2087 GI/2026
(2061)
रजजस्ट्री सं. डी.एल. (एन) 04/0007/2003—05
REGD. NO. D. L. (N) 04/0007/2003—05
xxxGIDHxxx
xxxGIDExxx
प्राजधकार से प्रकाजित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
साप् ताजहक
WEEKLY
सं. 12]
नइ ददल् ली, माचच 29—ऄप्रैल 4, 2026, िजनवार/चैत्र 8—चैत्र 14, 1948
No. 12]
NEW DELHI, MARCH 29—APRIL 4, 2026, SATURDAY/CHAITRA 8––CHAITRA 14, 1948
आस भाग में जभन् न ृृ् सं् या दी जाती है जजससे दक यह ृृथक संकलन के प ृ में रखा जा सके
Separate Paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation
भाग II—खण् ड 3—ईृ-खण् ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)
भारत सरकार के मंत्रालयों (रक्षा मंत्रालय को छोड़कर) द्वारा जारी दकए गए सांजवजधक अदेि और ऄजधसूचनाएं
Statutory Orders and Notifications Issued by the Ministries of the Government of India
(Other than the Ministry of Defence)
जवत्त मंत्रालय
(जवत्तीय सेवाएं जवभाग)
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 454.—बीमांकक ऄजधजनयम, 2006 (2006 का 35) की धारा 12 की ईृधारा (2) के खंड (ख)(i)
द्वारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केन्रीय सरकार, एतद् द्वारा, श्री प्रिांत कुमार गोयल, भूतृूवच संयुि सजचव,
जवत्तीय सेवाएं जवभाग के स्ट्थान ृर श्री अिीष माधवराव मोरे, संयुि सजचव, जवत्तीय सेवाएं जवभाग को तत्काल प्रभाव
से और ऄगले अदेिों तक, जवत्त मंत्रालय का प्रजतजनजधत्व करने के जलए भारतीय बीमाकंक संस्ट् थान ृररषद के सदस्ट् य के
प ृ में नाजमत करती है।
[फा. सं. ए-11013/03/2024-बीमा-I]
ऄब्दुल गुफरान, ऄवर सजचव
सी.जी.-डी.एल.-सा.-18042026-271902
CG-DL-W-18042026-271902
सी.जी.-डी.एल.-सा.-18042026-271902
CG-DL-W-18042026-271902
2062
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
((Department of Financial Services)
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 454.—In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b)(i) of sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Actuaries
Act, 2006 (35 of 2006), the Central Government, hereby nominates Shri Ashish Madhaorao More, Joint Secretary,
Department of Financial Services as a member of the Council of the Institute of Actuaries of India to represent the
Ministry of Finance, with immediate effect and until further orders vice Shri Parshant Kumar Goyal, erstwhile, Joint
Secretary, Department of Financial Services.
[F. No. A-11013/03/2024-Ins. I]
ABDUL GUFRAN, Under Secy.
जिक्षा मंत्रालय
(ईच् चतर जिक्षा जवभाग)
नइ ददल्ली, 17 फरवरी, 2026
का.अ. 455.—लोक ृररसर (ऄनाजधकृत कब्जाधाररयों को बेदखल करना) ऄजधजनयम, 1971 (1971 का 40)
की धारा 3 दवारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केंर सरकार एतद्द्वारा नीचे दी गइ ताजलका के कॉलम (1) में
ईजल्लजखत ऄजधकारी, जो भारत सरकार के राजृजत्रत ऄजधकारी की रैंक के बराबर के ऄजधकारी है, को ईि ऄजधजनयम के
प्रयोजनाथच संृदा ऄजधकारी जनयुि करती है, जो ईि ताजलका के कॉलम (2) में जवजनर्ददष्ट लोक ृररसरों के संबंध में
ऄृने ऄजधकार क्षेत्र की स्ट्थानीय सीमाओं के भीतर, ईि ऄजधजनयम द्वारा ऄथवा ईसके तहत संृदा ऄजधकाररयों ृर सौंृे
गए कायो का जन् ृादन करेंगे और प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करेंगे:
सारणी
ऄजधकारी का ृदनाम
सावचजजनक ृररसरों की श्रेजणयां और क्षेत्राजधकार की स्ट्थानीय सीमाएं
(1)
(2)
रजजस्ट्रार, जवश् वेश्वरैया राष्ट्रीय प्रौद्योजगकी संस्ट्थान, नागृुर।
जवश् वेश्वरैया राष्ट्रीय प्रौद्योजगकी संस्ट्थान, नागृुर के प्रिासजनक
जनयंत्रण के तहत और ईससे संबंजधत सभी ृररसर।
[फा. सं. 11-4/2026-टीएस-III]
जवकास जत्रृा ी, ऄवर सजचव
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
(Department of Higher Education)
New Delhi, the 17th February, 2026
S.O. 455.—In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (40 of 1971), the Central Government hereby appoints the officer mentioned in
column (1) of the Table below being an officer equivalent to the rank of gazetted officer of the Government of India
to be the Estate Officer for the purposes of the said Act who shall exercise the powers conferred and perform the
duties imposed on estate officers by or under the said Act, within the local limits of his jurisdiction in respect of the
public premises specified in column (2) of the said Table:-
Table
Designation of Officer
Categories of public premises and local limits of jurisdiction
(1)
(2)
Registrar, Visvesvaraya National Institute of
Technology, Nagpur.
All the premises belonging to and under the administrative
control of the Visvesvaraya National Institute of
Technology, Nagpur.
[F. No. 11-4/2026-TS.III]
VIKAS TRIPATHI, Under Secy.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2063
कौिल जवकास और ईद्यमिीलता मंत्रालय
(प्रजिक्षण महाजनदेिालय)
नइ ददल्ली, 11 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 456.—केंर सरकार, राजभाषा (संघ के िासकीय प्रयोजनों के जलए प्रयोग) जनयम 1976 (यथासंिोजधत
1987, 2007 और 2011) के जनयम 10 के ईृ-जनयम (4) के ऄनुसरण में प्रजिक्षण महाजनदेिालय, कौिल जवकास और
ईद्यमिीलता मंत्रालय के जनयंत्रणाधीन राष्ट्रीय कौिल प्रजिक्षण संस्ट्थान, लुजधयाना, जजसके 80% से ऄजधक कार्ममकों ने
जहन्दी का कायचसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर जलया है, को ऄजधसूजचत करती है।
[फा. सं. डीजीटी-इ-11012/1/2017-हहदी]
सुनील कुमार गुप् ता, ईृ महाजनदेिक
MINISTRY OF SKILL DEVELOPMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
(Directorate General of Training)
New Delhi, the 11th March, 2026
S.O. 456.—In Pursuance of sub- rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Languages (Use for Official Purposes of
the Union) Rule 1976 (as amended 1987, 2007 and 2011), the Central Government hereby notifies the National Skill
Training Institute, Ludhiana under control of Directorate General of Training, Ministry of Skill Development and
Entrepreneurship whose more than 80% staff have acquired working knowledge of Hindi.
[F. No. DGT-E-11012/1/2017-HINDI]
SUNIL KUMAR GUPTA, Dy. Director General
ईत्तर ृूवी क्षेत्र जवकास मंत्रालय
नइ ददल्ली, 9 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 457.—राष्ट्रृजत, केंरीय जसजवल सेवा (वगीकरण, जनयंत्रण एवं ऄृील) जनयम, 1965 के जनयम 8 के
प्रावधान के ृरंतुक के ऄनुसरण में और कार्ममक जवभाग के ददनांक 18.1.1973 के अदेि सं्या 7/8/72-स्ट्था.(ए) का
ऄजधक्रमण करते हुए, एतद्द्वारा अदेि देते हैं दक ईत्तर ृूवी ृररषद (एनइसी) में केंरीय जसजवल सेवा, समूह 'क' और केंरीय
जसजवल ृद, समूह 'क' में 7वें केंरीय वेतन अयोग मैररक्स के वेतन स्ट्तर-11 वाली सभी जनयुजियां ईत्तर ृूवी ृररषद के
सजचव द्वारा की जाएंगी।
[फा. सं. ए-12011/1/2026 ऄवर सजचव (ृीएस) कायाचलय]
ृणाच साहाना, ऄवर सजचव
MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH EASTERN REGION
New Delhi, the 9th March, 2026
S.O. 457.—In pursuance of the proviso to the Rule 8 of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1965 and in supersession of Department of Personnel's Order No. 7/8/72-Ests(A) dated 18.1.1973, the
President hereby orders that all the appointments to Central Civil Services, Group ‗A‘ and Central Civil Posts, Group
‗A‘ carrying scale of Pay Level-11 of 7th CPC Matrix, in North Eastern Council (NEC) shall be made by Secretary of
the North Eastern Council.
[F. No. A-12011/1/2026 O/o UNDER SECRETARY(PS)]
PARNA SAHANA, Under. Secy.
2064
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 9 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 458.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
भारतीय स्ट्टेट बैंक ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; caxyksj ds iapkV (a33/2025) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y – 39025/01/2026 - vkbZ vkj (ch-II)-27]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT
New Delhi, the 9th March, 2026
S.O. 458.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 33/2025) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Bangalore as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Canara Bank and
their workmen.
[No. L-39025/01/2026- IR (B-II)-27]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, BANGALORE
DATED
: 6th FEBRUARY 2025
PRESENT : Smt. K P INDIRA B.A., LLB.
Presiding Officer
C R No. 33/2025
I Party
II Party
The General Secretary,
Canara Bank Staff Federation, No. 243,
RS Anugraha, 6th Cross, 8th Main,
Smapangirama Nagara,
BENGALURU – 560 027.
The General Manager,
Canara Bank,
Head Office, J C Road,
BANGALORE – 560 002.
Appearances
I Party :
General Secretary
II Party :
Shri P Udayashnakar Rai
Advocate
1.
The Office of the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C), Government of India, Ministry of Labour,
Bengaluru vide Order No. 95(FOC/36)2025-B4 dated 13.03.2025 in exercise of the power conferred by clause
(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred as ―The Act‖) (14 of 1947) referred the following Industrial Dispute to this Tribunal for adjudication:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of Canara Bank, Bangalore in not regularizing the services of
Smt. Geetha B N, Temporary worker with effect from 14.01.2024 is proper, legal and justified? If not,
what relief the workman is entitled to?‖
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2065
2.
In obedience to the notice issued from this Tribunal the I Party appeared in person and the II Party
appearance through counsel. During the pendency of the proceeding, the General Secretary of the I Party
appeared and filed Memo on 06.02.2026 stating that the concerned workman Smt. Geetha has now submitted
letter dated 27.10.2025 to the I Party Union stating that she is not attending duty due to her bad health and
requested the union to communicate the same to this Tribunal that she is not interested in pursuing the instant
matter. The Union thereon requested this Tribunal in the Memo aforesaid to dispose of the instant dispute in
the aforesaid scenario.
3.
Perused the records. The memo filed by the I Party Union dated 06.02.2026 bears the signature of the
General Secretary of the 1st Party Union which espoused the cause of the I Party and accompanied with the
letter of the I Party to the Union to withdraw the case. Therefore, in view of the above, the Memo is recorded
and prayer of the I Party is allowed. The reference is thus dismissed.
AWARD
Reference is dismissed. Transmit.
(Dictated to Secretary to Court, transcribed by him, corrected and signed by me on 06.02.2026)
K. P. INDIRA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 23 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 459.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार राष्ट्रीय आस्ट्ृात जनगम जलजमट जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट; जमडफील्ड आंडस्ट्रीज जलजमटेड; मेससच ऋजषता
एसोजसएट्स के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री मुरलीधर दलाइ के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक
ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- एमृी 10/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 23.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/03/2026-अइअर(एम)-6]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 23rd March, 2026
S.O. 459.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 10/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri Muralidhar Dalai which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 23.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-6]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 5th day of December 2025
M.P. No. 10/2017
Between:
Muralidhar Dalai,
S/o. D. Krishna,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…..Petitioner
2066
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 which is corresponding section 59 (2) under the Industrial Relation Code 2020 for the
recovery of the amount Rs. 77,683.69ps with regard to legitimate dues of full and final payments including
retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2067
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 836 working days,
amounting to Rs. 77,683.69ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent‘s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2069
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.77,683.69ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of
being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the
form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of
strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August
2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of
Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
―Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates‘ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2071
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.77,683.69ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at serial No. 24 and
against his name the total number of working days 836 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl.No.59 name of the Petitioner, Sri Muralidhar
Dalai, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.77,683.69ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, on going oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 77,683.69ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex.W8, W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged for
work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry of
R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, on going oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.77,683.69ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon‘ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon‘ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is
liable to pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable
to the contract labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing
similar work. The Division Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose.
Section 21(1), however, provides that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each
worker employed by his. Section 21(4) provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part
thereof, the principal employer is liable to make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor
as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition
of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals
with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to each of his worker; The definition of wages
would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the contractor is liable to pay his workers
under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts falling within the definition of wages
under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative of the principal employer
supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of Section 21 are
specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of employment
with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21 does not
deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between
the contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition
of “wages” under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon‘ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2073
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
―2(00) ―retrenchment ―means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or‖
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
2074
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 corresponding section 59 (2) under
the Industrial Relation Code is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 77,683.69ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order. Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to
Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on
this the 5th day of December, 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri Muralidhar Dalai .
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2075
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10: Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11: Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12: Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14: Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512832 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
2076
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 460.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a135/2025) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12025/01/2026-अइअर(बी-I)-68]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 460.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 135/2025) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2026- IR(B-I)-68]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: - Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 5th February, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 135/2025
Between:
Sri Mondi Naresh
H. No. 3-157, SC Colony,
Parvathadevarapalli
Sri Satya Sai District
Andhra Pradesh-515641
..….Petitioner
AND
The Proprietor, M/s Rajendra Management Group
WZ, 206, St No. 15, Sadha Nagar, Palem Colony
New Delhi-110045
The General Manager
State Bank of India(SBI), Silk Branch, Dharmavaram
Sri Satya sai District
Andhra Pradesh-515671
… Respondents
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s M Venkatesh, Advocate
For the Respondent(s): None
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No.7/128/2024-B1 dated 07-01-2025 referred the
following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication to this Tribunal between the
management of M/s Rajendra Management Group and their workmen. The reference is,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2077
SCHEDULE
“Whether the action of the management of M/s Rajendra Management Group, contractor of State Bank of
India (SBI) in dismissing the service of Sri Mondi Naresh is legal and justified? If not, what relief the
workman is entitled to?”
The reference is numbered in this Tribunal as I.D. No. 135/2025 and notices were issued to the parties concerned.
2. Petitioner absent on the date fixed for filing of claim statement and documents. Despite service of notice
and sufficient opportunity, the petitioner did not file any claim statement or documents. Hence, in the absence of a
claim statement, a ‗No-Claim‘ Award is passed. Transmit.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Shri Vinay Panghal, Lower Division Clerk , corrected by me on this the 5th
February, 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
NIL
NIL
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 461.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a212/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/84/2001-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 461.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 212/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/84/2001- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 12th day of March, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 212/2001
Between:
Sri G. Anjaiah,
S/o Pochaiah,
6-244, Vani Nagar,
Chintal, HMT Raod,
Hyderabad.
… Petitioner
2078
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
And
The Assistant General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Deptt.)
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office, Bank Street, Koti
Hyderabad.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/84/2001-IR(B.I) dated 07.09.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the
question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad in
terminating the services of Sri G. Anjaiah, Temporary-/Non-Messenger SBI w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified or
not? If not, what relief the applicant is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 212/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2079
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribuna!;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement dated
20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Non Messenger on 1986 to 1997, and has
rendered unblemished service spreading over a period of about 11 years and by dint of hard work till his services were
terminated by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent
bank decided to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by
wait- listing them by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
2080
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High Court
also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2081
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees where in they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without
jurisdiction and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of
Understanding dated 27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is
not published anywhere to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that
Management did not adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90
in the year 1995. The same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The
management has followed the procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving
chance to the empanelled candidates like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent
Management sent letters to the all similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997,
subsequent to the passing of impugned termination orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating,
the Management refused to engage these candidates. It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for
absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the
Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of
the Respondent Management terminating the services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal,
violative of principles of natural justice and hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman
and to grant all incidental and consequential benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2083
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex.W1 to W5. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support of
his claim which are discussed as under:-
Ex.W1 is the Notification. Further Ex.W2 is the Service Certificate dated 15.07.1992 Ex.W3 is the Service
Certificate 15.11.1997. Ex.W4 is the circular letter. Ex.W5 is the circular letter dated 14.07.1999.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad branch in terminating the
services of Workman Sri G. Anjaiah a Non- Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and 30.7.1996,
minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed between the
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947
read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2085
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
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have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service provision
contained Under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
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“My name was not sponsored by any employment exchange. I did not under go the selection process required for
appointment for a non-messenger.”
“I did not work for 240 days in any year in the bank in my service.”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman had
worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied to the bank in response to an advertisement issued by the bank as per the settlements between the union
and the Management…. The panel was prepared basing on the no. of days service put in by the temp. employees…..
Some of the persons whose names were included in the panel were given appointment on regular basis in the
bank…..I am not having any documents to show that any of my juniors are continuing in the service.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of the
Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case
of Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2093
was decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists
concurrently. A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another
settlement was entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies
arising up to December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so
prepared were to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said
panels lapse. MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including
part time attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-
messengerial positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before the empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997.
Ex.M6 is the copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of
understanding was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned
will lapse on 31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the
statements giving the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non-
messenger panel, Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included
in the 1989 panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come he could not be
given permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in
accordance with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority,
number of days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner
was not sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for
appointment as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary
service in the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank.
Further, MW1 states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels
and these panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such
employees. Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the
counter. However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such but their services were not utilized after the cut off date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No.IV:- In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri G. Anjaiah, Ex. Non-Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the
Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence,
dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 12th day of March, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri G. Anjaiah
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photocopy of Notification
Ex.W2:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 15.07.1992
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W3:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 15.11.1992
Ex.W4:
Photocopy of Circular letter
Ex.W5:
Photocopy of Circular letter dated 14.07.1999
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 462.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a209/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/71/2001-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 462.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 209/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/71/2001- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 12th day of March, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 209/2001
Between:
Sri Arolla Agaiah,
S/o Ramaiah,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2095
Mandal Cherial-506223,
Warangal Distt.
… Petitioner
And
The Assistant General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Deptt.)
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office, Bank Street, Koti,
Hyderabad.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/71/2001-IR(B.I) dated 07.09.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the
question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head office, Hyderabad, in
terminating the services of Sri Arolla Agaiah, Ex-Temp. Messenger SBI A.D.B Cherial Branch, Warangal
Dist.(A.P) w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified or not? If not, what relief applicant is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 209/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribunal;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement dated
20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Non-Messenger on 1983 to 1997, and has
rendered unblemished service spreading over a period of about 6 years and by dint of hard work till his services were
terminated by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent
bank decided to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by
wait- listing them by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2097
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High court
of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It also
directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High Court
also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees where in they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without
jurisdiction and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of
Understanding dated 27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is
not published anywhere to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that
Management did not adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90
in the year 1995. The same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The
management has followed the procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving
chance to the empanelled candidates like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent
Management sent letters to the all similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997,
subsequent to the passing of impugned termination orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating,
the Management refused to engage these candidates. It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for
absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the
Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of
the Respondent Management terminating the services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal,
violative of principles of natural justice and hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman
and to grant all incidental and consequential benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2099
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly, placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of
A.P. and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch
was filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees
filed Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge
in WP No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the
Judgements cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not
come into play. Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various
Hon'ble High Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex.W1 to W5. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support of
his claim which are discussed as under:-
Ex.W1 is the Service Certificate dated 22.08.1988. Further Ex.W2 is the Notification. Ex.W3 is the Absorption
letter. Ex.W4 is the Service Certificate dated 20.05.1996. Ex.W5 is the letter to employment exchange. Ex.W6 is the
circular issued by the Respondent.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2101
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad branch in terminating the
services of Workman Sri Arolla Agaiah a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-
Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and
30.7.1996, minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed
between the State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of
I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2103
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service provision
contained Under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“ I have not been sponsored by any employment exchange. I did not undergo the regular process of selection before
my engagement as temporary Non-Messenger in the branch.”
“ It is true that I did not work for 240 days in any year, in my entire service in the bank in any branch.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2105
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman had
worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2107
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied for appointment as Non-messenger, in response to the advertisement issue by the bank and the union in
the year 1989….., I was called for interview ……. The panel was prepared basing upon the number of days of
service, put in by the temporary employees. Some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the
panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel. …..
It is true that I am not having any documents to show that any of my juniors are continuing in the service bank.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
2108
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2109
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case
of Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it
was decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists
concurrently. A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another
settlement was entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies
2110
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
arising up to December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so
prepared were to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said
panels lapse. MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including
part time attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-
messengerial positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before the empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997.
Ex.M6 is the copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of
understanding was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned
will lapse on 31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the
statements giving the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non-
messenger panel, Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included
in the 1989 panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come he could not be
given permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in
accordance with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority,
number of days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner
was not sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for
appointment as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary
service in the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank.
Further, MW1 states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels
and these panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such
employees. Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the
counter. However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such but their services were not utilized after the cut off date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No.IV:- In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri Arolla Agaiah, Ex. Non-Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the
Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence,
dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 12th day of March, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri Arolla Agaiah
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 22.08.1988
Ex.W2:
Photocopy of Notification
Ex.W3:
Photocopy of Appointment letter
Ex.W4:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 20.05.1996
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2111
Ex.W5:
Photocopy of letter to employment exchange
Ex.W6:
Photocopy of circular issued by Respondent bank
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 463.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a53/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/389/2000-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 463.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 53/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/389/2000- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of February, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 53/2001
Between:
Sri K. Surender,
S/o. K. Balaraju,
2112
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
H.No.8-3-430/77, Dr. Ambedkar nagar,
Reddyguda, Ameerpet,
Hyderabad – 500 073
… Petitioner
And
The Assistant General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Department)
State Bank of India,
Local Head office,
Bank Street,
Koti, Hyderabad- 095
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/389/2000-IR(B.I) dated 26.6.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head Office Hyderabad, in
terminating the services of Sri K. Surender Temporary/ Non-Messenger, SBI w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified? If
not, what relief applicant is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 53/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2113
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribuna!;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement dated
20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Messenger from 1989 to 1997 and has rendered
unblemished service spreading over a period of about 8 years. The Respondent has terminated services of Workman
by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent bank decided to
give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by wait- listing them
by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
2114
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2115
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees wherein they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without jurisdiction
and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of Understanding dated
27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is not published anywhere
to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that Management did not
adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90 in the year 1995. The
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The management has followed the
procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates
like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent Management sent letters to all similarly
situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997, subsequent to the passing of impugned termination
orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating, the Management refused to engage these candidates.
It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the
Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are
absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of the Respondent Management terminating the
services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal, violative of principles of natural justice and
hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman and to grant all incidental and consequential
benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2117
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex. W1 to W10. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support
of his claim which are discussed as under: -
Ex.W1 is the notification.. Further Ex.W2 is the interview call letter. Ex.W3 is the letter of empanelment. Ex.W4
to Ex.W8 are the service certificates. Ex.W9 is letter to employment exchange issued by Respondent in 1999.
Ex.W10 is the audit report dt.14.7.1999.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head Office Hyderabad in terminating the services
of Workman Sri K. Surender, a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and 30.7.1996,
minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed between the
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947
read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2119
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service in view of the
contents of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“I was not sponsored by any employment exchange. I did not undergo regular process of selection before my
appointment as a temporary attender..”
“It is true that I did not work for 240 days in any year in my entire service in the bank.”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman
had worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2123
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied in response to the advertisement issued by the bank as per the settlement entered between the bank and
the union…. Further, witness states, The panel was prepared basing on the number of days of service put in by the
temporary employees. Some of them whose names were included in the panel were given regular employment in the
bank in order of their seniority in the panel…. Further witness states, I am not having any document to show that
any person who had worked for less no. of days than me was given regular appointment in the bank.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2125
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
2126
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case of
Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2127
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh, and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it was
decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists concurrently.
A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another settlement was
entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies arising up to
December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so prepared were
to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said panels lapse.
MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including part time
attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-messengerial
positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the
empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus, in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997. Ex.M6 is the
copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding
was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned will lapse on
31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the statements giving
the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non- messenger panel,
Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included in the 1989
panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come, he could not be given
permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in accordance
with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority, number of
days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner was not
sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for appointment
as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary service in
the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank. Further, MW1
states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels and these
panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such employees.
Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents, Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the counter.
However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover, the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such, but their services were not utilized after the cutoff date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No. IV: - In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri K. Surender Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the Petitioner is not
entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence, dismissed. Reference
is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 26th day of February, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri K. Surender MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
2128
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1: Photocopy of notification
Ex.W2: Photocopy of interview call letter
Ex.W3: Photocopy of letter of empanelment
Ex.W4 to
Ex.W8: Photocopies of service certificates
Ex.W9: Photocopy of letter to employment exchange issued by Respondent in 1999 Ex.W10:
Photocopy of the
audit report dt.14.7.1999.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 464.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a54/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/414/2000-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 464.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.54/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of
India and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/414/2000- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of February, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 54/2001
Between:
Smt. S. Padma,
W/o Late Satya Raju.,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2129
H.No. 8/56, Prakashnagar,
Yerrammukkapalli,
Cuddapah-516 001.
… Petitioner
And
The Dy. General Manager,
State Bank of India,
Zonal office, Rernigunta Road,
Tirupathi.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/414/2000-IR(B.I) dated 14.6.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Cuddapah main branch in terminating the
services of Smt. S. Padma, Messenger, is justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 54/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
2130
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribuna!;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement dated
20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Messenger from 1989 to 1997 and has rendered
unblemished service spreading over a period of about 9 years. The Respondent has terminated services of Workman
by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent bank decided to
give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by wait- listing them
by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid up to December 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2131
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March 1997. The Hon‘ble High Court
also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
2132
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees wherein they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without jurisdiction
and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of Understanding dated
27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is not published anywhere
to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that Management did not
adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90 in the year 1995. The
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The management has followed the
procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates
like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent Management sent letters to all similarly
situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997, subsequent to the passing of impugned termination
orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating, the Management refused to engage these candidates.
It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the
Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are
absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of the Respondent Management terminating the
services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal, violative of principles of natural justice and
hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman and to grant all incidental and consequential
benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2133
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined herself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex. W1 to W6. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support of
her claim which are discussed as under: -
Ex.W1 School Certificate of the Petitioner. Further Ex.W2 is the Caste Certificate. Ex.W3 is the Certificate dated
12.08.1989 issued by the Respondent. Ex.W4 is the service certificate issued by the Respondent. Ex. W5 is the
letter dated 07.08.1992. Ex. W6 is the service certificate dated 23.08.1997.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri K. Bala Kotaiah and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2135
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head Office Hyderabad in terminating the services
of Workman Smt. S. Padma Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-
Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and
30.7.1996, minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed
between the State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of
I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2137
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated her
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing her oral as well as documentary evidence in support of her claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service in view of the
contents of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged her initial burden of proof in respect of her claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of her termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in her cross examination has stated that,
“I was not sponsored by any employment exchange. I did not undergo regular process of selection before my
engagement as temporary non-messenger in the branch..”
“It is true that I did not work for 240 days in any year in my entire service in a single branch.”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2139
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that she has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of her claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman
had worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather she was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove her claim that she was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F
of the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that she had worked for
240 days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that she has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that she had worked as a daily wager
for which she has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2141
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied for appointment as Non-Messenger, in response to the advertisement issued by the bank in the year
1992…. Further, witness states, The panel was prepared basing upon the number of days of service put in by the
temporary employees. Some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in the order of their seniority in the panel…. Further witness states, I am not having any
documents to show that any person worked for less number of days than me was given appointment in the bank.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman herself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2143
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has she
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case of
Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh, and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it was
decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists concurrently.
A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another settlement was
entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies arising up to
December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so prepared were
to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said panels lapse.
2144
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including part time
attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-messengerial
positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the
empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus, in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997. Ex.M6 is the
copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding
was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned will lapse on
31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the statements giving
the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non- messenger panel,
Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included in the 1989
panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come, he could not be given
permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in accordance
with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority, number of
days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner was not
sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for appointment
as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary service in
the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank. Further, MW1
states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels and these
panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such employees.
Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents, Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the counter.
However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover, the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such, but their services were not utilized after the cutoff date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontroverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No. IV: - In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Smt S. Padma Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the Petitioner is not
entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence, dismissed. Reference
is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 26th day of February, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Smt S. Padma
MW1: Sri K. Bala Kotaiah
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1: Photocopy of School certificate of the Petitioner
Ex.W2: Photocopy of Caste certificate
Ex.W3: Photocopy of Certificate dated 12.08.1989 issued by the Respondent
Ex.W4: Photocopy of Single Certificate issued by the Respondent
Ex.W5: Photocopy of letter dated 07.08.1992 calling the Petitioner for interview
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2145
Ex.W6: Photocopy of single certificate dated 23.08.1997 issued by the Respondent
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 465.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a55/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/422/2000-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 465.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 55/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of
India and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/422/2000- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
In The Central Government Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court At Hyderabad
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of February, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 55/2001
Between:
Sri V.M. Venkata Ratnam,
S/o. Subbaiah,
R/o.16/257,
Sunnapurallamitta, Maraipet,
Cuddapah.
… Petitioner
2146
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
And
The Dy General Manager,
State Bank of India,
Zonal Office, Renigunta Road,
Tirupathi-517 501.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/422/2000-IR(B.I) dated 14.6.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Cuddapah Main branch in terminating the
services of Sri V.M. Venkata Ratnam Messenger, is justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 55/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribuna!;
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2147
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement
dated 20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Messenger from 1989 to 1997 and has rendered
unblemished service spreading over a period of about 8 years. The Respondent has terminated services of Workman
by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent bank decided to
give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by wait- listing them
by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
2148
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2149
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees wherein they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without jurisdiction
and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of Understanding dated
27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is not published anywhere
to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that Management did not
adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90 in the year 1995. The
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The management has followed the
procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates
like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent Management sent letters to all similarly
situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997, subsequent to the passing of impugned termination
orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating, the Management refused to engage these candidates.
It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the
Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are
absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of the Respondent Management terminating the
services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal, violative of principles of natural justice and
hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman and to grant all incidental and consequential
benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
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31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex. W1 to W7. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support of
his claim which are discussed as under: -
Ex.W1 is the Caste certificate, memo of marks and transfer certificate of the Petitioner are Ex.W2 and Ex.W3.
Ex.W3 is the list of the panel workers. Ex.W4 and Ex.W5 are the service certificates, Ex.W6 is the panel list. Ex.W7
is the service certificate.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri K.Bala Kotaiah and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Zonal office Tirupati in terminating the services of
Workman Sri V.M. Venkata Ratnam Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No. I:-Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and 30.7.1996,
minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed between the
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947
read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorized in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer.
Section 18(1) provides as follows: -
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than during conciliation
proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below: -
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2153
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2155
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service provision
contained under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“I was not sponsored by any employment exchange. I did not undergo any selection process before my appointment
as a messenger in the bank..”
“I did not work for 240 days in any year in my entire service in the bank.”
2156
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman
had worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2157
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in
regular vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied in response to the advertisement issued by the bank as per the settlements between the union and the
bank..…. Further, witness states, I donot know that the panel was prepared by the bank as per number of days of
service put in by the temporary messengers. It is true that some of the temporary employees who were included in the
panel were given regular appointment in the bank as per the settlements. Further witness states, I am not having any
documents to show that any of my juniors are continuing in service.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2159
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
2160
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case of
Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh, and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it was
decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists concurrently.
A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another settlement was
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2161
entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies arising up to
December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so prepared were
to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said panels lapse.
MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including part time
attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-messengerial
positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the
empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus, in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997. Ex.M6 is the
copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding
was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned will lapse on
31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the statements giving
the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non- messenger panel,
Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included in the 1989
panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come, he could not be given
permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in accordance
with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority, number of
days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner was not
sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for appointment
as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary service in
the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank. Further, MW1
states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels and these
panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such employees.
Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents, Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the counter.
However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover, the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such, but their services were not utilized after the cutoff date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No. IV: - In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri V.M. Venkata Ratnam Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the
Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence,
dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 26th day of February, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri V.M. Venkata Ratnam
MW1: Sri K.Bala Kotaiah
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1: Photocopy of Caste certificate
Ex.W2: Photocopy of memo of marks
Ex.W3: Photocopy of transfer certificate
2162
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W4 to Ex.W5: Photocopies of service certificates
Ex.W6: Photocopy of is the panel list
Ex.W7: Photocopy of service certificate
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11: Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 466.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a128/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/353/2000-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 466.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 128/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/353/2000- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 26th day of February, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 128/2001
Between:
Sri P. Shankaraiah,
S/o P. Rajaiah,
R/o H.No. 2-3-46/4/1,
Sanjeevaiah Nagar,
Siddipet,
Medak Distt.
… Petitioner
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2163
And
The Assistant General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Deptt.)
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office,
Bank street Koti,
Hyderabad-500095.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/353/2000-IR(B.I) dated 27.04.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the
question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head office, Hyderabad in terminating
the services of Sri P. Shankaraiah, Temporary/Non-Messenger, SBI w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified? If not,
what relief the applicant is entitled ?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 128/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favour of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
2164
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribuna!;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement dated
20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that,
the he joined the service of the Respondent Bank at the workman joined in the services of the Management Institution
as Non-Messenger on 1987 to 1992 and rendered unblemished service spreading over a period of about 5 years, and
by dint of hard work till his services were terminated by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted
that the management of Respondent bank decided to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found
suitable for permanent appointment‖ by wait- listing them by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such
opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were
listed. That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have
completed 270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed
minimum of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate
temporary service in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid upto December, 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May, 1989 was
held. A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to
be valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the
years 1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the
panel, eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have
been pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st
settlement (Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd
settlement (Ex M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement
(Ex M6). In between there is minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all
these settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the
list of the selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be
regularized in the services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under
the bonafide hope that sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options
elsewhere. It is needless to point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was
made is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P.. It is
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2165
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
2166
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees where in they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without
jurisdiction and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of
Understanding dated 27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is
not published anywhere to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that
Management did not adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90
in the year 1995. The same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The
management has followed the procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving
chance to the empanelled candidates like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent
Management sent letters to the all similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997,
subsequent to the passing of impugned termination orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating,
the Management refused to engage these candidates. It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for
absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the
Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of
the Respondent Management terminating the services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal,
violative of principles of natural justice and hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman
and to grant all incidental and consequential benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2167
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex.W1 to W12. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support
of his claim which are discussed as under:-
Ex.W1 is the Notification Further Ex.W2 is the Service Certificate dated 04.09.1989. Ex.W3 is the Interview call
letter. Ex.W4 is the panel list. Ex.W5 is the Service Certificate dated 16.09.1991. Ex. W6 is the Service Certificate
dated 18.10.1991. Ex.W7 is the Service Certificate dated 15.11.1991. Ex. W8 is the Service Certificate. Ex. W9 is
the Service Certificate dated 31.12.1991. Ex. W10 is the Service Certificate dated 01.02.1992. Ex. W11 is the
Service Certificate dated 1.03.1992. Ex. W12 is the Service Certificate.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2169
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head office, Hyderabad branch in terminating the
services of Workman Sri P. Shankaraiah, a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-
Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and
30.7.1996, minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed
between the State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of
I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2171
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide
5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has
negotiated with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as
individual do not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the
Respondent Branch and in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he
was selected for inclusion his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent
post in order of their seniority in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India
State Bank of India Staff Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard
non-messengerial position and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before empanel list is allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant
case, Agreement dated 30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the
panels on 31.3.1997 and absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post
likely to arise upto 31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in
view of provision contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service Provision
contained under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“I was not sponsored by any employment exchange. I did not undergo regular selection process before my
appointment as a temporary messenger.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2173
“It is true that I did not work for 240 days in any year in my entire service in the bank.”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman
had worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2175
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied in response to the notification issued by the bank as per the settlements entered into by the union and the
bank.…. Further, witness states, The panel was prepared basing on the number of days of service put in by the
temporary employees. The bank had filled up the vacancies of messenger with the temporary employees in the panel
basing on their seniority..…. Further witness states, I am not having any document to show that any person who
had worked for less no. of days than me was given appointment on regular basis..”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2177
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case
of Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it
was decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists
concurrently. A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
settlement was entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies
arising up to December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so
prepared were to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said
panels lapse. MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including
part time attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-
messengerial positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before the empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997.
Ex.M6 is the copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of
understanding was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned
will lapse on 31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the
statements giving the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non-
messenger panel, Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included
in the 1989 panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come he could not be
given permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in
accordance with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority,
number of days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner
was not sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for
appointment as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary
service in the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank.
Further, MW1 states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels
and these panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such
employees. Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the
counter. However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such but their services were not utilized after the cut off date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No.IV:- In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri P. Shankaraiah, Ex. Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the
Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence,
dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 26th day of February, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri P. Shankaraiah
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1: Photocopy of Notification
Ex.W2: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 04.09.1989
Ex.W3: Photocopy of interview call letter
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2179
Ex.W4: Photocopy of Panel list
Ex.W5: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 15.11.1991
Ex.W6: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 18.10.1991
Ex.W7: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 1.8.1995
Ex.W8: Photocopy of Service Certificate
Ex.W9: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 31.12.1991
Ex.W10: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 01.02.1995
Ex.W11: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 1.03.1992
Ex. W12:
Photocopy of Service Certificate
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 467.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a242/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/164/2001-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 467.— In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 242/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/164/2001- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
2180
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 5th day of March, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 242/2001
Between:
Sri A. Gopal Yadav,
S/o A. Krishna,
R/o 3-2-353,
Cheppal Bazar,
Kachiguda,
Hyderabad.
… Petitioner
And
The Assistant General Manager,
(Personnel & HDR Deptt.)
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office
Hyderabad.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/164/2001-IR(B.I) dated
03.10.2001 referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide
the question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad, in
terminating the services of Sri A. Gopal Yadav Temporary/Non-Messenger, SBI w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is
justified? If not, what relief applicant is entitled for?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 242/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2181
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribuna!;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement
dated 20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the Service of the Respondent Bank the workman joined in the services of the Management
Institution as Non Messenger on 1988 to 1997 and rendered unblemished service spreading over a period of about 9
years, and by dint of hard work till his services were terminated by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it
is submitted that the management of Respondent bank decided to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel
―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by wait- listing them by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting
till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2183
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees where in they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without
jurisdiction and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of
Understanding dated 27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is
not published anywhere to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that
Management did not adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90
in the year 1995. The same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The
management has followed the procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
chance to the empanelled candidates like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent
Management sent letters to the all similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997,
subsequent to the passing of impugned termination orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating,
the Management refused to engage these candidates. It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for
absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the
Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of
the Respondent Management terminating the services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal,
violative of principles of natural justice and hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman
and to grant all incidental and consequential benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2185
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex.W1 to W3. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support of
his claim which are discussed as under:-
2186
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W1 is the Service Certificate dated 16.07.1992. Further Ex.W2 is the Notification. Ex.W3 is the Panel list.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad branch in terminating the
services of Workman Sri A. Gopal Yadav a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and 30.7.1996,
minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed between the
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947
read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2187
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
2188
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2189
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service provision
contained under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“I was not sponsored by any employment exchange, did not undergo the regular process of selection before my
engagement as temporary messenger in the bank..”
“It is true that I did not work for 240 days in any year in my entire service in the bank in any branch.”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman had
worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2191
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied for appointment as messenger in response to the advertisement issued by the bank and the union in the
year 1992,……. Further, witness states, The panel was prepared basing upon the number of days of service put in by
the temporary employees. Some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given
regular appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel…. Further witness states, It is true that I am
not having any documents to show that any of my juniors are continuing in service in the bank.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2193
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2195
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case
of Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it
was decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists
concurrently. A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another
settlement was entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies
arising up to December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so
prepared were to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said
panels lapse. MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including
part time attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-
messengerial positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before the empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997.
Ex.M6 is the copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of
understanding was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned
will lapse on 31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the
statements giving the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non-
messenger panel, Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included
in the 1989 panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come he could not be
given permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in
accordance with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority,
number of days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner
was not sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for
appointment as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary
service in the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank.
Further, MW1 states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels
and these panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such
employees. Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the
counter. However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such but their services were not utilized after the cut off date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No.IV:- In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri A. Gopal Yadav Ex. Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the
Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence,
dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
2196
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 5th day of March, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri A. Gopal Yadav
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photocopy of Notification
Ex.W2:
Photocopy of Notification
Ex.W3:
Photocopy of panel list
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 468.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a97/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/451/2000-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 468.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 97/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/451/2000- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2197
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 9th day of March, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 97/2001
Between:
Sri. G. Yadaiah,
S/o Narasaiah,
H.No. 357, Indiranagar colony,
Medchal,
Ranga Reddy Distt.-500 001
… Petitioner
And
The Assistant General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Deptt.)
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office,Bank
Hyderabad.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/451/2000-IR(B.I) dated
20.07.2001 referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide
the question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad, in terminating
the services of Sri G. Yadaiah Temporary/ Non-Messenger, SBI w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified? If not, what
relief the applicant is entitled ?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 97/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
2198
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribuna!;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement
dated 20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the Service of the Respondent Bank the workman joined in the Respondent Bank at
Balanagar branch, Hyderabad as a Messenger on 28.10.1991 and worked upto 13.01.1992 for 78 days. He submits
that his last drawn salary was Rs. 1600/- approximately. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent
bank decided to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by
wait- listing them by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2199
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
2200
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees where in they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without
jurisdiction and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of
Understanding dated 27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is
not published anywhere to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that
Management did not adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90
in the year 1995. The same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The
management has followed the procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2201
chance to the empanelled candidates like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent
Management sent letters to the all similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997,
subsequent to the passing of impugned termination orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating,
the Management refused to engage these candidates. It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for
absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the
Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of
the Respondent Management terminating the services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal,
violative of principles of natural justice and hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman
and to grant all incidental and consequential benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
2202
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex.W1 to W8. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support of
his claim which are discussed as under:-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2203
Ex.W1 is the Study certificate. Further Ex.W2 is the Employment Card. Ex.W3 is the Caste certificate. Ex. W4 is
the Service Certificate dated 31.01.1992. Ex. W5 is the Notice. Ex. W6 is the Notice. Ex. W7 is the Minutes of
meeting. Ex. W8 is the Failure report.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad branch in terminating the
services of Workman Sri. G. Yadaiah a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and 30.7.1996,
minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed between the
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947
read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
2204
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2205
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
2206
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2207
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service provisions
contained under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“ At the time of my appointment on temporary basis, I was not sponsored by any employment exchange. I did not
undergo regular process of selection before my engagement as temporary Messenger..”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman had
worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
2208
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge
the same.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2209
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I did not apply in response to the notification issued by the bank in terms of the settlements entered between the
union and the bank….
I do not know that the bank had filled up all the vacancies of messengers with the temporary employees whose
names were included in the panel in the order of their seniority depending upon the no. of days of service put in by
them in the bank…..
I am not having any documents to show that any person who had worked less no. of days than me was given
appointment in the bank.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
2210
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2211
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
2212
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case
of Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it
was decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists
concurrently. A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another
settlement was entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies
arising up to December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so
prepared were to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said
panels lapse. MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including
part time attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-
messengerial positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before the empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997.
Ex.M6 is the copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of
understanding was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned
will lapse on 31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the
statements giving the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non-
messenger panel, Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included
in the 1989 panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come he could not be
given permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in
accordance with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority,
number of days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner
was not sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for
appointment as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary
service in the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank.
Further, MW1 states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels
and these panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such
employees. Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the
counter. However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such but their services were not utilized after the cut off date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No.IV:- In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri. G. Yadaiah Ex. Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the Petitioner is
not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence, dismissed.
Reference is answered accordingly.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2213
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 9th day of March, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri G. Yadaiah
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photocopy of Study certificate
Ex.W2:
Photocopy of Employment card
Ex.W3:
Photocopy of Caste Certificate
Ex.W4:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 31.01.1992
Ex.W5:
Photocopy of Notice
Ex.W6:
Photocopy of Notice
Ex.W7:
Photocopy of Mintues of meeting
Ex.W8:
Photocopy of Failure report
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 469.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a81/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/525/2000-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
2214
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 469.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 81/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/525/2000- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 11th day of March, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 81/2001
Between:
Sri B. Yadagiri,
S/o Rajaiah,
C/o S. Odaiah,
(V&P) Rimmanaguda,
(M) Gajwel,
Medak Distt.-312.
… Petitioner
And
The Asst. General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Deptt.),
Local Head Office,
Bank SP street, Koti
Hyderabad-500095.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent: Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/525/2000-IR(B.I) dated 14.6.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Hyderabad in
terminating the services of Sri B. Yadagiri, Temporary/Non-Messenger, SBI w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified? If
not, what relief the applicant is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 81/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favour of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2215
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribuna!;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement
dated 20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that,
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Messenger from 1989 to 1996, and has rendered
unblemished service spreading over a period of about 7 years. The Respondent has terminated services of Workman
by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent bank decided
to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by wait- listing them
by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were
listed. That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have
completed 270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed
minimum of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate
temporary service in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid upto December, 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
2216
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May, 1989 was
held. A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to
be valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the
years 1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the
panel, eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have
been pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st
settlement (Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd
settlement (Ex M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement
(Ex M6). In between there is minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all
these settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the
list of the selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be
regularized in the services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under
the bonafide hope that sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options
elsewhere. It is needless to point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was
made is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P.. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2217
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees where in they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
2218
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without
jurisdiction and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of
Understanding dated 27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is
not published anywhere to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that
Management did not adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90
in the year 1995. The same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The
management has followed the procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving
chance to the empanelled candidates like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent
Management sent letters to the all similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997,
subsequent to the passing of impugned termination orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating,
the Management refused to engage these candidates. It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for
absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the
Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of
the Respondent Management terminating the services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal,
violative of principles of natural justice and hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman
and to grant all incidental and consequential benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2219
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
2220
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex.W1 to W6. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support of
his claim which are discussed as under:-
Ex.W1 is the Caste Certificate. Further Ex.W2 is the Transfer Certificate. Ex.W3 is the Service Certificate. Ex.W4
is the Service Particulars. Ex.W5 is the Call letter for interview. Ex.W6 is the service certificate.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head Office Hyderabad in terminating the
services of Workman Sri B. Yadagiri, a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and 30.7.1996,
minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed between the
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947
read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2221
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
2222
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2223
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
2224
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service provision
contained under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“I was not sponsored by any employment exchange..”
“I did not work for 240 days in any of the years I worked in the bank.”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman
had worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2225
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in
regular vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“ I also did not apply pursuing to any notification for engagement as a temporary messenger…. Further, witness
states, It is not true to say that panels are prepared basing the upon the no. of days of service and the vacancies were
filled up with the candidates from the panels in order of their seniority…. Further witness states, I am not having any
document to show that the persons who had less no. of days of service all juniors to me in the panel were given
appointment in the panel..”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2227
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
2228
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2229
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of the
Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case
of Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it
was decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists
concurrently. A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another
settlement was entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies
arising up to December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so
prepared were to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said
panels lapse. MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including
part time attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-
messengerial positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before the empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997.
Ex.M6 is the copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of
understanding was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned
will lapse on 31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the
statements giving the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non-
messenger panel, Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included
in the 1989 panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come he could not be
given permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in
accordance with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority,
number of days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner
was not sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for
appointment as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary
service in the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank.
Further, MW1 states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels
and these panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such
employees. Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the
counter. However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such but their services were not utilized after the cut off date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
2230
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
48.
Point No.IV:- In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri B. Yadagiri, Ex. Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the Petitioner
is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence, dismissed.
Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 11th day of March, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri B. Yadagiri
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1: Photocopy of Caste Certificate
Ex.W2: Photocopy of Transfer Certificate
Ex.W3: Photocopy of Service Certificate
Ex.W4: Photocopy of Service particulars
Ex.W5: Photocopy of Call letter for interview
Ex.W6:
Photocopy of service certificate
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2231
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 470.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a78/2001) izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/522/2000-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 470.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 78/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/522/2000- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 11th day of March, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 78/2001
Between:
Sri A.N. Sai Kumar,
S/o A.P. Narasimha,
H.No. 28-122,
Neredmet(P),
Ramakrishnapuram,
Secunderabad.
… Petitioner
And
The Asstt. General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Deptt),
Local Head Office,
State Bank of India,
Koti,
Hyderabad- 500095.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent: Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/522/2000-IR(B.I) dated 14.06.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the
question:
2232
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Hyderabad in
terminating the services of Sri A.N. Sai Kumar, Temporary/Non-Messenger, SBI with effect from 31.3.1997
is justified? If not, what relief the applicant is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 78/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award of the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. All these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribunal;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement
dated 20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Messenger on 1989 to 1997, and has rendered
unblemished service spreading over a period of about 8 years and by dint of hard work till his services were
terminated by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent
bank decided to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by
wait- listing them by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2233
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
2234
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees where in they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2235
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without
jurisdiction and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of
Understanding dated 27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is
not published anywhere to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that
Management did not adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90
in the year 1995. The same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The
management has followed the procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving
chance to the empanelled candidates like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent
Management sent letters to the all similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997,
subsequent to the passing of impugned termination orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating,
the Management refused to engage these candidates. It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for
absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the
Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of
the Respondent Management terminating the services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal,
violative of principles of natural justice and hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman
and to grant all incidental and consequential benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
2236
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2237
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex.W1 to W8. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support of
his claim which are discussed as under:-
Ex.W1 is the Caste Certificate. Further Ex.W2 is the Service Certificate dated 19.09.1991. Ex.W3 is the Absorption
letter. Ex.W4 is the Service Certificate 20.9.1993. Ex.W5 is the Service Certificate dated 6.03.1996. Ex.W6 is the
Service Certificate dated 6.3.1996 Ex.W7 is the Three Salary Cheques Ex.W8 is the Service Certificate
dated 2.07.1997.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, in terminating the services of Workman Sri A.N. Sai
Kumar a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-
Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and
30.7.1996, minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed
between the State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of
I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
2238
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2239
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
2240
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2241
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service in view of the
contents of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“ It is true that my name was not sponsored by any employment exchange. I did not undergo the regular process of
selection before my appointment as temporary Messenger.”
“It is true that I did not work for 240 days in any year ,in my entire service.”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman had
worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
2242
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2243
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
2244
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied in response to an advertisement issued by the bank in terms of settlements entered into by the union with
the management……I do not know that the panel was prepared depending upon the no.of days of service put in by the
temporary employees…..Some of the persons whose names were included in the panel were given appointment on
regular basis in order of their seniority in the panel ……. I am not having any papers to show that any of my juniors
are continuing in service in the bank.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2245
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
2246
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case
of Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it
was decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists
concurrently. A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another
settlement was entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies
arising up to December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so
prepared were to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said
panels lapse. MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including
part time attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-
messengerial positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before the empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997.
Ex.M6 is the copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of
understanding was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned
will lapse on 31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the
statements giving the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non-
messenger panel, Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included
in the 1989 panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come he could not be
given permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in
accordance with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority,
number of days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2247
was not sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for
appointment as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary
service in the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank.
Further, MW1 states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels
and these panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such
employees. Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the
counter. However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such but their services were not utilized after the cut off date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No.IV:- In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri A.N. Sai Kumar, Ex. Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the
Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence,
dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 11th day of March, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri A.N Sai Kumar
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photocopy of Transfer Certificate
Ex.W2:
Photocopy of call letter for interview.
Ex.W3:
Photocopy of Service Certificate
Ex.W4:
Photocopy of Service certificate
Ex.W5:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 6.03.1996
Ex.W6:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 6.3.1996
Ex.W7:
Photocopy of Three Salary Cheques
Ex.W8:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 2.07.1997
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
2248
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 471.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdkas vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (46/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/449/2000-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 471.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.46/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/449/2000- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 25th day of February, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 46/2001
Between:
Sri T. Venkataratnam,
C/o S. Suvarnaraju,
D.No. 7-1-307/38,
Sanathanager,
Hyderabad-18
Petitioner
And
The Assistant General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Department)
State Bank of India,
Local Head office,
Bank Street,
Koti, Hyderabad- 095
….. Respondent
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2249
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/449/2000-IR(B.I) dated 7.6.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head Office Hyderabad, in
terminating the services of Sri T. Venkata Ratnam Temporary/ Non-Messenger, SBI w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is
justified? If not, what relief the applicant is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 46/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribuna!;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
2250
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement dated
20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Messenger from 19.5.1986 to March, 1997 and
has rendered unblemished service spreading over a period of about 11 years. The Respondent has terminated
services of Workman by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of
Respondent bank decided to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent
appointment‖ by wait- listing them by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary
service in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2251
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
2252
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees wherein they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without jurisdiction
and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of Understanding dated
27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is not published anywhere
to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that Management did not
adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90 in the year 1995. The
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The management has followed the
procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates
like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent Management sent letters to all similarly
situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997, subsequent to the passing of impugned termination
orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating, the Management refused to engage these candidates.
It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the
Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are
absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of the Respondent Management terminating the
services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal, violative of principles of natural justice and
hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman and to grant all incidental and consequential
benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2253
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex. W1 to W22. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support
of his claim which are discussed as under: -
Ex. W1 is the Employment card. Further Ex. W2 is the transfer certificate. Ex. W3 is the caste and Study
certificate. Ex. W4 is the Study certificate Ex. W5 is the service certificate. Ex. W6 is the paper publication. Ex.
W7 is the application of Petitioner. Ex.W8 and Ex.W9 are the service certificates. Ex.W10 is the panel of workers.
Ex. W10 to Ex.W14 are the service certificates. Ex.W15 is the letter to all branches not to employ Petitioner and other
workers. Ex.W16 is the letter to employment exchange. Ex.W17 is reply to national commission for SC. Ex.W18 is
the letetr of Respondent to branch officers. Ex.W19 is the another letter. Ex.W20 is the notice regarding conciliation
proceedings. Ex.W21 is failure report. Ex.W22 is letter from Respondent to National Commission for SCs.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2255
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head Office Hyderabad in terminating the services
of Workman Sri T. Venkataratnam, a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-
Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and
30.7.1996, minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed
between the State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of
I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2257
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
2258
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service in view of the
contents of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1949. Now, in view of the provision contained
under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, we have to examine whether the Workman has
discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240 days continuous service in a calendar year just
preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“I was not sponsored by any employment exchange. I did not undergo the regular process of selection before my
appointment in the branch..”
“It is true that I did not work for 240 days in any year in my entire service in a single branch.”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2259
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman
had worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2261
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied for appointment as Messenger, in response to the advertisement issued by the bank in the year 1989….
Further, witness states, The panel was prepared basing upon the number of days of service put in by the temporary
employees. Some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel…. Further witness states, It is true that I am not
having any documents to show that any of my juniors are continuing in service in the bank.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2263
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case of
Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh, and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it was
decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists concurrently.
A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another settlement was
entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies arising up to
December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so prepared were
to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said panels lapse.
MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including part time
attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-messengerial
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the
empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus, in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997. Ex.M6 is the
copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding
was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned will lapse on
31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the statements giving
the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non- messenger panel,
Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included in the 1989
panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come, he could not be given
permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in accordance
with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority, number of
days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner was not
sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for appointment
as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary service in
the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank. Further, MW1
states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels and these
panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such employees.
Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents, Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the counter.
However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover, the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such, but their services were not utilized after the cutoff date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No. IV: - In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri T. Venkataratnam, Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the Petitioner
is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence, dismissed.
Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt.K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 25th day of February, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri T. Venkataratnam
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1: Photocopy of Employment card
Ex.W2: Photocopy of transfer certificate
Ex.W3: Photocopy of caste and Study certificate.
Ex.W4: Photocopy of Study certificate
Ex.W5: Photocopy of service certificate
Ex.W6: Photocopy of paper publication
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2265
Ex.W7: Photocopy of application of Petitioner.
Ex.W8 & Ex.W9: Photocopies of service certificates.
Ex.W10: Photocopy of panel of workers
Ex. W11 to Ex.W14: Photocopies of service certificates
Ex.W15:
Photocopy of the letter to all branches not to employ Petitioner and other workers.
Ex.W16:
Photocopy of the letter to employment exchange
Ex.W17:
Photocopy of reply to national commission for SC
Ex.W18:
Photocopy of the letter of Respondent to branch officers
Ex.W19:
Photocopy of the another letter
Ex.W20:
Photocopy of the notice regarding conciliation proceedings
Ex.W21:
Photocopy of failure report
Ex.W22:
Photocopy of letter from Respondent to National Commission for SCs.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 472.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a236/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/151/2001अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 472.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.236/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India
and their workmen.
[No. L-12012/151/2001- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
2266
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 12th day of March, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 236/2001
Between:
Sri M. Lingam
H.No. 5-4-135/40,
Muralidharbagah,
Abids,
Hyderabad.
… Petitioner
And
The Assistant General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Deptt.)
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office, Bank Street, Koti,
Hyderabad – 500 095.
…..Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
M/s. V. Mallik, K. Shankar Rao, M. Madhusudhan & Galaiah Velugu,
Advocates
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/151/2001-IR(B.I) dated
03.10.2001 referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide
the question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad, in
terminating the services of Sri M. Lingam, Temporary/ Non-Messenger, SBI w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified or
not? If not, what relief the applicant is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 236/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2267
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award af the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. AIl these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribunal;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement dated
20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Non Messenger on 1987 to 1997, and has
rendered unblemished service spreading over a period of about 10 years and by dint of hard work till his services were
terminated by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent
bank decided to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by
wait- listing them by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
2268
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2269
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees where in they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without
jurisdiction and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of
Understanding dated 27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is
not published anywhere to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that
Management did not adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90
in the year 1995. The same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The
management has followed the procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving
2270
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
chance to the empanelled candidates like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent
Management sent letters to the all similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997,
subsequent to the passing of impugned termination orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating,
the Management refused to engage these candidates. It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for
absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the
Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of
the Respondent Management terminating the services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal,
violative of principles of natural justice and hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman
and to grant all incidental and consequential benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2271
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex.W1 to W22. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support
of his claim which are discussed as under:-
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W1 is the Service Certificate. Further Ex.W2 is the Notification. Ex.W3 is the Absorption letter. Ex. W3A is the
Appointment letter. Ex.W3B is the panel list. Ex.W4 is the Service Certificate dated 22.04.1991. Ex.W5 is the
service certificate dated 11.2.1992. Ex.W6 is the Service certificate dated 4.10.1991 Ex. W7 is the Service
certificate dated 15.07.1992. Ex. W8 is the Memorandum. Ex. W9 is the Service Certificate dated 23.3.1993. Ex.
W10 is the Service certificate dated 01.07.1993. Ex. W11 is the Service certificate for dated 16.07.1996 Ex. W12 is
the Service Certificate dated 29.03.1995. Ex. W13 is the Service Certificate dated 18.02.1995. Ex. W14 is the Service
Certificate dated 06.04.1995. Ex. W15 is the Service Certificate dated 03.04.1997. Ex. W17 is the Service Certificate
dated 5.5.1997. Ex. W17 is the Service Certificate dated 03.04.1997. Ex. W18 is the Service Particulars. Ex. W19 is
the Service Particulars. Ex. 19A is the Service Certificate dated 30.04.1998. Ex. W20 is a bunch of 37 Vouchers. Ex.
W21 is the letter to employment exchange by the Respondent. Ex.W22 is the circular issued by the Respondent.
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad branch in terminating the
services of Workman Sri M. Lingam a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-
Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and
30.7.1996, minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed
between the State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of
I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2273
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
2274
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2275
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
2276
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service in view of the
contents of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“I was sponsored by employment exchange. I did not undergo the regular process of selection before my
engagement as temporary Non-Messenger in the branch.”
“It is true that I did not work for 240 days in any year in my entire service in the bank in any single branch.”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman had
worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
terminated from service by this order.
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2277
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
2278
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied for appointment as Non-Messenger, in response to the advertisement issued by the bank and the union in
the year 1989…..
The panel was prepared basing upon the number of days of service, put in by the temporary employees. Some of the
temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of
their seniority in the panel. It is true that I am not having any documents to show that any of my juniors are
continuing in service in the bank.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2279
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2281
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case
of Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it
was decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists
concurrently. A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another
settlement was entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies
arising up to December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so
prepared were to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said
panels lapse. MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including
part time attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-
messengerial positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before the empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997.
Ex.M6 is the copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of
understanding was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned
will lapse on 31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the
statements giving the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non-
messenger panel, Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included
in the 1989 panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come he could not be
given permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in
accordance with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority,
number of days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner
was not sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for
appointment as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary
service in the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank.
Further, MW1 states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels
and these panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such
employees. Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the
counter. However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such but their services were not utilized after the cut off date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No.IV:- In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
2282
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri M. Lingam, Ex. Non-Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the
Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence,
dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 12th day of March, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri M. Lingam
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1: Photocopy of Service Certificate
Ex.W2: Photocopy of Notification
Ex.W3: Photocopy of Absorption letter
Ex.W3A: Photocopy of Appointment letter
Ex.W4: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 22.04.1991
Ex.W5: Photocopy of service certificate dated 11.2.1992
Ex.W6: Photocopy of Service certificate dated 4.10.1991
Ex. W7: Photocopy of Service certificate dated 15.07.1992
Ex.W8: Photocopy of Service certificate
Ex.W9: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 23.3.1993
Ex.W10: Photocopy of Service certificate dated 01.07.1993
Ex.W11: Photocopy of Service certificate for dated 16.07.1996
Ex.W12: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 29.03.1995
Ex.W13: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 18.02.1995
Ex.W14: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 06.04.1995
Ex.W15: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 03.04.1997
Ex.W16: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 03.04.1997
Ex.W17: Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 5.5.1997
Ex.W18: Photocopy of Service Particulars
Ex. W19:Photocopy of Service Particulars
Ex.W19A:Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 30.04.1998
Ex.W20: Photocopies of bunch of 37 Vouchers
Ex.W21: Photocopy of letter to employment exchange by the Respondent
Ex.W22: Photocopy of circular issued by Respondent
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2283
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 473.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjkas ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a203/2001) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12012/39/2001-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 473.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 203/2001) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of State Bank of India and
their workmen.
[No. L-12012/39/2001- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 11th day of March, 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 203/2001
Between:
Sri Om Prakash Thakur,
S/o Thakur,
Air Force Academy,
Hyderabad.
… Petitioner
And
The Assistant General Manager,
(Personnel & HRD Deptt.)
State Bank of India,
Local Head Office,Bank Street, Koti,
Hyderabad-500 095
….. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner :
Sri Macherla Rangaiah, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Sri Y. Ranjeeth Reddy, Advocate
2284
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-12012/39/2001-IR(B.I) dated 06.09.2001
referred the following dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 requiring this forum to decide the
question:
SCHEDULE
―Whether the action of the management of State Bank of India, Local Head office, Hyderabad in
terminating the services of Sri Om Prakash Thakur, Temporary-/Non-Messenger SBI w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is
justified or not? If not, what relief the applicant is entitled?‖
After receipt of the reference, it was numbered as ID No. 203/2001 and notices were issued to both the Workman and
the management.
2.
Before unfolding the factual matrix of the instant industrial dispute it would be apposite to have a bird eye
view of a chequered history of the instant industrial dispute. Earlier instant industrial dispute along with the batch
cases was decided by this Tribunal vide common award dated 17.5.2005 and the reference was answered in favor of
the Respondent and against the Workman. That said common award dated 17.5.2005 was challenged by the
aggrieved Workmen in various Writ petition No.6470/2014 along with batch of writ petitions before the Hon‘ble
High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Hon‘ble High Court vide its‘ judgement dated 23.6.2014 allowed all batch of writ
petitions and set aside the common award dated 17.5.2005 passed in ID No.222 of 2001 and other batch of ID cases
by Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad and the Respondent management of State
Bank of India was directed to reengage the Writ Petitioners in position, which they have been occupying prior to
their termination and further directed to consider their cases for regularization as and when the substantive vacancy
arises. This judgement dated 23.6.2014 of Hon‘ble High Court of AP, passed in WP No.6470/2014 and batch
petitions was challenged by Respondent management before the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1268 of
2014. The aforesaid Writ Appeals No.1268/2014 and other Writ Appeals were decided by Division Bench of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgement dated 20.3.2019. Hon‘ble High Court in aforesaid Writ Appeal
was pleased to pass the order which is extracted as below:-
“ 7. Hearing the learned senior counsel for the SBI and the learned senior counsel for the contesting unofficial
Respondents, we see that while the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the award of the Tribunal, the
proper course to be adopted was to remit all the cases to the Tribunal. This we say for reasons more than one. Firstly,
in such matters, claims have to be decided on individual basis, as different persons have different claims as to the
length of officiation or discharge of duties and functions; quality of engagement, drawings, accounting of the post for
each one of them, who have worked etc. All these issues will not be the same in all the cases. Therefore, each case
ought to have been directed to be decided by the Tribunal afresh on individual basis. The second and most important
aspect is the learned single Judge has in one go ordered re-employment of all the workmen. This is not a relief that
could have been granted without answering the individual issues; each issue relating to each case could not have
been decided by the writ Court within the format of its adjudication procedures and scope. The adjudicating body,
which has to do that activity, is the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that while we would sustain the
order of the learned singe Judge insofar as it interfered and sets aside the award of the Tribunal, the further findings
and directions, issued through the impugned order have to go and the individual cases have to be sent back for
consideration of the Tribunal. Such further procedure before the Tribunal will have to be carried forward with the
materials already on record and also by affording an opportunity to the persons, who have claims as well as the
management to place their rival contentions and further material before the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing
for the workmen are justified in pointing out that enormous delay has already happened and further action by the
Tribunal in this line may be expedited.
9. In the result, these writ appeals are ordered;
(1) affirming the impugned common order of the learned single Judge to the extent it sets aside the common award
dated 17.05.2005 of the Industrial Tribunal;
(2) the further findings and directions issued through the impugned common order are vacated:
(3) all the matters shall be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose of them within an outer limit
of five (5) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and,
(4) the parties to make appearance before the Tribunal on the given date.”
Thus, in view of the above direction of Hon‘ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A.No.1268 of 2014 and batch
cases. This Tribunal has taken up the matter of industrial dispute for hearing and deciding it afresh in view of the
aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Hon‘ble High Court in Writ Appeal No.1268/2014 vide judgement dated
20.3.019.
3.
The factual matrix of instant industrial dispute as narrated by the Workman in his claim statement are that
the Workman joined in the service of the management institution as Messenger on 1986 to 1997, and has rendered
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2285
unblemished service spreading over a period of about 11 years and by dint of hard work till his services were
terminated by oral orders with effect from 1.4.1997. Further, it is submitted that the management of Respondent
bank decided to give a chance to temporarily employed personnel ―found suitable for permanent appointment‖ by
wait- listing them by offering permanent appointment or waitlisting till such opportunity arises.
4.
That on 17.11.1987 a settlement was reached between All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the
Management of State Bank of India - settlement one, under this settlement three categories of employees were listed.
That is, A) those who have completed 240 days in 12 months or less after 1.7.1975. B) those who have completed
270 days in any continuous block of 36 calendar months after 1.7.1975. C) (i) those who have completed minimum
of 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1.7.1975 or (ii) 70 days aggregate temporary service
in continuous block of 36 months after 1.7.1975.
5.
The persons who satisfied in all the above 4 categories were to be interviewed by a selection committee and
the said selection committee would determine the suitability of the said candidate for permanent appointment.
Therefore, the bank prescribed certain qualifications and from among the candidates satisfying the qualifications the
suitable candidates were enlisted by a selection committee. The Clause 7 of the said agreement provided with the
selected candidate would be wait listed in order of their respective categorization and the selected panel would be
valid up to December 1991. Clause 10 of the settlement specifically provided that henceforth. ―there will be no
temporary appointments in the subordinate cadre‖, except on a restrictive basis in the specified category, ―from
amongst empanelled candidates as per existing guidelines of the bank‖. The Workman further submits that
consequent upon the said agreement and the draft, a notification was issued in the newspapers. The last date for
responding to the advertisement was 30.8.1988. A written examination followed by viva-voce in May 1989 was held.
A selected panel was prepared, as per Clause 7 of the agreement, ie. Settlement No.1, the selected panel was to be
valid upto December, 1991, the Workman submits that circular was issued on 26.4.91 by the said letter it is
mentioned that the terms of the agreement dated 17.11.87 was modified vide second agreement dated 16.7.88 was
entered into between the parties. In terms of the said agreement a chance was to be given, ―to all eligible temporary
employees for permanent appointments. The appointments were against the vacancies likely to arise during the years
1995-96, circular made it clear that in view of the enormity of the problem an extension of the currency of the panel,
eligible temporary employees who have been empanelled could not appear in the earlier interviews and have been
pursuing their cases thereafter, ―will be given another chance to appear for interview‖.
6.
Workman submits that there were total five settlements. The settlement dated 17.11.87 is the 1st settlement
(Ex M1), settlement dated 16.7.88 is 2nd settlement (Ex M2), settlement dated 27.10.88 is the 3rd settlement (Ex
M3), then settlement dated 9.1.91 is 4th settlement and settlement dated 30.7.96 is 5th settlement (Ex M6). In
between there are minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.95 marked as Ex M5. That due to all these
settlements which were extended by subsequent settlements thereby created reasonable expectations in the list of the
selected candidates arose with that it‘s a question of time their appointments or services would be regularized in the
services of the bank. The Workman was working with the bank on temporary basis was under the bonafide hope that
sooner his services will be regularized with the bank. He is thereby closed all his options elsewhere. It is needless to
point out that employing person to whom hope of employment in substantial terms was made is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
7.
Further Workman submits that the Government of India issued Circular No. F-3/3/104/87-IR, dated
16.8.1990. Under said circular the chief Executives of all public sector banks including the Management herein were
specifically instructed that until the problem of existing temporary employees is fully resolved, no bank is permitted
to make any permanent appointments. That some of the persons similarly situated like this Workman aggrieved by
the inaction on the part of the management of the bank is not regularizing their services from out of the selected panel
and not clearly focusing the vacancy position, filed W.P. No. 4194/97 before Hon‘ble High court of A.P. It is
specifically averred in the said writ petition that the Management of the bank had failed to implement the settlement
and that it violates the various fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. The Hon‘ble High
court of A.P .. by order dated 5.3.97 directed the bank to implement the settlement as amended from time to time. It
also directed the bank to carry out the terms of settlement before the expiry of March, 1997. The Hon‘ble High
Court also recorded finding that the Bank cannot escape its liability of enforcement of the Settlement. In view of the
directions given by the High Court all candidates whose names appeared in the select panels prepared on the basis of
the agreement entered into on 17.11.87 under which the panel was valid upto December, 1991, and on the basis of a
settlement dated 27.10.1988 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 under which the panel was valid
upto December, 1999. The other agreement dated 16.7.1988 under which the panel was valid upto 1992 and on the
basis of the settlement dated 27.10.1998 whereby the panels were made alive upto 31.3.1997 were under the bonafide
impression that their cases will be considered for regularization and were living on the basis of the said reasonable
expectation. Unfortunately, contrary to the aforesaid directions given by the High Court and contrary to the
settlements entered into between the parties, the bank issued proceedings dated 25.3.1997, dated 27.3.1997 and
31.3.1997 instructing the various authorities of the Management not to continue the temporary employees those who
are in services of the bank from 1.4.97. The said order was followed by the Management. Aggrieved by the said
action the Workman herein and similarly situated candidates have filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
and by way of Writ Petition No.9206/97 seeking a declaration that the proceedings issued by the Deputy General
2286
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Manager and the Assistant General Manager (Respondents 3,4 and 5 therein) on 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97 as
illegal and also non-continuance of the Workmen therein in service by absorbing them in the services of the bank as
violative of Section 2(p) and 18(1) read with Rule 58 of Central Rules and sought for specific direction to the bank to
absorb them in service.
8.
Further, Workman submits that in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9206/97, the bank has
submitted that it has about 805 branches in Andhra Pradesh alone. It has stated that due to exigencies of
circumstances and on account of the urgent need in its banks, it employed temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
It is pertinent to mention that it does not state the urgent or need or the nature of temporary employees that it had
engaged. Enquiry into the same would reveal that the stand taken by the bank either on the ground of urgent need or
of temporary employees is a façade to perpetuate unfair labour practice. It is designed to on the one hand, keep the
employed in the erroneous zone of hope and on the other to ensure that benefits that a model employer will extend
under various statutes to its employees is not required to be borne out by the bank. A reading of the counter affidavit
would show that the bank would opines that being just fair and reasonable are which obviously is reprehensible and is
a facet of unfair labour practice.
9.
The Workman submits that the bank had referred in its counter affidavit to three settlements dated 17.11.87,
16.7.88 and 27.10.88. The bank in the guise of extending the benefits of the circular of Government dated 16.8.90
stated in its counter affidavit that as follows:
"Government of India, vide its letter dated 16.8.1990, issued guidelines to all the public sector banks with regard to
recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks. The said guidelines were issued to
implement on the lines of the approach paper on the issue provided by a committee constituted in this regard. The
Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow the provisions laid down in
the approach paper.
The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary employees who had put in not less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 consecutive Months and who are entitled to benefit of Section 25-F may be decided by
entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less than
240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the Management
so desired, they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. Para 6(h), it is mentioned
that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days after 1.1 1982 would be
eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a settlement in respect
of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 or more days, the bank by way of further concession entered
into settlements Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days. As such, it could be Seen that the
settlements are more beneficial to the temporary employees concerned. The approach paper also specify at para 6(c)
that the banks would provide one time opportunity to all the temporary employees and for that purpose temporary
employees worked in the bank on or after 1.1.1982 could be considered for re-employment in terms of the scheme.
The Respondents have gone further wherein even persons working after 1975 were also considered.
As could be seen from the above, there was a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide
permanent employment for as many as possible subject to availability of the vacancies.
It is further submitted that at para 6(k) of the approach paper, it was made clear that this would be one time
exercise in full and final settlement of all the aims and disputes for the past period in respect of temporary workmen
covered by the settlement. This would mean that the Government of India guidelines would cover only those persons
who were temporarily employed for the period specified therein and not otherwise. As such, it is submitted that the
Respondents have not only followed the Government of India guidelines but in fact covered cases of the employees
who had worked for less than 90 days. As such, question of violation does not arise and in any case those were only
broad guidelines and not directives".
10.
The Workman submits that the bank also referred a subsequent settlement dated 9.1.1991 wherein there is a
clause to the effect- that the panel of temporary employees and the panel of daily wage employees will be operated to
a particular period. Therefore, their cases will not be considered. The Management herein relying upon this settlement
in their impugned action. It is submitted that even the settlement dated 9.1.1991 will not empower the management
to terminate the services of the temporary employees who are working in the bank services like the Workman herein
as it does not specify the termination of the employees. In fact there are so many vacancies wherein the Management
has engaged several new persons as temporary messengers/ attendars/ sweepers etc., even after the judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court without considering the cases of the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein. It is
submitted inspite of engaging fresh candidates as is now being done by the Management they would have continued
the similarly situated candidates like the Workman herein in the services of the bank and consider their cases for
absorption in view of the circulars issued by Central Government as well as the directions of this Hon'ble Court in
Writ Petition No.4194/97, dated 5.3.97. In view of the circulars issued by the Central Government, the Management
should not have relied upon the settlement dated 9.1.1991. Hence, the impugned action of the Management is illegal,
unjust, violative of fundamental rights such as Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2287
11.
The Workman submits that in W.P. No.4194/97 filed by the union of temporary employees where in they
have complained about the non- implementation of the settlements arrived between the parties and sought for
absorption. Such employees in the bank services on permanent basis before the date fixed for carrying out the terms
of settlement, the Court held that the members of the union had been empanelled in the list, they were not regularized
and the time was going to run out to the near future and the Respondent bank and its officers cannot escape from the
liability of enforcing the settlement which has been reached and therefore directed that the bank and the officers shall
implement the settlement dated 17.11.87 as amended from time to time before the expiry of 31.3.97.
12.
Further, it is submitted that in the clause of Settlement it is specifically mentioned that the workmen to be
absorbed/appointed in the bank prohibiting any temporary appointments subsequent to the date of settlement even the
authorities want to make temporary appointments that should be made only from among the empanelled can be
appointed either for temporary vacancy or permanent vacancy except from among the empanelled candidates like the
Workman and that should be continued till they are absorbed. The management committed unfair labour practices
and terminated the services of the candidates with effect from 1.4.1997 which is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to
their own guidelines and violative of the constitutional provisions which are guaranteed in Chapter-III of the
Constitution of India.
13.
The Workman submits that it is strange as to how the panels were allowed to lapse by a so-called
Memorandum of Understanding dated 25.2.1997, that the action of terminating such employees like the
Workman by virtue of an impugned oral proceedings without implementing the settlement would be illegal and unfair
labour practice which cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. That the discontinuance of the Workman after 31.3.97
who had served in the bank in any capacity amounts to retrenchment. It could not have been done without any notice
and it violates Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said action is violative of principles of natural
justice guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. This amounts to retrenchment without one month's
notice and taken in view of such notice. Thus, the main proceedings issued by the Respondent is without
jurisdiction and is arbitrary, illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. That the alleged Memorandum of
Understanding dated 27.2.97, Ex.M5 does not own any legal entity, as the said Memorandum of Understanding is
not published anywhere to brought to the notice of the Workman whose rights are being affected. It is submitted that
Management did not adhere to the procedure envisaged by the Central Government in its' instructions dated 16.8.90
in the year 1995. The same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies.
The
management has followed the procedure of calling candidates through Employment exchange instead of giving
chance to the empanelled candidates like the Workman here. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent
Management sent letters to the all similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month of June, 1997,
subsequent to the passing of impugned termination orders. After knowing the facts that the candidates are litigating,
the Management refused to engage these candidates. It is once again reiterated that the panels are meant for
absorption but not for termination. It was the duty of the Management to engage the empanelled candidates like the
Workman even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular vacancies. Hence, the action of
the Respondent Management terminating the services of the Workman by oral order dated 31.3.97 is unjust, illegal,
violative of principles of natural justice and hence, the Management be directed to reinstate and absorb the Workman
and to grant all incidental and consequential benefits.
14.
Per contra, Respondent had filed counter and made a contentions that the reference is not tenable and
contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Respondent submitted that to tide over severe sub-ordinate staff
constraints which arose out of leave vacancies, exigencies, etc., and also owning to the restrictions imposed by the
Government of India/Reserve Bank of India on intake of staff, the Respondent bank used to engage sub-ordinate staff
like messengers, sweepers, sweeper cum water boys, etc., depending on the availability of work on purely temporary
basis for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the branches. It is submitted that the All India State Bank of
India Staff Federation which represents majority of the employees in the State Bank of India comprising about 98% of
the work force as its' members espoused the cause of temporary employees who have put in less than 240 days of
temporary service in 12 calendar months in the bank and who were ineligible for any protection under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to give a chance for being considered for absorption and permanent appointments.
15.
Discussions were held and on 17.11.1987 an agreement was signed between the federation and the
Management bank under Sec. 2(p) read with Sec 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. A copy of the said settlement dated 17.11.87 which may be herein after
referred as first settlement is filed and 4 categories were made as it has already been mentioned in the claim statement
above, it need not be repeated here. In the first settlement, it was agreed that the temporary employees as categorized
would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank's service against the vacancies
which are likely to arise during the period 1987 to 1991. On 16.7.88 second settlement was arrived between the
Federation and the Bank whereby it was agreed to substitute the period of consideration of vacancies as 1987 to 1992
in place of 1987 to 1991 as contemplated under the first settlement dated 17.11.1987. This is the second settlement.
A 3rd settlement was entered into on 27.10.88 and it was agreed that the bank's service against the vacancies likely to
arise from 1988 to 1992 was to be considered. Government of India vide its letter dated 16.8.90 issued guidelines to
all the public sector banks with regard to recruitment and absorption of temporary employees in public sector banks.
The said guidelines were issued to implement on the lines of approach paper on the issue provided by a committee
2288
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
constituted in this regard. Government of India guidelines made it clear that all the public sector banks may follow
the provisions laid down in the approach paper. The approach paper specified that the cases of temporary service in
12 consecutive months and who are entitled to benefit of Sec.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be decided
by entering into a settlement with the representative union. In respect of temporary employees who had put in less
than 240 days of service in 12 consecutive months or less, a settlement could be avoided and however if the
Management so desired they could enter into a conciliation settlement with the representative union. In para. 6(h) it
is mentioned that only those temporary employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days after
1.1.82 would be eligible for considering under the scheme. Although the Government guidelines envisaged for a
settlement in respect of employees who had put in temporary service of 90 days or more days, the bank by way of a
further concession entered into settlements. Even in respect of those who had put in less than 90 days and also the
bank went a step further and said those persons who are working after 1975 were also considered. Hence, there was
a genuine effort on the part of the Respondent bank to provide as many as possible jobs subject to the availability of
the vacancies. However, para 6 (k) of the approach paper made it clear that it is a one time, exercise in full and final,
settlement of all the claims and disputes for the past period, in respect of temporary workmen covered by the
settlement. Another settlement was entered on 9.1.91 herein after referred as 4th settlement and the time limit was
extended upto 1994 and separate panel was prepared for temporary employees, casual/daily wagers. It was agreed that
while vacancies arising between 1988 to 1994 in respect of temporary employees and in respect of casual/daily
wagers, they can be considered for the vacancies arising between 1995-96 only.
16.
It is submitted that the administrative set up of the Hyderabad Local Head Office comprises of four Zonal
Offices (Zones) at Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam and Tirupathi covering all the Districts of Andhra
Pradesh. In terms of the settlement the Management after following the procedure laid down therein prepared the
panels of qualified candidates of temporary employees denoted as 1989 panel and also panel of casual/daily wagers
denoted as 1992 panel for giving a chance for being considered for permanent absorption. These panels were
prepared zone-wise separately for messengers and non-messengers in the descending order of temporary service put
in by the candidates during the stipulated period i.e., 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988. That the Federation approached the
Regional Labour Commissioner(C) for implementation of bi-partite settlement in respect of absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner(C) conducted conciliation proceedings and an agreement was
arrived between the Federation and the bank. It was agreed that it would be kept alive upto March, 1997. A copy of
the conciliation proceedings dated 9.2.1995 signed by the parties is filed as material paper. A settlement was arrived
at and an agreement was signed between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Sec.2 (p) read
with Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which is hereinafter called as 5th settlement. That on
27.2.1997 a Memorandum of understanding was also signed by the federation‘s affiliate and the bank Management
recording the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been
completed by Central Office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were sanctioned . It was agreed that these
vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-
messengerial staff in the usual manner and the agreement was reached accordingly. It was agreed between the
Federation's affiliate and the Management bank that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of
temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees would lapse on 31.3.1997. That as agreed upon vacancies
were filled from the panels. The Workman who has put in an aggregate temporary service of less than 240 days in a
continuous block of 12 months period during 1.7.1975 to 31.7.1988 has no right to seek a direction to consider his
candidature for absorption in the Management bank under any rule/law except under the settlement entered into
thereon.
17.
Respondent contended that, in fact, the case of the Workman can be considered under all the five settlements
having got his case considered under provisions of these settlements. All the other provisions and terms of the
settlements are also binding on him/her. The Management bank has not violated any of the provisions of the terms of
the said settlement. That the very preparation and maintenance of panel is in compliance of the terms agreed under
these settlements. These settlements were time bound and they ceased to exist on 31.3.1997. That the bank has never
promised that all the candidates in the panel will be absorbed. In the advertisement itself it was made clear that
candidates will be considered for absorption in the vacancies that may arise upto 1992. Keeping alive the panels after
31.3.1997 is contrary to the settlements arrived between the State Bank of India Staff Federation and the Management
bank. That the settlements are binding on the parties. The Workman is also bound under the terms of the said
settlement. The settlement does not suffer from any ambiguity as their language is very clear. The right under the
settlements is to give them a chance to be considered for future appointment in the bank's services against the
vacancies likely to arise. The settlements were effected to balance the expectations of the temporary employees to be
absorbed in permanent service as against the constitutional rights for all eligible persons to be considered for
employment every time a vacancy arises. That the alleged dispute including the demand for reinstatement has to be
decided in this context. It is submitted that the period of panel list got expired on 31.3.97 and it is an integral term of
the settlement and cannot be modified in any proceedings under the law. These temporary employees who
unfortunately could not be accommodated for want of vacancies have no further rights to be considered for
regularization. That the Hon'ble High Court in WP No.12964/94, held as follows, "It is needless to state that the
settlement arrived at between the All India State Bank of India Staff Federation which, is the majority union and the
bank Management is binding on the Workmen also. It is not at all the case of the Workman that any of the terms of
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the settlement has been violated by the bank's Management. If the Workman had worked in the bank on part-time
basis before 31.5.94, that itself would not vest in him a right to claim that his services should be regularized on
permanent basis against a full time cadre post. The claim put forth by the Workman in the present petition is therefore
misconceived and not tenable. However, it is open to the Workman to claim any right which flows from the
settlement between the union and the bank Management. As already pointed out that it is not the grievance of the
Workman that some right which has flown from the settlement in favour of the Workman has been denied by the bank
Management. Therefore, I do not find any ground, let alone substantial ground, to grant the kind of relief sought for
by the Workman. Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
18.
Further, it is contended that if the panels were not lapsed at the end of designated period and allowed to be
continued it would result in making the contracts of temporary employment indirectly permanent through back door
entry, which would not only be contrary to the settlements but also to Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India and
deprive the chances of original claimants who would Come through proper recruitment procedure. As their rights
have been crystallized by operation of the settlements. Hence, there is no question of any Legitimate expectation
being violated.
19.
Similarly placed ex-employees filed WP No.9206/1995 and the batch before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.
and the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the same WA No.86/98 and the batch was
filed and the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. Thereafter the ex-temporary employees filed
Special Leave Petition No.11886-11888 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India also dismissed the SLP. Therefore, reference to the Judgement of the Learned Single Judge in WP
No.9206/97 is of no consequences as the same has already been set aside. The observations made in the Judgements
cannot be relied upon for any purpose what so ever. The question of operation of Sec.25F would not come into play.
Further the issue is covered by various Judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various Hon'ble High
Courts. Hence, the reference may be ordered that the Workman is not entitled for any relief.
20.
In order to fortify his claim Workman has examined himself as WW1 and also filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited as Ex.W1 to W13. Further, the Workman has filed photocopies of documents in support
of his claim which are discussed as under:-
Ex.W1 is the Service Certificate dated 17.08.1988. Further Ex.W2 is the Notification. Ex.W3 is the Call letter for
interview. Ex.W4 is the Absorption letter. Ex.W5 is the Service Certificate. Ex. W6 is the Service Certificate. Ex.
W7 is the Service Certificate dated 8.04.1992. Ex. W8 is the Memorandum. Ex. W9 is the Memorandum. Ex. W10 is
the Memorandum Ex. W11 is the Service Certificate dated 25.5.1997. Ex. W12 is the letter to employment exchange
by the Respondent. Ex. W13 is the Circular letter dated 14.7.1999
21.
On the other hand, Respondent has examined witness MW1 Sri Aluru Rama Rao and this witness has
exhibited 12 documents, marked as Ex.M1 to M12. The details of these documents are as follows:-
Ex.M.1 is the Settlement dated 17.11.1987. Ex.M2 is the Settlement dated 16.7.1988. Ex.M3 is the Settlement
dated 27.10.1988. Ex.M4 is the Settlement dated 9.1.1991. Ex.M5 is the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings
dated 9.6.1995. Ex.M6 is the Settlement dated 30.7.1996. Ex.M7 is the Memorandum of Understanding dt.
27.2.1997. Ex.M8 is the Particulars of 1989 Messengerial Panel. Ex.M9 is the Particulars of 1989 Non-
Messengerial Panel. Ex.M10 is the Particulars of 1992 General Attendant Panel. Ex.M11 is the Judgment of
Hon‘ble High Court of A.P. in Writ Appeal No.86/98 dt.1.5.1998. Ex.M12 is the Judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme
Court of India in SLP No. 11886-11888 of 1998 dt.10.8.1998.
22.
Apart from afore mentioned documents, Learned Counsel for Workman has also filed a long list of various
judgements of Hon‘ble Supreme Court as well as Hon‘ble High Court, which we will discuss at appropriate place in
this Award.
23.
Heard the argument of Learned Counsel for Workman as well as for Respondent.
24.
On the basis of rival pleadings of both the parties and submissions made by the Learned Counsel for both
the parties, following points arise for determination in the industrial dispute :-
I.
Whether the 1st settlement dated 17.11.1987, 2nd settlement dated 16.7.1988, 3rd settlement dated
27.10.1988, 4th settlement dated 9.1.1991 and 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996 entered into between
State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and also Memorandum of
Understanding are binding upon both the parties?
II.
Whether the action of State Bank of India, Local Head office Hyderabad branch in terminating the
services of Workman Sri Om Prakash Thakur a Messenger with effect from 31.3.1997 is justified?
III.
Whether the Workman is entitled for absorption on permanent post in the Branch of Respondent
management as per averments made by him in the claim statement?
IV.
To what relief if any the Workman is entitled for?
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Findings:-
25.
Point No.I:-
Undisputedly settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 and
30.7.1996, minutes of conciliation proceedings and memorandum of understanding dated 27.2.1997 were executed
between the State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation under section 2(p) and 18 (1) of
I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957.
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows:-
(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;
Section 18(1) provides as follows:-
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.
- [(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and Workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, in view of the provision contained u/s.18 (1) I.D. Act, 1947, terms and conditions enumerated in the
aforesaid settlements are binding on the parties to the agreement. The Learned Counsel for Workman has argued that
the Workman after going through the selection procedure has successfully been listed in the panel for appointment on
the permanent basis in the Respondent management and the empanelled list has to be valid till last person in the
empanelled list is appointed on permanent basis. But the impugned order dated 25.3.97, 27.3.97 and 31.3.97, has been
issued by Respondent management thereby the services of the Workman has been terminated and the said order is not
in consonance of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further, Workman submits that the
Respondent in the 5th settlement has mentioned the date i.e., 31.3.1997 for lapse of empanel list which is illegal and
that is not binding upon the Workman. The condition of lapse of empanelment list on 31.3.97 incorporated in the
aforesaid 5th settlement, is arbitrary and illegal.
26.
The perusal of the impugned order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief/Branch Manager, SBI Zonal
Office has issued the letter to all the branches with regard to the subject not to make any temporary appointments in
the Branch in messengerial category from 1.4.1997. The extract of the said letter is given below:-
―We have been advised by the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panels of
temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labours of 1992 will lapse by 31.3.1997, it has been decided
by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1.4.1997.‖
Thus, from the contents of the aforesaid letter, it manifest that Head Office of State Bank of India vide letter dated
25.3.1997 has issued direction to all its branches not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category
from 1.4.1997 due to reason of lapse of both panels i.e., 1989 & 1992 on 31.3.1997 as per terms of settlements
entered into by both parties. Further, the contents of the subsequent letter dated 27.3.1997 issued by Respondent
Management is also direction to Branch Manager, State Bank of India not to make any temporary messengerial
category appointment with effect from 1.4.1997 and it has also been communicated to all concerned that the panels
of temporary employees and daily wagers maintained by Zonal offices stand lapsed from 31.1.1997. Further, office
order dated 31.3.1997 has been issued by Respondent management that goes to reveal that the said office order has
been issued to this effect that, ―Consequent on absorption of temporary employees in permanent cadre, it has been
decided by the competent authority that no one onwards, no further daily labour or temporary
employees/appointments should be resorted to/engaged/employed.‖ Therefore, it reflects from the contents of the
aforesaid orders that the temporary appointment in messengerial category and daily labour has been stopped by the
Respondent management with effect from 1.4.1997 because of the lapsed of panel of temporary workers and daily
wagers by 31.3.1997. The agreement for lapse of both the panels on 31.3.1997 is contained in the 5th settlement
which has been arrived at between the parties on dated 30.7.1996 with the consensus of both the parties. Therefore,
Workman can not challenge the terms and conditions contained in settlement dated 30.7.1996 regarding lapse of
panel on 31.3.1997 as agreed between State Bank of India and State Bank of India Staff Federation. As per provision
contained u/s.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 the said Agreement dated 30.7.1996 is binding on both the parties.
In the case of Allied Sales Corporation Secunderabad vs.The Authority Under Andhra Pradesh..... 1990 II LLJ
510 AP para 414, Hon’ble Court have held:-
―4. There was a settlement between the Management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act on 25th April 1983 under which the age of superannuation of the workmen was fixed at 55 years. The settlement
was to be in force upto 30th June 1986 and the next settlement, incorporating practically the same terms, was again
entered into on 4th February 1987 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that these
settlements are under Section 18(1).
14. Now the Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the Act is an authority with very limited jurisdiction. It can
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2291
only decide in the first appeal whether a termination by the management is valid or not and is within the parameters
of Section 40 of the Act. The said Authority, in our view, has absolutely no jurisdiction to decide whether a settlement
entered into under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the representatives of the Workmen and of the
Management, is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion on the part of the Management. The
Authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, was never intended by the A.P. Legislature to have
jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes
Act by an Industrial Court. That Parliament has, in fact, constituted Industrial Courts under the Industrial Disputes
Act, with extensive powers cannot be disputed. What we mean to say is that the Authority under Section 41(1) of the
A.P. Act has no jurisdiction what-so-ever either to question or to decide about the validity of any such settlements. If
parties to a settlement have a grievance about the validity of a settlement, it is for them to agitate the matter before
the appropriate forum and they cannot ask an Authority constituted under Section 41(1) of the A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966 with limited jurisdiction, to go into any such question and, that too, incidentally while
deciding whether retirement as per the contract of employment, is legal or not.”
It is not the case of Workman that aforesaid settlements are vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation or
coercion on the part of the management. If the Workman feeling aggrieved by any terms of settlement/ agreement on
the aforementioned grounds then he can challenge of settlement before a competent authority under the Act, 1947.
But here in the instant matter it is not a case of Workman that aforementioned settlement has been entered into
between the parties on the ground of undue influence or misrepresentation or coercion. Therefore, Workman is barred
to raise any objection in respect of fixing the date of lapse of both panels on 31.3.1997 as agreed between both the
parties and Workman can not challenge any terms of said Agreement.
Further in the case of Herbertsons Limited Vs. Workmen of Herbertsons Limited and Ors, 1977 AIR 322,
Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
The Tribunal thought that the question of the quantum of membership of the 2nd Respondent did not call for a finding
at all in view of 1his Court's order. As observed above that was not a correct assumption. On the other hand, we feel
that this view of the Tribunal has led it to approach the matter in an entirely erroneous manner. The Tribunal is,
rightly enough, conscious that under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the settlement was binding on the
company and the members of the 3rd Respondent union. Even so, the Tribunal devoted nearly half of its order in
scanning the evidence given by the company and Respondent No. 3 to find out whether the terms of the settlement had
been explained by the President of the union to the workmen or not and whether the workers voluntarily accepted the
settlement knowing all the "consequences". This to our mind is again an entirely wrong approach.
“When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is
not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union,
which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour.
This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of
mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other induce- ments. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the
President of the 3rd Respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration.
It is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad.
Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other
advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settle- ment as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be
accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust. Even before this Court
the 3rd Respondent representing admittedly the large majority of the workmen has stood by this settlement and that is
a strong factor which it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the
fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. Besides, the period of settlement has since expired
and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd Respondent are negotiating another settlement with further
improvements. These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony
when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining
have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just
and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. The said
settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, the contention of the
Workman that the date fixed for lapse of empanelled list on 31.3.1997 for appointment to the permanent post vide 5th
Settlement dated 30.7.1996 is arbitrary, illegal is not untenable. The recognized union of Workmen has negotiated
with the Respondent Bank Management representing large number of Workmen and the Workman as individual do
not come into picture. Workman in the instant case has work as temporary Workmen in the Respondent Branch and
in response of Notification he had applied for inclusion of his name in the panel and he was selected for inclusion
his name in the panel list to be utilized for absorption of such Workman to permanent post in order of their seniority
in the list. The Settlement dated 30.7.1996 between State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff
Federation under Sec.2(p) and Sec.18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 has clearly provided as regard non-messengerial position
and it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned fallen vacant upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before empanel list is
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
allowed to lapse. Thus, in view of law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, in the instant case, Agreement dated
30.7.1996 was entered into between both the parties in respect of lapsing of the both the panels on 31.3.1997 and
absorption of the Workmen from panel list was subject to availability of vacancy of post likely to arise upto
31.3.1997, have a binding force on Workman as well as management of State Bank of India in view of provision
contained under section 18 (1) of I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, Point No.I is answered against the Workman and in favour of the Respondent.
27.
Point No.II:- Firstly, it is submitted on behalf of the Workman that the Respondent has terminated his
services by oral order on 31.3.1997 without issuing any notice or paying any salary or compensation in lieu thereof.
Therefore, the termination order of the Workman from service is in violation of provision contained Under Section 25
F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside.
28.
On the other hand, Respondent counsel contended that Workman has not worked for 240 days in any
preceding calendar year. Therefore, reference of the industrial dispute is not relevant. In this context, the Workman
has examined himself as WW1 who has reiterated that Workman has been terminated from service by Respondent on
31.3.1997 without notice of salary or compensation in lieu thereof. Before examining the claim of the Workman on
merit it would be apposite to reproduce the provision contained under section 25 F:-
Section 25F provides:-
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No Workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the Workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the Workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the Workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified
by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.
Section 25B defines the term continuous service which provides
Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a Workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the Workman;
(2) where a Workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six
months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the Workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a Workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case
In order to prove the fact of 240 days of service within 12 months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of
termination, the initial burden of proof lies upon the Workman and the Workman has to prove this factum by
adducing his oral as well as documentary evidence in support of his claim.
Further, how to calculate 240 days of service by the Workman in a calendar year. In this context the reference of
decisions of Hon‘ble Supreme Court is relevant and the same are discussed below:-
In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004) Apex Court held:
"It was the case of the Workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was
denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had worked for 240 days in the year
preceding the date of his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is statement which is in his favor and that cannot be
regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had
worked for 240 days in a year These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3)
SCC 25. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court held that the
Workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."
In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), held "the burden was on the Workman to
show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment." In
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2293
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:
"The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn
erroneously ..‖
In the case of Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S Mani (2005) SCC Page 100, the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court held that "the initial burden of proof was on the Workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service."
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs Management BEL 1981 SCC page 225 has laid down the
principle that how to count 240 days of service within one year it is held: "Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction
to treat a Workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered period of 240 days during the period of 12
calendar service for months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date, ie the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained. move
backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the
period of 12 months, the Workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively
answered in favor of the Workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed
that the Workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification
enacted in Section 25-F"
“14. We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative
exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra
Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., Chinnappa
Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd case, held as under:
"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a Workman who has
actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service
for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that
he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."
In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2). Therefore, both on principle
and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a Workman is not in employment
for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12
calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has,
he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and
Chapter VA.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above the initial burden of proof lies
upon the Workman to show that he has completed 240 days of the service with the Respondent just preceding from
the date of his termination. Further, in respect of the employment of calculating the 240 days service provision
contained under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
29.
Now, in view of the provision contained under Section 25 F and law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court,
we have to examine whether the Workman has discharged his initial burden of proof in respect of his claim of 240
days continuous service in a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
In this context, WW1 in his cross examination has stated that,
“ I was not sponsored by any employment exchange did not undergo the regular process of selection before my
engagement as temporary Messenger in the branch. .…..”
“ It is true that I did not put in 240 days in any year, in my entire service in the bank in any branch..”
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of WW1 that the Workman had not worked for 240 days continuously in any 12
months of a calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination in the Respondent bank. Therefore,
Workman failed to establish his plea by his oral and documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in calendar year just preceding from the date of his termination i.e., 31.3.1997. Thus, the claim of the
Workman that he has been terminated by oral order without issuing notice or payment in lieu after termination, in
contravention of Section 25 F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not tenable. However the documents filed by the
Workman in support of his claim, number of days worked with the Respondent goes to reveal that the Workman had
worked intermittently as daily wager depending upon availability of work in branch. Workman did not file any
document of appointment letter or salary slips in support of his claim for appointment as a non-messenger in the
Respondent branch on temporary basis.
30.
Per contra, the Learned Counsel for Respondent has submitted the allegation of Workman that he was
terminated from services is not correct. As the vacancies were filled up on regular basis in order of their respective
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
seniority the non-engagement of the Workman does not amount to termination. Further, Respondent contended that
no law provide that even though there is no work temporary employee should be continued in the bank work as the
very engagement of Workman was subject to availability of work. Therefore, the allegation that the bank has
indulged in unfair labour practice is incorrect.
31.
Thus, in view of the fore gone discussion and contentions made by the Respondent, I find the force in the
argument advanced by the Respondent that in the instant matter, Workman was not terminated from service by order
dated 31.3.1997 rather he was disengaged in view of the non-availability of the work in the branch. Further, there
was direction issued by the Head Office of the Respondent authority not to engage any daily wager Workman/
temporary Worker w.e.f. 1.4.1997. Thus, such disengagement of Workman does not amount to termination.
Moreover, the Workman failed to prove his claim that he was terminated in contravention of provision of Sec.25F of
the I.D. Act, 1947 as he failed to establish his plea by any oral or documentary evidence that he had worked for 240
days continuously in a twelve months of calendar year just preceding from date of termination i.e., 31.3.1997.
32.
Further, perusal of the order dated 25.3.1997 goes to reveal that the Chief Branch Manager, State Bank of
India has issued the letter to Zonal Office with direction to all its branches to this effect that they have been advised
by the DGM, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that as both the panel of temporary employees of 1989 and daily
wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse on 31.3.1997 it has been decided by central office not to make any temporary
appointments in messengerial cadre from 1.4.1997, therefore it was directed to issue suitable instructions not to make
temporary appointments from 1.4.1997. There is no mention in this order that the Workman herein has been
33.
Further, the circular dated 27.3.1997 was issued by DGM, SBI to all branches in commercial network in
respect of the non-appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre and it has directed not to make any
temporary employment in the subordinate cadre with effect from 1.4.97 and further, it has directed to ensure that no
temporary/casual/daily basis appointment of the petty cash. Further, it is directed to all Branch Managers that any
deviation in this regard will be viewed seriously. Thus, these circulars do not reflect that the Workman has been
terminated from service by this order.
34.
Similarly, office order dated 31.3.1997 is simply a direction to all branches of the Respondent bank by
DGM that no further daily labour should be engaged or employed. Therefore, the plea of the Workman that he has
been terminated by the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1997, 27.3.1997 and 31.3.1997 from the service by the Respondent
is not acceptable. The evidence adduced by the Workman clearly goes to reveal that he had worked as a daily wager
for which he has been paid wages according to number of working days. As there was an order for prohibition for
engaging temporary workmen, in the bank, therefore, Workman could not be engaged by the Respondent for work
from 1.4.1997 and there after. It is settled law that the daily wagers are engaged by the employer depending upon
the availability of work and as the work was not available the Workman was not engaged further by the Respondent
management. Therefore, the Workman on the ground of number of days he had worked in the Respondent bank
cannot claim any right to reinstate him into the employment. As the Workman failed to prove the mandatory
condition of 240 days of continuous service as required under Sec.25F of I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the
disengagement of Workman from work can not be termed in contravention of provision contained under Sec.25F and
25 B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
Thus, this point is answered against the Workman and in favour of Respondent.
35.
Point No.III:- In this context, the Workman has contended that the management failed to implement the
selected panels during its valid tenure. The management adopted the back door methods contrary to the settlements
and filled up the vacancies. The same is evident from the proceedings dated 18.11.1993 a copy of the same is filed in
the material papers and the same may be read as part of the claim statement. Further, it is submitted that management
has to adhere the procedure issued by the Central Government, the instructions dated 16.8.1990 in the year 1995, but
same was not followed in the year 1997 despite there being vacancies. The management has followed the procedure
of calling candidates through employment exchange instead of giving chance to the empanelled candidates like the
Workman herein. The management sent call letters to the similarly situated candidates like the Workman in the month
of June 1997 subsequent to issuance of impugned termination orders. After knowing the fact that they are litigating
the issue by way of dispute, the management has refused to engage those candidates, the copies of call letters issued
are filed herein along with claim petition. The Workman herein reiterates that the panels are meant for absorption but
not for termination. In view of the same a duty is cast upon the Respondent management to engage the empanelled
candidates like the Workman herein even in temporary vacancies till they are absorbed permanently in regular
vacancies.
36.
On the other hand, Respondent has contended that the Federation approached Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) for implementation of bipartite settlement in respect of the absorption of temporary
employees. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) conducted conciliation proceedings and agreement was
arrived at between the Federation and the Management bank. It is submitted that it was agreed between the
Federation and the Management that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual labour would
be kept alive upto March, 1997 and the vacancies as agreed to under the afore set out settlements will be filled from
both the lists concurrently. A copy of the conciliation proceedings dated 9.6.1995 signed by the parties to the dispute
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2295
is filed as a material paper. Further, it is submitted that the settlement was arrived at and an agreement was signed
between the Federation and the Management bank on 30.7.1996 under Section 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957 which is binding on the parties. A copy of this agreement which hereinafter
may be referred to as 5th settlement for brevity, is also filed as a material paper. The 5th settlement dated 30.7.1996
whereunder the earlier four settlements dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 were also referred, it
was agreed to, by the Federation and the Management bank that both the panels of temporary employees and daily
wagers/casual employees will be kept alive upto March, 1997 for filling the vacancies existing/arrived at as on
31.12.1994 as per the norms agreed to between the bank and Federation and that thereafter the said panels would
lapse. It was also agreed that within the framework of the above settlements the modalities about drawing names
from either the panel of temporary employees or the panel of daily wagers and casual labour would be decided
administratively on circle to circle basis depending upon the local requirements in consultation with the Federation‘s
affiliate by the Circle management. It was further agreed that all messenger real vacancies/positions in the subordinate
cadre including part-time attendants specifically provided as leave reserve will be filled by the end of 31.3.1997.
Further, Respondent contended that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of understanding was also signed between the
Federation‘s affiliate and the bank management regarding the fact that the exercise of identifying the messengerial
vacancies as on 31.12.1994 has since been completed by central office and thereby 403 messengerial vacancies were
sanctioned to the circle of the Management bank and it was agreed that these vacancies may be filled from 1989 panel
of temporary employees after effecting conversion from full time non-messengerial staff in the usual manner and the
agreement was reached upon. Further, it was agreed between the Federations affiliate and the management bank
that in terms of the settlement dated 30.7.1996 both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers /casual
employees would lapse on 31.3.1997.
37.
The Workman has contended that the empanelled list prepared by the Respondent management for
appointment of temporary and daily wage Workers to the permanent post cannot lapse unless until it is exhausted by
appointing all the empanelled persons and it should continue even after 31.3.1997, i.e., the date fixed for the lapse of
panel. It is undisputed that the date of lapse of empanelled list of Workmen has been fixed to 31.3.1997 as
mentioned in the settlement dated 30.7.1996, and agreed between the parties. It is settled law that and once the life
of panel list lapses on the date as agreed between the parties it cannot be extended beyond that date. In the instant
case the panel list of the workmen was valid upto 31.3.1997 in view of the terms and conditions enumerated in the 5th
Settlement entered into between the parties. As the lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997 has been agreed by State Bank of
India and State Bank of India Staff Federation through 5th Settlement, the Workman is not competent to challenge the
same.
In this context I would like to take reference of the decision of the apex court in the case of Syndicate Bank and Ors
vs. Shankar Paul and Ors , AIR 1997 SC 3091, therein the Hon’ble Apex Court have held:-
“Till 1982, the branches of the appellant Bank in Calcutta region were recruiting persons locally to work as
temporary attenders in leave vacancies. In view of the revised procedure prescribed by the Government of India in
respect of such temporary appointments, the Calcutta regional office of the appellant Bank issued a circular to all of
its branches on 14.8.1982, instructing all the branches under it to discontinue the old practice from 1.6.1982 and
appoint only empanelled candidates. The regional office was to prepare a panel of eligible candidates, after calling
names from the local/district employment exchange, and split it up branch-wise. Following that new procedure yearly
panels were prepared thereafter. Names of the Respondents were for the first time included in the panel prepared for
the period 7.2.1987 to 6.2.1988. By its letter dated 7.2.1987 the Bank had informed the Respondents that the panel
was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek
permanent appointment in the service of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the
fact that it was an yearly panel expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right,
because of inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents, as contained in
the writ petition was thus misconceived and therefore the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first
decided the appeal, were right in dismissing the writ petition and the appeal respectively.”
Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court and in view of the terms and conditions of the
5th Settlement the contention of the Workman that empanelled list should continue even after 31.3.1997 till the last
Workman in the panel is absorbed is not tenable. The contention of the Workman is baseless in view of recital in
the settlement. Therefore, in view of the fore gone discussion and finding given at Point No. I regarding binding
nature of Settlements and terms and conditions enumerated therein, in view of the provision contained u/s.18(1) of the
I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the considered view that life of panels lapsed on 31.3.1997 in view of terms of settlement
dated 30.7.1996 and plea of Workman that the panel shall continue even after 31.3.1997 till last man absorbed has
no legal force and same is untenable.
38.
Undisputedly, settlement agreement dated 30.7.1996 was executed between the State Bank of India and
State Bank of India Staff Federation and in that settlement it was agreed that both the panels of temporary employees
and daily wagers/ casual employees will be used for filling vacancies existing as on 31.12.1994 as per the norms
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
agreed between the bank and the Federation. These empanelled workmen were to be given a chance for permanent
appointment in the bank against vacancies arising up to December 1994 whereas the daily wagers/ casual employees
were to be considered against the vacancies arise from January 1995 to December 1996, whereby the said panel
would lapse. It was agreed that the vacancies falls upto 31.3.1997 shall be filled before the empanelled list is
allowed to lapse. Thus, the claim of the Workman to the post of permanent non-messenger in the Respondent
management was subject to the availability of the sanctioned post and vacancies arising upto 31.3.1997. The
workmen given chance to the permanent post were seniors in number of working days in panel list and Workman
herein was junior to those workmen. Therefore, Workman could not be given absorption to permanent post being
junior to other workmen in the panel list.
39.
In this context the Workman witness WW1 was cross examined by the Respondent counsel and in the cross
examination the witness WW1 states:-
“I applied for appointment as Messenger, in response to the advertisement issued by the bank and the union in the
year 1989,…. The panel was prepared basing upon the no. of days of service put in by the temporary employees.
Some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the
bank in order of their seniority in the panel….. It is true that I am not having any documents to show that any of my
juniors are continuing in service in the bank.”
Thus, from the above statement of the Workman witness WW1 it is clear that the panel was prepared in terms of
various settlements entered into between Staff Federation of State Bank of India and State Bank of India and it was
prepared on the basis of number of days of work put in by the temporary employees. Further, the Workman himself
admitted that some of the temporary employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular
appointment in the bank in order of their seniority in the panel and he is not having any document to show that any
person who worked for less number of days than the Workman was given appointment in the bank. Therefore, the
allegation of the Workman that the regular appointment has been made by the bank from the panel list in breach of
the terms of the settlement and violation of seniority of panel list is not proved by this evidence of WW1. Thus,
there is no evidence on record that bank has given the appointment to the temporary employees as well as daily
wagers from the panel list 1989 and 1992 in breach of seniority of the temporary employees in the list. There is no
evidence of jumbling in the panel list to make appointment of any permanent Workman in breach of the seniority.
Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the Respondent Management has appointed the workmen from panel list in
order of seniority and there is no jumbling of workmen in the panel list before it got lapsed on 31.3.1997.
40.
However, Workman has taken the plea that the panels of Workmen for absorption in the employment of the
Respondent banks (panels of temporary employees and daily wagers) has been lapsed on 31.3.1997 in contravention
of terms of settlement as the object of preparing the entire empanelment of temporary and daily wagers was to
provide them permanent employment and till the both the panel lists exhausted the panel list cannot be lapsed on
31.3.1997 and the date of lapsing of the panel on 31.3.1997 has been fixed by the Respondent arbitrarily without any
authority.
41.
In this context, the perusal of Settlement dated 30.7.1996 reveals that the 5th Settlement dated 30.7.1996
was entered under Section 2(p) and 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947 read with Rule 58 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules
1957. This settlement has been entered into by the competent parties and in this settlement parties thereto agreed
that both the panels of temporary employees and daily wagers/casual employees will lapse on 31.3.1997. Thus the
date of lapse of panel was fixed by both the parties with consensus under the settlement dated 30.7.1996 and same is
binding upon the Workman under the provision of Section 18(1) of I.D. Act, 1947. Moreover, this issue of binding
force of the settlement dated 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988 and 9.1.1991 has already been discussed, decided at
finding in Point No.I of this award. However, the legality and validity of the aforementioned settlement has not been
challenged by the Workman before any competent forum. Thus, claim of Workman that the date of lapse of panel
i.e., 31.3.1997 has been fixed arbitrarily by the Respondent bank is untenable. As regard the claim of Workman for
his absorption to the permanent post it is settled law that the Workman can not claim his regularization to permanent
post merely on the basis of number of working days.
42.
In this context the reference of the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation vs Krishan Gopal 2020(3) SCALE 272, date of decision 7.2.2020 is relevant therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have has laid down principle regarding regularization of the Workman on permanent posts. Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have laid down the prepositions of regularization of the workmen to permanent post is as under:-
―(i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order
regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained
in Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of
permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not
filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary
or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages;
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2297
(iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are
available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of
service;
(iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open
to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make
a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of
Article 14; and
(v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the
ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years,
with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.
Thus, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as discussed above, in the instant matter the
Workman utterly failed to prove his claim by adducing any documentary or oral evidence that the employer has
indulged in unfair labour practice by not filling the permanent posts even though such posts are available and by
continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performance was the same work,
as regular workmen on lower wages.
43.
Respondent has contended that all the vacancies exist and arise upto 31.3.1997 has been filled up from the
panel list in order of seniority and no vacancy exists or arises as on 31.3.1997 remained unfilled. Further, it is
contended that as per terms of settlement the life of panel lists has been lapsed on 31.3.1997, hence, there is no
occasion to extend the life of panel lists beyond 31.3.1997. However, the workman failed to prove contrary by any
evidence to the aforesaid contention of the Respondent that the vacancies were existing as on 31.3.1997 and the
workman was not given absorption to the permanent post in order of his seniority. It is settled law that the power to
create permanent or sanctioned post lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to
grant regularization would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service. Therefore, the
claim of the workman on this ground also not acceptable.
44.
Further, as per the of settlement, panel was prepared for absorption of the workmen on the permanent posts
has already been lapsed on 31.3.1997 and the vacancies existing and arising upto 31.12.1994 and upto 31.3.1997 as
settlement dated 30.7.1996 has been filled up from the panel by appointing the workmen as per seniority in the panel
list. Workman witness WW1 in his cross examination has himself admitted this fact that, some of the temporary
employees whose names were included in the panel were given regular appointment in the bank in order of their
seniority in the panel. The Workman failed to show that there was any breach of terms of settlement has been
committed by the Respondent in appointment to permanent post from aforesaid panel list.
45.
As discussed in preceding paragraph of this Award, the life of the panel has not been extended beyond
31.3.1997, by any further settlement hence, the panel list in which name of the Workman was included got expired
on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the Workman that Respondent has regularized similarly situated workmen either in
the scheme or otherwise and the Workman has been deprived of same benefit on par with those workmen or the
vacancies remained unfilled on the date of lapse of panels i.e., 31.3.1997, Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
extend the date of lapse of panel i.e., 31.3.1997. This Tribunal can not order for regularization of workmen to the
permanent post in contravention of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula & Anr, Civil Appeal No.5875/2007 date of
judgement 13.12.2007, Hon‘ble Supreme Court have held:-
“8. Respondent is a Local Authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a
statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a Local Authority without following the provisions of the
recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by
reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in
absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularized.”
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‘ble Apex Court, the claim of the Workman for absorption merely
on the basis of number of day of work in the Respondent bank Branch is not acceptable. As regard plea of the
Workman that the Workman should have been given employment even after 31.3.1997 as temporary Workman, it is
the discretion of Respondent to engage the Workman depending upon availability of work and this Tribunal can not
direct the Respondent to engage the Workman in the absent of such rule/scheme.
46.
In view of principle laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the instant matter Workman
utterly failed to establish the fact of rendering continuous service for a period of 240 days of service within a period
of 12 calendar months commencing and coming backward from relevant date i.e., the date of retrenchment, if has he
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
would be denied to be in continuous service for a period of one year. Therefore, the provision contained under
Sec.25F of retrenchment is not applicable to Workman.
Counsel for Workman has relied upon number of decisions of Hon‘ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court and
few of them are discussed herein:-
In the case of F.C.I., vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries 1993 (1) SCC 71, therein Hon‘ble Supreme Court have
held:-
“7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law:
A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and to adopt
a procedure which is `fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a
reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and
give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected by the decision or else
that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona
fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of
arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but
providers for control of its exercise by judicial review.”
In the case of State Bank of India, R.O., Vijayawada vs. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad WP No.193/1997,
therein Hon‘ble High Court have held,
―Sri Krovvidi Narasimham, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, supporting the award that it was a
permanent vacancy and even though the 2nd respondent was appointed on temporary basis, his services were not
liable to be terminated and he was to be regularised into service on permanent basis. Shastry award warrants that no
temporary appointment can be made to a permanent post. But the matter is now covered by two division bench
judgements dated 28.11.1986 in W.A. No.791 of 1986 and 25.8.1987 in W.A. No.270 of 1982. The ratio decided in the
two judgements is to the effect that there cannot be any mandate to appoint employees on permanent basis when the
requirement was for appointment on temporary basis. But it is held in the said judgements that when a temporary
appointee is ousted from service and not for misconduct and, if again temporary appointment is to be made, then, the
case of such temporary appointee who was ousted, has got to be considered in accordance with Sec. 25-H of
the Act.”
In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others. 1992 (4) SCC 118, therein Hon‘ble
Supreme Court have held:-
“ 49. If for any reason an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must
consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record
is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the state.”
In the above cited judgements by the Workman the facts of the case are different hence do not apply to instant case
of Workman.
47.
On the other hand, in support of his contention Respondent has examined witness MW1 and MW1 in chief
examination states that, Settlements i.e., on 17.11.1987, 16.7.1988, 27.10.1988, 9.1.1991 were entered into between
the SBI and SBI Staff Federation for filling up of the vacancies that arise up to 1994 for those temporary employees
who has worked on scale wages. Further, MW1 states that two different panels for messengers and non-messengers
as per the eligibility criteria prescribed by the bank. There are four modules in Andhra Pradesh and they are
Hyderabad, Tirupathi, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam. MW1 states that the temporary employees so empanelled
were given permanent absorption depending upon the vacancies so arise strictly in terms of the settlement. MW1
states that on 9.6.1995 conciliation proceeding was held before the RLC(C), Hyderabad and in said proceedings it
was decided that the panels will be kept live up to 31.3.1997 and vacancies will be filled from both the lists
concurrently. A copy of the said minutes of proceedings is Ex.M5. Further, MW1 states that on 30.7.1996 another
settlement was entered between the SBI and All India SBI Staff Federation providing for filling up of the vacancies
arising up to December 1994 in respect of subordinate cadre and daily wage /casual wage employees out of panel so
prepared were to be considered against vacancies arising from January 1995 to December 1996, thereafter the said
panels lapse. MW1 states that it was also agreed that all the non- messenger positions in subordinate cadre including
part time attendants specially provided as leave reserve will be filled before 31.3.1997 and as regards to non-
messengerial positions it is agreed that all such posts sanctioned and fallen vacant up to 31.3.1997 shall be filled
before the empanelled list is allowed to lapse. Thus in both the cases empanelled list were lapsed on 1.4.1997.
Ex.M6 is the copy of the settlement dated 30.7.1996. Further, witness states that on 27.2.1997 a memorandum of
understanding was reached between the SBI and SBI Staff Federation providing that both the panels above mentioned
will lapse on 31.3.1997. Ex.M7 is the copy of the memorandum of understanding and Ex.M8 is the copy of the
statements giving the particulars of 1989 non-messenger panel, Ex.M9 is the copy of the statement of 1989 non-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2299
messenger panel, Ex.M10 is the copy of statement of 1992 panel. Further, witness states that petitioner was included
in the 1989 panel. As the existing vacancies at that time were exhausted and his turn did not come he could not be
given permanent employment in the bank as per the agreements. All the appointments were made strictly in
accordance with the settlements reached from time to time between SBI and SBI staff federation and as per seniority,
number of days of temporary service put in by them in the bank in the given period. Further, MW1 states petitioner
was not sponsored by any employment exchange he did not undergo the regular process of selection required for
appointment as a regular non-messenger the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any year in his entire temporary
service in the bank. The petitioner and other temporary employees were terminated from service by the bank.
Further, MW1 states that the vacancies were filled up on regular basis with the temporary employees from the panels
and these panels were expired in terms of the settlements so reached and there were no vacancies to absorb such
employees. Thus, witness MW1 has proved the documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M12 and also contentions made in the
counter. However, MW1 was cross examined by the Petitioner Counsel. But nothing has been elicited in his cross
examination so as to discredit the testimony of the witness MW1 as regards the date of lapse of both the panels on
31.3.1997 and reasons assigned for non-absorption of the Petitioner from the panel list to the permanent post.
Moreover the witness MW1 was re-examined by the Respondent and the witness MW1 states that panels were
expired in terms of the settlement send absorptions to the extent of the available vacancies were made. There was no
termination of any temporary messenger as such but their services were not utilized after the cut off date as the
available vacancies were already filled up and most of these Petitioners were not in the service of the bank as on the
date of the expiry date of the panels. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid testimony of the MW1 in re-examination in
the absence of cross examination remained uncontraverted, the claim of the Workman that he was entitled for
absorption in permanent post in the branch of Respondent Management on the basis of panel list is found not
established.
This point is answered against the Workman.
48.
Point No.IV:- In view of the discussion and finding given at Point Nos. I, II and III, the Workman is not
entitled for any relief and claim statement of Workman sans merit and liable to be dismissed.
This Point is answered accordingly.
AWARD
In view of the fore gone discussion, it is held that the action of the Respondent bank in terminating the
services of Sri Om Prakash Thakur Ex. Messenger by way of oral orders w.e.f. 31.3.1997 is justified. Hence, the
Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed for. The claim statement filed by Workman sans merit, hence,
dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Typed to my dictation by Smt. K. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed
by me on this the 11th day of March, 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri Om Prakash Thakur
MW1: Sri Aluru Rama Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 17.08.1988
Ex.W2:
Photocopy of Notification
Ex.W3:
Photocopy of Call letter for interview.
Ex.W4:
Photocopy of Absorption letter
Ex.W5:
Photocopy of Service Certificate
Ex.W6:
Photocopy of Service Certificate
Ex.W7:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 8.04.1992
Ex.W8:
Photocopy of Service Certificate
Ex.W9:
Photocopy of Service Certificate
Ex.W10:
Photocopy of Service Certificate
Ex.W11:
Photocopy of Service Certificate dated 25.5.1997
Ex.W12: Photocopy of letter to employment exchange by the Respondent
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W13:
Photocopy of Circular letter dated 14.7.1999
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.17.11.87
Ex.M2:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.16.7.88
Ex.M3:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.27.10.1988
Ex.M4:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.9.1.1991
Ex.M5:
Photocopy of conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner(C) dt.9.6.1995
Ex.M6:
Photocopy of settlement between Respondent and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation
dt.30.7.1996
Ex.M7:
Photocopy of Memorandum of understanding dt. 27.1.1997
Ex.M8:
Photocopy of statements giving the particulars of 1989 messenger panel.
Ex.M9:
Photocopy of statement of 1989 Non-messenger panel
Ex.M10:
Photocopy of statement of 1992 panel
Ex.M11:
Photocopy of order of Hon‘ble High Court in WA No.86/98 dt. 1.5.98
Ex.M12:
Photocopy of order in SLP No.11886-11888 of 1998 dated 10.8.98
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 474.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a21/2012) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-41011/14/2012-अइअर(बी-I)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 474.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 21/2012) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Mumbai- 1 as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Western Railway
and their workmen.
[No. L-41011/14/2012- IR(B-I)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1, MUMBAI
Present
JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR MISHRA
Presiding Officer
REFERENCE NO.CGIT - 21 of 2012
Parties: Employers in relation to the management of
Western Railway
V/s.
Their Workmen
Appearances:
For the first party Management
: Mr. B.K. Ashok(Adv.)
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2301
For the second party workmen
: Absent
Mumbai, dated the 05th day of February, 2026.
AWARD
The present reference has been made by the Central Government by its order No. L-41011/14/2012 dated 07/05/2012
passed in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of section (1) read with sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the
Industrial Dispute Act 1947. The terms of reference as per the schedule to the said order are as under:
“Whether the demand of Union Paschim Railway Karamchari Parishad that the screening list issued on
16.2.2011 for 13 candidate should be multifield, and name of Shri Ravikumar H. Bharti Trade welder be
mentioned in General Quota is legal and justified ? If what relief the Union is entitled.?”
In view of the above said facts the claimant/workman has not filed evidence in support of his case on affidavit, in
spite of several opportunities in spite of several opportunities given to him and taking into consideration the law as
laid by the Hon'ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (1) and others 1981 (29) FLR
194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove illegality of the
order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must fail. Whenever a workman
raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is imperative for him to file written statement
before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence
to prove his case. If the workman fails to appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred
by the State Government cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon‘ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd., V.K. Raj
Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1984 (49) FLR 38 and
Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of any evidence led by or on behalf of the
workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court against the workman. In such a situation it is not
necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation
made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon‘ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519; wherein it has been held as
under:
“The submission is that even if the petitioner failed to lead the evidence, burden was on the shoulders of the
respondent to prove the termination order as illegal. He was required to lead evidence first which he failed. A perusal
of the impugned award also does not show that any evidence either oral or documentary was led by the respondent.
In the case of no evidence, the reference has to be dismissed.”
Since the claimant/workman has not filed evidence in support of his case on affidavit, in spite of several opportunities
given to him, the claim is liable to be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and the union is not entitled for any relief.
Accordingly, the reference stands answered in terms aforesaid.
Award as above.
Justice ARVIND KUMAR, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 475.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a05/2018) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12025/01/2026-अइअर(बी-I)-70]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 475.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.05/2018) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Kolkata
as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Eastern Railway and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2026- IR(B-I)-70]
SALONI, Dy. Director
2302
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present : Justice (Retd.) Ananda Kumar Mukherjee, Presiding Ofificer/Link Officer.
Application No. CGIT-05 of 2018
Suman Das
… Applicant
Versus
1. Chairman, Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway, Kolkata.
2. Additional General Manager, Eastern Railway, Kolkata.
… Respondents
APPLICATION U/S 2A(2) OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT.
Representative:
For the Workman : Mr. Somnath Chakraborty, Advocate.
For the Opposite Party/Employer
: Mr.AbhijitBhadra, Advocate.
INDUSTRY
; RAIL
STATE
: WEST BENGAL
DATE OF AWARD : 10th March, 2026
AWARD
The Petitioner/workman filed an application before this Tribunal under section 2A (2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ―I.D.Act‖) on 21-02-2018.
The fact of the case, in brief is that the petitioner was engaged as a cleaning staff on daily wage basis at the
office of the Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway, Kolkata from 01-05-2012. He was entrusted with the work
of cleaning the entire office premises of the railway authority consisting of six rooms and a premises of 700 square
meters.
The petitioner was engaged as labour on contract basis at a daily wage far below the minimum wages
approved by the Ministry of Labour, Central Govt. for employment of sweeping and cleaning staff. The
petitioner/workman was initially paid Rs.84.02 per day. After rendering services for five years the Chief
O.S./Recruitment put up a note dated 12-02-2013 for revision of wages of the daily wage labours who were
performing cleaning job in the office premises. The proposal for enhancing the wages was at the rate of Rs.217/- per
day including a bonus @ Rs.36.15 per day but the employer authority enhanced the daily wages to Rsd.150/- per day.
The Petitioner served at the office of the Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway without any break. It
has further stated that there was no provision for any leave and they had to work even on holidays and Sundays. The
employer authority did not pay the minimum wages and the petitioner made several representations to the office of
the Railway Recruitment Cell, which went unheard. Subsequently, the petitioner made a representation before the
authority under Minimum Wages Act, 1948 alleging non-payment of minimum wages.
The Chairman, Railway Recruitment Cell was not pleased with the action of the petitioner/workman.
Consequently, the petitioner was terminated from his service on 01-04-2017 without issuing any letter of termination.
Accordingly to the petitioner he had been performing work continuously and the employer authority terminated him
illegally without complying the due process of law.
Being aggrieved with the illegal termination petitioner made a complaint before the Regional Labour
Commissioner- (Central) at Kolkata on 05-09-2017. The Conciliation proceeding failed and the petitioner has filed
this application before this Tribunal under section2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, challenging the illegal
termination. The petitioner has prayed for setting aside the illegal termination, for reinstatement, payment of back
wages and payment of retrenchment compensation u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act along with consequently
relief.
The Chairman, Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway along with another contested the case by filing
written statement on 20-07-2018. Admittedly the petitioner was deployed under the Respondent Authority as a
dailywager on the basis of ‗no work no pay‘ . According to the Respondent discontinuation of service of the workman
was not in violation of any existing rules or principles of natural justice. It is contended that the petitioner has no legal
right to enter the premises of the Railway without sanction from the concerned authority. The Respondent asserted
that the workman was terminated from the service of Railway Recruitment Cell of the Railway and notice had been
tendered but the workman refused to acknowledge receipt of the same. It is contended that there was no scope for
seeking explanation or initiating any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner for the purpose of discontinuing
his work as his engagement was on day to day basis. The employer asserted that the petitioner is not entitled to
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2303
reinstatement in service and he is also not entitled to any payment of back wages or retrenchment compensation under
section 25-F of the I.D. Act. The Respondent urged the application is liable to be dismissed.
Points for Consideration:
On the basis of the statement of claim and the written objection filed by the Respondent, following issues are
formulated for determination :
1. Whether the application u/s 2A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is maintainable?
2. Whether the petitioner/workman is entitled to retrenchment compensation or reinstatement in his service
along with back wages?
In order to prove his case Sri Suman Das examined himself as Workman Witness No.1. He filed an Affidavit
in Chief,
reiterating the case disclosed in his application. In his affidavit in chief the workman further stated that he
was working in the office of the Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway, Kolkataw.e.f. 01-05-2012. The
Respondent company initially paid him Rs.,84.02 per day as safaiwala which is far below the minimum wages. A
proposal was put up on 12-02-2013 for revision of wages of the contractual workers who were doing cleaning job
in the office premises for payment of Rs.217/- per day but the Respondent Authority increased the wages only to
Rs.150/-. It is further stated that he worked on all days of the work including Sundays and there was no leave
facility. The workman disclosed that he made a representation before the authority under the Minimum Wages
Act, 1948 alleging non-payment of minimum wages.
The Respondent company was annoyed with him and his work was terminated from 31-08-2017. He was not
allowed to join his duty on 01-09-2017. The workman stated in his affidavit that he was illegally terminated
without issuance of any letter. Thereafter, he made a representation before the Regional Labour Commissioner,
Kolkata on 05-09-2017 but the Respondent did not agree to reinstate him.
In course of his examination in chief the workman witness produced the following documents :
1. A copy of note sheet of the Railway Authority dated 18-05-2006 regarding engagement of casual
workersanitation work at RRC/ER/Kolkata, has been produced as Exb. W-1.
2. A copy of joint petition submitted by Sri Suman Das and one Sri DipankarHalder before Railway
Authority on 06-01-2016 praying for regularization of their service is produced as Exb.W-2.
3. Copies of letters issued by Railway dated 01-08-2016 are marked as Exb.W-3 and W-3/A.
4. Copy of injury certificate of Suman Das issued from Medical College& Hospital, Kolkata dated 01-09-
2017 is marked as Exb.W-4 (after objection).
5. Copy of petition addressed Regional LabourCommissioner, as Exb.W-5.
6. Copy of certificate issued by Regional Labour Commissioner u/s 2A of the Industrial Dispute Act dated
30-10-2017, as Exb.W-6.
7. Copy of note sheet dated 18-05-2006 relating to recruitment of sanitation workers in RRC is
collectively marked as Exb.-W-7.
8. Copy of payment sheet for the month of March, 2015 as Exb.W-8.
9. Copy of order passed by R.L.C., Kolkata under Minimum Wages Act dated 16-10-2017 is collectively
marked as Exb.W-9.
In course of cross examination the witness admitted that he worked as daily wage labourer at ‗no work
no pay‘ basis. Apart from Safaiwala job he performed other office works also, but did not mention what
other works he used to perform. The workman also admitted that as per order of the Labour Commissioner
compensation was paid to him on three occasions before hearing of the Minimum Wages Act.
The management of the Respondent establishment examined Smt. Sucharita Das, Management Witness
No.1. She filed an affidavit in chief where she stated that the petitioner was assigned with cleaning job on
daily wage basis and there was no assurance for his regularization in the job. The witness denied the
allegation of the petitioner relating to illegal termination from his employment. The witness further averred
that by discontinuation of his service the authority did not violate any existing rule and that the service of the
petitioner was terminated in accordance with the law. The witness further stated that after hearing the claim
application, the authority under the Minimum Wages Act allowed three compensations in respect of the
arrear of differential wages amounting to Rs.5,68,284/- in favour of the petitioner and the same has already
been paid by the Railway Authority. It is asserted that the application filed by the petitioner is liable to be
dismissed. In the course of her examination in chief, the witness produced a copy of order dated 16-10-2017
passed by the authority under the Minimum Wages Act relating to payment of minimum wages which has
2304
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
been marked as Exb.M-1.
In cross examination the management witness deposed that she had no personal knowledge about the
employment of the workman. She also deposed she has no knowledge since when the workman was
employed as casual Safai worker by the Recruitment Cell. The management witness was unable to state if
the service of the petitioner was continuous one or not. Regarding refusal of the workman to sign the letter of
termination, the witness deposed that the workman did not refuse to sign the letter of termination in her
presence and admitted that they have not produced letter of termination which hade been refused by the
workman.
Mr. Somnath Chakraborty, Ld.Advocate for the workman advancing his argument submitted that Sri
Suman Das was engagedas a daily wager under Railway Recruitment Cell of Eastern Railway at Kolkata on
the basis of his letter of engagement which has been produced as Exb.W-3. The workman served
continuously as a cleaning staff from 01-05-2012 till 31-08-2017. The workman was illegally terminated
from his service of the Respondent without issuing any notice of termination or retrenchment. It is further
argued that the workman was engaged at a daily wage of Rs.84.02 per day. The wage was revised to Rs.150/-
per day w.e.f. 12-02-2013 which was also less than the minimum wages to which the workman was entitled
to at the relevant period. The workman made a representation before the authority under the Minimum
Wages Act which was considered and an order was passed on 16-10-2017 directing the O.P employer i.e.
Railway Administration, Eastern Railway, Kolkata to deposit Rs.5,68,284/- in favour of Sri Suman Das as
differential wages and towards compensation three times the arrear of wages.
The Ld. Advocated argued that the employer authority was annoyed with the claim of the workman for
which he has been illegally terminated. It is urged that the workman has rendered continuous service to the
Respondent as per section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and he is entitled to retrenchment
compensation under section 25-F of the Act for not issuing one month‘s notice indicating the reason of the
retrenchment. Ld. Advocate submitted that the workman may be paid his back wages and his service under
Respondent may be restored.
Mr. Abhijit Bhadra, Ld. Advocate for the Respondent refuting the claim argued that the workman was
employed as a daily wager on the basis of ‗no work no pay‘ and the workman is not entitled to any
retrenchment compensation as he has failed to prove that he rendered continuous service for at least 240 days
in the preceding years. It has urged that the workman has already been paid his compensation and arrear
wages up to 31-08-2017 and the instant application is liable to be dismissed with cost.
Considered the rival argument and the written notes of argument in the light of pleadings of the parties,
evidence adduced and the law involved. Both the issues are taken up together for convenience of discussion.
It is appeared to me that this is a case where the employee has been discontinued from his service and he
made a complaint before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Kolkata u/s 2A of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The same resulted in failure and the certificate was issued by the Conciliation Officer u/s 2A
of the Act on 30-10-2017. This application u/s 2A (2) has been filed before this Tribunal on 21-02-2018
which is within the statutory period of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination of service. Therefore, I hold that the case is maintainable.
Admitted Sri Suman Das was engaged as Safaiwala at the Railway Recruitment Cell of Eastern Railway,
Kolkata from 01-05-2012. No formal letter of engagement has been produced by any of the parties. Ld.
Advocate for the workman advancing his argument submitted that Exb.W-3, a letter dated 01-08-2016 is the
letter of engagement of the workman. On a close reading of the same I find that Exb.W-3 is a reply to the
claim made by workman for regularization of the workman in his employment. From the said document it is
gathered that the cleaning staff was engaged purely on daily wage basis without any assurance for
regularization. In the application u/s 2A of I.D. Act seeking the restoration of service and payment of back
wages. For the first timeit is statedin paragraph 21 (f) of the petition that the workman worked continuously
for more than five years andhe is eligible for retrenchment compensation u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes
Act. The workman neither pleaded in his application as to how many days he had worked in the preceding
years nor did he specify the number of days he was employed in each year since 01-05-2010. No evidence
has been adduced by him to prove that he has rendered continuous service to the respondent establishment as
necessary u/s 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act i.e. for not less than 240 days in a year.
Ld. Advocate for the petitioner relying upon the order passed by the Authority under Minimum Wages
Act (Exb.-W-9 collectively) submitted that while computing the arrears of differential wages paid to the
workman, the entire period was accepted by the authority. Therefore it would be presumed that workman
has rendered continuous service during the entire period of the previous years and he is entitled to
retrenchment compensation which is equivalent to fifteen days‘ average pay for every complete year of
continuous service or any part thereof.
On perusal of the order dated 16-10-2017 regarding payment of differential wages I find that there is no
clear observation as to the total number of days of service rendered by the workman. It is simply stated that
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2305
the O.P. employer/Railway Administration did not contest the minimum rate of wages and the period of
work as claimed by the applicant in the instant claim application. I, therefore, hold that the said order passed
by the authority under the Minimum Wages Act cannot substitute the burden of proof which lies upon the
workman to establish that he has rendered continuous service for not less than 240 days in a calendar year
during his said period of engagement.
In the case of Essen Dinki –vs- Rajiv Kumar, 2002 III CLR 943, Hon‘ble Supreme Court observed that
the burden of proof that he was working for 240 days was upon the employee. There is no iota of evidence in
this case to prove that the workman as a daily wage labourer had been engaged and rendered service for at
least 240 days in a year under the employer. Accordingly I hold that the workman has failed to establish that
he has fulfilled the condition precedence for application of the provision of section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act for payment of retrenchment compensation for the years of continuous service rendered.
In this connection it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions which defines the term
―retrenchment‖ in I.D. Act. Section 2(oo) lays down :
―retrenchment‖ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include—
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment
between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
[(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of
employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being
terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or]
(c) termination of he service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health].
In the instant case the workman, a daily wager has failed to discharge his burden that he has served
continuously for at least 240 days in any one calendar year under the employer. Therefore, section 25-F of
I.D. Act which lays down the condition precedence the retrenchment of workman would have no application.
The workman therefore is not entitled to retrenchment compensation u/s 25-F (b) which is
equivalent to 15 days‘ average pay for every complete year of continuous service or any part there in excess
of six months.
It emerges from evidence on record that the workman had lodged a complaint before the authority
under Minimum Wages Act and on the basis of an order passed by the concerned authority on 16-10-2017
(Exb.W-9) the workman received differential minimum wages for the period of work along with
compensation which was three times the wages which had fallen due.
In the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited –vs- Bhurumal; (2014) 7 SCC 177, the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held as follows :
―33… it is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
retrenchment with full back wages , when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in
all cases. While that may be the position where service of a regular/permanent worker are terminated
illegally and/or malafide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it come
to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of
procedural defect namely in violation of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this court is consistent
in taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead of the
workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice….‖
At this juxtapose it would be rewarding to examine the provisions of section 25-F of I.D. Act which
provides that ―No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than
one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until –
(a) the workman has been given one month‘s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice.
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days‘ average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess
of six months.
Therefore, the condition president to retrenchment of the workman u/s 25-F have not been fulfilled
and the workman, a daily wage labourer is not entitled to one month‘s prior notice in writing before his
termination as provided u/s 25-F of the I.D. Act.
2306
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Admitted the daily wager ―cleaning staff‖ of the respondent worked for several years and has been
retrenched from his work without any notice. The engagement of the workman was not against any
sanctioned post nor did he undergo any selection procedure before engagement. The workman has been
discontinued from work since 01-09-2017 and eight years have passed thereafter. The petitioner therefore
has no legal right to be reinstated in his earlier place of work. He has received compensation on the basis of
order passed in Exb.W-9 by the RPFC. The workman expected that he would continue to be employed by the
respondent until his work was stopped abruptly. There is no evidence on record that he is gainfully employed
at any other place since his termination.
Therefore, applying the ratio of the decision posited in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. -vs-
Bhurumal (supra), I hold that it would be just and appropriate to grant a monetary compensation to the
workman for the unfair labour practice and his illegal termination without prior notice, which shall be
equivalent to one month‘s daily wage at the then prevailing rate.
This issue noi.2 relating to relief is accordingly allowed in favour of the workman.
The Industrial Dispute is allowed in part in favour of the workman.
Hence,
ORDERED
that the Industrial Dispute u/s 2A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is allowed in part on contest against the
respondent. The petitioner is granted monetary compensation equivalent to one month‘s daily wages at the then
prevailing rate. The amount shall be paid by the respondent within one month from date of communication of the
award. Let the award be drawn in the light of my above discussion. Let the copies of the award, in duplicate be sent to
the Ministry for information and notification.
ANANDA KUMAR MUKHERJEE, Presiding Officer/Link Officer.
नइ ददल्ली, 24 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 476.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjkas ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a06/2018) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12025/01/2026-अइअर(बी-I)-71]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 24th March, 2026
S.O. 476.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 06/2018) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Kolkata
as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Eastern Railway and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2026- IR(B-I)-71]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present : Justice (Retd.) Ananda Kumar Mukherjee, Presiding Officer/Link Officer.
Application No. CGIT-06 of 2018
Dipankar Halder … Applicant
Versus
1. Chairman, Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway, Kolkata.
2.
Additional General Manager, Eastern Railway, Kolkata.
… Respondents
APPLICATION U/S 2A(2) OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT.
Representative :
For the Workman : Mr. Somnath Chakraborty, Advocate.
For the Opposite Party/Employer : Mr.Abhijit Bhadra, Advocate.
INDUSTRY
; RAIL
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2307
STATE
: WEST BENGAL
DATE OF AWARD : 10th March, 2026
AWARD
The Petitioner/workman filed an application before this Tribunal under section 2A (2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ―I.D.Act‖) dated 21-02-2018..
The fact of the case, in brief is that the petitioner was engaged as a cleaning staff on daily wage basis at the
office of the Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway, Kolkata from 01-05-2010. He was entrusted with the work
of cleaning the entire office premises of the railway authority at 56, C.R. Avenue, Kolkata.
The proposal for engagement as labour on contract basis at a daily wage far below the minimum wages
approved by the Ministry of Labour, Central Govt. for employment of sweeping and cleaning staff. The
petitioner/workman was initially paid Rs.84.02 per day. After rendering services for seven years the Chief
O.S./Recruitment put up a note dated 12-02-2013 for revision of wages of the daily waged labourer who were
performing cleaning job in the office premises. The proposal for enhancing the wages was at the rate of Rs.217/- per
day including a bonus @ Rs.36.15 per day but the employer authority enhanced the daily wages to Rsd.150/- per day.
The Petitioner served at the office of the Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway without any break. It
has further stated that there was no provision for any leave and they had to work even on holidays and Sundays. The
employer authority did not pay the minimum wages and the petitioner made several representations to the office of
the Railway Recruitment Cell, which went unheard. Subsequently, the petitioner made a presentation before the
authority under Minimum Wages Act, 1948 alleging non-payment of minimum wages.
The Chairman, Railway Recruitment Cell was not pleased with the action of the petitioner/workman.
Consequently, the petitioner was terminated from his service without issuing any letter of termination. Accordingly to
the petitioner he had been performing work continuously and the employer authority terminated him illegally without
complying the due process of law.
On being aggrieved with the illegal termination a complaint was submitted before the Regional Labour
Commissioner- ―Central‖ at Kolkata on 05-09-2017. The Conciliation proceeding failed and the petitioner filed this
application before this Tribunal u/s 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act challenging the illegal termination. The
petitioner has prayed for setting aside the illegal termination, for reinstatement, payment of back wages and payment
of retrenchment compensation u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act along with consequently relief.
The Chairman, Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway along with another contested the case by filing
written statement on 20-07-2018. Admittedly the petitioner was deployed under the Respondent Authority on daily
wage labourer on the basis of ‗no work no pay‘ . According to the Respondent discontinuation of service of the
workman was not in violation of any existing rules or principle of natural justice. It is contended that the petitioner
has no legal right to enter the premises of the Railway without sanction from the concerned authority. The
Respondent asserted that the workman was terminated from the service of Railway Recruitment Cell of the Railway
and notice had been tendered but the workman refused to acknowledge receipt of the same. It is contended that there
was no scope for seeking explanation or initiating any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner for the purpose of
discontinuing his work as his engagement was on day to day basis. The employer asserted that the petitioner is not
entitled to reinstatement in service and he is also not entitled to any payment of back wages or retrenchment
compensation under section 25-F of the I. D. Act. The Respondent urged the application is liable to be dismissed.
Points for Consideration:
On the basis of the statement of claim and the written objection filed by the Respondent, following issues are
framed for determination :
1. Whether the application u/s 2A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is maintainable?
2. Whether the petitioner/workman is entitled to retrenchment compensation or reinstatement in his service
along with back wages?
In order to prove his case Sri Dipankar Halder examined himself as Workman Witness No.1. He filed an Affidavit in
Chief reiterating the case disclosed in his application. In his affidavit in chief the workman further stated that he was
working in the premises of the Railway Recruitment Cell, Eastern Railway, Kolkata as a daily rated worker w.e.f. 01-
05-2012. The Respondent company paid him Rs.,84.02 per day as safaiwala which is far below the minimum wages.
A proposal was put up on 12-02-2013 for revision of wages of the contractual workers who were doing cleaning job
in the office premises for payment of Rs.217/- per day but the Respondent Authority increased the wages only to
Rs.150/-. It is further stated that his office was open on all days of the work including Sundays and there was no leave
facility. The workman disclosed that he made a representation before the authority under the Minimum Wages Act,
1948 alleging non-payment of minimum wages.
The Respondent company was annoyed with him and his work was terminated from 31-08-2017. He was not
2308
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
allowed to join his duty on 01-09-2017. The workman stated in his affidavit that he was illegally terminated without
issuance of any letter. Thereafter, he made a representation before the Regional Labour Commissioner, Kolkata on
05-09-2017 but the Respondent did not agree to reinstate him.
In course of his examination in chief the workman witness produced the following documents :
1. A copy of note sheet of the Railway Authority dated 18-05-2006 regarding engagement of casual workers for
sanitation work at RRC/ER/Kolkata has been produced as Exb. W-1.
2. A copy of joint petition submitted by Sri Suman Das and one Sri Dipankar Halder before Railway Authority
on 06-01-2016 praying for regularization of service is produced as Exb.W-2.
3. Copies of letters issued by Railway dated 01-08-2016 is marked as Exb.W-3 and W-3/A.
4. Copy of petition addressed Regional Labour Commissioner as Exb.W-4.
5. Copy of certificate issued by Regional Labour Commissioner u/s 2A of the Industrial Dispute Act dated 30-
10-2017 as Exb.W-5.
6. Copy of note sheet dated 18-05-2006 relating to recruitment of sanitation workers in RRC is collectively
marked as Exb.-W-6.
7. Copy of payment sheet for the month of March, 2015 as Exb.W-7.
8. Copy of order passed by R.L.C under Minimum Wages Act dated 16-10-2017 is collectively marked as
Exb.W-8.
In course of cross examination the witness admitted that he worked as daily wage labourer at ‗no work no pay‘
basis. Apart from Safaiwala‘s job he performed other office works also, but did not mention what other works he used
to perform. The workman also admitted that as per order of the Labour Commissioner compensation was paid to him
on three occasions before hearing of the Minimum Wages Act.
The management of the Respondent establishment examined Smt. Sucharita Das, Management Witness No.1. She
filed an affidavit in chief where she stated that the petitioner was assigned with cleaning job on daily wage basis and
there was no assurance for his regularization in the job. The witness denied the allegation of the petitioner relating to
illegal termination from his employment. The witness further averred that by discontinuation of his service the
authority did not violate any existing rule and that the service of the petitioner was terminated in accordance with the
law. The witness further stated that after hearing the claim application, the authority under the Minimum Wages Act
allowed three compensations in respect of the arrear of differential wages amounting to Rs.5,68,284/- in favour of the
petitioner and the same has already been paid by the Railway Authority. It is stated that the application filed by the
petitioner is liable to be dismissed. In the course of her examination in chief, the witness produced a copy of order
dated 16-10-2017 passed by the authority under the Minimum Wages Act relating to payment of minimum wages
which has been marked as Exb.M-1.
In cross examination the management witness deposed that she had no personal knowledge about the employment of
the workman. She also deposed she has no knowledge since when the workman was employed as casual ―Safai
worker‖ by the Recruitment Cell. The management witness was unable to state if the service of the petitioner was
continuous one or not. Regarding refusal of the workman to sign the letter of termination, the witness deposed that the
workman did not refuse to sign the letter of termination in her presence and admitted that they have not produced
letter of termination which hade been refused by the workman.
Mr. Somnath Chakraborty, Ld. Advocate for the workman advancing his argument submitted that Sri Dipankar
Halder was engaged as a daily wager under Railway Recruitment Cell of Eastern Railway at Kolkata on the basis of
his letter of engagement which has been produced as Exb.W-3. The workman served continuously as a cleaning staff
from 01-05-2012 till 31-08-2017. The workman was illegally terminated from his service of the Respondent without
issuing any notice of termination or retrenchment. It is further argued that the workman was engaged at a daily wage
of Rs.84.0[2 per day. The same was revised to Rs.150/- per day w.e.f. 12-02-2013 which was also less than the
minimum wages to which the workman was entitled to at the relevant period. The workman made a representation
before the authority under the Minimum Wages Act which was considered and an order was passed on 16-10-2017
directing the O.P employer i.e. Railway Administration, Eastern Railway, Kolkata to deposit Rs.5,68,284/- in favour
of Sri Suman Das within a period of 30 days as differential wages and a compensation three times the arrear of wages.
The Ld. Advocated argued that the employer authority was annoyed with the claim of the workman for which he has
been illegally terminated. It is urged that the workman has rendered continuous service to the Respondent as per
section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and he is entitled to retrenchment compensation under section 25-F of the
Act for not issuing one month‘s notice indicating the reason of the retrenchment. Ld. Advocate submitted that the
workman may be paid his back wages and his service under Respondent may be restored.
Mr. Abhijit Bhadra, Ld. Advocate for the Respondent refuting the claim argued that the workman was employed as
a daily wager on the basis of ‗no work no pay‘ and the workman is not entitled to any retrenchment compensation as
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2309
he has failed to prove that he rendered continuous service for at least 240 days in the preceding years. It has urged that
the workman has already been paid his compensation and arrear wages up to 31-08-2017 and the instant application is
liable to be dismissed with cost.
Considered the rival arguments and written notes of argument in the light of the pleadings of the parties, evidence
adduced and the law involved. Both the issues are taken up together for convenience of discussion. It is appeared to
me that this is a case where the employee has been discontinued from his service and he made a complaint before the
Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Kolkata u/s 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The same resulted in failure
and the certificate was issued by the Conciliation Officer u/s 2A of the Act on 30-10-2017. This application u/s 2A (2)
has been filed before this Tribunal on 21-02-2018 which is within the statutory period of three years from the date of
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service. Therefore I hold that the case is maintainable.
Admitted Sri Dipankar Halder was engaged as Safaiwala at the Railway Recruitment Cell of Eastern Railway,
Kolkata from 01-05-2012. No formal letter of engagement has been produced by any of the parties. Ld. Advocate for
the workman advancing his argument submitted that Exb.W-3, a letter dated 01-08-2016 is the letter of engagement
of the workman. On a close reading of the same I find that Exb.W-3 is a reply to the claim made by the workman for
regularization of the workman in his employment. From the said document it is gathered that the cleaning staff was
engaged purely on daily wage basis without any assurance for regularization. In the application u/s 2A of I.D. Act
seeking the restoration of service and payment of back wages. For the first time it is stated in paragraph 21(f) of the
petition that the workman worked continuously for more than five years and is eligible for retrenchment
compensation u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman neither pleaded in his application as to how many
days he had worked in the preceding years nor did he specify the number of days he was employed in each year since
01-05-2010. No evidence has been adduced by him to prove that he has rendered continuous service to the respondent
establishment as necessary u/s 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act i.e. for not less than 240 days in a year.
Ld. Advocate for the petitioner relying upon the order passed by the Authority under Minimum Wages Act (Exb.-
W-9 collectively) submitted that while computing the arrears of differential wages paid to the workman, the entire
period was accepted by the authority. Therefore it would be presumed that workman has rendered continuous service
during the entire period of the previous years and he is entitled to retrenchment compensation which is equivalent to
fifteen days‘ average pay for every complete year of continuous service or any part thereof.
On perusal of the order dated 16-10-2017 regarding payment of differential wages I find that there is no clear
observation as to the total number of days of service rendered by the workman. It is simply stated that the O.P.
employer/Railway Administration did not contest the minimum rate of wages and the period of work as claimed by
the applicant in the instant claim application. I, therefore, hold that the said order passed by the authority under the
Minimum Wages Act cannot substitute the burden of proof which lies upon the workman to establish that he has
rendered continuous service for not less than 240 days in a calendar year during his said period of engagement.
In the case of Essen Dinki –vs- Rajiv Kumar, 2002 III CLR 943, Hon‘ble Supreme Court observed that the burden
of proof that he was working for 240 days was upon the employee. There is no iota of evidence in this case to prove
that the workman as a daily wage labourer had been engaged and rendered service for at least 240 days in a year
under the employer. Accordingly I hold that the workman has failed to establish that he has fulfilled the condition
precedence for application of the provision of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act for payment of retrenchment
compensation for the years of continuous service rendered.
In this connection it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions which defines the term ―retrenchment‖ in I.D.
Act. Section 2(oo) lays down :
―retrenchment‖ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever,
otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include—
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between
the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
[(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment
between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a
stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or]
(c) termination of he service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health].
In the instant case the workman, a daily wager has failed to discharge his burden that he has served continuously for
at least 240 days in any one calendar year under the employer. Therefore, section 25-F of I.D. Act which lays down
the condition precedence the retrenchment of workman would have no application.
The workman therefore is not entitled to retrenchment compensation u/s 25-F (b) which is equivalent to 15 days‘
average pay for every complete year of continuous service or any part there in excess of six months.
2310
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
It emerges from evidence on record that the workman had lodged a complaint before the authority under Minimum
Wages Act and on the basis of an order passed by the concerned authority on 16-10-2017 (Exb.W-9) the workman
received differential minimum wages for the period of work along with compensation which was three times the
wages which had fallen due.
In the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited –vs- Bhurumal; (2014) 7 SCC 177, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court
held as follows :
―33… it is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of retrenchment
with full back wages , when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that
may be the position where service of a regular/permanent worker are terminated illegally and/or malafide and/or by
way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it come to the case of termination of a daily-wage
worker and where the termination is found illegal because of procedural defect namely in violation of section 25-F of
the Industrial Disputes Act, this court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages
is not automatic and instead of the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of
justice….‖
employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be
retrenched by that employer until -
(a) the workman has been given one month‘s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period
of the notice.
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days‘ average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of
six months.
Therefore, the condition president to retrenchment of the workman u/s 25-F have not been fulfilled and the
workman, a daily wage labourer is not entitled to one month‘s prior notice in writing before his termination as
provided u/s 25-F of the I.D. Act.
Admitted the daily wager ―cleaning staff‖ of the respondent worked for several years and has been
retrenched from his work without any notice. The engagement of the workman was not against any sanctioned post
nor did he undergo any selection procedure before engagement. The workman has been discontinued from work since
01-09-2017 and eight years have passed thereafter. The petitioner therefore has no legal right to be reinstated in his
earlier place of work. He has received compensation on the basis of order passed in Exb.W-9 by the RPFC. The
workman expected that he would continue to be employed by the respondent until his work was stopped abruptly.
There is no evidence on record that he is gainfully employed at any other place since his termination.
Therefore, applying the ratio of the decision posited in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. -vs- Bhurumal
(supra), I hold that it would be just and appropriate to grant a monetary compensation to the workman for the unfair
labour practice and his illegal termination without prior notice, which shall be equivalent to one month‘s daily wage
at the then prevailing rate.
This issue noi.2 relating to relief is accordingly allowed in favour of the workman.
The Industrial Dispute is allowed in part in favour of the workman.
Hence,
OR0DERED
that the Industrial Dispute u/s 2A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is allowed in part on contest against the
respondent. The petitioner is granted monetary compensation equivalent to one month‘s daily wages at the then
prevailing rate. The amount shall be paid by the respondent within one month from date of communication of the
award. Let the award be drawn in the light of my above discussion. Let the copies of the award, in duplicate be sent to
the Ministry for information and notification.
ANANDA KUMAR MUKHERJEE, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 25 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 477.—केन्रीय सरकार, कमचारी राज्य बीमा ऄजधजनयम, 1948 (1948 का 34) (जजसे आसमे आसके
ृश्चात ईि ऄजधजनयम कहा गया है) की धारा 91क के साथ ृर त धारा 88 द्वारा प्रदत्त िजियों का प्रयोग करते हुए,
मैससच राष्ट्रीय रसायन एवं ईवचरक जलजमटेड (थल यूजनट) के कारखानों और प्रजतष्ठानों के जनयजमत कमचाररयों को ईि
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2311
ऄजधजनयम के प्रवतचन से छूट देती है और यह छूट सामाजजक सुरक्षा संजहता, 2020 (2020 का 36) के प्रारंभ होने की जतजथ
से एक वषच की ऄवजध के जलए प्रभावी होगी।
2. यह छूट जनम्नजलजखत ितों के ऄध्याधीन है, ऄथाचत:-
(1) कारखाने और प्रजतष्ठान कमचाररयों का एक रजजस्ट्टर बनाए रखेंगे जजसमें छूट प्राप्त कमचाररयों के नाम और
ृदनाम जनर्ददष्ट होंगे।
(2) कमचाररयों को ईि ऄजधजनयम के ऄधीन ऐसे लाभ प्राप्त होते रहेंगे जजनके जलए वे ईस तारीख से ृहले
भुगतान दकए गए ऄंिदान के अधार ृर हकदार होते जजससे आस ऄजधसूचना द्वारा दी गइ छूट संचाजलत होती है;
(3) छूट दी गइ ऄवजध के जलए योगदान, यदद ृहले ही भुगतान कर ददया गया है, तो वाृसी योग्य नहीं होगा;
(4) ईि कारखाने और प्रजतष्ठान का जनयोिा ईस ऄवजध के संबंध में जजसके दौरान वह कारखाना ईि ऄजधजनयम
(जजसे आसमें आसके ृश्चात ईि ऄवजध कहा गया है) के संचालन के ऄध्यधीन था, ऐसे प्ररुृो में जववरणी प्रस्ट्तुत
करेगा जजसमें ऐसे जवजिजष्टया िाजमल होंगी जो कमचारी राज्य बीमा (सामान्य) जवजनयम 1950 के ऄंतगचत ईि
ऄवजध के संबंध में आससे देय थे।
(5) ईि ऄजधजनयम की धारा 45 की ईृ-धारा (1) के ऄंगतचगत जनगम द्वारा जनयुि एक सामाजजक सुरक्षा
ऄजधकारी या आसके द्वारा आस संबंध में प्राजधकृत जनगम के ऄन्य ऄजधकारी-
(i) ईि ऄवजध हेतु ईि ऄजधजनयम की धारा 44 की ईृ-धारा (1) के ऄंतगचत प्रस्ट्तुत दकसी भी जववरणी में जनजहत
जववरणों को सत्याजृत करने; या
(ii) यह सुजनजश्चत करने दक क्या ईि ऄवजध के जलए कमचारी राज्य बीमा (सामान्य) जवजनयम, 1950 द्वारा
ऄृेजक्षत रजजस्ट्टर और रेकॉडच बनाए गए थे; या
(iii) यह सुजनजश्चत करने दक क्या कमचारी जनयोिा द्वारा नकद और वस्ट्तु के प ृ में प्रदान दकए जाने वाले ईन
लाभों के हकदार बने हुए हैं, जजन लाभों के प्रजतफल में आस ऄजधसूचना के ऄंतगचत छूट प्रदान की जा रही है; या
(iv) यह सुजनजश्चत करने दक क्या ईि कारखाने और प्रजतष्ठान के संबंध में ईन ईृबंधों के लागू रहने की ऄवजध के
दौरान ऄजधजनयम के दकसी भी ईृबंध का ृालन दकया गया था, आस प्रयोजन हेतु-वह
(क) प्रधान या ऄव्यवजहत जनयोजक से ऐसी जानकारी की ऄृेक्षा करेगा जो वह आस ऄजधजनयम के प्रयोजन हेतु
अवश्यक समझे; ऄथवा
(ख) दकसी भी ईजचत समय ृर ऐसे प्रधान या ऄव्यवजहत जनयोजक के अजधृत्य वाले दकसी भी कारखाने,
प्रजतष्ठान, कायाचलय या ऄन्य ृररसर में प्रवेि करेगा और वहां के प्रभारी व्यजि से यह ऄृेक्षा करेगा दक वह ऐसे
जनरीक्षक या ऄन्य ऄजधकारी के समक्ष कर्ममयों के जनयोजन और वेतन के भुगतान से संबंजधत खाते, बजहयां और ऄन्य
दस्ट्तावेज प्रस्ट्तुत करे और ईसे ईनकी जांच करने दे या ईसे ऐसी जानकारी प्रदान करे जो वह अवश्यक समझे; या
(ग) प्रधान या ऄव्यवजहत जनयोजक, ईसके ेकेदार या सेवक, या ऐसे कारखाने, प्रजतष्ठान, कायाचलय या ऄन्य ृररसर
में ृाए गए दकसी भी व्यजि, या दकसी भी ऐसे व्यजि की जांच करेगा जजसके बारे में ईि जनरीक्षक या ऄन्य
ऄजधकारी के ृास यह जवश्वास करने का ईजचत कारण हो दक वह कमचारी रहा है; या
(घ) ऐसे कारखाने, प्रजतष्ठान, कायाचलय या ऄन्य ृररसर में रखे गए दकसी भी रजजस्ट्टर, खाता बही या ऄन्य
दस्ट्तावेज की प्रजतयां बनाएगा या ईनसे सारंि प्राप्त करेगा; या
(ङ) ऐसी ऄन्य िजियों का प्रयोग करेगा जो जनर्ददष्ट की जाएं;
2312
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(6) जवजनवेि या जनगमीकरण के मामले में, दी गइ छूट रद्द कर दी जाएगी और नइ संस्ट्था छूट के जलए समुजचत सरकार को
अवेदन कर सकती है।
[सं. एस-38014/05/2020-एसएस-I]
डी.एम. खरे ऄवर सजचव
New Delhi, the 25th March, 2026
S.O. 477.—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 88 read with section 91A of the Employees‘ State
Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the Central Government hereby exempts the
regular employees of factories and establishments of M/s Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilisers Limited (Thal Unit)
from the operation of the said Act and the exemption shall be effective for a period of one year from the date of
commencement of the code on Social Security, 2020 (36 of 2020).
2. The exemption is subject to the following conditions, namely:-
(1) the factories and establishments shall maintain a register of the employees specifying the names and
designations of the exempted employees‘;
(2) the employees shall continue to receive such benefits under the said Act to which they would have been
entitled to on the basis of the contribution paid prior to the date from which exemption granted by this
notification operates;
(3) the contribution for the exempted period, if already paid, shall not be refundable;
(4) the employer of the said factory and establishment shall submit in respect of the period during which that
factory was subject to the operation of the said Act (hereinafter referred as the said period), such returns in
such forms and containing such particulars as were due from it in respect of the said period under the
Employees‘ State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950;
(5) a Social Security Officer appointed by the Corporation under sub-section (1) of section 45 of the said Act
or other official of the Corporation authorised in this behalf by it, shall, for the purpose of —
(i) verifying the particulars contained in any return submitted under sub-section (1) of section 44 of
the said Act for the said period; or
(ii) ascertaining whether registers and records were maintained as required by the Employees‘ State
Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950 for the said period; or
(iii) ascertaining whether the employees continue to be entitled to benefits provided by the
employer in cash and kind being benefits in consideration of which exemption is being granted
under this notification; or
(iv) ascertaining whether any of the provisions of the Act had been complied with during the period
when such provisions were in force in relation to the said factory and establishment to be
empowered to —
(a) require the principal or immediate employer to him such information as he may consider
necessary for the purpose of this Act; or
(b) at any reasonable time enter any factory, establishment, office or other premises occupied
by such principal or immediate employer at any reasonable time and require any person found
in charge thereof to produce to such inspector or other official and allow him to examine
accounts, books and other documents relating to the employment of personal and payment of
wages or to furnish to him such information as he may consider necessary; or
(c) examine the principal or immediate employer, his agent or servant, or any person found in
such factory, establishment, office or other premises or any person whom the said inspector or
other official has reasonable cause to believe to have been an employee ; or
(d) make copies of or take extracts from any register, account
book or other document maintained in such factory, establishment, office or other
premises; or
(e) exercise such other powers as may be specified;
(6) in case of disinvestment or corporatisation, the exemption granted shall stand cancelled and the new
entity may apply to the appropriate Government for exemption.
[No. S-38014/05/2020-SS-I]
D.M. KHARE, Under Secy.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2313
नइ ददल्ली, 25 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 478.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
प्रिासजनक कमांडर मु्यालय (नागररक रक्षा), ृंचकुला ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-I ds iapkV (40/2024) izdkf'kr
djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12025/01/2026-अइअर(बी-I)-69]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 25th March, 2026
S.O. 478.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 40/2024) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Admn.
Commander Head Quarter ( Civil Defence), Panchkula and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2026- IR(B-I)-69]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH
(Present:- Mr. Kamal Kant, PO-cum-Link Officer).
ID No. 40/2024
Registered on:-16.10.2019
Kiran Devi W/o Sh. Hardeep Singh R/o 202 Budhanpur, Panchkula, Haryana.
-------- Workman
Versus
1. Admn. Commander Station Head Quarter (Civil Defence), Chandi Mandir Cantt. Panchkula, Haryana.
2. M/s A.A. Foundation For safety, Head Office-5919, DLF City, Face-4, Gurugaon-122022.
----Respondents
Present:-
Sh. Jang Bahadur, AR for workman.
Sh. Satinder Singh, AR for respondent no.1.
Respondent no.2 already ex parte.
Award :10.03.2026
1.
Workman has filed the present claim petition under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter called the Act) against her termination w.e.f. 27.10.2018 claiming reinstatement into service along
with continuity of service and full back wages.
2.
It is maintained by the workman in the claim petition that that she was appointed as sweeper/safai
karamchari on 01.04.2017 by respondent no.1 at minimum wages prescribed by the Central Government. But
the said minimum wages were never paid to her. Management has unlawfully deducted 12% EPF share, 1.75%
ESI and Rs.300/- as TDS from his salary despite of the fact that her total wages comes under the ambit of tax
free limit. She was working under respondent no.1 directly, but respondent no.1 in order to avoid its liability
always shows his employment in record under different contractors, which tantamount to unfair labour
practice.
3.
It is further maintained that workman including 200 other safai karamcharis of respondent no.1 raised the
demand for non-deduction of TDS from the wages paid by respondent no.1. However, their demand was not
accepted. Other workers working under respondent no.1 formed union and subsequently her services were
dispensed with w.e.f. 27.10.2018. It is also maintained that respondent no.1 retained juniors in service and also
made fresh appointments after termination of her services and no compensation was paid under Section 25F of
the Act. Thus, there is violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act. Hence this petition.
4.
Notice of the petition was given to respondents.
2314
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
5.
Respondent no.1 filed reply to the claim petition maintaining therein that the workman has not come to
the Court with clean hands as she was appointed as sweeper by respondent no.2 (contractor) at minimum wage
rate as prescribed by the Central Government. As per Government Policy dated 18.03.2011 (Ex.R-1), Non-
Cantonment Military Stations have been authorized to outsource conservancy safaiwala. The answering
respondent entered into contract with various private agencies for outsourcing of sweepers (safai karamcharis).
In July 2018, the answering respondent entered into contract with M/s AA Foundation for safety and M/s
Sunrise Facilitator Pvt. Ltd. through e-tendering for outsourcing of safai karamcharis to provide conservancy
services in Chandi Mandir Military Station for the financial year 2018-19. Respondent no.2 submits bill for
payment for the days the safai karamcharis performed their duties and answering respondent is only
responsible to forward these bills to PCDA Western Command Chandigarh to release payment directly to the
contractor‘s account. Salary is paid to the workman by the contractor. Compliance of PF, ESI Rules etc. is
carried out by the contractor as per contract agreement. Answering respondent has no responsibility of
disbursement of wages and deduction of EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed
union in the headquarter, which is not permitted and also carried out demonstration inside the premises of
Station Headquarter on 27.10.2018 and failed to perform his duties. Thereafter, answering respondent asked
respondent no.2 to ask the workers to perform their duties. Answering respondent has no role or responsibility
for termination services of the workman. There is no relationship of employer and employee between the
answering respondent and the workman. In view of Army Headquarter Letter, the civilian employees of the
answering respondent cannot organize themselves into trade unions as station headquarter is an administrative
office of the Government of India. In spite of that, workman along with other safai karamcharis formed union
unauthorizedly and indulge in unlawful activities. It is maintained that workman is the employee of contractor
and therefore, termination is the prerogative of the contractor. It is prayed that the claim be dismissed.
6.
It is pertinent to mention here that respondent no.2 was proceeded ex parte on 07.05.2024.
Evidence of workman:-
7. In order to prove his case, workman examined himself as WW1 and tendered into evidence his affidavit
WW1/A and has been cross examined by the AR for respondent no.1. AR for workman closed the evidence on
22.07.2024.
Evidence of respondent no.1:-
8. Respondent no.1 examined Colonel K P Singh S/o Late Colonel P. P. Singh, OIC, Civic Cell, Station
Head Quarter, Chandi Mandir Panchkula as MW1, who tendered into evidence his affidavit Ex.MW1/A along
with documents Ex.R1 to Ex.R4. AR for respondent no.1 closed the evidence on 29.01.2026.
Sr. No.
Document
Dated
Exhibit
1.
Policy
18.03.2011
Ex.R-1
2.
Agreement with respondent no.2
05.07.2018
Ex.R-2
3.
Copy of ECR of EPFO
Ex.R-3
4.
Letter of Head Quarter
22.04.1980
Ex.R-4
Submissions of workman:-
9. While arguing the case, AR for workman contended that in this case, workman was appointed by
respondent no.1 under a camouflage agreement with respondent no.2. The workman was appointed directly by
respondent no.1 on 01.04.2017 as sweeper and her services were dispensed with on 27.10.2018 without any
reason in violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act as no compensation was paid to the workman and
junior to him were retained in service and fresh appointment were made after termination of the workman. So
far as the agreements between the respondent no.1 & 2 are concerned, they are totally not tenable and is unfair
labour practice. The work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature. The contractor was not having
any license. The contractor has left after three months. No domestic inquiry was held before terminating the
service of the workman, which is mandatory under the Act.
Submissions of respondent no.1:-
10.
On the other hand, AR for respondent no.1 contended that the workman was engaged by respondent
no.2 (contractor) as per agreement executed between respondent no.1 & 2 on outsource basis and there is no
relationship of employer and employee between respondent no.1 and the workman. Wages were paid by the
respondent no.2 to the workman and there was no role of respondent no.1 in appointing or terminating the
services of the workman. Workman is employee of respondent no.2. If there is any violation of provision of
the Act, then it is done by respondent no.2. As per Ex.R3, all dues were paid by the contractor with regard to
EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed union in the Headquarter, which is not
permitted as per Ex.R4. Respondent no.1 being the Government Agency, workman is trying to take benefit of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2315
his appointment by respondent no.2 and has filed a false claim after concealing material facts and claim of the
workman is not maintainable.
11.
I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by AR for both the parties.
Findings:-
12.
The first contention regarding the applicant is that whether applicant comes within the definition of
workman as is defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. I may mention that applicant was appointed as sweeper as
per his claim petition and affidavit submitted before the Tribunal. In plain words the applicant was performing
his duties as labourer/unskilled worker. She was not in supervisory or administrative post requiring him to
perform only administrative duties. While interpreting Section 2(s) Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of
Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur, AIR 2011 Supreme Court 2532,has observed as follows:-
“The source of employment, the quantum of recruitment, the terms & conditions of
employment/ contract of service, the quantum of wages/ pay and mode of payment are
not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a workman within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time and part time employee or a person appointed on contract
basis. There is nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be
inferred that only person employed on regular basis or a person employed for doing
whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or contract
basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a
workman.”
13.
Thus Hon‘ble Supreme Court has clarified that the definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time or part time employee or a person appointed on contract basis. There is nothing in
plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be infer that only person employed on regular basis or a
person employed for doing whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or
contract basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a workman. In
view of the ratio of law enunciated in the above ruling, in my considered opinion the applicant herein
admittedly falls within the definition of ‗workman‘ under Section 2(s) of the Act.
14.
The Hon‘ble Supreme Court after analyzing the catena of cases has laid down in Balwant Raj
Saluja Vs. Air India Limited in Civil Appeal No.10266 dated 25.08.2014, two well recognized tests to find
out whether the labours are the contract employees of the principal employer are:-
1) Whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of contractor and
2) Whether the principal employer controls and supervise the work of the employees?
15.
The facts regarding the payment of salary by the management or contractor has not been stated in
the claim petition of the workman. In fact, claim petition is totally silent regarding the payment of wages,
salary, letter of appointment by respondent no.1 or by contractor or anything likewise. Thus, this basic feature
for holding the relationship of employer and employee i.e. between respondent no.1 and workman totally
lacking not in the pleading but also in the evidence submitted by the workman. However, MW1 Colonel K P
Singh in his cross examination has stated that it is responsibility of the contractor to pay monthly wages to the
conservancy staff provided by him. Respondent no.1 has nothing to do with the minimum wages, DC rate to
the conservancy staff. Contractor is responsible to give notice to the conservancy staff provided by him.
Respondent no.1 has no roll in terminating the services of the workman. Thus, it was the respondent no.2 who
was required to ensure the payment of wages to the workers engaged by him from time to time.
16.
It is also added here that respondent no.1 has also placed on record documents Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-4.
Ex.R-2 is the contract agreement between respondent no.1 & 2. Thus, from the adduced evidence, it emerges
that workman was paid salary by the contractor and she was being controlled and supervised by the contractor.
Thus, there does not exist any relationship of employee and employer between the workman and respondent
no.1. However, there exists relation of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
17.
It is also added here that as per definition of contractor as given in the Section 2(c) of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter called as Contract Act), respondent no.2 was
supplying contract labour to the respondent no.1. Thus, respondent no.2 would fall under the definition of
contractor. Section 2(c) of the Contract Act is reproduced as under:
“Contractor”, in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to
produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or
articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies
contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor;
18.
The Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Banglore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa
2316
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
1978(36) FLR 266 dealt at length with the ambit and scope of expression ―industry‖ as defined in Section 2(j)
of the Act, and has laid down triple test for determining whether a particular establishment is industry or not.
The triple test is where (a) systematic activity (b) organized by cooperation between employer and employee
(the direct and substantial element is commercial (c) for the production or distribution of goods and services to
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes prima facie is an ―Industry‖ in that enterprise. The workman was
doing work i.e. systematic activity for respondent no.1 at the asking of respondent no.2 and there was
cooperation between the workman and respondent no.2, which involve substantial commercial element for
rendering service to satisfy human wants. Thus, respondent no.2 would be termed as industry.
19.
Workman in her deposition has clearly stated that there was non-compliance of Section 25F, 25G
and 25H of the Act. She also stated that she was appointed on 01.04.2017 and she was paid minimum wages
prescribed by Central Government and was working with respondent no.1. She was not given any
compensation before terminating his services on 27.10.2018. In his cross examination, she has further stated
that her salary used to be credited in his bank account. But she has not placed on record any bank account, in
which her salary was credited in order to enable this Court to see who was making payment to the workman.
However, there is no denial that the workman was paid salary by respondent no.2 (contractor). However, from
the agreement dated 05.07.2018 (Ex.R-2) placed on file by respondent no.1, it emerges that safai karamcharis
were provided by respondent no.2 (contractor) to work with respondent no.1. Thus, workman was employee of
respondent no.2 and not of respondent no.1 as has been discussed above. There does not exist any relationship
of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.1. However, there exists relation of
employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
20.
Admittedly, there is non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2. However, as
regards violation of other provisions i.e. Section 25G and 25H of the Act, there is no evidence lead by the
workman. Hence, workman is entitled for compensation from respondent no.2.
21.
It is also added here that there is no iota of evidence that any unfair labour practice used by
respondent no.1 by entering into contract with contractors for supply of safai karamcharis and agreement
executed between respondent no.1 and 2 cannot be said to be any unfair labour practice. So far as contentions
of AR for workman that the work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature and no domestic inquiry
was held before terminating the services of workman are concerned, in this regard, it is pointed out that
workman was entitled only for compensation under Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2 (contractor) and
no domestic inquiry was required to be conducted. Merely because work is of perennial in nature does not
mean that any right has accrued in favour of the workman to get employment with respondent no.1, which is a
department of Civil Defence run by Government of India and for that regular recruitment procedure is
provided. Workman cannot seek backdoor entry into service. Moreover, workman is not employee of
respondent no.1 being employee of respondent no.2 (contractor).
22.
In view of above discussion, it is held that since respondent no.2 (contractor) is currently not
working with respondent no.1, so keeping in view the tenure of service rendered by the workman and salary
given to him during the period of his stay with the contractor and non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act,
this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that workman is entitled for compensation.
23.
Keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the present case, the following scheme of
compensation is deemed fit by this Tribunal:
i. Workman who worked for less than 2 years with contractor shall be entitled for Rs.20,000/-.
ii.
Workman who worked for more than 2 years but less than 5 years with contractor shall be entitled
Rs.30,000/-.
iii.
Workman who worked for more than 5 years with contractors shall be entitled for Rs.50,000/-.
24.
Present workman employed on 01.04.2017 and was terminated on 27.10.2018 (less than 2 years), so
she is entitled for Rs.20,000/-.
25.
Respondent no.2 is directed to pay the workman Rs.20,000/- within one month from the date of the
notification of the award failing which the respondent no.2 shall further pay interest @6% per annum from the
date of award till the date of making payment. It is also added here that in case respondent no.1 requires safai
karamcharis, then workman may be engaged through any contractor on sympathetic ground.
26.
Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17
of the Act.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2317
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 479.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
कोलकाता ृोटच रस्ट्ट ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a15/2015) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-32011/06/2014-अइअर(बी- II)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 479.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.15/2015) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Kolkata
as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Kolkata Port Trust and their
workmen.
[No. L-32011/06/2014 IR(B-II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present : Justice (Retd.) Ananda Kumar Mukherjee, Presiding Officer/Link Officer.
REF. NO. 15 OF 2015
Parties :Employers in relation to the management of
Kolkata Port Trust
VS
President, Calcutta Port Shramik Janata Panchayet
Appearance:
On behalf Kolkata Port Trust: Mr.Ashok Kumar Jena, Advocate.
On behalf of Kolkata Port Shramik Janata Panchayet :Smt. Mala Chakraborty, Advocate
Dated: 9th March, 2026
Mr. Ashok Kumar Jena, Ld. Advocate appeared for the management of Kolkata Port Trust, now known as
Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Port, Kolkata.
None appeared for Kolkata Port Shramik Janata Panchayet.
The scheduled industrial dispute referred under Order No. L-32011/06/2014-IR (B-II) dated 19-02-2015 to this
Tribunal in exercise of power in clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act,1947 for adjudication by this Tribunal is fixed up today for producing order form the Hon‘ble High
SCHEDULE
― (1) Whether the action of the management of Kolkata Port Trust in denying the minimum wages and
statutory benefits to 354 contract labourers is legal and/or justified? What relief the workmen are entitled to?
(2) Whether the action of the management of Kolkata Port Trust in denying the regularization of service to
354 contract labourers is legal and/or justified? What relief the workmen are entitled to?‖
Ld. Advocate for the management of Port Trust filed an application accompanied by a copy of order passed
by the Hon‘ble High Court in W.P. No.4929 (W) of 2016 dated 17-03-2025. Perused the application and copy of
Hon‘ble Court‘s order.
REF-15 OF 2015
The petitioner has prayed before this Tribunal to drop the proceeding in view of order dated 17-03-2025
passed by the Hon‘ble High Court.
I find from the observation passed by Hon‘ble Court that the order of reference dated 19-02-2015 issued by
the Desk Officer of Govt. of India, Ministry of Labour, Shram Mantralaya as well as the proceeding under Reference
Case No.15 of 2015 pending before this Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata have been quashed and set
aside.
2318
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
No appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the Learned Single Judge. The reference case and
the proceeding in the Industrial Dispute is accordingly dropped and the case is disposed of.
Let the copy of this order be communicated to the Ministry u/s 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act for
information.
Justice (Retd.) ANANDA KUMAR MUKHERJEE Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 480— fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
मेससच स्ट्टार जिृ सप्लायर ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V fookn esa
dsUnzh; ljdkj vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a13/2015) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. एल-32011/07/2014-अइअर(बी- II)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 480.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 13/2015) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Kolkata as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of M/s. Star Ship
Supplier and their workmen.
[No. L-32011/07/2014- IR(B-II)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present : Justice (Retd.)Ananda Kumar Mukherjee, Presiding Officer/Link Officer.
REF. NO. 13 OF 2015
Parties : Employers in relation to the management of
M/s. Star Ship Supplier
Vs
President, Calcutta Port Shramik Janata Panchayet.
Appearance:
On behalf M/s., Star Ship Suppliers: None
On behalf of Calcutta Port Shramik Janata Panchayet : Smt. Mala Chakraborty, Advocate.
On behalf of Kolkata Port Trust: Mr. Ashok Kumar Jena, Advocate
Dated: 9th March, 2026
Mr. Ashok Kumar Jena, Ld. Advocate appeared for the management of Kolkata Port Trust, now known as
Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Port, Kolkata.
None appeared for M/s. Star Ship Suppliers and Kolkata Port Shramik Janata Panchayet.
The industrial disputes referred to this Tribunal under order No. L-32011/07/2014 -IR (B-II) dated 05-03-
2015 and 28-10-2015 in exercise of powers vested under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section
10 of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 for adjudication by this Tribunal is fixed up today for producing order form the
Hon‘ble High Court.
Schedule
―Whether the action of the management of M/s. Star Ship Supplier, sub-contractor and M/s. Soham Overseas
Pvt. Ltd. Contractor of Kolkata Port Trust by denying payment with effect from July, 2013 to November, 2014 (As
per Annexure-A) to contractual workmen is legal and/or justified? If not, what relief the workmen are entitled to?
REF. NO. 13 OF 2015
Mr. Jena ld. advocate for the management filed an application accompanied by a copy of order passed by the
Hon‘ble High Court in W.P. A. No.6182 of 2016 dated 17-03-2025. Perused the application and copy of Hon‘ble
Court‘s order.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2319
The petitioner has prayed before this Tribunal to drop the proceeding in compliance with order dated 17-03-
2025 passed by the Hon‘ble High Court.
I find from the order passed by Hon‘ble Court‘s that the order of reference dated 05-03-2015and 28-10-2015
issued by the Desk Officer of Govt. of India, Ministry of Labour, Shram Mantralaya as well as the proceeding under
Reference Case No.13 of 2015 pending before this Central Government Industrial Tribunal have been quashed and set
aside.
No appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the Learned Single Judge. The reference case and
the proceeding in the Industrial Dispute is accordingly dropped and the case is disposed of.
Let the copy of this order be communicated to the Ministry u/s 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act for
information.
Justice (Retd.) ANANDA KUMAR MUKHERJEE, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 481.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय सरकार
ऑफ़ ; ; ;
; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और के
बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, ई , ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स
न.- 293/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के
साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-अइअर( )-4]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 481.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 293/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Airport Authority of India; M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd; M/s Plasma
Premium Launch; M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd; M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels and Shri Vinay which
was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-4]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1
ROOM NO.207, ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX,
NEW DELHI.
DID No. 293/2017
Shri Vinay S/o Shri Pratap Singh, Through Hindustan & General Mazdoor Union (Regd 4479), D-2/24, Sultanpuri,
Delhi.
Claimant…
Versus
1.
Airport Authority of India,
Rajiv Ganshi Bhawan, New Delhi-110005.
2.
M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
New Udan Bhawan, Opp. ATS, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
3.
M/s Plasma Premium Launch,
IGI Airport Terminal-3, New Delhi-110037.
2320
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
4.
M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd.,
Plot No.54/3A, Rama Road, New Delhi-110015.
5.
M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels,
Terminal No.3, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
Management…
AWARD
Present: None for the Claimant.
Sh. Amit Bardhan, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.1.
Sh. Digvijay Rai, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.2.
None for the Respondent/Management No.3 to 5.
Shri Vinay Vs. Airport Authority of India and ors.
1.
The present claim petition was filed by the claimant under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Briefly stated, the case of the claimant was to the following effect. The claimant was working on the post of Baggi
Operator w.e.f. 10.12.2014 onwards. The respondents had illegally shown the employment of the claimant to be
working through the contractor. The services of the claimant had been illegally terminated by the respondents.
Through the present claim petition, the claimant had prayed that his termination order from service be set aside and he
be reinstated in service with full back wages.
2.
Respondents/managements No. 1 to 3 had contested the claim petition by filing written statements. No
written statement by respondents/managements no.4 & 5. On the pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were framed
and the case was fixed for the evidence of claimant. Thereafter, none has appeared on behalf of the claimant nor any
evidence adduced on behalf of the claimant.
3.
It appears that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his case.
4.
Hence, this Tribunal has no option except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. I order accordingly. Case file
be consigned to the Record Room.
5.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for notification under section 17 of the I.D. Act,
1947.
AJAY KUMAR JAIN, Presiding Officer
Date: 08.01.2026
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 482.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऑफ़ ; ; ;
; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, ई , ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स
न.- 294/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के
साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-अइअर( )-5]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O.482.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 294/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Airport Authority of India; M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd; M/s Plasma
Premium Launch; M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd; M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels and Shri Gurmeet
which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-5]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2321
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1
ROOM NO. 207, ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX,
NEW DELHI.
DID No. 294/2017
Shri Gurmeet S/o Shri Sompal, Through Hindustan & General Mazdoor Union (Regd 4479), D-2/24, Sultanpuri,
Delhi.
Claimant…
Versus
1. Airport Authority of India,
Rajiv Ganshi Bhawan, New Delhi-110005.
2. M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
New Udan Bhawan, Opp. ATS, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
3. M/s Plasma Premium Launch,
IGI Airport Terminal-3, New Delhi-110037.
4. M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd.,
Plot No.54/3A, Rama Road, New Delhi-110015.
5. M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels,
Terminal No.3, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
Management…
AWARD
Present: None for the Claimant.
Sh. Amit Bardhan, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.1.
Sh. Digvijay Rai, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.2.
None for the Respondent/Management No. 3 to 5.
Shri Gurmeet Vs. Airport Authority of India and ors.
1.
The present claim petition was filed by the claimant under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Briefly stated, the case of the claimant was to the following effect. The claimant was working on the post of Baggi
Operator w.e.f. 01.02.2014 onwards. The respondents had illegally shown the employment of the claimant to be
working through the contractor. The services of the claimant had been illegally terminated by the respondents.
Through the present claim petition, the claimant had prayed that his termination order from service be set aside and he
be reinstated in service with full back wages.
2.
Respondents/managements No. 1 to 3 had contested the claim petition by filing written statements. No
written statement by respondents/managements no.4 & 5. On the pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were framed
and the case was fixed for the evidence of claimant. Thereafter, none has appeared on behalf of the claimant nor any
evidence adduced on behalf of the claimant.
3.
It appears that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his case.
4.
Hence, this Tribunal has no option except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. I order accordingly. Case file
be consigned to the Record Room.
5.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for notification under section 17 of the I.D.
Act, 1947.
AJAY KUMAR JAIN, Presiding Officer
Date: 08.01.2026
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 483.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऑफ़ ; ; ;
2322
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, ई , ृंचाट
(ररफरेन्स न.- 295/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-अइअर( )-6]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 483.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 295/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Airport Authority of India; M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd; M/s Plasma
Premium Launch; M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd; M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels and Shri Sachin
Kumar Sharma which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-6]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1
ROOM NO. 207, ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX,
NEW DELHI.
DID No. 295/2017
Shri Sachin Kumar Sharma S/o Shri Brahm Dutt Sharma, Through Hindustan & General Mazdoor Union (Regd
4479), D-2/24, Sultanpuri, Delhi.
Claimant…
Versus
1.
Airport Authority of India,
Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan, New Delhi-110005.
2.
M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
New Udan Bhawan, Opp. ATS, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
3.
M/s Plasma Premium Launch,
IGI Airport Terminal-3, New Delhi-110037.
4.
M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd.,
Plot No.54/3A, Rama Road, New Delhi-110015.
5.
M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels,
Terminal No.3, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
Management…
AWARD
Present: None for the Claimant.
Sh. Amit Bardhan, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.1.
Sh. Digvijay Rai, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.2.
None for the Respondent/Management No.3 to 5.
Shri Sachin Kumar Sharma Vs. Airport Authority of India and ors.
1.
The present claim petition was filed by the claimant under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Briefly stated, the case of the claimant was to the following effect. The claimant was working on the post of Baggi
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2323
Operator w.e.f. 15.03.2014 onwards. The respondents had illegally shown the employment of the claimant to be
working through the contractor. The services of the claimant had been illegally terminated by the respondents.
Through the present claim petition, the claimant had prayed that his termination order from service be set aside and he
be reinstated in service with full back wages.
2.
Respondents/managements No. 1 to 3 had contested the claim petition by filing written statements. No
written statement by respondents/managements no.4 & 5. On the pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were framed
and the case was fixed for the evidence of claimant. Thereafter, none has appeared on behalf of the claimant nor any
evidence adduced on behalf of the claimant.
3.
It appears that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his case.
4.
Hence, this Tribunal has no option except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. I order accordingly. Case file
be consigned to the Record Room.
5.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for notification under section 17 of the I.D. Act,
1947.
AJAY KUMAR JAIN, Presiding Officer
Date: 08.01.2026
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 484.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऑफ़ ; ; ;
; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, ई , ृंचाट
(ररफरेन्स न.- 296/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-अइअर( )-7]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 484.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 296/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Airport Authority of India; M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd; M/s Plasma
Premium Launch; M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd; M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels and Shri Sandeep
Dabas which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-7]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1
ROOM NO. 207, ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX,
NEW DELHI.
DID No. 296/2017
Shri Sandeep Dabas S/o Shri Surendra Singh Dabas, Through Hindustan & General Mazdoor Union (Regd 4479),
D-2/24, Sultanpuri, Delhi.
Claimant…
2324
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Versus
1.
Airport Authority of India,
Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan, New Delhi-110005.
2.
M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
New Udan Bhawan, Opp. ATS, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
3.
M/s Plasma Premium Launch,
IGI Airport Terminal-3, New Delhi-110037.
4.
M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd.,
Plot No.54/3A, Rama Road, New Delhi-110015.
5.
M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels,
Terminal No.3, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
Management…
AWARD
Present:
None for the Claimant.
Sh. Amit Bardhan, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.1.
Sh. Digvijay Rai, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.2.
None for the Respondent/Management No. 3 to 5.
Shri Sandeep Dabas Vs. Airport Authority of India and ors.
1.
The present claim petition was filed by the claimant under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Briefly stated, the case of the claimant was to the following effect. The claimant was working on the post of Baggi
Operator w.e.f. 01.12.2011 onwards. The respondents had illegally shown the employment of the claimant to be
working through the contractor. The services of the claimant had been illegally terminated by the respondents.
Through the present claim petition, the claimant had prayed that his termination order from service be set aside and he
be reinstated in service with full back wages.
2.
Respondents/managements No. 1 to 3 had contested the claim petition by filing written statements. No
written statement by respondents/managements no.4 & 5. On the pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were framed
and the case was fixed for the evidence of claimant. Thereafter, none has appeared on behalf of the claimant nor any
evidence adduced on behalf of the claimant.
3.
It appears that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his case.
4.
Hence, this Tribunal has no option except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. I order accordingly. Case file
be consigned to the Record Room.
5.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for notification under section 17 of the I.D. Act,
1947.
AJAY KUMAR JAIN, Presiding Officer
Date: 08.01.2026
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 485.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऑफ़ ; ; ;
; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, ई , ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स
न.- 297/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के
साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-अइअर( )-8]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2325
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 485.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 297/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Airport Authority of India; M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd; M/s Plasma
Premium Launch; M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd; M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels and Shri Amit
Sharma which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-8]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1
ROOM NO. 207, ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX,
NEW DELHI.
DID No. 297/2017
Shri Amit Sharma S/o Shri Devendra Sharma, Through Hindustan & General Mazdoor Union (Regd 4479), D-2/24,
Sultanpuri, Delhi.
Claimant…
Versus
1. Airport Authority of India,
Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan, New Delhi-110005.
2. M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
New Udan Bhawan, Opp. ATS, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
3. M/s Plasma Premium Launch,
IGI Airport Terminal-3, New Delhi-110037.
4. M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd.,
Plot No.54/3A, Rama Road, New Delhi-110015.
5. M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels,
Terminal No.3, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
Management…
AWARD
Present:
None for the Claimant.
Sh. Amit Bardhan, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.1.
Sh. Digvijay Rai, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.2.
None for the Respondent/Management No.3 to 5.
Shri Amit Sharma Vs. Airport Authority of India and ors.
1.
The present claim petition was filed by the claimant under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Briefly stated, the case of the claimant was to the following effect. The claimant was working on the post of Baggi
Operator w.e.f. 01.01.2014 onwards. The respondents had illegally shown the employment of the claimant to be
working through the contractor. The services of the claimant had been illegally terminated by the respondents.
Through the present claim petition, the claimant had prayed that his termination order from service be set aside and he
be reinstated in service with full back wages.
2.
Respondents/managements No. 1 to 3 had contested the claim petition by filing written statements. No
written statement by respondents/managements no.4 & 5. On the pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were framed
and the case was fixed for the evidence of claimant. Thereafter, none has appeared on behalf of the claimant nor any
evidence adduced on behalf of the claimant.
3.
It appears that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his case.
4.
Hence, this Tribunal has no option except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. I order accordingly. Case file
2326
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
be consigned to the Record Room.
5.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for notification under section 17 of the I.D. Act,
1947.
AJAY KUMAR JAIN, Presiding Officer
Date: 08.01.2026
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 486.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऑफ़ ; ; ;
; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, ई , ृंचाट
(ररफरेन्स न.- 298/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-अइअर( )-9]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 486.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 298/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Airport Authority of India; M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd; M/s Plasma
Premium Launch; M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd; M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels and Shri Rohan
Yadav which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-9]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1
ROOM NO.207, ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX,
NEW DELHI.
DID No. 298/2017
Shri Rohan Yadav S/o Shri Babu Ram Yadav, Through Hindustan & General Mazdoor Union (Regd 4479), D-2/24,
Sultanpuri, Delhi.
Claimant…
Versus
1.
Airport Authority of India,
Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan, New Delhi-110005.
2.
M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
New Udan Bhawan, Opp. ATS, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
3.
M/s Plasma Premium Launch,
IGI Airport Terminal-3, New Delhi-110037.
4.
M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd.,
Plot No.54/3A, Rama Road, New Delhi-110015.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2327
5.
M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels,
Terminal No.3, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
Management…
AWARD
Present:
None for the Claimant.
Sh. Amit Bardhan, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.1.
Sh. Digvijay Rai, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.2.
None for the Respondent/Management No. 3 to 5.
Shri Rohan Yadav Vs. Airport Authority of India and ors.
1.
The present claim petition was filed by the claimant under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Briefly stated, the case of the claimant was to the following effect. The claimant was working on the post of Baggi
Operator w.e.f. 15.03.2014 onwards. The respondents had illegally shown the employment of the claimant to be
working through the contractor. The services of the claimant had been illegally terminated by the respondents.
Through the present claim petition, the claimant had prayed that his termination order from service be set aside and he
be reinstated in service with full back wages.
2.
Respondents/managements No. 1 to 3 had contested the claim petition by filing written statements. No
written statement by respondents/managements no.4 & 5. On the pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were framed
and the case was fixed for the evidence of claimant. Thereafter, none has appeared on behalf of the claimant nor any
evidence adduced on behalf of the claimant.
3.
It appears that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his case.
4.
Hence, this Tribunal has no option except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. I order accordingly. Case file
be consigned to the Record Room.
5.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for notification under section 17 of the I.D.
Act, 1947.
AJAY KUMAR JAIN, Presiding Officer
Date: 08.01.2026
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 487.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऑफ़ ; ; ;
; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, ई , ृंचाट
(ररफरेन्स न.- 299/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-अइअर( )-10]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 487.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 299/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Airport Authority of India; M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd; M/s Plasma Premium
Launch; M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd; M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels and Shri Deepak Borji which
was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-10]
SALONI, Dy. Director
2328
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1
ROOM NO.207, ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX,
NEW DELHI.
DID No. 299/2017
Shri Deepak Borji S/o Shri Pundlik Borji, Through Hindustan & General Mazdoor Union (Regd 4479), D-2/24,
Sultanpuri, Delhi.
Claimant…
Versus
1.
Airport Authority of India,
Rajiv Ganshi Bhawan, New Delhi-110005.
2.
M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
New Udan Bhawan, Opp. ATS, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
3.
M/s Plasma Premium Launch,
IGI Airport Terminal-3, New Delhi-110037.
4.
M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd.,
Plot No.54/3A, Rama Road, New Delhi-110015.
5.
M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels,
Terminal No.3, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
Management…
AWARD
Present: None for the Claimant.
Sh. Amit Bardhan, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.1.
Sh. Digvijay Rai, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.2.
None for the Respondent/Management No. 3 to 5.
Shri Deepak Borji Vs. Airport Authority of India and ors.
1.
The present claim petition was filed by the claimant under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Briefly stated, the case of the claimant was to the following effect. The claimant was working on the post of Baggi
Operator w.e.f. 12.03.2012 onwards. The respondents had illegally shown the employment of the claimant to be
working through the contractor. The services of the claimant had been illegally terminated by the respondents.
Through the present claim petition, the claimant had prayed that his termination order from service be set aside and
he be reinstated in service with full back wages.
2.
Respondents/managements No. 1 to 3 had contested the claim petition by filing written statements. No
written statement by respondents/managements no.4 & 5. On the pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were
framed and the case was fixed for the evidence of claimant. Thereafter, none has appeared on behalf of the claimant
nor any evidence adduced on behalf of the claimant.
3.
It appears that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his case.
4.
Hence, this Tribunal has no option except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. I order accordingly. Case
file be consigned to the Record Room.
5.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for notification under section 17 of the I.D.
Act, 1947.
AJAY KUMAR JAIN, Presiding Officer
Date: 08.01.2026
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 488.— fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
( ), ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k
esa fufnZ’V fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-I ds iapkV (63/2024)
izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y- 12025/01/2026-vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-72]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2329
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 488.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 63/2024) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Admn. Commander
Head Quarter ( Civil Defence), Panchkula and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2026- IR (B-I)-72]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH
(Present:- Mr. Kamal Kant, PO-cum-Link Officer).
ID No. 63/2024
Registered on:-16.10.2019
Mamta Rani W/o Sh. Mangat Ram R/o 1822 New Indira Colony, Chandigarh.
-------- Workman
Versus
1. Admn. Commander Station Head Quarter (Civil Defence), Chandi Mandir Cantt. Panchkula, Haryana.
2. M/s A.A. Foundation For safety, Head Office-5919, DLF City, Face-4, Gurugaon-122022.
----Respondents
Present:-
Sh. Jang Bahadur, AR for workman.
Sh. Satinder Singh, AR for respondent no.1.
Respondent no.2 already ex parte.
Award :10.03.2026
1. Workman has filed the present claim petition under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter called the Act) against her termination w.e.f. 27.10.2018 claiming reinstatement into service along
with continuity of service and full back wages.
2. It is maintained by the workman in the claim petition that that she was appointed as sweeper/safai
karamchari on 16.03.2012 by respondent no.1 at minimum wages prescribed by the Central Government. But
the said minimum wages were never paid to her. Management has unlawfully deducted 12% EPF share, 1.75%
ESI and Rs.300/- as TDS from his salary despite of the fact that her total wages comes under the ambit of tax
free limit. She was working under respondent no.1 directly, but respondent no.1 in order to avoid its liability
always shows his employment in record under different contractors, which tantamount to unfair labour practice.
3. It is further maintained that workman including 200 other safai karamcharis of respondent no.1 raised the
demand for non-deduction of TDS from the wages paid by respondent no.1. However, their demand was not
accepted. Other workers working under respondent no.1 formed union and subsequently her services were
dispensed with w.e.f. 27.10.2018. It is also maintained that respondent no.1 retained juniors in service and also
made fresh appointments after termination of her services and no compensation was paid under Section 25F of
the Act. Thus, there is violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act. Hence this petition.
4. Notice of the petition was given to respondents.
5. Respondent no.1 filed reply to the claim petition maintaining therein that the workman has not come to the
Court with clean hands as she was appointed as sweeper by respondent no.2 (contractor) at minimum wage rate
as prescribed by the Central Government. As per Government Policy dated 18.03.2011 (Ex.R-1), Non-
Cantonment Military Stations have been authorized to outsource conservancy safaiwala. The answering
respondent entered into contract with various private agencies for outsourcing of sweepers (safai karamcharis).
In July 2018, the answering respondent entered into contract with M/s AA Foundation for safety and M/s
Sunrise Facilitator Pvt. Ltd. through e-tendering for outsourcing of safai karamcharis to provide conservancy
services in Chandi Mandir Military Station for the financial year 2018-19. Respondent no.2 submits bill for
payment for the days the safai karamcharis performed their duties and answering respondent is only responsible
to forward these bills to PCDA Western Command Chandigarh to release payment directly to the contractor‘s
account. Salary is paid to the workman by the contractor. Compliance of PF, ESI Rules etc. is carried out by the
contractor as per contract agreement. Answering respondent has no responsibility of disbursement of wages and
deduction of EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed union in the headquarter,
2330
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
which is not permitted and also carried out demonstration inside the premises of Station Headquarter on
27.10.2018 and failed to perform his duties. Thereafter, answering respondent asked respondent no.2 to ask the
workers to perform their duties. Answering respondent has no role or responsibility for termination services of
the workman. There is no relationship of employer and employee between the answering respondent and the
workman. In view of Army Headquarter Letter, the civilian employees of the answering respondent cannot
organize themselves into trade unions as station headquarter is an administrative office of the Government of
India. In spite of that, workman along with other safai karamcharis formed union unauthorizedly and indulge in
unlawful activities. It is maintained that workman is the employee of contractor and therefore, termination is the
prerogative of the contractor. It is prayed that the claim be dismissed.
6. It is pertinent to mention here that respondent no.2 was proceeded ex parte on 07.05.2024.
Evidence of workman:-
7. In order to prove his case, workman examined himself as WW1 and tendered into evidence his affidavit
WW1/A and has been cross examined by the AR for respondent no.1. AR for workman closed the evidence on
22.07.2024.
Evidence of respondent no.1:-
8. Respondent no.1 examined Colonel K P Singh S/o Late Colonel P. P. Singh, OIC, Civic Cell, Station Head
Quarter, Chandi Mandir Panchkula as MW1, who tendered into evidence his affidavit Ex.MW1/A along with
documents Ex.R1 to Ex.R4. AR for respondent no.1 closed the evidence on 29.01.2026.
Sr. No.
Document
Dated
Exhibit
1.
Policy
18.03.2011
Ex.R-1
2.
Agreement with respondent no.2
05.07.2018
Ex.R-2
3.
Copy of ECR of EPFO
Ex.R-3
4.
Letter of Head Quarter
22.04.1980
Ex.R-4
Submissions of workman:-
9. While arguing the case, AR for workman contended that in this case, workman was appointed by
respondent no.1 under a camouflage agreement with respondent no.2. The workman was appointed directly by
respondent no.1 on 16.03.2012 as sweeper and her services were dispensed with on 27.10.2018 without any
reason in violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act as no compensation was paid to the workman and
junior to him were retained in service and fresh appointment were made after termination of the workman. So
far as the agreements between the respondent no.1 & 2 are concerned, they are totally not tenable and is unfair
labour practice. The work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature. The contractor was not having
any license. The contractor has left after three months. No domestic inquiry was held before terminating the
service of the workman, which is mandatory under the Act.
Submissions of respondent no.1:-
10. On the other hand, AR for respondent no.1 contended that the workman was engaged by respondent no.2
(contractor) as per agreement executed between respondent no.1 & 2 on outsource basis and there is no
relationship of employer and employee between respondent no.1 and the workman. Wages were paid by the
respondent no.2 to the workman and there was no role of respondent no.1 in appointing or terminating the
services of the workman. Workman is employee of respondent no.2. If there is any violation of provision of
the Act, then it is done by respondent no.2. As per Ex.R3, all dues were paid by the contractor with regard to
EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed union in the Headquarter, which is not
permitted as per Ex.R4. Respondent no.1 being the Government Agency, workman is trying to take benefit of
his appointment by respondent no.2 and has filed a false claim after concealing material facts and claim of the
workman is not maintainable.
11. I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by AR for both the parties.
Findings:-
12.
The first contention regarding the applicant is that whether applicant comes within the definition of
workman as is defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. I may mention that applicant was appointed as sweeper as
per his claim petition and affidavit submitted before the Tribunal. In plain words the applicant was performing
his duties as labourer/unskilled worker. She was not in supervisory or administrative post requiring him to
perform only administrative duties. While interpreting Section 2(s) Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of
Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur, AIR 2011 Supreme Court 2532,has observed as follows:-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2331
“The source of employment, the quantum of recruitment, the terms & conditions of
employment/ contract of service, the quantum of wages/ pay and mode of payment are
not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a workman within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time and part time employee or a person appointed on contract
basis. There is nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be
inferred that only person employed on regular basis or a person employed for doing
whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or contract
basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a
workman.”
13. Thus Hon‘ble Supreme Court has clarified that the definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time or part time employee or a person appointed on contract basis. There is nothing in
plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be infer that only person employed on regular basis or a
person employed for doing whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or
contract basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a workman. In
view of the ratio of law enunciated in the above ruling, in my considered opinion the applicant herein
admittedly falls within the definition of ‗workman‘ under Section 2(s) of the Act.
14. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court after analyzing the catena of cases has laid down in Balwant Raj Saluja Vs.
Air India Limited in Civil Appeal No.10266 dated 25.08.2014, two well recognized tests to find out whether
the labours are the contract employees of the principal employer are:-
1) Whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of contractor and
2) Whether the principal employer controls and supervise the work of the employees?
15. The facts regarding the payment of salary by the management or contractor has not been stated in the
claim petition of the workman. In fact, claim petition is totally silent regarding the payment of wages, salary,
letter of appointment by respondent no.1 or by contractor or anything likewise. Thus, this basic feature for
holding the relationship of employer and employee i.e. between respondent no.1 and workman totally lacking
not in the pleading but also in the evidence submitted by the workman. However, MW1 Colonel K P Singh in
his cross examination has stated that it is responsibility of the contractor to pay monthly wages to the
conservancy staff provided by him. Respondent no.1 has nothing to do with the minimum wages, DC rate to
the conservancy staff. Contractor is responsible to give notice to the conservancy staff provided by him.
Respondent no.1 has no roll in terminating the services of the workman. Thus, it was the respondent no.2 who
was required to ensure the payment of wages to the workers engaged by him from time to time.
16. It is also added here that respondent no.1 has also placed on record documents Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-4. Ex.R-2
is the contract agreement between respondent no.1 & 2. Thus, from the adduced evidence, it emerges that
workman was paid salary by the contractor and she was being controlled and supervised by the contractor.
Thus, there does not exist any relationship of employee and employer between the workman and respondent
no.1. However, there exists relation of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
17. It is also added here that as per definition of contractor as given in the Section 2(c) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter called as Contract Act), respondent no.2 was supplying
contract labour to the respondent no.1. Thus, respondent no.2 would fall under the definition of contractor.
Section 2(c) of the Contract Act is reproduced as under:
“Contractor”, in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to
produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or
articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies
contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor;
18. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Banglore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa
1978(36) FLR 266 dealt at length with the ambit and scope of expression ―industry‖ as defined in Section 2(j)
of the Act, and has laid down triple test for determining whether a particular establishment is industry or not.
The triple test is where (a) systematic activity (b) organized by cooperation between employer and employee
(the direct and substantial element is commercial (c) for the production or distribution of goods and services to
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes prima facie is an ―Industry‖ in that enterprise. The workman was
doing work i.e. systematic activity for respondent no.1 at the asking of respondent no.2 and there was
cooperation between the workman and respondent no.2, which involve substantial commercial element for
rendering service to satisfy human wants. Thus, respondent no.2 would be termed as industry.
19. Workman in her deposition has clearly stated that there was non-compliance of Section 25F, 25G and
25H of the Act. She also stated that she was appointed on 16.03.2012 and she was paid minimum wages
prescribed by Central Government and was working with respondent no.1. She was not given any
compensation before terminating his services on 27.10.2018. In his cross examination, she has further stated
2332
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
that her salary used to be credited in his bank account. But she has not placed on record any bank account, in
which her salary was credited in order to enable this Court to see who was making payment to the workman.
However, there is no denial that the workman was paid salary by respondent no.2 (contractor). However, from
the agreement dated 05.07.2018 (Ex.R-2) placed on file by respondent no.1, it emerges that safai karamcharis
were provided by respondent no.2 (contractor) to work with respondent no.1. Thus, workman was employee of
respondent no.2 and not of respondent no.1 as has been discussed above. There does not exist any relationship
of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.1. However, there exists relation of
employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
20. Admittedly, there is non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2. However, as regards
violation of other provisions i.e. Section 25G and 25H of the Act, there is no evidence lead by the workman.
Hence, workman is entitled for compensation from respondent no.2.
21. It is also added here that there is no iota of evidence that any unfair labour practice used by respondent
no.1 by entering into contract with contractors for supply of safai karamcharis and agreement executed
between respondent no.1 and 2 cannot be said to be any unfair labour practice. So far as contentions of AR for
workman that the work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature and no domestic inquiry was held
before terminating the services of workman are concerned, in this regard, it is pointed out that workman was
entitled only for compensation under Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2 (contractor) and no domestic
inquiry was required to be conducted. Merely because work is of perennial in nature does not mean that any
right has accrued in favour of the workman to get employment with respondent no.1, which is a department of
Civil Defence run by Government of India and for that regular recruitment procedure is provided. Workman
cannot seek backdoor entry into service. Moreover, workman is not employee of respondent no.1 being
employee of respondent no.2 (contractor).
22. In view of above discussion, it is held that since respondent no.2 (contractor) is currently not working
with respondent no.1, so keeping in view the tenure of service rendered by the workman and salary given to
him during the period of his stay with the contractor and non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act, this
Tribunal is of the considered opinion that workman is entitled for compensation.
23. Keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the present case, the following scheme of compensation is
deemed fit by this Tribunal:
i.
Workman who worked for less than 2 years with contractor shall be entitled for Rs. 20,000/-.
ii. Workman who worked for more than 2 years but less than 5 years with contractor shall be entitled
Rs.30,000/-.
iii. Workman who worked for more than 5 years with contractors shall be entitled for Rs. 50,000/-.
24. Present workman employed on 16.03.2012 and was terminated on 27.10.2018 (more than 5 years), so she
is entitled for Rs.50,000/-.
25. Respondent no.2 is directed to pay the workman Rs.50,000/- within one month from the date of the
notification of the award failing which the respondent no.2 shall further pay interest @6% per annum from the
date of award till the date of making payment. It is also added here that in case respondent no.1 requires safai
karamcharis, then workman may be engaged through any contractor on sympathetic ground.
26. Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17 of the
Act.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 489.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऑफ़ ; ; ;
; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, ई , ृंचाट
(ररफरेन्स न.- 308/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-अइअर( )-11]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2333
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 489.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 308/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Airport Authority of India; M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd; M/s Plasma Premium
Launch; M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd; M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels and Shri Sanjay Dudhwal which
was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-11]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1
ROOM NO. 207, ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX,
NEW DELHI.
DID No. 308/2017
Shri Sanjay Dudhwal S/o Shri Rajendra Singh, Through Hindustan & General Mazdoor Union (Regd 4479), D-2/24,
Sultanpuri, Delhi.
Claimant…
Versus
1.
Airport Authority of India,
Rajiv Ganshi Bhawan, New Delhi-110005.
2.
M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
New Udan Bhawan, Opp. ATS, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
3.
M/s Plasma Premium Launch,
IGI Airport Terminal-3, New Delhi-110037.
4.
M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd.,
Plot No.54/3A, Rama Road, New Delhi-110015.
5.
M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels,
Terminal No.3, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
Management…
AWARD
Present:
None for the Claimant.
Sh. Amit Bardhan, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.1.
Sh. Digvijay Rai, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.2.
None for the Respondent/Management No. 3 to 5.
Sh. Sanjay Dudhwal Vs. Airport Authority of India and ors.
1.
The present claim petition was filed by the claimant under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Briefly stated, the case of the claimant was to the following effect. The claimant was working on the post of Baggi
Operator w.e.f. 06.01.2011 onwards. The respondents had illegally shown the employment of the claimant to be
working through the contractor. The services of the claimant had been illegally terminated by the respondents.
Through the present claim petition, the claimant had prayed that his termination order from service be set aside and he
be reinstated in service with full back wages.
2.
Respondents/managements No. 1 to 3 had contested the claim petition by filing written statements. No
written statement by respondents/managements no.4 & 5. On the pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were framed
and the case was fixed for the evidence of claimant. Thereafter, none has appeared on behalf of the claimant nor any
evidence adduced on behalf of the claimant.
3.
It appears that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his case.
4.
Hence, this Tribunal has no option except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. I order accordingly. Case file
2334
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
be consigned to the Record Room.
5.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for notification under section 17 of the I.D. Act,
1947.
AJAY KUMAR JAIN, Presiding Officer
Date: 08.01.2026
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 490.— fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
ृंजाब नेिनल बैंक ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa fufnZ’V fookn esa dsUnzh;
ljdkj vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky;
ds iapkV (a04/2024) izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y-39025/01/2026- vkbZ vkj (ch-II)-30]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 490.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 04/2024) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Kolkata
as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Punjab National Bank and their
workmen.
[No. L-39025/01/2026- IR(B-II)-30]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT KOLKATA
Present :
Justice (Retd.) Ananda Kumar Mukherjee,
Presiding Officer/Link Officer.
REF. No. 04 OF 2024
Punjab National Bank Staff Union, Brabourne Road, Kolkata
Versus
Management of Punjab National Bank, Kolkata.
Representative :
For the Union /Workman : Mr. Umaprasad Sinha Mahapatra, Advocate.
For the Bank
: None
INDUSTRY
; BANK
STATE
: WEST BENGAL
DATE OF AWARD : 11th March, 2026
AWARD
In exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
read with sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act, the Government of India through Ministry of Labour and
Employment vide its order No. Kol-700020/04/2024-Dy. CLC (C ) dated 04-03-2024 has been pleased to refer the
following dispute between the employer bank i.e. Management of Punjab National Bank, Kolkata Zonal Office and
their workmen represented by the union for adjudication by this Tribunal.
Schedule
―Whether the action of the management of Punjab National Bank in denying the facilities on Mini Deposit
(SalpaSanchay) Scheme which was enjoyed by the aggrieved 6 (six) Mini Deposit Collectors at United Bank of India
(UBI) before amalgamation with Punjab National Bank is legal and/or justified? If not, what relief the concerned
workmen are entitled to?‖
On receiving order No. Kol-700020/04/2024-Dy. CLC (C ) dated 04-03-2024 from the Govt. of India,
Ministry of Labour& Employment, New Delhi through Dy. CLC (C ), Kolkata, a Reference Case was registered on
07-03-2024 and an order was passed for issuing notice to the parties through Registered Post, directing them to appear
and submit statement of claim by workmen and written statements by the management with relevant documents.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2335
On 24-04-2024 representative of the bank appeared. The envelops containing notices issued to the bank and
the union were not returned unserved. Therefore, it is presumed that the notices were served upon he addresses.
The union issued a letter of authrisation in favour of Mr. Umaprasad Sinha Mahapatra, President of the union
who appeared on 25-07-2024. The case was thereafter fixed on 17-09-2024, 19-11-2024, 31-12-2024, 18-02-2025,
08-09-2025,12-11-2025, 12-01-2026 and today during special campaign on 11-03-2026 for appearance of the parties,
filing statement of claim i.d. the case would be disposed of in the form of ‗No dispute award‘.
In nearly two years‘ time neither the union nor the management have filed statement of claim/written
statement in support of their case.
On repeated calls at 1-15 p.m. none appeared for the parties. It appears to me that the concerned union is not
diligent in proceeding with their claim. It may be presumed that the workmen are not interested in pursuing the
dispute referred to this Tribunal for adjudication.
Under such circumstances the industrial dispute is dismissed for default.
Hence,
ORDER
That the industrial dispute is dismissed for default of the union. Let a ―No Dispute Award‖ be drawn up. Let
copy of the award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry for information and notification.
Justice (Retd.) ANANDA KUMAR MUKHERJEE, Presiding Officer / Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 491.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार ऑफ़ ; ; ;
; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और
के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, ई , ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स
न.- 309/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के
साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-अइअर( )-12]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 491.— In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 309/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Airport Authority of India; M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd; M/s Plasma Premium
Launch; M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd; M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels and Shri Vidya Sagar which was
received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-12]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT DELHI - 1
ROOM NO. 207, ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX,
NEW DELHI.
DID No. 309/2017
Shri Vidya Sagar S/o Shri Hansraj Sharma, Through Hindustan & General Mazdoor Union (Regd 4479), D-2/24,
Sultanpuri, Delhi.
Claimant…
Versus
1.
Airport Authority of India,
Rajiv Ganshi Bhawan, New Delhi-110005.
2336
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
2.
M/s Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
New Udan Bhawan, Opp. ATS, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
3.
M/s Plasma Premium Launch,
IGI Airport Terminal-3, New Delhi-110037.
4.
M/s Machlin Engineering Ltd.,
Plot No.54/3A, Rama Road, New Delhi-110015.
5.
M/s Uttam Uddan Tour and Travels,
Terminal No.3, IGI Airport, New Delhi-110037.
Management…
AWARD
Present:
None for the Claimant.
Sh. Amit Bardhan, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.1.
Sh. Digvijay Rai, A/R for the Respondent/Management No.2.
None for the Respondent/Management No.3 to 5.
Shri Vidya Sagar Vs. Airport Authority of India and ors.
1.
The present claim petition was filed by the claimant under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Briefly stated, the case of the claimant was to the following effect. The claimant was working on the post of Baggi
Operator w.e.f. 01.01.2011 onwards. The respondents had illegally shown the employment of the claimant to be
working through the contractor. The services of the claimant had been illegally terminated by the respondents.
Through the present claim petition, the claimant had prayed that his termination order from service be set aside and he
be reinstated in service with full back wages.
2.
Respondents/managements No. 1 to 3 had contested the claim petition by filing written statements. No
written statement by respondents/managements no.4 & 5. On the pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were framed
and the case was fixed for the evidence of claimant. Thereafter, none has appeared on behalf of the claimant nor any
evidence adduced on behalf of the claimant.
3.
It appears that the claimant is not interested in pursuing his case.
4.
Hence, this Tribunal has no option except to pass a ‗No Dispute/Claim‘ award. I order accordingly. Case file
be consigned to the Record Room.
5.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for notification under section 17 of the I.D.
Act, 1947.
AJAY KUMAR JAIN, Presiding Officer
Date: 08.01.2026
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 492.— fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
( ), ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdks vkSj muds deZdkjks ds chp vuqca/k
esa fufnZ’V fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-I ds iapkV (62/2024)
izdkf'kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y-12025/01/2026- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-73]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 492.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 62/2024) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Admn. Commander
Head Quarter ( Civil Defence), Panchkula and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2026- IR (B-I)-73]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2337
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH
(Present:- Mr. Kamal Kant, PO-cum-Link Officer).
ID No. 62/2024
Registered on:-16.10.2019
Rajesh Kumar S/o Sh. Shayam Lal, R/o 575 Beed Ghaghar, Chandi Mandir, Panchkula, Haryana.
-------- Workman
Versus
1. Admn. Commander Station Head Quarter (Civil Defence), Chandi Mandir Cantt. Panchkula, Haryana.
2. M/s A.A. Foundation For safety, Head Office-5919, DLF City, Face-4, Gurugaon-122022.
----Respondents
Present:-
Sh. Jang Bahadur, AR for workman.
Sh. Satinder Singh, AR for respondent no.1.
Respondent no.2 already ex parte.
Award :10.03.2026
1.
Workman has filed the present claim petition under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter called the Act) against his termination w.e.f. 27.10.2018 claiming reinstatement into service along
with continuity of service and full back wages.
2.
It is maintained by the workman in the claim petition that that he was appointed as sweeper/safai
karamchari on 27.10.2014 by respondent no.1 at minimum wages prescribed by the Central Government. But
the said minimum wages were never paid to him. Management has unlawfully deducted 12% EPF share,
1.75% ESI and Rs.300/- as TDS from hissalary despite of the fact that his total wages comes under the ambit
of taxfree limit. He was working under respondent no.1 directly, but respondent no.1 in order to avoid its
liability always shows his employment in record under different contractors, which tantamount to unfair labour
practice.
3.
It is further maintained that workman including 200 other safai karamcharis of respondent no.1 raised
the demand for non-deduction of TDS from the wages paid by respondent no.1. However, their demand was
not accepted. Other workers working under respondent no.1 formed union and subsequently his services were
dispensed with w.e.f. 27.10.2018. It is also maintained that respondent no.1 retained juniors in service and also
made fresh appointments after termination of his services and no compensation was paid under Section 25F of
the Act. Thus, there is violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act. Hence this petition.
4.
Notice of the petition was given to respondents.
5.
Respondent no.1 filed reply to the claim petition maintaining therein that the workman has not come to
the Court with clean hands as he was appointed as sweeper by respondent no.2 (contractor) at minimum wage
rate as prescribed by the Central Government. As per Government Policy dated 18.03.2011 (Ex.R-1), Non-
Cantonment Military Stations have been authorized to outsource conservancy safaiwala. The answering
respondent entered into contract with various private agencies for outsourcing of sweepers (safai karamcharis).
In July 2018, the answering respondent entered into contract with M/s AA Foundation for safety and M/s
Sunrise Facilitator Pvt. Ltd. through e-tendering for outsourcing of safai karamcharis to provide conservancy
services in Chandi Mandir Military Station for the financial year 2018-19. Respondent no.2 submits bill for
payment for the days the safai karamcharis performed their duties and answering respondent is only
responsible to forward these bills to PCDA Western Command Chandigarh to release payment directly to the
contractor‘s account. Salary is paid to the workman by the contractor. Compliance of PF, ESI Rules etc. is
carried out by the contractor as per contract agreement. Answering respondent has no responsibility of
disbursement of wages and deduction of EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed
union in the headquarter, which is not permitted and also carried out demonstration inside the premises of
Station Headquarter on 27.10.2018 and failed to perform his duties. Thereafter, answering respondent asked
respondent no.2 to ask the workers to perform their duties. Answering respondent has no role or responsibility
for termination services of the workman. There is no relationship of employer and employee between the
answering respondent and the workman. In view of Army Headquarter Letter, the civilian employees of the
answering respondent cannot organize themselves into trade unions as station headquarter is an administrative
2338
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
office of the Government of India. In spite of that, workman along with other safai karamcharis formed union
unauthorizedly and indulge in unlawful activities. It is maintained that workman is the employee of contractor
and therefore, termination is the prerogative of the contractor. It is prayed that the claim be dismissed.
6.
It is pertinent to mention here that respondent no.2 was proceeded ex parte on 07.05.2024.
Evidence of workman:-
7.
In order to prove his case, workman examined himself as WW1 and tendered into evidence his affidavit
WW1/A and has been cross examined by the AR for respondent no.1. AR for workman closed the evidence on
22.07.2024.
Evidence of respondent no.1:-
8.
Respondent no.1 examined Colonel K P Singh S/o Late Colonel P. P. Singh, OIC, Civic Cell, Station
Head Quarter, Chandi Mandir Panchkula as MW1, who tendered into evidence his affidavit Ex.MW1/A along
with documents Ex.R1 to Ex.R4. AR for respondent no.1 closed the evidence on 29.01.2026.
Sr. No.
Document
Dated
Exhibit
1.
Policy
18.03.2011
Ex.R-1
2.
Agreement with respondent no.2
05.07.2018
Ex.R-2
3.
Copy of ECR of EPFO
Ex.R-3
4.
Letter of Head Quarter
22.04.1980
Ex.R-4
Submissions of workman:-
9.
While arguing the case, AR for workman contended that in this case, workman was appointed by
respondent no.1 under a camouflage agreement with respondent no.2. The workman was appointed directly by
respondent no.1 on 27.10.2014 as sweeper and his services were dispensed with on 27.10.2018 without any
reason in violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act as no compensation was paid to the workman and
junior to him were retained in service and fresh appointment were made after termination of the workman. So
far as the agreements between the respondent no.1 & 2 are concerned, they are totally not tenable and is unfair
labour practice. The work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature. The contractor was not having
any license. The contractor has left after three months. No domestic inquiry was held before terminating the
service of the workman, which is mandatory under the Act.
Submissions of respondent no.1:-
10.
On the other hand, AR for respondent no.1 contended that the workman was engaged by respondent
no.2 (contractor) as per agreement executed between respondent no.1 & 2 on outsource basis and there is no
relationship of employer and employee between respondent no.1 and the workman. Wages were paid by the
respondent no.2 to the workman and there was no role of respondent no.1 in appointing or terminating the
services of the workman. Workman is employee of respondent no.2. If there is any violation of provision of
the Act, then it is done by respondent no.2. As per Ex.R3, all dues were paid by the contractor with regard to
EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed union in the Headquarter, which is not
permitted as per Ex.R4. Respondent no.1 being the Government Agency, workman is trying to take benefit of
his appointment by respondent no.2 and has filed a false claim after concealing material facts and claim of the
workman is not maintainable.
11.
I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by AR for both the parties.
Findings:-
12.
The first contention regarding the applicant is that whether applicant comes within the definition of
workman as is defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. I may mention that applicant was appointed as sweeper as
per his claim petition and affidavit submitted before the Tribunal. In plain words the applicant was performing
his duties as labourer/unskilled worker. He was not in supervisory or administrative post requiring him to
perform only administrative duties. While interpreting Section 2(s) Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of
Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur, AIR 2011 Supreme Court 2532,has observed as follows:-
“The source of employment, the quantum of recruitment, the terms & conditions of
employment/ contract of service, the quantum of wages/ pay and mode of payment are
not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a workman within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time and part time employee or a person appointed on contract
basis. There is nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2339
inferred that only person employed on regular basis or a person employed for doing
whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or contract
basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a
workman.”
13.
Thus Hon‘ble Supreme Court has clarified that the definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time or part time employee or a person appointed on contract basis. There is nothing in
plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be infer that only person employed on regular basis or a
person employed for doing whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or
contract basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a workman. In
view of the ratio of law enunciated in the above ruling, in my considered opinion the applicant herein
admittedly falls within the definition of ‗workman‘ under Section 2(s) of the Act.
14.
The Hon‘ble Supreme Court after analyzing the catena of cases has laid down in Balwant Raj
Saluja Vs. Air India Limited in Civil Appeal No.10266 dated 25.08.2014, two well recognized tests to find
out whether the labours are the contract employees of the principal employer are:-
1) Whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of contractor and
2) Whether the principal employer controls and supervise the work of the employees?
15.
The facts regarding the payment of salary by the management or contractor has not been stated in
the claim petition of the workman. In fact, claim petition is totally silent regarding the payment of wages,
salary, letter of appointment by respondent no.1 or by contractor or anything likewise. Thus, this basic feature
for holding the relationship of employer and employee i.e. between respondent no.1 and workman totally
lacking not in the pleading but also in the evidence submitted by the workman.However, MW1 Colonel K P
Singh in his cross examination has stated that it is responsibility of the contractor to pay monthly wages to the
conservancy staff provided by him. Respondent no.1 has nothing to do with the minimum wages, DC rate to
the conservancy staff. Contractor is responsible to give notice to the conservancy staff provided by him.
Respondent no.1 has no roll in terminating the services of the workman. Thus, it was the respondent no.2 who
was required to ensure the payment of wages to the workers engaged by him from time to time.
16.
It is also added here that respondent no.1 has also placed on record documents Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-4.
Ex.R-2 is the contract agreement between respondent no.1 & 2. Thus, from the adduced evidence, it emerges
that workman was paid salary by the contractor and he was being controlled and supervised by the contractor.
Thus, there does not exist any relationship of employee and employer between the workman and respondent
no.1. However, there exists relation of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
17.
It is also added here that as per definition of contractor as given in the Section 2(c) of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter called as Contract Act), respondent no.2 was
supplying contract labour to the respondent no.1. Thus, respondent no.2 would fall under the definition of
contractor. Section 2(c) of the Contract Act is reproduced as under:
“Contractor”, in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to
produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or
articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies
contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor;
18.
TheHon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Banglore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa
1978(36) FLR 266 dealt at length with the ambit and scope of expression ―industry‖ as defined in Section 2(j)
of the Act, and has laid down triple test for determining whether a particular establishment is industry or not.
The triple test is where (a) systematic activity (b) organized by cooperation between employer and employee
(the direct and substantial element is commercial (c) for the production or distribution of goods and services to
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes prima facie is an ―Industry‖ in that enterprise. The workman was
doing work i.e. systematic activity for respondent no.1 at the asking of respondent no.2 and there was
cooperation between the workman and respondent no.2, which involve substantial commercial element for
rendering service to satisfy human wants. Thus, respondent no.2 would be termed as industry.
19.
Workman in his deposition has clearly stated that there was non-compliance of Section 25F, 25G
and 25H of the Act. He also stated that he was appointed on 27.10.2014 and he was paid minimum wages
prescribed by Central Government and was working with respondent no.1. He was not given any
compensation before terminating his services on 27.10.2018. In his cross examination, he has further stated
that his salary used to be credited in his bank account. But he has not placed on record any bank account, in
which his salary was credited in order to enable this Court to see who was making payment to the workman.
However, there is no denial that the workman was paid salary by respondent no.2 (contractor). However, from
the agreement dated 05.07.2018 (Ex.R-2) placed on file by respondent no.1, it emerges that safai karamcharis
were provided by respondent no.2 (contractor) to work with respondent no.1. Thus, workman was employee of
respondent no.2 and not of respondent no.1 as has been discussed above. There does not exist any relationship
2340
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.1. However, there exists relation of
employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
20.
Admittedly, there is non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2. However, as
regards violation of other provisions i.e. Section 25G and 25H of the Act, there is no evidence lead by the
workman. Hence, workman is entitled for compensation from respondent no.2.
21.
It is also added here that there is no iota of evidence that any unfair labour practice used by
respondent no.1 by entering into contract with contractors for supply of safai karamcharis and agreement
executed between respondent no.1 and 2 cannot be said to be any unfair labour practice. So far as contentions
of AR for workman that the work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature and no domestic inquiry
was held before terminating the services of workman are concerned, in this regard, it is pointed out that
workman was entitled only for compensation under Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2 (contractor) and
no domestic inquiry was required to be conducted. Merely because work is of perennial in nature does not
mean that any right has accrued in favour of the workman to get employment with respondent no.1, which is a
department of Civil Defence run by Government of India and for that regular recruitment procedure is
provided. Workman cannot seek backdoor entry into service. Moreover, workman is not employee of
respondent no.1 being employee of respondent no.2 (contractor).
22.
In view of above discussion, it is held that since respondent no.2 (contractor) is currently not
working with respondent no.1, so keeping in view the tenure of service rendered by the workman and salary
given to him during the period of his stay with the contractor and non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act,
this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that workman is entitled for compensation.
23.
Keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the present case, the following scheme of
compensation is deemed fit by this Tribunal:
i.
Workman who worked for less than 2 years with contractor shall be entitled for Rs.20,000/-.
ii. Workman who worked for more than 2 years but less than 5 years with contractor shall be entitled
Rs.30,000/-.
iii. Workman who worked for more than 5 years with contractors shall be entitled for Rs.50,000/-.
24.
Present workman employed on 27.10.2014 and was terminated on 27.10.2018 (More than 2 years
and less than 5 years), so he is entitled for Rs.30,000/-.
25.
Respondent no.2 is directed to pay the workman Rs.30,000/- within one month from the date of the
notification of the award failing which the respondent no.2 shall further pay interest @6% per annum from the
date of award till the date of making payment. It is also added here that in case respondent no.1 requires safai
karamcharis, then workman may be engaged through any contractor on sympathetic ground.
26.
Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17
of the Act.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer-cum-Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 493.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
प्रिासजनक कमांडर मु्यालय (नागररक रक्षा), ृंचकुला ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-I ds iapkV (41/2024) izdkf'kr
djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12025/01/2026- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-76]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 493.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 41/2024) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Admn.
Commander Head Quarter ( Civil Defence), Panchkula and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2026- IR(B-I)-76]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2341
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH
(Present:- Mr. Kamal Kant, PO-cum-Link Officer).
ID No. 41/2024
Registered on:-16.10.2019
Savitri W/o Sh. Anil Kumar R/o 602 Gate No.01 Chandi Mandir, Panchkula, Haryana.
-------- Workman
Versus
1. Admn. Commander Station Head Quarter (Civil Defence), Chandi Mandir Cantt. Panchkula, Haryana.
2. M/s A.A. Foundation For safety, Head Office-5919, DLF City, Face-4, Gurugaon-122022.
----Respondents
Present:-
Sh. Jang Bahadur, AR for workman.
Sh. Satinder Singh, AR for respondent no.1.
Respondent no.2 already ex parte.
Award :10.03.2026
1. Workman has filed the present claim petition under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter called the Act) against her termination w.e.f. 27.10.2018 claiming reinstatement into service along
with continuity of service and full back wages.
2. It is maintained by the workman in the claim petition that that she was appointed as sweeper/safai
karamchari on 01.01.2015 by respondent no.1 at minimum wages prescribed by the Central Government. But
the said minimum wages were never paid to her. Management has unlawfully deducted 12% EPF share,
1.75% ESI and Rs.300/- as TDS from his salary despite of the fact that her total wages comes under the ambit
of tax free limit. She was working under respondent no.1 directly, but respondent no.1 in order to avoid its
liability always shows his employment in record under different contractors, which tantamount to unfair
labour practice.
3. It is further maintained that workman including 200 other safai karamcharis of respondent no.1 raised the
demand for non-deduction of TDS from the wages paid by respondent no.1. However, their demand was not
accepted. Other workers working under respondent no.1 formed union and subsequently her services were
dispensed with w.e.f. 27.10.2018. It is also maintained that respondent no.1 retained juniors in service and also
made fresh appointments after termination of her services and no compensation was paid under Section 25F of
the Act. Thus, there is violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act. Hence this petition.
4. Notice of the petition was given to respondents.
5. Respondent no.1 filed reply to the claim petition maintaining therein that the workman has not come to
the Court with clean hands as she was appointed as sweeper by respondent no.2 (contractor) at minimum wage
rate as prescribed by the Central Government. As per Government Policy dated 18.03.2011 (Ex.R-1), Non-
Cantonment Military Stations have been authorized to outsource conservancy safaiwala. The answering
respondent entered into contract with various private agencies for outsourcing of sweepers (safai karamcharis).
In July 2018, the answering respondent entered into contract with M/s AA Foundation for safety and M/s
Sunrise Facilitator Pvt. Ltd. through e-tendering for outsourcing of safai karamcharis to provide conservancy
services in Chandi Mandir Military Station for the financial year 2018-19. Respondent no.2 submits bill for
payment for the days the safai karamcharis performed their duties and answering respondent is only
responsible to forward these bills to PCDA Western Command Chandigarh to release payment directly to the
contractor‘s account. Salary is paid to the workman by the contractor. Compliance of PF, ESI Rules etc. is
carried out by the contractor as per contract agreement. Answering respondent has no responsibility of
disbursement of wages and deduction of EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed
union in the headquarter, which is not permitted and also carried out demonstration inside the premises of
Station Headquarter on 27.10.2018 and failed to perform his duties. Thereafter, answering respondent asked
respondent no.2 to ask the workers to perform their duties. Answering respondent has no role or responsibility
for termination services of the workman. There is no relationship of employer and employee between the
answering respondent and the workman. In view of Army Headquarter Letter, the civilian employees of the
answering respondent cannot organize themselves into trade unions as station headquarter is an administrative
office of the Government of India. In spite of that, workman along with other safai karamcharis formed union
2342
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
unauthorizedly and indulge in unlawful activities. It is maintained that workman is the employee of contractor
and therefore, termination is the prerogative of the contractor. It is prayed that the claim be dismissed.
6. It is pertinent to mention here that respondent no.2 was proceeded ex parte on 07.05.2024.
Evidence of workman:-
7. In order to prove his case, workman examined himself as WW1 and tendered into evidence his affidavit
WW1/A and has been cross examined by the AR for respondent no.1. AR for workman closed the evidence on
22.07.2024.
Evidence of respondent no.1:-
8. Respondent no.1 examined Colonel K P Singh S/o Late Colonel P. P. Singh, OIC, Civic Cell, Station Head
Quarter, Chandi Mandir Panchkula as MW1, who tendered into evidence his affidavit Ex.MW1/A along with
documents Ex.R1 to Ex.R4. AR for respondent no.1 closed the evidence on 29.01.2026.
Sr. No.
Document
Dated
Exhibit
1.
Policy
18.03.2011
Ex.R-1
2.
Agreement with respondent no.2
05.07.2018
Ex.R-2
3.
Copy of ECR of EPFO
Ex.R-3
4.
Letter of Head Quarter
22.04.1980
Ex.R-4
Submissions of workman:-
9.
While arguing the case, AR for workman contended that in this case, workman was appointed by
respondent no.1 under a camouflage agreement with respondent no.2. The workman was appointed directly by
respondent no.1 on 01.01.2015 as sweeper and her services were dispensed with on 27.10.2018 without any
reason in violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act as no compensation was paid to the workman and
junior to him were retained in service and fresh appointment were made after termination of the workman. So
far as the agreements between the respondent no.1 & 2 are concerned, they are totally not tenable and is unfair
labour practice. The work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature. The contractor was not having
any license. The contractor has left after three months. No domestic inquiry was held before terminating the
service of the workman, which is mandatory under the Act.
Submissions of respondent no.1:-
10.
On the other hand, AR for respondent no.1 contended that the workman was engaged by respondent
no.2 (contractor) as per agreement executed between respondent no.1 & 2 on outsource basis and there is no
relationship of employer and employee between respondent no.1 and the workman. Wages were paid by the
respondent no.2 to the workman and there was no role of respondent no.1 in appointing or terminating the
services of the workman. Workman is employee of respondent no.2. If there is any violation of provision of
the Act, then it is done by respondent no.2. As per Ex.R3, all dues were paid by the contractor with regard to
EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed union in the Headquarter, which is not
permitted as per Ex.R4. Respondent no.1 being the Government Agency, workman is trying to take benefit of
his appointment by respondent no.2 and has filed a false claim after concealing material facts and claim of the
workman is not maintainable.
11.
I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by AR for both the parties.
Findings:-
12.
The first contention regarding the applicant is that whether applicant comes within the definition of
workman as is defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. I may mention that applicant was appointed as sweeper as
per his claim petition and affidavit submitted before the Tribunal. In plain words the applicant was performing
his duties as labourer/unskilled worker. She was not in supervisory or administrative post requiring him to
perform only administrative duties. While interpreting Section 2(s) Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of
Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur, AIR 2011 Supreme Court 2532,has observed as follows:-
“The source of employment, the quantum of recruitment, the terms & conditions of
employment/ contract of service, the quantum of wages/ pay and mode of payment are
not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a workman within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time and part time employee or a person appointed on contract
basis. There is nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be
inferred that only person employed on regular basis or a person employed for doing
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2343
whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or contract
basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a
workman.”
13.
Thus Hon‘ble Supreme Court has clarified that the definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time or part time employee or a person appointed on contract basis. There is nothing in
plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be infer that only person employed on regular basis or a
person employed for doing whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or
contract basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a workman. In
view of the ratio of law enunciated in the above ruling, in my considered opinion the applicant herein
admittedly falls within the definition of ‗workman‘ under Section 2(s) of the Act.
14.
The Hon‘ble Supreme Court after analyzing the catena of cases has laid down in Balwant Raj
Saluja Vs. Air India Limited in Civil Appeal No.10266 dated 25.08.2014, two well recognized tests to find
out whether the labours are the contract employees of the principal employer are:-
1) Whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of contractor and
2) Whether the principal employer controls and supervise the work of the employees?
15.
The facts regarding the payment of salary by the management or contractor has not been stated in
the claim petition of the workman. In fact, claim petition is totally silent regarding the payment of wages,
salary, letter of appointment by respondent no.1 or by contractor or anything likewise. Thus, this basic feature
for holding the relationship of employer and employee i.e. between respondent no.1 and workman totally
lacking not in the pleading but also in the evidence submitted by the workman. However, MW1 Colonel K P
Singh in his cross examination has stated that it is responsibility of the contractor to pay monthly wages to the
conservancy staff provided by him. Respondent no.1 has nothing to do with the minimum wages, DC rate to
the conservancy staff. Contractor is responsible to give notice to the conservancy staff provided by him.
Respondent no.1 has no roll in terminating the services of the workman. Thus, it was the respondent no.2 who
was required to ensure the payment of wages to the workers engaged by him from time to time.
16.
It is also added here that respondent no.1 has also placed on record documents Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-4.
Ex.R-2 is the contract agreement between respondent no.1 & 2. Thus, from the adduced evidence, it emerges
that workman was paid salary by the contractor and she was being controlled and supervised by the contractor.
Thus, there does not exist any relationship of employee and employer between the workman and respondent
no.1. However, there exists relation of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
17.
It is also added here that as per definition of contractor as given in the Section 2(c) of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter called as Contract Act), respondent no.2 was
supplying contract labour to the respondent no.1. Thus, respondent no.2 would fall under the definition of
contractor. Section 2(c) of the Contract Act is reproduced as under:
“Contractor”, in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to
produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or
articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies
contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor;
18.
The Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Banglore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa
1978(36) FLR 266 dealt at length with the ambit and scope of expression ―industry‖ as defined in Section 2(j)
of the Act, and has laid down triple test for determining whether a particular establishment is industry or not.
The triple test is where (a) systematic activity (b) organized by cooperation between employer and employee
(the direct and substantial element is commercial (c) for the production or distribution of goods and services to
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes prima facie is an ―Industry‖ in that enterprise. The workman was
doing work i.e. systematic activity for respondent no.1 at the asking of respondent no.2 and there was
cooperation between the workman and respondent no.2, which involve substantial commercial element for
rendering service to satisfy human wants. Thus, respondent no.2 would be termed as industry.
19.
Workman in her deposition has clearly stated that there was non-compliance of Section 25F, 25G
and 25H of the Act. She also stated that she was appointed on 01.01.2015 and she was paid minimum wages
prescribed by Central Government and was working with respondent no.1. She was not given any
compensation before terminating his services on 27.10.2018. In his cross examination, she has further stated
that her salary used to be credited in his bank account. But she has not placed on record any bank account, in
which her salary was credited in order to enable this Court to see who was making payment to the workman.
However, there is no denial that the workman was paid salary by respondent no.2 (contractor). However, from
the agreement dated 05.07.2018 (Ex.R-2) placed on file by respondent no.1, it emerges that safai karamcharis
were provided by respondent no.2 (contractor) to work with respondent no.1. Thus, workman was employee of
respondent no.2 and not of respondent no.1 as has been discussed above. There does not exist any relationship
of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.1. However, there exists relation of
2344
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
20.
Admittedly, there is non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2. However, as
regards violation of other provisions i.e. Section 25G and 25H of the Act, there is no evidence lead by the
workman. Hence, workman is entitled for compensation from respondent no.2.
21.
It is also added here that there is no iota of evidence that any unfair labour practice used by
respondent no.1 by entering into contract with contractors for supply of safai karamcharis and agreement
executed between respondent no.1 and 2 cannot be said to be any unfair labour practice. So far as contentions
of AR for workman that the work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature and no domestic inquiry
was held before terminating the services of workman are concerned, in this regard, it is pointed out that
workman was entitled only for compensation under Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2 (contractor) and
no domestic inquiry was required to be conducted. Merely because work is of perennial in nature does not
mean that any right has accrued in favour of the workman to get employment with respondent no.1, which is a
department of Civil Defence run by Government of India and for that regular recruitment procedure is
provided. Workman cannot seek backdoor entry into service. Moreover, workman is not employee of
respondent no.1 being employee of respondent no.2 (contractor).
22.
In view of above discussion, it is held that since respondent no.2 (contractor) is currently not
working with respondent no.1, so keeping in view the tenure of service rendered by the workman and salary
given to him during the period of his stay with the contractor and non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act,
this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that workman is entitled for compensation.
23.
Keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the present case, the following scheme of
compensation is deemed fit by this Tribunal:
i.
Workman who worked for less than 2 years with contractor shall be entitled for Rs.20,000/-.
ii. Workman who worked for more than 2 years but less than 5 years with contractor shall be entitled
Rs.30,000/-.
iii. Workman who worked for more than 5 years with contractors shall be entitled for Rs.50,000/-.
24.
Present workman employed on 01.01.2015 and was terminated on 27.10.2018 (more than 2 years
and less than 5 years), so she is entitled for Rs.30,000/-.
25.
Respondent no.2 is directed to pay the workman Rs.30,000/- within one month from the date of the
notification of the award failing which the respondent no.2 shall further pay interest @6% per annum from the
date of award till the date of making payment. It is also added here that in case respondent no.1 requires safai
karamcharis, then workman may be engaged through any contractor on sympathetic ground.
26.
Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17
of the Act.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 494.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
प्रशासनिक कमाांडर मुख्यालय (िागररक रक्षा), पांचकुला ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k
esa fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-I ds iapkV (65/2024)
izdkf”kr djrh gSA
[सं. ,y-12025/01/2026-vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-75]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 494.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref.65/2024) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Admn. Commander
Head Quarter ( Civil Defence), Panchkula and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2026- IR(B-I)-75]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2345
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH
(Present:- Mr. Kamal Kant, PO-cum-Link Officer).
ID No. 65/2024
Registered on:-16.10.2019
Virender S/o Sh. Rupa R/o 201, Rampur Seuri Surat Pur, Kalka, Haryana.
-------- Workman
Versus
1. Admn. Commander Station Head Quarter (Civil Defence), Chandi Mandir Cantt. Panchkula, Haryana.
2. M/s A.A. Foundation For safety, Head Office-5919, DLF City, Face-4, Gurugaon-122022.
----Respondents
Present:-
Sh. Jang Bahadur, AR for workman.
Sh. Satinder Singh, AR for respondent no.1.
Respondent no.2 already ex parte.
Award :10.03.2026
1.
Workman has filed the present claim petition under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter called the Act) against his termination w.e.f. 27.10.2018 claiming reinstatement into service along
with continuity of service and full back wages.
2.
It is maintained by the workman in the claim petition that that he was appointed as sweeper/safai
karamchari on 01.04.2017 by respondent no.1 at minimum wages prescribed by the Central Government. But
the said minimum wages were never paid to him. Management has unlawfully deducted 12% EPF share,
1.75% ESI and Rs.300/- as TDS from his salary despite of the fact that his total wages comes under the ambit
of tax free limit. He was working under respondent no.1 directly, but respondent no.1 in order to avoid its
liability always shows his employment in record under different contractors, which tantamount to unfair labour
practice.
3.
It is further maintained that workman including 200 other safai karamcharis of respondent no.1 raised the
demand for non-deduction of TDS from the wages paid by respondent no.1. However, their demand was not
accepted. Other workers working under respondent no.1 formed union and subsequently his services were
dispensed with w.e.f. 27.10.2018. It is also maintained that respondent no.1 retained juniors in service and also
made fresh appointments after termination of his services and no compensation was paid under Section 25F of
the Act. Thus, there is violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act. Hence this petition.
4.
Notice of the petition was given to respondents.
5.
Respondent no.1 filed reply to the claim petition maintaining therein that the workman has not come to
the Court with clean hands as he was appointed as sweeper by respondent no.2 (contractor) at minimum wage
rate as prescribed by the Central Government. As per Government Policy dated 18.03.2011 (Ex.R-1), Non-
Cantonment Military Stations have been authorized to outsource conservancy safaiwala. The answering
respondent entered into contract with various private agencies for outsourcing of sweepers (safai karamcharis).
In July 2018, the answering respondent entered into contract with M/s AA Foundation for safety and M/s
Sunrise Facilitator Pvt. Ltd. through e-tendering for outsourcing of safai karamcharis to provide conservancy
services in Chandi Mandir Military Station for the financial year 2018-19. Respondent no.2 submits bill for
payment for the days the safai karamcharis performed their duties and answering respondent is only
responsible to forward these bills to PCDA Western Command Chandigarh to release payment directly to the
contractor‘s account. Salary is paid to the workman by the contractor. Compliance of PF, ESI Rules etc. is
carried out by the contractor as per contract agreement. Answering respondent has no responsibility of
disbursement of wages and deduction of EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed
union in the headquarter, which is not permitted and also carried out demonstration inside the premises of
Station Headquarter on 27.10.2018 and failed to perform his duties. Thereafter, answering respondent asked
respondent no.2 to ask the workers to perform their duties. Answering respondent has no role or responsibility
for termination services of the workman. There is no relationship of employer and employee between the
answering respondent and the workman. In view of Army Headquarter Letter, the civilian employees of the
answering respondent cannot organize themselves into trade unions as station headquarter is an administrative
office of the Government of India. In spite of that, workman along with other safai karamcharis formed union
2346
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
unauthorizedly and indulge in unlawful activities. It is maintained that workman is the employee of contractor
and therefore, termination is the prerogative of the contractor. It is prayed that the claim be dismissed.
6.
It is pertinent to mention here that respondent no.2 was proceeded ex parte on 07.05.2024.
Evidence of workman:-
7.
In order to prove his case, workman examined himself as WW1 and tendered into evidence his affidavit
WW1/A and has been cross examined by the AR for respondent no.1. AR for workman closed the evidence on
22.07.2024.
Evidence of respondent no.1:-
8.
Respondent no.1 examined Colonel K P Singh S/o Late Colonel P. P. Singh, OIC, Civic Cell, Station
Head Quarter, Chandi Mandir Panchkula as MW1, who tendered into evidence his affidavit Ex.MW1/A along
with documents Ex.R1 to Ex.R4. AR for respondent no.1 closed the evidence on 29.01.2026.
Sr. No.
Document
Dated
Exhibit
1.
Policy
18.03.2011
Ex.R-1
2.
Agreement with respondent no.2
05.07.2018
Ex.R-2
3.
Copy of ECR of EPFO
Ex.R-3
4.
Letter of Head Quarter
22.04.1980
Ex.R-4
Submissions of workman:-
9.
While arguing the case, AR for workman contended that in this case, workman was appointed by
respondent no.1 under a camouflage agreement with respondent no.2. The workman was appointed directly by
respondent no.1 on 01.04.2017 as sweeper and his services were dispensed with on 27.10.2018 without any
reason in violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act as no compensation was paid to the workman and
junior to him were retained in service and fresh appointment were made after termination of the workman. So
far as the agreements between the respondent no.1 & 2 are concerned, they are totally not tenable and is unfair
labour practice. The work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature. The contractor was not having
any license. The contractor has left after three months. No domestic inquiry was held before terminating the
service of the workman, which is mandatory under the Act.
Submissions of respondent no.1:-
10.
On the other hand, AR for respondent no.1 contended that the workman was engaged by respondent
no.2 (contractor) as per agreement executed between respondent no.1 & 2 on outsource basis and there is no
relationship of employer and employee between respondent no.1 and the workman. Wages were paid by the
respondent no.2 to the workman and there was no role of respondent no.1 in appointing or terminating the
services of the workman. Workman is employee of respondent no.2. If there is any violation of provision of
the Act, then it is done by respondent no.2. As per Ex.R3, all dues were paid by the contractor with regard to
EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed union in the Headquarter, which is not
permitted as per Ex.R4. Respondent no.1 being the Government Agency, workman is trying to take benefit of
his appointment by respondent no.2 and has filed a false claim after concealing material facts and claim of the
workman is not maintainable.
11.
I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by AR for both the parties.
Findings:-
12.
The first contention regarding the applicant is that whether applicant comes within the definition of
workman as is defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. I may mention that applicant was appointed as sweeper as
per his claim petition and affidavit submitted before the Tribunal. In plain words the applicant was performing
his duties as labourer/unskilled worker. He was not in supervisory or administrative post requiring him to
perform only administrative duties. While interpreting Section 2(s) Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of
Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur, AIR 2011 Supreme Court 2532,has observed as follows:-
“The source of employment, the quantum of recruitment, the terms & conditions of
employment/ contract of service, the quantum of wages/ pay and mode of payment are
not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a workman within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time and part time employee or a person appointed on contract
basis. There is nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be
inferred that only person employed on regular basis or a person employed for doing
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2347
whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or contract
basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a
workman.”
13.
Thus Hon‘ble Supreme Court has clarified that the definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time or part time employee or a person appointed on contract basis. There is nothing in
plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be infer that only person employed on regular basis or a
person employed for doing whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or
contract basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a workman. In
view of the ratio of law enunciated in the above ruling, in my considered opinion the applicant herein
admittedly falls within the definition of ‗workman‘ under Section 2(s) of the Act.
14.
The Hon‘ble Supreme Court after analyzing the catena of cases has laid down in Balwant Raj
Saluja Vs. Air India Limited in Civil Appeal No.10266 dated 25.08.2014, two well recognized tests to find
out whether the labours are the contract employees of the principal employer are:-
1) Whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of contractor and
2) Whether the principal employer controls and supervise the work of the employees?
15.
The facts regarding the payment of salary by the management or contractor has not been stated in
the claim petition of the workman. In fact, claim petition is totally silent regarding the payment of wages,
salary, letter of appointment by respondent no.1 or by contractor or anything likewise. Thus, this basic feature
for holding the relationship of employer and employee i.e. between respondent no.1 and workman totally
lacking not in the pleading but also in the evidence submitted by the workman.However, MW1 Colonel K P
Singh in his cross examination has stated that it is responsibility of the contractor to pay monthly wages to the
conservancy staff provided by him. Respondent no.1 has nothing to do with the minimum wages, DC rate to
the conservancy staff. Contractor is responsible to give notice to the conservancy staff provided by him.
Respondent no.1 has no roll in terminating the services of the workman. Thus, it was the respondent no.2 who
was required to ensure the payment of wages to the workers engaged by him from time to time.
16.
It is also added here that respondent no.1 has also placed on record documents Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-4.
Ex.R-2 is the contract agreement between respondent no.1 & 2. Thus, from the adduced evidence, it emerges
that workman was paid salary by the contractor and he was being controlled and supervised by the contractor.
Thus, there does not exist any relationship of employee and employer between the workman and respondent
no.1. However, there exists relation of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
17.
It is also added here that as per definition of contractor as given in the Section 2(c) of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter called as Contract Act), respondent no.2 was
supplying contract labour to the respondent no.1. Thus, respondent no.2 would fall under the definition of
contractor. Section 2(c) of the Contract Act is reproduced as under:
“Contractor”, in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to
produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or
articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies
contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor;
18.
TheHon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Banglore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa
1978(36) FLR 266 dealt at length with the ambit and scope of expression ―industry‖ as defined in Section 2(j)
of the Act, and has laid down triple test for determining whether a particular establishment is industry or not.
The triple test is where (a) systematic activity (b) organized by cooperation between employer and employee
(the direct and substantial element is commercial (c) for the production or distribution of goods and services to
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes prima facie is an ―Industry‖ in that enterprise. The workman was
doing work i.e. systematic activity for respondent no.1 at the asking of respondent no.2 and there was
cooperation between the workman and respondent no.2, which involve substantial commercial element for
rendering service to satisfy human wants. Thus, respondent no.2 would be termed as industry.
19.
Workman in his deposition has clearly stated that there was non-compliance of Section 25F, 25G
and 25H of the Act. He also stated that he was appointed on 01.04.2017 and he was paid minimum wages
prescribed by Central Government and was working with respondent no.1. He was not given any
compensation before terminating his services on 27.10.2018. In his cross examination, he has further stated
that his salary used to be credited in his bank account. But he has not placed on record any bank account, in
which his salary was credited in order to enable this Court to see who was making payment to the workman.
However, there is no denial that the workman was paid salary by respondent no.2 (contractor). However, from
the agreement dated 05.07.2018 (Ex.R-2) placed on file by respondent no.1, it emerges that safai karamcharis
were provided by respondent no.2 (contractor) to work with respondent no.1. Thus, workman was employee of
2348
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
respondent no.2 and not of respondent no.1 as has been discussed above. There does not exist any relationship
of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.1. However, there exists relation of
employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
20.
Admittedly, there is non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2. However, as
regards violation of other provisions i.e. Section 25G and 25H of the Act, there is no evidence lead by the
workman. Hence, workman is entitled for compensation from respondent no.2.
21.
It is also added here that there is no iota of evidence that any unfair labour practice used by
respondent no.1 by entering into contract with contractors for supply of safai karamcharis and agreement
executed between respondent no.1 and 2 cannot be said to be any unfair labour practice. So far as contentions
of AR for workman that the work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature and no domestic inquiry
was held before terminating the services of workman are concerned, in this regard, it is pointed out that
workman was entitled only for compensation under Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2 (contractor) and
no domestic inquiry was required to be conducted. Merely because work is of perennial in nature does not
mean that any right has accrued in favour of the workman to get employment with respondent no.1, which is a
department of Civil Defence run by Government of India and for that regular recruitment procedure is
provided. Workman cannot seek backdoor entry into service. Moreover, workman is not employee of
respondent no.1 being employee of respondent no.2 (contractor).
22.
In view of above discussion, it is held that since respondent no.2 (contractor) is currently not
working with respondent no.1, so keeping in view the tenure of service rendered by the workman and salary
given to him during the period of his stay with the contractor and non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act,
this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that workman is entitled for compensation.
23.
Keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the present case, the following scheme of
compensation is deemed fit by this Tribunal:
i.
Workman who worked for less than 2 years with contractor shall be entitled for Rs.20,000/-.
ii.
Workman who worked for more than 2 years but less than 5 years with contractor shall be entitled
Rs.30,000/-.
iii.
Workman who worked for more than 5 years with contractors shall be entitled for Rs.50,000/-.
24.
Present workman employed on 01.04.2017 and was terminated on 27.10.2018 (less than 2 years), so
he is entitled for Rs.20,000/-.
25.
Respondent no.2 is directed to pay the workman Rs.20,000/- within one month from the date of the
notification of the award failing which the respondent no.2 shall further pay interest @6% per annum from the
date of award till the date of making payment. It is also added here that in case respondent no.1 requires safai
karamcharis, then workman may be engaged through any contractor on sympathetic ground.
26.
Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17
of the Act.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 495.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14 ) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
प्रिासजनक कमांडर मु्यालय (नागररक रक्षा), ृंचकुला ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-I ds iapkV (64/2024) izdkf'kr
djrh gSA
[सं. एल-12025/01/2026- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-74]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 495.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 64/2024) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Admn. Commander
Head Quarter ( Civil Defence), Panchkula and their workmen.
[No. L-12025/01/2026- IR(B-I)-74]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2349
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH
(Present:- Mr. Kamal Kant, PO-cum-Link Officer).
ID No. 64/2024
Registered on:-16.10.2019
Gurcharan Singh S/o Sh. Sadhu Ram, R/o 1458 Mohalla Nagla Mani Majra, Chandigarh.
-------- Workman
Versus
1. Admn. Commander Station Head Quarter (Civil Defence), Chandi Mandir Cantt. Panchkula, Haryana.
2. M/s A.A. Foundation For safety, Head Office-5919, DLF City, Face-4, Gurugaon-122022.
----Respondents
Present:-
Sh. Jang Bahadur, AR for workman.
Sh. Satinder Singh, AR for respondent no.1.
Respondent no.2 already ex parte.
Award :10.03.2026
1.
Workman has filed the present claim petition under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter called the Act) against his termination w.e.f. 27.10.2018 claiming reinstatement into service along
with continuity of service and full back wages.
2.
It is maintained by the workman in the claim petition that that he was appointed as sweeper/safai
karamchari on 05.07.2015 by respondent no.1 at minimum wages prescribed by the Central Government. But
the said minimum wages were never paid to him. Management has unlawfully deducted 12% EPF share,
1.75% ESI and Rs.300/- as TDS from hissalary despite of the fact that his total wages comes under the ambit
of taxfree limit. He was working under respondent no.1 directly, but respondent no.1 in order to avoid its
liability always shows his employment in record under different contractors, which tantamount to unfair labour
practice.
3.
It is further maintained that workman including 200 other safai karamcharis of respondent no.1 raised
the demand for non-deduction of TDS from the wages paid by respondent no.1. However, their demand was
not accepted. Other workers working under respondent no.1 formed union and subsequently his services were
dispensed with w.e.f. 27.10.2018. It is also maintained that respondent no.1 retained juniors in service and also
made fresh appointments after termination of his services and no compensation was paid under Section 25F of
the Act. Thus, there is violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act. Hence this petition.
4.
Notice of the petition was given to respondents.
5.
Respondent no.1 filed reply to the claim petition maintaining therein that the workman has not come to
the Court with clean hands as he was appointed as sweeper by respondent no.2 (contractor) at minimum wage
rate as prescribed by the Central Government. As per Government Policy dated 18.03.2011 (Ex.R-1), Non-
Cantonment Military Stations have been authorized to outsource conservancy safaiwala. The answering
respondent entered into contract with various private agencies for outsourcing of sweepers (safai karamcharis).
In July 2018, the answering respondent entered into contract with M/s AA Foundation for safety and M/s
Sunrise Facilitator Pvt. Ltd. through e-tendering for outsourcing of safai karamcharis to provide conservancy
services in Chandi Mandir Military Station for the financial year 2018-19. Respondent no.2 submits bill for
payment for the days the safai karamcharis performed their duties and answering respondent is only
responsible to forward these bills to PCDA Western Command Chandigarh to release payment directly to the
contractor‘s account. Salary is paid to the workman by the contractor. Compliance of PF, ESI Rules etc. is
carried out by the contractor as per contract agreement. Answering respondent has no responsibility of
disbursement of wages and deduction of EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed
union in the headquarter, which is not permitted and also carried out demonstration inside the premises of
Station Headquarter on 27.10.2018 and failed to perform his duties. Thereafter, answering respondent asked
respondent no.2 to ask the workers to perform their duties. Answering respondent has no role or responsibility
for termination services of the workman. There is no relationship of employer and employee between the
answering respondent and the workman. In view of Army Headquarter Letter, the civilian employees of the
answering respondent cannot organize themselves into trade unions as station headquarter is an administrative
2350
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
office of the Government of India. In spite of that, workman along with other safai karamcharis formed union
unauthorizedly and indulge in unlawful activities. It is maintained that workman is the employee of contractor
and therefore, termination is the prerogative of the contractor. It is prayed that the claim be dismissed.
6.
It is pertinent to mention here that respondent no.2 was proceeded ex parte on 07.05.2024.
Evidence of workman:-
7.
In order to prove his case, workman examined himself as WW1 and tendered into evidence his affidavit
WW1/A and has been cross examined by the AR for respondent no.1. AR for workman closed the evidence on
22.07.2024.
Evidence of respondent no.1:-
8. Respondent no.1 examined Colonel K P Singh S/o Late Colonel P. P. Singh, OIC, Civic Cell, Station Head
Quarter, ChandiMandir Panchkula as MW1, who tendered into evidence his affidavit Ex.MW1/A along with
documents Ex.R1 to Ex.R4. AR for respondent no.1 closed the evidence on 29.01.2026.
Sr. No.
Document
Dated
Exhibit
1.
Policy
18.03.2011
Ex.R-1
2.
Agreement with respondent no.2
05.07.2018
Ex.R-2
3.
Copy of ECR of EPFO
Ex.R-3
4.
Letter of Head Quarter
22.04.1980
Ex.R-4
Submissions of workman:-
9.
While arguing the case, AR for workman contended that in this case, workman was appointed by
respondent no.1 under a camouflage agreement with respondent no.2. The workman was appointed directly by
respondent no.1 on 05.07.2015 as sweeper and his services were dispensed with on 27.10.2018 without any
reason in violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act as no compensation was paid to the workman and
junior to him were retained in service and fresh appointment were made after termination of the workman. So
far as the agreements between the respondent no.1 & 2 are concerned, they are totally not tenable and is unfair
labour practice. The work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature. The contractor was not having
any license. The contractor has left after three months. No domestic inquiry was held before terminating the
service of the workman, which is mandatory under the Act.
Submissions of respondent no.1:-
10.
On the other hand, AR for respondent no.1 contended that the workman was engaged by respondent
no.2 (contractor) as per agreement executed between respondent no.1 & 2 on outsource basis and there is no
relationship of employer and employee between respondent no.1 and the workman. Wages were paid by the
respondent no.2 to the workman and there was no role of respondent no.1 in appointing or terminating the
services of the workman. Workman is employee of respondent no.2. If there is any violation of provision of
the Act, then it is done by respondent no.2. As per Ex.R3, all dues were paid by the contractor with regard to
EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safai karamcharis formed union in the Headquarter, which is not
permitted as per Ex.R4. Respondent no.1 being the Government Agency, workman is trying to take benefit of
his appointment by respondent no.2 and has filed a false claim after concealing material facts and claim of the
workman is not maintainable.
11.
I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by AR for both the parties.
Findings:-
12.
The first contention regarding the applicant is that whether applicant comes within the definition of
workman as is defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. I may mention that applicant was appointed as sweeper as
per his claim petition and affidavit submitted before the Tribunal. In plain words the applicant was performing
his duties as labourer/unskilled worker. He was not in supervisory or administrative post requiring him to
perform only administrative duties. While interpreting Section 2(s) Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of
Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur, AIR 2011 Supreme Court 2532,has observed as follows:-
“The source of employment, the quantum of recruitment, the terms & conditions of
employment/ contract of service, the quantum of wages/ pay and mode of payment are
not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a workman within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time and part time employee or a person appointed on contract
basis. There is nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2351
inferred that only person employed on regular basis or a person employed for doing
whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or contract
basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a
workman.”
13.
Thus Hon‘ble Supreme Court has clarified that the definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time or part time employee or a person appointed on contract basis. There is nothing in
plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be infer that only person employed on regular basis or a
person employed for doing whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or
contract basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a workman. In
view of the ratio of law enunciated in the above ruling, in my considered opinion the applicant herein
admittedly falls within the definition of ‗workman‘ under Section 2(s) of the Act.
14.
The Hon‘ble Supreme Court after analyzing the catena of cases has laid down in Balwant Raj
Saluja Vs. Air India Limited in Civil Appeal No.10266 dated 25.08.2014, two well recognized tests to find
out whether the labours are the contract employees of the principal employer are:-
1) Whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of contractor and
2) Whether the principal employer controls and supervise the work of the employees?
15.
The facts regarding the payment of salary by the management or contractor has not been stated in
the claim petition of the workman. In fact, claim petition is totally silent regarding the payment of wages,
salary, letter of appointment by respondent no.1 or by contractor or anything likewise. Thus, this basic feature
for holding the relationship of employer and employee i.e. between respondent no.1 and workman totally
lacking not in the pleading but also in the evidence submitted by the workman.However, MW1 Colonel K P
Singh in his cross examination has stated that it is responsibility of the contractor to pay monthly wages to the
conservancy staff provided by him. Respondent no.1 has nothing to do with the minimum wages, DC rate to
the conservancy staff. Contractor is responsible to give notice to the conservancy staff provided by him.
Respondent no.1 has no roll in terminating the services of the workman. Thus, it was the respondent no.2 who
was required to ensure the payment of wages to the workers engaged by him from time to time.
16.
It is also added here that respondent no.1 has also placed on record documents Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-4.
Ex.R-2 is the contract agreement between respondent no.1 & 2. Thus, from the adduced evidence, it emerges
that workman was paid salary by the contractor and he was being controlled and supervised by the contractor.
Thus, there does not exist any relationship of employee and employer between the workman and respondent
no.1. However, there exists relation of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
17.
It is also added here that as per definition of contractor as given in the Section 2(c) of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter called as Contract Act), respondent no.2 was
supplying contract labour to the respondent no.1. Thus, respondent no.2 would fall under the definition of
contractor. Section 2(c) of the Contract Act is reproduced as under:
“Contractor”, in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to
produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or
articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies
contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor;
18.
TheHon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Banglore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa
1978(36) FLR 266 dealt at length with the ambit and scope of expression ―industry‖ as defined in Section 2(j)
of the Act, and has laid down triple test for determining whether a particular establishment is industry or not.
The triple test is where (a) systematic activity (b) organized by cooperation between employer and employee
(the direct and substantial element is commercial (c) for the production or distribution of goods and services to
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes prima facie is an ―Industry‖ in that enterprise. The workman was
doing work i.e. systematic activity for respondent no.1 at the asking of respondent no.2 and there was
cooperation between the workman and respondent no.2, which involve substantial commercial element for
rendering service to satisfy human wants. Thus, respondent no.2 would be termed as industry.
19.
Workman in his deposition has clearly stated that there was non-compliance of Section 25F, 25G
and 25H of the Act. He also stated that he was appointed on 05.07.2015 and he was paid minimum wages
prescribed by Central Government and was working with respondent no.1. He was not given any
compensation before terminating his services on 27.10.2018. In his cross examination, he has further stated
that his salary used to be credited in his bank account. But he has not placed on record any bank account, in
which his salary was credited in order to enable this Court to see who was making payment to the workman.
However, there is no denial that the workman was paid salary by respondent no.2 (contractor). However, from
the agreement dated 05.07.2018 (Ex.R-2) placed on file by respondent no.1, it emerges that safai karamcharis
were provided by respondent no.2 (contractor) to work with respondent no.1. Thus, workman was employee of
respondent no.2 and not of respondent no.1 as has been discussed above. There does not exist any relationship
2352
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.1. However, there exists relation of
employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
20.
Admittedly, there is non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2. However, as
regards violation of other provisions i.e. Section 25G and 25H of the Act, there is no evidence lead by the
workman. Hence, workman is entitled for compensation from respondent no.2.
21.
It is also added here that there is no iota of evidence that any unfair labour practice used by
respondent no.1 by entering into contract with contractors for supply of safai karamcharis and agreement
executed between respondent no.1 and 2 cannot be said to be any unfair labour practice. So far as contentions
of AR for workman that the work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature and no domestic inquiry
was held before terminating the services of workman are concerned, in this regard, it is pointed out that
workman was entitled only for compensation under Section 25F of the Act by respondent no.2 (contractor) and
no domestic inquiry was required to be conducted. Merely because work is of perennial in nature does not
mean that any right has accrued in favour of the workman to get employment with respondent no.1, which is a
department of Civil Defence run by Government of India and for that regular recruitment procedure is
provided. Workman cannot seek backdoor entry into service. Moreover, workman is not employee of
respondent no.1 being employee of respondent no.2 (contractor).
22.
In view of above discussion, it is held that since respondent no.2 (contractor) is currently not
working with respondent no.1, so keeping in view the tenure of service rendered by the workman and salary
given to him during the period of his stay with the contractor and non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act,
this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that workman is entitled for compensation.
23.
Keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the present case, the following scheme of
compensation is deemed fit by this Tribunal:
i.
Workman who worked for less than 2 years with contractor shall be entitled for Rs.20,000/-.
ii.
Workman who worked for more than 2 years but less than 5 years with contractor shall be entitled
Rs.30,000/-.
iii.
Workman who worked for more than 5 years with contractors shall be entitled for Rs.50,000/-.
24.
Present workman employed on 05.07.2015 and was terminated on 27.10.2018 (More than 2 years
and less than 5 years), so he is entitled for Rs.30,000/-.
25.
Respondent no.2 is directed to pay the workman Rs.30,000/- within one month from the date of the
notification of the award failing which the respondent no.2 shall further pay interest @6% per annum from the
date of award till the date of making payment. It is also added here that in case respondent no.1 requires safai
karamcharis, then workman may be engaged through any contractor on sympathetic ground.
26.
Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17
of the Act.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 496.—औद्योजगक fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 (a1947 dk 14) dh /kkjk 17 ds vuqlj.k esa dsUnzh; ljdkj
प्रिासजनक कमांडर मु्यालय (नागररक रक्षा), ृंचकुला ds izca/kr=] lac) fu;kstdksa vkSj muds deZdkjksa ds chp vuqca/k esa
fufnZ’V औद्योजगक fookn esa dsUnzh; ljdkj औद्योजगक vf/kdj.k@Je U;k;ky; चंडीगढ़-I ds iapkV (42/2024) izdkf'kr
djrh gSA
[सं एल-12025/01/2026- vkbZ vkj (ch-I)-77]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 496.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. 42/2024) of the Cent.Govt.Indus.Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
Chandigarh-I as shown in the Annexure, in the industrial dispute between the management of Admn. Commander
Head Quarter ( Civil Defence), Panchkula and their workmen.
[L-12025/01/2026- IR(B-I)-77]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2353
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH
(Present:- Mr. Kamal Kant, PO-cum-Link Officer).
ID No. 42/2024
Registered on:-16.10.2019
Munni Devi W/o Sh. Balbir R/o Rampur Seuri, Kalka, Panchkula, Haryana.
-------- Workman
Versus
1. Admn. Commander Station Head Quarter (Civil Defence), Chandi Mandir Cantt. Panchkula, Haryana.
2. M/s A.A. Foundation For safety, Head Office-5919, DLF City, Face-4, Gurugaon-122022.
----Respondents
Present:-
Sh. Jang Bahadur, AR for workman.
Sh. Satinder Singh, AR for respondent no.1.
Respondent no.2 already ex parte.
Award :10.03.2026
1.
Workman has filed the present claim petition under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter called the Act) against her termination w.e.f. 27.10.2018 claiming reinstatement into service along
with continuity of service and full back wages.
2.
It is maintained by the workman in the claim petition that that she was appointed as sweeper/safai
karamchari on 01.09.2018 by respondent no.1 at minimum wages prescribed by the Central Government. But
the said minimum wages were never paid to her. Management has unlawfully deducted 12% EPF share, 1.75%
ESI and Rs.300/- as TDS from his salary despite of the fact that her total wages comes under the ambit of tax
free limit. She was working under respondent no.1 directly, but respondent no.1 in order to avoid its liability
always shows his employment in record under different contractors, which tantamount to unfair labour
practice.
3.
It is further maintained that workman including 200 other safai karamcharis of respondent no.1 raised the
demand for non-deduction of TDS from the wages paid by respondent no.1. However, their demand was not
accepted. Other workers working under respondent no.1 formed union and subsequently her services were
dispensed with w.e.f. 27.10.2018. It is further maintained that the workman has completed 240 days in the
preceding year from the date of her termination. It is also maintained that respondent no.1 retained juniors in
service and also made fresh appointments after termination of her services and no compensation was paid
under Section 25F of the Act. Thus, there is violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act. Hence this
petition.
4.
Notice of the petition was given to respondents.
5.
Respondent no.1 filed reply to the claim petition maintaining therein that the workman has not come to
the Court with clean hands as she was appointed as sweeper by respondent no.2 (contractor) at minimum wage
rate as prescribed by the Central Government. As per Government Policy dated 18.03.2011 (Ex.R-1), Non-
Cantonment Military Stations have been authorized to outsource conservancy safaiwala. The answering
respondent entered into contract with various private agencies for outsourcing of sweepers (safaikaramcharis).
In July 2018, the answering respondent entered into contract with M/s AA Foundation for safety and M/s
Sunrise Facilitator Pvt. Ltd. through e-tendering for outsourcing of safaikaramcharis to provide conservancy
services in ChandiMandir Military Station for the financial year 2018-19. Respondent no.2 submits bill for
payment for the days the safaikaramcharis performed their duties and answering respondent is only responsible
to forward these bills to PCDA Western Command Chandigarh to release payment directly to the contractor‘s
account. Salary is paid to the workman by the contractor. Compliance of PF, ESI Rules etc. is carried out by
the contractor as per contract agreement. Answering respondent has no responsibility of disbursement of
wages and deduction of EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safaikaramcharis formed union in the
headquarter, which is not permitted and also carried out demonstration inside the premises of Station
Headquarter on 27.10.2018 and failed to perform his duties. Thereafter, answering respondent asked
respondent no.2 to ask the workers to perform their duties. Answering respondent has no role or responsibility
for termination services of the workman. There is no relationship of employer and employee between the
answering respondent and the workman. In view of Army Headquarter Letter, the civilian employees of the
2354
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
answering respondent cannot organize themselves into trade unions as station headquarter is an administrative
office of the Government of India. In spite of that, workman along with other safaikaramcharis formed union
unauthorizedly and indulge in unlawful activities. It is maintained that workman is the employee of contractor
and therefore, termination is the prerogative of the contractor. It is prayed that the claim be dismissed.
6.
It is pertinent to mention here that respondent no.2 was proceeded ex parte on 07.05.2024.
Evidence of workman:-
7.
In order to prove his case, workman examined himself as WW1 and tendered into evidence his affidavit
WW1/A and has been cross examined by the AR for respondent no.1. AR for workman closed the evidence on
22.07.2024.
Evidence of respondent no.1:-
8.
Respondent no.1 examined Colonel K P Singh S/o Late Colonel P. P. Singh, OIC, Civic Cell, Station
Head Quarter, ChandiMandir Panchkula as MW1, who tendered into evidence his affidavit Ex.MW1/A along
with documents Ex.R1 to Ex.R4. AR for respondent no.1 closed the evidence on 29.01.2026.
Sr. No.
Document
Dated
Exhibit
1.
Policy
18.03.2011
Ex.R-1
2.
Agreement with respondent no.2
05.07.2018
Ex.R-2
3.
Copy of ECR of EPFO
Ex.R-3
4.
Letter of Head Quarter
22.04.1980
Ex.R-4
Submissions of workman:-
9.
While arguing the case, AR for workman contended that in this case, workman was appointed by
respondent no.1 under a camouflage agreement with respondent no.2. The workman was appointed directly by
respondent no.1 on 01.09.2018 as sweeper and her services were dispensed with on 27.10.2018 without any
reason in violation of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act as no compensation was paid to the workman and
junior to him were retained in service and fresh appointment were made after termination of the workman. So
far as the agreements between the respondent no.1 & 2 are concerned, they are totally not tenable and is unfair
labour practice. The work performed by the workman is of perennial in nature. The contractor was not having
any license. The contractor has left after three months. No domestic inquiry was held before terminating the
service of the workman, which is mandatory under the Act.
Submissions of respondent no.1:-
10.
On the other hand, AR for respondent no.1 contended that the workman was engaged by respondent
no.2 (contractor) as per agreement executed between respondent no.1 & 2 on outsource basis and there is no
relationship of employer and employee between respondent no.1 and the workman. Wages were paid by the
respondent no.2 to the workman and there was no role of respondent no.1 in appointing or terminating the
services of the workman. Workman is employee of respondent no.2. If there is any violation of provision of
the Act, then it is done by respondent no.2. As per Ex.R3, all dues were paid by the contractor with regard to
EPF and ESI etc. The workman and other safaikaramcharis formed union in the Headquarter, which is not
permitted as per Ex.R4. Respondent no.1 being the Government Agency, workman is trying to take benefit of
his appointment by respondent no.2 and has filed a false claim after concealing material facts and claim of the
workman is not maintainable.
11.
Moreover, it is also contended that the workman has worked for less than two months i.e. from
01.09.2018 to 27.10.2018, whereas, workman has pleaded that she has worked for 240 days in the preceding
years from the date of her termination.
12.
I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by AR for both the parties.
Findings:-
13.
The first contention regarding the applicant is that whether applicant comes within the definition of
workman as is defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. I may mention that applicant was appointed as sweeper as
per his claim petition and affidavit submitted before the Tribunal. In plain words the applicant was performing
his duties as labourer/unskilled worker. She was not in supervisory or administrative post requiring him to
perform only administrative duties. While interpreting Section 2(s) Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of
Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur, AIR 2011 Supreme Court 2532,has observed as follows:-
“The source of employment, the quantum of recruitment, the terms & conditions of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2355
employment/ contract of service, the quantum of wages/ pay and mode of payment are
not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a workman within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time and part time employee or a person appointed on contract
basis. There is nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be
inferred that only person employed on regular basis or a person employed for doing
whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or contract
basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a
workman.”
14.
Thus Hon‘ble Supreme Court has clarified that the definition of workman also does not make any
distinction between full time or part time employee or a person appointed on contract basis. There is nothing in
plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be infer that only person employed on regular basis or a
person employed for doing whole time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part time or
contract basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a workman. In
view of the ratio of law enunciated in the above ruling, in my considered opinion the applicant herein
admittedly falls within the definition of ‗workman‘ under Section 2(s) of the Act.
15.
The Hon‘ble Supreme Court after analyzing the catena of cases has laid down in Balwant Raj Saluja
Vs. Air India Limited in Civil Appeal No.10266 dated 25.08.2014, two well recognized tests to find out
whether the labours are the contract employees of the principal employer are:-
1) Whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of contractor and
2) Whether the principal employer controls and supervise the work of the employees?
16.
The facts regarding the payment of salary by the management or contractor has not been stated in the
claim petition of the workman. In fact, claim petition is totally silent regarding the payment of wages, salary,
letter of appointment by respondent no.1 or by contractor or anything likewise. Thus, this basic feature for
holding the relationship of employer and employee i.e. between respondent no.1 and workman totally lacking
not in the pleading but also in the evidence submitted by the workman. However, MW1 Colonel K P Singh in
his cross examination has stated that it is responsibility of the contractor to pay monthly wages to the
conservancy staff provided by him. Respondent no.1 has nothing to do with the minimum wages, DC rate to
the conservancy staff. Contractor is responsible to give notice to the conservancy staff provided by him.
Respondent no.1 has no roll in terminating the services of the workman. Thus, it was the respondent no.2 who
was required to ensure the payment of wages to the workers engaged by him from time to time.
17.
It is also added here that respondent no.1 has also placed on record documents Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-4. Ex.R-2
is the contract agreement between respondent no.1 & 2. Thus, from the adduced evidence, it emerges that
workman was paid salary by the contractor and she was being controlled and supervised by the contractor.
Thus, there does not exist any relationship of employee and employer between the workman and respondent
no.1. However, there exists relation of employee and employer between the workman and respondent no.2.
18.
It is also added here that as per definition of contractor as given in the Section 2(c) of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter called as Contract Act), respondent no.2 was
supplying contract labour to the respondent no.1. Thus, respondent no.2 would fall under the definition of
contractor. Section 2(c) of the Contract Act is reproduced as under:
“Contractor”, in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to
produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or
articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies
contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor;
19.
The Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Banglore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa
1978(36) FLR 266 dealt at length with the ambit and scope of expression ―industry‖ as defined in Section 2(j)
of the Act, and has laid down triple test for determining whether a particular establishment is industry or not.
The triple test is where (a) systematic activity (b) organized by cooperation between employer and employee
(the direct and substantial element is commercial (c) for the production or distribution of goods and services to
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes prima facie is an ―Industry‖ in that enterprise. The workman was
doing work i.e. systematic activity for respondent no.1 at the asking of respondent no.2 and there was
cooperation between the workman and respondent no.2, which involve substantial commercial element for
rendering service to satisfy human wants. Thus, respondent no.2 would be termed as industry.
20.
Workman has pleaded that she was appointed on 01.09.2018 and her services were terminated w.e.f.
27.10.2018. This fact has also been pleaded by her in her affidavit. How she has worked 240 days in the
preceding year of her termination on 27.10.2018 is not at all understandable. The workman has filed a false
affidavit before the Court regarding her claim for working for 240 days in preceding year from the date of her
termination.
2356
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
21.
However, as regards violation of other provisions i.e. Section 25G and 25H of the Act, there is no
evidence lead by the workman.
22.
In view of the above findings that workman has filed false affidavit regarding her working for 240 days
in the preceding year from the date of her termination on 27.10.2018, her claim petition is not at all
maintainable and therefore, the claim petition is dismissed.
23.
Let copy of this award be sent to Central Government for publication as required under Section 17 of the
Act.
KAMAL KANT, Presiding Officer-cum-Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 497.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार मेससच आंजडयन ऑयल ब्लेंहडग जलजमटेड; मेससच लतीफ़ एंड संस के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और ृेरोजलयम
कमचारी संघ के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-2, मुंबइ, ृंचाट
(ररफरेन्स न.- 53/2010) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी
के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. एल-30011/8/2010-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 497.— In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 53/2010) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-2, Mumbai as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to M/s. Indian Oil Blending Ltd; M/s. Latif & Sons and Petroleum Employees’ Union which was
received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. L-30011/8/2010-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE JUSTICE RETIRED SHIV SHANKER PRASAD
PRESIDING OFFICER/LINK OFFICER
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.2, MUMBAI
PRESENT
JUSTICE RETIRED SHIV SHANKER PRASAD
Presiding Officer/Link Officer
REFERENCE NO. CGIT-2/53 of 2010
EMPLOYERS IN RELATION TO THE MANAGEMENT OF
Party No.1 (i) M/s. Indian Oil Blending Ltd.,
(now known as M/s. IOC Ltd.)
Indian Oil Bhavan,
Bandra (East),
Mumbai 400 051.
(ii) The Chief Terminal Manager,
M/s. Indian Oil Blending Ltd.,
(now known as M/s. IOC Ltd.)
Pir Pau, Trombay,
Bombay 400074.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2357
(iii) The Plant Manager,
M/s. Indian Oil Blending Ltd.,
(now known as M/s. IOC Ltd.)
D-100, T.T.C. Industrial Area,
Kukshit Village,
Vashi,
Navi Mumbai 400 705.
(iv) M/s. Latif & Sons,
Plot No.44, Shop No.7,
Post Office Road,
Shivaji Nagar, Govandi,
Mumbai 400 043.
AND
THEIR WORKMEN.
Party No. 2 (Petroleum Employees’ Union)
The Secretary General,
Petroleum Employees‘ Union
Tel Rasayan Bhavan, Tilak Road,
Dadar (E),
Mumbai- 400 014.
APPEARANCES:
Management No.1, 2 & 3 : Ms. Jayashree Kumar
Advocate
Management No.4
:
No appearance
Workmen
: No appearance.
AWARD
(Delivered on 19-12-2025)
1.
This Reference has been made by the Central Government in exercise of powers under clause (d) of sub-
section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, vide Government of India,
Ministry of Labour & Employment, New Delhi, order No. L-30011/8/2010 (IR(M) dated 21.05.2010. The terms of
reference given in the schedule are as follows:
“1. Whether the Contract between the contractor M/s. A. Latif & Sons, Mumbai and the management of erstwhile
Indian Oil Blending Ltd., (now known as M/s. IOC Ltd.) is sham and bogus and is a camouflage to deprive the
workmen namely (1) Shri Janardhan C. Patel, (2) Vasudev T. Koli (3) Arun R. Shelavale (4) Sopan B. More (5)
Jagannath V. Mhatre (6) Madan K. Patel and (7) Prashant M. Koli, from the benefits available to permanent workers
of erstwhile M/s. Indian Oil Blending Ltd. (now known as M/s. IOL Ltd.)?
2. Whether the above mentioned contract workmen should be declared as permanent workmen and wages and
consequential benefits be paid to concerned workmen?”
2.
The case is called out today. The Learned Counsel for the respondent Ms. Jayshree Kumar is present before
the Court, but no one is present on behalf of the petitioner. From perusal of record, it is apparent that, the petitioner is
not responding and attending the Court since 24.03.2015 long back. Although, Statement of Claim & Written
Statements have been filed by the parties respectively, but the petitioner has not filed any evidence to prove his case.
The petitioner is not coming to the Court since long back. It appears that, the petitioner is not interested to contest the
case furthermore. The claim of the petitioner is not proved. So, the case is closed.
Hence, it is ordered.
ORDER
1. The Contract between the contractor M/s. A. Latif & Sons, Mumbai and the management of erstwhile
Indian Oil Blending Ltd., (now known as M/s. IOC Ltd.) is not sham and bogus and is not a camouflage to
2358
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
deprive the workmen namely (1) Shri Janardhan C. Patel, (2) Vasudev T. Koli (3) Arun R. Shelavale (4) Sopan
B. More (5) Jagannath V. Mhatre (6) Madan K. Patel and (7) Prashant M. Koli, from the benefits available to
permanent workers of erstwhile M/s. Indian Oil Blending Ltd. (now known as M/s. IOL Ltd.).
2. The above mentioned contract workmen should not be declared as permanent workmen and wages and
consequential benefits be not paid to concerned workmen.
Date: 19-12-2025
Justice SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 498.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार महानगर गैस जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री दुगाचप्रसाद लालचंद कनौजजया के बीच ऄनुबंध में
जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-2, मुंबइ, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 57/2003) को जैसा दक
ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त
हुअ था l
[सं. एल -30012/32/2003-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 498.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 57/2003) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-2, Mumbai as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Mahanagar Gas Limited and Shri Durgaprasad Lalchand Kanojia which was received along with soft
copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. L-30012/32/2003-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE JUSTICE RETIRED SHIV SHANKER PRASAD
PRESIDING OFFICER/LINK OFFICER
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.2, MUMBAI
PRESENT
JUSTICE RETIRED SHIV SHANKER PRASAD
Presiding Officer/Link Officer
REFERENCE NO. CGIT-2/57 of 2003
EMPLOYERS IN RELATION TO THE MANAGEMENT OF
Party No.1 M/s. Mahanagar Gas Limited
Managing Director,
Mahanagar Gas Limited
Pay and Accounts Building
Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra (E)
Mumbai
AND
THEIR WORKMAN.
Party No.2 (Mr. Durgaprasad Lalchand Kanojia)
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2359
C/o. Aboo Talib, General Secretary,
1st Floor, 25/26, Pinjari Chawl,
K. K. Marg, Jacob Circle,
Mumbai- 400 011.
APPEARANCES:
Management
:
No appearance.
Workmen
: No appearance.
AWARD
(Delivered on 18-12-2025)
1.
This Reference has been made by the Central Government in exercise of powers under clause (d) of sub-
section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, vide Government of India,
Ministry of Labour & Employment, New Delhi, order No. L-30012/32/2003 (IR(M) dated 16.09.2003. The terms of
reference given in the schedule are as follows:
“Whether the action of the Mahanagar Gas Ltd., Mumbai in terminating the services of Mr. Durgaprasad Lalchand
Kanojia w.e.f. 7.12.1999 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workman entitled to?”
2.
The case is called out today. Both parties are absent. From perusal of record, it is apparent that, the petitioner
and his counsel are not responding and attending the Court since 08.03.2022. Today, both parties are absent. One
application dated 09.07.2024 has been moved by the respondent for passing of dismissal order in the absence of the
petitioner as well as non-compliance of the order of this court. Although, Statement of Claim and Written Statements
have been filed by the parties respectively, but no other evidence has been filed by the petitioner to prove his case.
The petitioner is not coming to the Court since long back. It appears that, the petitioner is not interested to contest the
case furthermore. The claim of the petitioner is not proved. So, the case is closed.
Hence, it is ordered.
ORDER
The action of the Mahanagar Gas Ltd., Mumbai in terminating the services of Mr. Durgaprasad Lalchand
Kanojia w.e.f. 7.12.1999 is legal and justified. The concerned workman is not entitled to any relief.
Date: 18-12-2025
Justice SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 499.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार मेससच एचृीसीएल ऑटो केयर सेंटर; मेससच जविाल एंटरप्राआजेज के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री ऄिोक
दयािंकर जत्रृा ी के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1, मुंबइ, ृंचाट
(ररफरेन्स न.- 01/2025) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट
कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-13]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 499.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 01/2025) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court-1, Mumbai as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to M/s HPCL Auto Care Centre; M/s Vishal Enterprises and Shri Ashok Dayashankar
Tripathi which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-13]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1,
MUMBAI
Present
2360
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR MISHRA
Presiding Officer
REFERENCE NO.CGIT-01 of 2025
Parties: Employers in relation to the management
1. HPCL Auto Care Centre
3/4, S.V. Road, Gurunanak Road, Bahndra(W),
Mumbai -400 050.
2. M/s . Vishal Enterprises
405, Amitk Court, Near mangla Talkies,
Shivaji Nagar,
Pune-411005.
V/s.
Shri Ashok Dayashankar Tripathi,
SP Road, SAngam Nagar, Wadala(East)
Mumbai-400 037.
Artificial Limb Centre Employees Union,
73, Wwanwarie Bazar,
Pune-411040.
Appearances:
For the first party Management
:
Mr. L‘Dousza(Adv.)
For the second party workmen
:
Absent
Mumbai, dated the 5th day of January, 2026.
AWARD
The present reference has been made by the Central Government by its order No. B.ALC©-I/8/(15)2023-B-2 dated
23/10/2024 passed in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of
Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947. The terms of reference as per the schedule to the said order are as
under:
“Whether the termination of service of Shri Ashok Dayashankar Tripathi by M/s Vishal Enterprises,
Contracotr of M/s. HPCL Auto Care Centre(T&E) is legal and justified? If not, what relief the workman is
entitled to?” ”
In view of the above said facts the claimant/workman has not field any statement of claim/ evidence in support of his
case on affidavit, in spite of several opportunities given to him and taking into consideration the law as laid by the
Hon'ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (1) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove illegality of the
order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must fail. Whenever a workman
raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is imperative for him to file written statement
before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence
to prove his case. If the workman fails to appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred
by the State Government cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon‘ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd., V.K. Raj
Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1984 (49) FLR 38 and
Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of any evidence led by or on behalf of the
workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court against the workman. In such a situation it is not
necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation
made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon‘ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519;
The Second party workmen by its application dated 01.04.2025 desired to withdraw the present dispute and prayed
that the second party workmen be allowed to withdraw the dispute.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2361
The application is allowed. As such the reference is disposed of for want of prosecution.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and the workman is not entitled for any relief.
Accordingly, the reference stands answered in terms aforesaid.
Award as above.
Justice ARVIND KUMAR MISHRA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 500.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय सरकार
एयरृोटच ऄथॉररटी ऑफ़ आंजडया के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और मोहम्मद गौस, सुृरवाआज़र के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट
केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 54/2012) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक
में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. एल-11011/4/2012-अइअर(एम)]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 500.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government
hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 54/2012) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour
Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation to Aiports
Authoritys of India and Mohd Gouse, Supervisor which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. L-11011/4/2012-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT AT
HYDERABAD
Present: Sri IRFAN QAMAR
Presiding Officer
Dated the 6th day of January 2026
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE No. 54/2012
Between:
Mohd Gouse Supervisor (Lifts)
Airports Authority of India
Hyderabad Airport 500016.
….. Petitioner
AND
Airport Director,
Aiports Authoritys of India,
Hyderbad Airport 500016.
…. Respondent
Appearances:
For the Petitioner : Sri Mohd. Ghouse, Advocate
For the Respondent: M/s. A.K.Jayaprakash Rao, Govind &
Venkatesh Dixit, Advocate
AWARD
The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order No. L-11011/4/2012-IR(M) dated 11th September
2012 has referred the Industrial Dispute under section 10(1)(d) of the I.D. Act, 1947 for adjudication by this Tribunal
to the following fact.
SCHEDULE
2362
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
―Whether the action of the management of Airport Director Begumpet Airport Hyderabad unchanging
service conditions of the workman Shri Md. Gouse Sr. Assistant (Lift) is legal and justified? What relief the
workman is entitled to?‖
After receiving the schedule, it was registered as I.D. No. 54/2012 and notices were served upon the parties.
petitioner has filed the claim statement with the averment that on 23.03.2008 at 00.00 hours the Commercial
operations of International Airport were shifted to Rajiv Gandhi International Airport at Shamshabad without notice,
without informing to the workmen and not following Provisions of sec 9A of the I.D Act. It resulted into a lot of
hardship to the workmen and adversely affected the service conditions of the workmen. Petitioner has filed the cases
for protection of service conditions of the workman as member of AAWU and Branch secretary of the union Branch
at Hyderabad.
Petitioner workmen has filed 2K petition before ALC for not extending the facilities for three shifts, 64 hours O. T,
night duty wages, shift timings, change of weekly off and deploying one shift in general duty vide schedule IV Item
No. 4,5,6,8,11 under sec 9A. Conciliation meetings went on till Nov.2008.There was no settlement, or no failure
report was sent. A complaint was filed under sec 33 A before ALC, and notice was issued to the employer
management. The management sought a letter that the workmen can be accommodated in other job also during
conciliation. This Petitioner gave the 3 options in the branches of Law, land, terminal. Management and he was
posted at ATM duty along with the lift operation duty vide duty roster of ATM and S.M.Elect vide office Note No
AAU/HY/ENGG(E) staff from 8.02.2009 with 64 hours O.T one day morning and one day evening duty with
Monday weekly off as agreed by the Senior Manager Law.. This continued up to 24th July 2010 the day on which the
claim statement was filed in I.D 18/2010 on 22.07.2010 on 24.07.2010 the Respondent was necked out of the ATM
duties by S.M terminal management. Then this Respondent filed a representation to the management and the R.L.C.
while performing lift duties with the same timings. The roaster was changed on 22.09.2010 changing all the agreed
terms before the A.L.C. Then the Respondent filed 2K petition before the R.L.C on 22.09.2010 file no 8/9/2008-09
and the matter could not settle and F.O.C report was sent to the Secretary Union Labour Ministry which was referred
to CGIT and it was taken as I.D 54 of 2012.
Airport Authority Kamgar Uinon AAKU) filed 2k petition this unions filed the cases for protection of
service conditions of the workmen settlement before A.LC as per the terms of the settlement u/s.12 (3) of ID
management agrees to arrange round the clock shift duties as per the previous practices for the workmen of the Engg.
And operational category admittedly I am in Engg. Service and according to AAI operational category Engg. Wing
shortage and there is to post of Superintend and Senior Supt (Lifts) as per the seniority list. For proper maintained
either O.T or Manpower required.
Petitioner submitted that he was working as workman Supervisor (Lifts) Technical block lifts since 1980 at
Begumpet, Hyderabad. I am Supervisor (Lifts) and I was authorized to operate and maintenance of Four (4) l8ifts and
Three (3) Escalators in airports authority of India which is a profit making Public Enterprise awarded with Mini-
Ratna Category- 1 award. This public Sector Enterprise is the profit making. In the year 2011 after tax increased the
profit has raised from Rs.712.29 crores to Rs. 846.39 crores. Employer alternation of condition of service during
pendency of proceedings of I.D.18 of 2012. Employer change the duties weekly off, place of duties, timing, starting
the shift withdrawal the Three Shifts, then two shifts then one shift now general shift from 9.30 AM to 5.30 PM 6
days week instead of 5 days and violation his own order vide NoAAI/SR/M/2-1(11)EH dtd 06-03-29 and withdrawal
over time, without intimation, contrary to sec 9 A of 1.D. Act and contrary of Sec.33 A and the direction of Jt. Genl.
Manager (Electrical), dtd: 26-03-2009 vide Ref. letter No. AAI/HY/Engg./(E) Staff and the order of ALC in file No.
8/9/2008-09. The applicant was troubled with three days on 19th 20th and 21 may 2010 for these three days the
applicant was shown as absent statement in June 2010 and 3 days C.L. was debited, for same three days H.L. was
debited and also same three days C. Off was debited and E.OL was. In the month of June 2010 pay was recover from
the salary.
The duty of Petitioner Mohd Ghouse was changed on 22-12-2008 not in accordance with section 9A of the
ID Act, and posted in general duty, an application for conciliation was filed before the RLC. During the conciliation
proceedings the Senior Law Manager, has given an undertaking that the applicant shall be posted in shift duty if he
agrees to a place posted at some other place. This applicant agreed and was posted on shift duty at the ATM on 08-02-
2009 with 64 hours over time, weekly off on Monday, and double duty on Sunday. One day morning M-6A.M to
1.P.M and next day Evening duty 2P.M to 10 P.M All of a sudden on 25-07-2010 while he was on duty in Terminal
Management he was asked to get out from the duty and was not given the roaster nor the reliving letter with a
direction where to report and not furnishing the Leave entitlement and Compensatory off.
That the management refused to take the workman on round the clock three shifts duties with effect from
26-07-2010 and informed him verbally that his A.T.M duty and over time were withdrawal and management
deployed a office Assistant non workman from land management section in my place and providing the facilities
available to him because he was local president of recognized union and started harassing workman it is violative of
item No 6 and 8 of schedule IV Su 9.A of 1.D.Act 1947. It is submitted that Both Terminal R.G.T. and NTR Earlier
There werel2L lift operator for three escalators and five lifts and now there are only one General shift have been
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2363
working without O.T and night wages with likewise Timing and weekly off. The workman belonging to the other
two unions are not treated at par with reference to the members of the recognized union. Their timely up-Gradations
were not given. They were changed from their duty places without information or notice and were troubled march at
the behest of the recognized union. There are many such sufferers and some of them are Mohd.Ghouse K.Veeriah,
C.Anjaiah. .T.L Satyanarayana and many other retired workmen and others.
Lift operators is in scale of Rs 330-10 as 1200-30 CDA scale has been changed as 2950-90-5400 so lift operators will
clubbed with other Cadre who are in 2950 scale whatever may call name implement as ratio 40; 30; 30; vide order no
pers/mpp/1106/99/2005 dt 31-5-07 in this connection, it is retreated that notional benefits due to restructuring will be
given from w.e.f 1-1-1997 in workmen there is no dying cadre at all in workmen they will be up graded in time bound
ways and higher pay scale will be given recruited on or before 1980 persons recruited in 1986 as electrical khlasi Non
I.T.L. Non Metric have got 4 to 5 up gradation to the level of senior superintends leaving these three original lift
operators as on 31-3-1995 on record 12 lift and escalators operators as on 31-3-1997.
Further, Petitioner claims that his primary duty is to Vide letter no AAI/HY/AM (E) IN/LIFTS Dated
7.7.1999 operation of lifts and Escalator at Hyderabad Airport. the lift operator shall be responsible for operation and
maintenance of lifts and escalator available at N.T.R. Domestic Terminal, R.G.T. and technical block at Hyd Airport
the lift operator should be available at R.G.T. during working hours and shall attend to Emergency calls and V.VIP
moments.
S NO 8 Srinivas D Deployed as ATM duty in place of the petitioner because he was Local Branch President of
Recognized Union
Petitioner submitted that he belongs to Classified regular Division therefore my post is nontransferable in
nature, and I was absorbed with the Airport Authority of India on 01/07/1990 along with 1700 personnel working
with my erstwhile department. My name was sponsored by the regional employment exchange technical along with
56 candidates for two sanctioned post 1 It is therefore prayed that authority may be pleased to direct the Respondent
to restore to the position of this Workman to the position with anti to dt 23-03-2008 or 25-07-2010 which he was
performing shifts duties since 15-05-1980 and 08-02-2009 as lift. operator and A.T.M.
3.
Per contra, Respondent has filed the counter. Therein, Respondent has contended that, the allegations of
workman that this Respondent Management adopted unfair labour practice and changed the service conditions is
devoid of any truth and the said allegations were made by the workman only for self-serving purpose. This
Respondent humbly submits that the workman has filed Claim Statement and traversed beyond the scope of the
reference, referring to various other cases which has no relevance to the present case and the workman is in the habit
of creating disputes and harassing the management and disturbing the peace in the administrative office. service
conditions of the workman as alleged and this Respondent Management has not violated any provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act. This Respondent respectfully submits that on 23-03-2008 the commercial operations of
International Airport were shifted to Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad. This Respondent further
submits that the workman union and some other unions filed Writ Petitions before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra
Pradesh with regard to shifting of Airport and the Hon'ble High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions on 06-07-2009
stating that their service conditions were not altered. It is respectfully submitted that the Begumpet Airport is still in
operation and its employees are performing their duties at Begumpet Airport. It is further submitted that the workman
is always in the habit of misleading and misrepresenting the facts of the case and also misguiding the other workmen,
thereby creating industrial unrest. This Respondent further submits that the workman has no locus-standee of filing
the cases by showing him as Union representative or Branch Secretary of Airports authority of India Workers Union.
This Respondent further submits that there is no intimation to the management that the workman is Branch Secretary
to the Airports authority of India Workers Union and said This Respondent respectfully submits that there is no
change in the union was not recognized by the management. This Respondent submits that the Begumpet Airport of
Hyderabad was closed for commercial aircraft operations which were shifted to Shamshabad Airport vide Central
Govt. Notification dated 10-03-2008. It is further submitted that both the terminal buildings-NTR Terminal building
and Rajiv Gandhi Terminal building are not operated, as there are no commercial passenger movements from
Begumpet Airport. Therefore, the escalators those Terminal Buildings are not functioning for passenger Therefore,
the workman was transferred from Hyderabad to Rajahmundry Airport by order dated 23-08-2012 and he was
relieved from his duty, but he failed to report for duty at Rajahmundry till this day. This Respondent further submits
that the workman has filed Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh questioning the transfer
order and the Hon'ble High Court did not grant any order in his favour and ultimately the workman has withdrawn the
Writ Petition No.27455 of 2012 and the same was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 19-09-2013 and the Hon'ble
High Court did not grant any liberty to the workman.
This Respondent submits that consequent to the closure of commercial operations at Begumpet Airport, only
the departments like ATM,CNS, Engineering, Land Management, Commercial, Finance, HR and Fire Services etc.,
are functioning with employees numbering approximately 100 are working. This Respondent further submits that the
workman was working as Lift Operator and due to the shifting of commercial operations from Begumpet to
Shamshabad, no lift is required and hence the workman was transferred to Rajahmundry Airport.
2364
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
This Respondent submits that the allegation of workman with regard to study leave, it is submitted that there
is no provision under the Airports Authority of India Leave Rules and Regulations for granting study leave. This
Respondent further submits that the workman has been absorbed purely on technical basis for operating lifts.
Therefore, his services cannot be utilized in any other filed. This Respondent submits that the case law referred by the
workman has no relevance to facts and circumstance or case of workman.
This Respondent submits that since the commercial operations were shifted to Shamshabad, there is no requirement of
Lift Operators. Therefore, this Respondent did not extract any overtime and night wages are not the matter of right of
the workman until and unless the workman does overtime and night duties. This Respondent, therefore, humbly
submits that the workman does not have legal or vested right to claim any wages for overtime and night allowance.
This Respondent further denies the allegation of the workman that he was discriminated among the other two unions
and the workman is put to strict proof of the same.
This Respondent submits that the workman was absorbed from CPWD from 01-07-1990 with the option of
abiding by the terms and conditions of Public Sector Undertaking with prescribed medical facilities and other staff
welfare-oriented schemes in this National Airports Authority of India. This Respondent submits that the CGHS
facility available with the Central Govt., le., CPWD the workman can directly approach CPWD what are the
subscriptions that were deducted from his portion of salary. This Respondent respectfully submits that no amount has
been deducted towards CGHS, and therefore this Respondent is not liable to extend 4 facility/2 0 arty.
This Respondent submits that the workman is claiming the higher scale of pay and the reference herein is
only in respect of change of service condition. Therefore, the workman is stopped from making any claim other than
the reference.
Further, it is contended that allegation of the workman that Mr. Srinivas was deployed as ATM duty in place
of the petitioner, because he was local president of recognized union, is absolutely incorrect. Petitioner has no legal or
vested right to question the administrative functions and cannot dictate term to the Respondent Management.
Therefore, prayed to answer the reference, rejecting the claim statement of the workman.
In support of claim statement, petitioner has filed Chief statement affidavit of WW1 and also filed
photocopies of the document. On the other hand, Respondent has filed Chief affidavit of the witness MW1.
Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
Ongoing pleading of both the parties following issues emerged for determination in the present case: -
1. Whether the action of management of Airport director, Begumpet Airport, Hyderabad, in changing the
service condition of the workman, Shri Mohammad Ghouse, Senior Assistant Lift, is legal and justifiable?
2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed?
Findings: -
Issue No.I:-
In support of the averment made in the claim statement, petitioner in oral evidence has submitted his own
Chief statement affidavit and therein he has reiterated the averment made in the claim statement. Petitioner witness
was cross-examined by the Respondent Counsel and in cross-examination WW1 has stated that it is true that in chief
examination he has not marked any document, although he has submitted list of documents along with the claim
statement. Further, witness admits that it is true that he has not mentioned what service conditions have been changed
by the Respondent. Further, in reply to the question by the Respondent that what changes of service condition made
by the Respondent the Petitioner witness WW1 state that at the Airport, its employees working as shift-duty round the
clock 24/7 as on today continuing in Begumpet Airport without change of any salary, workplace, or overtime
allowances. Further, witness states that it is true that whenever worker is working overtime, Respondent used to pay
the overtime wages. Further, witness states that at Begumpet Airport, VIPs and commercial flights are coming and
landing. Further, witness state that it is not true to suggest that Respondent is not extracting overtime and night work
from the workers, and that they are not entitled to any allowances. It is not true to suggest that there is no change of
service condition due to the change of Airport from Begumpet to Shamshabad.
Thus, petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim by oral or documentary evidence about the change in the
service condition due to shifting of the commercial flights from the Begumpet Airport to Shamshabad Airport.
Further, petitioner has failed to specify and establish by evidence that what are those service conditions of the
Petitioner that has been changed to the prejudice of the interest of the Petitioner. Petitioner failed to produce any oral
or documentary evidence on record in support of his claim about change in service condition. However, Petitioner
witness has admitted in cross examination that they are doing the same work and are being paid as in the past.
Moreover, Respondent has filed chief statement affidavit of the witness MW1, wherein the witness has
reiterated the contention made in the counter. This witness was cross-examined by the petitioner and in his cross-
examination, witness states that, due to official requirement, only one lift is in use for the terminal building, and the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2365
technical block lift is working till date for operational purposes. Further, Respondent witness state that it is not true to
say that even today ATC works around the clock but work only for operational requirements. Furthermore, MW1
states that it is not true that the petitioner has illegally transferred and changed his service condition, but his transfer
was on administrative grounds. Further, suggestion was given to the witness that only support the rival union,
petitioner has been transferred to Rajmundry has been denied by the witness. Further, witness state that at Rajmundry
there is no lift, but a conveyor belt post exists at the Rajmundry airport.
Thus, on appreciation of evidence of by either parties, I am constrained to come to conclusion that the
petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim of a change in his service condition. However, the petitioner Sri. Gouse
Mohd has attained the age of superannuation on 30. 06.2014 and retired and has settled all his claims with
Respondent Management. Therefore, claim of the Petitioner has become infructuous as no cause of action survives on
account of his retirement, and no relief could be granted to the petitioner. Thus, petitioner had attained the age of
superannuation on 30th June 2014 and has settled all his claims with the Respondent. Therefore, dispute relating to the
petitioner's claim about change in service conditions anted dated 23rd March 2008 has become infructuous and with
retirement of Petitioner from service after attaining superannuation age, the employer-employee relationship between
Petitioner and Respondent has come to an end and remedies of service law like change in service condition are
generally prospective and tied to active service. Therefore, this court cannot typically order to be place in a specific
active-duty post or reverse the past order as if the employer was still in service.
Therefore, in view of the foregone discussion I am constrained to hold that the action of the Respondent
management of the Airport director, Begumpet Airport, is legal and justified, as the petitioner failed to substantiate
his claim regarding change in service condition. Further, due to retirement of Petitioner after attaining the age of
superannuation on 30.06.2014. the cause of action with referred dispute does not service hence became infructuous.
This issue is decided against the petitioner.
Issue No. II: -
In view of the discussion and findings given at point no. 1 Petitioner is not entitled to any relief and
claim statement filed by the Petitioner deserved to be dismissed.
AWARD
The action of the management of Airport Director, Begumpet Airport Hyderabad is held legal and justified. The
claim petition sans merit stands dismissed. Reference is answered accordingly.
Award is passed accordingly. Transmit.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected, and signed by me on this
the 6th day of January 2026.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri Mohd. Gouse
MW1: Sri Christopher James Manuel
Documents marked for the Petitioner
NIL
Documents marked for the Respondent
NIL
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 501.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार जेृी जहमाचल सीमेंट ग्राआंहडग एंड ब्लेंहडग यूजनट जलजमटेड; ऄल्राटेक सीमेंट जलजमटेड के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध
जनयोजकों और श्री ृंकज कुमार के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय-1,
चंडीगढ़, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 53/2015) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय
सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/04/2025-अइअर(एम)-14]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
2366
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 501.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 53/2015) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-1, Chandigarh as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to JAYPEE Himachal Cement grinding & Blending Unit Ltd; Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. and Shri Pankaj
Kumar which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-14]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-I,
CHANDIGARH
(Present:- Mr. Kamal Kant, Presiding-cum-Link Officer).
ID No. 53/2015
Registered on:-29.03.2016
Pankaj Kumar S/o Sh. Rattan Lal R/o Village Behni, P.O. Masswal, Tehsil Anandpur Sahib, Distt. Rupnagar.
-------- Workman
Versus
1.
General Manager, JAYPEE Himachal Cement grinding & Blending Unit Ltd. Village, Bagheri, Distt. Solan
(H.P).
2.
Managing Director, Ultra Tech Cement Ltd, through Registered Office at B Wing, Ahura Centre, 2nd Floor,
Mahakali Caves Road, Andheri (East) Mumbai-400093.
----Respondents
Present :-
Sh. R P Rana, AR for Workman.
Sh. S C Gupta, AR for Respondent No.1 and 2.
Award/Order : 09.01.2026
1.
Workman has filed the present claim petition under Section 2(A) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947
(hereinafter called as the Act) against termination dated 17.05.2015 claiming reinstatement into service along with
continuity of service and full back wages.
2.
In this case, an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on behalf of respondent
no.1 was filed for dropping the proceedings against it. It is maintained in the application that vide order dated
03.06.2024, Hon'ble National Company Law Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Prayagraj (hereinafter called as Hon'ble
NCLT, Allahabad) has appointed Resolution Professional (RP) of the management in case titled as ICICI Bank Ltd.
V/s Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. In the said case, Hon'ble NCLT, Allahabad has passed following observations:-
“102. As a necessary consequence of the moratorium in terms of Section 14, the following prohibitions are imposed,
which must be followed by all and sundry:
a.
the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including
execution of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority;
b.
Transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the corporate debtor any of its assets or any legal
right or beneficial interest therein;
c.
Any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of
its property including any action under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002;
d.
The recovery of any property by an owner or lessor, where such property is occupied by or in the possession
of the corporate debtor.
e.
It is further directed that the supply of essential goods or services to the corporate debtor as may be
specified, shall not be terminated or suspended or interrupted during the moratorium period.
f.
The provisions of Section 14(3) shall, however, not apply to such transactions as may be notified by the
Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator and to a surety in a contract of guarantee to a
corporate debtor.
g.
The order of moratorium shall have effect from the date of this order till completion of the corporate
insolvency resolution process or until this Bench approves the resolution plan under sub-section (1) of Section 31 or
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2367
passes an order for liquidation of the corporate debtor under Section 33 as the case may be."
3.
In view of the above, AR for Respondent No.1 contended that all the proceedings pending before any
Tribunal cannot go on against respondent no.1 and he prayed that reference my kindly be dropped in the interest of
justice.
4.
On the other hand, ld. counsel for workman contended that in this case, Jaypee Cement Company have been
bought by Ultratech vide tripartite agreement dated 29.06.2017. He further referred to para 3 of the tripartite
agreement executed by and between Jaypee Cement and Ultra Tech Cement, vide which Ultratech Cement company
had agreed that it shall bound and liable for all the liabilities, obligations and to run the project on the terms and
conditions as specified in the MOUs dated 09.07.2004, 18.08.2010. He thus contended that proceedings may not be
dropped and workman be allowed to continue with the case as all the liability of Jay Pee Cement has been take over
by Ultra Tech Cement as per tripartite agreement dated 29.06.2017.
5.
I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by AR for both the parties.
6.
The present claim statement has been filed by workman and now the workman wants to continue the present
case in view of the tripartite agreement executed between Jay Pee Cement and Ultratech Cement dated 29.06.2017.
However, in this regard, it is pointed out that ICICI Bank has gone before the Hon'ble NCLT, Allahabad for
liquidation of Jaypee Cement and Hon'ble NCLT, Allahabad vide order dated 03.06.2024 in the above mentioned
case, had stayed all the proceedings before any Tribunal as per para 102 as reproduced above. Now the effect of
tripartite agreement would be seen by the Hon'ble NCLT, Allahabad at while disposing of the petition of ICICI Bank.
Since all the proceedings have been stayed by Hon'ble NCLT, Allahabad as per Para 102 as reproduced above of its
order dated 03.06.2024 and it would be a futile exercise to proceed further with the present reference as all the
proceedings before this Tribunal had already been stayed by the Hon'ble NCLT, Allahabad.
7.
In view of this, the application is allowed and reference is dismissed. Workman can proceed further before
Hon'ble NCLT, Allahabad as per law.
8.
Let copy of this award be sent to the Appropriate Government as required under Section 17 of the Act for
publication. File after completion be consigned to the record room.
KAMAL KANT, PO-Cum-Link Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 502.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय सरकार मॉयल
की बालाघाट माआंस के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री राजेि भरतलाल नायक के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय
सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, जबलृुर, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- 55/2015) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. एल-27012/2/2015-अइअर(एम]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 502.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 55/2015) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court, Jabalpur as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in relation
to Balaghat Mines of MOIL and Shri Rajesh Bhratlal Nayak which was received along with soft copy of the
award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. L- 27012/2/2015-IR(M)]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, JABALPUR, (M.P.)
NO. CGIT/LC/ R/55/2015
Present: P.K.Srivastava
H.J.S.(Retd.)
Shri Rajesh Bhratlal Nayak,
Gandhi Ward, Near talkies cinema,
Mukam Post- Ramtaik, Tehsil- Ramtaik,
2368
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Distt.- Nagpur(MS)-Nagpur - 441106
Workman
Vs
The Mines Manager,
Balaghat Mines of MOIL,
PO- Bharveli, Tehsil & Distt.- Balaghat(MP),
Balaghat – 481102
Management
(JUDGMENT)
(Passed on this 10th day of December, 2025)
As per letter dated 05/06/2015 by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, the reference
has been made to this Tribunal under Section-10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‗Act’), now The
Industrial Relations Code 2020 (in short the Code) as per Notification No. L-27012/2/2015(IR(M)) dt. 05/06/2015.
The dispute under reference relates to:-
“क्या खान प्रबंधक बालाघाट माइन्स ऑफ मॉयल जलजमटेड, ृो.अ. भरवैली, तहसील व जजला - बालाघाट (मध्य प्रदेि)
द्वारा अवेदक श्री राजेि भरतलाल नायक, ृूवच ृीस रेट कामगार को ईनको ददये गये अरोृ-ृत्र क्रमांक
BGT/Aroppatra/4679, ददनांक 14/09/2005 ृर कोइ कायचवाही न कर ृुनः लगभग 13 वषों बाद अरोृ-ृत्र क्रमांक
39(1)/CS/BGT/13-14/853, ददनांक 18/06/2013 जारी कर ऄृने अदेि क्रमांक BGT/39/(1)73, ददनांक
08/09/2014 द्वारा सेवा से जन्काजसत करना ईजचत है? यदद नहीं तो कमचकार क्या ऄनुतोष ृाने का ऄजधकारी है ?”
After registering the case on the basis of reference, notices were issued to the parties. They appeared and
filed their respective statement of claim in defense.
The case of the workman is mainly that he was appointed on 06.11.1996 on compassionate ground, was
transferred from Mansor Mines were he was working to Bharveli Mines vide order of Management dated 02.12.1999
and was relieved on 08.12.1999 with a direction to report on at the place of his transfer. He could not report on place
of his transfer because he met an accident while shifting his family and received serious injuries. He informed the
Management about the accident and requested them to extend time for reporting at the place of transfer. He was
issued a charge-sheet on 14.09.2005 alleging him misconduct by way of unauthorizedly and willfully absenting
himself from work without any information to management or getting any leave sanctioned. According to him, he
submitted reply of the charge sheet. Management, issued a second charge sheet with same allegations on 18.06.2013
and conducted enquiry within one year without following principles of natural justice and rules. No opportunity of
cross-examination of witness was given to the Workman.
The case of the management is mainly that, they have panel of doctors, qualified enough to treat the sick
employees of management, the Workman never reported sick nor did he inform management about his sickness and
he did not submit any application for leave with medical certificates. He kept himself absenting for 5 years. He was
issued a charge sheet on 14.09.2005, he submitted reply to the charge sheet on 26.09.2005. Thereafter, he again
absented himself from duty without information for another 7 years and reported at workplace thereafter. He was
issued a second charge sheet with regard to his unauthorized absence from 09.12.1999 to 11.12.2012 on date
18.06.2013.
Charges against were as follows: -
Clause 29(A) (10):
Leaving work without permission.
Clause 29(B) (5):
Habitual late attendance and habitual absence without leave or without sufficient cause.
Clause 29(B) (9):
Habitual indiscipline.
Clause 29(B) (15
Continuous absence without permission or without satisfactory reason for more than 10 days.
He submitted his reply on 09.07.2013, considering his reply not sufficient, Management decided to conduct a
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2369
departmental enquiry in which the Workman participated.
Evidence of the management was taken on that date which was mainly documents. The Workman cross-examined
himself in the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 18.09.2013 holding the charges proved. The
Workman submitted reply of the show-cause notice issued to him and enquiry report on 26.11.2013 which was found
unsatisfactory and order of dismissal of his services was passed by Disciplinary Authority on 09.04.2013. Thus
according management there is no illegality or material irregularity of any kind in the enquiry.
Following preliminary issue was framed vide order dated 23.02.2024.
Whether the departmental enquiry conducted against the workman is a just, proper and legal?
Management filed and proved enquiry documents. They filed affidavit of its witness as his examination-in-chief. He
has been cross-examined by Workman Side.
The Workman filed his affidavit as his examination-in-chief he has been cross-examined by management.
On the basis of the arguments and record, preliminary issue was decided vide order dated 07.03.2025, holding the
departmental enquiry just, legal and proper. This order is part of this Award.
Following additional issues were framed thereafter:-
1. Whether the charges have been rightly held proved from evidence in enquiry?
2. Whether the punishment is proportionate to the charges?
3. Whether the workman is entitled to any relief?
No evidence was filed by any of the parties on additional issues.
I have heard arguments of Learned Counsel Mr. Uttam Maheswari for Workman and Learned Counsel Mr.
Neeraj Kewat for Management and have gone through the record. Management side has filed written submissions
also which are part of record. I have gone through the written submissions as well.
Additional Issue No.1,
Charges against the workman have been detailed earlier.
Case of management is that the workman first absented himself from 09.12.1999 till 11.07.2005 , he was issued
a charge sheet dated 14.09.2005 in this respect and submitted his written explanation in this respect but he did not
report on duty even thereafter till 11.12.2012, hence, repeated his misconduct which he had committed earlier. Thus,
the fresh charge with respect to unauthorized absence from 2005 to 2012 was added in the charge sheet and enquiry
proceeded. This pleading is supported from record. Hence, it cannot be said that the enquiry was initiated with
unexplained inordinate delay. In total, the workman has been alleged to have absented himself from duty
unauthorizedly and willfully without intimation or any leave sanctioned.
Perusal of record of enquiry shows that regarding his absence from 1999 to 2005, the workman took a case that
he was sick and had informed the management accordingly in his reply to the first charge sheet regarding his absence
from 2005 to 2012, the workman took a case that he was ill for the said period also, his this defense taken during
enquiry is not supported by medical evidence.
The Enquiry Officer found during his enquiry that the workman was transferred in the year 1999 and since
then he absented till 2012 and never reported on duty. It is also found during the enquiry that the establishment has its
own medical facilities, having qualified doctors and good hospital. The workman was required to avail this facility
which he did not.
The settled proposition of law with respect to proof of charges in a departmental enquiry is that the charges
need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt as they are required to be proved in a criminal trial.
Testing the evidence during the enquiry on these parameters, the charges are held to have been rightly
proved as recorded by the Enquiry Officer.
Additional issue No. 1 is answered accordingly.
Additional Issue No. 2,
The charges proved are unauthorized and wilful absence from workplace for 13 years. No employer can afford such
an employee. Hence, the punishment of dismissal from service is held not disproportionate to the charge proved.
Additional issue No. 2 stands answered accordingly.
Additional Issue No. 3,
On the basis of above discussion and findings, the workman is held entitled to no relief.
2370
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Additional issue No. 3 stands answered accordingly.
No other point was pressed.
In light of above discussion and findings, the reference is answered as follows.-
AWARD
“The action of management, M.O.I.L. Limited in terminating the services of workman, Rajesh Bharatlal Nayak on
the basis of charge sheet dated 18.06.2013 as mentioned in the reference, is held just, legal and proper and the
workman is held entitled to no relief. ”
No order as to cost.
DATE:- 10-12-2025
P.K. SRIVASTAVA, Presiding Officer
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 503.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय सरकार
राष्ट्रीय आस्ट्ृात जनगम जलजमट जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट; जमडफील्ड आंडस्ट्रीज जलजमटेड; मेससच ऋजषता एसोजसएट्स के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री के. ऄप्ृाला राजू के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं
श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- एमृी 57/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती
है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/03/2026-अइअर(एम)-55]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 503.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 57/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers
in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited; M/s Rishita
Associates and Shri K. Appala Raju which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-55]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 6th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 57/2017
Between:
K. Appala Raju,
S/o K. Sathyanarayan,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2371
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,444.92ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
2372
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 898 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,444.92ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent‘s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,444.92ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2375
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the
form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of
strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August
2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of
Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
―Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates‘ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
to the tune of Rs.83,444.92ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 23 and
against his name the total number of working days 898 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 23 name of the Petitioner, Sri K. Appala
Raju, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.83,444.92ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,444.92ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,444.92ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon‘ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2377
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon‘ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon‘ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
―2(00) ―retrenchment ―means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or‖
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2379
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,444.92ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
6th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri K. Appala Raju
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2381
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 504.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार राष्ट्रीय आस्ट्ृात जनगम जलजमट जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट; जमडफील्ड आंडस्ट्रीज जलजमटेड; मेससच ऋजषता
एसोजसएट्स के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री एम. कृ्णा के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक
ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- एमृी 58/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/03/2026-अइअर(एम)-56]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 504.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 58/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri M. Krishna which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-56]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 6th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 58/2017
Between:
M. Krishna,
S/o M. Narsing Rao,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,537.85ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 899 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,537.85ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2383
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent‘s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2385
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,537.85ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the
form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of
strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August
2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of
Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
―Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates‘ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.83,537.85ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No.72 and
against his name the total number of working days 899 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 72 name of the Petitioner, Sri M.
Krishna, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.83,537.85ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2387
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,537.85ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,537.85ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon‘ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon‘ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon‘ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2389
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No. 3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
―2(00) ―retrenchment ―means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or‖
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,537.85ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to
Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 6th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri M. Krishna
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2391
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
.Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 505.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार राष्ट्रीय आस्ट्ृात जनगम जलजमट जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट; जमडफील्ड आंडस्ट्रीज जलजमटेड; मेससच ऋजषता
एसोजसएट्स के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री के. ृोथु राजू के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक
2392
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- एमृी 59/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/03/2026-अइअर(एम)-57]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 505.— In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 59/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers
in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited; M/s Rishita
Associates and Shri K. Pothu Raju which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government
on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-57]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 6th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 59/2017
Between:
K. Pothu Raju,
S/o K. Appanna,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2393
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,073.23ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 894 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,073.23ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent‘s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2395
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,073.23ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
―Dear sir
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2397
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates‘ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.83,073.23ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 6 and
against his name the total number of working days 894 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 6 name of the Petitioner, Sri K. Pothu
Raju, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.83,073.23ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,073.23ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
2398
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,073.23ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon‘ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon‘ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2399
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon‘ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
―2(00) ―retrenchment ―means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or‖
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,073.23ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
6th day of January 2026
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2401
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri K. Pothu Raju
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 506.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार राष्ट्रीय आस्ट्ृात जनगम जलजमट जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट; जमडफील्ड आंडस्ट्रीज जलजमटेड; मेससच ऋजषता
एसोजसएट्स के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री डी. टाटा राव के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक
ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- एमृी 60/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/03/2026-अइअर(एम)-58]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 506.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 60/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri D. Tata Rao which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-58]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2403
Dated the 6th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 60/2017
Between:
D. Tata Rao,
S/o Appanna,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 61,178.00ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
2404
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 756 working days,
amounting to Rs. 61,178.00ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent‘s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2405
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
2406
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2407
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.61,178.00ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
―Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates‘ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
2408
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.61,178.00ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 45 and
against his name the total number of working days 756 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 45 name of the Petitioner, Sri D. Tata
Rao, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.61,178.00ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 61,178.00ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.61,178.00ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2409
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon‘ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon‘ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon‘ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
2410
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
―2(00) ―retrenchment ―means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or‖
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2411
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 61,178.00ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to
Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 6th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri D. Tata Rao
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
2412
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2413
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 507.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार राष्ट्रीय आस्ट्ृात जनगम जलजमट जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट; जमडफील्ड आंडस्ट्रीज जलजमटेड; मेससच ऋजषता
एसोजसएट्स के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री एम. सूयचनारायण के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- एमृी 61/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/03/2026-अइअर(एम)-59]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 507.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 61/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri M. Suryanarayana which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-59]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 6th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 61/2017
Between:
M. Suryanarayana,
S/o Gurumurthi,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
2414
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,816.62ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2415
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 902 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,816.62ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent‘s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2417
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,816.62ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the
form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of
strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August
2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of
Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
―Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates‘ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.83,816.62ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 56 and
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2419
against his name the total number of working days 902 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 56 name of the Petitioner, Sri M.
Suryanarayana, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is
shown as Rs.83,816.62ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General
Manager Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment
directly which is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August
2009 to 15th August 2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by
Respondent No.2 for release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral
and documentary evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent
No.3 as contract labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from
12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012 and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,816.62ps. towards full and final payment as terminal
benefit from Respondent No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that
Petitioner was engaged for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to
15.8.2012 to work in industry of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,816.62ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon‘ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
2420
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon‘ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon‘ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2421
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
―2(00) ―retrenchment ―means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or‖
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
2422
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,816.62ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to
Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 6th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri M. Suryanarayana
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2423
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 508.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार राष्ट्रीय आस्ट्ृात जनगम जलजमट जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट; जमडफील्ड आंडस्ट्रीज जलजमटेड; मेससच ऋजषता
एसोजसएट्स के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री बी. गोहवदा राव के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार
औद्योजगक ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- एमृी 62/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में
ददखाया गया है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/03/2026-अइअर(एम)-60]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
2424
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 508.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 62/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri B. Govinda Rao which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-60]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 6th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 62/2017
Between:
B. Govinda Rao,
S/o B. Suri babu,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2425
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,630.77ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 900 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,630.77ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent‘s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
2426
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2427
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,630.77ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the
form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of
strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August
2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of
Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
―Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2429
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates‘ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.83,630.77ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 57 and
against his name the total number of working days 900 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 57 name of the Petitioner, Sri B. Govinda
Rao, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.83,630.77ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,630.77ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,630.77ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon‘ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon‘ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2431
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon‘ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
―2(00) ―retrenchment ―means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or‖
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,630.77ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to
Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 6th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri B. Govinda Rao
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2433
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
2434
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 509.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार राष्ट्रीय आस्ट्ृात जनगम जलजमट जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट; जमडफील्ड आंडस्ट्रीज जलजमटेड; मेससच ऋजषता
एसोजसएट्स के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री के. गुरु मूर्मत के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक
ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- एमृी 63/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/03/2026-अइअर(एम)-61]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 509.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 63/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri K. Guru Murthy which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-61]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 63/2017
Between:
K. Guru Murthy,
S/o Guruvulu,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2435
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 76,289.85ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
2436
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 821 working days,
amounting to Rs. 76,289.85ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent‘s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2437
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.76,289.85ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2439
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the
form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of
strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August
2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of
Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
―Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates‘ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
2440
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.76,289.85ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 2 and
against his name the total number of working days 821 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 2 name of the Petitioner, Sri K. Guru
Murthy, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.76,289.85ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 76,289.85ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.76,289.85ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon‘ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2441
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon‘ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon‘ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
2442
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
―2(00) ―retrenchment ―means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or‖
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2443
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 76,289.85ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri K. Guru Murthy
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
2444
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नइ ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.अ. 510.—औद्योजगक जववाद ऄजधजनयम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के ऄनुसरण में, केन्रीय
सरकार राष्ट्रीय आस्ट्ृात जनगम जलजमट जविाखाृत्तनम स्ट्टील प्लांट; जमडफील्ड आंडस्ट्रीज जलजमटेड; मेससच ऋजषता
एसोजसएट्स के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध जनयोजकों और श्री एस. ऄप्ृा राव के बीच ऄनुबंध में जनर्ददष्ट केन्रीय सरकार औद्योजगक
ऄजधकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, हैदराबाद, ृंचाट (ररफरेन्स न.- एमृी 64/2017) को जैसा दक ऄनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया
है, प्रकाजित करती है जो केन्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉृी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुअ था l
[सं. जेड-16025/03/2026-अइअर(एम)-62]
सलोनी, ईृ जनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2445
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 510.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 64/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri S. Appa Rao which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-62]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 64/2017
Between:
S. Appa Rao,
S/o S. Simhachalam,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 81,865.23ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2446
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 881 working days,
amounting to Rs. 81,865.23ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent‘s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2447
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
2448
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2449
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.81,865.23ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the
form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of
strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August
2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of
Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
―Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
2450
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates‘ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.81,865.23ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 15 and
against his name the total number of working days 881 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 15 name of the Petitioner, Sri S. Appa
Rao, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.81,865.23ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 81,865.23ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.81,865.23ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2451
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon‘ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon‘ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon‘ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
2452
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
―2(00) ―retrenchment ―means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or‖
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2453
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon‘ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 81,865.23ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri S. Appa Rao
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
2454
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent‘s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजृत्र : ऄप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2455
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2456
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 511.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और ई. के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं
श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 65/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-63]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 511.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 65/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri E. Thata Babu which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-63]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 65/2017
Between:
E. Thata Babu,
S/o E. Appala Swamy,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 81,865.23ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 881 working days,
amounting to Rs. 81,865.23ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided ex-
parte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.81,865.23ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C (2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.81,865.23ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 14 and
against his name the total number of working days 881 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 14 name of the Petitioner, Sri E. Thata
Babu, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.81,865.23ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 81,865.23ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.81,865.23ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2464
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 81,865.23ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri E. Thata Babu
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2466
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 512.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण
एिं श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 66/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-64]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 512.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 66/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri D. Appala Reddy which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-64]
SALONI, Dy. Director
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 66/2017
Between:
D. Appala Reddy,
S/o D. Appa Rao,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,909.54ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2468
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 903 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,909.54ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2474
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,909.54ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the
form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of
strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August
2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of
Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2476
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.83,909.54ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 20 and
against his name the total number of working days 903 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 20 name of the Petitioner, Sri D. Appala
Reddy, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.83,909.54ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,909.54ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,909.54ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2478
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2480
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,909.54ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to
Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this
the 7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri D. Appala Reddy
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2482
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 513.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और ई. के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण
एिं श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 67/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-65]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 513.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 67/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri Y. Srinivasa Rao which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-65]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 67/2017
Between:
Y. Srinivasa Rao,
S/o Y. Jagannadham,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2484
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 84,002.46ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 904 working days,
amounting to Rs. 84,002.46ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2486
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2488
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
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pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2490
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.84,002.46ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2492
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.84,002.46ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 65 and
against his name the total number of working days 904 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 65 name of the Petitioner, Sri Y.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Srinivasa Rao, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is
shown as Rs.84,002.46ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General
Manager Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment
directly which is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August
2009 to 15th August 2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by
Respondent No.2 for release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral
and documentary evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent
No.3 as contract labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from
12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012 and he is entitled to receive Rs. 84,002.46ps. towards full and final payment as terminal
benefit from Respondent No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that
Petitioner was engaged for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to
15.8.2012 to work in industry of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.84,002.46ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2494
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2496
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 84,002.46ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri Y. Srinivasa Rao
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2498
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
Presiding Officer
2499
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 514.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं श्रम
न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 68/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित करती
है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-66]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 514.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 68/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri D. Ramana which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-66]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 68/2017
Between:
D. Ramana,
S/o D. Appa Rao,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2500
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 81,772.31ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 880 working days,
amounting to Rs. 81,772.31ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2502
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2504
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2506
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.81,772.31ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2508
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.81,772.31ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 11 and
against his name the total number of working days 880 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 11 name of the Petitioner, Sri D. Ramana,
unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.81,772.31ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
2509
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 81,772.31ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.81,772.31ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2510
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2512
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
2513
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 81,772.31ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2514
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri D. Ramana
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
2515
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 515.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं
श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 69/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-67]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 515.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 69/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri G. Kantha Rao which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-67]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 69/2017
Between:
G. Kantha Rao,
S/o G. Suryanarayana,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2516
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,723.69ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 901 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,723.69ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2518
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
2519
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C (2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2520
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
2521
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2522
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,723.69ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2524
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.83,723.69ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 31 and
against his name the total number of working days 901 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 31 name of the Petitioner, Sri G. Kantha
Rao, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.83,723.69ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
2525
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,723.69ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,723.69ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2526
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
2527
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2528
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
2529
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,723.69ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2530
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri G. Kantha Rao
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17: Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18: Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19: Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W20: Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21: Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22: Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 516.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं
श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 70/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-68]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 516.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 70/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri B. Suri Babu which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-68]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 70/2017
Between:
B. Suri Babu,
S/o B. Appalanarasayya,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2532
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 70,249.85ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
2533
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 779 working days,
amounting to Rs. 70,249.85ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2534
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2536
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
2537
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2538
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
2539
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.70,249.85ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009- 10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2540
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.70,249.85ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 41 and
against his name the total number of working days 779 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 41 name of the Petitioner, Sri B. Suri
Babu, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.70,249.85ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 70,249.85ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.70,249.85ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2542
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2544
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2546
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 70,249.85ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri B. Suri Babu
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 517.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं
श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 71/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-69]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 517.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 71/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri K. Sankar Rao which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-69]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2548
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 71/2017
Between:
K. Sankar Rao,
S/o K. Appa Rao,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 79,542.15ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
2549
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 856 working days,
amounting to Rs. 79,542.15ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2550
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2552
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C (2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2554
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.79,542.15ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2556
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
to the tune of Rs.79,542.15ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 62 and
against his name the total number of working days 856 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 62 name of the Petitioner, Sri K. Sankar
Rao, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.79,542.15ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 79,542.15ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2558
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.79,542.15ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2560
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2562
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 79,542.15ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri K. Sankar Rao
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 518.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं
श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 72/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-70]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 518.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 72/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2564
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri S.K. Mishra which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-70]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 72/2017
Between:
S.K. Mishra,
S/o Durga Saran,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 1,05,142.15ps with regard to legitimate dues of
full and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 904 working days,
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2566
amounting to Rs. 1,05,142.15ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
2567
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2568
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
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2570
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.1,05,142.15ps. along with the interest for the work under contract
is not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from
Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2572
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.1,05,142.15ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 70 and
against his name the total number of working days 904 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 70 name of the Petitioner, Sri S.K.
Mishra, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.1,05,142.15ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General
Manager Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment
directly which is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August
2009 to 15th August 2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by
Respondent No.2 for release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral
and documentary evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent
No.3 as contract labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from
12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012 and he is entitled to receive Rs. 1,05,142.15ps. towards full and final payment as terminal
benefit from Respondent No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that
Petitioner was engaged for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to
15.8.2012 to work in industry of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2574
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.1,05,142.15ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2576
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2578
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 1,05,142.15ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of
this order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of
due i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri S.K. Mishra
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
2579
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 519.— औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं
श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 73/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-71]
, उप गनदेिक
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2580
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 519.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 73/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri N. Venkata Ramana which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-71]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 73/2017
Between:
N. Venkata Ramana,
S/o N. Mutyalu,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
2581
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,259.08ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2582
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 896 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,259.08ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
2583
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2584
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
2585
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2586
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,259.08ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2588
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.83,259.08ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 50 and
against his name the total number of working days 896 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 50 name of the Petitioner, Sri N. Venkata
Ramana, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.83,259.08ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,259.08ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2590
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,259.08ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2592
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2594
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,259.08ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri N. Venkata Ramana
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 520.— औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2596
एिं श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 74/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-72]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 520.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 74/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri S. Sanyasi Rao which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-72]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 74/2017
Between:
S. Sanyasi Rao,
S/o S. Appa Rao,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
….. Respondents
2597
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 84,652.92ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2598
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 911 working days,
amounting to Rs. 84,652.92ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
2599
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2600
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
2601
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2602
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
2603
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.84,652.92ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2604
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
2605
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.84,652.92ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 80 and
against his name the total number of working days 911 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 80 name of the Petitioner, Sri S. Sanyasi
Rao, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.84,652.92ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 84,652.92ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2606
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.84,652.92ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
2607
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2608
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
2609
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2610
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 84,652.92ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri S. Sanyasi Rao
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
2611
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2612
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 521.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं श्रम
न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 75/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित करती
है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-73]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 521.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 75/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri V. Demudu which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-73]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 75/2017
Between:
V. Demudu,
S/o V. Somulu,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
2613
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,816.62ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2614
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 902 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,816.62ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2616
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2618
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
2619
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,816.62ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2620
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
2621
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.83,816.62ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 54 and
against his name the total number of working days 902 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 54 name of the Petitioner, Sri V.
Demudu, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.83,816.62ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,816.62ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2622
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,816.62ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
2623
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2624
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2626
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,816.62ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri V. Demudu
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 522.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और ई. के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं
श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 76/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-74]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 522.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 76/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri Y. Thata Rao which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central
Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-74]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2628
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 7th day of January 2026
M.P. No. 76/2017
Between:
Y. Thata Rao,
S/o Y. Peddulu,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…. Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 83,259.08ps with regard to legitimate dues of full
and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 896 working days,
amounting to Rs. 83,259.08ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of nearly
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2630
15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour benefits
payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th September
2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
2631
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2632
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2634
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.83,259.08ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2636
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence
which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the
form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of
strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August
2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of
Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.83,259.08ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No.
44 and against his name the total number of working days 896 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 44 name of the Petitioner, Sri Y. Thata
Rao, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.83,259.08ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General Manager
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment directly which
is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 for
release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary
evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the Respondent No.3 as contract
labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012
and he is entitled to receive Rs. 83,259.08ps. towards full and final payment as terminal benefit from Respondent
No.3 as per terms of contract Ex. W8, Ex. W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that Petitioner was engaged
for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 to work in industry
of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2638
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, ongoing oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.83,259.08ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2640
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C (2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
2641
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 83,259.08ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of this
order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of due
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2642
i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
7th day of January 2026
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri Y. Thata Rao
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
2643
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 523.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2644
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और . के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण
एिं श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 77/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-75]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 523.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 77/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri P. Nagabhushan Rao which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-75]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 4th day of December 2025
M.P. No. 77/2017
Between:
P. Nagabhushan Rao,
S/o. P. Guruvayya,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…..Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
…..
Respondents
2645
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 which is corresponding section 59 (2) under the Industrial Relation Code 2020 for the
recovery of the amount Rs. 74,617.23ps with regard to legitimate dues of full and final payments including
retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2646
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 803 working days,
amounting to Rs. 74,617.23ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
2647
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2648
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
2649
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2650
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.74,617.23ps. along with the interest for the work under contract is
not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from Respondent.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2652
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being
computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at
which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be wait under this
act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate government within a
period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that rules of Evidence Act, are not strictly applicable to the matters under Industrial
Dispute Act. Therefore, evidence produced by Petitioner in support of his claim is admissible. Therefore, evidence
recorded in MP No.2/2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim of Petitioner. In this
context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness WW1.The perusal of these
document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal employer i.e., Deputy
General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged M/s. Midfield
industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated 15th September
2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.74,617.23ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at serial No. 24 and
against his name the total number of working days 803 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl.No.28 name of the Petitioner, Sri P.
Nagabhushan Rao, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is
shown as Rs.74,617.23ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General
Manager Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment
directly which is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August
2009 to 15th August 2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by
Respondent No.2 for release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, on going
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2654
oral and documentary evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the
Respondent No.3 as contract labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period
from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012 and he is entitled to receive Rs. 74,617.23ps. towards full and final payment as terminal
benefit from Respondent No.3 as per terms of contract Ex.W8, W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established that
Petitioner was engaged for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to
15.8.2012 to work in industry of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, on going oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.74,617.23ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2656
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2658
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 corresponding section 59 (2) under
the Industrial Relation Code is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 74,617.23ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of
this order. Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of
due i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
4th day of December, 2025.
2659
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri P. Nagabhushan Rao .
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2660
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512832 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 524.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 15) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और के बीच अनुबंध में
गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं श्रम न्द्यायालय-1, ई, पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 05/2024) को जैसा दक
अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ
था l
[सं. -16025/04/2025-आईआर( )-15]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 524.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (15 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 05/2024) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-1, Mumbai as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
relation to Pramerica Life Insurance Company Ltd. and Shri Ajay Dattaram More which was received along
with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2025-IR(M)-15]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.1,
MUMBAI
Present
JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR MISHRA
Presiding Officer
REFERENCE NO.CGIT-05 of 2024
Parties: Employers in relation to the management of
Pramerica Life Insurance company Ltd,
8th Floor, B Wing, Sohraqabh Hall Opp. Jahangir Hosp.
Pune, Maharashtra-411015.
And
Ajay Dattaram More,
Datta Niwas, Sr. No. 1/239, Behind Vitthal Mandir,
Nr. Hanuman Temple, Kalas Gaon,
Pune-411015
Appearances:
For the first party Management
:
Absent
For the second party workmen
:
Absent
Mumbai, dated the 6th day of January, 2026.
2661
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
AWARD
The present reference has been made by the Central Government by its order No. RLCP/8(21)/2023 dated 28/12/2023
passed in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the
Industrial Dispute Act 1947. The terms of reference as per the schedule to the said order are as under:
“Whether the action of the Managing Director, M/s. Pramerica Life Insurance Ltd, in terminating the
services of Shri Ajay Dattaram More from 13.01.2023 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the
workman is entitled to?
2. Whether the demand of the workman Shri Ajay Dattaram More for payment of salary and incentives along
with back wages and all other consequential benefits is legal and justified? If yes, to what relief the workman
is entitled to?”
In view of the above said facts the claimant/workman has not field any statement of claim/ evidence in support of his
case on affidavit, in spite of several opportunities given to him and taking into consideration the law as laid by the
Hon'ble High Court in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court (1) and others 1981 (29) FLR 194 as under:
“It is well settled that if a party challenges the legality of an order, the burden lies upon him to prove illegality of the
order and if no evidence is produced the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must fail. Whenever a workman
raises a dispute challenging the validity of the termination of service if is imperative for him to file written statement
before the Industrial Court setting out grounds on which the order is challenged and he must also produce evidence
to prove his case. If the workman fails to appear or to file written statement or produce evidence, the dispute referred
by the State Government cannot be answered in favour of the workman and he would not be entitled to any relief.”
In the case of M/s Uptron Powertronics Employees’ Union, Ghaziabad through its Secretary v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (II), Ghaziabad and others 2008 (118) FLR 1164 Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held as under:
“The law has been settled by the Apex Court in case of Shanker Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd., V.K. Raj
Industries v. Labour Court and Ors., Airtech Private Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1984 (49) FLR 38 and
Meritech India Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 FLR that in the absence of any evidence led by or on behalf of the
workman the reference is bound to be answered by the court against the workman. In such a situation it is not
necessary for the employers to lead any evidence at all. The obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation
made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would be, who would fail if no evidence is led.”
And by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of District Administrative Committee, U.P. P.A.C.C.S.C.
Services v. Secretary-cum-G.M. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2010 (126) FLR 519;
Since no statement of claim has been filed by the union in support of his case, the claim is liable to be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed and the union is not entitled for any relief.
Accordingly, the reference stands answered in terms aforesaid.
Award as above.
Justice ARVIND KUMAR MISHRA, Presiding Officer
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 525.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
ऑ ; के प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और ;
के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं श्रम न्द्यायालय-2, ई, पंचाट
(ररफरेन्द्स न.- 2/2011) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी
के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/04/2026-आईआर( )-76]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 525.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. 2/2011) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
cum Labour Court-2, Mumbai as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the employers in
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2662
relation to Indian Oil Corporation Ltd; M/s Vidya Caerers and Petroleum Employees’ Union; Mr. Mahesh
Hegde which was received along with soft copy of the award by the Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/04/2026-IR(M)-76]
SALONI, Dy. Director
ANNEXURE
BEFORE JUSTICE RETIRED SHIV SHANKER PRASAD
PRESIDING OFFICER/LINK OFFICER
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.2, MUMBAI
PRESENT
JUSTICE RETIRED SHIV SHANKER PRASAD
Presiding Officer/Link Officer
COMPLAINT NO. CGIT-2/2 of 2011
IN
Reference No. CGIT-2/54 of 2010
1. The Workman represented by
Petroleum Employees Union.,
C/o, Tel Rasayan Bhavan,
Tilak Road,
Dadar (E),
Mumbai- 400 014.
2. Mr. Mahesh Hegde
Ekta Apartment
E-1-40, A-5,
Phase-II,
Sector-10,
Nerul,
Navi Mumbai – 400 705. Complainants
V/s.
1. Indian Oil Corporation Limited,
Indian Oil Bhavan,
Bandra (E),
Mumbai- 400 051.
2. The Plant Manager,
Indian Oil Corporation Limited,
D-100, T. T. C. Industrial Area,
Kukshit Village,
Vashi,
Mumbai – 400 705.
3. M/s. Vidya Caterers,
Purported Contractors,
Indira Colony,
B-1, Room No.4, Kurar Village,
Dafthary Road,
Malad (E),
Navi Mumbai – 400 097. Opposite Parties
2663
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
APPEARANCES:
For the Complainant
: No appearance
For the Opposite Party No.
1&2 : Ms. Jayshree Kumar
Advocate
For the Opposite Party No.
3 : No appearance
Mumbai, dated 21st January 2026.
AWARD
(Delivered on 21-01-2026)
1.
This is a Complaint u/s. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, filed by the complainant.
2. The case is called out today. Ms. Jayshree Kumar, the learned counsel for the opposite party no.1 & 2 is present
before the Tribunal but no one is present on behalf of the workman/complainant. From perusal of record, it is
apparent that, the complainant/workman is not responding and attending the Tribunal since 20.12.2018 long back.
Although, Statement of Claim and Written Statements have been filed by the parties respectively. Complainant has
also filed his affidavit. The contents of the affidavit as well as the contents of the complaint has not been supported by
the evidence of the workman by producing him before the Tribunal. The complainant/workman is not coming to the
Tribunal since long back. It appears that, he is not interested to contest the case furthermore. The claim of the
complainant/workman is not proved. The case is closed.
In view of this, this Complaint is disposed off for want of prosecution.
Date: 21-01-2026
Justice SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, Presiding Officer/Link Officer
नई ददल्ली, 27 माचच, 2026
का.आ. 526.—औद्योगगक गििाद अगधगनयम (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार
; ; के
प्रबंधतंत्र के संबद्ध गनयोजकों और के बीच अनुबंध में गनर्ददष्ट केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगगक अगधकरण एिं
श्रम न्द्यायालय, , पंचाट (ररफरेन्द्स न.- 27/2017) को जैसा दक अनुलग्नक में ददखाया गया है, प्रकागित
करती है जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को सॉफ्ट कॉपी के साथ 27.03.2026 को प्राप्त हुआ था l
[सं. -16025/03/2026-आईआर( )-20]
, उप गनदेिक
New Delhi, the 27th March, 2026
S.O. 526.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central
Government hereby publishes the award (Reference No. MP 27/2017) of the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal cum Labour Court, Hyderabad as shown in the Annexure, in the Industrial dispute between the
employers in relation to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limit Visakhapatnam Steel Plant; Midfield Industries Limited;
M/s Rishita Associates and Shri Sanjay Tiwari which was received along with soft copy of the award by the
Central Government on 27.03.2026.
[No. Z-16025/03/2026-IR(M)-20]
SALONI, Dy. Director
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2664
ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD
Present: -
Shri Irfan Qamar,
Presiding Officer
Dated the 12th day of December 2025
M.P. No. 27/2017
Between:
Sanjay Tiwari,
S/o. R.N. Tiwari,
Walzen Strips Pvt. Ltd., Wire Rod Mill-1,
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530031.
…..Petitioner
And
1. Chairman & Managing Director
Rastriya Ispat Nigam Limit
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam – 530 031.
Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chairman & Managing Director,
Midfield Industries Limited
Plot No.6, Phase-IV Extn. I.D.A.
Jeedimetla,
Hyderabad – 500 055 (Telangana)
3. M/s. Rishita Associates,
Rep. By Smt. J. Vijaya
Proprietrix,
Door No. 57-24-79/3,
Tummadapalem, Kancharapalem,
Visakhapatnam – 530008.
Andhra Pradesh.
….. Respondents
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
Sri B.V. Rao, Advocate
For the Respondent-I :
M/s. Saibaba & Srinivas, Advocates
For the Respondent -III:
Sri K. Appa Rao, Advocate
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent Management under section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for the recovery of the amount Rs. 1,04,560.62ps with regard to legitimate dues of
full and final payments including retrenchment allowances as per contract.
2.
Petitioner in his petition has averred that the 1st Respondent Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, got registered itself
as Principal Employer under Central Legislative Enactment, "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970."
2665
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
(Annexure 13) dated 14th August 2009, and (Annexure 14) dated 29th July 2011. The 2nd Respondent "Midfield
Industries Limited," is licensed contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and copy
of the license is Annexure 17, dated 19th August 2009, confirming that the 2nd Respondent is licensed to work as a
contractor in the 1st Respondent industry establishment at Visakhapatnam. The 3rd Respondent "M/s Rishita
Associates," is also licensed contractor by Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970, and the license
issued to the 3rd Respondent is (Annexure 15) dated 6th November 2000. Further, Petitioner has averred that 1st
Respondent acknowledged and accepted the 3rd Respondent, Rishita Associates, as sub-contractor for the 2nd
Respondent, Midfield Industries Limited, vide annexure 12, dated 15th September 2009. The 2nd Respondent and 3rd
Respondent are licensed to work for the first Respondent, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, at Visakhapatnam. Further, it is
averred that the 1st Respondent issued the work order to the 2nd Respondent vide work contract, dated 12th September
2009, under later of acceptance by the 2nd Respondent, vide (Annexure 7) and the 2nd Respondent accepted the work
contract initially for a period of 24 months from 16th August 2009, and later it was extended for another 12 months,
vide letter dated 17th October 2012, confirming the work contract extension up to 15th August 2012, by (Annexure
8). Further, Petitioner averred that the 2nd Respondent who engaged the Petitioner workmen as contact labour upon
receiving the work contract (Annexure 7), later shifted all contact labour to the 3rd Respondent vide agreement
between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents meant to execute work order of the 1st Respondent dated 12th September 2009.
According to (Annexure 11) which is the agreement between the 2nd Respondent, "Midfield Industries Limited," and
3rd Respondent, "Rishita Associates," dated 12.9.2009 for the work order dated 16th August 2009, and same is binding
agreement/settlement between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and is the foundation for the claim application for the
recovery of the arrears as settled under (Annexure 11) settlement. Further, Petitioner has contended that Annexure-20
confirms that the 3rd Respondent Rishita Associates, received photo gate pass under (Annexure 11) in favour of the
86-contract labour including the Petitioner engaged by the 3rd Respondent between the period of contract, i.e., 16th
August 2009, to 15th August 2012, for 36 months on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and (Annexure 20) is the photo
identity gate pass cancellation order issued by 1st Respondent for 86 contract labour upon completion of the work
contract. Further, it is averred that the Petitioner workmen are entitled to receive wages and terminal benefits upon
the completion of the work contract, as contracted and settled under (annexure 11) between the second and 3rd
Respondents for executing the work contract of the first Respondent and Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment
allowances for contract labour at the rate of "actual working days/26 x month" 8 days. The Petitioner is unskilled
and is entitled for the arrear of the amount due to words notice pay, service pay, and leave pay for 899 working days,
amounting to Rs. 1,04,560.62ps Since both third Respondent as well as the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the terminal
benefits upon the completion of the work contract on 15th August 2012, Petitioner workman demanded the legal dues
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2666
with interest from all Respondent collectively, but they did not pay. Further, it is submitted that after a lapse of
nearly 15 months, 2nd Respondent addressed a letter to the 1st Respondent (annexure 19) to make all the labour
benefits payments directly to the workman such of that amount to be cleared against the work contract dated 12th
September 2009, from pending amount due to the 2nd Respondent’s account with the 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent
acknowledged the letter, but no payment was made. Moreover, Petitioner union also addressed a letter (annexure 6)
dated 24th March 2014, directly to 1st Respondent to release all the contract labour legal dues, and 1st Respondent
acknowledged the same, but it was in vain. Further, it is averred that the 2nd Respondent, vide (annexure 5) dated 12th
January 2015, addressed letter to the 1st Respondent requesting to settle all legal dues to the Petitioner contract labour
and 1st Respondent acknowledged the receipt of this letter but did not pay dues. Further, all the contract labour
including Petitioner made representation through their union before the Regional Labour Commissioner Central
Vishakhapatnam, vide (annexure 3) dated 19th August 2015, and (annexure 4) dated 20th July 2015. The concerned
authority issued notices to all Respondents, but no relief was granted to the workman. Therefore, Petitioner has
moved this petition under section 33C (2) of the ID Act for recovery of his legitimate dues from Respondent.
Petitioner submitted that the 1st Respondent is legally bound to pay all the legal dues to the contract labour vide
(Annexure 13) the undertaking given by the 1st Respondent, and under section 21(4) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Petitioner is also entitled to receive all the legitimate dues with interest at
the rate of 18% per annum.
3.
Notice were issued to all Respondent. Respondent No.1 and Respondent No. 3 has filed their counter, but
Respondent No. 2 did not file any counter despite service of notice. Therefore, case is proceeding ex-parte against 2nd
Respondent.
4.
In response to notice Respondent No. 1 has filed counter and therein, he has contended that the petition filed
by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Further, it is contended that this
Respondent awarded a contract to the 2nd Respondent, Midfield Industry Limited, Hyderabad, a licensed contractor
for the work of "strapping of mill products‖ vide work order No. VSP/WC/WRM/58485-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359
dated 12th August 2009, for the period of 24 month, commencing from 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2011. This
contract was further extended for another period of 12 months with effect from 16th August 2011 to 15th August 2012.
The 2nd Respondent contractor vide letter dated 12th August 2009, requested Respondent No. 1 to permit it to engage
M/s Rishita Associates, Vishakhapatnam, sub/contractor, for supply of the labour for the subject contract work. 1st
Respondent considered request made by the 2nd Respondent-contractor and, vide its letter dated 15th September 2009,
approved the engagement of M/s Rishita Associates by the 2nd Respondent as its sub-contractor. In the letter dated
15th September 2009, 1st Respondent clearly mentioned that clearance approved by it for engaging sub-contractor does
2667
THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
not establish any contractual relationship between the sub-contractor Rishita Associates and Respondent No.1
Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant. It was clarified further that 2nd Respondent contractor is not relieved from the
Contractual obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, etc. Further, Respondent contended that 86 contract labour
are the contract labour of M/s Midfield Industries. The 2nd Respondent and as per the approval given by this
Respondent, 2nd Respondent has subcontracted the work awarded to it to the third Respondent Rishita Associates
vide Agreement Dt 16.8.2009 for execution of the work on behalf of the second Respondent/contractor and for
purpose of execution of the contract work on behalf of the main contractor/second Respondent gate passes were also
issued to the third Respondent/sub-contractor for the manpower engaged by it. As per the procedure, the gate passes
should be cancelled immediately when once the contract comes to an end and full and final amounts will be settled by
the contracting, agency, the second Respondent. Further, Respondent No. 2 should submit a proof to the Principal
Employer/RINI, claiming reimbursement of the same. Respondent contended that third Respondent/sub-
contractor/Rishita Associates had paid the wages to the contract labour for the total contract period after expiry of the
contract period with the second Respondent, and entire contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued to
work under a new contractor for the same work as the work of Strapping of Mill Products in WRM" is a continuous
process. Further, it is submitted that second Respondent/contractor/Mid Field Industries submitted a request to RINL
stating that it is entangled in income tax problems and requested to make payment in full and final due to its
contractor labour, from out of the amounts due to it and pending with RINL. Accordingly, after obtaining due
approvals and based on the amount due it was released by 1st Respondent/RINL to 2nd Respondent/contractor paid an
amount of Rs.28.58.522/- to the contract labour towards partial disbursement of terminal benefits. A copy of the
payment particulars to contract labour in enclosed herewith and Petitioner has been paid Rs. 33,272/- out of the
amount of Rs. 46,836/-. The 2nd Respondent/contractor addressed a Letter di 19.02.2014 requesting the Principal
Employer/RINL to release the amount equivalent to full and final amount as a special case by making partial
modifications to the agreement entered between it and 1st Respondent/RINL. Respondent made several reminders to
the second Respondent/ contractor to submit its final bill till February 2013. Though the contract work was
completed on 15.08.2012 but 2nd Respondent/contractor did not respond to the same therefore, the 1st
Respondent/RINL processed the bill exparte. Respondent contended that as directions issued by the Income Tax
Authorities to the Finance Department, this Respondent was supposed to deduct an amount of Rs 14,34,52,643/- as
dues to be paid to the Income Tax Department from the pending bills of the second Respondent/contractor M/s
Midfield Industries and accordingly, this Respondent deducted appropriate amount and paid to the Income Tax
Department. Further, Respondent contended that the terminal benefit claimed by the Petitioner does not form part of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2668
wages and, as such the contractor as a direct employer is legally responsible to make all other payments if any to the
Petitioner. Therefore, the petition is devoid of any merit and not legally maintainable, and it is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Respondent No. 2 did not turn up despite service of notice and nor filed any counter. Therefore, case is
proceeding ex-parte against Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20th September 2017 and being heard and decided
exparte.
6.
Respondent No. 3 has filed his counter and therein it is contended that the averments made by the Petitioner
in the petition are not true, valid, tenable, and petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable under law, as no amount is due and payable by this Respondent to the Petitioner.
Further, Respondent No.3 contended that the first Respondent Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited/Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant vide its Work Order dated 12th September 2009 awarded a contract for the work of "Scrapping of Mill Products
in Wire Rod MHL to the second Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited, Hyderabad. Initially, contract period to
work was for 24 months from 16.08.2009 to 15.08 2011 and later on it was extended for further period of 12 months
commencing from 16.08.2011 to 15.08.2012. Further, it is contended that after obtaining approval from the first
Respondent/ RINL, 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries Limited of labour to carry out the contract work entrusted the
work to Respondent No.3 on sub-contract basis i.e. for supply of contract labour between the first Respondent/RINL
and second Respondent, work on commission basis and this Respondent has no other role in respect of Midfield
Industries Ltd. While approving/permitting the second Respondent for giving the work to this Respondent on sub-
contract basis, the first Respondent has clearly stated in their Letter dt. 15.09.2009 that the permission for engaging
the sub-contractor does not establish or create between their Respondent and 2nd Respondent/Midfield Industries
Limited any contractual relationship or obligation between RINL and Respondent No. 2 is not relieved from the
contractual obligations, liabilities and other responsibilities and he is alone responsible for any claim. This clearly
establish that any dispute or claim by any third party, the first Respondent a Principal Employer and the Second
Respondent as main Contractor are liable/responsible, and this Respondent is not liable for any claim made by the
Petitioner. Further it is contended that prior to award of the Work contract labour including the Petitioner herein have
worked under the previous contract by name M/s. Walzen Strips Private Limited and on completion of contract period
of Mis Walzen Strips Private Limited on 15.08.2009 this work was awarded to the 2nd Respondent/Contractor and
thereafter to Respondent No.3 with prior approval of Respondent No.1 as mentioned in work order. This Respondent
was engaged as sub-contractor and after completion of the period of the Work Order dt. 16.08.2009 on 15.08.2012 the
obligations under sub-contract of the Respondent with the second Respondent came to end. Respondent No.3
submits that Respondent contractors have not terminated or retrenched the services of workers at any point in respect
of the said contract including the Petitioner herein and obligations on completion of the contract period does not arise.
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Respondent contractors have no obligation and Petitioner is not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as his
employment is still continuing under the subsequent contractors without any break in service. Further, it is contended
that first Respondent RINL continued the second Respondent/contractor under a fresh work order with effect from
16.08.2012 and contract labour including the Petitioner herein continued his services under the second
Respondent/contractor. Hence in case of any claim by any contract labour much less the claim made by the Petitioner,
it is for the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor to answer/respond the same and this
Respondent is no way concerned with the claim of the contract labour. Further, Respondent submitted that on
payment of amount made by the second Respondent/contractor, this Respondent paid the wages to all the contract
labour including the Petitioner herein within time for the entire contract period of three years. There are no arrears of
salary or any dues payable to the contract labour including the Petitioner herein. Further, it is contended that the first
Respondent/RINL during the period of contract work under the Work Order Dt.16.08.2009 deducted amounts from
time to time from RA Bill amounts payable to the second Respondent/contractor under the head of "Other recoveries"
pertaining to retrenchment compensation, etc. Therefore, in case of any legally valid claim for retrenchment
compensation raised by the contract labour, the first Respondent/RINL and the second Respondent/contractor are
responsible/liable to pay the same. Copy of a Running Account Bill Report Dt.11.08.10 and details of other recoveries
dt.11.08.2010 of the first Respondent/RINL are filed herewith and the same may be read as part of this Counter.
Further, it is submitted that the calculation made by the Petitioner for dues is not correct and binding and Petitioner is
not entitled to claim retrenchment compensation as their services were not terminated and they are still continuing
without any break under the new contractor. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
7.
Petitioner has also filed a rejoinder in response to the contention of the Respondent made in their counter
Petitioner submitted that no full and final settlements were made by any of the Respondents to date. Further, para 6
of the counter of Respondent No. 3 is the admission of the employment of contract labour including this Petitioner
between 16th August 2009 to 15th August 2012, and all contractual obligations are specifically required to be fulfilled
by the 3rd Respondent. Petitioner submits that the law enforced under section 21(4) of the Contract Labor
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 contemplate that it is the statutory duty of the principal employer to redeem the
losses on failure of the contractor to pay the due wages to the contract labour. Further, Petitioner submits that the
claim amount of this Petitioner is covered within the definition of clause H of wages of Section 2 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. Further, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1 has admitted that they
changed the 3rd Respondent after the expiry of the contract period. Continuation of contract labour employment by
another contractor leads to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent (RINL) is implying the contract labour by changing
the contact at their will, and as such, changing of contract means that such contract is a form of ―Sham" mean to avoid
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2670
direct employment by the contractor. Further, it is submitted that the second Respondent never settled the claim of
final settlement. The Petitioner' monthly wages were directly credited to the Petitioner bank account, and Petitioner
insists proof of payment of full and final settlement. It is repeated that not a single rupee was paid to the Petitioner.
The copy of the payment particular brought on record is not a genuine document and is disputed altogether. Further, it
is contended that the averment made by the third Respondent that this Petitioner is continuing employment with
another contractor under RINL is sufficient proof that the Petitioner's employment with the 3rd Respondent has been
terminated, and third Respondent is bound to pay settlement terminal benefits. The averment that there is no break in
the service of the Petitioner since the Petitioner is continuing in the employment Respondent No. 1 is ridiculous.
Therefore, prayed to direct Respondent to pay the legitimate dues of the Petitioner as per contract Ex. W11.
8. In support of the averments made in the petition, Petitioner has examined himself as WW1 and in his chief
examination affidavit, witness has re-iterated the averments made in the petition for recovery of the terminal benefits
from Respondent WW1 has also exhibited documents Exhibit W1 to W22, Witness WW1 was cross-examined by
Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondent No. 3. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that after completion
of the one contract work, he used to continue under subsequent contractor in the same Steel Plant till date. Further,
witness WW1 states that he has not received wages from the contractor after completion of the contract work period.
Further, in cross-examination, WW1 states that he is the contract worker and not an employee of Steel Plant. The
work has been awarded to the 2nd Respondent by Respondent No.1 and under the supervision of Respondent No.3
work was carried out by him within the premises of Steel Plant of Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that he is
working in the Steel Plant of Respondent No.1 under different contractors for the last 25 years. The 2nd Respondent
did his contract work for three years under Respondent No.1. Further, witness states that Respondent No.2 has
appointed him under Respondent No. 3 and he has not filed any document that well show that he has been appointed
by Respondent. Further, witness states that he has not filed any document to show that his services had been
terminated. Further, witness stated that at paragraph three of Exhibit-W2 it has been clearly stated that the entrustment
of work to Respondent No.3 does not confer any contractual relationship between R1 and R2 and R1 shall not be
liable for any contractual obligations. It is not true to say that Respondent No.3 has paid amount to him on receipt
the amount from R2, and as such R2 is real contractor and R3 contractor is no way responsible to pay the wages to
him.
9.
On the other hand, Respondent No.1 has examined witness MW1 in support of his contention and in his
chief statement affidavit MW1 has reiterated the contention made in counter. However, MW1, was cross-examined by
the Petitioner counsel and in cross-examination MW1 states that "It is true that R2 was given contract for the purpose
of strapping of mill product in the WRM department of R1 initially for a period of two years with effect from 16th
2671
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[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
August 2009 to 15th August 2011 and later it was extended for one more year, i.e., up to 15th August 2012." Further,
MW1 states "It is true that permission has been taken from R1 to give sub-contract to R3 for the supply of labour for
the same period. Sub-contact has been given to M/s. Rishita Associates (R3). It is true that R2 on the request of R1
has released the part payment to R3 and R1 has released the same to R2, an amount of Rs.28,58,522/-. It is true that
after completion of the work, a letter dated 19th February 2014 was addressed by R2 to R1 to release the amount
equivalent to the full and final amount as a special case by making partial modifications to the agreement between it
and R1." Further, Witness MW1 states that, "I am not aware of how much amount has been paid to R2 and the date
of release towards full and final payment." Further, MW1 states that "It is not true to suggest that full and final
payment was not made to R2 and as such I am not in a position to say the date and amount of release and hence
deposing false with regard to full and final payment.‖ Further, MW1 state that "it is not true to suggest that full and
final payment was made to R2 by R1 after completion of the work.‖ Further, he stated that it is true that he has not
filed any document in support of his contention made in his affidavit and evidence especially with regard to the
payment mentioned in para 8. Further, MW1 has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to prove
his statement. Further, MW1 states that ―It is not true to suggest that the Petitioners are eligible for the payment of
total dues from R1 as claimed in the petition along with 24% interest."
10. Heard the argument of learned counsel for either parties.
11. Perused the record. At the outset, Respondent counsel urged that present petition filed by the Petitioner for the
recovery of full and final payment amounting to Rs.1,04,560.62ps. along with the interest for the work under contract
is not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of ID Act 1947 as there is no amount due to the Petitioner from
Respondent.
Firstly, we have to examine provision contained under section 33 C (2) of the ID Act. Section 33 C (2) of ID Act
provides :-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be
wait under this act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
government within a period of not exceeding three month."
12. Thus, in view of provision contained u/s 33-C (2) we proceed to examine the question whether the Petitioner is
entitled to receive from employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
Petitioner has filed affidavit therein he has disposed that in MP. No. 2/2017 Co-workman has disposed as WW1 in
evidence and exhibited document W1 to W22. The evidence recorded in said petition may be treated as evidence of
Petitioner in this case including cross examination of WW1. Since Petitioner has similar averment and evidence in
both the petition. It is settled law that the rule of evidence Act do not apply strictly to the matter under I.D. Act.
Therefore, evidence recorded in MPNo.2-2017 is taken on record and considered in this Petition in support of claim
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2672
of Petitioner. In this context Petitioner has filed documents in evidence which has been exhibited by witness
WW1.The perusal of these document reveals that the document Ex. W1 is the form of certificate issued by principal
employer i.e., Deputy General Manager Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam to the effect that it has engaged
M/s. Midfield industries Ltd Respondent No.2 for the work of strapping of mill product in WRM as contractor at
Steel Plant, Visakhapatnam vide certificate dated 14th August 2009. Further, Document Ex. W8 is the letter dated
15th September 2009, issued by AGM works contract of Respondent No.1 addressed to M/s. Midfield Industries
Limited.
The contents of Ex. W8, is extracted here under: -
“Dear sir
Sub:- Strapping of Mill products in wire Rod Mill (T.no:58495-0)
Ref:- 1. Letter of Acceptance vide ref no: VSP/WC/WRM/58495-0/OT/2009-10/8090000359 dt: 12/09/2009
2. Your letter dt: 21/08/2009
“1. This has reference to your letter under ref(2) above seeking approval for engaging M/s Rishita
Associates as your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work.
2. Your proposal has been considered and approval is hereby accorded for engaging M/s Rishitha! Associates as
your subcontractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order license reference above. Your
subcontractor shall adhere to all statutory regulations like PF.
3. This clearance does not establish any contractual relationship between your subcontractor and the Employer
(RINL/VSP) and shall not relieve you from any of your obligations. responsibilities, liabilities etc, as per clause no
3.2 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC)
4. In this connection you are requested to kindly note the following points for compliance
a) To submit to VSP a copy of the kindly order/Letter of Intent placed by M's Midfield Industries Limited on M's
Rishita Associates
b) To submit performance details of M/s Rishita Associates including the value of work done with reference to the
above said W.O/LOL”
Thus, document Ex. W8, which has been proved by WW1 and admitted by Respondent No. 1 reveals that vide letter
dated 15th September 2009 Respondent No. 1 has approved the proposal of Respondent No. 2 for engaging M/s.
Rishitha Associates’ Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor for supply of labour for the subject work against the order
under reference above this document. Therefore, according to Ex. W12 the supply of labour was to be made by
Respondent No.3 M/s. Rishitha Associates for the subject work and Respondent Rishitha Associates was the
employer contractor of the Petitioner workman. Further, document Ex. W10 is letter dated 28th November 2011
addressed to the Respondent No. 2-Midfield Industries Limited by the Respondent No. 1 for extension of time of
contract for the work up to 29th February 2012. Document Ex. W11 is letter addressed to Respondent No. 2 Midfield
industries by Respondent No.1 in reference to further extension of time of contract up to 15th August 2012.
Document Ex. W9 is the Note for the approval of final deviation for the work of ―Strapping of mills product in
WRM‖ of Respondent No. 1 and this work was awarded to M/s. Midfield Industries Respondent No.2. In the clause 6
it is mentioned that approved time extension period 12 months up to 15th August 2012. Further Ex. W12 is the
document wherein the terms of the payment/Mode of payment by M/s. Rishitha Associates as approved by VSP sub-
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
contractor, for Labour supply by the Respondent No.2 is mentioned. The terms of payment and mode of payment are
mentioned in the column of Retrenchment allowances for workers and the calculation has been shown as actual
working days/26 x month / 8 days. Thus, as per this calculation Petitioner has calculated his retrenchment allowances
to the tune of Rs.1,04,560.62ps. for the period of 3 years of his employment with Respondent No.3. Further, in the
agreement clause 7 it is mentioned that the agreement shall come into force on 16th August 2009 and shall be enforced
until the end of 15th August 2011. This time of contract was further extended up to 15th August 2012. Document
Ex. W14 is the statement showing actual working days of the contract labour including Petitioner and that has been
prepared and signed by Respondent No.2 Mid-field Industries, for the period from 16th August 2009 to 15th August
2012. The statement of actual working days goes to show that the Petitioner's name is mentioned at Sl. No. 37 and
against his name the total number of working days 899 has been recorded. Further, document Ex. W15 is the
statement of full and final amount calculation, and these details has been prepared and signed by the authorized
signatories of Respondent No.2. This document goes to show that at Sl. No. 37 name of the Petitioner, Sri Sanjay
Tiwari, unskilled workman is recorded and against his name amount due towards full and final amount is shown as
Rs.1,04,560.62ps Further, document Ex. W16 is the letter dated 3rd December 2013, addressed to the General
Manager Vishakhapatnam Steel Plant, Respondent No.1 by Respondent No.2 regarding labour benefit payment
directly which is to be cleared by Respondent No.2 in respect of contract labour for the period from 16th August
2009 to 15th August 2012. Similarly, documents Ex. W17 and W20 are the letters addressed to Respondent No.1 by
Respondent No.2 for release of amount equivalent to full and final benefit due to contract labour. Thus, on going
oral and documentary evidence produced by the Petitioner, it is established that Petitioner was engaged by the
Respondent No.3 as contract labour for the work of Respondent No.1 on behalf of Respondent No.2 during the period
from 12.8.2009 to 12.8.2012 and he is entitled to receive Rs. 1,04,560.62ps. towards full and final payment as
terminal benefit from Respondent No.3 as per terms of contract Ex.W8, W9, and Ex. W12. Further, it is established
that Petitioner was engaged for work by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Rishitha Associates for the period from 16.8.2009 to
15.8.2012 to work in industry of R-1 Principal Employer Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Vishakpatnam Steel Plant.
13.
Although Respondent has contended that all the wages and dues towards the final settlement have been paid
to the Petitioner workman but in support of his contention Respondent has not filed any document to corroborate it.
Respondent No. 1 has also examined witness MW2 Sri K. Sudhakar Rao who has produced and exhibited document
Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and states that Ex. M6 is showing the amount paid by 2nd Respondent to claimants but in cross
examination MW2 states that it is true that Ex.M6 relates to amount Rs. 28,58,522/- which is mentioned in para 5 of
chief statement of MW1 and he is not aware that Rs. 61,76,628/- is still balance due to be paid to workman. Thus, the
testimony of MW2 is not direct evidence in respect of payment of claimed amount in the petition, hence his evidence
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2674
is not relevant in this regard. Therefore, contention of the Respondent No.1 in this context is untenable for the want
of cogent and relevant evidence. Thus, on going oral and documentary evidence on record, it is established that the
Petitioner workman is entitled to receive from the employer Respondent No.3 the amount of Rs.1,04,560.62ps. for the
period of August,2009 to 2012 towards retrenchment allowances as per document Ex. W12.
14.
Now, question arises that who is liable to pay the said retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner as per
contract. Admittedly, Petitioner workman was engaged by Respondent No.3 for the work of Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 has admitted that the Petitioner had worked in the work of Strapping Mills Products WRM in its
industry during the period from 16.8.2009 to 15.8.2012 as contract labour engaged by Respondent No.3. Since the
Respondent No. 3 was sub-contractor for labour supply for the work order Ex. W8 of Respondent No.2, therefore,
Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 are jointly and severally liable to pay retrenchment
allowances towards the full and final payment to the Petitioner as per contract. Although Respondent No.3 contended
that it has paid all the money due to the Petitioner, but Respondent No.3 has not produced any document to establish
that full and final payment as claimed by the Petitioner towards retrenchment allowances has been paid by 2nd
Respondent or 3rd Respondent. However, Respondent has filed photocopies of documents as proof of payment to the
workman by R-2. The perusal of these photocopies goes to show that these are not proved by any cogent and relevant
evidence of witness. Therefore, these photocopies in respect of payment are not admissible in evidence. Moreover,
the genuineness of these document photocopies has been challenged by the Petitioner in his rejoinder, therefore,
burden of proof to prove the factum of payment to the Petitioner lies on the Respondent No.1 which he failed to
discharge. Thus, it is established that Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount towards benefits upon his
retrenchment from service by R-3. Moreover, Respondent No.1 is the Principal Employer of Petitioner contract
labour, therefore, Respondent No.1 is also liable to pay retrenchment allowances to Petitioner along with Respondent
No.2 and Respondent No.3 jointly and severally.
15.
In this context, relevant decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court, are discussed as
hereunder: -
(a) In the case of Sail Growth Works versus Nilmani Lal and others, Writ Petition Number 386 of 2025, dated 10th
March 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata has held:
19. Gratuity, payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is a gratuitous payment required to be
made by an employer to his employee at the time of termination of services of the employee or upon such
employee’s death.
Section 21 (4) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), mandates that a
principal employer is responsible for the payment of 'wages' to a contract employee in the event of a contractor's
failure to pay within the stipulated timelines or in the event of a contractor making a short payment. The principal
employer then has the ability to recover the amount paid as 'wages', from the contractor. Section 2(h) of the CLRA
defines the term 'wages' as all remuneration (whether by salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money or capable of being so expressed, which would if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
includes, among others, "(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment...". However, it excludes "(6) any
gratuity payable on the termination of employees in cases other than those specified in (d)." In Superintending
Engineer, Mettur Thermal Power Station, Mettur vs. Appellate Page 11 Authority, Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Coimbatore & Anr, 2012 LLR 1160, it has been held by the Madras High Court that gratuity payable under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 falls within this definition of 'wages'. The principal employer or the contractor may
be liable to pay gratuity to contract employees, depending on the circumstances. Principal employer The principal
employer is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if the contractor fails to pay. The principal employer is
liable to pay gratuity if the contractor makes a short payment.
The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contractor terminates the services of the contract
employee. The principal employer is liable to pay gratuity if the contract employee works for multiple contractors.
Contractor The contractor is liable to pay gratuity to contract employees if they have worked for at least five years
and the contract is separate from the company.
(b) In the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited versus Commissioner of Labour, Appeal Civil
Number 11355 of 1996, dated 3rd September 1996, the Hon’ble Court have held: -
“The short question that arises for determination is whether the appellant who the principal employer is liable to
pay to the contract workers any amount which constitutes the difference between the wages payable to the contract
labour by the contractor and the wages paid by the appellant to its own employees doing similar work. The Division
Bench seems to have relied upon Section 21(4) of the said Act for this purpose. Section 21(1), however, provides
that the contractor shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each worker employed by his. Section 21(4)
provides that if the contractor fails to make this payment or any part thereof, the principal employer is liable to
make this payment and may recover the same from the contractor as set out in that sub-section. Looking to the
definition of wages Under the said Act read with the definition of wages in the payment of Wages Act, which we
have set out earlier, it is clear that Section 21 only deals with the payment of contractual wages by the contractor to
each of his worker; The definition of wages would cover within its scope, inter alia, also those amounts which the
contractor is liable to pay his workers under any award, settlement or order of court as well as other amounts
falling within the definition of wages under the payment of Wages Act Subjection (2) provides for a representative
of the principal employer supervising this payment. Clearly, therefore, the wages which are the subject-matter of
Section 21 are specified sums which are payable in present by the contractor under the terms of his contract of
employment with each worker as well as under any existing award, settlement or order of the court. -Section 21
does not deal with, nor does if cover the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Hence Section
21(4) will not apply to such obligations of the contractor which may be the subject-matter of dispute between the
contractor and his workers at time of disbursement of wages and which do not fall within the definition of “wages”
under the Act.”
(c) Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bombay Industries Chemical Industries Vs Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Civil Appeal Number 813 of 2022, D.O.D dated 4th February 2022, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing
benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Court added that in the case of Kanku Ben, it is
observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court Under section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit
sought to be enforced Under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a
preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act, while the latter does not.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2676
(d) In the case of Jeet Lal Sharma versus Presiding Officer, 2001 VAD Delhi One, dated 15th March 2000, the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi have held:-
“15. The point which is emphasised is that entitlement to receive money the pre-existing right can the
based on (1) adjudication (2) settlement (3) service conditions. If the right to get a particular benefit is there, the
application us. 13-C(2) would be maintainable and jurisdiction of Labour Court will not be barred merely because
employer has denied the same
16. What is the meaning of the expression "entitlement in receive". No doubt it is referable to pre-existing
right. However where the workman claims a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right and approaches the Labour
Courts 33-612) for computation of the right in term of money and the employer disputes the existences of the right,
the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question, whether the right exists and if the existence
of right is established than in proceed in compute the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of money or on its
decisions recovery proceedings start (New Taj Mahal Cafe Private Limited versus Labour Court reported in 1970
(2) LLN 51 and East India Coal Company Limited (supra) In deciding the maintainability of the application u/s
13-(12) what is in be looked at is the clans set up in the application and not what the other side contends in its
reply. The fact that the employer by his plea rises some dispute, does not mean that Jurisdiction of Labour Court to
deal with the question is taken away.”
16. Thus, in view of forgone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed above, Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of ID Act,1947 against the Respondents for recovery of retrenchment allowances as
per Ex. W12 is acceptable. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 M/s Rishitha Associates, and
Respondent No.2 has engaged Respondent No. 3 as sub-contractor for Labour supply to work in the establishment of
Respondent No.1 with prior approval vide document Ex. W8. Therefore, Respondent No.3 as such contractor for
Labour supply for the work is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowances to the Petitioner. It has come on
record Respondent No.3 has not paid the claimed amount to the Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent No. 3 and
Respondent No.2 as main contractor is jointly and severally liable for payment of the claimed amount to the
Petitioner. However, Respondent No.3 has contended that the Petitioner has not been retrenched by him and
Petitioner is still continuing work with the Respondent No.1 under new contractor. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to recover retrenchment allowances from Respondent. Undisputedly, Petitioner was engaged by Respondent No.3 to
work in the establishment of Respondent No.1 for the period from 16.08.2009 to 15.08.2012 as per Ex. W8.
Respondent No.3 is no more employer of Petitioner after 15.08.2012 of the petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012 and it makes
no difference whether petitioner is still working with Respondent No.1 under some other contention. Thus,
Respondent No.3 has retrenched services of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012.
The definition of retrenchment as provided under Section 2 (oo) is extracted as here under: -
“2(00) “retrenchment “means the termination by the employer f the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include---
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman: or
(b) Retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or”
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Although Petitioner might be working with Respondent No.1 even after 15.08.2012 but Respondent No.3 is no more
employer of workman. Therefore, only conclusion can be drawn in such circumstances that Respondent No. 3 has
terminated the service of Petitioner w.e.f 16.08.2012. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to receive retrenchment/allowance as
per Ex. W12. Thus, the contention of R3 in this context is untenable. Therefore, the plea of Petitioner that Petitioner
worker is working now under new contractor is untenable as the Respondent No. 3 is no more employer of the
Petitioner after 15-08-2012 meaning thereby Petitioner has been terminated by Respondent No. 3 from service w.e.f
16.08.2012 and is entitled to receive retrenchment allowances as per terns of the contract.
17. However, Respondent No. 1 has contended that terminal benefits claimed by the Petitioner do not form part of
wages and as such the contractor as direct employer is responsible to make all other payments. In this context, the
reference of definition of wages u/s 2 (IV) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is relevant. Therein it is provided that wages
mean all remuneration (whether by way of salaries, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money are capable
of being so expressed which would if the terms of employment, expressed or employed were fulfilled be payable to
person employed in respect of his employer or of work done in such employer and includes.
(d) Any sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law
contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum whether with nor without deduction but does not
provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.
Thus, in view of the above definition of wages the retrenchment allowances are very much covered under the
definition of wages and the contention of the Respondent No.1 that retrenchment allowances are not included under
the wages is untenable. According to Ex. W12 the term of payment/mode of payment has been agreed upon between
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No.3 sub-contractor, to be paid to the contract Labour i.e.
Petitioner for doing the work at Respondent No.1 industry. The employment of Petitioner by Respondent No.3 of the
Petitioner has been admitted by Respondent No. 1 & 2 and it is also admitted that retrenchment allowances of the
Petitioner workman has not been paid by none of the Respondents. Therefore, as a Principal Employer Respondent
No.1 is liable to pay retrenchment allowance to the Petitioner in view of the provision contained under Section 21 (4)
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and he may recover the said amount of retrenchment
allowances so paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3. Thus, the contention of Respondent
No. 1 in this context is untenable.
18. Therefore, in view of foregone discussion and law laid down by Hon’ble Court as discussed in preceding
paragraph of this order, I come to irresistible conclusion that as per document Ex. W8 and W12 Petitioner had worked
with the Respondent No. 1 as contract labour employed by Respondent No.3 as sub-contractor of Respondent No.2,
during the period from 16-08-2009 to 15-08-2012 and Respondent No.3 the employer has terminated the services of
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2678
Petitioner w.e.f 16-08-2012. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled for payment of retrenchment allowances as per
document Ex. W12 which has been proved by the oral and documentary evidence of Petitioner and also admitted by
Respondent No. 3 it is undisputed that none of the Respondents has paid such retrenchment allowance to the
Petitioner. Therefore, as per provision contained under section 21 (4) of contract labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 the Respondent No. 1 being principal employer is responsible for payment of retrenchment allowance to
Petitioner, and he may recover said amount paid to Petitioner from Respondent No. 1 and 2 jointly and severally.
Thus, the Petition filed by the Petitioner has merits and deserved to be allowed.
ORDER
The Petition filed by the Petitioner under section 33C(2) of ID Act 1947 is allowed.
Respondent No. 1 Chairman & Managing Director, Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd, Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
Visakhapatnam is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 1,04,560.62ps. to the Petitioner within 30 days from the date of
this order Respondent No.1 is further directed to pay the interest @ 12% per annum on this amount from the date of
due i.e., 16-08-2012 up to the date of payment.
It is further directed that Respondent No.1 is entitled to recover the said amount paid to Petitioner from
Respondent No.2 the main contractor and Respondent No. 3 the sub-contractor jointly and severally.
Ordered accordingly.
Dictated to Smt. P. Phani Gowri, Personal Assistant, transcribed by her, corrected and signed by me on this the
12th day of December 2025.
IRFAN QAMAR, Presiding Officer
Appendix of evidence
Witnesses examined for the
Witnesses examined for the
Petitioner
Respondent
WW1: Sri Sanjay Tiwari .
MW1: Sri Bammadi Joga Rao
MW2: Sri K. Sudhakara Rao
Documents marked for the Petitioner
Ex.W1:
Photostat copy of proceedings of Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 18.11.2015.
Ex.W2:
Photostat copy of notice by Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
To Respondents Two and Three dt: 10.09.2015.
Ex.W3:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt:19.08.2015
Ex.W4:
Photostat copy of union representation before Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam dt: 20.07.2015
Ex.W5:
Photostat copy of Second Respondents letter to first Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 12.01.2015.
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THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : APRIL 4, 2026/CHAITRA 14, 1948
[PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]
Ex.W6:
Photostat copy of Union Representation before 1st Respondent
Principal Employer dt: 24.03.2014.
Ex.W7:
Photostat copy of Work contract issued to second Respondent by
Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt: 12.09.2009.
Ex.W8:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract to 2nd Respondent by
1st Respondent dt: 28.11.2011.
Ex.W9:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
dt:28.11.2011.
Ex.W10:
Photostat copy of extension of work contract by 2nd Respondent
Dt:22.03.2012.
Ex.W11:
Photostat copy of agreement between 2nd and 3rd Respondent
(Basis of Claim) dt: 16.8.2009.
Ex.W12:
Photostat copy of Acceptance of 3rd Respondent as Sub-Contractor
Of 2nd Respondent by Principal Employer 1st Respondent dt:15.9.2009.
Ex.W13:
Photostat copy of Form-V issued by Principal Employer 1st Respondent
To 2nd Respondent under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 dt: 14.08.2009.
Ex.W14:
Photostat copy of Undertaking given to 2nd Respondent by 1st
Respondent dt: 29.07.2011.
Ex.W15:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:06.11.2009.
Ex.W16:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt: 16.08.2009.
Ex.W17:
Photostat copy of Licence issued to 3rd Respondent by Licencing
Officer under CL (R&A) Act, 1970 dt:19.08.2009.
Ex.W18:
Photostat copy of Coverage Intimation by Regional provident Fund
Commissioner of 3rd Respondent establishment under E.P.F & MP
Act, dt:03.08.2004.
Ex.W19:
Photostat copy of 2nd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to pay
All due of Petitioner workmen dt:03.11.2013.
Ex.W20:
Photostat copy of 3rd Respondent’s letter to 1st Respondent to cancel
Gate passes of all Petitioner workmen dt:13.08.2012.
Ex.W21:
Photostat copy of statement of actual working days
Ex.W22:
Photostat copy of Statement of full and final amount calculation details.
Documents marked for the Respondent
Ex.M1:
Photostat copy of notice sent by Income Tax Dept. dt: 07.11.2012.
[भाग II—खण् ड 3(ii)]
भारत का राजपत्र : अप्रैल 4, 2026/चैत्र 14, 1948
2680
Ex.M2:
Photostat copy of demand draft No.002716 showing Payment of
Rs. 2,84,86,336/- by RINL to Income Tax Department dt: 07.03.2013.
Ex.M3:
Photostat copy of Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Hyderabad to RINL dt: 07.11.2013.
Ex.M4:
Photostat copy of letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer,
It Department dt: 22.08.2015.
Ex.M5:
Photostat copy of Letter sent by RINL to the Tax Recovery Officer, IT
Department Enclosing Demand Draft No. 512814 Dt.04.12.2015 for
Rs. 7,82,321/- dt: 17.12.2015
Ex.M6:
Photostat copy of Statement showing the amounts paid by the 2nd
Respondent to the claimants
Uploaded by Dte. of Printing at Government of India Press, Ring Road, Mayapuri, New Delhi-110064
and Published by the Controller of Publications, Delhi-110054.
SARVESH KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA
Digitally signed by SARVESH KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA
Date: 2026.04.18 15:06:00 +05'30'