentions the following substantial questions would arise for
our consideration:
14.1. (i) Whether the High Court is justified in passing the impugned judgment [U.P. SRTC v. Sudarshan
Rajpoot, Writ-C No. 21553 of 2005, order dated 5-3-2008 (All)] , order and reversing the award passed by the
Labour Court?
14.2. (ii) Whether the order of termination passed against the appellant workman amounts to retrenchment as
defined under Section 2(s) of the UPID Act, 1947?
14.3. (iii) Whether non-compliance with the statutory provisions under Sections 6-N and 6-Q of the UPID Act
which are analogous with Sections 25-F and 25-H, respectively, of the ID Act, 1947 renders the order of termination
void ab initio in law?
14.4. (iv) What relief is the appellant workman entitled to?
15. To answer the above substantial questions of law it is necessary for this Court to extract the order of
termination passed by the Assistant Regional Manager of the Corporation, which reads thus:
―OFFICE OF ASSISTANT REGIONAL MANAGER,
6060
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
U.P. TRANSPORT CORPORATION, AZAD NAGAR DEPOT
Letter No. ARM/A. Ngr/Bus Accident 0582/2000/3591 dated 29-7-2000
OFFICE ORDER
On 7-6-1999 vehicle bearing No. 8582 which had met with an accident which was being driven on 7-6-1999 by
Shri Sudarshan Rajpoot, contractual driver and conductor Shri Kamta Prasad on Deoria to Kanpur route and
accident occurred on the way at 1.30 a.m. in the night at Village Palhari, Barabanki near Police Station Safdarganj
and due to negligent driving of the driver, department suffered heavy loss.
Hence, in order to meet departmental loss, forfeiting security of driver Shri Sudarshan Rajpoot, I pass the order
to strike off his name from the contract roll with an immediate effect. His name be struck off from contract roll.
sd/-
(Illegible)
(Sad Sayed)
Assistant Regional Manager,
Azad Nagar, Depot‖
(emphasis supplied)
In the aforesaid order of termination it is specially mentioned that the appellant workman was appointed as a driver
on contractual basis. It has been further stated that the accident occurred on 7-6-1999 due to the negligent driving of
the appellant workman resulting in heavy loss to the Department of the respondent Corporation. In order to meet the
departmental loss, security amount of driver was forfeited and Assistant Regional Manager had struck off the name of
the appellant workman from the contract employees roll with immediate effect.
16. The respondent Corporation has neither produced documentary evidence nor showed before the Labour
Court that the appellant workman was appointed on contract basis. The fact that he deposited Rs 2000 towards
security amount with the respondent Corporation indicates that he was working as a driver on a permanent basis. In
view of Schedule V, Item 10 of the ID Act, 1947 the respondent Corporation is prohibited from engaging the appellant
workman as a badli, casual or temporary workman to work on permanent basis. The fact that he had been
continuously working for more than 3 years and he had rendered more than 240 days of service as the driver in a
calendar year until his termination order and yet he is being engaged on a contractual basis in the respondent
Corporation is statutorily prohibited. The same amounts to an unfair labour practice as defined under Section 2(ra)
read with Section 25-T, which action of the Corporation is punishable under Section 25-U of the ID Act. This legal
position is settled by this Court in Chief Conservator of Forests case [Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath
Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 500] wherein it was held as under : (SCC pp. 302-03, para
22)
―22. … In our opinion, it would be permissible on facts of a particular case to draw the inference mentioned
in the second part of the item, if badlis, casuals or temporaries are continued as such for years. We further state
that the present was such a case inasmuch as from the materials on record we are satisfied that the 25 workmen
who went to the Industrial Court of Pune (and 15 to the Industrial Court, Ahmednagar) had been kept as casuals
for long years with the primary object of depriving them of the status of permanent employees inasmuch as giving
of this status would have required the employer to pay the workmen at a rate higher than the one fixed under the
Minimum Wages Act. We can think of no other possible object as, it may be remembered, that the Pachgaon
Parwati Scheme was intended to cater to the recreational and educational aspirations also of the populace,
which are not ephemeral objects, but par excellence permanent. We would say the same about environment-
pollution-care work of Ahmednagar, whose need is on the increase because of increase in pollution. Permanency
is thus writ large on the face of both the types of work. If, even in such projects, persons are kept in jobs on
casual basis for years the object manifests itself; no scrutiny is required. We, therefore, answer the second
question also against the appellants.‖
25. This Court in the later judgment in Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India [Hari Nandan
Prasad v. Food Corporation of India, (2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] , after adverting to the law laid
down in U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh [(2007) 5 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 258]
and Maharashtra SRTC [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC
556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] wherein Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is adverted to in both the cases, held that on a harmonious reading of the two judgments, even
when there are posts available, in the absence of any unfair labour practice the Labour Court cannot give direction
for regularisation only because a worker has continued as daily-wage worker/ad hoc/temporary worker for number
of years. Further, such a direction cannot be given when the worker concerned does not meet the eligibility
requirement of the post in question as per the recruitment rules:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6061
25.1. It was held at para 32 in Hari Nandan Prasad case [Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India,
(2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] as under : (SCC p. 211)
―32. However, the Court in Maharashtra SRTC case [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan
Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] found that the factual position was
different in the case before it. Here the post of cleaners in the establishment were in existence. Further, there was
a finding of fact recorded that the Corporation had indulged in unfair labour practice by engaging these workers
on temporary/casual/daily-wage basis and paying them paltry amount even when they were discharging duties of
eight hours a day and performing the same duties as that of regular employees.‖
25.2. Further, Hari Nandan Prasad [Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India, (2014) 7 SCC 190 :
(2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] referred at para 36, LIC v. D.J. Bahadur [(1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111 :
(1981) 1 SCR 1083] in which the relevant para 22 of LIC case [(1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111 : (1981) 1
SCR 1083] is extracted as under : (Hari Nandan Prasad case [Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India,
(2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] , SCC p. 213)
―36. … ‗22. The Industrial Disputes Act is a benign measure which seeks to pre-empt industrial tensions,
provide the mechanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infrastructure, so that the energies of the
partners in production may not be dissipated in counterproductive battles and the assurance of industrial justice
may create a climate of goodwill.‘ (D.J. Bahadur case [(1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111 : (1981) 1 SCR
1083] , SCC p. 334, per Krishna Iyer, J.)
In order to achieve the aforesaid objectives, the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals are given wide powers not
only to enforce the rights but even to create new rights, with the underlying objective to achieve social justice.
Way back in the year 1950 i.e. immediately after the enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act, in one of its first
and celebrated judgment in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees [1950 SCC 470 : AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950 LLJ 921 at
p. 948] this aspect was highlighted by the Court observing as under : (AIR p. 209, para 61)
‗61. … In settling the disputes between the employers and the workmen, the function of the Tribunal is
not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer rights and privileges on either
party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing
agreement. It has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the
parties. It can create new rights and obligations between them which it considers essential for keeping
industrial peace.‘‖
25.3. And again at para 37, observing that the aforesaid sweeping power conferred upon the Tribunal is not
unbridled and is circumscribed by this Court in New Maneck Chowk Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. v. Textile Labour
Assn. [AIR 1961 SC 867] , the relevant para 6 of which is extracted as under : (Hari Nandan Prasad case [Hari
Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India, (2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] , SCC p. 213, paras 37-
38)
―37. … ‗6. … This, however, does not mean that an Industrial Court can do anything and everything when
dealing with an industrial dispute. This power is conditioned by the subject-matter with which it is dealing and
also by the existing industrial law and it would not be open to it while dealing with a particular matter before it
to overlook the industrial law relating to that matter as laid down by the legislature or by this Court.‘ (Textile
Labour Assn. case [AIR 1961 SC 867] , AIR p. 870)
38. It is, thus, this fine balancing which is required to be achieved while adjudicating a particular dispute,
keeping in mind that the industrial disputes are settled by industrial adjudication on principle of fair play and
justice.‖
26. In view of the aforesaid statement of law laid down by this Court after adverting to the powers of the
Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Court as interpreted by this Court in the earlier decisions referred to supra, the
said principle is aptly applicable to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
recorded a finding of fact in favour of the workman that the termination of services of the appellant herein is not legal
and valid and further reaffirmed the said finding and also clearly held that the plea taken in the order of termination
that he was appointed on contract basis as a driver is not proved by producing cogent evidence. Further, we hold that
even if the plea of the employer is accepted, extracting work though of permanent nature continuously for more than
three years, the alleged employment on contract basis is wholly impermissible. Therefore, we have held that it
amounts to an unfair labour practice as defined under Section 2(ra) of the ID Act, 1947 read with Section 25-T which
is prohibited under Section 25-U, Chapter V-C of the ID Act, 1947. We have to hold that the judgment of the High
Court in reversing the award is not legal and the same is set aside by us.
21. In the order of termination, it is alleged that on account of negligent driving of the bus by the appellant
workman the accident of the vehicle happened, the said allegation was neither proved in the inquiry required to be
conducted nor producing evidence before the Labour Court by the respondent Corporation. Therefore, the High
Court has failed to examine the above vital aspects of the case on hand and erroneously interfered with the award
6062
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
passed by the Labour Court in exercise of its extraordinary and supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India. This exercise of power is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Harjinder
Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. [(2010) 3 SCC 192 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146] , wherein this Court held
thus : (SCC p. 205, para 21)
―21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles
226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in
mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and
the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and
the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular,
which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure
equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve
the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J.
opined that:
‗10. … the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives
sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.‘
(State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines [AIR 1958 SC 923] , AIR p. 928, para 10.)‖
24. We are of the opinion that the view taken in Maharashtra SRTC [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya
Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] at para 36 after
distinguishing Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is the
plausible view. Therefore, we have to hold that the finding of the High Court in setting aside the finding of fact
recorded by the Labour Court in its award by applying Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006)
4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is wholly untenable in law. Therefore, the same is set aside by this Court.
23. Further, the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court on Umadevi (3) case [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] by the High Court to reverse the finding of fact
recorded in the award in favour of the workman in answering the points of dispute in the negative, is not tenable in
law in view of the judgment of this Court in Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari
Sanghatana [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2
SCC (L&S) 513] , wherein, this Court after adverting to Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006)
4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] at para 36, has held that the said case
―does not denude the Industrial and Labour Courts of their statutory power under Section 30 read with Section
32 of the MRTU and PULP Act to order permanency of the workers who have been victims of unfair labour
practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV where the posts on which they have been
working exist‖. (SCC p. 574)
Further, this Court held that : (SCC p. 574, para 36)
―36. … Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]
cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order
under Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item
6 of Schedule IV is established.‖
The referred case can be distinguished from the facts in hand that the workman was held not contractual
employee rather was found the regular employee of the management but the principles laid down by Hon‘ble Court
are of much significance.
It is a established from evidence that the applicant workman was first appointed by ESIC on contract basis
extended on year to year basis and thereafter, her services were taken by ESIC as an outsourced employee supplied by
the outsourcing agencies who had employed the workman on contract extended on yearly basis.
By not employing a person on permanent regular basis against the permanent vacancy and engaging contract
labours for a work of permanent perennial nature either directly or by outsourcing agencies, the management ESIC is
held adopting unfair labour practice which is prohibited under the Act.
Reference may be taken of judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaggo v/s Union of India
reported in (2024) SCC Online SC 3826 , the relevant paragraphs of this judgment are being reproduced as follows:-
―22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader
systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig
economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of
benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and
undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness
and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6063
sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in
the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations.
………
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face
multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to
address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term
obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:
• Misuse of ―Temporary‖ Labels:- Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to
the functioning of an institution are often labelled as ―temporary‖ or ―contractual,‖ even when their roles
mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and
benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.
• Arbitrary Termination:- Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in
the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of
constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service.
• Lack of Career Progression:- Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for
skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a
systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally
significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield:- Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by
temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only
perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular
employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits:- Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as
pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack
of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness,
retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.‖
The principle laid down in the case of Jaggo (Supra) has been followed by Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the
case of Shripal Vs. Nagar Nigam Ghaziabad in Civil Appeal No. 8157/2024 (2025 INSC 144). The relevant portion
of the said judgment is being reproduced as follows:-
―12. The evidence, including documentary material and undisputed facts, reveals that the Appellant
Workmen performed duties integral to the Respondent Employer‘s municipal functions specifically the upkeep of
parks, horticultural tasks, and city beautification efforts. Such work is evidently perennial rather than sporadic or
project-based. Reliance on a general ―ban on fresh recruitment‖ cannot be used to deny labor protections to long
serving workmen. On the contrary, the acknowledged shortage of Gardeners in the Ghaziabad Nagar Nigam
reinforces the notion that these positions are essential and ongoing, not intermittent. By requiring the same tasks
(planting, pruning, general upkeep) from the Appellant Workmen as from regular Gardeners but still
compensating them inadequately and inconsistently the Respondent Employer has effectively engaged in an unfair
labour practice. The principle of ―equal pay for equal work,‖ repeatedly emphasized by this Court, cannot be
casually disregarded when workers have served for extended periods in roles resembling those of permanent
employees. Long-standing assignments under the Employer‘s direct supervision belie any notion that these were
mere short-term casual engagements.
14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi (supra) to contend that daily-wage or
temporary employees cannot claim permanent absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing such
absorption. However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between appointments that are
―illegal‖ and those that are ―irregular,‖ the latter being eligible for regularization if they meet certain conditions.
More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years
without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given the record which shows no true contractor based
arrangement and a consistent need for permanent horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh recruitment,
though real, cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or continued unfair practices.
15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously rendered their services over several years,
sometimes spanning more than a decade. Even if certain muster rolls were not produced in full, the Employer‘s
failure to furnish such records—despite directions to do so—allows an adverse inference under well-established
labour jurisprudence. Indian labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in
circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal
requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a
genuine contractor agreement. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to recall the broader critique of indefinite
―temporary‖ employment practices as done by a recent judgement of this court in Jaggo v. Union of India
6064
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
16. The High Court did acknowledge the Employer‘s inability to justify these abrupt terminations.
Consequently, it ordered re-engagement on daily wages with some measure of parity in minimum pay. Regrettably,
this only perpetuated precariousness: the Appellant Workmen were left in a marginally improved yet still uncertain
status. While the High Court recognized the importance of their work and hinted at eventual regularization, it
failed to afford them continuity of service or meaningful back wages commensurate with the degree of statutory
violation evident on record.
17. In light of these considerations, the Employer‘s discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen stands in
violation of the most basic labour law principles. Once it is established that their services were terminated without
adhering to Sections 6E and 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that they were engaged in essential,
perennial duties, these workers cannot be relegated to perpetual uncertainty. While concerns of municipal budget
and compliance with recruitment rules merit consideration, such concerns do not absolve the Employer of
statutory obligations or negate equitable entitlements. Indeed, bureaucratic limitations cannot trump the legitimate
rights of workmen who have served continuously in de facto regular roles for an extended period. 18. The
impugned order of the High Court, to the extent they confine the Appellant Workmen to future daily-wage
engagement without continuity or meaningful back wages, is hereby set aside with the following directions:-
I. The discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen‘s services, effected without compliance with Section 6E
and Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is declared illegal. All orders or communications
terminating their services are quashed. In consequence, the Appellant Workmen shall be treated as continuing in
service from thereof their termination, for all purposes, including seniority and continuity in service.
II. The Respondent Employer shall reinstate the Appellant Workmen in their respective posts (or posts
akin to the duties they previously performed) within four weeks from the date of this judgment. Their entire period
of absence (from the date of termination until actual reinstatement) shall be counted for continuity of service and
all consequential benefits, such as seniority and eligibility for promotions, if any.
III. Considering the length of service, the Appellant Workmen shall be entitled to 50% of the back wages
from the date of their discontinuation until their actual reinstatement. The Respondent Employer shall clear the
aforesaid dues within three months from the date of their reinstatement.
IV. The Respondent Employer is directed to initiate a fair and transparent process for regularizing the
Appellant Workmen within six months from the date of reinstatement, duly considering the fact that they have
performed perennial municipal duties akin to permanent posts. In assessing regularization, the Employer shall not
impose educational or procedural criteria retroactively if such requirements were never applied to the Appellant
Workmen or to similarly situated regular employees in the past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies for such
duties exist or are required, the Respondent Employer shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to
ensure these longtime employees are not indefinitely retained on daily wages contrary to statutory and equitable
norms.‖
In the light of above discussion and findings the reference is answered as follows:-
AWARD
Holding that the management of ESIC has adopted unfair labour practice with respect to the applicant
workman by taking work from her for years as a contract employee and outsourced employee on contract when the
vacancy is of permanent nature and is still available, the management of ESIC is directed to initiate a fair and
transparent process for recruitment for the position on which, the applicant workman has been working, within
six months from the date of publication of award in the Gazette Appellant Workman shall be granted age
relaxation for the period she has worked on contract basis with ESIC or as outsourced employee. The management
of ESIC shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to ensure that such longtime employees are not
indefinitely retained on contractual assignments or through outsourcing, contrary to statutory and equitable
norms.
Copy of this judgment be sent to the Ministry as per rules for publication in official Gazette.
DATE:- 23/07/2025
P.K.SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1637.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार इएसअइ; मेससश हाआजिड फ्लीट मजनेजमेंट प्राआवेट जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री िजलेन्द्र हसह
गुजर के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जबलृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स
न.-41/2023) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ
08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-131]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6065
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1637.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 41/2023) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to ESI; M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Limited and Shri Shailendra Singh Gujar which was received
along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-131]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/41/2023
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..(Retd)
1.
Shailendra Singh Gujar,
101 near Sharma Hospital, Mahal Gaon,
City Centre,
Gwalior (M.P.)- 474004
Workman
Vs
1. The Regional Director,
ESI, Indore (MP), Panchdeep Bhavan, Nanadanagar,
Indore, Madhya Pradesh-452011
2. The Managing Director,
M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Limited,
AC-7. 1st Floor, Tagore Garden,
New Delhi- 110027
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 23rd day of July- 2025)
As per letter dated 22/06/2023 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‗Act‘)as per Notification No.
24(17)2023-IR dt. 22/06/2023. The dispute under reference relates to:
―Whether the action of management of ESI Indore to terminate the services of Sh. Shailendra Singh
Gujar, Workman through M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Ltd., a sham contractor, without complying the
statutory Provision of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, is illegal and unjustified in the eye of law or not?
If yes, what other relief workman is entitled to?‖
Case of the Workman is mainly that, the Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) had invited
application for appointment of I.T. Assistant on contract basis. He applied for it and after interview, was selected. He
was appointed as I.T. Assistant vide order dated 08.10.2018 w.e.f., 09.06.2016 on contract basis for a period of one
year and was posted in the ESCI, at Gwalior. His contract was extended for another one year on the same condition
and salary. The management of ESIC had engaged the outsourcing company which is respondent No. 2. Accordingly,
from the year 2020-21 onwards, he worked with the ESIC in same capacity but as an outsourcing employee supplied
by the outsourcing company (respondent No. 2). His contract was extended up to 2022-23 on yearly basis. He was
informed by the respondent No. 2 vide communication dated 03.02.2023 that his job contract had expired on
31.12.2022 and another person has been taken on job in his place.
According to the applicant/workman he had been working on a vacant post under the management of ESIC.
This was a permanent post and of perennial nature, the management adopted unfair labour practice in engaging his on
contract basis as outsourced employee on year to year basis, thus action of management is in violation of section
25(F), 25(G) and 25(H) of the Act.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
It is further the case of the applicant/workman that, he is the ‗workman‘ as defined under section 2(s) of the
Act, the managements are industry‘ as defined under section 2(j) of the Act and his disengagement is ‗retrenchment‘
as defined under section 2(oo) of the Act. He has sought a relief of his reinstatement with full back wages and benefits
holding the action of the managements in terminating his service against law.
In its written statement of defense, the management of ESIC has taken the case that he was never
appointed by them on contract basis for any period, thereafter the policy of engaging I.T. Manager and I.T. Assistants
was changed by the ESIC, Head Quarter vide its letter I-20/14/01/2016-ICT in (IT Man Power) dated 10.08.2018 and
it was decided to hire man power through NICSI empanelled agencies. It is in pursuance of this policy change, M/s
Silvertouch Technologies Ltd. was authorized by NICSI to provide man power in M.P. Region of ESIC. The
applicant/workman was selected by the outsourcing agency i.e., M/s Silvertouch Technologies Ltd. and was appointed
by them he was posted with the ESIC as an outsourced employee of the outsourcing company M/s Silvertouch
Technologies Ltd.
It is further the case of the management that the policy of hiring man power is again changed vide letter I-
20/14/01/2016-ICT in (IT Man Power)dated 03.08.2020 and it was directed to take service of I.T. man power through
GeM and empanelled agencies as per qualification and experience approved earlier.
It is in pursuance of this policy the change, M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Limited was hired through
GeM Portal to provide the man power to ESIC. They hired services of the applicant/workman and he was posted as
outsourced employee with the ESIC at Gwalior thus after the policy change in 2018, he was never the employee of
ESIC rather he was outsourced employee of the outsourcing agency posted with ESIC. Hence, there is no occasion of
his disengagement by management of ESIC because there is no relation of employer or employee between the
applicant/workman and ESIC. Also it has been pleaded that he is not a ‗workman‘ as defined under the Act. Thus,
according to management of ESIC, their action is not questionable they have requested that the reference be answered
against the workman.
The outsourcing agency which is M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Ltd. has pleaded in their written
statement of defense that they had appointed his purely on contract basis on year to year basis and provided his
services to ESIC as outsourced employee under the contract of man power supply awarded to them by ESIC. His
contract was for a fixed term which expired and was not renewed by them.
According to them, his non renewal of service contract is not a case of retrenchment as defined under section
2 (oo) of the Act. They have also prayed that the reference be answered against the workman.
In evidence, the Workman has filed his affidavit, as his Examination-in-chief. He has also filed his letter
of termination of his appointment on expiry of his tenure issued on 03.02.2023, letter of appointment dated 30.12.201
issued by M/s Hybrid Fleet Management, admitted by management of M/s Hybrid Fleet Management man power.
Management has not filed any documentary evidence.
I have heard argument of Learned Counsel for the applicant/workman Mr. Aditya Ahiwasi, Mr. Sanjeev Tuli
for ESIC and Mr. Ravindra Gupta for M/s Hybrid Fleet Management Private Limited and I have gone through the
record.
The main argument of Learned Counsel for the workman is that, there is vacancy of I.T. Assistant with
the management of ESIC, this vacancy is of permanent and perennial nature, the management has been adopting
unfair labour practice by engaging contract labour for a job of permanent nature. The workman was first appointed on
contract by the management of ESIC for a fixed term extended on year to year basis and thereafter his services were
transferred to outsourcing companies and he worked with ESIC as outsourcing employee, he is qualified for the post
and the work is still being taken by other outsourcing employee by ESIC. Thus, the action of management in
continuing his as out sourced employee by way of extending his service contract year by year is bad in law and he is
entitled to be reinstated as employee of ESIC.
On the other hand, Learned Counsel for ESIC has submitted that they had appointed the workman for a
fixed term of one year in 2016 which was extended for another one year up to 2018 (details mentioned earlier) and
thereafter, they had no relation with his as an employer and employee because his service contract was not extended
further and it expired due to completion of tenure in the service agreement, thereafter he worked with them as
outsourced employee through outsourcing agency. Hence, they have nothing to do with his termination and cannot be
held liable for it.
It has been submitted on behalf of the outsourcing agency that his service agreement was for a fixed term
which was not renewed after expiry of the term, this is not retrenchment, hence there is no illegality.
The Learned Counsel for workman has relied on judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sudarshan Rajpoot v/s U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (2015) II, SCC 317.
On perusal of record in the light of rival arguments, the reference itself appears to be the issue for
determination.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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6067
Before entering into any discussion some relevant provision are required to be reproduced which are as
follows:-
2(j) ―industry‖ means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes
any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen;
2(k) ―industrial dispute‖ means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between
employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-
employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;
2 (oo) ―retrenchment‖ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include—
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between
the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment
between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a
stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;
11A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of
discharge or dismissal of workmen.—Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a
workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of
the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that
the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal
and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief
to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of
the case may require: Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in
relation to the matter.
2(ra) ―unfair labour practice‖ means any of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule;
THE FIFTH SCHEDULE See section 2(ra) UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES I.—On the part of
employers and trade unions of employers
1. To interfere with, restrain from, or coerce, workmen in the exercise of their right to organise, form, join or
assist a trade union or to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, that is to say:— (a) threatening workmen with discharge or dismissal, if they join a trade union;
(b) threatening a lock-out or closure, if a trade union is organised;
(c) granting wage increase to workmen at crucial periods of trade union organisation, with a view to
undermining the efforts of the trade union organisation.
2. To dominate, interfere with or contribute support, financial or otherwise, to any trade union, that is to
say:—
(a) an employer taking an active interest in organising a trade union of his workmen; and
(b) an employer showing partiality or granting favour to one of several trade unions attempting to organise
his workmen or to its members, whether such a trade union is not a recognised trade union. 3. To establish employer
sponsored trade unions of workmen.
4. To encourage or discourage membership in any trade union by discriminating against any workman, that
is to say:—
(a) discharging or punishing a workman, because he urged other workmen to join or organise a trade
union;
(b) discharging or dismissing a workman for taking part in any strike (not being as strike which is deemed
to be an illegal strike under this Act);
(c) changing seniority rating of workmen because of trade union activities;
(d) refusing to promote workmen to higher posts on account of their trade union activities;
(e) giving unmerited promotions to certain workmen with a view to creating discord amongst other
workmen, or to undermine the strength of their trade union;
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(f) discharging office-bearers or active members of the trade union on account of their trade union
activities.
5. To discharge or dismiss workmen—
(a) by way of victimisation;
(b) not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise of the employer's rights;
(c) by falsely implicating a workman in a criminal case on false evidence or on concocted evidence;
(d) for patently false reasons;
(e) on untrue or trumped up allegation of absence without leave;
(f) in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of domestic enquiry or with undue
haste; for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to the nature of the particular
misconduct or the past record or service of the workman, thereby leading to a disproportionate punishment.
6. To abolish the work of a regular nature being done by workmen, and to give such work to contractors as a
measure of breaking a strike.
7. To transfer a workman mala fide from one place to another, under the guise of following management
policy.
8. To insist upon individual workmen, who are on a legal strike to sign a good conduct bond, as a pre-
condition to allowing them to resume work.
9. To show favouritism or partiality to one set of workers regardless of merit.
10. To employ workmen as ―badlis‖, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with
the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.
11. To discharge or discriminate against any workman for filing charges or testifying against an employer in
any enquiry or proceeding relating to any industrial dispute.
12. To recruit workmen during a strike which is not an illegal strike.
13. Failure to implement award, settlement or agreement.
14. To indulge in acts of force or violence.
15. To refuse to bargain collectively, in good faith with the recognised trade unions.
16. Proposing or continuing a lock-out deemed to be illegal under this Act.
25T. Prohibition of unfair labour practice.—No employer or workman or a trade union, whether registered
under the Trader Unions Act, 1926 (18 of 1926), or not, shall commit any unfair labour practice.
25U. Penalty for committing unfair labour practices.—Any person who commits any unfair labour practice
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to
one thousand rupees or with both.
As regards to the issue that whether the applicant is a workman as defined under the Act or not, Hon‘ble
High Court of Bombay in the case of Union Carbide (India) Ltd. V.s. Ramesh Kumbla and Others reported in
MANU/MH/0073/1999 and another judgment of the same High Court in the case of Union Carbide (India) Ltd.
V.s. D. Samuel and Others reported in MANU/MH/1713/1998, may be referred in this respect. In these two cases,
after analyzing the judgment of various High Courts and Hon‘ble Supreme Court, the Single Bench of Hon‘ble
Bombay High Court has summarized the principles on the basis of which it is to be decided whether the Applicant is
in supervisory capacity or not. These tests mentioned in Para 34 and 35 of the Judgment are being reproduced as
follows:
Para-34. In so far as the Apex Court is concerned, some of the tests laid down are:
(1)
Designation is not material but what is important is the nature of work.
(2)
Find out the dominant purpose of employment and not any additional duties the employee may be
performing.
(3)
Can he bind the Company/employer to some kind of decisions on behalf of the
Company/employer.
(4)
Has the employee power to direct or oversee the work of his subordinates.
(5)
Has the power to sanction leave or recommend it; and
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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6069
(6)
Has he the power to appoint, terminate or take disciplinary action against workmen.
Para-35.From the judgment of this Court and the other High Courts some of the tests apart from what the
Apex Court has stated are:
(a) whether the employee can examine the quality of work and whether such work is performed in
satisfactory manner or not;
(b) Does the employee have powers of assigning duties and distribution of work;
(c) Can he indent material and distribute the same amongst the workmen;
(d) Even though he has no authority to grant leave does he have power to recommend leave;
(e) Are these persons working under him;
(f) Has he the power to supervise the work of men and not merely machines;
(g) Dos he mark the attendance of other employees;
(h) Does he write the confidential reports of his subordinates.
The judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Maini vs. M/s. Carona Sahu Company, (1994)
3 SCC 510. Para 9, 10 & 11 of this judgment are being reproduced as follows :-
―9. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made
by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that whether or not an employee is a workman under
Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be determined with reference to his principal nature
of duties and functions. Such question is required to be determined with reference to the facts and
circumstances of the case and materials on record and it is not possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula
which can decide the dispute as to the real nature of duties and functions being performed by an employee in
all cases. When an employee is employed to do the types of work enumerated in the definition of workman
under Section 2(s), there is hardly any difficulty in treating him as a workman under the appropriate
classification but in the complexity of industrial or commercial organisations quite a large number of
employees are often required to do more than one kind of work. In such cases, it becomes necessary to
determine under which classification the employee will fall for the purpose of deciding whether he comes
within the definition of workman or goes out of it. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision
of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. Burmah Shell Management
Staff Assn. [(1970) 3 SCC 378 : (1971) 2 SCR 758 : (1970) 2 LLJ 590] In All India Reserve Bank
Employees' Assn. v. Reserve Bank of India [(1965) 2 LLJ 175 : AIR 1966 SC 305 : (1966) 1 SCR 25] it has
been held by this Court that the word ‗supervise‘ and its derivatives are not words of precise import and must
often be construed in the light of context, for unless controlled, they cover an easily simple oversight and
direction as manual work coupled with the power of inspection and superintendence of the manual work of
others. It has been rightly contended by both the learned counsel that the designation of an employee is not of
much importance and what is important is the nature of duties being performed by the employee. The
determinative factor is the main duties of the employee concerned and not some works incidentally done. In
other words, what is, in substance, the work which employee does or what in substance he is employed to do.
Viewed from this angle, if the employee is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally or for a fraction of
time also does some manual or clerical work, the employee should be held to be doing supervisory works.
Conversely, if the main work is of manual, clerical or of technical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory
or other work is also done by the employee incidentally or only a small fraction of working time is devoted to
some supervisory works, the employee will come within the purview of ‗workman‘ as defined in Section 2(s) of
the Industrial Disputes Act.
10. In Mcleod and Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal, W.B. [AIR 1958 Cal 273] P.B. Mukharji, J. of the Calcutta
High Court as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed that whether a person was a workman within the
definition of the Industrial Disputes Act would be the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Tribunal. The court further observed that in order to determine the categories of service indicated by the use
of different words like ‗supervisory‘, ‗managerial‘ and ‗administrative‘, it was not necessary to import the
notions of one into the interpretation of the other The words such as ‗supervisory‘, ‗managerial‘ and
‗administrative‘ are advisedly loose expressions with no rigid frontiers and too much subtlety should not be
used in trying to precisely define whether supervision ends and management begins or administration starts.
For that would be theoretical and not practical. It has to be broadly interpreted from a common sense point of
view whose tests will be simple both in theory and in their application. The learned Judge further observed
that a supervisor need not be a manager or an administrator and a supervisor can be a workman so long as he
did not exceed the monetary limitation indicated in the section and a supervisor irrespective of his salary is not
a workman who has to discharge function mainly of managerial nature by reasons of the duties attached to
his office or of the powers vested in him. The aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court was noted with
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
approval by this Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan Bhageria [1988 Supp SCC 82 :
1988 SCC (L&S) 428 : AIR 1988 SC 329] .
11. It may be noted in this connection that in view of the amendment of Section 2(s) enlarging the ambit of the
classification of various types of workmen except managerial force, entire labour force has been included
within the definition of workman under Section 2(s) as has been indicated by this Court in S.K.
Verma v. Mahesh Chandra [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510 : (1983) 3 SCR 799] . But if the
principal function is of supervisory nature, the employee concerned will not be workman only if he draws a
particular quantum of salary at the relevant time as indicated in Section 2(s). In the instant case, it, however,
appears to us that Shri Maini as Manager/In-charge of the shop was made responsible and liable to make
good such amount of credit whether such sale on credit had been made by him or by any other member of the
staff in employment under him with or without his knowledge. Under the terms and conditions of service, he
was asked to take charge of the shop to which his service was transferred. Mr Maini, under the terms and
conditions of service, was required to be held responsible and liable for any loss suffered by the Company due
to deterioration of the quality of the stock or any part thereof and loss of any of the other articles lying in the
shop caused by reason of any act of negligence and/or omission to take any precaution by the employees. Mr
Maini was also required to notify the Company by trunk call and/or telegram not later than three hours after
the discovery in the said shop of any fire, theft, burglary, loot or arson. He was required to investigate into the
matter immediately and get the cause and amount of loss established by local authorities. Mr Maini as in-
charge of the shop was required to keep and maintain proper accounts as approved by the Company indicating
the exact amount to be paid from the receipts from the respective staff. Under Clause XIII of the terms and
conditions of the service, Mr Maini would remain fully responsible to the Company for damages or loss
caused by acts or commission of the loss of the employees of the shop. Under Clause XV of the terms and
conditions of service, the shop in-charge was required to keep himself fully conversant with all the regulations
in force which may come into force from time to time with regard to Octroi, Sales Tax and Shops and
Commercial Establishments Act and/or any other local regulation applicable to the shop. Clause XXI indicates
that non-compliance with any of the local or State Acts or Central Acts would be viewed seriously and
Manager would be held responsible for any fine/penalty imposed and/or prosecution launched against the
Company. It also appears that in the event of a salesman being absent, the shop in-charge is empowered to
appoint temporary helper for the said period to work as acting salesman. Similarly, in the event of helper
being absent, the shop manager is also empowered to appoint part-time sweeper and to entrust the work of a
helper to a sweeper. Such functions, in our view, appear to be administrative and managerial. By virtue of his
being in-charge of the shop, he was the principal officer-in-charge of the management of the shop. We
therefore find justification in the finding of the High Court that the principal function of the appellant was of
administrative and managerial nature. It is true that he himself was also required to do some works of clerical
nature but it appears to us that by and large Shri Maini being in-charge of the management of the shop had
been principally discharging the administrative and managerial work. A manager or an administrative officer
is generally invested with the power of supervision in contradistinction to the stereotype work of a clerk. This
Court in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Panna Lal Gupta [(1961) 1 LLJ 18 : AIR 1967 SC 428] has indicated that a
manager or administrator generally occupies a position of command or decision and is authorised to act in
certain matters within the limits of his authority without the sanction of his superior. In the instant case within
the authority indicated in the terms and conditions of his service, Shri Maini was authorised to take decisions
in the matter of temporary appointments and in taking all reasonable steps incidental to the proper running of
the shop. Precisely for the said reason, Shri Maini had signed the statutory forms as an employer. It should be
borne in mind that an employee discharging managerial duties and functions may not, as a matter of course,
be invested with the power of appointment and discharge of other employees. It is not unlikely that in a big set-
up such power is not invested to a local manager but such power is given to some superior officers also in the
management cadre at divisional or regional level. The unit in a local shop may not be large but management
of such small unit may fulfil the requirements and incidences of managerial functions. On a close scrutiny of
the nature of duties and functions of the Shop Manager with reference to the admitted terms and conditions of
service of Shri Maini, it appears to us that the High Court was justified in holding that the appellant was not a
workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the aforesaid facts, it is not necessary to go into
the question as to whether or not domestic enquiry had been properly conducted or the Enquiring Officer had
acted with bias. It is also not necessary to decide for the purpose of the disposal of the appeal as to whether or
not the Company was entitled to lead fresh evidence in support of the domestic enquiry before the Labour
Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed without, however, any order as to cost.‖
In another case of Vandana Joshi vs. Standard Charter Bank MANU/MH/1391/2010, decided by Hon‘ble
High Court of Bombay it has been laid down that the question as to whether the employee is a applicant or not must
be decided with reference to the dominant nature of the duties and responsibilities performed by employee.
In the case of Arkal Govind Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 371, it was held that the
person concerned would not cease to be a applicant if he performs some supervisory duty but he must be a person
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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6071
engaged in supervisory duty and the test to be employed is what was the primary, basic or dominant nature of
duties for which the person whose status is under inquiry was employed.
Now analyzing the evidence in the case in hand on the basis of tests laid down in the aforesaid Judgments,
it comes out that the role and duties of the Applicant/Petitioner have not been defined in his letter of service contract.
There is nothing on record to show that the workman was working in any managerial or supervisory capacity. Hence
the applicant is held to be a workman as defined under section 2(s) of the Act.
It is undisputed that when the service of the workman was terminated, he was working on contract basis
which was for one year, expired on 30.12.2022. The termination letter filed by the workman shows that it was issued
by the outsourcing agency and ground of termination was expiry of his tenure. Since the termination of his service
was on the ground of expiry of tenure and a fixed term service contract, it does not qualify to be a retrenchment as
defined under section 7 (oo) of the Act.
Since the termination of service of the workman is held not retrenchment, he is held not entitled to the
benefit of section 25(F), 25(G) and 25(H) of the Act because they are applied in case of retrenchment only.
The second argument of learned counsel for the workman is that the outsourcing agreement itself is bad in
law and is sham agreement because it is a prohibited agreement under Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act,
1970, he has referred to section 10 of the Act which is being reproduced as follows:-
―10. Prohibition of employment of contract labour.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the appropriate Government may, after consultation with
the Central Board or, as the case may be, a State Board, prohibit, by notification in the Official Gazette,
employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment.
(2) Before issuing any notification under sub-section (1) in relation to an establishment, the appropriate
Government shall have regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour that
establishment and other relevant factors, such as-
(a) whether the process, operation or other work is incidental to, or necessary for the industry, trade,
business, manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the establishment ;
(b) whether it is of perennial nature, that is to say, it is so of sufficient duration having regard to the nature
of industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation carried on in that establishment;
(c) whether it is done ordinarily through regular workmen in that establishment or an establishment similar
thereto;
(d) whether it is sufficient to employ considerable number of whole-time workmen. Explanation.- If a
question arises whether any process or operation or other work is of perennial nature, the decision of the
appropriate Government thereon shall be final.‖
The learned counsel further submits that it is established that there is a vacancy of permanent nature with the
ESIC, hence, contract labour could not be engaged for it, secondly, there is nothing to show that ESIC are registered
as a principal employer, hence, not authorized to engage contract manpower on outsourcing basis through outsourcing
agency, also that he has been working firstly as contract employee of ESIC for two years and thereafter as outsourcing
employee through outsourcing agency on the same post for another five years.
Learned counsel also submits that engaging Badli, Casual or Temporaries employees on permanent post is
unfair labour practice as defined in the Act and is prohibited in the Act, hence, outsourcing agreements are sham
contracts and contractors are sham contractors engaged just to flout law in this respect in fact, outsourcing agreements
itself are sham agreement. Learned counsel also submits that it has to be kept in mind that he has been working at the
site of ESIC and under direction as well control of ESIC officers.
Learned counsel as further referred to following paragraphs of the judgment referred which are being
reproduced as follows:-
11. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant workman that the High Court has erred in
placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006)
4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , which was distinguished inasmuch as the said case is not applicable to the
case on hand for the reason that the appellant workman is a ―workman‖ as defined under Section 2(z) of the
UPID Act and the respondent is the statutory corporation which is an undertaking of the State Government and
therefore, as it is an instrumentality of the State Government, it will come within the definition of ―industry‖ as
defined under Section 2(k) of the UPID Act. Therefore, the said provisions of the UPID Act are applicable to the
appellant workman as he is a ―workman‖ as defined under Section 2(z) of the UPID Act and Section 2(s) of the
ID Act, 1947.
12. Further, it is contended that the High Court has failed to consider the ―unfair labour practice‖ as defined
under Section 2(ra) of the ID Act, 1947 read with Sections 25-T and 25-U and Schedule V of the ID Act. Item 10
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of Schedule V of the ID Act prohibits the employer to employ workmen as badlis, casuals or temporaries and to
continue them as such for years in the Corporation, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges
of permanent workmen is prohibited. It is further contended that the respondent Corporation is liable for penal
action under the provisions of Section 25-U of the ID Act. In support of the above contention, reliance was
placed on the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti
Kondhare [Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293 : 1996 SCC
(L&S) 500] .
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Corporation sought to justify
the correctness of the finding and reasons recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment [U.P.
SRTC v. Sudarshan Rajpoot, Writ-C No. 21553 of 2005, order dated 5-3-2008 (All)] . Alternatively, it is
contended that even if the order of termination is bad in law, the workman who is working on the contract basis
is not entitled for reinstatement with full back wages as per the view taken by this Court in several decisions.
Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation submits that the impugned judgment [U.P.
SRTC v. Sudarshan Rajpoot, Writ-C No. 21553 of 2005, order dated 5-3-2008 (All)] and order need not be
interfered with by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
14. With reference to the abovesaid rival legal contentions the following substantial questions would arise for
our consideration:
14.1. (i) Whether the High Court is justified in passing the impugned judgment [U.P. SRTC v. Sudarshan
Rajpoot, Writ-C No. 21553 of 2005, order dated 5-3-2008 (All)] , order and reversing the award passed by the
Labour Court?
14.2. (ii) Whether the order of termination passed against the appellant workman amounts to retrenchment as
defined under Section 2(s) of the UPID Act, 1947?
14.3. (iii) Whether non-compliance with the statutory provisions under Sections 6-N and 6-Q of the UPID Act
which are analogous with Sections 25-F and 25-H, respectively, of the ID Act, 1947 renders the order of termination
void ab initio in law?
14.4. (iv) What relief is the appellant workman entitled to?
15. To answer the above substantial questions of law it is necessary for this Court to extract the order of
termination passed by the Assistant Regional Manager of the Corporation, which reads thus:
―OFFICE OF ASSISTANT REGIONAL MANAGER,
U.P. TRANSPORT CORPORATION, AZAD NAGAR DEPOT
Letter No. ARM/A. Ngr/Bus Accident 0582/2000/3591 dated 29-7-2000
OFFICE ORDER
On 7-6-1999 vehicle bearing No. 8582 which had met with an accident which was being driven on 7-6-1999
by Shri Sudarshan Rajpoot, contractual driver and conductor Shri Kamta Prasad on Deoria to Kanpur route and
accident occurred on the way at 1.30 a.m. in the night at Village Palhari, Barabanki near Police Station
Safdarganj and due to negligent driving of the driver, department suffered heavy loss.
Hence, in order to meet departmental loss, forfeiting security of driver Shri Sudarshan Rajpoot, I pass the
order to strike off his name from the contract roll with an immediate effect. His name be struck off from contract
roll.
sd/-
(Illegible)
(Sad Sayed)
Assistant Regional Manager,
Azad Nagar, Depot‖
(emphasis supplied)
In the aforesaid order of termination it is specially mentioned that the appellant workman was appointed as a driver
on contractual basis. It has been further stated that the accident occurred on 7-6-1999 due to the negligent driving of
the appellant workman resulting in heavy loss to the Department of the respondent Corporation. In order to meet the
departmental loss, security amount of driver was forfeited and Assistant Regional Manager had struck off the name of
the appellant workman from the contract employees roll with immediate effect.
16. The respondent Corporation has neither produced documentary evidence nor showed before the Labour
Court that the appellant workman was appointed on contract basis. The fact that he deposited Rs 2000 towards
security amount with the respondent Corporation indicates that he was working as a driver on a permanent basis. In
view of Schedule V, Item 10 of the ID Act, 1947 the respondent Corporation is prohibited from engaging the appellant
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6073
workman as a badli, casual or temporary workman to work on permanent basis. The fact that he had been
continuously working for more than 3 years and he had rendered more than 240 days of service as the driver in a
calendar year until his termination order and yet he is being engaged on a contractual basis in the respondent
Corporation is statutorily prohibited. The same amounts to an unfair labour practice as defined under Section 2(ra)
read with Section 25-T, which action of the Corporation is punishable under Section 25-U of the ID Act. This legal
position is settled by this Court in Chief Conservator of Forests case [Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath
Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 500] wherein it was held as under : (SCC pp. 302-03, para
22)
―22. … In our opinion, it would be permissible on facts of a particular case to draw the inference mentioned in
the second part of the item, if badlis, casuals or temporaries are continued as such for years. We further state
that the present was such a case inasmuch as from the materials on record we are satisfied that the 25 workmen
who went to the Industrial Court of Pune (and 15 to the Industrial Court, Ahmednagar) had been kept as casuals
for long years with the primary object of depriving them of the status of permanent employees inasmuch as giving
of this status would have required the employer to pay the workmen at a rate higher than the one fixed under the
Minimum Wages Act. We can think of no other possible object as, it may be remembered, that the Pachgaon
Parwati Scheme was intended to cater to the recreational and educational aspirations also of the populace,
which are not ephemeral objects, but par excellence permanent. We would say the same about environment-
pollution-care work of Ahmednagar, whose need is on the increase because of increase in pollution. Permanency
is thus writ large on the face of both the types of work. If, even in such projects, persons are kept in jobs on
casual basis for years the object manifests itself; no scrutiny is required. We, therefore, answer the second
question also against the appellants.‖
25. This Court in the later judgment in Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India [Hari Nandan
Prasad v. Food Corporation of India, (2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] , after adverting to the law laid
down in U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh [(2007) 5 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 258]
and Maharashtra SRTC [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC
556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] wherein Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is adverted to in both the cases, held that on a harmonious reading of the two judgments, even
when there are posts available, in the absence of any unfair labour practice the Labour Court cannot give direction for
regularisation only because a worker has continued as daily-wage worker/ad hoc/temporary worker for number of
years. Further, such a direction cannot be given when the worker concerned does not meet the eligibility requirement
of the post in question as per the recruitment rules:
25.1. It was held at para 32 in Hari Nandan Prasad case [Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India,
(2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] as under : (SCC p. 211)
―32. However, the Court in Maharashtra SRTC case [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan
Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556: (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] found that the factual position was
different in the case before it. Here the post of cleaners in the establishment was in existence. Further, there was a
finding of fact recorded that the Corporation had indulged in unfair labour practice by engaging these workers on
temporary/casual/daily-wage basis and paying them paltry amount even when they were discharging duties of
eight hours a day and performing the same duties as that of regular employees.‖
25.2. Furthis, Hari Nandan Prasad [Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India, (2014) 7 SCC 190 :
(2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] referred at para 36, LIC v. D.J. Bahadur [(1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111 :
(1981) 1 SCR 1083] in which the relevant para 22 of LIC case [(1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111 : (1981) 1
SCR 1083] is extracted as under : (Hari Nandan Prasad case [Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India,
(2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] , SCC p. 213)
―36. … ‗22. The Industrial Disputes Act is a benign measure which seeks to pre-empt industrial tensions,
provide the mechanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infrastructure, so that the energies of the
partners in production may not be dissipated in counterproductive battles and the assurance of industrial justice
may create a climate of goodwill.‘ (D.J. Bahadur case [(1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111 : (1981) 1 SCR
1083] , SCC p. 334, per Krishna Iyer, J.)
In order to achieve the aforesaid objectives, the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals are given wide powers not
only to enforce the rights but even to create new rights, with the underlying objective to achieve social justice.
Way back in the year 1950 i.e. immediately after the enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act, in one of its first
and celebrated judgment in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees [1950 SCC 470 : AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950 LLJ 921 at
p. 948] this aspect was highlighted by the Court observing as under : (AIR p. 209, para 61)
‗61. … In settling the disputes between the employers and the workmen, the function of the Tribunal is
not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer rights and privileges on either
party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing
agreement. It has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the parties.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
It can create new rights and obligations between them which it considers essential for keeping industrial
peace.‘‖
25.3. And again at para 37, observing that the aforesaid sweeping power conferred upon the Tribunal is not
unbridled and is circumscribed by this Court in New Maneck Chowk Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. v. Textile Labour
Assn. [AIR 1961 SC 867] , the relevant para 6 of which is extracted as under : (Hari Nandan Prasad case [Hari
Nandan Prasad v. Food Corporation of India, (2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] , SCC p. 213, paras 37-
38)
―37. … ‗6. … This, however, does not mean that an Industrial Court can do anything and everything when
dealing with an industrial dispute. This power is conditioned by the subject-matter with which it is dealing and
also by the existing industrial law and it would not be open to it while dealing with a particular matter before it to
overlook the industrial law relating to that matter as laid down by the legislature or by this Court.‘ (Textile
Labour Assn. case [AIR 1961 SC 867] , AIR p. 870)
38. It is, thus, this fine balancing which is required to be achieved while adjudicating a particular dispute,
keeping in mind that the industrial disputes are settled by industrial adjudication on principle of fair play and
justice.‖
26. In view of the aforesaid statement of law laid down by this Court after adverting to the powers of the
Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Court as interpreted by this Court in the earlier decisions referred to supra, the said
principle is aptly applicable to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court recorded a
finding of fact in favour of the workman that the termination of services of the appellant herein is not legal and valid
and further reaffirmed the said finding and also clearly held that the plea taken in the order of termination that he was
appointed on contract basis as a driver is not proved by producing cogent evidence. Further, we hold that even if the
plea of the employer is accepted, extracting work though of permanent nature continuously for more than three years,
the alleged employment on contract basis is wholly impermissible. Therefore, we have held that it amounts to an
unfair labour practice as defined under Section 2(ra) of the ID Act, 1947 read with Section 25-T which is prohibited
under Section 25-U, Chapter V-C of the ID Act, 1947. We have to hold that the judgment of the High Court in
reversing the award is not legal and the same is set aside by us.
21. In the order of termination, it is alleged that on account of negligent driving of the bus by the appellant
workman the accident of the vehicle happened, the said allegation was neither proved in the inquiry required to be
conducted nor producing evidence before the Labour Court by the respondent Corporation. Therefore, the High Court
has failed to examine the above vital aspects of the case on hand and erroneously interfered with the award passed by
the Labour Court in exercise of its extraordinary and supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India. This exercise of power is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Harjinder
Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. [(2010) 3 SCC 192 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146] , wherein this Court held
thus : (SCC p. 205, para 21)
―21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles
226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in
mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and
the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and
the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular,
which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure
equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve
the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J.
opined that:
‗10. … the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives
sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.‘
(State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines [AIR 1958 SC 923] , AIR p. 928, para 10.)‖
24. We are of the opinion that the view taken in Maharashtra SRTC [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya
Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 :(2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] at para 36 after
distinguishing Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is the
plausible view. Therefore, we have to hold that the finding of the High Court in setting aside the finding of fact
recorded by the Labour Court in its award by applying Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006)
4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is wholly untenable in law. Therefore, the same is set aside by this Court.
23. Further, the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court on Umadevi (3) case [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] by the High Court to reverse the finding of fact
recorded in the award in favour of the workman in answering the points of dispute in the negative, is not tenable in
law in view of the judgment of this Court in Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari
Sanghatana [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6075
SCC (L&S) 513] , wherein, this Court after adverting to Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006)
4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] at para 36, has held that the said case
―does not denude the Industrial and Labour Courts of their statutory power under Section 30 read with Section 32
of the MRTU and PULP Act to order permanency of the workers who have been victims of unfair labour practice
on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV where the posts on which they have been working exist‖.
(SCC p. 574)
Further, this Court held that : (SCC p. 574, para 36)
―36. … Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]
cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order
under Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item
6 of Schedule IV is established.‖
The referred case can be distinguished from the facts in hand that the workman was held not contractual
employee rather was found the regular employee of the management but the principles laid down by Hon‘ble Court
are of much significance.
It is a established from evidence that the applicant workman was first appointed by ESIC on contract basis
extended on year to year basis and thereafter, his services were taken by ESIC as an outsourced employee supplied by
the outsourcing agencies who had employed the workman on contract extended on yearly basis.
By not employing a person on permanent regular basis against the permanent vacancy and engaging contract
labours for a work of permanent perennial nature either directly or by outsourcing agencies, the management ESIC is
held adopting unfair labour practice which is prohibited under the Act.
Reference may be taken of judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaggo v/s Union of India
reported in (2024) SCC Online SC 3826 , the relevant paragraphs of this judgment are being reproduced as follows:-
―22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader
systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig
economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of
benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and
undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness
and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public
sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in
the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations.
………
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face
multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to
address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term
obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:
• Misuse of ―Temporary‖ Labels:- Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to
the functioning of an institution are often labelled as ―temporary‖ or ―contractual,‖ even when their roles
mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and
benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.
• Arbitrary Termination:- Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in
the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of
constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service.
• Lack of Career Progression:- Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for
skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a
systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally
significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield:- Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by
temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only
perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular
employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits:- Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as
pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack
of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness,
retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.‖
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
The principle laid down in the case of Jaggo (Supra) has been followed by Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the
case of Shripal Vs. Nagar Nigam Ghaziabad in Civil Appeal No. 8157/2024 (2025 INSC 144). The relevant portion
of the said judgment is being reproduced as follows:-
―12. The evidence, including documentary material and undisputed facts, reveals that the Appellant
Workmen performed duties integral to the Respondent Employer‘s municipal functions specifically the
upkeep of parks, horticultural tasks, and city beautification efforts. Such work is evidently perennial rather
than sporadic or project-based. Reliance on a general ―ban on fresh recruitment‖ cannot be used to deny
labor protections to long serving workmen. On the contrary, the acknowledged shortage of Gardeners in the
Ghaziabad Nagar Nigam reinforces the notion that these positions are essential and ongoing, not
intermittent. By requiring the same tasks (planting, pruning, general upkeep) from the Appellant Workmen
as from regular Gardeners but still compensating them inadequately and inconsistently the Respondent
Employer has effectively engaged in an unfair labour practice. The principle of ―equal pay for equal work,‖
repeatedly emphasized by this Court, cannot be casually disregarded when workers have served for extended
periods in roles resembling those of permanent employees. Long-standing assignments under the Employer‘s
direct supervision belie any notion that these were mere short-term casual engagements.
……………………………………………………….
14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi (supra) to contend that daily-wage or
temporary employees cannot claim permanent absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing such
absorption. However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between appointments that are
―illegal‖ and those that are ―irregular,‖ the latter being eligible for regularization if they meet certain conditions.
More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years
without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given the record which shows no true contractor based
arrangement and a consistent need for permanent horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh recruitment,
though real, cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or continued unfair practices.
15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously rendered their services over several years,
sometimes spanning more than a decade. Even if certain muster rolls were not produced in full, the Employer‘s
failure to furnish such records—despite directions to do so—allows an adverse inference under well-established
labour jurisprudence. Indian labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in
circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal
requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a
genuine contractor agreement. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to recall the broader critique of indefinite
―temporary‖ employment practices as done by a recent judgment of this court in Jaggo v. Union of India
16. The High Court did acknowledge the Employer‘s inability to justify these abrupt terminations.
Consequently, it ordered re-engagement on daily wages with some measure of parity in minimum pay. Regrettably,
this only perpetuated precariousness: the Appellant Workmen were left in a marginally improved yet still uncertain
status. While the High Court recognized the importance of their work and hinted at eventual regularization, it
failed to afford them continuity of service or meaningful back wages commensurate with the degree of statutory
violation evident on record.
17. In light of these considerations, the Employer‘s discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen stands in
violation of the most basic labour law principles. Once it is established that their services were terminated without
adhering to Sections 6E and 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that they were engaged in essential,
perennial duties, these workers cannot be relegated to perpetual uncertainty. While concerns of municipal budget
and compliance with recruitment rules merit consideration, such concerns do not absolve the Employer of
statutory obligations or negate equitable entitlements. Indeed, bureaucratic limitations cannot trump the legitimate
rights of workmen who have served continuously in de facto regular roles for an extended period. 18. The
impugned order of the High Court, to the extent they confine the Appellant Workmen to future daily-wage
engagement without continuity or meaningful back wages, is hereby set aside with the following directions:-
I. The discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen‘s services, effected without compliance with Section 6E
and Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is declared illegal. All orders or communications
terminating their services are quashed. In consequence, the Appellant Workmen shall be treated as continuing in
service from thereof their termination, for all purposes, including seniority and continuity in service.
II. The Respondent Employer shall reinstate the Appellant Workmen in their respective posts (or posts
akin to the duties they previously performed) within four weeks from the date of this judgment. Their entire period
of absence (from the date of termination until actual reinstatement) shall be counted for continuity of service and
all consequential benefits, such as seniority and eligibility for promotions, if any.
III. Considering the length of service, the Appellant Workmen shall be entitled to 50% of the back wages
from the date of their discontinuation until their actual reinstatement. The Respondent Employer shall clear the
aforesaid dues within three months from the date of their reinstatement.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6077
IV. The Respondent Employer is directed to initiate a fair and transparent process for regularizing the
Appellant Workmen within six months from the date of reinstatement, duly considering the fact that they have
performed perennial municipal duties akin to permanent posts. In assessing regularization, the Employer shall not
impose educational or procedural criteria retroactively if such requirements were never applied to the Appellant
Workmen or to similarly situated regular employees in the past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies for such
duties exist or are required, the Respondent Employer shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to
ensure these longtime employees are not indefinitely retained on daily wages contrary to statutory and equitable
norms.‖
In the light of above discussion and findings the reference is answered as follows:-
AWARD
Holding that the management of ESIC has adopted unfair labour practice with respect to the applicant
workman by taking work from his for years as a contract employee and outsourced employee on contract when the
vacancy is of permanent nature and is still available, the management of ESIC is directed to initiate a fair and
transparent process for recruitment for the position on which, the applicant workman has been working, within
six months from the date of publication of award in the Gazette Appellant Workman shall be granted age
relaxation for the period he has worked on contract basis with ESIC or as outsourced employee. The management
of ESIC shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to ensure that such longtime employees are not
indefinitely retained on contractual assignments or through outsourcing, contrary to statutory and equitable
norms.
Copy of this judgment be sent to the Ministry as per rules for publication in official Gazette.
DATE:- 23/07/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1638.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम. 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार एअइ एयरृोटश सर्सवस जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री ऄनुप ृ ृाण्डेय के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि
केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जबलृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-59/2023) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक
में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-132]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1638.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 59/2023) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to AI Airport Service Limited and Shri Anurup Pandey which was received along with soft copy of the award by
the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-132]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/59/2023
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S..(Retd)
Shri Anuroop Pandey,
House No. 39, Casa Villa Talawali Canda,
Indore (M.P.) 451010
Workman
Vs
The Chief Executive Officer,
AI Airport Service Limited,
6078
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
2nd Floor, GSD Building Air India Complex Terminal-2,
IGI Airport,
(New Delhi) – 110037
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 18th day of July- 2025)
As per letter dated 25/07/2023 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‗Act‘)as per Notification No.
24(23)2023-IR dt. 25/07/2023. The dispute under reference relates to:
―Whether the action of management in AI Airport Service Limited to terminate the services of its
workman Shri Anuroop Pandey without conducting proper disciplinary proceeding on the grounds that
workman was a Fixed term employee, is correct? If not what other relief workman is entitled to‖
Case of the Workman is mainly that, he was appointed as Senior Customer Agent on contractual basis in
2011 for one year. His tenure was extended from time to time and was last extended for one year on 01.06.2023 to
31.05.2023, clause 13 of the contract of service provided that in case the employee wished to leave company at any
time then he will have to give one month notice in writing. According to applicant/workman, he submitted his
resignation vide letter dated 25.02.2023 and stated in the resignation that the notice period of one month be taken
from the date of receipt of the letter by the management. He also sent a copy of this letter on email to the management
on 16.03.2023. He had also sent a reminder on 27.03.2023 in this respect. He was informed by management vide
communication dated 28.03.2023 that his resignation was not accepted and he was required to serve the notice period
as per changed management policy. The management had issued an order on 14.02.2023 whereby they arbitrarily
amended the rule with regard to resignation according to which spot resignation would not be accepted and an
employee would have to serve three months notice period.
The case of the applicant/workman further is that, he was never informed of the amended rules nor was sent
any copy of these rules. He came to know about these amended rules for the first time on 28.03.2023 when
management sent their communication dated 28.03.2023 by email. The workman was issued a charge sheet alleging
misconduct and was asked to show cause. He denied the charges but the management arbitrarily terminated his
services just before five days of completion of his service contract without conducting any enquiry and without giving
any opportunity to the applicant/workman to defend himself which is unjust, illegal and arbitrary on the part of the
management.
It is further the case of the applicant/workman that, firstly, the management unilaterally and arbitrarily
extended the notice period from one month to three months and also dispensed with spot resignation, made these rules
applicable retrospectively which is unjust and illegal as well arbitrary and malafide on the part of the management.
The applicant/workman was neither informed about it nor was any fresh service agreement entered into between the
applicant/workman and management containing these amended provisions with respect to the notice in case of
resignation; hence they cannot bind the applicant/workman. Secondly, according to workman, termination of his
service contract on the basis of charge is stigmatic for which no enquiry has been conducted.
The workman has requested for holding the action of management in terminating the service conduct of the
workman on the basis of charge without conducting a proper disciplinary proceeding is unjust, illegal and arbitrary, he
be held to be entitled to be deemed in service and entitled to all the in-service benefits.
Case of the Management as taken by them in their written statement of defense is that the
applicant/workman was given a chance to explain and justify his involvement with respect to the charge which was
levelling false allegations on the officers and officials of the management without any justification and termination of
his employee contract was done after due enquiry and investigation in the matter. The management also contested the
allegation of the workman that the office order dated 14.02.2023 extending the notice period was not made to the
applicant/workman. According, to the management this order was widely circulated among the employees including
the workman. Moreover, as mentioned in clause 5.2 of the service contract, the workman was required to keep himself
informed about the changed rules with respect to salary and otherwise and management had right to change rules with
respect to salary and otherwise which will be acceptable by the applicant/workman.
Management has further stated that, the applicant did not perform his duties with sincerity and honesty and
used to make derogatory remarks against his superior officials. He has sent emails on 22.04.2023 and 26.04.2023 to
management making such derogatory remarks which caused inconvenience to the management. Thus according to
management their action in terminating the employment contract is just and legal, the management has requested that
the reference be answered against the workman.
In evidence, the Workman filed documents, admitted by management and marked Ex-W/1 to W/11. The
management filed documents, admitted by workman, marked Ex-M/1 to M/5 both the sides have filed affidavits.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6079
I have heard argument of Learned Counsel for the applicant/workman Mr. Siddharth Shrivastava and
Learned Counsel Mr. Somesh Shukla for the Management; both the sides have filed written submission also which are
part of record. I have gone through the written arguments also.
On perusal of record in the light of rival arguments, the reference itself appears to be the issue for
determination.
Both the sides have relied upon the appointment contract of the workman signed between him and the
management, the first appointment contract is of 01.08.2011 by which the workman was appointed for one year, the
last service contract is of 01.04.2022 commencing from 01.06.2022 to 31.05.2023. Thus this agreement was to expire
on 31.05.2023. The Learned Counsel for workman has referred to clause 13.1 of the service agreement which is being
reproduced as follows:-
―13.1:- In case you wish to leave your fixed term contractual engagement with the Company at any time, you
shall be required to give one month‘s notice period in writing or one month‘s gross emolument/compensation
in lieu of such notice period‖.
The case of workman is that he sent his resignation vide letter dated 25.02.2023 stating that the notice period
of one month be calculated from the day of receipt of this letter and sent a copy of this letter by email on March 16,
2023. It is further his case that he sent a reminder email on March 27, 2023 with copy of his resignation letter dated
25.02.2023.
Management has taken the case in their pleadings that the resignation letter dated 25.02.2023 is fabricated, it
was never served on management. For the first time, the workman served his resignation on 16.03.2023. The
photocopy of this letter dated 25.02.2023 has been filed by workman as Annexure-A/3 to the statement of claim, he
has stated about this letter and about sending this letter to management in his affidavit filed before this Tribunal in
Para 3 of the affidavit, there is no denial of this fact in the affidavit of the management witness Abdul Gaffar only a
denial in pleading is not sufficient, hence the case of the applicant/workman that he did sent his resignation letter
dated 25.02.2023 on the date 25.02.2023 is held proved. Furthermore, the Rule 3 as amended by management on
20.02.2023, had it been brought to the notice of the workman till 25.02.2023, there was no occasion for him
mentioning one month notice in his resignation. The case of the management is that it was incumbent on the workman
to keep himself abreast with all rules and regulations of the management. Learned Counsel for the management has
referred to Clause 5.2 of the service agreement in this respect which is being reproduced as follows:-
―5.2:- Further the Company may at any time modify or change or add such terms and conditions, policies,
procedures, regulations or rules whether related to your salary or otherwise, and such changes will apply to
your job responsibilities and be binding on you after the effective date of the change. It shall be your
responsibility to familiarize with any and all such changes and modifications‖.
The Learned Counsel for management has further submitted that the rules regarding resignation and notice
period were changed by management on 14.02.2023. This office order was applicable to all the categories including
the workman also and was duly circulated by Junior Officer vide email communication dated 20.02.2023 to all the
Regional Managers/Airport In-charge of management to circulate information in the Office Order to all concerned
within their jurisdiction and the Regional Managers/Airport In-charge of the management placed it on the notice
board accordingly at the Indore Office where the applicant was working. The applicant has mentioned in his affidavit
that these rules were amended from a back date the order amending rules was backdated and was never circulated or
communicated at any level.
The management witness Abdul Gaffar states in his affidavit on this point in Para 5 of the affidavit that upon
receipt of the said office order, the concerned Regional Managers/Airport In-Charge of the respondent No. 1 had
placed it on the notice board for information of all the employees working within their jurisdiction. The petitioner at
that time was working at Indore Office and became aware of the Office Order. The verification clause of the affidavit
states that all the facts in the affidavit are true and correct to his knowledge. This fact could not be in the personal
knowledge of the witness because it was not he who had pasted the notice on the notice board. Certainly he would
have come to know this fact of circulation by the person who has put this notice on the notice board. The management
who have filed the affidavit of the person who had the personal note of affixing the notice on the notice board at
Indore office which was the best evidence available with management in absence of this, adverse inference may be
drawn against management at this point, hence on the basis of above discussion the case of the management for the
said Circular/Officer Order dated 14.02.2023 was circulated by way of pasting it on notice board at Indore office is
also not free from suspicion.
Even if it be taken that provisions regarding notice with respect to resignation by workman in the service
contract work change, a fresh service agreement was required to be entered into between the applicant/workman and
the management as the terms of contract in the first agreement had substantially changed
The termination order dated 03.05.2023, filed by the workman is on record as Ex-W\6, this is being
reproduced as follows:-
6080
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
―This has reference to our letter Ref.No.AIASL/IR/Sr.CSE/2504, dated 1 May, 2023, thereby calling upon
you to show cause as to why your contractual engagement should not be terminated in terms of the relevant
clauses of the contract, executed by you with the Company, viz., Clause Nos. 4.3, 5.5, 5.5(xiv), 5.5(xv),
12.1(e), 12.1(g), 12.1(k) & 15(1), for the serious acts of misconduct, committed you, including your prolonged
unauthorized absence from duties without permission of the competent authority, as detailed in the said
Show Cause notice.
We are in receipt of your reply vide your e-mail dated 1 May, 2023, in response to the above-referred Show
Cause notice. You reply has been duly examined by us, but the same has not, at all, been found satisfactory
and hence not acceptable to the management.
As the misconducts, committed by you, are very serious in nature indulging into abusing the superior
dignitaries as well as tarnishing the entire image of the Company by e-mail communications throughout the
network, it has been decided to terminate your contract, executed with the Company, with immediate effect,
as per above-referred clauses of the terms & conditions of the Contract.
You are required to surrender the Company properties such as Identity Card, Uniform and other belongings,
in your possession, immediately to the office. You accounts will be settled after checking your commitments,
if any.‖
The main submission on behalf of the applicant/workman is that this termination order shows that it is
stigmatic because this caused stigma, resulting into evil consequences, on the applicant/workman when it levels
alleged serious misconduct on his part.
The Learned Counsel has further submitted that the service contract was terminated levelling stigma
without a proper departmental enquiry, hence, such termination of service agreement is vitiated in law. The Learned
Counsel has submitted that the workman was not issued any charge sheet nor was he asked to appear before the
enquiry officer, he was not given any opportunity to defend himself or cross-examine witness, he was not even
granted name sake hearing. The respondents unilaterally declared in the impugned termination order the reply of the
show cause notice as unsatisfactory without recording any reasons or objective evaluation. Thus, prejudice in the case
of the applicant/workman also it has been submitted that this termination order is vitiated by procedural impropriety,
non application of mind and legally informed.
The Learned Counsel has referred to a judgment of Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of
Malkhan Singh Malviya v/s State of M.P., [2018] SCC Online MP 1774: ILR 2018 MP 660 in which it has been laid
down that, ―Even an employee not borne out of regular appointment is entitled to be afforded reasonable
opportunity of being heard before the stigmatic order can be passed terminating his service and with mere issue of
a show cause notice calling reply will not be sufficient in this respect.‖
On the other hand, it has been submitted that from the side of management that the workman was issued a
show cause notice, he replied and after his reply was found unsatisfactory his service contract was terminated
prematurely. Hence, there is no illegality in adopting the procedure.
The Learned Counsel has referred to judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar
Pradesh v/s Smt. Sushmita reported in [2021] Volume III SCC online 108, Para 14 and submitted that where no
departmental enquiry is conducted, the employer retains the right to justify this itself before the court by leading
evidence and that the absence of departmental enquiry does not itself vitiate the termination.
Considering the arguments on this point submitted by parties as above, in light of record on this point, it
comes out that the settled fact is that firstly, there was an exit clause in the service agreement providing one month
notice or one month salary if any employee wishes to resign his service. This was unilaterally altered that the consent
of the concerned employee who had executed the earlier service agreement and probably without duly informing him
under the clause in service agreement providing sweeping powers to the management to alter the service conditions in
the service agreement with respect to salary and otherwise.
Even if the legality of the unilateral change in the service conditions is kept aside, it is established that before
premature termination of service contract the workman was issued a notice by management levelling allegations and
serious misconduct in form of intentionally insulting and use improper things for superior officer of the management
by the applicant/workman. The show cause notice on record goes to show that he never admitted the charges, he
simply stated, firstly, that according to service agreement executed between him and the management, his tenure is
over, where is evidence with respect to the allegations and secondly, denying the allegations. The order of
management regarding premature termination of service agreement has been referred earlier which goes to show that
the service agreement was terminated because the workman was found to have committed serious act of misconduct.
In the case of Purushottam Lal Dhingra v/s Union of India, reported in 1958 AIR 36, it has been laid down
that a termination is stigmatic when it has evil consequences, the relevant paragraphs in this respect are being
reproduced as follows:-
―Art. 31O of the Constitution, which makes no distinction between persons holding permanent or
temporary posts in the matter of their tenure being dependent on the pleasure of the President or the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6081
Governor, Art. 311 which is in the nature of a proviso to Art.310, also makes no distinction between
permanent and temporary posts and extends its protection equally to all Government servants holding
permanent or temporary posts or officiating in any of them.
But the protection of Art.311 can be available only where dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is sought to
be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. These were the major punishments evolved by the
Service Rules and Rules of the Railway Code, and well-understood as such, against which protection was
sought to be provided by the Rules. These protections were in due course incorporated in s. 240 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, and reproduced in Art.311 of the Constitution, thus qualifying the principle
embodied in Art. 310(1).
One test for determining whether the termination of service was by way of punishment or otherwise is to
ascertain whether under the Service Rules, but for such termination, the servant has the right to hold the
post. In the three cases of (1) substantive appointment to a permanent post, (2) temporary appointment for
a fixed term
and (3) a temporary appointment which has ripened into a quasi-permanent status
under the Temporary Service Rules, where such a right exists, the servant will be entitled to the protection
of Art. 311. Conversely, where no such right can exist, as in the case of a probationary or officiating
appointment to a permanent or temporary post or where the service has not ripened into a quasi-permanent
status, and under the general law the service can
be terminated on reasonable notice, the termination
of service cannot amount to a punishment and attract the Article. Broadly speaking, Art. 311(2) can apply to
those cases where the Government servant, if in private employment, could maintain an action for wrongful
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. So where the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or
under the Rules, the right to terminate the service at any time, such termination, in the manner provided in
the contract or under the Rules, cannot attract the provisions of Art. 311. That does not, however, means that
the termination of service of a servant who has no right to the post can never be a dismissal or removal by
way of punishment. Although in such a termination the actual motive of the Government must be wholly
irrelevant, where it expressly chooses to penalise the servant for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or the
like by inflicting on him the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction, the requirements of Art. 311
must be complied with.
A reduction in rank must, similarly, be a punishment if it carries
penal consequences with it and the
two tests to be applied are (1) whether the servant has a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether evil
consequences such as forfeiture of pay or allowances, loss of seniority in his substantive rank, stoppage or
postponement of future chances of promotion, follow as a result of the order. Where either of these tests
applies, the reduction in rank mast be one within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and attract
its protection.‖
This judgment has been constantly followed by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and the Hon‘ble High Courts,
some case decisions are being referred to as follows:-
1-Swati Priyadarshini Vs State of M.P. 2024 INSC 620 Held-
―30. A bird‘s eye views reveals thus. The appellant topped the revised Merit List, leading to her appointment
as an APC. While serving as such, complaint(s) against her, in brief, were that she was not performing her
duties, primarily on two counts – (i) not punctual in attending to her duties, and; (ii) not correctly reported
with regard to the events in the hostel. As against these, the appellant‘s response, via her replies to the SCNs,
is that she, inter alia, frankly admits to being late on occasion, but to compensate for her late-coming, she
used to sit till late evening in the office for completion of work. On this count, the Respondents cannot be
faulted. It is no justification for the appellant to contend that she was late, but worked late/overtime such that
the work did not suffer. However, as borne out from the record, with regard to the hostel, charge was given to
her for only 5/6 days. As such, in our view, it cannot be said that within such a short period, the appellant,
without fully understanding the attendant issues, could have 16 straightaway given any opinion/report on the
hostel.
Be that as it may, this case turns on our findings infra. 31. Clause 4 of the RGPSM‘s General Service
Conditions under the heading ―Resignation/Termination‖ provides as below:
―Persons working on contract can be terminated with one month notice if found inefficient. In case of
persons found indulged in undesirable activities amounting to degradation of dignity of Mission, Mission
Director shall reserve right to terminate him/her with immediate effect.‖ (emphasis supplied)
32. Perusal of Clause 4 makes it clear that ordinarily, for inefficiency, one month‘s notice is sufficient. The
Clause also makes it clear that if someone is found to have indulged in ―undesirable activities‖, the Mission
6082
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Director was competent to terminate such person‘s services ―with immediate effect‖. We are afraid that the
Respondents have placed themselves in a Catch-224 situation. If the order dated 30.03.2013 falls within the
former part of Clause 4, as contended by the respondent, on the 4 colloquially, when one is placed in a
dilemma due to two contradictory conditions. The phrase was popularized by Joseph Heller‘s novel of the
same name, first published in 1961.17premise that it is a case of termination simpliciter and non-stigmatic,
then one month‘s notice was required to be issued to the appellant, which admittedly was not done in the
instant matter.
Arguendo, were the order dated 30.03.2013 to be seen as falling under the latter part of Clause 4, it would be
stigmatic, as made clear by the use of the words ―indulged in undesirable activities amounting to degradation
of dignity of Mission‖.
33. In either of the above-noted eventualities, the Impugned Judgment would have to necessarily be setaside.
Nevertheless, let us examine the reasoning of the Division Bench, which opined that the order is non-
stigmatic and simpliciter non-renewal of contract. The order dated 30.03.2013 was, quite obviously, the
culmination of the process set into motion by the two SCNs, which has been overlooked by the Division
Bench. The mere non-mention of the background situation or the SCNs in the order dated 30.03.2013
cannot, by itself, be determinative of the nature of the order. As held by this Court in Samsher Singh v State
of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 8315 and Anoop Jaiswal v Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC6, the form of an
order is not its final determinant and the Court can find out the real reason and true character behind
terminating/removing an employee. Moreover, the Impugned Judgment also does not deal with Clause
34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v
Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
―28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a
contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand
v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420: (1953) SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory
retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of
a in the facts and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave
character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Article 311 …‖
―12. It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of
dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged to go behind the
form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the court holds that the order though in the form is
merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the court would not
be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the
employee.‖ punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal
v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the
service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the
Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be
the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the
contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the
rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has
said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India [LR 58 Bom 673 : AIR (1956) Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In
short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then,
prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311
is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the
employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or
removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the
termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As
already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment
or the rules provide to the 20 contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on
such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates
as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts
an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of
punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then
the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and
privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating
higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the
servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6083
the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a
lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the
reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also
visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his
pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his
future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had
purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the
terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated
the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression ―terminate‖ or ―discharge‖ is not
conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned
above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited
with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it
must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a
dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in
rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have
not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful
and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.‖ (emphasis supplied)
35. We would only be adding to verbosity by multiplying authorities. In view of the above dictum, it is clear that
the Respondents did not comply with Clause 4 – either the first part or the second part thereof. The order dated
30.03.2013 does visit the appellant with evil consequences and would create hurdles for her further
employment.‖
Hence on the basis of the said preposition of law as referred to above action of management in prematurely
terminating the service agreement of the applicant/workman on the charges of misconduct without
conducting a departmental enquiry is held vitiated in law.
As regards argument from the side of management that they should be given an opportunity to prove the
charge before this Tribunal, this argument cannot be accepted because it is a fixed term contract, the time limit of
which is expired and secondly, the management has nowhere pleaded that if the enquiry is held vitiated, they be given
opportunity to prove the charges before this Tribunal. Accordingly, the judgment of State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Smt.
Sushmita reported in [2021] Volume III SCC online 108, Para 14 referred to by management does not help them.
As regards the relief to which the applicant/workman may be entitled, following facts are relevant in this
respect which is being referred as follows:-
(i) The service contract of the applicant/workman was unilaterally changed by management to the prejudice
of the workman by taking away his right to spot resignation the legality of which is suspect.
(ii)
The premature termination of service contract order was issued against the workman just less than a
week before the completion of service tenure mentioned in his service agreement.
(iii) The applicant had to approach Hon‘ble High Court by way of filing W.P. No. 22050/2023 and he could
get relieving order only after Hon‘ble High Court directed the management to issue it vide its order
dated 02.09.2023.
(iv) During the proceedings of this case before this Tribunal, it came out that the applicant/workman was
ready to withdraw his case if the management changed the terminology used by it in the termination
order by way of deleting portion of the termination order which is stigmatic against him, but the
management did not consent to it.
The applicant/workman has been out of job due to his stigmatic termination without enquiry till date and his
future prospects are ruined.
Since it was a fixed term appointment the tenure of which has already expired, it will not be in the interest of
justice to order the reinstatement of the applicant/workman. It is also noteworthy that the applicant/workman himself
has resigned prematurely in this case on this ground also his reinstatement will not be a just relief.
Keeping in view the fact that he has lost job opportunity due to his this termination order and has suffered
harassment for more than two years, lump sum compensation in lieu of all his losses and claims seems to be a just
relief for him. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, a lump sum compensation of Rs.
15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lacs) in lieu of all his losses will meet the ends of justice which he is held entitled to receive
from the management within 60 days from the date of publication award in Gazette failing which interest @ 10% p.a.
from the date of award till payment.
In the light of above discussion and findings the reference is answered as follows:-
AWARD
―Holding the action of management of AI Airport Service Limited in terminating the service of its
workman Anuroop Pandey without conducting proper disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the workman
6084
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
was a fixed term employee unjust, illegal and arbitrary, the workman is held entitled to lump sum compensation of
Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lacs), payable to him by management within 60 days from the date of publication award
in Gazette failing which interest @ 10% p.a. from the date of award till payment.‖
Copy of this judgment be sent to the Ministry as per rules for publication in official Gazette.
DATE:- 18/07/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1639.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार जभलाइ स्ट्टील प्लांट के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्रीमती जयंती के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जबलृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-92/2014) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया
गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
एल-29012/24/2014-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1639.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 92/2014) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to Bhilai Steel Plant and Smt. Jayanti which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. L-29012/24/2014-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/92/2014
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.(Retd.)
Smt. Jayanti,
W/o Late N. Subramanayam
Qtr. No. 06, Sector – 8,
Bhilai Nagar,
Durg (CG)
Workman
Vs
The Managing Director,
Bhilai Steel Plant,
PO – Bhilai, Distt. Durg (CG)
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 24nd day of July - 2025)
As per letter dated 05/12/2014 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference
has been made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‗Act‘) as per
Notification No. L-29012/24/2014-IR(M) dt. 05/12/2014. The dispute under reference relates to:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6085
―Whether the action of the Management of Bhilai, in terminating the services of Smt. Jayanti
W/o Late N. Subramanayam, w.e.f. 07-07-2012 is legal and justified? If not, what relief the Workman is
entitled to?‖
Case of the workman is that, she was working as Staff Attendant Grade-6 in the General Establishment
Department of the Management. She was removed from service by the Management vide order dated 07.07.2012, she
came to know about this order when she obtained information from Management under right to information Act vide
letter of Management dated 07.10.2013. It is further her case that, she became ill and was ousted by her son from
house, she became mentally disturbed and started living with her daughter at the residence of her daughter which is
House No.6 A Road No. 37B Sector -7 Bhilai, Distt. Durg (CG). She had furnished written as well oral information to
the Management with respect to her new address. She further alleges that none of the letters said to be sent to her by
the Management namely. She received no information about the charge sheet regarding enquiry, regarding show
cause notice said to be issued by the Disciplinary Authority that enquiry report nor did she receive any punishment
order. The Management removed her from service on the ground of her absence at Workplace from 10.05.2010 to
13.08.2010 without any intimation and without any enquiry giving her opportunity to defend herself which is unjust,
illegal and arbitrary. She raised a dispute before the concerned Labour Commissioner after failure of conciliation, the
reference was made to this Tribunal. The Workman has prayed that, holding the order of Management dated
07.07.2013 removing her from service, she be held entitled to be reinstated with back wages and benefits.
The case of the Management is mainly that, she was first appointed by Management w.e.f. 25.10.1986 on
compassionate ground as Kitchen Attendant. She was designated as staff attendant, was irregular in presence at
Workplace. She was in the habit of remaining absent from duty unauthorizedly and without any leave permission or
sanctioned leave, she was allotted quarter No. 3C Street No. 6 Sector 8 Bhilai by Management by virtue of her
employment, she did not vacant the residence allotted dispute termination of services. She was required under Clause
17 of Certified Standing Orders to inform the Management about the change of her residential address which she
never did. She was issued a charge-sheet dated 10.09.2010 and 27.05.2011 for unauthorized and willfully absence of
71 and 207 days and after enquiry was punished with reduction in increments. Her unauthorized absence from
January 2009 to June 2012 was about 1049 days. She was present only for 114 days during this period on workplace.
She was issued a charge sheet dated 22.12.2011 for unauthorized and willful absence, for a period of 207 days.
Management decided to conduct an enquiry vide order dated 19.10.2012, the moments with respect to enquiry was
sent on her residential address, she did not appear in the enquiry on any of the days, the notice with respect to the
enquiry was sent by way of registered post as well by way of fixing the notice on the General Notice Board. The
Enquiry Officer conducted enquiry and submitted his enquiry report holding the charge of the misconduct against her,
by way of unauthorizedly and willfully absenting herself proved. The punishment order was passed by the
disciplinary authority after giving her opportunity to show cause.
The Workman has filed a rejoinder wherein she has mainly re-treated her case.
On the basis of pleadings, following issues were frame vide order dated 29.03.2017.
1. Whether enquiry conducted against the workman is proper and legal?
2. Whether the charges alleged against workman are proved from evidence adduced in enquiry
proceeding?
3. Whether the punishment of dismissal imposed against the Workman is legal?
4. If so, to what relief the workman is entitled?
Issue No. 1 -
Issue No. 1 was taken as a preliminary issue and was decided on the basis of evidence on record
vide order dated 09.09.2024 holding the Departmental enquiry just legal and proper. This order is part of this
judgment.
None of the parties filed any other evidence on remaining issues.
At the time of arguments, none appeared for the Workman. Argument of Learned Counsel for Management
Mr. R.C. Shrivastava were heard by me. Later on, Mr. Ram Raj Chouhan Learned Counsel for Workman submitted
his arguments on 14.05.2025. He written arguments also, which are part of the record. I have gone through the written
arguments as well the record.
Issue No. 1 is answered accordingly.
Issue No. 2 -
The settled preposition of law with respect to proof of the charge in a Departmental Enquiry is that, the
charge not be proved beyond doubt.
Perusal of enquiry papers filed and proved by Management, it comes out that, during enquiry, witness have
6086
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
supported on oath that documents the absence of the Workman are according to them was unauthorized because, she
absented herself without informing the Management, and without getting any leave sanctioned. The reasons behind
her absence were to be proved by the Workman, in which she has failed. Hence, the findings of the enquiry officer
and congruence of the Disciplinary Authority with respect to proof of charge is held to have recorded on the basis of
evidence and is affirmed.
Issue No. 2 is answered accordingly.
Issue No. 3 -
There is evidence on record that, on two occasions earlier the same charge was proved against the
workman and she was awarded punishment. It goes to show that, she is a habitual in committing this type of
misconduct in the light of these facts, the punishment of her removal from service by Management is held
proportionate to the charge proved.
Issue No. 3 is answered accordingly.
Issue No. 4 -
In the light of above discussion and findings, the Workman is held entitled to no relief.
Issue No. 4 is answered accordingly.
On the light of above discussion, the reference is answered as follows:
AWARD
Holding the action of Management of Bhilai Steel Plant, in terminating services of the Workman Smt.
Jayanti wife of Late N. Subaramanyam w.e.f. from 07.07.2012 legal and justified, she is held entitled to no
relief.
No order as to cost.
DATE:- 24/07/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1640.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार जभलाइ आस्ट्ृात प्लांट; मेससश रोजी एंटरप्राआजेज प्राआवेट जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
श्री िेख आकबाल के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जबलृुर, ृंचाट
(ररफरेन्स न.-42/2024) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी
के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-133]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1640.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 42/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to Bhilai Steel Plant; M/s. Rosy Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and Shri Sheikh Iqbal which was received along with soft
copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-133]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6087
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/42/2024
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.( Retd.)
Shri Sheikh Iqbal
Qtr – 7e, Street 28, Sector-5, Bhilai
Durg, Chhattisgarh - 490006
Workman
Versus
1. M/s. Rosy Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.,
C-652, Koel Nagar, Rourkela
Odisha - 769014
2. The Director
Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai
Durg, Chhattisgarh - 490006
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 07th day of August - 2025.)
As per letter dated 27/05/2024 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number RP-7(-3-04)/2024-ES-III
dt. 27/05/2024. The dispute under reference related to :-
―Whether the termination of employment of the workman Shri Sheikh Iqbal By M/s. Rosy Enterprises
Private Limited a Contractor of Bhilai Steel Plant is legal and justified ? If not, to what relief of Shri
Sheikh Iqbal is entitled to ?‖
After registering a case on the basis of the reference, notices were sent to the parties and served. None of the
parties filed any pleadings or evidence. The workman side never appeared.
Since, the initial burden to prove its case is on the workman side in which he fails. Hence, holding the
claim of the workman not proved, the reference stands answered against him.
DATE: 07/08/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1641.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार जभलाइ आस्ट्ृात प्लांट; मेससश रोजी एंटरप्राआजेज प्राआवेट जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और छत्तीसगढ़
प्लेसमेंट कमशचारी संघ के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जबलृुर,
ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-43/2024) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-134]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
6088
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1641.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 43/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to Bhilai Steel Plant; M/s. Rosy Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and Chhattisgarh Placement Karmchari Sangh which was
received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-134]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/43/2024
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.( Retd.)
Chhattisgarh Placement Karmchari Sangh
Qtr. 7e, Street 28, Sector 5, Durg
Chhattisgarh - 490006
Workman
Versus
1. M/s. Rosy Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.,
C-652, Koel Nagar, Rourkela
Odisha - 769014
2. The Director
Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai
District Durg - 490001
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 07th day of August - 2025.)
As per letter dated 27/05/2024 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number RP-7(3-5)/2024-ES-III dt.
27/05/2024. The dispute under reference related to :-
―Whether the termination of employment of the workman Shri Dhal Singh Sahu By M/s. Rosy enterprises
Private Limited a Contractor of Bhilai Steel Plant is legal and justified ? If not, to what relief of Shri Dhal
Singh Sahu is entitled to ?‖
After registering a case on the basis of the reference, notices were sent to the parties and served. None of the
parties filed any pleadings or evidence. The workman side never appeared.
Since, the initial burden to prove its case is on the workman side in which he fails. Hence, holding the
claim of the workman not proved, the reference stands answered against him.
DATE: 07/08/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1642.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार जभलाइ आस्ट्ृात प्लांट; मेससश रोजी एंटरप्राआजेज प्राआवेट जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और छत्तीसगढ़
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6089
प्लेसमेंट कमशचारी संघ के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जबलृुर,
ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-44/2024) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-135]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1642.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 44/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to Bhilai Steel Plant; M/s. Rosy Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and Chhattisgarh Placement Karmchari Sangh which was
received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 08.09.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-135]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/R/44/2024
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.(Retd.)
Chhattisgarh Placement Karmchari Sangh
Qtr-7e, Street-28, Sector-5, Durg
Chhattisgarh - 490006
Workman
Versus
1. M/s. Rosy Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.,
C-652, Koel Nagar, Rourkela
Odisha - 769014
2. The Director
Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai
Durg, (C.G.) - 490001
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 07th day of August - 2025.)
As per letter dated 27/05/2024 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference is
made to this Tribunal under section-10 of I.D. Act, 1947 as per reference number RP-7(3-3)/2024-ES-III
dt. 27/05/2024. The dispute under reference related to :-
―Whether the termination of employment of the workman Shri Gopal Chakradhari By M/s. Rosy
Enterprises Private Limited a Contractor of Bhilai Steel Plant is legal and justified ? If not, to what relief
of Shri Gopal Chakradhari is entitled to ?‖
After registering a case on the basis of the reference, notices were sent to the parties and served. None of the
parties filed any pleadings or evidence. The workman side never appeared.
Since, the initial burden to prove its case is on the workman side in which he fails. Hence, holding the
claim of the workman not proved, the reference stands answered against him.
DATE: 07/08/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
6090
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1643.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार जभलाइ आस्ट्ृात प्लांट; जिक्षा जवभाग; बी.एस.ृी. हाइ स्ट्कूल के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्रीमती ऄजहल्या
बाइ ृत्नी तेलुचंद्र, बी.एस.ृी. ईच्चतर माध्यजमक जवद्यालय के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण
एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जबलृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-15/2022) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया हज, प्रकाजित करती
हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-136]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1643.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 15/2022) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to Bhilai Steel Plant; Education Department; B.S.P. High School and Smt. Ahilya Bai W/o Teluchandra,
B.S.P. Higher Secondary School which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 08.09.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-136]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, JABALPUR
NO. CGIT/LC/RC/15/2022
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.( Retd.)
1.
Smt. Ahilya Bai W/o Teluchandra,
B.S.P. Higher Secondary School,
Sector-8, Tahsil-Bhilai,
District – Durg C.G.
Workman
Versus
1.
The Chief Executive Officer,
Bhilai Steel Plant, Durg [CG]
2.
Education Department,
Russian Complex,
Sector-07, Bhilai,Durg [CG]
3.
Principal, B.S.P. High School,
Sector-8, Bhilai, Durg [CG],
Present School- Bhilai School Sector-02,
Bhilai Durg [CG]
Management
AWARD
(Passed on this 05th day of August-2025.)
The workman has filed petition u/s. 2A (2&3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, as amended by
Amendment Act, 2010 (in short the ‗Act‘).
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6091
The case of the workman is that she is an employee of B.S.P. High School which is run by Management of
Bhilai Steel Plant and is under their control as well supervision. She was first engaged as sweeper on 01.01.1999 and
was paid wages till 02.11.2020 @ Rs. 650/- per month. She was disengaged from services, she filed a petition before
the Labour Court. The Labour Court passed an order on 29.01.2005 directing the reinstatement with 50% backwages.
This judgment and award of the Labour Court was challenged by the management before Hon‘ble High Court of
Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur. Hon‘ble High Court remanded the matter back to the Lower Court to decide the matter afresh
in light of directions mentioned in the judgment. According to the workman, the Labour Court passed this judgment
and award on 05.12.2011 which was not complied with by the management. The workman had to file a contempt
petition before the Hon‘ble High Court of Chhatisgarh which directed execution of the said award through the Labour
Commissioner and payment be made to the workman on minimum wages since 01.12.2015. Since then, she has been
working but management issued a letter dated 02.07.2020 stating that since the school will not function in the
academic calendar 2020-21, hence her services were not required. They paid her one month salary and compensation
through bank cheque. According to workman, this action of management is arbitrary because other staff were
transferred to different schools run by the same management and she was retrenched, the workman as prayed that
management of the school be directed to reinstate her with all back wages and benefits.
Management of the Bhilai Steel Plant has taken a case that there is no employer-employee relation between
the parties. The school is not under the management supervision or control of Bhilai Steel Plant and this Tribunal does
not have the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.
The workman filed photocopy of certificates issued by Labour Commissioner, Judgment of Labour Court,
Durg, and Judgment of Hon‘ble High Court of Chhatisgarh in contempt proceedings.
The workman absented thereafter hence the case proceeded Ex-parte against her.
None of the parties filed any evidence or affidavit in evidence.
I have heard argument of learned Counsel for management Mr. R. C. Shrivastava. None appeared for the
workman. I have gone through the record as well.
The initial burden to prove its case is on the petitioner/workman she has to prove that the school was under
controlled supervision of management of Bhilai Steel Plant and she was engaged by Bhilai Steel Plant, in absence of
evidence on these facts, holding the claim of the workman not proved, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
ORDER
Petition dismissed.
DATE: 05/08/2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1644.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय
सरकार मेससश सेंरल जसल्वर प्लांट; मेससश ब्लजक हाईंड जससयोररटी सर्सवसेज प्राआवेट जलजमटेड; मेससश मासश नेटवकश
जससयोररटी सर्सवसेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री संदीृ कुमार हसह के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददि केन्द्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, लखनउ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.-24/2011) को जजसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
हज, प्रकाजित करती हज जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 08.09.2025 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं
जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-84]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1644.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 24/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Lucknow as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to M/s Central Silver Plant; M/s Black Hound Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Mars Network Security Services
and Shri Sandeep Kumar Singh which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 08.09.2025.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-84]
SALONI, Dy. Director
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-cum-Labour Court, LUCKNOW
PRESENT
JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
PRESIDING OFFICER
I.D. No. 24 of 2011
Sandeep Kumar Singh S/o Sri Ram Kumar Singh
R/o Village - Tikarwaal, PO - Jitwa (Tappy bighvan)a
District-Maharajganj
.......Applicant/Workman
Versus
1.
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli,
Through its Project Manager;
2.
Project Manager
M/s. Central Sliver Plant,
Khadi Village & Industries Commission,
Amawan Road, Rae-bareli;
3.
M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd.
261, Sadar Bazar District Jhansi
through its Managing Director;
4.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services,
Head Office at 435, Lakhanpur, Vikas Nagar,
District Kanpur through its Manager
....Employers/Opp.Parties
Judgment
Heard Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman and Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 & 2.
Case of the workman:
Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman on the basis of pleading in the application u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submits and under:
―1.
The workman was initially engaged on 01.01.2007 by the employer ie. Project Manager, M/S.
Central Sliver Plant, Khadi Village & Industries Commission, Amawan Road, Raibareli and since
then the workman had been continuously working till his oral termination on 16.03.2010 in the
department of carding, Daffer and blowroom.
2.
The workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in each and every calendar year from
his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been given to the workman and has worked
on the Machines of the principal employer ie. Central Sliver Plant, KVIC, Raibareli.
3.
That the monthly salary was being paid to the tune of Rs. 2900/- after deduction of contribution of
provident Fund as well as E.S.I..
4.
The work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found as excellent
and no complaint, show cause notice or any such charge sheet has been served to the workman during his
whole service period by the employers.
5.
The services of the workman has wrongly been terminated/retrenched orally on 16.03.2010 without
any thyme and reason and prior To termination/retrenchment neither any notice nor notice pay in lieu thereof
has making such been given to the workman by the aforesaid employers, as such the employers have
contravened and violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as L.D.
Act).
6.
The work for which the workman was engaged is perennial in nature and is still available and in
place of the workman some new workmen have been newly engaged through the contractor.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6093
7.
About 21 workmen were engaged as on daily wager basis and all workmen have completed about
10 to 6 years continuous service were become eligible for regularization but in lieu of making regularization,
their services have been terminated/retrenched orally from the month of February 2010 to March 2010
without following due process of law violating certain provisions under Section 25-F of the 1.D.Act, 1947,
which is mandatory.
8.
The workmen are working under the supervision and control of the aforesaid employer on the
various machines of the establishment for the work of Comber fitter, Simplex, Carding, Blowroom, Daffer
etc. which relates the perennial in nature of work.
9.
The concerned workmen are being shown the employee of the Contractor by the principal employer
and the detail of the said contractor had never been furnished and the said contractor was not having such
license under certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to supply the
labour.
10.
For proving the case of the workmen to the effect that the workmen are working under the
supervision and control of the project Manager, the relevant paper namely known as DAILY
ATTENDANCE SHEET as well as the UTPADAN LOG SHEET are liable to be summoned from the
principal employer for last several years.
11.
The concerned workmen moved an I.R.C.P. CASE No. 02/2010 before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner/Conciliation Officer making request to reconcile/adjudicate the matter in respect of the
grievance, which belongs to unfair labour practice , the prayer of the workmen was following herein
as under :-
(i) The services of the workmen be regularized.
(ii) The services of the workmen may not be terminated during pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(iii) The Minimum wages till regularization shall be paid.
(iv) The benefits at par with the regular employees shall be given to the workmen like Bonus, Leave
encashment, Holidays, Medical Leave and other facilities which are being provided to the regular
employees of the establishment.‖
Accordingly, Sri R.K. Verma learned counsel for the workman submits that as the conciliation proceedings have
failed so applicant has filed the present industrial dispute u/s 2A of the Act.
In view of the said factual background on the basis of pleadings, taken by applicant in his claim petition, challenged
the oral order of termination/retrenchment of workman dated 16.03.2010 on the following grounds:
―(i) Because the services of the workman has been terminated/retrenched in contravention of section 25-F of
the LD.Act, 1947.
(ii) Because the workman has completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year since his initial
date of engagement December 2004.
(iii) Because the alleged contractors i.e. opposite party No. 3 and 4 are not having license under certain
provisions of the Contractor Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Because the work, conduct, performance and behaviour of the workman has always been found excellent
by his superiors and no complaint, no show cause notice or charge sheet has been served to the workman in
his whole service period.
(v) Because the new persons have been engaged in place of the workman, as such, such act of the employer
is violative to Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the I.D.Act, 1947.
(vi) Because the entire act of the employers amounts to unfair Labour practice under L.D.Act, 1947.
(vii) Because the workman is entitled to get reinstatement with continuity of service along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits.
(viii) Because the workman is entitled for regularization for want of his length of continuous service.‖
Accordingly, applicant has made following prayer:
―(a) to set aside the oral termination of the workman w.e.f. 16.03.2010 directing the principal employer to
reinstate the workman in his service with continuity of service with full back wages along with all the
resultant and consequential benefits for the same and
6094
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(b) to regularize the services of the workman and be paid salary at par with the similarly situated regular
employees.‖
Accordingly, it is submitted by Sri R.K. Verma, learned counsel for workman that oral order of termination be set
aside and workman be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages.
Submissions on behalf of Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli:
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.1 submits as under:-
The Central Silver Plant, KVIC situated at Rae-bareli is governed and controlled by the Government of India and as
such, it has its own settled principles of rules of recruitment. The applicant was never appointed by Central Silver
Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli but in fact he was deployed to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC by a contractor namely M/s.
Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd., Jhansi which too as per the exigency of work after an agreement entered into
with M/s. Black Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. The period of contract with M/s. Black Hound Security Services
came to an end and thereafter a fresh agreement was entered into between the establishment and respondent no.4 i.e.
M/s. Mars Network Security Services, Vikas Nagar, Kanpur and the workman was sent to the establishment by the
said contractor to work the applicant as contract labour. Accordingly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the workman is a contract labour supplied through agency to the establishment as per the exigency of
work. So there was no master or servant relationship between the establishment and the workman rather they are the
workers of labour contractors, hence, it is well settled principal of law as has been laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex
Court in a catena of decisions that a contract labour can in no circumstances become the employee of the
establishment, creating a direct relationship of master and servant with the establishment. The Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 neither contemplates creation of direct relationship of Master and servant
between the Principal Employer and the Contract Labour nor can such a relationship be implied from the provisions
of Act.
Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 on the basis of above said facts as stated in the
written statement has argued that the workman is not an employee of the establishment rather he was supplied by the
agency and thus the services were retrenched by the contractor who had supplied the workman. Accordingly it was
also submitted that as the workman had been engaged as per exigency of work and was not working against regular
and sanctioned post so he was not entitled for any relief and the present I.D. case filed under Section 2-A of the Act
by the workman is liable to be dismissed keeping in view the law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case
of Kilsokar Brothers Ltd. Versus Ramcharan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1.
Further in spite of notices issued to the respondent no.3 they did not file the written statement nor bring any material
on record in support of their case. The opposite party no.4 filed their written statement. On behalf of applicant the
rebuttal to the written statement was also filed and thereafter the parties had filed evidences and pleadings in support
of their case.
Accordingly, Sri Adarsh Jagdhari, Learned counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 submitted that claim petition, filed
by workman, lacks merit, liable to be dismissed.
Finding & Conclusion:
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
The workman was initially engaged as casual labour on 01.01.2007 and in the said capacity he worked and discharged
his duties till 16.03.2010 when his services were terminated/retrenched. Now the first point which is to be considered
is to the effect that if the workman had been engaged through contractor i.e. opposite parties no.3 & 4 and he had
been working and discharging his duties with M/s Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli then in that circumstances
whether the respondent no.1 falls within the ambit and scope of definition of ‗Principal Employer‘ or not?
In the case of Kirloskar Brothers Limited Versus Ram charan & others reported in 2023 LLR 1 the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
―3.2 It is submitted that neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether
expressly or by necessary implication, provides for absorption of contract labour in the absence of a
notification by an appropriate Government, namely, in the present case, the State Government, under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other
work in any establishment. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly, no notification under Section
10 of the CLRA Act has been issued. It is submitted that therefore, in the absence of a notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, which can only be passed by the appropriate Government, the Industrial
Court could have given relief to the workmen only if they had claimed and proved by leading cogent
evidence that the contract with the contractor was a sham. It is further submitted that in the present case,
there was no such allegation or pleading or finding arrived at by any Court that the contract between the
parties was a sham and not genuine. Heavy reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the case
of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6095
(paras 65, 108, 109, 120 and 125) and International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo
Workers‘ Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374 (paras 36, 37 to 40, 53.13, 56).
4.1 On going through the entire material on record, no documentary evidence was produced, by which it can
be said that the contesting respondents were the employees of the appellant. There is no provision
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act that the workers/employees employed by the contractor automatically
become the employees of the appellant and/or the employees of the contractor shall be entitled for automatic
absorption and/or they become the employees of the principal employer. It is to be noted that even the direct
control and supervision of the contesting respondents was always with the contractor. There is no evidence
on record that any of the respondents were given any benefits, uniform or punching cards by the appellant.
4.2 Under the contract and even under the provisions of the CLRA, a duty was cast upon the appellant to pay
all statutory dues, including salary of the workmen, payment of PF contribution, and in case of non- payment
of the same by the contractor, after making such payment, the same can be deducted from the contractor‘s
bill. Therefore, merely because sometimes the payment of salary was made and/or PF contribution was paid
by the appellant, which was due to non-payment of the same by the contractor, the contesting respondents
shall not automatically become the employees of the principal employer – appellant herein.
4.3 Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, in the absence of a notification under Section 10 of the CLRA
Act unless there are allegations or findings with regard to a contract being sham, private respondents
herein, who are as such the workmen/employee of the contractor, cannot be held to be employees of the
appellant and not of the contractor. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra) is required to be referred to.
Following two questions fell for consideration before this Court:-
A. whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the
principal employer on issuance of the abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA
Act; and
B. whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him
by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges.
4.4 After considering various decisions of this Court on the point, in paragraph 125, it was concluded as
under:-
―125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the
State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in
view of the definition of the expression ―appropriate Government‖ as stood in the CLRA Act, on the
answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the
establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of
banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be
the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of
the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the
question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is
included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the
Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then
the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other
establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the
appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the
appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the
case may be, and
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the
establishment in question, and
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section
10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not
satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from
the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order
passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this
judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has
otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by
necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a
notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any
establishment.Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] prospectively and
declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court,
for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377] shall
hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment
in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider
the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken
to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with
various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract
is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be
treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of
the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by
it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate
Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of
any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the
principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile
contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to
maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their
initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications
other than technical qualifications.‖
4.5 Thus, as observed and held by this Court, neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in
the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on
issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting
employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or any other work in any establishment and
consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working
in the establishment concerned. It has further been observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of
contract labour or otherwise, in case of an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in
regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the
contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a
mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers
of the benefits thereunder.
4.6 In the present case, neither any notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act has been issued
prohibiting the contract labour, nor there are allegations and/or even findings that the contract is sham and
bogus and/or camouflage.
4.7 In the case of International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers‘ Union and
Anr. (supra), after considering the decision of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (supra), it has been observed and held by this Court that
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6097
where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour
contends that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and
merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service
or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short,
who has direct control over the employee. It is further observed that where there is no notification
under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract
was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularise the services of the contract labour does not arise. It has further been observed in paragraphs 38
and 39 as under :-
―38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour agreement is a
sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the contract is for supply of labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and
control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is
with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short,
worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal
employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is
secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.‖
Reverting to the facts of the present case and from the material exchanged by the parties and documents available on
record, the position which emerges out that on behalf of workman a document namely I.D. Card was filed which was
issued by Employee State Insurance Corporation in which the name of the workman employer code and address of the
employer was mentioned. In the written statement the said document was not categorically denied by the respondent
no.1. Further on behalf of the workman as per Rule 78(1)(a)(2) of Minimum Wages Act, extract of register of wages
was filed of one worker and from the perusal of said extract it establishes that the name and address has been as
KVIC, Rae-bareli.
In rebuttal to the said document no material document on behalf of respondent no.1 was filed to establish its case that
the respondent no.1 is an Employer. Workman in his evidence filed on affidavit (examination in chief) has stated
that he was engaged in the establishment KVIC, Rae-bareli and services were retrenched on 16.03.2010 by the
authority of respondent no.1. in his chief examination he has also submitted that his ESI/EPF had been deducted from
the wages which is paid to him each and every month by the respondent no.1/authority of the respondent no.1 i.e.
Factory Incharge Sri Balwant Singh.
Thus keeping in view the said facts and law as laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kisloskar Brothers
Limited Versus Ramcharan & others in the absence of any notification under Section 10 of Contract Labour
(Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 on the basis of material documents and facts which are stated hereinabove it
clearly established that the respondent no.1 M/s. Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli was the principal employer of
workman/applicant.
Thus, the next point to be considered is whether the services of workman has been terminated in violation of
provisions of section 25 F of the act or not? Once he had worked for more than 240 days continuously in last 12
months preceding the date of alleged termination.
In order to decide the same it will be appropriate to have a glance to the provisions of section 25 F of the Act, which
reads as under:
"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under
an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six
months; and
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette."
A perusal of Section 25-F of the Act reveals that in order to claim the benefit of Section 25-F, the workman needs to
prove that she has been in continuous service for not less than one year from the date of his retrenchment. Section
25B of the Act stipulates that a person who has worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding year is deemed to be
in continuous service for a period of one year. The relevant extract from Section 25B is produced below for reference:
"25B. Definition of continuous service.
For the purposes of this Chapter:
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(3) or a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;"
Taking into consideration the above said facts, next point to be considered that whether the worker has worked for
more than 240 days in last preceding twelve months from the date of alleged termination. It is well-settled that the
burden to prove that the workman was in continuous employment of 240 days with the management is on the
workman herself. This principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of R.M.
Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106; the relevant paragraph is extracted below:
"17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms
do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the
workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-
waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof
of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce
before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any,
the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-
serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden
placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above
judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression
by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the
management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
These principles were reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi,
(2009) 11 SCC 522, and the law on this subject was traced as under in paragraphs 8 to 10 which are reproduced as
under:-
"8. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 8 SCC 161] the position was
again reiterated in para 6 as follows : (SCC p.163)
'6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal
to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were
highlighted in Range Forest Officer v.S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25]. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll
for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240
days as claimed.'
9. In Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] it was held that the burden was on
the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his
alleged retrenchment.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6099
In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [(2004) 8 SCC 246] the position was again reiterated in para 11 as
follows : (SCC p. 250)
'11. The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the
Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse
inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195] wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's
view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is
what this Court had to say in that regard: (SCC p. 198, para 15)
"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not
presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have
gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional
and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in
the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on
some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference
against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the
evidence adduced by the respondent."'
In RBI v. S. Mani [(2005) 5 SCC 100] a three- Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that
the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal's
view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now the quesiton to be examined is whether the
workman/applicant discharged his burden of proving that he was in continuous employment for at least 240 days in
the year preceding his date of retrenchment or not?
In this regard on behalf of workman an application was moved for summoning the documents i.e. daily attendance
sheets, Utpadan Log Sheet till the date of retrenchment of his services to which the objections were filed. This
Tribunal after taking into consideration disposed of the application by an order dated 3.9.2013, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:-
―Hon‘ble Gujrat High Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhakubhai Meghajibhai Chavda
2010 AIR SCW 542; has observed that for proving 240 days‘ continuous working, the workman would have
difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster rolls etc.in connection with his service, therefore,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite
period to constitute continuous service.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Gujrat High Court, the management of the Central Silver
Plang, KVIC cannot escape from its legitimate responsibility as admittedly the workman worked under the
control of the OP No.1 & 2. The issue that who was the supplier of man force is secondary. The workman
has submitted that to substantiate his pleadings it is necessary to summon documents for the period
December 2007 till his termination, and accordingly he has summoned relevant documents which in
possession of the management to prove his working with the opposite party.
Accordingly the management of the Central Silver Plant, KVIC is directed to file the documents detailed in
para 1(i) & (ii) of the application W-10 Application for summoning the documents is disposed of
accordingly.‖
In response to the same the respondents no.1 & 2 filed a document titled as ‗kendriya pooni sanyantra, khadi aur
gramodyog ayog, audyogik khestra, Amawa Road, Rae-bareli‘. From the perusal of said documents it clearly
established that workman worked and discharged his duties as causal employee for more than 240 days prior to
retrenchment of his services in the last preceding calendar year. Workman in Para-2 of the claim statement has
categorically stated as under:-
―That it is much relevant to mention here that the workman has rendered his services more than 240 days in
each and every calendar year from his date of engagement without any break even no holidays has been
given to the workman and has worked on the machines of the principal employer i.e. Central Silver Plant,
KVIC, Rae-bareli.‖
In response to the same on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in their written statement it has been stated as under:-
―That the contents of paras-1 to 4 of the claim statement are absolutely false and concocted hence denied. In
reply it is stated that the applicant was never employed with Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli, but was
in fact a contract labour deployed by a contractor to the Central Silver Plant, KVIC, Rae-bareli M/s. Black
Hound Security Services (P) Ltd. 261, Sadar Bazar Jhansi, U.P. that too as per exigencies of work.‖
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Keeping in view the said facts, material evidence and documents available on record the best evidence is with the
respondents to prove and establish as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act 1872 that workman has not worked and
discharged his duties for 240 days prior to his retrenchment. However, the respondents no.1 & 2 failed to discharge
their burden that assertion as made by the workman on the point in issue is totally incorrect and wrong.
In addition to the said facts in his evidence on affidavit (examination in chief) the respondents no.1 & 2 categorically
stated that he has worked 240 days in the preceding calendar year from the date of his termination/retrenchment. In
the cross examination he has also categorically stated in this regard. Moreover on behalf of respondents no.1 & 2 in
support of their case an affidavit of one Sri Avdhesh Kumar Dixit who is working on the post of ‗Audyogik Sharmik
Sherni-2‘ was filed (examination in chief) and in the said affidavit only in it has been stated the workman is an
employee of the contractor as per agreement entered into between the establishment and the contractor and his
services were disengaged by the contractor. Even in the cross examination he has not disputed the said facts.
Thus in view of the said facts and evidence it clearly establishes that the applicant/workman has worked and
discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to the date of
termination/retrenchment of his services.
Accordingly, question which is to be considered that what relief the workman/applicant is entitled?
Answer to the said question finds place in the judgment of the Hon‘ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment
and order dated 4.4.2024 passed in the case of Chief Medical & Health Officer Versus Umrao Singh reported in
2024 (182) FLR 882 has held as under:-
―4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for parties.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
177 has held as under:-
"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases
reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jayant Vasantrao Hiwarkar Vs. Anoop Ganpatrao Bobde and
others reported in (2017)11 SCC 244 has upheld the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement as the
respondent had merely worked for a period of one year.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of
Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 190 has held as under:-
''19. The following passages from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court
on the question of reinstatement:(BSNL case, SCC pp. 187-88, paras 29-30)
"29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement. In BSNL v. Man Singh, this Court has held that when the
termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not
necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In Incharge Officer v.
Shankar Shetty, it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily-wage basis,
and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3 years and where the termination had taken
place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
'2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement
of a daily-wager has been brought to an end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in
recent years has been uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of
this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6101
Development Authority v.Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras
7 & 14)
"7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the
legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure.Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid
down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside
but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in
a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily-wagers has not been found to be proper
by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a
daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee."
21. We make it clear that reference to Umadevi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where
the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had
it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, Appellant 1 would not be
entitled to reinstatement...........''
8. The Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited
and others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 337 has held as under :-
"6. Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement
when the concerned regulation is found to be void. In the sphere of employer- employee relations in
public sector undertakings, to which Article 12 of the Constitution of India is attracted, it cannot be
posited that reinstatement must invariably follow as a consequence of holding that an order of
termination of service of an employee is void. No doubt in regard to "blue collar" workmen and
"white collar" employees other than those belonging to the managerial or similar high level cadre,
reinstatement would be a rule, and compensation in lieu thereof a rare exception. Insofar as the
high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether
different perspective -- a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National
Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive co-
existence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie
with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable
integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the "policy-makers" of such
undertakings. Then and then only can the public sector undertaking achieve the goals of (1)
maximum production for the benefit of the community,
(2) social justice for workers, consumers and the people, and
(3) reasonable return on the public funds invested in the undertaking.
7. It is in public interest that such undertakings or their Boards of Directors are not compelled and
obliged to entrust their managements to personnel in whom, on reasonable grounds, they have no
trust or faith and with whom they are in a bona fide manner unable to function harmoniously as a
team working arm-in-arm with success in the aforesaid three-dimensional sense as their common
goal. These factors have to be taken into account by the court at the time of passing the
consequential order, for the court has full discretion in the matter of granting relief, and the court
can sculpture the relief to suit the needs of the matter at hand. The court, if satisfied that ends of
justice so demand, can certainly direct that the employer shall have the option not to reinstate
provided the employer pays reasonable compensation as indicated by the court."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008)
4 SCC 261 has held that statutory authorities are obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional
scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void and, under these circumstances, it was
held at Workman is entitled for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Deepak Vs. Nagar Panchayat, reported in (2008) 1 SCC
575, has held that merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date
of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized. At the most,
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
interest of justice will be subserved if payment of sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of damages is made to the
Workman.
11. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity
Board Vs. Laxmi Kant Gupta, reported in 2009(16) SCC 562, Senior Superintendent Telegraph Vs. Santosh
Kumar Seal, reported in 2010(6) SCC 773, Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Vs. Gitam Singh,
reported in 2013(5) SCC 136.‖
Accordingly in view of the facts of the present case as well as law referred hereinabove it is clear that
retrenchment/termination of service of workman is in contravention to the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Thus he is entitled for compensation and not for reinstatement. Further in the present case the
workman Ramesh Yadav was engaged as casual employee on 01.01.2007 and his services were terminated/retrenched
on 16.03.2010. So, taking into consideration the facts of the case the workman is not entitled for reinstatement in
services rather it will be appropriate to award a compensation of sum of Rs. 1.50 Lakhs (Rupees One Lakh Fifth
Thousand only) to the workman/applicant against the respondents.
Award
For the foregoing reasons the workman/applicant is only entitled for compensation of sum of Rs. 1.50 Lakhs (Rupees
One Lakh Fifth Thousand only) and the same should have be paid to the applicant within a period of three months by
the respondents from the date of publication of the award.
And workman is not entitled for reinstatement in services.
LUCKNOW.
06th March, 2025
Justice ANIL KUMAR, Presiding Officer
Let two copies of this award be sent to the Ministry for publication.
नइ ददल्ली, 8 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1645.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ओररएंटल बैंक ऑफ कॉमसश ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
II
ds iapkV (a62/2021) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं
एल-39025/01/2025-अइअर(बी-II)-30]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 8th September, 2025
S.O. 1645.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 62/2021) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court No.
II Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Oriental Bank of
Commerce and their workmen.
[No. L-39025/01/2025– IR(B-II)-30]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM – LABOUR COURT NO. II, NEW DELHI
I.D. No.62/2021
Sh. Badri Dutt Joshi vs. Oriental Bank of Commerce
Sh. Badri Dutt Joshi,
R/o House No. 116-117, Ground Floor, Pocket-03,
Sector-25, Rohini, New Delhi-110085.
Versus
1. The Chairman/MD,
Oriental Bank of Commerce,
C.O. Plot No.05, Sector-32, Institutional Area,
Gurgaon, Haryana-122001.
Applicant/Claimant
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6103
2. The AGM,
Oriental Bank of Commerce,
E-Block, Connaught Place, New Delhi-110001.
Management/respondent
Counsels:
For workman/ Claimant:
Sh. Vijay Pal, Ld. AR.
For Management/ Respondent:
Sh. Rajat Arora and Sh. Niraj Kumar, Ld. ARs.
AWARD
23.06.2025
The Ministry of Labour and Employment had referred the following reference to this tribunal for
adjudication:
a. Whether the enquiry conducted by the management of Oriental Bank of commerce (Now Known as PNB) was
vitiated with regard to Sh. Badri Dutt Joshi.
b. If yes, what relief these workers are entitled to?
c.
What other relief the said workman is entitled to?
Pursuant to the reference, notices were issued to both parties. The claimant appeared and filed his claim
statement stating that he was temporarily appointed in the management bank as a personal driver and was attached
with Mr. S.D. Malhotra (AGM) and Mr. Vikram Kochar (Chief Manager of Bank) from 02.07.1986 to 01.07.1990.
Thereafter, as per rules of the Bank, he was regularized as a peon w.e.f. 02.07.1990 and confirmed in the services of
the bank since 02.06.1991. He was promoted to clerical cadre vide office letter no. 452/97 dated 04.03.1997.
The claimant stated that he had never submitted any forged and purported documents pertaining to the bank,
in regard with availment of loans from the co-operative societies and any other financial institutions, and no dues
were outstanding against him. Nevertheless, the management discontinued his services without proving any
misconduct. From 13.03.2003, he was reportedly suffering from various diseases and kept sending leave applications
along with medical certificates to the management until 25.12.2003, and on 26.12.2003. After recovery, he visited the
zonal office of the bank and requested resumption of his duty but was not allowed. He claimed that he remained
unemployed since and sought reinstatement with full back wages and other consequential benefits.
The management filed a written statement raising a preliminary objection that present claim raised by the
claimant doesn‘t fall within definition of Industrial Dispute in accordance to sub-section (3) read with subsection (2)
and (1) of Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Hereinafter referred to as ‗the Act‘); it was also
submitted that the present claim is time-barred having been filed almost 18 years after the conclusion of the
disciplinary action against him in 2003. It was further stated that the claimant‘s pleadings were contradictory and
diametrically opposite to those made before the Conciliation Officer. In the present claim, it has been stated that the
claimant was not aware of any departmental proceedings against him. It has been stated in Para 2 of the claim
statement that his services had been discontinued without any misconduct even without serving any show cause,
memos, charge sheet, dismissal or removal letter etc. However, it is evident from the claim statement itself, as well as
from the documents filed by the claimant before the Conciliation Officer, the claimant was indeed issued a charge-
sheet dated 19.08.2002 by the management of Oriental Bank of Commerce for allegedly forging signatures of various
Bank Officers to obtain loans from Cooperative Urban Society.
The claimant filed a rejoinder denying the management‘s averment in its written statement and reaffirming
the averments made in his claim statement.
After completion of the pleadings, following issues had been framed vide order dated 04.07.2022:
Whether the proceeding is maintainable.
Whether the claim is barred by limitation.
Whether the domestic inquiry conducted against the claimant was fair and in principles of natural justice
were followed.
To what relief the claimant is entitled.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
It had been observed in order dated 04.07.2022 that issue no. 3 would be treated as a preliminary issue.
The management was called to lead evidence first. However, it failed to do so, citing that a long time had
passed since the enquiry, during which, the records related to enquiry had been weeded out. Consequently, the issue
of enquiry goes against the management and in favor of the claimant.
Another preliminary issue that had been framed is whether the claim petition is barred by limitation. The
claimant had been allegedly terminated in 2003 and filed his claim in 2021 after a significant delay.
The claimant reiterated his initial service details, stating that he was temporarily appointed in the
management bank as personal driver of the bank and attached with Mr. S.D. Malhotra, AGM, and Mr. Vikram
Kochar, Chief Manager of the Bank w.e.f. 02.07.1996 to 01.07.1990 and thereafter as per rules of the bank, the
claimant was regularized in the services of the bank as a peon since 02.07.1990, and he was confirmed in the services
of the bank since 02.06.1991. His further succeeded in promotion exam from sub-staff cadre to clerical cadre which
was held on 17.11.1996.
His further case is that his colleagues started hatching conspiracy against him without any rhyme or reason
when he was in a dire of loan due to acute financial crunch which resulted into issuance of charge-sheet dated
19.08.2002 by Sh. Harish Bhatia, the then AGM, by labeling false charges against him, which was duly replied.
However, instead of considering his reply, the AGM decided to hold a departmental enquiry against him, knowing
very well that he was suffering from multiple diseases, severe mental depression and financial crisis.
The claimant participated in the enquiry; however, the documents regarding the enquiry were not supplied to
him, in spite of repeated requests made by his legal assistant. He submitted that the dismissal order was supplied to
him only in the year 2019, mentioning therein his suspension issued by Sh. B.R. Tangri without any signature.
He relied upon the following documents:
Ex.WW-1/1: Copy of appreciation letter dated 05.04.1990 issued by the management to the deponent.
Ex.WW-1/2 (Colly): Copy of letter issued by the management to the deponent (date not specified).
Ex.WW-1/3: Copy of letter dated 20.07.1994.
Ex.WW-1/4: Copy of letter dated 04.07.1996.
Ex.WW-1/5: Copy of letter dated 17.09.1997.
Ex.WW-1/6 (Colly): Copy of letter dated 04.03.1997.
Ex.WW-1/7: Copy of letter dated 12.02.1997.
Ex.WW-1/8: Copy of letter dated 02.06.1999.
Ex.WW-1/9 (Colly – 31 Pages): Copies of letters and medical certificates submitted by the deponent for
medical leave.
Ex.WW-1/10 (Colly – 2 Pages): Copy of complaint/charge sheet dated 19.08.2002.
Ex.WW-1/11: Copy of dismissal order dated 22.10.2003.
Ex.WW-1/12: Copy of notice/representation dated 09.10.2019 along with postal receipt dated 17.10.2019.
Surprisingly, the witness stated in his cross-examination that he had not received the dismissal letter in 2003.
He claimed that he visited connaught place branch of the management bank in 2019, where he was given the charge
sheet and termination letter. He further stated that he hadn‘t received charge-sheet earlier in 2002.
The management relied upon the judgment of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India in The Nedungadi Bank
Ltd. vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors., Civil Appeal no. 638 of 2000, (MANU/SC/0049/2000), where in Para-6, it
was held:
Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under
Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters
which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There
appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case
after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was
made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is
stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be
said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become
final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in
the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the
time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6105
other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were
dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for
raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and Incompetent.
On the other hand, the claimant relied upon the judgment decided by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India, in
Sapan Kumar Pandit vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Others, appeal (civil) 4471 of 2001 AIR 2001 SUPREME
COURT 2562, decided on 24 July 2001, where it was held that delay in filing a case is justified when the dispute has
remained alive, though not galvanized on account of other justified reasons.
The gist of the claimant‘s arguments is that he was not aware of his dismissal order in 2003 and he came to
know about it only in 2019, when he visited the Connaught place branch, where he was given the charge-sheet as well
as the order of dismissal. During the course of arguments, he was asked to produce the person who allegedly gave
him these documents. However, he later expressed his inability to do so.
This tribunal fails to understand how an unknown person could have given the charge-sheet and dismissal
order to him, without knowing the identity of the claimant. It is also an admitted fact that in 2002, the claimant
himself had admitted that he had participated in the enquiry proceedings therein which had been arisen out of the
charge-sheet issued to him, of which he had submitted a reply. How could he now escape the fact that he was not
aware of the charge-sheet as well as the dismissal order? A long time has elapsed in between, and due to this delay,
the enquiry file has been weeded out. Additionally, the erstwhile Oriental Bank of Commerce has now merged with
the Punjab National Bank, which may also have been the reason for untracing of the relevant files.
Nevertheless, it has been proved that there has been excessive delay and laches on the part of the claimant in
approaching the appropriate forum. While he alleges that some officials hatched conspiracy against him which
resulted into enquiry and charge-sheet against him. However, he failed to provide any specific reason behind the
conspiracy against him, nor has he indicated any enmity with his colleagues or something else.
In view of the above facts and evidence on record, it is held that the claim is barred by laches. The claim has
been filed almost 18 years after his alleged dismissal. No record has been produced to demonstrate what steps the
claimant took to re-join duties, if he was genuinely unaware of his dismissal. It has also not been explained whether
any suspension allowance was given to him, or it was stopped. Nothing related to this matter has been brought on
record.
In light of the above findings, the reference is answered against the claimants and in favor of the
management. Accordingly, the claim of the claimant stands dismissed. The claimant is not entitled to any relief.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for notification under section 17 of the I.D Act. The case
file is consigned to record room.
ATUL KUMAR GARG, Presiding Officer
Dated 23.06.2025
नइ ददल्ली, 4 जसतम् बर, 2025
का.अ. 1646.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
cSad vkWQ cM+kSnk ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa औद्योजगक
vf/kdj.k@JeU;k;ky;
ds iapkV ¼dsUnzh;½&03@2016¼lhvkbZ,l&03@2016½¼lh,uvkj&vkjtsdsVh060001732016½ izdkf”kr
djrh gSA
[सं
एल-12012/14/2016-अइअर(बी-II)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 4th September, 2025
S.O. 1646.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 03/2016(CIS-03/2016) (CNR- RJKT 060001732016) of the
Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Kota as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the
management of Bank of Baroda and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/14/2016- IR(B-II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
6106
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
U;k;k/kh'k] vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k¼dsUnzh;½dksVk]¼jkt-½
ihBklhu vf/kdkjh& lanhi dqekj 'kekZ] vkj-ts-,l- ¼ftyk tt laoxZ½
funsZ'k izdj.k dzekad%vkS-U;k-¼dsUnzh;½&03@2016¼lhvkbZ,l&03@2016½
¼lh,uvkj&vkjtsdsVh060001732016½
fnukad LFkkfir% 18-05-2016
izlax%
Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh ds vkns'k dz- ,y&12012@14@2016
¼vkbZvkj¼ch&II½½ fn-21-04-2016
funsZ'k@fookn vUrxZr /kkjk 10¼1½¼?k½ ,oa mi/kkjk 2¼d½ vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e]1947
e/;
nsoyky xqtZj iq= Jh NksVwyky xqtZj] fuoklh okMZ ua- 13] xzke uekuk] rglhy o ftyk cwUnh
--------izkFkhZ Jfed
,oa
1-
lgk;d cSad vkwQ cM+kSnk] 'kk[kk uekuk] ftyk cwanh
2-
lgk;d izca/kd] cSad vkWQ cM+kSnk] {kS=h; dk;kZy;] dksVk ¼jkt-½
3-
egkizca/kd] cSad vkWQ cM+kSnk] t;iqj ¼jkt-½
--------vizkFkhZx.k fu;kstd
mifLFkr
izkFkhZ Jfed dh vksj ls izfrfuf/k%&
Jh iq:"kksRre nk/khp
vizkFkhZ fu;kstd dh vksj ls izfrfuf/k%&
Jh lqjs'k ekFkqj
%%vf/kfu.kZ;%%
fn-% 04-06-2025
Hkkjr ljdkj] Je ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh ds izklkafxd vkns'k fnukad 21-04-2016 ds tfj;s funsZ'k fookn] vkS|ksfxd fookn
vf/kfu;e] 1947 ¼ftls vkxs ^^vf/kfu;e^^ ls lEcksf/kr fd;k tkosxk½ dh /kkjk 10¼1½¼?k½ ds vUrxZr bl U;k;kf/kdj.k dks vf/kfu.kZ;kFkZ lEizsf"kr
fd;k x;k gS%&
^^D;k deZdkj Jh nsoyky xqtZj iq= Jh NksVwyky th xqtZj dks izca/kd Jheku izca/kd] cSad vkWQ cM+kSnk] 'kk[kk uekuk] ftyk cwanh
¼jkt-½ 2- Jheku lgk;d izca/kd] cSad vkwQ cM+kSnk {kS=h; dk;kZy;] dksVk ¼jkt-½ o 3- Jheku egkizca/kd cSad vkWQ cM+kSnk] t;iqj
¼jkt-½ }kjk ekSf[kd vkns'k fnukad 31-10-2013 }kjk ukSdjh ls fudkyus o fu;fer dk;Z ij ugha ysus dh dk;Zokgh fof/k ,oa
U;k;laxr gS \ ;fn ugha rks izkFkhZ fdl jkgr o dc ls ikus dk gdnkj gS \**
2&mDr fookn] U;k;kf/kdj.k esa jsQj gksus ij iathc) dj i{kdkjksa dks mifLFkfr ckcr uksfVl tkjh fd, x,A uksfVl dh ikyuk esa izkFkhZ
Jfed }kjk mifLFkr gksdj LVsVesUV vkWQ Dyse U;k;kf/kdj.k ds le{k izLrqr dj laf{kIrr% ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd fu;kstd }kjk izkFkhZ
Jfed dks fnukad 01-01-1994 ls prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh ds in ij lsok esa fu;ksftr fd;kA izkFkhZ dk fu;kstu vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 }kjk fd;s tkus ds
i'pkr bldh lwpuk vizkFkhZ la[;k 2 o 3 dks vuqeksnu gsrq nh tkrh FkhA fu;kstd us iwoZ lwpuk ds fcuk fnukad 31-10-2013 dks Jfed dks
ukSdjh ls gVk fn;k] tks voS/k gSA fnukad 18-03-2008 dks esustesaV cSad vkWQ cM+kSnk ,oa vkWy bf.M;k cSad vkWQ cM+kSnk ,EIykbZt QsMjs'ku ds
e/; ekaxks ds laca/k esa ,d le>kSrk lEiUu gqvk FkkA ml le>kSrs ds vUrxZr dstqvy fivksu LihlZ vkfn dks cSad dh fu;fer lsok esa ysus ds
laca/k esa fu.kZ; fy;s x;s Fks rFkk bl le>kSrs dh 'krZ la[;k 2 ds Qst kk o Qst kkk ds vUrxZr izkFkHZ fu;fer gksus dk vf/kdkjh gSA izkFkhZ us
bl laca/k esa fu;fer djus gsrq fuosnu fd;k Fkk ijarq bl ij dksbZ /;ku ugha fn;k x;kA Jfed us fu;kstd ds ;gka fnukad 01-01-1994 ls 30-
10-2013 rd fujUrj dk;Z fd;k gS rFkk bl vof/k esa 240 fnu ls vf/kd le; ls dk;Z fd;k gS] tks fd NaVuh dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrk gSA Jfed
dks lsok i`Fkd djrs le; ofj"Brk lwph dk izdk'ku ugha fd;k x;k] uk gh Jfed dks uksfVl] uksfVl osru ,oa NaVuh eqvkotk vnk fd;k x;k
tks fd vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e dh /kkjkvksa dk mYya?ku gS vkSj izkFkZuk dh gS fd izkFkhZx.k dks Jfed ds fiNys lEiw.kZ osru dk ykHk fnyk;k
tkosA
vizkFkhZ fu;kstd dh vksj ls LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse dk tokc izLrqr dj vfHkdFku fd;k fd Jfed dks vizkFkhZ }kjk dksbZ fu;qfDr ugha
nh x;h rks ,sls esa mls gVkus dk iz'u gh mRiUu ugha gksrk gSA izfri{kh laLFkku Hkkjr ljdkj dk midze gS ftlesa fu;qfDr ds fu;e cuq gq, gS
ftlds vuqlkj ;k rks fu;qfDr gsrq v[kckj esa lwpuk izdkf'kr dh tkrh gS fu;kstu dk;kZy; ls uke eaxok;s tkrs gS mu O;fDr;ksa dks tks ukSdjh
ikuk pkgrs gS igys lk{kkRdkj gksrk gS] lk{kkRdkj esa ikl gksus ds i'pkr mu O;fDr;ksa dks fu;qfDr i= fn;k tkrk gS fu;qfDr i= nsus ds mijkar
ukSdjh nh tkrh gSA bu izfdz;kvksa ds fcuk fdlh dks izfri{kh laLFkku esa ukSdjh ugah nh tk ldrh gSA izkFkhZ ds dsl esa mDr dksbZ izfdz;k ugha
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6107
viukbZ xbZ D;ksafd izkFkhZ dks ukSdjh ij j[kk gh ugha bl dkj.k ls u rks izkFkhZ dks fu;qfDr i= fn;k x;k u gh izkFkhZ mDr izfdz;k ls gh xqtjkA
bu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa ;g lkQ tkfgj gS fd izkFkhz dHkh izfri{kh dk fu;skftr deZpkjh ugha jgk gSA 'kk[kk izca/kd dks LFkk;h :i ls ukSDjh ij
j[kus dk dksbZ vf/kdkj ugah gksrk gSA vxj 'kk[kk izca/kd fdlh deZpkjh ls dksbZ dke djkrk gS rks mls laLFkku esa LFkk;h deZpkjh ds :i esa
ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA var esa izkFkZuk dh gS fd izkFkhZ dk Dyse izkFkZuk i= lO;; [kkfjt fd;k tkosA
3&lk{; esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls Lo;a izkFkhZ nsoyky xqtZj ,oa vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls jkedqekj eh.kk ds 'kiFk i= izLrqr fd;s x;s gSa ftu ij ijLij
ftjg dh xbZ gSA izkFkhZ i{k dh vksj ls nLrkosth lk{; Hkh izLrqr dh xbZ gS ftldk ;Fkk le; mYys[k fd;k tkosxkA
4&mHk;i{k dh cgl lquh xbZ tks fd mudh vksj ls izLrqr vius&vius vH;kosnuksa ds vuq:i gh jgh gSA izkFkhZi{k dh vksj ls nkSjkus cgl ;g
dFku fd;k x;k gS fd Jfed dks vizkFkhZ fu;kstd us fn- 01-01-1994 dks fu;ksftr fd;k x;k vkSj fn- 31-10-1994 dks Jfed dks vizkFkhZ }kjk
fcuk lwpuk ds o uksfVl osru ds gVk fn;k] mDr vof/k ds nkSjku Jfed us izR;sd dys.Mj o"kZ esa 240 fnu ls vf/kd le; rd dk;Z fd;k gSA
nkSjkus cgl vizkFkhZ izfrfuf/k dk dsoy ;g rdZ jgk gS fd izkFkhZ us muds ;gka fdlh Hkh dys.Mj o"kZ esa 240 fnu dk;Z ugha fd;k gS
blfy, izdj.k esa vf/kfu;e ds izko/kku ykxw ugha gksrs gSA izkFkhZ }kjk uk rks viuk fu;qfDr i= uk gh lsokeqfDr i= lk{; esa izLrqr fd;k gS
tcfd izkFkhZ Lo;a viuh lk{; esa fnukad 01-10-1994 dks vizkFkhZ ds fu;sktu esa dk;Z djuk o fu;qfDr ikuk dFku djrk gS ijarq lk{; esa dksbZ
nLrkost izLrqr ugha fd;s x;s gSaA vius dFkuksa ds leFkZu esa vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls fuEufyf[kr U;kf;d n`"Vkar izLrqr fd;s x;s ftudk llEeku
voyksdu fd;k x;k rFkk muls ekxZn'kZu izkIr fd;k x;k%&
1-
2004(103) FLR 187 SC Municipal Corporation Faridabad Vs. Siri Niwas
2-
2004(103) FLR SC Rajasthan State Ganganagar Mills Vs. State of Rajasthan
3-
2003(96) FLR 492 SC UP and Anr. Vs. Karak and Anr.
4-
206(110) FLR 1212 SC Krishna Bhagya Jala Vs. Mohammed Rafi.
5-
2006 LAB I.C. 883 SC Rgnl. Manager Vs. Rakesh kumar Tewari
6-
SC FLR 1997 (76) P 237 Himanshu Kumar Vs. State of Bihar and Other
7-
1999 LAB I,.C. 2662 Channey Lal and Vs. Director Malaria Research Centre.
8-
RLR 1996 (2) Shashi Kant Vs. State of Raj.
9-
2003(98) FLR 385 Rajasthan High Court Regional Manager Bank of Baroda Vs. PO Central Govt.
10-
2006 (110) FLR 767 SC HUDA and Jagmal singh
11-
2008(117) FLR 312 Patna High Court Sanjay Kumar Tiwary Vs. State of Bihar
12-
2002 (95) FLR 1137 Kerala High Court President Peroorkada Service Co Operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Smt. S.
Sheena and Other
13-
MAT No. 3764/1998 dated 10-03-1999 High Court of Calcutta Between Calcutta Tramways Co. Vs. Ramesh
and 17 Others.
5&gLrxr izdj.k esa U;k;ky; dks eq[; :i ls ;g ns[kuk gS fd D;k izkFkhZ Jfed nsoyky xqtZj us mlds }kjk of.kZr lsok i`Fkdrk fnukad
31-10-2013 ls Bhd iwoZ ds ,d dys.Mj esa 240 fnu dk;Z fd;k gS vFkok ugha\
bl laca/k esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls lk{; esa Lo;a dk 'kiFki= izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ftlesa mlus LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse esa of.kZr rF;ksa dh
iqujko`fRr dh gS vkSj ftjg esa dFku fd;k gS fd mlus cSad ds vkns'k fnukad 01-01-1994 dk gokyk 'kiFk i= esa fn;k gS ysfdu mDr vkns'k
i=koyh esa is'k ugh gSA fnukad 01-11-2012 ls 31-10-2013 rd mlus ftrus fnu dke fd;k gS mlds laca/k esa nLrkost i=koyh esa is'k fd;k
gSA izkFkhZ us i=koyh ns[kdj dgk fd i=koyh esa ,slk dksbZ nLrkost ugh gSA izn'kZ 5 ,-Mh- ,e lkgc us tks lwpuk ekaxh gS mldh QksVks izfr gS]
,-Mh-,e us tks lwpuk ekaxh Fkh og ;s gS fd fdl deZpkjh us fdrus fnu dke fd;k gSA izn'kZ 5 esa ugh fy[kk gqvk gS fd mlus dc ls dc rd
dke fd;k gSA mlus fdl eghus] fdl lky fdrus&fdrus fnu dke fd;k gS mlds laca/k esas izn'kZ 8 esa fy[kk gqvk gS tks lgh fy[kk gqvk gSA
izn'kZ 4 ds vuqlkj ;s LVsVesaUV 2009 ls 2012 rd dk gS mlds igys dk LVsVesUV ystj esa gksrk FkkA ;g ckr lgh gS fd izn'kZ 4 ds vykok
igys ds vkSj ckn ds LVsVesUV mlds ikl ugh Fks blfy, mlus is'k ugh fd;s gSA ;g ckr lgh gS fd ukSdjh ij j[kus o gVkus dk dksbZ i=
vf/kdkjh us ugh fn;k Fkk blfy, mlus is'k ugh fd;kA mlus ukSdjh ls gVus ds ckn cSad dks dksbZ uksfVl ugh fn;kA mlus fnukad 01-01-1994
ls ysdj 31-10-2013 rd fdrus fnu] fdrus eghus vkSj fdrus lky dke fd;k mldk jsdkWMZ mlds ikl ugh gS cSad ds ikl gksxkA mlus cSad
ls jsdkWMZ izkIr djus ds fy, cSad dks dksbZ uksfVl ugh fn;kA
lk{; esa vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls jkedqekj eh.kk dk 'kiFk i= izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ftlesa mUgksaus tokc LVsVesaV vkWQ Dyse esa of.kZr rF;ksa
dh iqujko`fRr dh gS vkSj ftjg esa ;g dFku fd;k gS fd og miyC/k fjdkWMZ ns[kdj vk;k gSA cSad vkWQ cMkSnk] 'kk[kk uekuk] ftyk cwanh esa
mldh fu;qfDr flrEcj 2022 ls gSA fnukad 01-01-1994 ls 30-10-2013 rd mDr vof/k esa mldh ml 'kk[kk esa fu;qfDr ugha FkhA mDr
vof/k esa izca/kd dkSu Fks mlds ckjs esa fjdkWMZ ns[kdj crk ldrk gSA ;g ckr lgh gS fd nSfud osru deZpkfj;ks dks okmpj ls Hkqxrku fd;k
tkrk gSA ;g ckr lgh gS fd mDr vof/k esa ftrus Hkh deZpkfj;ksa us dke fd;k gS muds ckmpj i=koyh esa is'k ugh fd;s gSA orZeku esa 10
lky iqjkus fjdkWMZ dks cSad ds fu;ekuqlkj 'kk[kk ls ys tkrs gSA mDr fjdkWMZ dks orZeku esa miyC/k ugh djok ldrs gSaA ;g ckr lgh gS fd 10
lky iqjkus fjdkWMZ dks gVkus dk ifji= Hkh i=koyh esa is'k ugh fd;k gSA 10 lky iqjkuk fjdkWMZ {ks=h; dk;kZy; ds vkns'kkuqlkj osUMj dks
fHktok fn;k tkrk gSA mDr vof/k dk dkSu&dkSu lk fjdkWMZ fHktok;k gS mldk fooj.k Hkh i=koyh esa is'k ugh fd;k gSA izn'kZ MCY;w 6 o 7
6108
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA :SEPTEMBER 13, 2025/BHADRA 22, 1947
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
gekjs cSad dk gh gS ijUrq blesa tks fy[kk gS mlds ckjs esa mls irk ugh gSA izn'kZ MCY;w 8 dh mls tkudkjh ugh gSA izn'kZ MCY;w 5 esa flrEcj
1994 ls dke djuk crk;k gS og lgh gSA ftu Hkh nSfud osru Hkksxh deZpkfj;ksa us 90 fnu dke fd;k gS mudk LFkkbZdj.k fd;k gks rks mls
irk ugh gS] 90 fnu esa LFkkbZdj.k djuk cSad ds fu;e esa ugh gSA fu;fer deZpkfj;ksa dh lwph gSM vkWfQl esa gksrh gSA mls irk ugh gS fd
fnukad 01-01-1994 ds ckn ds nSfud osru Hkksxh deZpkfj;ks dk fu;fefrdj.k dj fn;k gks vkSj Jfed dk fu;fefrdj.k ugh fd;k x;k gksA
mls irk ugh gS fd izkFkhZ dks 31-10-2013 dks fudky fn;k x;k gksA izn'kZ MCY;w 1 dh mls tkudkjh ugh gSA izn'kZ MCY;w 1 dh tkudkjh
tujy eSustj ,p0vkj0,e0 MhikVZesUV ns ldrk gSA izn'kZ MCY;w 1 cSad vkSj ;wfu;u ds chp dk le>kSrk gSA izn'kZ MCY;w 2 o 3 dh mls
tkudkjh ugh gSA izn'kZ MCY;w 4 esa Jfed }kjk eghus esa ftrus fnu dke fd;k gS mldh etnwjh dh jkf'k mlds cpr [kkrs esa Mkyh xbZ gSA
izn'kZ MCY;w 9 yxk;r 13 dh mls tkudkjh ugh gS ijUrq izn'kZ 12 dk cSad }kjk fgUnh esa izn'kZ 13 tokc fn;k x;k gSA izn'kZ MCY;w 14 o 15
dh mls tkudkjh ugh gSA mls irk ugh gS fd izkFkhZ dks fcuk NaVuh ds eqvkotk fn;s gVk fn;k x;k gksA nSfud osru Hkksxh deZpkjh dh gkftjh
ugh yxrh gSA mls irk ugh gS fd Jfed us muds ;gka 20 lky dke fd;k gksA
6&i=koyh ds voyksdu ls izdV gS fd çkFkhZ }kjk vizkFkhZ ds fu;sktu esa fnukad 01-01-1994 ls 30-10-2013 rd yxkrkj dk;Z djuk crk;k x;k
gS ysfdu izkFkhZ dh vksj ls dsoy ek= Dyse o 'kiFk&i= dh lk{; esa gh ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd mlus vçkFkhZ ds v/khu fnukad 01-01-1994
ls 30-10-2013 rd fujUrj dk;Z djrs gq, 240 fnu ls Hkh vf/kd le; rd dk;Z iw.kZ fd;k gS ijarq bl laca/k esa dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; izLrqr
ugha h x;h gS vksj tks nLrkosth lk{; izn'kZ MCy;w- 4 izLrqr fd;k x;k gS og fnukad 19-09-2009 ls 24-09-2012 rd dh vof/k dk gSA blds
vfrfjDr izn'kZ MCy;w- 5 esa Hkh izkFkhZ dk uke vafdr gS ijUrq mDr izn'kZ MCY;w- 5 ij izkFkhZ dk uke fdl :i esa vafdr gS ;g izdV ugha gS vkSj
mDr nLrkost fnukad 24-07-2009 dks tkjh fd;k tkuk izdV gksrk gSA blds vfrfjDr izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izn'kZ MCy;w-8 nLrksot izLrqr dj
iznf'kZr djk;k x;k gS ftlesa nSfud osru Hkksxh deZpkfj;ksa dk fooj.k gS ftlesa izkFkhZ dh lsok vof/k fnukad 27-02-1996 ls 31-03-2001 rd dh
vafdr dh x;h gSA izkFkhZ Lo;a us ftjg esa ;g Li"V dFku fd;k gS fd ^^mlus cSad ds vkns'k fnukad 01-01-1994 dk gokyk 'kiFk i= esa fn;k gS
ysfdu mDr vkns'k i=koyh esa is'k ugh gSA fnukad 01-11-2012 ls 31-10-2013 rd mlus ftrus fnu dke fd;k gS mlds laca/k esa nLrkost
i=koyh esa is'k fd;k gSA izkFkhZ us i=koyh ns[kdj dgk fd i=koyh esa ,slk dksbZ nLrkost ugh gSA mlus fdl eghus] fdl lky fdrus&fdrus
fnu dke fd;k gS mlds laca/k esas izn'kZ 8 esa fy[kk gqvk gS tks lgh fy[kk gqvk gSA izn'kZ 4 ds vuqlkj ;s LVsVesaUV 2009 ls 2012 rd dk gS
mlds igys dk LVsVesUV ystj esa gksrk FkkA ;g ckr lgh gS fd izn'kZ 4 ds vykok igys ds vkSj ckn ds LVsVesUV mlds ikl ugh Fks blfy,
mlus is'k ugh fd;s gSA mlus ukSdjh ls gVus ds ckn cSad dks dksbZ uksfVl ugh fn;kA** bl izdkj izn'kZ 8 ds eqrkfcd izkFkhZ }kjk fnukad 27-02-
1996 ls 31-03-2001 rd dk;Z fd;k tkuk izdV gksrk gSA ,sls esa mDr leLr nLrkostkr ds voyksdu ls izdV gS fd izkFkhZ }kjk mldh lsok
i`Fkdrk fnukad 31-10-2013 ls Bhd iwoZ ,d dys.Mj o"kZ esa 31-10-2012 ls 30-10-2013 rd dh vof/k esa 240 fnol rd dk;Z fd;k gksA izkFkhZ ds
dFkuksa dk [k.Mu djrs gq, vizkFkhZ us crk;k gS fd izkFkhZ us muds ;gka vyx&vyx le;ksa ij vkdfLed@vLFkk;h vk/kkj ij dsoy
vkdfLedrk esa vko';drk ds vk/kkj ij uekuk 'kk[kk esa dk;Z fd;k gS blds vfrfjDr izkFkhZ us muds ;gka dksbZ dk;Z ugha fd;k gSA izkFkhZ dh
vksj ls ,slh dksbZ nLrkosth ;k ekSf[kd lk{; i=koyh ij is'k ugha dh xbZ gS ftlls ;g izekf.kr gksrk gks fd mlus vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa
mlds }kjk of.kZr lsok lekfIr fnukad 31-10-2013 ls Bhd ,d iwoZ ds dys.Mj esa 240 fnu dk;Z fd;k gksA izkFkhZ }kjk ,slk dksbZ izkFkZuk i= Hkh
U;k;ky; ds le{k izLrqr ugha fd;k gS ftlesa ;g izkFkZuk dh xbZ gks fd mlds fu;sktu o dk;Z ds laca.k esa vizkFkhZ ls nLrkost ryc fd;s
tkos] blds vfrfjDr izkFkhZ dh vksj ls tks nLrkost dh ekax lwpuk ds vf/kdkj ds rgr dh xbZ gS mldk izkFkZuk i= izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ijarq
mlds laca/k esa mls D;k lwpuk izkIr gqbZ bldk mYys[k ;k dksbZ nLrksth lk{; izLrqr ugha dh xbZ gSA blds vfrfjDr tks le>kSrk izn'kZ MCy;w-
1 izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr fd;k x;k gS mlesa izkFkhZ i{kdkj gksuk izdV ugha gksrk gS ,sls esa mDr le>kSrk izkFkhZ ij ykxw Hkh ugha gksrk gSA izkFkhZ
}kjk tks jkstxkj dk;kZy; dk dkMZ izn'kZ McY;w- 2 o 3 izLrqr fd;k gS mlls Hkh izkFkhZ dks ,slh lgk;rk izkIr ugha gksrh gS fd izkFkhZ vizkFkhZ ds
fu;sktu esa mldh lsok lekfIr dh frfFk ls iwoZ 12 dys.Mj ekgksa esa dk;Zjr jgk gksA izkFkhZ dks okafNr vuqrks"k izkIr djus ds fy, ;g izekf.kr
djuk vko';d gS fd mlds }kjk crkbZ xbZ lsok lekfIr fnukad 31-10-2013 ls Bhd iwoZ ds 12 dyS.Mj ekg esa mlds }kjk vizkFkhZ ds v/khu
fujUrj 240 fnu dk;Z fd;k x;k Fkk] fdUrq bl lEcU/k esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls tks lk{; izLrqr dh x;h gS] mlls mlds dFkuksa dh fdlh Hkh izdkj
ls iqf"V ugha gksrh gSA izkFkhZ Jfed ij 240 fnu yxkrkj dke djus ds rF; dks lkfcr djus dk tks Hkkj gS] mlesa izkFkhZ Jfed }kjk dsoy ek=
vius 'kiFk&i= esa ;g fy[k nsuk fd mlus 240 fnu rd yxkrkj dke fd;k] i;kZIr ugha gksxk] vfirq mls fdlh Bksl ekSf[kd ,oa
izys[kh;@nLrkosth lk{; ls bl rF; dks lkfcr djuk gksxk ftlls fd ;g rF; lEiq"V gks lds] ijUrq gLrxr izdj.k esa i=koyh ij miyC/k
lk{; ls izkFkhZ ;g rF; lkfcr djus esa iw.kZr;k vlQy jgk gS fd mlds }kjk crkbZ xbZ lsok lekfIr dh fnukad ls Bhd iwoZ ds 12 dyS.Mj
ekg dh vof/k esa mlus vizkFkhZ ds fu;kstu esa fujUrj 240 ;k mlls vf/kd dk;Z fd;k gSA ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk fuEufyf[kr U;kf;d
n`"Vkarksa esa bl laca/k esa le;≤ ij ;gh fl)kar izfrikfnr fd;k gS&
Ranip Nagar Palika Vs. Babuji Gabhaji Thakore-IX(2007) SLT 805 SC esa ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;g
fl)kar izfrikfnr fd;k gS fd LABOUR LAW- 240 days completion of service- Burden of proof lies on workman to
show he worked continuously for 240 days for preceding one year - It is for workman to adduce evidence apart
from examining himself to prove factum of being in employment of employer.
State of Gujrat vs Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar, (2001) 9 SCC 713. esa ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;g
fl)kar izfrikfnr fd;k gS fd In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus of the management without
first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year
preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the
appeallant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year
preceding his termination. Filling of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as
sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for
240 days in a year. No Proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or
engagement for this period was produced by the workman. on this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : जसतम् बर 13, 2025/ भाद्र 22, 1947
6109
Rajasthan State Ganganagar Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr. v(2004) LST
686=2004(8)SCC161,
esa ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;g fl)kar izfrikfnr fd;k gS fd "It was the case of the
workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was denied by the appellant. It
was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his
termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded
as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240
days in a year. These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer vs S.T. Hadimani, 2002 (3) SCC 25. No
Proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produceci. Mere Non-production
of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked
for 240 days as claimed."
Manager Reserve Bank of India Bangalore Vs S. Mani and Others 2005 (5) SCC page 100 esa ekuuh;
loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;g fl)kar izfrikfnr fd;k gS fd The Initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he
had compledted 240 days of service. Tribunal's view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous.
R.M. Yellatti Vs The Asst. Executive Engineer (2006 (1) SCC 1006) 2005 AIR SCW 6103 esa ekuuh;
loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;g fl)kar izfrikfnr fd;k gS fd "Analysing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the
provisions of the Evidence Act. in terms do not apply to the proceedings under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes
Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgements we find that this court has
repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a
given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in thewitness box. This burden is discharged
upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily
waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment.
Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal
muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance
register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above
decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will
not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for
240 days in a given year. The above judgements further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se
without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse
inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgements lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case."
7&bl izdkj mijksDr foospu o fo'ys"k.k ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ viuh lk{; ls ;g fl) dj ikus esa vlQy jgk gS fd mlus vizkFkhZx.k ds ;gka
mlds }kjk of.kZr lsok lekfIr fnukad 31-10-2013 ls Bhd iwoZ ds ,d dyS.Mj o"kZ] vFkkZr 12 dyS.Mj ekg esa fujUrj 240 fnu dk;Z fd;k gS
,slh fLFkfr esa izkFkhZ Jfed] vizkFkhZx.k fu;kstd ls fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ vuqrks"k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gksuk ugha ik;k tkrk gS ,oa lEizsf"kr
funsZ'k@jsQzsUl blh vuq:i mRrfjr gksus ;ksX; gSA
izkFkhZ Jfed nsoyky xqtZj viuh lk{; ls ;g
fl) dj ikus esa vlQy jgk gS fd mlus vizkFkhZ izca/kd] cSad vkWQ cM+kSnk] 'kk[kk uekuk] ftyk cwanh ds ;gka mlds }kjk
of.kZr lsok lekfIr fnukad 31-10-2013 ls Bhd iwoZ ds ,d dyS.Mj o"kZ] vFkkZr 12 dyS.Mj ekg esa fujUrj 240 fnu dk;Z
fd;k gS ,slh fLFkfr esa izkFkhZ Jfed] vizkFkhZx.k fu;kstd ls fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ vuqrks"k izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh ugha gSA
¼lanhi dqekj 'kekZ½
U;k;k/kh'k
vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k ¼dsUnzh;½] dksVk ¼jkt-½
vf/kfu.kZ; vkt fnukad 04-06-2025 dks [kqys U;k;kf/kdj.k esa lquk;k tkdj gLrk{kfjr fd;k x;k ftls fu;ekuqlkj leqfpr ljdkj
dks izdk'kukFkZ fHktok;k tkosA
¼lanhi dqekj 'kekZ½
U;k;k/kh'k
vkS|ksfxd U;k;kf/kdj.k ¼dsUnzh;½] dksVk ¼jkt-½
Uploaded by Dte. of Printing at Government of India Press, Ring Road, Mayapuri, New Delhi-110064
and Published by the Controller of Publications, Delhi-110054. GORAKHA NATH
YADAVA
Digitally signed by GORAKHA
NATH YADAVA
Date: 2025.09.22 15:35:57 +05'30'