¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
655
∑˝§◊Ê¢∑§ xx ]
⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, ‡ÊÈ∑˝§flÊ⁄U, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆóüÊÊfláÊ wx, ‡Ê∑§ v~yw
÷ʪ 1
⁄UÊíÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§ •ÊŒ‡Ê
‚Ê◊Êãÿ ¬˝‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ Áfl÷ʪ
◊¢òÊÊ‹ÿ, ◊„UÊŸŒË ÷flŸ, ŸflÊ ⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, •≈U‹ Ÿª⁄
ŸflÊ ⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, •≈U‹ Ÿª⁄U ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ wz ¡ÍŸU wÆwÆ
∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§ ߸U v-Æ~/wÆv~/∞∑§-w.ó⁄UÊíÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∞ÃŒ˜mÊ⁄UÊ fl·¸ wÆv~ ’Òø ∑§ ÁŸêŸÁ‹Áπà ¬Á⁄UflˡÊÊäÊËŸ ÷Ê.¬˝.‚. •ÁäÊ∑§ÊÁ⁄UÿÊ¥ ∑§Ë
ÁŸêŸÊŸÈ‚Ê⁄U ŸflËŸ ¬ŒSÕʬŸÊ ∑§Ë ¡ÊÃË „ÒU —ó
∑˝§.
•ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄UË ∑§Ê ŸÊ◊
flø◊ÊŸ ¬ŒSÕʬŸÊ
ŸflËŸ ¬ŒSÕʬŸÊ
(v)
(w)
(x)
(y)
v.
üÊË ‹Á‹ÃÊÁŒàÿ ŸË‹◊
‚„UÊÿ∑§ ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-⁄UÊ¡ŸÊ¥ŒªÊ¥fl
‚„UÊÿ∑§ ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-Á’‹Ê‚¬È⁄U
‚¢øÊ‹∑§, ◊Ⱥ˝áÊ ÃÕÊ ‹πŸ ‚Ê◊ª˝Ë, ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U mÊ⁄UÊ ‡ÊÊ‚∑§Ëÿ ˇÊòÊËÿ ◊Ⱥ˝áÊÊ‹ÿ, ⁄UÊ¡ŸÊ¢ŒªÊ¢fl ‚ ◊ÈÁº˝Ã ÃÕÊ ¬˝∑§ÊÁ‡ÊÃówÆwÆ.
¬¢¡ËÿŸ ∑˝§◊Ê¢∑§
“¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U/ŒÈª¸/Æ~/wÆvx-wÆvz.”
“Á’¡Ÿ‚ ¬ÊS≈U ∑§ •ãê¸Ã «UÊ∑§
‡ÊÈÀ∑§ ∑§ ŸªŒ ÷ȪÃÊŸ (Á’ŸÊ «UÊ∑§
Á≈U∑§≈U) ∑§ ¬˝·áÊ „UÃÈ •ŸÈ◊Ã. ∑˝§◊Ê¢∑§
¡Ë. w-ww-¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ª¡≈U/x} Á‚.
‚. Á÷‹Ê߸, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ xÆ-z-wÆÆv.”
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ
¬˝ÊÁœ∑§Ê⁄U ‚ ¬˝∑§ÊÁ‡ÊÃ
Áfl·ÿó‚ÍøË
÷ʪ v.ó(v) ⁄UÊÖÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§ •ÊŒ‡Ê, (w) Áfl÷ʪ ¬˝◊ÈπÊ¥ ∑§ •ÊŒ‡Ê,
(x) ©Uëø ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ ∑§ •ÊŒ‡Ê •ÊÒ⁄U •Áœ‚ÍøŸÊ∞¢, (y)
⁄UÊÖÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§ ‚¢∑§À¬, (z) ÷Ê⁄Uà ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§ •ÊŒ‡Ê •ÊÒ⁄U
•Áœ‚ÍøŸÊ∞¢, ({) ÁŸflʸøŸ •Êÿʪ, ÷Ê⁄Uà ∑§Ë •Áœ‚ÍøŸÊ∞¢,
(|) ‹Ê∑§-÷Ê·Ê ¬Á⁄UÁ‡ÊCÔU.
÷ʪ w.óSÕÊŸËÿ ÁŸ∑§Êÿ ∑§Ë •Áœ‚ÍøŸÊ∞¢.
÷ʪ x.ó(v) ÁflôÊʬŸ •ÊÒ⁄U ÁflÁflœ ‚ÍøŸÊ∞¢, (w) ‚Ê¢ÁÅÿ∑§Ëÿ
‚ÍøŸÊ∞¢.
÷ʪ y.ó(∑§) (v) ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U Áflœÿ∑§, (w) ¬˝fl⁄U ‚Á◊Áà ∑§
¬˝ÁÃflŒŸ, (x) ‚¢‚Œ ◊¥ ¬È⁄U—SÕÊÁ¬Ã Áflœÿ∑§, (π) (v)
•äÿÊŒ‡Ê, (w) ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U •ÁœÁŸÿ◊, (x) ‚¢‚Œ˜Ô ∑§
•ÁœÁŸÿ◊, (ª) (v) ¬˝ÊM§¬ ÁŸÿ◊, (w) •¢ÁÃ◊ ÁŸÿ◊.
{zz
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
656
(v)
(w)
(x)
(y)
w.
‚ÈüÊË Ÿ◊˝ÃÊ ¡ÒŸ
‚„UÊÿ∑§ ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-’‹ÊҌʒʡÊ⁄U-
‚„UÊÿ∑§ ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U
÷Ê≈UʬÊ⁄UÊ.
x.
‚ÈüÊË ⁄‘UŸÊ ¡◊Ë‹
‚„UÊÿ∑§ ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-∑§Ê¥∑§⁄U
‚„UÊÿ∑§ ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-’SÃ⁄U
y.
üÊË Áfl‡flŒË¬
‚„UÊÿ∑§ ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-∑§ÊÁ⁄UÿÊ
‚„UÊÿ∑§ ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-‚⁄UªÈ¡Ê
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ¬Ê‹ ∑§ ŸÊ◊ ‚ ÃÕÊ •ÊŒ‡ÊÊŸÈ‚Ê⁄U,
∑§◊‹¬˝Ëà Á‚¥„U, ‚Áøfl.
ÁflÁäÊ •ÊÒ⁄U ÁfläÊÊÿË ∑§Êÿ¸ Áfl÷ʪ
◊¢òÊÊ‹ÿ, ◊„UÊŸŒËU ÷flŸ, ŸflÊ ⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, •≈U‹ Ÿª⁄
ŸflÊ ⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, •≈U‹ Ÿª⁄U ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy ¡È‹Ê߸U wÆwÆ
∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§ z~w{/x|}|/wv-’/¿U.ª./wÆwÆ.ó⁄UÊíÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ, ∞ÃŒ˜mÊ⁄UÊ, ∑ȧ≈ÈUê’ ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊, v~}y (‚Ÿ˜ v~}y ∑§Ê ‚¥ÅÿÊ {{)
∑§Ë äÊÊ⁄UÊ Æ{ ∞fl¥ ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ∑ȧ≈ÈUê’ ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ ÁŸÿ◊, wÆÆ| ∑§ ÁŸÿ◊ { mÊ⁄UÊ ¬˝ŒûÊ ‡ÊÁÄÃÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê ¬˝ÿʪ ◊¥ ‹Êà „ÈUÿ ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ©UìÊ ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ
Á’‹Ê‚¬È⁄U ∑§ ¬⁄UÊ◊‡Ê¸ ‚, ÁŸêŸÁ‹Áπà ÃÊÁ‹∑§Ê ∑§Ë ∑¥§Á«U∑§Ê Æw ◊¥ ŒÁ‡Ê¸Ã ∑ȧ≈ÈUê’ ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ „UÃÈ, ÃÊÁ‹∑§Ê ∑§Ë ∑¥§Á«U∑§Ê Æx ◊¥ flÁáʸà √ÿÁÄà ∑§Ê
•Áª˝◊ •ÊŒ‡Ê Ã∑§ ∑§ Á‹∞, ¬⁄UÊ◊‡Ê¸ŒÊÃÊ ÁŸÿÈÄà ∑§⁄UÃÊ „ÒU —ó
∑˝§.
∑ȧ≈ÈUê’ ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ ∑§Ê ŸÊ◊
¬⁄UÊ◊‡Ê¸ŒÊÃÊ ∑§Ê ŸÊ◊
(v)
(w)
(x)
v.
©UûÊ⁄U ’SÃ⁄U ∑§Ê¥∑§⁄U
üÊË ª¡ÊŸ¥Œ ¡ÒŸ
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ¬Ê‹ ∑§ ŸÊ◊ ‚ ÃÕÊ •ÊŒ‡ÊÊŸÈ‚Ê⁄U,
◊ŸË· ∑ȧ◊Ê⁄U ∆UÊ∑ȧ⁄U, •ÁÃÁ⁄UÄà ‚Áøfl.
üÊ◊ Áfl÷ʪ
◊¢òÊÊ‹ÿ, ◊„UÊŸŒËU ÷flŸ, ŸflÊ ⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, •≈U‹ Ÿª⁄
ŸflÊ ⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, •≈U‹ Ÿª⁄U ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ | ¡È‹Ê߸U wÆwÆ
∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§ ∞»§ v-{/wÆvw/v{.ó∑§Ê⁄UπÊŸÊ •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊, v~y} (‚Ÿ˜ v~y} ∑§Ë {x) ∑§Ë äÊÊ⁄UÊ } ∑§Ë ©U¬äÊÊ⁄UÊ (w) ◊¥ ¬˝ŒûÊ ‡ÊÁÄÃÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê
©U¬ÿʪ ∑§⁄Uà „ÈU∞ ∞fl¥ ßU‚ ‚¥’¥äÊ ◊¥ ¬Ífl¸ ◊¥ ¡Ê⁄UË ‚◊Sà •ÁäÊ‚ÍøŸÊ•Ê¥ ∑§Ê •ÁäÊ∑˝§Á◊à ∑§⁄Uà „ÈU∞, ⁄UÊíÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∞ÃŒ˜mÊ⁄UÊ üÊË ∞‹Ä‚ √„UË.∞»§.¬ÊÚ‹
◊ŸŸ √„UË. (÷Ê.¬˝.‚.) üÊ◊ÊÿÈÄà ∑§Ê ‚ê¬Íáʸ ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊíÿ ∑§ Á‹∞ ◊ÈÅÿ ∑§Ê⁄UπÊŸÊ ÁŸ⁄UˡÊ∑§ ÁŸÿÈÄà ∑§⁄UÃÊ „ÒU.
No. F 1-6/2012/16.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 8 of the Factories Act,
1948 (63 of 1948) and in supersession of the all previous notifications in this respect, the Government of Chhattisgarh
hereby appoints Shri Alex V. F. Paul Menon V. (IAS), Labour Commissioner, Chhattisgarh, to be Chief Inspector of
Factories for the state of Chhattisgarh.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ¬Ê‹ ∑§ ŸÊ◊ ‚ ÃÕÊ •ÊŒ‡ÊÊŸÈ‚Ê⁄U,
⁄‘UáÊÈ∑§Ê üÊËflÊSÃfl, ©U¬-‚Áøfl.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
657
⁄UÊ¡Sfl Áfl÷ʪ
∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ, ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-⁄UÊÿª…∏U (¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U),U ∞fl¢ ¬ŒŸ ©U¬-‚Áøfl, ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ,
⁄UÊ¡Sfl ∞fl¥ •Ê¬ŒÊ ¬˝’¥äÊŸ Áfl÷ʪ
⁄UÊÿª…∏U, ÁŒŸÊ¥∑§ w} ◊߸U wÆwÆ
÷Í-•¡¸Ÿ ¬˝∑§⁄UáÊ ∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§ Æz/•-}w/wÆv~-wÆ.óøÍ¢Á∑§ ⁄UÊÖÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§Ê ÿ„U ¬˝ÃËà „UÊÃÊ „ÒU Á∑§ ß‚‚ ‚¢‹ÇŸ •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ (v)
‚ (y) ◊¥ flÁáʸà ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ë •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ ({) ◊¥ ©U‚∑§ ‚Ê◊Ÿ ÁŒÿ ªÿ ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ ∑§ Á‹ÿ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ „ÒU •ÕflÊ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ
¬«∏UŸ ∑§Ë ‚¢÷ÊflŸÊ „ÒU. •Ã— ÷ÍÁ◊ •¡¸Ÿ, ¬ÈŸflʸ‚Ÿ •ÊÒ⁄U ¬ÈŸ√ÿ¸flSÕʬŸ ◊¥ ©UÁøà ¬˝ÁÃ∑§⁄U •ÊÒ⁄U ¬Ê⁄UŒÁ‡Ê¸ÃÊ ∑§Ê •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄U •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊, wÆvx (Á¡‚
∞ÃŒ˜ ¬‡øÊØ •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊ wÆvx ∑§„UÊ ¡ÊflªÊ) ∑§Ë äÊÊ⁄UÊ vv ∑§Ë ©U¬-äÊÊ⁄UÊ (v) ∑§ ©U¬’¥äÊÊ¥ ∑§ •ŸÈ‚Ê⁄U ‚÷Ë ‚¥’¥ÁäÊà √ÿÁQ§ÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê ßU‚∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ßU‚
•Ê‡Êÿ ∑§Ë ‚ÍøŸÊ ŒË ¡ÊÃË „ÒU Á∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∞ÃŒ˜mÊ⁄UÊ •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ (z) ◊¥ ©UÀ‹Áπà ¬˝ÊÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄UË ∑§Ê ©UÄà ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§ ‚¥’¥äÊ ◊¥ äÊÊ⁄UÊ vw ∑§
•¥Ãª¸Ã ŒË ªÿË ‡ÊÁÄÃÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê ¬˝ÿʪ ∑§⁄UŸ ∑§ Á‹∞ ¬˝ÊÁäÊ∑Χà ∑§⁄UÃÊ „ÒU —ó
•ŸÈ‚ÍøË
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê fláʸŸ
œÊ⁄UÊ vw ∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ
Á¡‹Ê
ÄU‚Ë‹
Ÿª⁄U/ª˝Ê◊
‹ª÷ª ˇÊòÊ»§‹
¬˝ÊÁœ∑Χà •Áœ∑§Ê⁄UË
∑§Ê fláʸŸ
(„UÄ≈Uÿ⁄U ◊¥)
(v)
(w)
(x)
(y)
(z)
({)
⁄UÊÿª…∏U
Ã◊ŸÊ⁄U
ªÊ…∏UË
Æ.v}{
◊„Uʬ˝’¥äÊ∑§, ∞Ÿ.≈UË.¬Ë.‚Ë.
∞Ÿ.≈UË.¬Ë.‚Ë. ⁄‘U‹ ‹Ê߸UŸ
ÁËÊ߸U¬Ê‹Ë.
ÁŸ◊ʸáÊ „UÃÈ ¬Í⁄U∑§ ÷Í-
•¡¸Ÿ.
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê ŸÄ‡ÊÊ (å‹ÊŸ) •ŸÈÁfl÷ʪËÿ •ÁäÊ∑§⁄UË ⁄UÊ¡Sfl, ÉÊ⁄UÉÊÊ«∏Ê ∑§ ∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ ◊¥ ŒπÊ ¡Ê ‚∑§ÃÊ „ÒU.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ¬Ê‹ ∑§ ŸÊ◊ ‚ ÃÕÊ •ÊŒ‡ÊÊŸÈ‚Ê⁄U,
÷Ë◊ Á‚¥„U, ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U ∞fl¥ ¬ŒŸ ©U¬-‚Áøfl.
∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ, ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-¡Ê¥¡ªË⁄U-øÊ¥¬Ê (¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U),U ∞fl¢ ¬ŒŸ ©U¬-‚Áøfl, ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ,
⁄UÊ¡Sfl ∞fl¥ •Ê¬ŒÊ ¬˝’¥äÊŸ Áfl÷ʪ
¡Ê¥¡ªË⁄U-øÊ¥¬Ê, ÁŒŸÊ¥∑§ v} ¡ÍŸ wÆwÆ
∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§ z{vz/•-}w/wÆwÆ.óøÍ¢Á∑§ ⁄UÊÖÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§Ê ÿ„U ¬˝ÃËà „UÊÃÊ „ÒU Á∑§ ß‚‚ ‚¢‹ÇŸ •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ (v) ‚ (y) ◊¥ flÁáʸÃ
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ë •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ ({) ◊¥ ©U‚∑§ ‚Ê◊Ÿ ÁŒÿ ªÿ ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ ∑§ Á‹ÿ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ „ÒU •ÕflÊ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ ¬«∏UŸ ∑§Ë ‚¢÷ÊflŸÊ
„ÒU. •Ã— ÷ÍÁ◊ •¡¸Ÿ, ¬ÈŸflʸ‚Ÿ •ÊÒ⁄U ¬ÈŸ√ÿ¸flSÕʬŸ ◊¥ ©UÁøà ¬˝ÁÃ∑§⁄U •ÊÒ⁄U ¬Ê⁄UŒÁ‡Ê¸ÃÊ ∑§Ê •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄U •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊, wÆvx (Á¡‚ ∞ÃŒ˜ ¬‡øÊØ
•ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊ wÆvx ∑§„UÊ ¡ÊflªÊ) ∑§Ë äÊÊ⁄UÊ vv ∑§Ë ©U¬-äÊÊ⁄UÊ (v) ∑§ ©U¬’¥äÊÊ¥ ∑§ •ŸÈ‚Ê⁄U ‚÷Ë ‚¥’¥ÁäÊà √ÿÁQ§ÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê ßU‚∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ßU‚ •Ê‡Êÿ ∑§Ë
‚ÍøŸÊ ŒË ¡ÊÃË „ÒU Á∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∞ÃŒ˜mÊ⁄UÊ •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ (z) ◊¥ ©UÀ‹Áπà ¬˝ÊÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄UË ∑§Ê ©UÄà ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§ ‚¥’¥äÊ ◊¥ äÊÊ⁄UÊ vw ∑§ •¥Ãª¸Ã ŒË
ªÿË ‡ÊÁÄÃÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê ¬˝ÿʪ ∑§⁄UŸ ∑§ Á‹∞ ¬˝ÊÁäÊ∑Χà ∑§⁄UÃÊ „ÒU —ó
•ŸÈ‚ÍøË
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê fláʸŸ
œÊ⁄UÊ vw ∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ
Á¡‹Ê
ÄU‚Ë‹
Ÿª⁄U/ª˝Ê◊
‹ª÷ª ˇÊòÊ»§‹
¬˝ÊÁœ∑Χà •Áœ∑§Ê⁄UË
∑§Ê fláʸŸ
(„UÄ≈Uÿ⁄U ◊¥)
(v)
(w)
(x)
(y)
(z)
({)
¡Ê¥¡ªË⁄U-øÊ¥¬Ê
¡Ò¡Ò¬È⁄U
∑Ò§ÕÊ
Æ.vvw
∑§Êÿ¸¬Ê‹Ÿ •Á÷ÿ¥ÃÊ, „U‚Œfl
Œfl⁄UÉÊ≈UÊ ∞ŸË∑§≈U
¬.„U.Ÿ¥. xv
Ÿ„U⁄U ¡‹ ¬˝’¥äÊ ‚¥÷ʪ ¡Ê¥¡ªË⁄U
ÁŸ◊ʸáÊ „UÃÈ.
Á¡‹Ê-¡Ê¥¡ªË⁄U-øÊ¥¬Ê.
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê ŸÄ‡ÊÊ (å‹ÊŸ) ∑§Ê ÁŸ⁄UˡÊáÊ ‚¥’¥ÁäÊà •ŸÈÁfl÷ʪËÿ •ÁäÊ∑§⁄UË (⁄UÊ.), ‚ÄÃË ∑§ ∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ ◊¥ Á∑§ÿÊ ¡Ê ‚∑§ÃÊ „ÒU.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
658
¡Ê¥¡ªË⁄U-øÊ¥¬Ê, ÁŒŸÊ¥∑§ v~ ¡ÍŸ wÆwÆ
∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§ z|{w/•-}w/wÆwÆ.óøÍ¢Á∑§ ⁄UÊÖÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§Ê ÿ„U ¬˝ÃËà „UÊÃÊ „ÒU Á∑§ ß‚‚ ‚¢‹ÇŸ •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ (v) ‚ (y) ◊¥ flÁáʸÃ
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ë •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ ({) ◊¥ ©U‚∑§ ‚Ê◊Ÿ ÁŒÿ ªÿ ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ ∑§ Á‹ÿ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ „ÒU •ÕflÊ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ ¬«∏UŸ ∑§Ë ‚¢÷ÊflŸÊ
„ÒU. •Ã— ÷ÍÁ◊ •¡¸Ÿ, ¬ÈŸflʸ‚Ÿ •ÊÒ⁄U ¬ÈŸ√ÿ¸flSÕʬŸ ◊¥ ©UÁøà ¬˝ÁÃ∑§⁄U •ÊÒ⁄U ¬Ê⁄UŒÁ‡Ê¸ÃÊ ∑§Ê •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄U •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊, wÆvx (Á¡‚ ∞ÃŒ˜ ¬‡øÊØ
•ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊ wÆvx ∑§„UÊ ¡ÊflªÊ) ∑§Ë äÊÊ⁄UÊ vv ∑§Ë ©U¬-äÊÊ⁄UÊ (v) ∑§ ©U¬’¥äÊÊ¥ ∑§ •ŸÈ‚Ê⁄U ‚÷Ë ‚¥’¥ÁäÊà √ÿÁQ§ÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê ßU‚∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ßU‚ •Ê‡Êÿ ∑§Ë
‚ÍøŸÊ ŒË ¡ÊÃË „ÒU Á∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∞ÃŒ˜mÊ⁄UÊ •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ (z) ◊¥ ©UÀ‹Áπà ¬˝ÊÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄UË ∑§Ê ©UÄà ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§ ‚¥’¥äÊ ◊¥ äÊÊ⁄UÊ vw ∑§ •¥Ãª¸Ã ŒË
ªÿË ‡ÊÁÄÃÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê ¬˝ÿʪ ∑§⁄UŸ ∑§ Á‹∞ ¬˝ÊÁäÊ∑Χà ∑§⁄UÃÊ „ÒU —ó
•ŸÈ‚ÍøË
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê fláʸŸ
œÊ⁄UÊ vw ∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ
Á¡‹Ê
ÄU‚Ë‹
Ÿª⁄U/ª˝Ê◊
‹ª÷ª ˇÊòÊ»§‹
¬˝ÊÁœ∑Χà •Áœ∑§Ê⁄UË
∑§Ê fláʸŸ
(„UÄ≈Uÿ⁄U ◊¥)
(v)
(w)
(x)
(y)
(z)
({)
¡Ê¥¡ªË⁄U-øÊ¥¬Ê
¡Ò¡Ò¬È⁄U
¬⁄U‚ŒÊ
Æ.yÆ|
∑§Êÿ¸¬Ê‹Ÿ •Á÷ÿ¥ÃÊ, „U‚Œfl
„U‚ÊÒŒ ÁflÃ⁄U∑§ Ÿ„U⁄U
¬.„U.Ÿ¥. xy
Ÿ„U⁄U ¡‹ ¬˝’¥äÊ ‚¥÷ʪ ∑˝§
ÁŸ◊ʸáÊ „UÃÈ.
¡Ê¥¡ªË⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-¡Ê¥¡ªË⁄U-øÊ¥¬Ê.
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê ŸÄ‡ÊÊ (å‹ÊŸ) ∑§Ê ÁŸ⁄UˡÊáÊ ‚¥’¥ÁäÊà •ŸÈÁfl÷ʪËÿ •ÁäÊ∑§⁄UË (⁄UÊ.), ‚ÄÃË ∑§ ∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ ◊¥ Á∑§ÿÊ ¡Ê ‚∑§ÃÊ „ÒU.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ¬Ê‹ ∑§ ŸÊ◊ ‚ ÃÕÊ •ÊŒ‡ÊÊŸÈ‚Ê⁄U,
ÿ‡Êfl¥Ã ∑ȧ◊Ê⁄U, ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U ∞fl¥ ¬ŒŸ ©U¬-‚Áøfl.
∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ, ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-∑§’Ë⁄UäÊÊ◊ (¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U),U ∞fl¢ ¬ŒŸ ©U¬-‚Áøfl, ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ,
⁄UÊ¡Sfl ∞fl¥ •Ê¬ŒÊ ¬˝’¥äÊŸ Áfl÷ʪ
∑§’Ë⁄UäÊÊ◊, ÁŒŸÊ¥∑§ vw ◊Êø¸, wÆwÆ
∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§ w|~/Æy/•-}w/wÆv}-v~.óøÍ¢Á∑§ ⁄UÊÖÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§Ê ÿ„U ¬˝ÃËà „UÊÃÊ „ÒU Á∑§ ß‚‚ ‚¢‹ÇŸ •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ (v) ‚ (y) ◊¥
flÁáʸà ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ë •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ ({) ◊¥ ©U‚∑§ ‚Ê◊Ÿ ÁŒÿ ªÿ ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ ∑§ Á‹ÿ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ „ÒU •ÕflÊ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ ¬«∏UŸ ∑§Ë
‚¢÷ÊflŸÊ „ÒU. •Ã— ÷ÍÁ◊ •¡¸Ÿ, ¬ÈŸflʸ‚Ÿ •ÊÒ⁄U ¬ÈŸ√ÿ¸flSÕʬŸ ◊¥ ©UÁøà ¬˝ÁÃ∑§⁄U •ÊÒ⁄U ¬Ê⁄UŒÁ‡Ê¸ÃÊ ∑§Ê •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄U •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊, wÆvx (Á¡‚ ∞ÃŒ˜
¬‡øÊØ •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊ wÆvx ∑§„UÊ ¡ÊflªÊ) ∑§Ë äÊÊ⁄UÊ vv ∑§Ë ©U¬-äÊÊ⁄UÊ (v) ∑§ ©U¬’¥äÊÊ¥ ∑§ •ŸÈ‚Ê⁄U ‚÷Ë ‚¥’¥ÁäÊà √ÿÁQ§ÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê ßU‚∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ßU‚
•Ê‡Êÿ ∑§Ë ‚ÍøŸÊ ŒË ¡ÊÃË „ÒU Á∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∞ÃŒ˜mÊ⁄UÊ •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ πÊŸ (z) ◊¥ ©UÀ‹Áπà ¬˝ÊÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄UË ∑§Ê ©UÄà ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§ ‚¥’¥äÊ ◊¥ äÊÊ⁄UÊ vw ∑§
•¥Ãª¸Ã ŒË ªÿË ‡ÊÁÄÃÿÊ¥ ∑§Ê ¬˝ÿʪ ∑§⁄UŸ ∑§ Á‹∞ ¬˝ÊÁäÊ∑Χà ∑§⁄UÃÊ „ÒU —ó
•ŸÈ‚ÍøË
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê fláʸŸ
œÊ⁄UÊ vw ∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ
Á¡‹Ê
ÄU‚Ë‹
Ÿª⁄U/ª˝Ê◊
‹ª÷ª ˇÊòÊ»§‹
¬˝ÊÁœ∑Χà •Áœ∑§Ê⁄UË
∑§Ê fláʸŸ
(„UÄ≈Uÿ⁄U ◊¥)
(v)
(w)
(x)
(y)
(z)
({)
∑§’Ë⁄UäÊÊ◊
’Ê«∏‹Ê
‚⁄U߸U¬Ã⁄UÊ
Æ.Æw}
∑§Êÿ¸¬Ê‹Ÿ •Á÷ÿ¥ÃÊ, ¡‹ ‚¥‚ÊäÊŸ
‚⁄U߸U¬Ã⁄UÊ √ÿ¬fløŸ
¬.„U.Ÿ¥. yy
Áfl÷ʪ, ∑§’Ë⁄UäÊÊ◊.
ÿÊ¡ŸÊ¥Ãª¸Ã Ÿ„U⁄U ŸÊ‹Ë
ÁŸ◊ʸáÊ.
÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê ŸÄ‡ÊÊ (å‹ÊŸ) ∑§Ê ÁŸ⁄UˡÊáÊ •ŸÈÁfl÷ʪËÿ •ÁäÊ∑§⁄UË (⁄UÊ¡Sfl), ’Ê«∏‹Ê ∑§ ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ ◊¥ Á∑§ÿÊ ¡Ê ‚∑§ÃÊ „ÒU.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ¬Ê‹ ∑§ ŸÊ◊ ‚ ÃÕÊ •ÊŒ‡ÊÊŸÈ‚Ê⁄U,
•flŸË‡Ê ∑ȧ◊Ê⁄U ‡Ê⁄UáÊ, ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U ∞fl¥ ¬ŒŸ ©U¬-‚Áøfl.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
659
∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ, ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U, Á¡‹Ê ©UûÊ⁄U ’SÃ⁄U ∑§Ê¥∑§⁄U,
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ∞fl¢ ¬ŒŸ ©U¬ ‚Áøfl, ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ,
⁄UÊ¡Sfl ∞fl¥ •Ê¬ŒÊ ¬˝’¥äÊŸ Áfl÷ʪ
∑§Ê¥∑§⁄U, ÁŒŸÊ¥∑§ v} ¡ÍŸ wÆwÆ
∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§/ww}}/flÊ./÷Í.•./¬˝.∑˝§./v|/•-}w/wÆv{-v|.ó
øÍ¢Á∑§ ⁄UÊÖÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§Ê ß‚ ’Êà ∑§Ê ‚◊ʜʟ „UÊ ªÿÊ „ÒU Á∑§ ŸËø ŒË ªß¸
•ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ ¬Œ (v) ◊¥ flÁáʸà ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ë •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ ¬Œ (w) ◊¥
©UÀ‹Áπà ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ ∑§ Á‹∞ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ „ÒU. •Ã— ÷ÍÁ◊
•¡¸Ÿ, ¬ÈŸflʸ‚Ÿ •ÊÒ⁄U ¬ÈŸ√ÿ¸flSÕʬŸ ◊¥ ©UÁøà ¬˝ÁÃ∑§⁄U •ÊÒ⁄U ¬Ê⁄UŒÁ‡Ê¸ÃÊ
∑§Ê •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄U •ÁœÁŸÿ◊, wÆvx (Á¡‚ ∞ÃŒ˜ ¬‡øÊØ •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊,
wÆvx ∑§„UÊ ¡ÊÿªÊ) ∑§Ë œÊ⁄UÊ v~ ∑§ •ãê¸Ã ß‚∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ÿ„U ÉÊÊÁ·Ã
Á∑§ÿÊ ¡ÊÃÊ „ÒU Á∑§ ©UQ§ ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ë ©UQ§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ ∑§ Á‹∞ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ
„ÒU —ó
•ŸÈ‚ÍøË
(v) ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê fláʸŸ-
(∑§) Á¡‹Ê-©UûÊ⁄U ’SÃ⁄U ∑§Ê¥∑§⁄U
(π) ÄU‚Ë‹-øÊ⁄UÊ◊Ê
(ª) Ÿª⁄U/ª˝Ê◊-ÃÊ⁄U‚ªÊ¥fl
(ÉÊ) ‹ª÷ª ˇÊòÊ»§‹-v.wÆ „UÄ≈Uÿ⁄U
π‚⁄UÊ Ÿê’⁄U
⁄U∑§’Ê
(„UÄ≈Uÿ⁄U ◊¥)
(v)
(w)
y|Æ
Æ.Æw
y|w
Æ.Æw
{Æ~
Æ.Æv
y|x
Æ.Æw
zwy/v
Æ.Æw
zwy/w
Æ.v|
zwz/v
Æ.vv
zwz/w
Æ.v}
zwz/x
Æ.Æ{
zx~/w
Æ.Æ}
zyy
Æ.Æ|
z~|/v
Æ.Æx
z~|/w
Æ.Æy
z~}
Æ.Æz
z~~
Æ.Æy
{w{/v
Æ.Æw
{w|
Æ.Æ{
{ww
Æ.Æx
{w}/v
Æ.Æx
(v)
(w)
{ÆÆ
Æ.Æy
{vÆ/v
Æ.Æx
{vÆ/w
Æ.Æx
{wx
Æ.Æw
{w{/w
Æ.Æw
ÿʪ
wy
v.wÆ
(w) ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ Á¡‚∑§ Á‹∞ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ „ÒU-ÃÊ⁄U‚ªÊ¥fl-
‡ÊÊ„UflÊ«∏Ê ◊ʪ¸ ∑§ Á∑§.◊Ë. z/{ ◊¥ ◊„UÊŸŒË ¬⁄U ‚ÃÈ ÁŸ◊ʸáÊ ∑§
¬„Í¥Uø◊ʪ¸ „UÃÈ.
(x) ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê§ŸÄ‡ÊÊ (å‹ÊŸ) ∑§Ê ÁŸ⁄UˡÊáÊ •ŸÈÁfl÷ʪËÿ •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄UË
(⁄UÊ)/÷Í-•¡¸Ÿ •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄UË, øÊ⁄UÊ◊ÊU ∑§ ∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ ◊¥ Á∑§ÿÊ ¡Ê
‚∑§ÃÊ „ÒU.
∑§Ê¥∑§⁄U, ÁŒŸÊ¥∑§ v} ¡ÍŸ wÆwÆ
∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§/ww}~/flÊ./÷Í.•./¬˝.∑˝§./v{/•-}w/wÆv{-v|.ó
øÍ¢Á∑§ ⁄UÊÖÿ ‡ÊÊ‚Ÿ ∑§Ê ß‚ ’Êà ∑§Ê ‚◊ʜʟ „UÊ ªÿÊ „ÒU Á∑§ ŸËø ŒË ªß¸
•ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ ¬Œ (v) ◊¥ flÁáʸà ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ë •ŸÈ‚ÍøË ∑§ ¬Œ (w) ◊¥
©UÀ‹Áπà ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ ∑§ Á‹∞ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ „ÒU. •Ã— ÷ÍÁ◊
•¡¸Ÿ, ¬ÈŸflʸ‚Ÿ •ÊÒ⁄U ¬ÈŸ√ÿ¸flSÕʬŸ ◊¥ ©UÁøà ¬˝ÁÃ∑§⁄U •ÊÒ⁄U ¬Ê⁄UŒÁ‡Ê¸ÃÊ
∑§Ê •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄U •ÁœÁŸÿ◊, wÆvx (Á¡‚ ∞ÃŒ˜ ¬‡øÊØ •ÁäÊÁŸÿ◊,
wÆvx ∑§„UÊ ¡ÊÿªÊ) ∑§Ë œÊ⁄UÊ v~ ∑§ •ãê¸Ã ß‚∑§ mÊ⁄UÊ ÿ„U ÉÊÊÁ·Ã
Á∑§ÿÊ ¡ÊÃÊ „ÒU Á∑§ ©UQ§ ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ë ©UQ§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ ∑§ Á‹∞ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ
„ÒU —ó
•ŸÈ‚ÍøË
(v) ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê fláʸŸ-
(∑§) Á¡‹Ê-©UûÊ⁄U ’SÃ⁄U ∑§Ê¥∑§⁄U
(π) ÄU‚Ë‹-øÊ⁄UÊ◊Ê
(ª) Ÿª⁄U/ª˝Ê◊-‡ÊÊ„UflÊ«∏Ê
(ÉÊ) ‹ª÷ª ˇÊòÊ»§‹-v.}~ „UÄ≈Uÿ⁄U
π‚⁄UÊ Ÿê’⁄U
⁄U∑§’Ê
(„UÄ≈Uÿ⁄U ◊¥)
(v)
(w)
{wz
Æ.Æ|
{ww
Æ.Æy
|w|
Æ.vz
|w~/v
Æ.Æx
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
660
(v)
(w)
|w~/y
Æ.Æx
z}w
Æ.Æy
|xÆ
Æ.Æx
|yy
Æ.Æx
|zw
Æ.Æ~
{Æ|
Æ.Æv
|w}/w
Æ.Æx
z{w
Æ.Æy
{v~
Æ.Æx
{wÆ
Æ.Æz
z}Æ
Æ.Æ|
z~x
Æ.x{
z}v
Æ.Æy
z{{
Æ.Æv
z|x
Æ.Æx
z|z
Æ.Æw
z{z
Æ.Æw
z|y
Æ.Æw
z|{
Æ.vx
z~v
Æ.vv
(v)
(w)
{Æ{
Æ.Æ{
{wx
Æ.Æ{
z}x
Æ.Æw
{wv
Æ.Æz
|w}/v
Æ.Æx
{v}
Æ.Æ{
{Æz
Æ.vx
ÿʪ
xv
v.}~
(w) ‚Êfl¸¡ÁŸ∑§ ¬˝ÿÊ¡Ÿ Á¡‚∑§ Á‹∞ •Êfl‡ÿ∑§ÃÊ „ÒU-ÃÊ⁄U‚ªÊ¥fl-
‡ÊÊ„UflÊ«∏Ê ◊ʪ¸ ∑§ Á∑§.◊Ë. z/{ ◊¥ ◊„UÊŸŒË ¬⁄U ‚ÃÈ ÁŸ◊ʸáÊ ∑§
¬„Í¥Uø◊ʪ¸ „UÃÈ.
(x) ÷ÍÁ◊ ∑§Ê§ŸÄ‡ÊÊ (å‹ÊŸ) ∑§Ê ÁŸ⁄UˡÊáÊ •ŸÈÁfl÷ʪËÿ •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄UË
(⁄UÊ)/÷Í-•¡¸Ÿ •ÁäÊ∑§Ê⁄UË, øÊ⁄UÊ◊ÊU ∑§ ∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ ◊¥ Á∑§ÿÊ ¡Ê
‚∑§ÃÊ „ÒU.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ∑§ ⁄UÊíÿ¬Ê‹ ∑§ ŸÊ◊ ‚ ÃÕÊ •ÊŒ‡ÊÊŸÈ‚Ê⁄U,
∑§. ∞‹. øÊÒ„UÊŸ, ∑§‹Ä≈U⁄U ∞fl¥ ¬ŒŸ ©U¬-‚Áøfl.
Áfl÷ʪ ¬˝◊ÈπÊ¥ ∑§ •ÊŒ‡Ê
‚¥øÊ‹ŸÊ‹ÿ •ÊÁŒ◊¡ÊÁà •ŸÈ‚¥äÊÊŸ ∞fl¥ ¬˝Á‡ÊˇÊáÊ ‚¥SÕÊŸ
‚Ä≈U⁄U-wy, ŸflÊ ⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, •≈U‹ Ÿª⁄U, Á¡‹Ê-⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U (¿U.ª.)
ŸflÊ ⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, ÁŒŸÊ¥∑§ vz ¡ÍŸ wÆwÆ
CERTIFICATE TO TRANSFER OF CHARGE
∑˝§◊Ê¥∑§/≈Ë.•Ê⁄U.•Ê߸U./SÕÊ./wÆwÆ-wv/v}Æ.óCertified that I have in the forenoon of this day taken over and
received. Charge of Office of the Director, Tribal Research and Training Institute. C.G., raipur in pursuance of C.G.
Government, General Administration Department order No. E-1-02/2020/One-2 Date 11-06-2020.
‡Êê◊Ë •ÊÁ’ŒË,
‚¥øÊ‹∑§.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
661
∑§Êÿʸ‹ÿ ◊ÈÅÿ ÁŸflʸøŸ ¬ŒÊÁœ∑§Ê⁄UË, ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U
‡ÊÊSòÊË øÊÒ∑§, ¬È⁄UÊŸÊU ◊¢òÊÊ‹ÿ ¬Á⁄U‚⁄U, ⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U
⁄UÊÿ¬È⁄U, ÁŒŸÊ¥∑§ xÆ ◊Êø¸ wÆv~
»§Ê.∑˝§-v}/Æx/ÁŸflʸøŸ ÿÊÁø∑§Ê/wÆÆ~-v~/xw~w.ó÷Ê⁄Uà ÁŸflʸøŸ •Êÿʪ, Ÿß¸ ÁŒÀ‹Ë mÊ⁄UÊ ¡Ê⁄UË •Áœ‚ÍøŸÊ ‚¢ÅÿÊ }w/¬Ífl¸.•ŸÈ.-
v/¿U.ª.-Áfl.‚./(Æx/wÆvy)/wÆv~/ ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy ◊Êø¸, wÆv~ ‹Ê∑§ ¬˝ÁÃÁŸÁœàfl •ÁœÁŸÿ◊, v~zv (v~zv ∑§Ê yx) ∑§Ë œÊ⁄UÊ vÆ{(∑§) ∑§
•ŸÈ‚⁄UáÊ ◊¥ ÁŸflʸøŸ •Êÿʪ ∞ÃŒ˜ÔmÊ⁄UÊ ÁŸflʸøŸ •¡Ë¸ ‚¢ÅÿÊ-Æx/wÆvy ◊¥ ÁŒ∞ ª∞ ©UìÊ ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ, ¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U Á’‹Ê‚¬È⁄U ∑§ ÃÊ⁄UËπ xÆ ¡Ÿfl⁄UË,
wÆv~ ∑§ •ÊŒ‡Ê ∑§Ê ⁄UÊÖÿ ∑§ ‡ÊÊ‚∑§Ëÿ ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ ◊¥ ‚fl¸‚ÊœÊ⁄UáÊ ∑§Ë ¡ÊŸ∑§Ê⁄UË „UÃÈ ¬˝∑§ÊÁ‡Êà Á∑§ÿÊ ¡ÊÃÊ „ÒU.
(‚È’˝Ã ‚Ê„ÍU)
◊ÈÅÿ ÁŸflʸøŸ ¬ŒÊÁœ∑§Ê⁄UË.
÷Ê⁄Uà ÁŸflʸøŸ •Êÿʪ
ÁŸflʸøŸ ‚ŒŸ, •‡ÊÊ∑§ ⁄UÊ«U, Ÿß¸ ÁŒÀ‹Ë-vvÆÆÆv
Ÿß¸ ÁŒÀ‹Ë, ÃÊ⁄UËπ vy ◊Êø¸, wÆv~ówx »§ÊÀªÈŸÔU, v~yÆ (‡Ê∑§)
‚¢. }w/¬Ífl¸ •ŸÈ.-v/¿U.ª.-Áfl.‚./(x/wÆvy)/wÆv~.ó‹Ê∑§ ¬˝ÁÃÁŸÁœàfl •ÁœÁŸÿ◊, v~zv (v~zv ∑§Ê yx) ∑§Ë œÊ⁄UÊ vÆ{ (π)
∑§ •ŸÈ‚⁄UáÊ ◊¥, ÁŸflʸøŸ •Êÿʪ ∞ÃŒ˜ÔmÊ⁄UÊ ÁŸflʸøŸ •¡Ë¸ ‚¢. x/wÆvy ◊¥ ÁŒÿ ªÿ ©UìÊ ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ, ¬≈UŸÊ ∑§ ÃÊ⁄UËπ xÆ ¡Ÿfl⁄UË, wÆv~ ∑§ •ÊŒ‡Ê
∑§Ê ¬˝∑§ÊÁ‡Êà ∑§⁄UÃÊ „ÒU.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
E.P. No. 3 of 2014
PETITIONER
:
Sameera Paikara D/0 Late Gangaram Kanwar Aged About 31 Years R/o Umarkholi,
P.O. Jogishar, Tah. Pendra Road, P.S. Gourella, Distt. Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
VERSUS
RESPONDENTS :
1.
Amit Ajit Jogi Amit Aishwarya Jogi S/o Ajit Jogi Aged About 35 Years R/o Anugarh
Sagoun Bungalow, Raipur, P.S. Civil Line. Distt. Raipur Chhattisgarh.
2.
Suman Singh Wakare D/o Ramlal Wakare Aged About 48 Years R/o Bharridan,
Tah. Marwahi, P.S. Marwahi, Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
3.
Tapeshwar Marawi S/o Ramsingh Marawi Aged About 48 Years R/o Andi, Tah.
Marwahi, P.S. Marwahi, Distt. Bilaspur District, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
4.
Dr. Urmila Singh Marko W/o Ram Singh Marko Aged About 45 Years R/o Near
S.E.C.L. Colony, Bandhwa Para, P.S. Sarkanda, Bilaspur, Distt. Bilaspur, Dis-
trict, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
662
5.
Smt. Gajmati Bhanu W/o Amar Bhanu Aged About 46 Years R/o Semra, P.O.
Sanatorium, Tah. Pendra Road, P.S. Gourella, Distt. Bilaspur, District, Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh.
6.
Ghasiram Wakre S/o Sukla Wakre Aged About 55 Years R/o Kotmikala, Tah.
Pendra, P.S. Pendra Chouki, Kotmikala, Distt. Bilaspur, District, Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
7.
Than Singh Otti S/o Ramcharan Otti Aged About 38 Years R/o Baror, P.O. Baror,
Tah. Marwahi, P.S. Marwahi, Distt. Bilaspur, District, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
8.
Pancham Singh Masram S/o Maniram Masram Aged About 40 Years, R/o
Kotkharra, P.O. Lalpur, Tah. Marwahi. P.S. Gourella, Distt. Bilaspur, District,
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
9.
Budhman Dhurve S/o Vikram Singh Dhurve Aged About 52 Years R/o Vijarwar,
P.O. Lalpur, Tah. Pendra Road, P.S. Gourella, Distt. Bilaspur District, Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. S.C. Verma, Mr. Rajat Agrawal & Mr. Harsh Wardhan, Advocates.
For the Respondents
:
Dr. N. K. Shukla, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Vikram Sharma & Madam A. Sen
Gupta, Advocates.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Goutam Bhaduri
CAV JUDGMENT
(Reserved on 13.12.2018)
(Pronounced on 30.01.2019)
1.
The challenge in this election petition is to the election held for the Member of Chhattisgarh State Legisla-
tive Assembly of Area No. 24 of Marwahi Constituency. The result of the election was declared on 09.11.2013
wherein the respondent Amit Ajit Jogi was declared as elected. One of the Candidate Sameera Paikra D/o
Late Gangaram Kanwar who was a contesting candidate from BJP is the petitioner, Respondent no. 1 Amit
Ajit Jogi was contesting candidate of Indian National Congress. The returned candidate was Amit Ajit Jogi
and secured total 82909 votes whereas Sameera Paikra was polled 38659 Votes, thereby respondent no. 1
was declared elected.
2.
The inter-alia ground of challegne is that on 28.10.2013 the petitioner filed an application for grant of
social status (caste) certificate before the Tahsildar Pendra Road and Tahsildar Pendra Road without having
any jurisdiction issued the caste certificate on the same day by completing enquiry. It was stated that
respondent no. 1 did not have valid caste certificate ot contest the election as the seat was reserved for
scheduled tribe. The further pleading is that Amit Ajit Jogi did not file any application in prescribed format
5A to get the caste certificate and on 31.10.2013 when the Act of the Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social Status
(Caste) Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification) Act 2013
and Rules 2013 was enforced the caste certificate so held by respondent No. 1 would be invalid as the
procedure and ruels were not followed.
3.
The further pleading is that the returning officer and the officer who issued the caste certificate are one and
the same, therefore, issuing authority was a judge of his own case and acceptance of the nomination form
on the basis of social caste certificate would be bad in law.
4.
It is further pleaded that respondent No. 1 was born at Dallas Texas (USA) and was American citizen by
birth but had filed his nomination as an Indian citizen, therefore, no dual citizenship is permitted, he could
not have contested the election.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
663
5.
The further pleading was that the grand-father and grand-mother of respondent No. 1 were not tribes as they
have adopted the Cristian religion, so they do not continue to be tribe to contest the election to the said seat.
It is further stated that the returned candidate (R-1) submitted wrong information before filing the nomination
paper that his place of birth was at village Sarbahara whereas he was born at USA. Consequently, wrong
averments were made by suppression of fact. The petitioner contended that the returning officer should not
have accepted the nomination of candidate and illegally accepted the nomination and having objected to the
same, without any justification the same was dismissed. The petitioner further pleaded that during the
election they distributed money at the polling booth as such adopted the corrupt practice, therefore, the
election required to be set aside.
6.
The said pleading was denied by the returned candidate. No averments of the petition was accepted. On the
basis of the pleading, the following issues were framed by the Court.
1.
Whether the acceptance of nomination form of respondent
“Not proved”
by Returing Officer on the basis of provisional caste certi-
ficate was illegal ?
2.
Whether respondent No. 1 Suppressed the material fact
“Not Proved”
which would render the election to be declared void ?
3.
Whether the respondent is guilty of committing corrupt
“Not Proved”
practice ?
4.
Whether the finding over caste certificate can be adjudicated
“Yes”
in the instant election petition ?
5.
Whether respondent No. 1 was entitled for contesting the
“Was Indian Citizen
assembly election of the State being american Citizen by
at the time of filing Nomi-
birth ?
nation”
6.
Whether the petitioner is entitiled for any other relief
“No.”
which deems fit in the circumstances ?
7.
Petitioner Sameera Paikra on her behalf examined herself as P.W. 1 and further examined Smt. Reena Baba
Saheb Kangale as P.W. 2 the Special Secretary Adim jati kalyan Vibhag; Sarveshwar Narendra Bhure as
P.W. 3 who is Director National Rural Health Mission, Shri Prakash Patle, Patwari as P.W. 4; Bhaskar Singh
Markam, the SDO as P.W. 5 and B.C. Joshi, employee of Central Home Ministry as P.W. 6. During the
course of trial, the petitioner exhibited as many as 22 documents from Ex. P-1 to P-22.
8.
Respondent Amit Ajit Jogi himself was examined as D.W. 1 One Shankar singh was examined as D.W. 2.
One Janbhan singh, Teacher, was examined as D.W. 3 & Dil Prasad Paikra was examined as D.W. 4 and the
documents were exhibited from Ex. D-1 to D-8.
9.
(i)
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the respondent returned candidate has wrongly
submitted the place of birth as Sarbahara as also wrong date of birth was shown, therefore, by filing
a wrong affidavit before the returning officer on the basis of false caste certificate, the nomination
form was filed, It is further contended that by using false caste certificate of Scheduled Tribe,
nomination was filed for the reserved constituency of Marawahi, therefore, fraud was played. It is
also contended that when so called caste certificate was issued. The Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social
Status (Cast) Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certifica-
tion) Act 2013 and the Rules were not followed nor the affidavit was filed in presecribed format as it
described different coloured paper to be used at different stages. So by fraud, the result of the
election was materially affected. It is stated that the returning officer and the person issuing the caste
certificate were one and the same, consequently the bias can be very well arrived at by examining
the fact itself.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
664
(ii)
Referring to the statement of P.W. 2, the Chairman of the Caste High Powered Scrutiny Committee
and the order passed by the Committee it is contended that is was held that Ajit Jogi does not
belong
to kanwar caste, it is contended that the said decision would answer the entire issue that
the returned candidate though being not a Kanwar, the Tribe Community, has contested the
election for the reserved seat. Referring to the statement of P.W. 2 Sarveshwar Narendra Bure,
it is stated that the documents filed by the returned candidate for issuance of caste certificate was
not verified following the provisions of Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social Status (Caste), Scheduled
Tribes and Ohter backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification) Act, 2013 (herein-
after referred to as the Act, 2013), therefore, the certificate so issued is null and void. By referring
to Rules of Section 4 of the Act 2013, it is stated that once the complete procedure having been
prescribed in the Act of 2013 and if the procedure is not followed then even if the caste certificate
is issued would be non-est. It is stated that only provisional caste certificate was issued on the
basis that the Tahsildar had forwarded the same to the SDO and without any enquiry, the caste
certificate was isued in haste on the same date.
(iii)
It is further contended that according to P.W. 5 Bhaskar Singh, the place of birth of respondent no.
1 was shown at village Sarbahara whereas respondent no. 1 was born at Dallas Texas USA, as such,
the false declaration was made, Referring to the statement of B.C. Joshi (P.W. 6) it is stated that
the document would show that the respondent was born at Dallas (USA) and apparent wrong
submission of fact is on record. Counsel further referring to statement of D.W.1would submit that
rituals and customs of Nawa Khai is only performed by the Tribes and Amit Jogi being not a
Kanwar tribe did not follow the rituals and customs which would show that he is not Kanwar
though he contested as Kanwar Tribe. Therefore, though he contested on a reserved seat but in
fact he was not entitled to contest the seat reserved for the ST.
(iv)
Referring to issuance of caste certificate it is contended that the caste certificate was issued
hurriedly on the same day without following the mandate of the Act, 2013, therefore, on the
basis of false everments the election was contested. Reliance was placed in 1990 (4) SCC 526 and
AIR 2008 SC 632 and would submit that fraud on the constitution was played by the respondent
no. 1 and the certificate so issued is de-horse the Act and rules and loses its efficacy consequently
the special privilege to contest a reserved seat cannot be allowed, therefore, the re-election may be
set aside.
10.
(i)
Per contra learned counsel for the respondent submits that the entire averments and the allegations
so made have not been categorically pleaded in the petition. It is stated that the evidence adduced
by the petitioner would show that respondent No. 1 had accepted the Indian citizenship and was
major of more than 25 years of age, therefore, there was no bar to contest the election. It is further
submitted that the place of birth do not discriminate for a person of indian Ciitizen to contest the
election, therefore, even if his place of birth was at Dallas Texas (USA), he was entitled to contest
the election. It is stated that respondent No. 1 has accepted the citizenship of India, therefore, he no
longer remained to be citizen of USA and was entitled to contest the election, Counsel would
further submit that the domicile by choice was accepted by respondent herein India, therefore, the
place of birth of respondent No. 1 would be of least significance to contest the election.
(ii)
With respect to the corrupt practice, it is stated that the verification has been made in the election
petition which shows that the petitioner came to know from different sources, therefore, no cat-
egorical submission is made as to which information was based on her personal knowledge and
which was from outside source as in the statement everything was attributed to the personal
knowldege, it is stated that there was serious discrepancy in the manner of verification and the
evidence exists in the case.
(iii)
Learned counsel further submitted that the election petition is vague as it could be and general
omnibus allegations have been made and in the election cases, the evidence has to be beyond
reasonable doubt akin to the criminal cases and in the case on hand evidence do not lead to any
proof of fact warranting any interference by this Court. He further submitted that by now the tenure
of the election having been over, it is only academic and without prejudice to the averments, It is
stated that even if the election is set aside, no relief could be granted.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
665
11.
Heard learnd counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.
12.
In the facts of this case considering the submission made by the petitioner issue No. 5 is answered first as it
has bearing to the other issues, For the sake of convenience, issue no. 5 is reproduced herein below;
(v)
Whether respondent no. 1 was entittled for contesting the assembly election of the State being
American Citizen by birth.
13.
Article 173 of the Constitution of India prescribes the qualification for the memebrship of the State Legis-
lature. It reads as under;
“173 Qualification for membership of the Sate Legislature,—A person shall not be quali-
fied to Chosen to fill a seat in the Legislature of the State unless he—
(a)
is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person authorised in that behalf
by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the
purpose in the Third Schedule.
(b)
is, in the case of seat in the Legislative Assembly, not less than twenty-five years of age and
in the case of a seat in the Legislative Council, not less than thirty years of age; and
(c)
Possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or under any law
made by Parliament.”
14.
Reading of the Article 173 shows it prescribes that unless a person is citizen of india and if he is less than 25
years of age and unless he possesses such other requisite qualifications as per the law enacted by the
Parliament, he shall not contest the election for the State Legislature, Therefore, in the instant case as
against the averments made if the respondent No. 1 was 25 years of age as on date of filling the nomination,
he was entitled to contest the election or not to be examined apart of effect of birth which admittedly took
place at USA. The nominations for election were filed from 26.10.2013 to 01.11.2013. The date of birth of
respondent as per Ex.P.-19 (application for cast certificate) is shown as 07.08.1978 and another document of
citizenship Ex.P.-22 proved by the petitioner shows the date of birth of R-1 is as 07th August 1977. Therefore
one shows the year 1977 and another is 1978. So even if the date of birth is considered qua either in the year
1977 or 1978 respondent no. 1 appears to be more than 25 years of age as on the date of filing of the
nomination. Therefore, even if two different dates of birth are shown i.e., 07.08.1978 in Ex.P-19 and
07.08.1977 in Ex.P-22, it would not make substantial difference for this election petition since respondent
No. 1 was aged about 36 years of age on that date.
15.
The representation of people Act 1951, Chapter-II Section 5 further lays down the qualification for mem-
bership of the State Legislatures.
16.
Section 5(a) is relevant here which reads as under;
5.
Qualififactions for membership of State Legislative Assembly,— A person shall not be qualified to
be Chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly of a State unless—
(a)
in the case of seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes or for the Scheduled Tribes of that
State, he is a member of any of those castes or of those tribes, as the case may be, and is an
elector for any Assembly Constituency in that State;
(b)
........................................................
(c)
........................................................
17.
Reading of section 5 would show that he is to be an elector. The ‘elector” is defined in section 2(1)(e) of
RPA Act 1951 which reads as under;
“2(1)(e) “elector” in relation to a constituency means a person whose name is entered in the electoral
roll of that constituency for the time being in force and who is not subject to any of the disqualifications
mentioned in section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950)”.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
666
18.
Reading of the aforesaid definition would show that irrespective of the place of birth if the name of person
is entered in the electoral roll and if he is not disqualified otherwise, he may contest the election. There is no
pleading of fact or evidence on record to show that respondent No. 1 was not an elector of the constituency.
Therfore, even though the submission of petitioner for prohibition of discrimination on the place of birth of
respondent no. 1 is correct, but the same will not be available to petitioner if respondent No. 1 is an elector
as difined u/s 2(1)(e) of the Act, 1951.
19.
With respect to submission on the ground of religion, Article 15 of the Constitution of India would be
relevant here. The said Article mandates that a person cannot be discriminated on on the ground of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth which reads thus;
“15.
Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birht,—
(1)
The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds any of religion, race, caste,
sex place of birth or any of them.
(2)
No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them,
be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to—
(a)
access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment;or
(b)
the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained
wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.
(3)
Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making any Special provision for women
and Children.
(4)
Nothing in this article or in cluase (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes
of citizen or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
(5)
Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the State
from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educa-
tionally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes
insofar as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutuions
including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other
than the minority educational institutions referred to in cluase (1) of Article 30.”
20.
Now turning to pleading, Section 83 of the Act, 1951 requires that the contents of the election petition shall
contain a contcise statement of the material facts. Section 87 of the Act says the procedure of CPC to be
followed while deciding an election petition like that of a suit. The particular detailed pleading that how
respondent was not entitled to contest election on the ground of place of birth is vague and not clear.
21.
When the pleading and evidence to this fact qua Article 173 & Article 15 of the Constitution of India are
examined. It reveals at Para 9 of the petition wherein it is stated that respondent No. 1 was born at Dallas
USA on 07.08.1977 and he was Americal by birth, Ex.P-5 the docuemnt of petitioner shows that the objection
was made at Paras 5,6,7 & 10 wherein the petitioner contended that respondent No. 1 was born in USA and
he is not an Indian citizen, however, he obtained the temporary caste certificate or Kanwar, a Scheduled
Tribe Ex.P-6 shows an objection made to the returning officer Marawahi constituency. Para 6.1 of the
statement of the petitioner in affidavit under Order 18 Rules 4 of CPC is also on the same line. The petitioner
at para 58 of statement admits the fact that the name of Amit Ajit Jogi was in the voters list but she is not in
know of the fact as to when it was added. She further stated that while preparing to contest the election she
came to know that his name is in the voters list. She has further stated that from the statement she came to
know that Amit Ajit Jogi was born at America, therefore, he had to obtain the citizenship of India thereby
this fact that the name of respondent No. 1 was in the voters list as also the fact that he had applied for
citizenship of India is admitted.
22.
Para 60 of P.W. 1 would show that she has not set up a case that respondent no. 1 being not a citizen of India
cannot contest, whereas the citizenship is proved by P.W. 6 B.C. Joshi who is an employee of Cental Home
Ministry. According to him, Amit Jogi had applied for citizenship and his application was admitted on
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
667
26.07.2004, Ex.P_22 is a certificate of Registration issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs which shows
that according to the provisions of Section 5(1)(a) of Citizenship Act 1955, Amit Asihwarya Jogi was
registered as citizen of India. This too is proved by the petitioner herself.
23.
Sameera Paikra the petitioner in her statement at para 60 has stated that in respect of citizenship of respon-
dent no. 1, application under the Right to information was filed before Home Ministry and there is no
mention of such application in her election petition. She has further stated that though the application was
not filed but this fact is admitted that the said information was sought after the instant election petiiton was
preferred. At para 64, she admitted the fact that as on date, the respondent is citizen of India. The said
statement of petitioner would be an admission u/s 58 of the Indian Evidence Act.
24.
The Supreme Court in a case law reported in AIR 2001 3689 has dealt with similar nature of issue wherein
the argument was raised that a returned candidate being not citizen of India whether can be raised in
election petition. The Supereme Court held therein the validity of certificate of citizenship issued u/s 5(1)
can be gone into during trial of election.
25.
Now coming to the legal implication, Part II Article 5 of the Constitution of India defined the “Citizenship”
which reads as under.
5.
Citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution,—At the commencement of this Constitu-
tion every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and—
(a)
who was born in the territory of India; or
(b)
either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or
(c)
who has been ordinarily residenct in the territory of India for not less than five years
immediately preceding such commencement.
shall be a citizen of India.
26.
In the subject matter, the Supreme Court in AIR 1966 S.C. 160 (Kedar pandey vs. Narain Bikram Sah) has laid
down the ratio to determine the domicile and what is to be proved in such case, the objection was made by
way of an election petition against the returned candidate that he was not duly qualified under Article 173 of
the Constitution of India to contest the election as he was not the citizen of India claiming that returned
candidate was born at Nepal. The election Tribunal then had initially held that the respondent Narain Raja
was not citizen of India. The High Court on challenge made to it held that the respondent who was elected
acquiired the citizenship by “domicile of choice” in the Indian Territory, as such acquired the status of
citizen of India under Article 5(a) & (c) of the Constitution. The Supreme court while deciding the issue
proceeded on presumption that the returned candidate Narayan Raja was not borne in India.
27.
The Supreme Court at Para 8 after considering the submission held that the law attributes to every person at
birth a domicile which is called a “domicile of origin” and the “domicile of origin” is received by operation
of law at birth whereas the “domicile of choice” can also be acquired by a person by the actual removal of
the individual to another country accompanied by his animus manendi. It held that domicile of origin of an
individual is determined at the time of his birth, of the person upon whom he is legally dependent. The
Court further held that a legitimate child who is born in a wedlock to a living father receives the domicile
of the father at the time of birth; a posthumous legitimate child receives that of the mother at that time. As
regards the change of domicile, any person who is not under disability may at any time change his existing
domicile and acquire for himself a domicile of choice by the fact of residing in a county other than that of
his domicile of origin with the intention of continuing to reside there indefinitely. The court further pointed
out that the purpose of residence is a mere physical fact and it means no more than personal presence in a
locality, regarded apart from any of the circumstances attending it. If the physical fact is accompanied by
the required state of mind, neither its character nor its duration is in any away material. The state of mind,
or animus manendi, which is required demands that the person whose domicile is the object of the inquiry
should have formed a fixed and settled purpose of making his principal or sole permanent home in the
country of residence or in effect, he should have formed a deliberate intention to settle there.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
668
28.
According to me petitioner, at Para-65 she admits that Amit Jogi’s father Ajit Pramod Jogi and mother
Smt. Renu Jogi are indian citizens. Respondent Amit Jogi in his statement admitted that he was born at
Dallas, Taxas (USA) on 07th August, 1977. If the said statements are read along-with Ex.P.-22 which is a
certificate issued u/s 5(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act 1955 whereby the citizenship was granted to respondent
No. 1 would show that he has obtained the citizenship of india. If the facts are looked into from another
angle it would show that after birth, minor child came with the father and mother to India. In such state of
affairs, the ratio laid down in case of kedar Pandey AIR 1966 S.C. 160 (supra) would clearly apply and by
fiction it can be inferred that the person who is dependent on his parents comes back and settles herein India
then it would be considered that he has obtained the domicile by choice. In view of such principle, issue no.
5 that whether the petitioner was entitled to conest the election being American citizen by birth at India is
answered in favour of respondent No. 1 and it is held that merely because of birth of respondent No. 1 at
U.S.A., respondent no. 1 could not have been stopped to contest the election when he has chosen the
“domicile of choice” by accepting the citizenship, setting and expressed his mind to settle and continue in
India.
29.
The Statement of P.W.6 B.C. Joshi of Central Home Ministry, New Delhi shows that he has stated that
respondent No. 1 has surrendered his citizenship of USA and the application was preferred before the Home
Ministry. The Home Ministry after due enquiry issued the certificate. He has stated that the certificate under
section 5(1)(a) will be issued to those foreign citizens who have surrendered their earlier country citizen-
ship. Section 5 of the Citizenship Act 1955 postulates that it grants citizenship by registration and sub-
section (5) of section 5 contemplates that a person registered under this section shall be a citizen of India by
registration as from the date on which he is so registered and would be considered to be a citizen. In paras
9 & 10 petitoner has only stated that respondent No. 1 is citizen of USA. In the pleading except the fact that
he was born at USA, nothing has been pleaded. Here in the instant case the certificate Ex.P-22 is not under
challenge, therefore, the said issue is answered in favour of respondent No. 1.
30.
Now the findings are given on issues 2 & 3 which are reproduced here-in-below;
(ii)
Whether respondent No. 1 suppressed the material fact which would render the election to be
declared void ?
(iii)
whether the respondent is guilty of committing corrupt practice ?
Issue no. 2 & 3 are interlinked to each other, therefore, are decided together. A reading of petiton would
show that from Para 12 to 17, the Petitioner has averred about the corrupt practice. The verification of the
main petition would reveal that contents of paras 1 & 2 and Paras 18 & 19 have been stated to be true to the
personal knowedge of the petitioner and Paras 3 to 11 are said to be believed to be true based on records and
paras 12 to 17 are believed to be true based on information received.
31.
In the affidavit all the averments of corrupt practice from Paras 12 to 17 have been stated which are believed
to be true on the information received by her, when the Statement of the petitoner is traversed through, at
Para 49 it is stated that on 15.11.2013 a complaint was given by Santosh Tiwari to the election returning
officer. The complaint was made about a particular incident, which is said to have taken place on 15.11.2013.
This is a hear-say evidence as it was not to the knowledge of the petitioner. At para 13 of the petiton, it was
stated that liquor and Saris were distributed by the workers of respondent No. 1 which was informed by
Santosh Pandey and a written complaint was made to the returning officer about the incident of 17.11.2013.
Santosh Pandey has not been examined before the Court. Therefore, it is also hear-say only to the effect that
Santosh Kumar has informed to the petitioner;
32.
Likewise at Paras 15, 16 & 17 averments of corrupt practice have been made on the basis of information given
by Santosh Pandey which is corroborated by para 34 of the Statement of the petitioner that the information
was given by Santosh Pandey. At para 17 of the petition, the allegation of corrupt practice has been made for
distributing money, liquor and Saris and it has been stated that two Government workers had canvassed for
the returned candidate, which was witnessed by vorious persons and was informed by Dharamlal Yadav and
Surendra Singh Paikra. Both these persons who are said to have supplied the information have not been
examined. At para 14 of the petition, it was stated that certain money and liquor were distributed ot the voters
and haviing been objected by the petitioner’s workers Inder Singh Dhurvey and others, they were aboused.
Inder Singh Dhurvey was also not examined before the Court. Though the petitioner discloses that various
incidents of corrupt practice were reported by Santosh Pandey, Dharamlal Paikra, Surendra singh & indersingh
Dhurve but none of them were examined before the Court. Therefore, these facts would show that facts
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
669
pleaded were not in her personal knowledge as such the said statement of fact cannot be accepted being
inadmissible in evidence.
33.
The corrupt practice is defined u/s 123 of Representation of People Act read with section 100 sub-section (2)
which makes mandatory u/s 100 sub-section (2), that it was to be pleaded and proved that corrupt practice was
committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent. Therefore, it was the primary duty of the
petitioner to prove those facts that corrupt practice which was steated to be done by few person whether the
election agent or the respondent.
34.
The Supreme Court in case of Jeet Mohinder Singh vs. Harminder Singh Jassi (1999) 9 SCC 386 in para 40
held that “the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with. Any
petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law. The Court further held
that setting aside of an election involves serious consequences not only for the returned candidate and the
constituecny, but also for the public at large inasmuch as re-election involves an enermous load on the public
funds and administration.
35.
Further in (2010) 1 SCC 466-Kattinokkula Murali Krishna v. Veeramalla Koteswara Rao the Supreme Court
has held that it is a settled principle of law that evidence beyound the pleadings can neither be permitted to
be adduced nor can such evidence be taken into account. As such the standard of proof was emphasized in
such case law. similar view was adopted in (2000) 8 SCC 191 - Ravinder Singh Vs. Janmeja Singh, wherein it
was also held that “it is an the established proposition that no avidence can be led on a plea not raised in the
pleadings and that no amount of evidence can cure defect in the pleadings.”
36.
Futher in case law reported in (2014) 1 SCC 45-Regu Mahesh alias Regu Maheswar Rao Vs. Rajendra Pratap
Bhanj Dev the importance of setting out the sources of information in affidavits came up for consideration
and it was held that the sources of information should be clearly disclosed. It was also held that real impor-
tance of setting out the sources of information at the time of presentation of the petition is to give the other
side notice of the contemporaneous evidence on which the election petition is based and that will give an
opportunity to the other side to test the genuineness and veracity of the sources of information.
37.
Herein the present case, the pleading and evidence on corrupt practice is too vague and it is only based on
hear-say evidence. The petitioner though stated that certain goods were distributed in such case, It was also
upon the petitioner to prove that the workers against whom the charges of distribution of money and liquor,
Saris etc. have been made were the agents/workers of the returned candidate. The person who informed the
petitioner about those corrupt practices or maloractices are not examined. Though the personal knowledge
has been pleaded in the petition and affidavit but evidence whould show that it is all hear-say. As such the
petitioner failed to prove corrupt practice of distribution of money and various goods.
38.
It is further alleged by the petitioner that the respondents suppressed the material fact so as to render the
election in valid. The Petitioner in her statement under Order 18 rule 4 of CPC had stated that as per EX.P-9
which is report of the Patwari the place of birth of respondent No. 1 was at village Sarbahara and the date of
birth is 07.08.1978. The Patwari who prepared this document is P.W.4 Prakash Patle, P.W. 4 has deposed that
in the year 2013 Amit Jogi had filed an application before him to prepare the family tree and one Kamal Singh
who was Patel of village Jogishar came to him along-with application. The statement of witneesses and
photocopies of the affidavits were attached and Kamal Singh is the Government Servant, working in the
Revenue Department as Village Patel, The said document Ex.p-9 was not confronted with this witness though
the same is exhibited by the petitioner. Para 30 of the statement of the petitioner (P.W. 1) shows that while
such exhibits were marked it was objected that it is not a certified copy as per the provisions of Section 76 of
the Indian Evidence Act. The court thereon allowed to mark the said docuemnt as Exhibit and observed that
admissibility of the document would be considered at the time of evidence.
39.
A perusla of Ex.P-9 would show that it is a photocopy. P.W.4 was the witness of petitioner but the document
Ex.P-9 was not confronted to P.W.4 the Patwari Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act defines the public
document which is reproduced here-in-below;
74.
Public documents,—The following documents are public documents;
(1)
Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts—
(i)
of the sovereing authority,
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
670
(ii)
of official bodies and tribunals, and
(iii)
of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive of any part of India or of the
Commonwealth, or of a foreign country;
(2)
Public records kept in any State of private documents.
40.
Likewise, section 76 defines the certified copy of the public document which reads as under:
“76. Certified copies of public documents.—Every public officer having the custody of a public
document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment
of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is true copy of
such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subsribed by such
officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorised by law to
make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.”
41.
The certified copy as defined in Section 76 contemplates that it is to be issued on payment of legal fee thereof
together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part
thereof, as the case may be and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name
and his official title and shall be sealed. A perusal of Ex.P-9 do not show that certain fee was paid. However,
at the foot of the document, the words Satya Pratilipi and signature of Tahsildar Pendra Road are shown.
Bhaskar Singh, the Tahsildar Pendra Road was examined as P.W.5. The said office was not confornted with
the document Ex.P-9 though he was witness of the petitioner. As such the facts as to whose signature Ex.P-9
bears and who has issued the same and when the legal fee was deposited ought to have been explained to
comply the provisions of Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act so as to take within the ambit of certified
copy as defined in the Evidence Act.
42.
Further it is not clear by examination of Ex.P-9 that who had issued the same. In order to accept a document
it must satisfy the ingredients of section 76 of the Evidence Act. A persual of Ex.P-9 shows that requirements
of section 76 i.e. payment of legal fee and who has issued the same have not been made clear and the
Tahsildar was called upon to show that by whom it, was issued ? Therefore under the circumstances it do not
conform to the requirements of Section 76 so as to accept the same in the evidence. In the result, though the
document was exhibited but it cannot be read in evidence as it is not admissible in evidence.
43.
The other witness of Plaintiff Bhaskar Singh who is the SDO (Revenue) was exmined as P.W.5. In his state-
ment he has deposed that he had taken the statement of respondent no. 1 wherein respondent No. 1 has stated
that his place of birth was Sarbahara and his statement was recorded on oath and respondent No. 1 stated that
after birth, he was residing at Sarbahara. The order sheet of proceeding to grant the caste certificate is marked
as Ex.P-2. A perusal of the entire order sheets shows that it do not record the fact that respondnet No. 1 made
a statement that he was born at Sarbahara. Therefore, the oral evidence of P.W. 5 is not supported by order
sheet of the proceeding which he himself recorded. The order sheet do not record that he was borne at
Sarbahara. Ex.P.-20 was the statement of Amit Jogi. If his statement is read as a whole it do not reflect that he
made a statement that he was born at Sarbahara instead he stated that after birth he was residing along-with
his mother and father at village Sarbahara and thereafter the particulars of grand-Father etc. have been
stated.
44.
Now coming to the statement of P.W. 3 Sarveshwar Narendra Bhure, at para 4 he stated that he had not
recorded any statement but it was recorded by Tahsildar. At para 7, he further made a hearsay statement that
as told by respondent No. 1, his place of birth was written as Sarbahara in Patwari Report Patwari P.W.4 was
not confronted with the statement Ex.P-20 of the respondent nor was confronted with Ex.P-9 though these
documents were exhibited by the petitioner and they were witnesses of the petitioner. As such, the petitioner
himself has failed to prove the substantial fact that the statement was made by Amit Jogi that he was, born
at Sarbahara. When Amit Jogi was confronted with his statement as D.W. 1 in respect of Ex.P.-20 he
admitted to have made such statement. As averred herein-below., the statement Ex.P.-20 do, not categori-
cally say so that he was born at Sarbahara. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to prove this fact that such
wrong statement was made by respondent No.1.
45.
The petitioner has further averred that the returning officer namely P.W. 3 Serveshwar Narendra Bhure was
the SDO at the time of issuance of the caste certificate. The petitioner stated that the objection though was
raised in respect of caste certificate, the same officer rejected the objection and bias was pleaded on the
ground that the person cannot be Judge of his own case.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
671
46.
Now coming to the statement of P.W. 3 at Para 8 he deposed that the petitioner Sameera Paikra had objected
to the nomination on 3 grounds. One was about citizenship of Amit Ajit Jogi. Second was the caste of Amit
Jogi and the third was that Amit Jogi has shown two date of births. This witness has deposed that such
objection was decided after hearing both the parties and exmination of the docuemnt. Admittedly the evi-
dence shows that the same person SDO has issued the caste certificate Ex.P-4 and subsequently decided the
objection with respect to cast certificate.
47.
Now the question is whether there was bias caused. Admittedly P.W.3 issued the caste certificate in the
capacity of SDO and thereafter has decided the objection raised by the petitioner as a returning officer. If the
SDO was discharging the duty of Returning Officer then he was under the statutory obligation to deal with the
objection and decide the same as also at the time of issuance of certificate Likewise, when the caste certificate
was issued by him, he was under the obligation either to issue the certificate or to reject the same.
48.
The Oxford Administrative Law 8th Edition (Page 452) has interpreted such situation on the topc “THE
RULE AGAINST BIAS”. It is the principle which has been followed when the individual authorities qua case
of necessity, bias cannot be inferred for the reason when there is no substituion is possible and no-one-else
is emplwered to act. Natural justice then has to give wahy to the necessity; for otherwise there is no means
of deciding and machinery of justice or administration will break-down. It furhter says that in administra-
tive cases, the exigency of like nature may easily arise. Where the statute empowers a particular minister or
official to act, he will usualy be the one and only one person who can do so. There is then no way of
escaping the responsibilty, even if he is personally interested and transfer of responsibilty is, indeed, a
recognized type of ultra-vires.
49.
Considering the point of bais and in the light of the aforesaid principles, statement of P.W.3. Sarveshwar
Narendra Bure, who was the S.D.O. (Revenue) had stated that in the year 2013, he was appointed by the
election commission as a Returning Officer or Marawhi Assembly Election. At para-8 this witness he deposed
that Semeera Paikra, petitioner, has objected to the caste of respondent. The said objection was decided by
him on 02.11.2013 which has been marked as Ex.P.-7. The witness further deposed that after hearing both the
parties, he has adjudicated the objection and the objection was decided according to the statute of RP Act.
Reading of the said statement would show that Serveshwar Narendra Bhure who was appointed as Returning
Officer could not have refused the responsibilty and in the alternative if such responsibility was not
discharged, it would be a recognized type of ultravires.
50.
Further the petitoner in her statement at para 72 had referred caste certificate of Ajit Pramod Jogi, father of
respondent no. 1 and stated that the caste certificate was issued to Ajit Jogi on the basis of forged document
and she has received the said information from one Nand Kumar Sai. The said Nand Kumar Sai has not been
examined. It is a hearsay evidence. She has further averred that Ex.P-6 wherein the objection with respect to
the application preferred by the respondent was raised taht it was not in format and the competent person has
not issued the certificate. However, in order to prove the same it has not been substantiated, Ex.P-21 the order
dated 27.06.2017 was referred which was passed by the High Powered Committee against father of R-1
wherein it was declared that the father of R-1 ajit Pramod Kumar was not able to establish that the caste
certificate issued to him was valid.
51.
During the course of arguments the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 30.01.2018 passed in
W.P.(C). No. 2104/2017 was produced. A persual or the said judgement would show that the finding of Ex.P.-
21 wherein it was held that the father of respondent was not having a valid caste certificate was set aside and
therefore the enquiry was ordered with certain observations. The fact remains that the order Ex.P.-21 has been
set aside and it losses its efficacy and Ex.P-21 will merge into the order of Division Bench.
52.
Further the argument which is made by the petitioner that the petitioner was not kanwar and was Christian.
The pleading and evidence in this regard are considered. The petitioner in her deposition at Para 87 stated
that in Kanwar Tribe, the festival of Hareli, Cherchera, Sua, Karma are celebrated. With respect to Nawakhai,
he sated that it is not a festival. She further sated that Nawakhai programme is not a cllective programme.
It is entirely a family programme wherein the members of the family perform worship (Puja) at their home
only. She has furhter voluntarily stated that Ajit Jogi and Amit Gogi celebrate Nawakhai at the temple of
Jogishar village and all the nearby villagers are invited and they perform Nawakhai whereas Kanwar tribe
community do not follow such rituals. She has further stated that the said programmes are done by the Ajit
Jogi, father of returned candidate Amit Jogi. Renu Jogi wife of Ajit Jogi and Richa Jogi wife of R-1 Amit
Jogi to show that they are kanwars.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
672
53.
She has further stated that in programme of Nawakhai which is celebrated by Ajit Jogi and Amit Jogi, large
number of people from the entrie area participate and even from Bilaspur, people go to participate. The said
statement would go to show that Kanwar. Tribe community participates in the programmes conducted by the
respondent family. She has furhter stated that Kanwar community in their marriage, uses to call the other
person also and with respect to respondents, she has stated at Para 91 that respondent Amit Jogi had adopted
Christianity. As for documents Ex.P.-10 to P-18 she has stated at Para 93 that the said documents were given
to Vigilance Committee Raipur in the year 2014 and she sated that in the school living certificate, they are
shown as Christian (Isai). She has stated that since the respondent was a Christian, he cannot be held to be
Kanwar.
54.
The evidence as is on record gives a clear picture that Kanwar community of village participates in the
functions of Nawakhai, Puja etc. conducted by the respondents and therefore what would be the effect if the
person is accepted as a Kanwar though he is a Christian. This aspect whether he loses his right or whether the
Christian cannot be a Kanwar has to be examined. Admittedly the fact that respondent No. 1 is a Christian is
not disputed.
55.
In a book captioned as Law and Society in Modern India written by Marc Galanter, 1997 edition, Third
Impression at Page 105 the legal conception of social structure has been described. The said author has
referred to Judgment rendered in Kartik Oraon V. David Munzni AIR 1964 Patna 201 wherein a challenge in
the election petition was with respect to a candidate for member of Uraon family but he had been a Christian
since his grand father’s time. Therefore, the question was whether a particular person was eligible to contest
the seat reserved for Scheduled Tribe being Christian.
56.
It was ground of challenge that onece a person became a Christian, he cannot be no longer a Uraon. The High
Court founds that the candidates active participation in the civic life of tribe balied the charge of lack of
common interests and aspirations. In the instant patiition, the manner and custom and the evidence shows
that though the respondent has adopted Christianity, but they still continue observance of tribe religion. The
relevant part of judgment reported in kartik Oraon V. David Munzni AIR 1964 Patna 201 (supra) is quoted
herein-below;
(14)
“Tribe” has been defined in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 22, 1961 edition, at page 465, by
W.H.R. Rivers as “a social group of a simple kind, the members of which speak a common dialect,
have a single government, and act together for such common purposes as “warfare”. Other typical
characteristics include a common name, a contiguous territory, a reletively uniform culture or way
of life and a tradition of common descent.. Tribes are usually composed of a number of local
communities, e.g. bands, villages or neighborhoods, and are often aggregated in clusters of a higher
order called nations. The term is seldom applied to societies that have achieved a Strictly territorial
organization in large states but is usually confined to groups whose unity is based primarily upon a
sense of extended kinship ties. It is no longer used for kin groups in the strict sense, such as clans.”
As already observed, the case of the appelant is that two respondents have nothing to do
with the animistic faith and tribal way of life and they did not follow the manners and customs of the
tribes and have no affinity nor any common interest, defence of aspirations with or for the tribal
people and that, in order to be classed as a scheduled tribes, problems of common interest, espira-
tion and defence and must profess the tribal religion (animism) and follow the tribal way of life. In
reply to the above allegation, the respondent, in his written statement, stated that both the respon-
dent were and are members of the Oraon tribe which has been specified as a scheduled Tribe in the
State of Bihar under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 and that having anything to do
with the aimistic faith and tribal way of life was no ingredient of memebrship of Scheduled tribes
within the meaning of the said Order. It was further stated that many memebrs of various Sched-
uled Tribes, professing the Christian faith, have con tested Parliamentary and Assembly seats which
were reserved for memebrs of Scheduled Tribes in the first, second and third general elections in
this county and the successful contestants among them served their full term as members of the
respective legislature without any challenge, and that, as a matter of fact, respondent No. 2 had
successfully contested his particular reserved seat in the general election held in for the full term till
its dissolution on the eve of the general election of 1962.
57.
Likewise in Wilson Reade v. C.S. Booth AIR 1958 Assam Page 128, the election Commission had rejected
nomination papers for a Scheduled Tribe seat from a candidate, whose father was English and mother was a
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
673
Khasi Tribe. In such case in pre-indepence days he had accepted for himself and (his children his wife was
a Khasi) privileges restricted to anglo-Indians. But he was accepted as a Khasi by the tribes people, the
group being matri-lineal and anyone born of a Khasi mother being regarded as a member of Tribe; he had
followd ‘the customs and the way of the of the tribe’, was treated by them as one of themselves and had been
active in Khasi politics. The Assam High Court found that even though he was an ango_Indian within the
Constitutional definition, this did not prevent him from being a member of this tribe or some other community.
Weather he was in fact a Khasi depended not on purity of blood but on his conduct and on the acceptance of
the community.
58.
In exercise of power conferred by Clause (1) of Article 341 of the Constitution of India, the Presedent after
consultation with Governor and Rajpramukhs of the State concerned has issued the ordre which is called as
“The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. Another order called as “The Constituiton (Scheduled
Castes) Order 1950” was also issued by the Presidnet before issuance of the said S.T. Order, Clause (3) of
Scheduled Castes Order 1950 speaks that Notwithstanding anythiing contained in Paragraph 2, no person
who professes a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist regligion shall be deemed to be
memeber of a Schedule Caste. The said restriction is absent in the S.T. order which may be called as
Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) order, 1950. Therefore, necessary inference is that if the tribe converted to
Christianity, the said Tribal status shall continue.
59.
In the instant petition, respondent No. 1 has deposed that he is a kanwar. The petitioner also says that she is
a Kanwar but both of them adopted Christianity which is not in dispute. The entire reading of the petitione
shows that there is no allegation that respondent No. 1 is not a Kanwar but as against this, it is stated that the
certificate so issued to respondent showing him to be a kanwar is fake or it is not correct. Therefore,
necessary ingredients are missing in respect of the same to appreciate the argument of petitioner.
60.
Inview of the aforesaid discussions, the argument advanced by the petitioner that the petioner having adopted
the Christanity has lost his status of Kawar Tibe do not find support from settled law and the S.T. Order 1950
and it can be presumed that even if the respondent adopted the Christianity, his right of status of kanwar
Tribe cannot be taken away.
61.
Now further argument has been advanced that issuance of caste certificate to the respondent was nto according
to the Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social Staus (Cast), Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes (Regulation
of Social Status Certification) Act, 2013 or Rules made thereunder. At para 5 of the Petition, the petitioner
has made the pleading about the procedure. The pleading is silent as to what provisions of Act, 2013 was
violated. No. particulars thereof have been given. Only omnibus averments have been made. On going
through the principles laid down by authorilative pronouncements of different Courts, it is clear that in
election petition, the particulars have to be very much clear and distinct. There cannot be any presumptive
inference.
62.
Rule 2 of Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social Status (Cast), Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes
(Regulation of Social Status Certification) Rules, 2013 prescribes definitions. Rules 2(k) thereof refer to
“Presidential Notification”. which means order issued by the President under Article 341 and Article 342 of
the Constitution of India with respect to the State of Chhattisgarh, and as amended by the Parliament from
time to time.
63.
Likewise 2(L) defines the “Provisional Social Certificate” which reads thus;
“2 (i)
Provisional Social Status Certificate means a Social Status Certificate issued in FORM-4B under
Rule 10”.
64.
Rule 10 of the Rules 2013 provides for Provisional Certificate which is quoted below;
“10.
Provisiaonla Certificate;—
(1)
For the purpose of granting admission to educational institutions upto tenth standard or for
grantiing scholar ship or stipent at such level or for such other purposes, where large num
bers of Certificates are necessary and it is not feasible to issue such Certificate well in time.
the Competent Authority, may issue a provisional certificate in FORM-4B on the basis of
affidavit given by the applicant in FORM-2A within fifteen days from the date of applica
tion;
Provided that the Competent Authority shall maintain the details of provisional
certificates issued in FORM-58.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
674
(2)
The provisional Certificate shall be valid only for a period of six months or till the date of
issue of permanent Certificate, whichever is earlier.”
65.
Further Social Status Certificates is defined under Rule 9 which reads as under;
“9.
Social Status Certificate,—The Competent Authority after receiving application under sub-rule (1)
of Rule 3 and conducting an inquiry under Rule 8 and in case where himself is not an inquiry
officer, after satisfying himself with the annexed documents and Report of the inquiry officer,
within one month from the date of receipt of application, shall issue the certificate in FORM-4A(1)
to the Applicant of Scheduled Castes, in FORM-FA (2) to the Applicant of Scheduled Tribes and in
FORM-4A (3) to the applicant of Other Backward Classes.”
66.
The form of Affidavit which is to be given is found in 2-A which is as under;
FORM-2A
[See Rule 3(3)(a)]
Affidavit for issue of Social Status Certificate
I Mr./Mrs./Ms................................................................son/daughter of.............................................j
aged........................................................Year.......................................accupation............................................
resident of ................................................Tehsil......................................District..............................................
State.............................................hereby solemnly affirm the following :—
1.
That I have applied for the issuance of Social Status Certificate before the Competent Authority in
FORM-1A.
2.
That I have, according to the prescribed form, attached the copy of ....................................documents
along-with the application letter before the Competent authority. The document mentioned above
has been obtained tawfully by the person(s) authorized by me and I have not made any unauthorized
amendment/omission/change what soever of any kind in the document mentioned above or its
original copy by me o r my well-wishers and according to the best of my knowledge, the above-
mentioned document/documents have not been concocted with any malicious intention.
3.
That I have attached the family tree showing relation with those relatives whose validity certificates
have been attahced with this application.
4.
I hereby declare that, in pursuance of obtaining the Social Status Certificate, the iinformation
rendered by me in the Application presented in the prescribed form before the Competent Authority,
is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and if such information is found false or incorrect, then
proceedings in accordance with Section 8-13 of Chhattisgarh Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
and Other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification) Act, 2013 shall be initiated
against me.
Signature.......................................
Name of the Applicant.................................
Verification
I, Mr./Mrs./Ms.......................................Son/daughter of..............................................hereby verify
that the statements mentioned in Clause 1 to 4 of this affidavit are true to the best of my knowledge
and belief, and I verify them in full consciousness.
Signature.......................................
Name of the Applicant.................................
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
675
67.
In the context of aforesaid provisions, the evidence which is on record is examined, Ex.P-2 is proved by the
petitioner. In respect of the Revenue Order Sheet of Case No. 44/0-121/13-14. This is an order sheet of
Tahsildar, Pendra Raod, Reading of Ex.P-2 as a whole shows that the Tahsildear examined the documents i.e.
(a) Affidavit (b) copy of land holdng certificate; (iii) Patwari Report, Family Tree, certified copy of resolution
of Gram Sabha; (d) Education Certificate/Mark Sheet (e) the Caste Certificate of the applicant’s father and
her sister. The said Ex.P-2 records that the statement of wtness was recorded and the land revenue records,
affidavit. In its entriety was considered and the Tahsildar came to conclusion that the provisional caste
certificate may be issued and therafter, It was forwarded to the SDo, Pendra Road for permanent caste
certificate. Subsequent to that, provisional caste certificate was issued vide Ex.P-3. Furher Ex.P-3 is the
order sheet of the SDO, Pendra Road which shows that all the documents, affidavit, the certificate issued in
favour of the family memebrs of the respondent were duly considered by the SDO and thereafter, the
permanent caste certificate was issued vide Ex.P-4.
68.
The aforesaid documents have been proved by Bhaskar Singh Markam (P.W.5). According to his statement,
different documents as has been described in the order sheet were produced and after recording the statement
of respondent, the certificate was issued, Ex.P-9 is Patwari Report wherein it is stated by the applicant. that
village Sarbahara is the place of birth of respondent Patwari Prakash Patel (P.W.4) who prepared the report
(Ex.P-9) was not confronted with such document. Instead, at Para 30 of her statement, the petitioner has
exhibited the document Ex.P-9 with the objection. Ex.P-9 the original was not brought on record before this
court.
69.
The certified copy of the documents are necessarily need to be confronted with Section 74. Therefore, as
averred it would not satisfy the ingredients of sections 74 & 76 of the Evidence Act. Furhter more, if the
Statement of P.W.5 Bhaskar Singh Markam at Para-5 is considered he has stated that he recorded the
statement of respondent wherein he stated that his place of birth was at Sarbahara whereas the Order Sheet
Ex.P-2 do not record such fact and it contains other details of facts. As such, that part of oral evidence which
did not find place in the order sheet contradicts and cannot be accepted as against the contents of order sheet
dated Ex.P.-2.
70.
Ex.P.-20 the statement of respondent Amit Aishwarwa Jogi would show that he has deposed that after his
birth, he was living at village Sarbahara along-with father and mother. The said statement do not contain the
fact that he was born at Sarbahara. P.W.3 Sarveshwar Narain Bhure who was SDO at the relevant time in his
statement has narrated the entire procedure. The SDO P.W. 3 at Para 10 of his statement has stated that he
had issued the caste certificate. The said certificate was filed during the nomination.
71.
It is not the case of the petitioner that respondent contested the election on the basis of the false caste
certificate. Instead, it is the case of the petitioner that he did not belong to Kanwar Tribe, the said caste
certificate Ex.P.-4 was not cancelled. While dealiing with similar facts situation of the case i.e. E.P. No. 60/
2014 (Dr. Thaneshwar Patela vs. Sarjani Banjari decided on 08.05.2017) this Court has held that with
respect to power conferred to issue the caste certificate, a notification was made by the State of Chhattisgarh
on 24.09.2013 which has been placed for perusal. The notification bears No. F13-22/2012/A.P./1-3 dated
24.09.2013 wherein the power has been given as per Direction No. 4.2 even to issue the certificate on filing
of affidavit when the documents are nto available for caste certificate and after enquiry the caste certificate
can be issued. Further Direction 2.1 requires the list of documents which includes the affidavit, the family
tree issued by the Patwari, the documents of cut-off date to show that the person seeking caste certificate is
residing at Chhattisgarh before the notification and after Reorganization of the State of Madhya Pradesh on
1st November, 2000 and any of the documents i.e., family tree (Mishal), revenue records etc. Further, the
direction 5.3 contained in the notification would show that the SDO has also been given power to issue the
caste certificate. In this case the document Ex.P-2 the order sheet and the statement of Patwari and the SDO
P.W.3 & P.W. 4 would show that the SDO issued the certificate Therefore, it would be according to the
direction 5.3 contained in the notification wherein the SDO is also given power to issue the caste certificate.
72.
With respect to issuance or caste certificate, the petitioner at Paras 3, 4 & 5 and contended that the objection
to the caste certificate was decided on the same day. The application was submitted to Tahsildar and he
forwarded it to the SDO. He was not having a jrisdiction and virtually without any enquiry, the report was
submitted. In statement of the petitioner at Para 5, it is stated that one Shankar Singh Kanwar has filed the
objection whereas in the verifiation of the petitioner it is stated that the statements are belived to be true and
based on records the affidevit would show that the petitioner contended that the objection was filed through
Shanker Singh Kanwar, therefore, it contradicts the virification clause of the petition. With respect to filing of
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
676
petition for the caste certificate before the Tahsildar, para 71 of the deposition would show that she too had
filled an application for caste certificate before the Tahsildar Pendra. The entire procedure has been
described in that para. She further disclosed that all the averments which were disclosed in the Advocate
over the same do not find place in the petition. Therefore, it will show that the procedure which was adopted
by the respondent is also supported by the petitioner. She further fortified the fact that after the application
is filed to the Tahsildar, it has to be attanched with the family tree. Missal B-1 Khasra, income certificate
etc., and thereafter the Tahsildar after examining the said records, issues the caste certificate, therefore, the
procedure which is being challenged by the petitioner quo the respondent it shows the petitioner herself had
adopted the same procedure to obtaine the said certificate.
73.
The format which has been prescribed in Rules Form 1A, application for social status certificate do not
prescribe the place of birth. When the same form is considered as per Ex.P.-19 which is an application given
by the petitioner, it runts parallel except certain minor deviation. Therefore, what would be important to
contest the election is that as per Article 173(b) of the Consitutuion, a person can be qualified to contest the
election for the State Legislative Assembly if he is not less than 25 years of age. Section 100 of the RP Act
also do not contain any statutory requirement about the place of birth, therefore, in the facts of this case,
though the petitioner has failed to prove that respondent has given a wrong place of birth, even if it is
accepted as otherwise, the some would be of no consequence.
74.
Section 100(c) of the RP Act, 1951 given certain grounds to declare an election to be void when any
nomination has been improperly rejected and section 100(d) mandates that the election can be declared void
if it is proved that result of election in so far as it relates to a returned candidate has been materially affected
by improper acceptance of any nomination. Now reverting to the petition, nothing is on record to prove those
facts. In para 10 it has been stated that the petitioner was born at USA and in Para 7, the petitioner has stated
the nomination was illegally accepted. Except those, no pleading is on record, in Mahdeo v. Babu Uday
Pratap Singh AIR SC 1966 824 the Supreme Court with legiislative history has explained and held that the
petitioner in election petition has to prove the improper acceptance of nomination paper and how it had
materially affected the election petition. The difference of votes in this case between the petitioner and
respondent No. 1 is about 44,000. Therefore, how acceptance of nomination paper of respondent has
materially affected has not been proved. The pleading is completely silent. The principle has been laid in
AIR 2001 SC 905 Tek Chand v. Dile Ram and AIR 2016 2016 SC 4700 Rjendra Kumar Meshram v.
Vanshmani, that unless and until it is proved that acceptance of nomination has materially affected the
result of election, no relief can be granted.
75.
Further more, the facts would show that the permanent caste certificate was issued on 31.10.2013 vide
Ex.P-4. The returned candidate in its reply stated that at the time of scrutny, the permanent caste certificate
was filed, As per the election petition, scrutiny was done on 02.10.2013. The order of the returning officer
Ex.P.-7 is dated 02.11.2013 which would show that when the scrutiny was made on that date, the original
caste certificate was already produced. The same fact was corroborated by P.W.3 Serveshwar Narendra
Bhure at Para 10 that all the documents were considered and accordingly objections were decided. As such
no doubt can be created.
76.
Lastly, the prayer of the pettioner to declare the election of respondent No. 1 to be void whether can be
granted ? The term of the legislative assembly had already expired as the challenge in this petition is in
respect of the election held in the year 2013.
77.
Learned Senior Counsel Dr. N. K. Shukla, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 who is the author of
book captioned as Discretionary Nature of Opinion Judgments (Written by Dr. N. K. shukhlal has narrated
similar situations and issues therein based on legal principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. It is settled
preposition that the Court should not decide an iissue unless it is a living issue between the parties. The said
proposltion is supported by the decision of Suprem Court in AIR 1987 SC 1577-Dhartipakar Madan Lal
Agrawal Vs. Shri Rajiv Gandhi wherein it has been held that even if the election petition is allowed and the
election cannot be set aside after trial of the election petition, then the relief claiming for setting aside of
election would be rendered in fructurous by lapse of time. Accordingly, apart form the issue raised this fact
also becomes point of prime consideration.
78.
During the course of cross examination of witness Smt. Reena Baba Saheb Kangale, a publication was made
against her by the respondent. Subsequently, the application was filed by counsel for the petitioner u/s 151
of CPC read with Article 215 of the constitution of India and Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act to draw
contempt proceeding against respondent No. 1 for releasing a press note by respondent no. 1. Therefore,
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
677
during the course of proceeding prima facie, this Court was of the opinion that the pressure was exerted over
the witness while she is being cross examined and on 14.09.2017 this Court has issued show cause notices
as to why criminal proceedings be not drawn against them for uploading the statement of witness though
they were not certified and for making statement to media. Subsequently show cause notices were issued to
respondent No. 1 and also the counsel representing him.
79.
The respondent to the show cause issued by the court was filed, In the reply, unconditional apology has
been tendered assigning reasons and it is stated that no interpolations were made in the statement of
witnesses and further no misreporting was made in newspaper. It was further stated that neither there was
malice nor the respondent or their counsel had any remote knowledge which may give rise to such proceed-
ing. The reply of the concerned advocates is also perused. They have also tendered unconditional apology
and stated that there is no intention to over reach authority of Court and pressurize the witnesses. The reply
is supported by the affidavit.
80.
After reading of the entire explanation made by respondent no. 1 and his counsels and considering the
unqualified and unconditional apology, the court accepts the same and expects that in future they would be
cautious. As a result, no direction is made to initiate any contempt or criminal proceeding against them
pursuant to show cause.
81.
In view of the aforesaid discusson, the court is of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to prove the very
fact with respect to allegations raised in the election petition and no relief can be granted to the petitioner.
82.
In the result, the petiton sans merit and is dismissed.
Sd/-
GOUTAM BHADURI
JUDGE
•ÊŒ‡Ê ‚,
„USÃÊ./-
(Ÿ⁄‘Uãº˝ ŸÊ. ’È≈UÊÁ‹ÿÊ)
¬˝äÊÊŸ ‚Áøfl,
÷Ê⁄Uà ÁŸflʸøŸ •Êÿʪ.
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001
New Delhi, dated 14th March, 2019—23 Phalguna, 1940 (Saka)
No. 82/ES-1/CG-LA/(3/2014)/2019.—In pursuance of Section 106 of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 (43 of 1951), the Election Commission hereby publishes Order dated the 30th January, 2019 of the High Court
of Judicature of Chhattisgarh Bilaspur, in Election Petition No. 3/2014.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
E.P. No. 3 of 2014
PETITIONER
:
Sameera Paikara D/0 Late Gangaram Kanwar Aged About 31 Years R/o Umarkholi,
P.O. Jogishar, Tah. Pendra Road, P.S. Gourella, Distt. Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
VERSUS
RESPONDENTS :
1.
Amit Ajit Jogi Amit Aishwarya Jogi S/o Ajit Jogi Aged About 35 Years R/o Anugarh
Sagoun Bungalow, Raipur, P.S. Civil Line. Distt. Raipur Chhattisgarh.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
678
2.
Suman Singh Wakare D/o Ramlal Wakare Aged About 48 Years R/o Bharridan,
Tah. Marwahi, P.S. Marwahi, Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
3.
Tapeshwar Marawi S/o Ramsingh Marawi Aged About 48 Years R/o Andi, Tah.
Marwahi, P.S. Marwahi, Distt. Bilaspur District, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
4.
Dr. Urmila Singh Marko W/o Ram Singh Marko Aged About 45 Years R/o Near
S.E.C.L. Colony, Bandhwa Para, P.S. Sarkanda, Bilaspur, Distt. Bilaspur, Dis-
trict, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
5.
Smt. Gajmati Bhanu W/o Amar Bhanu Aged About 46 Years R/o Semra, P.O.
Sanatorium, Tah. Pendra Road, P.S. Gourella, Distt. Bilaspur, District, Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh.
6.
Ghasiram Wakre S/o Sukla Wakre Aged About 55 Years R/o Kotmikala, Tah.
Pendra, P.S. Pendra Chouki, Kotmikala, Distt. Bilaspur, District, Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
7.
Than Singh Otti S/o Ramcharan Otti Aged About 38 Years R/o Baror, P.O. Baror,
Tah. Marwahi, P.S. Marwahi, Distt. Bilaspur, District, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
8.
Pancham Singh Masram S/o Maniram Masram Aged About 40 Years, R/o
Kotkharra, P.O. Lalpur, Tah. Marwahi. P.S. Gourella, Distt. Bilaspur, District,
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
9.
Budhman Dhurve S/o Vikram Singh Dhurve Aged About 52 Years R/o Vijarwar,
P.O. Lalpur, Tah. Pendra Road, P.S. Gourella, Distt. Bilaspur District, Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. S.C. Verma, Mr. Rajat Agrawal & Mr. Harsh Wardhan, Advocates.
For the Respondents
:
Dr. N. K. Shukla, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Vikram Sharma & Madam A. Sen
Gupta, Advocates.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Goutam Bhaduri
CAV JUDGMENT
(Reserved on 13.12.2018)
(Pronounced on 30.01.2019)
1.
The challenge in this election petition is to the election held for the Member of Chhattisgarh State Legisla-
tive Assembly of Area No. 24 of Marwahi Constituency. The result of the election was declared on 09.11.2013
wherein the respondent Amit Ajit Jogi was declared as elected. One of the Candidate Sameera Paikra D/o
Late Gangaram Kanwar who was a contesting candidate from BJP is the petitioner, Respondent no. 1 Amit
Ajit Jogi was contesting candidate of Indian National Congress. The returned candidate was Amit Ajit Jogi
and secured total 82909 votes whereas Sameera Paikra was polled 38659 Votes, thereby respondent no. 1
was declared elected.
2.
The inter-alia ground of challegne is that on 28.10.2013 the petitioner filed an application for grant of
social status (caste) certificate before the Tahsildar Pendra Road and Tahsildar Pendra Road without having
any jurisdiction issued the caste certificate on the same day by completing enquiry. It was stated that
respondent no. 1 did not have valid caste certificate ot contest the election as the seat was reserved for
scheduled tribe. The further pleading is that Amit Ajit Jogi did not file any application in prescribed format
5A to get the caste certificate and on 31.10.2013 when the Act of the Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social Status
(Caste) Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification) Act 2013
and Rules 2013 was enforced the caste certificate so held by respondent No. 1 would be invalid as the
procedure and ruels were not followed.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
679
3.
The further pleading is that the returning officer and the officer who issued the caste certificate are one and
the same, therefore, issuing authority was a judge of his own case and acceptance of the nomination form
on the basis of social caste certificate would be bad in law.
4.
It is further pleaded that respondent No. 1 was born at Dallas Texas (USA) and was American citizen by
birth but had filed his nomination as an Indian citizen, therefore, no dual citizenship is permitted, he could
not have contested the election.
5.
The further pleading was that the grand-father and grand-mother of respondent No. 1 were not tribes as they
have adopted the Cristian religion, so they do not continue to be tribe to contest the election to the said seat.
It is further stated that the returned candidate (R-1) submitted wrong information before filing the nomination
paper that his place of birth was at village Sarbahara whereas he was born at USA. Consequently, wrong
averments were made by suppression of fact. The petitioner contended that the returning officer should not
have accepted the nomination of candidate and illegally accepted the nomination and having objected to the
same, without any justification the same was dismissed. The petitioner further pleaded that during the
election they distributed money at the polling booth as such adopted the corrupt practice, therefore, the
election required to be set aside.
6.
The said pleading was denied by the returned candidate. No averments of the petition was accepted. On the
basis of the pleading, the following issues were framed by the Court.
1.
Whether the acceptance of nomination form of respondent
“Not proved”
by Returing Officer on the basis of provisional caste certi-
ficate was illegal ?
2.
Whether respondent No. 1 Suppressed the material fact
“Not Proved”
which would render the election to be declared void ?
3.
Whether the respondent is guilty of committing corrupt
“Not Proved”
practice ?
4.
Whether the finding over caste certificate can be adjudicated
“Yes”
in the instant election petition ?
5.
Whether respondent No. 1 was entitled for contesting the
“Was Indian Citizen
assembly election of the State being american Citizen by
at the time of filing Nomi-
birth ?
nation”
6.
Whether the petitioner is entitiled for any other relief
“No.”
which deems fit in the circumstances ?
7.
Petitioner Sameera Paikra on her behalf examined herself as P.W. 1 and further examined Smt. Reena Baba
Saheb Kangale as P.W. 2 the Special Secretary Adim jati kalyan Vibhag; Sarveshwar Narendra Bhure as
P.W. 3 who is Director National Rural Health Mission, Shri Prakash Patle, Patwari as P.W. 4; Bhaskar Singh
Markam, the SDO as P.W. 5 and B.C. Joshi, employee of Central Home Ministry as P.W. 6. During the
course of trial, the petitioner exhibited as many as 22 documents from Ex. P-1 to P-22.
8.
Respondent Amit Ajit Jogi himself was examined as D.W. 1 One Shankar singh was examined as D.W. 2.
One Janbhan singh, Teacher, was examined as D.W. 3 & Dil Prasad Paikra was examined as D.W. 4 and the
documents were exhibited from Ex. D-1 to D-8.
9.
(i)
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the respondent returned candidate has wrongly
submitted the place of birth as Sarbahara as also wrong date of birth was shown, therefore, by filing
a wrong affidavit before the returning officer on the basis of false caste certificate, the nomination
form was filed, It is further contended that by using false caste certificate of Scheduled Tribe,
nomination was filed for the reserved constituency of Marawahi, therefore, fraud was played. It is
also contended that when so called caste certificate was issued. The Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social
Status (Cast) Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certifica-
tion) Act 2013 and the Rules were not followed nor the affidavit was filed in presecribed format as it
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
680
described different coloured paper to be used at different stages. So by fraud, the result of the
election was materially affected. It is stated that the returning officer and the person issuing the caste
certificate were one and the same, consequently the bias can be very well arrived at by examining
the fact itself.
(ii)
Referring to the statement of P.W. 2, the Chairman of the Caste High Powered Scrutiny Committee
and the order passed by the Committee it is contended that is was held that Ajit Jogi does not
belong
to kanwar caste, it is contended that the said decision would answer the entire issue that
the returned candidate though being not a Kanwar, the Tribe Community, has contested the
election for the reserved seat. Referring to the statement of P.W. 2 Sarveshwar Narendra Bure,
it is stated that the documents filed by the returned candidate for issuance of caste certificate was
not verified following the provisions of Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social Status (Caste), Scheduled
Tribes and Ohter backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification) Act, 2013 (herein-
after referred to as the Act, 2013), therefore, the certificate so issued is null and void. By referring
to Rules of Section 4 of the Act 2013, it is stated that once the complete procedure having been
prescribed in the Act of 2013 and if the procedure is not followed then even if the caste certificate
is issued would be non-est. It is stated that only provisional caste certificate was issued on the
basis that the Tahsildar had forwarded the same to the SDO and without any enquiry, the caste
certificate was isued in haste on the same date.
(iii)
It is further contended that according to P.W. 5 Bhaskar Singh, the place of birth of respondent no.
1 was shown at village Sarbahara whereas respondent no. 1 was born at Dallas Texas USA, as such,
the false declaration was made, Referring to the statement of B.C. Joshi (P.W. 6) it is stated that
the document would show that the respondent was born at Dallas (USA) and apparent wrong
submission of fact is on record. Counsel further referring to statement of D.W.1would submit that
rituals and customs of Nawa Khai is only performed by the Tribes and Amit Jogi being not a
Kanwar tribe did not follow the rituals and customs which would show that he is not Kanwar
though he contested as Kanwar Tribe. Therefore, though he contested on a reserved seat but in
fact he was not entitled to contest the seat reserved for the ST.
(iv)
Referring to issuance of caste certificate it is contended that the caste certificate was issued
hurriedly on the same day without following the mandate of the Act, 2013, therefore, on the
basis of false everments the election was contested. Reliance was placed in 1990 (4) SCC 526 and
AIR 2008 SC 632 and would submit that fraud on the constitution was played by the respondent
no. 1 and the certificate so issued is de-horse the Act and rules and loses its efficacy consequently
the special privilege to contest a reserved seat cannot be allowed, therefore, the re-election may be
set aside.
10.
(i)
Per contra learned counsel for the respondent submits that the entire averments and the allegations
so made have not been categorically pleaded in the petition. It is stated that the evidence adduced
by the petitioner would show that respondent No. 1 had accepted the Indian citizenship and was
major of more than 25 years of age, therefore, there was no bar to contest the election. It is further
submitted that the place of birth do not discriminate for a person of indian Ciitizen to contest the
election, therefore, even if his place of birth was at Dallas Texas (USA), he was entitled to contest
the election. It is stated that respondent No. 1 has accepted the citizenship of India, therefore, he no
longer remained to be citizen of USA and was entitled to contest the election, Counsel would
further submit that the domicile by choice was accepted by respondent herein India, therefore, the
place of birth of respondent No. 1 would be of least significance to contest the election.
(ii)
With respect to the corrupt practice, it is stated that the verification has been made in the election
petition which shows that the petitioner came to know from different sources, therefore, no cat-
egorical submission is made as to which information was based on her personal knowledge and
which was from outside source as in the statement everything was attributed to the personal
knowldege, it is stated that there was serious discrepancy in the manner of verification and the
evidence exists in the case.
(iii)
Learned counsel further submitted that the election petition is vague as it could be and general
omnibus allegations have been made and in the election cases, the evidence has to be beyond
reasonable doubt akin to the criminal cases and in the case on hand evidence do not lead to any
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
681
proof of fact warranting any interference by this Court. He further submitted that by now the tenure
of the election having been over, it is only academic and without prejudice to the averments, It is
stated that even if the election is set aside, no relief could be granted.
11.
Heard learnd counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.
12.
In the facts of this case considering the submission made by the petitioner issue No. 5 is answered first as it
has bearing to the other issues, For the sake of convenience, issue no. 5 is reproduced herein below;
(v)
Whether respondent no. 1 was entittled for contesting the assembly election of the State being
American Citizen by birth.
13.
Article 173 of the Constitution of India prescribes the qualification for the memebrship of the State Legis-
lature. It reads as under;
“173 Qualification for membership of the Sate Legislature,—A person shall not be quali-
fied to Chosen to fill a seat in the Legislature of the State unless he—
(a)
is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person authorised in that behalf
by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the
purpose in the Third Schedule.
(b)
is, in the case of seat in the Legislative Assembly, not less than twenty-five years of age and
in the case of a seat in the Legislative Council, not less than thirty years of age; and
(c)
Possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or under any law
made by Parliament.”
14.
Reading of the Article 173 shows it prescribes that unless a person is citizen of india and if he is less than 25
years of age and unless he possesses such other requisite qualifications as per the law enacted by the
Parliament, he shall not contest the election for the State Legislature, Therefore, in the instant case as
against the averments made if the respondent No. 1 was 25 years of age as on date of filling the nomination,
he was entitled to contest the election or not to be examined apart of effect of birth which admittedly took
place at USA. The nominations for election were filed from 26.10.2013 to 01.11.2013. The date of birth of
respondent as per Ex.P.-19 (application for cast certificate) is shown as 07.08.1978 and another document of
citizenship Ex.P.-22 proved by the petitioner shows the date of birth of R-1 is as 07th August 1977. Therefore
one shows the year 1977 and another is 1978. So even if the date of birth is considered qua either in the year
1977 or 1978 respondent no. 1 appears to be more than 25 years of age as on the date of filing of the
nomination. Therefore, even if two different dates of birth are shown i.e., 07.08.1978 in Ex.P-19 and
07.08.1977 in Ex.P-22, it would not make substantial difference for this election petition since respondent
No. 1 was aged about 36 years of age on that date.
15.
The representation of people Act 1951, Chapter-II Section 5 further lays down the qualification for mem-
bership of the State Legislatures.
16.
Section 5(a) is relevant here which reads as under;
5.
Qualififactions for membership of State Legislative Assembly,— A person shall not be qualified to
be Chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly of a State unless—
(a)
in the case of seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes or for the Scheduled Tribes of that
State, he is a member of any of those castes or of those tribes, as the case may be, and is an
elector for any Assembly Constituency in that State;
(b)
........................................................
(c)
........................................................
17.
Reading of section 5 would show that he is to be an elector. The ‘elector” is defined in section 2(1)(e) of
RPA Act 1951 which reads as under;
“2(1)(e) “elector” in relation to a constituency means a person whose name is entered in the electoral
roll of that constituency for the time being in force and who is not subject to any of the disqualifications
mentioned in section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950)”.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
682
18.
Reading of the aforesaid definition would show that irrespective of the place of birth if the name of person
is entered in the electoral roll and if he is not disqualified otherwise, he may contest the election. There is no
pleading of fact or evidence on record to show that respondent No. 1 was not an elector of the constituency.
Therfore, even though the submission of petitioner for prohibition of discrimination on the place of birth of
respondent no. 1 is correct, but the same will not be available to petitioner if respondent No. 1 is an elector
as difined u/s 2(1)(e) of the Act, 1951.
19.
With respect to submission on the ground of religion, Article 15 of the Constitution of India would be
relevant here. The said Article mandates that a person cannot be discriminated on on the ground of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth which reads thus;
“15.
Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birht,—
(1)
The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds any of religion, race, caste,
sex place of birth or any of them.
(2)
No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them,
be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to—
(a)
access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment;or
(b)
the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained
wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.
(3)
Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making any Special provision for women
and Children.
(4)
Nothing in this article or in cluase (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes
of citizen or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
(5)
Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the State
from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educa-
tionally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes
insofar as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutuions
including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other
than the minority educational institutions referred to in cluase (1) of Article 30.”
20.
Now turning to pleading, Section 83 of the Act, 1951 requires that the contents of the election petition shall
contain a contcise statement of the material facts. Section 87 of the Act says the procedure of CPC to be
followed while deciding an election petition like that of a suit. The particular detailed pleading that how
respondent was not entitled to contest election on the ground of place of birth is vague and not clear.
21.
When the pleading and evidence to this fact qua Article 173 & Article 15 of the Constitution of India are
examined. It reveals at Para 9 of the petition wherein it is stated that respondent No. 1 was born at Dallas
USA on 07.08.1977 and he was Americal by birth, Ex.P-5 the docuemnt of petitioner shows that the objection
was made at Paras 5,6,7 & 10 wherein the petitioner contended that respondent No. 1 was born in USA and
he is not an Indian citizen, however, he obtained the temporary caste certificate or Kanwar, a Scheduled
Tribe Ex.P-6 shows an objection made to the returning officer Marawahi constituency. Para 6.1 of the
statement of the petitioner in affidavit under Order 18 Rules 4 of CPC is also on the same line. The petitioner
at para 58 of statement admits the fact that the name of Amit Ajit Jogi was in the voters list but she is not in
know of the fact as to when it was added. She further stated that while preparing to contest the election she
came to know that his name is in the voters list. She has further stated that from the statement she came to
know that Amit Ajit Jogi was born at America, therefore, he had to obtain the citizenship of India thereby
this fact that the name of respondent No. 1 was in the voters list as also the fact that he had applied for
citizenship of India is admitted.
22.
Para 60 of P.W. 1 would show that she has not set up a case that respondent no. 1 being not a citizen of India
cannot contest, whereas the citizenship is proved by P.W. 6 B.C. Joshi who is an employee of Cental Home
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
683
Ministry. According to him, Amit Jogi had applied for citizenship and his application was admitted on
26.07.2004, Ex.P_22 is a certificate of Registration issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs which shows
that according to the provisions of Section 5(1)(a) of Citizenship Act 1955, Amit Asihwarya Jogi was
registered as citizen of India. This too is proved by the petitioner herself.
23.
Sameera Paikra the petitioner in her statement at para 60 has stated that in respect of citizenship of respon-
dent no. 1, application under the Right to information was filed before Home Ministry and there is no
mention of such application in her election petition. She has further stated that though the application was
not filed but this fact is admitted that the said information was sought after the instant election petiiton was
preferred. At para 64, she admitted the fact that as on date, the respondent is citizen of India. The said
statement of petitioner would be an admission u/s 58 of the Indian Evidence Act.
24.
The Supreme Court in a case law reported in AIR 2001 3689 has dealt with similar nature of issue wherein
the argument was raised that a returned candidate being not citizen of India whether can be raised in
election petition. The Supereme Court held therein the validity of certificate of citizenship issued u/s 5(1)
can be gone into during trial of election.
25.
Now coming to the legal implication, Part II Article 5 of the Constitution of India defined the “Citizenship”
which reads as under.
5.
Citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution,—At the commencement of this Constitu-
tion every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and—
(a)
who was born in the territory of India; or
(b)
either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or
(c)
who has been ordinarily residenct in the territory of India for not less than five years
immediately preceding such commencement.
shall be a citizen of India.
26.
In the subject matter, the Supreme Court in AIR 1966 S.C. 160 (Kedar pandey vs. Narain Bikram Sah) has laid
down the ratio to determine the domicile and what is to be proved in such case, the objection was made by
way of an election petition against the returned candidate that he was not duly qualified under Article 173 of
the Constitution of India to contest the election as he was not the citizen of India claiming that returned
candidate was born at Nepal. The election Tribunal then had initially held that the respondent Narain Raja
was not citizen of India. The High Court on challenge made to it held that the respondent who was elected
acquiired the citizenship by “domicile of choice” in the Indian Territory, as such acquired the status of
citizen of India under Article 5(a) & (c) of the Constitution. The Supreme court while deciding the issue
proceeded on presumption that the returned candidate Narayan Raja was not borne in India.
27.
The Supreme Court at Para 8 after considering the submission held that the law attributes to every person at
birth a domicile which is called a “domicile of origin” and the “domicile of origin” is received by operation
of law at birth whereas the “domicile of choice” can also be acquired by a person by the actual removal of
the individual to another country accompanied by his animus manendi. It held that domicile of origin of an
individual is determined at the time of his birth, of the person upon whom he is legally dependent. The
Court further held that a legitimate child who is born in a wedlock to a living father receives the domicile
of the father at the time of birth; a posthumous legitimate child receives that of the mother at that time. As
regards the change of domicile, any person who is not under disability may at any time change his existing
domicile and acquire for himself a domicile of choice by the fact of residing in a county other than that of
his domicile of origin with the intention of continuing to reside there indefinitely. The court further pointed
out that the purpose of residence is a mere physical fact and it means no more than personal presence in a
locality, regarded apart from any of the circumstances attending it. If the physical fact is accompanied by
the required state of mind, neither its character nor its duration is in any away material. The state of mind,
or animus manendi, which is required demands that the person whose domicile is the object of the inquiry
should have formed a fixed and settled purpose of making his principal or sole permanent home in the
country of residence or in effect, he should have formed a deliberate intention to settle there.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
684
28.
According to me petitioner, at Para-65 she admits that Amit Jogi’s father Ajit Pramod Jogi and mother
Smt. Renu Jogi are indian citizens. Respondent Amit Jogi in his statement admitted that he was born at
Dallas, Taxas (USA) on 07th August, 1977. If the said statements are read along-with Ex.P.-22 which is a
certificate issued u/s 5(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act 1955 whereby the citizenship was granted to respondent
No. 1 would show that he has obtained the citizenship of india. If the facts are looked into from another
angle it would show that after birth, minor child came with the father and mother to India. In such state of
affairs, the ratio laid down in case of kedar Pandey AIR 1966 S.C. 160 (supra) would clearly apply and by
fiction it can be inferred that the person who is dependent on his parents comes back and settles herein India
then it would be considered that he has obtained the domicile by choice. In view of such principle, issue no.
5 that whether the petitioner was entitled to conest the election being American citizen by birth at India is
answered in favour of respondent No. 1 and it is held that merely because of birth of respondent No. 1 at
U.S.A., respondent no. 1 could not have been stopped to contest the election when he has chosen the
“domicile of choice” by accepting the citizenship, setting and expressed his mind to settle and continue in
India.
29.
The Statement of P.W.6 B.C. Joshi of Central Home Ministry, New Delhi shows that he has stated that
respondent No. 1 has surrendered his citizenship of USA and the application was preferred before the Home
Ministry. The Home Ministry after due enquiry issued the certificate. He has stated that the certificate under
section 5(1)(a) will be issued to those foreign citizens who have surrendered their earlier country citizen-
ship. Section 5 of the Citizenship Act 1955 postulates that it grants citizenship by registration and sub-
section (5) of section 5 contemplates that a person registered under this section shall be a citizen of India by
registration as from the date on which he is so registered and would be considered to be a citizen. In paras
9 & 10 petitoner has only stated that respondent No. 1 is citizen of USA. In the pleading except the fact that
he was born at USA, nothing has been pleaded. Here in the instant case the certificate Ex.P-22 is not under
challenge, therefore, the said issue is answered in favour of respondent No. 1.
30.
Now the findings are given on issues 2 & 3 which are reproduced here-in-below;
(ii)
Whether respondent No. 1 suppressed the material fact which would render the election to be
declared void ?
(iii)
whether the respondent is guilty of committing corrupt practice ?
Issue no. 2 & 3 are interlinked to each other, therefore, are decided together. A reading of petiton would
show that from Para 12 to 17, the Petitioner has averred about the corrupt practice. The verification of the
main petition would reveal that contents of paras 1 & 2 and Paras 18 & 19 have been stated to be true to the
personal knowedge of the petitioner and Paras 3 to 11 are said to be believed to be true based on records and
paras 12 to 17 are believed to be true based on information received.
31.
In the affidavit all the averments of corrupt practice from Paras 12 to 17 have been stated which are believed
to be true on the information received by her, when the Statement of the petitoner is traversed through, at
Para 49 it is stated that on 15.11.2013 a complaint was given by Santosh Tiwari to the election returning
officer. The complaint was made about a particular incident, which is said to have taken place on 15.11.2013.
This is a hear-say evidence as it was not to the knowledge of the petitioner. At para 13 of the petiton, it was
stated that liquor and Saris were distributed by the workers of respondent No. 1 which was informed by
Santosh Pandey and a written complaint was made to the returning officer about the incident of 17.11.2013.
Santosh Pandey has not been examined before the Court. Therefore, it is also hear-say only to the effect that
Santosh Kumar has informed to the petitioner;
32.
Likewise at Paras 15, 16 & 17 averments of corrupt practice have been made on the basis of information given
by Santosh Pandey which is corroborated by para 34 of the Statement of the petitioner that the information
was given by Santosh Pandey. At para 17 of the petition, the allegation of corrupt practice has been made for
distributing money, liquor and Saris and it has been stated that two Government workers had canvassed for
the returned candidate, which was witnessed by vorious persons and was informed by Dharamlal Yadav and
Surendra Singh Paikra. Both these persons who are said to have supplied the information have not been
examined. At para 14 of the petition, it was stated that certain money and liquor were distributed ot the voters
and haviing been objected by the petitioner’s workers Inder Singh Dhurvey and others, they were aboused.
Inder Singh Dhurvey was also not examined before the Court. Though the petitioner discloses that various
incidents of corrupt practice were reported by Santosh Pandey, Dharamlal Paikra, Surendra singh & indersingh
Dhurve but none of them were examined before the Court. Therefore, these facts would show that facts
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
685
pleaded were not in her personal knowledge as such the said statement of fact cannot be accepted being
inadmissible in evidence.
33.
The corrupt practice is defined u/s 123 of Representation of People Act read with section 100 sub-section (2)
which makes mandatory u/s 100 sub-section (2), that it was to be pleaded and proved that corrupt practice was
committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent. Therefore, it was the primary duty of the
petitioner to prove those facts that corrupt practice which was steated to be done by few person whether the
election agent or the respondent.
34.
The Supreme Court in case of Jeet Mohinder Singh vs. Harminder Singh Jassi (1999) 9 SCC 386 in para 40
held that “the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with. Any
petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law. The Court further held
that setting aside of an election involves serious consequences not only for the returned candidate and the
constituecny, but also for the public at large inasmuch as re-election involves an enermous load on the public
funds and administration.
35.
Further in (2010) 1 SCC 466-Kattinokkula Murali Krishna v. Veeramalla Koteswara Rao the Supreme Court
has held that it is a settled principle of law that evidence beyound the pleadings can neither be permitted to
be adduced nor can such evidence be taken into account. As such the standard of proof was emphasized in
such case law. similar view was adopted in (2000) 8 SCC 191 - Ravinder Singh Vs. Janmeja Singh, wherein it
was also held that “it is an the established proposition that no avidence can be led on a plea not raised in the
pleadings and that no amount of evidence can cure defect in the pleadings.”
36.
Futher in case law reported in (2014) 1 SCC 45-Regu Mahesh alias Regu Maheswar Rao Vs. Rajendra Pratap
Bhanj Dev the importance of setting out the sources of information in affidavits came up for consideration
and it was held that the sources of information should be clearly disclosed. It was also held that real impor-
tance of setting out the sources of information at the time of presentation of the petition is to give the other
side notice of the contemporaneous evidence on which the election petition is based and that will give an
opportunity to the other side to test the genuineness and veracity of the sources of information.
37.
Herein the present case, the pleading and evidence on corrupt practice is too vague and it is only based on
hear-say evidence. The petitioner though stated that certain goods were distributed in such case, It was also
upon the petitioner to prove that the workers against whom the charges of distribution of money and liquor,
Saris etc. have been made were the agents/workers of the returned candidate. The person who informed the
petitioner about those corrupt practices or maloractices are not examined. Though the personal knowledge
has been pleaded in the petition and affidavit but evidence whould show that it is all hear-say. As such the
petitioner failed to prove corrupt practice of distribution of money and various goods.
38.
It is further alleged by the petitioner that the respondents suppressed the material fact so as to render the
election in valid. The Petitioner in her statement under Order 18 rule 4 of CPC had stated that as per EX.P-9
which is report of the Patwari the place of birth of respondent No. 1 was at village Sarbahara and the date of
birth is 07.08.1978. The Patwari who prepared this document is P.W.4 Prakash Patle, P.W. 4 has deposed that
in the year 2013 Amit Jogi had filed an application before him to prepare the family tree and one Kamal Singh
who was Patel of village Jogishar came to him along-with application. The statement of witneesses and
photocopies of the affidavits were attached and Kamal Singh is the Government Servant, working in the
Revenue Department as Village Patel, The said document Ex.p-9 was not confronted with this witness though
the same is exhibited by the petitioner. Para 30 of the statement of the petitioner (P.W. 1) shows that while
such exhibits were marked it was objected that it is not a certified copy as per the provisions of Section 76 of
the Indian Evidence Act. The court thereon allowed to mark the said docuemnt as Exhibit and observed that
admissibility of the document would be considered at the time of evidence.
39.
A perusla of Ex.P-9 would show that it is a photocopy. P.W.4 was the witness of petitioner but the document
Ex.P-9 was not confronted to P.W.4 the Patwari Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act defines the public
document which is reproduced here-in-below;
74.
Public documents,—The following documents are public documents;
(1)
Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts—
(i)
of the sovereing authority,
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
686
(ii)
of official bodies and tribunals, and
(iii)
of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive of any part of India or of the
Commonwealth, or of a foreign country;
(2)
Public records kept in any State of private documents.
40.
Likewise, section 76 defines the certified copy of the public document which reads as under:
“76. Certified copies of public documents.—Every public officer having the custody of a public
document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment
of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is true copy of
such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subsribed by such
officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorised by law to
make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.”
41.
The certified copy as defined in Section 76 contemplates that it is to be issued on payment of legal fee thereof
together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part
thereof, as the case may be and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name
and his official title and shall be sealed. A perusal of Ex.P-9 do not show that certain fee was paid. However,
at the foot of the document, the words Satya Pratilipi and signature of Tahsildar Pendra Road are shown.
Bhaskar Singh, the Tahsildar Pendra Road was examined as P.W.5. The said office was not confornted with
the document Ex.P-9 though he was witness of the petitioner. As such the facts as to whose signature Ex.P-9
bears and who has issued the same and when the legal fee was deposited ought to have been explained to
comply the provisions of Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act so as to take within the ambit of certified
copy as defined in the Evidence Act.
42.
Further it is not clear by examination of Ex.P-9 that who had issued the same. In order to accept a document
it must satisfy the ingredients of section 76 of the Evidence Act. A persual of Ex.P-9 shows that requirements
of section 76 i.e. payment of legal fee and who has issued the same have not been made clear and the
Tahsildar was called upon to show that by whom it, was issued ? Therefore under the circumstances it do not
conform to the requirements of Section 76 so as to accept the same in the evidence. In the result, though the
document was exhibited but it cannot be read in evidence as it is not admissible in evidence.
43.
The other witness of Plaintiff Bhaskar Singh who is the SDO (Revenue) was exmined as P.W.5. In his state-
ment he has deposed that he had taken the statement of respondent no. 1 wherein respondent No. 1 has stated
that his place of birth was Sarbahara and his statement was recorded on oath and respondent No. 1 stated that
after birth, he was residing at Sarbahara. The order sheet of proceeding to grant the caste certificate is marked
as Ex.P-2. A perusal of the entire order sheets shows that it do not record the fact that respondnet No. 1 made
a statement that he was born at Sarbahara. Therefore, the oral evidence of P.W. 5 is not supported by order
sheet of the proceeding which he himself recorded. The order sheet do not record that he was borne at
Sarbahara. Ex.P.-20 was the statement of Amit Jogi. If his statement is read as a whole it do not reflect that he
made a statement that he was born at Sarbahara instead he stated that after birth he was residing along-with
his mother and father at village Sarbahara and thereafter the particulars of grand-Father etc. have been
stated.
44.
Now coming to the statement of P.W. 3 Sarveshwar Narendra Bhure, at para 4 he stated that he had not
recorded any statement but it was recorded by Tahsildar. At para 7, he further made a hearsay statement that
as told by respondent No. 1, his place of birth was written as Sarbahara in Patwari Report Patwari P.W.4 was
not confronted with the statement Ex.P-20 of the respondent nor was confronted with Ex.P-9 though these
documents were exhibited by the petitioner and they were witnesses of the petitioner. As such, the petitioner
himself has failed to prove the substantial fact that the statement was made by Amit Jogi that he was, born
at Sarbahara. When Amit Jogi was confronted with his statement as D.W. 1 in respect of Ex.P.-20 he
admitted to have made such statement. As averred herein-below., the statement Ex.P.-20 do, not categori-
cally say so that he was born at Sarbahara. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to prove this fact that such
wrong statement was made by respondent No.1.
45.
The petitioner has further averred that the returning officer namely P.W. 3 Serveshwar Narendra Bhure was
the SDO at the time of issuance of the caste certificate. The petitioner stated that the objection though was
raised in respect of caste certificate, the same officer rejected the objection and bias was pleaded on the
ground that the person cannot be Judge of his own case.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
687
46.
Now coming to the statement of P.W. 3 at Para 8 he deposed that the petitioner Sameera Paikra had objected
to the nomination on 3 grounds. One was about citizenship of Amit Ajit Jogi. Second was the caste of Amit
Jogi and the third was that Amit Jogi has shown two date of births. This witness has deposed that such
objection was decided after hearing both the parties and exmination of the docuemnt. Admittedly the evi-
dence shows that the same person SDO has issued the caste certificate Ex.P-4 and subsequently decided the
objection with respect to cast certificate.
47.
Now the question is whether there was bias caused. Admittedly P.W.3 issued the caste certificate in the
capacity of SDO and thereafter has decided the objection raised by the petitioner as a returning officer. If the
SDO was discharging the duty of Returning Officer then he was under the statutory obligation to deal with the
objection and decide the same as also at the time of issuance of certificate Likewise, when the caste certificate
was issued by him, he was under the obligation either to issue the certificate or to reject the same.
48.
The Oxford Administrative Law 8th Edition (Page 452) has interpreted such situation on the topc “THE
RULE AGAINST BIAS”. It is the principle which has been followed when the individual authorities qua case
of necessity, bias cannot be inferred for the reason when there is no substituion is possible and no-one-else
is emplwered to act. Natural justice then has to give wahy to the necessity; for otherwise there is no means
of deciding and machinery of justice or administration will break-down. It furhter says that in administra-
tive cases, the exigency of like nature may easily arise. Where the statute empowers a particular minister or
official to act, he will usualy be the one and only one person who can do so. There is then no way of
escaping the responsibilty, even if he is personally interested and transfer of responsibilty is, indeed, a
recognized type of ultra-vires.
49.
Considering the point of bais and in the light of the aforesaid principles, statement of P.W.3. Sarveshwar
Narendra Bure, who was the S.D.O. (Revenue) had stated that in the year 2013, he was appointed by the
election commission as a Returning Officer or Marawhi Assembly Election. At para-8 this witness he deposed
that Semeera Paikra, petitioner, has objected to the caste of respondent. The said objection was decided by
him on 02.11.2013 which has been marked as Ex.P.-7. The witness further deposed that after hearing both the
parties, he has adjudicated the objection and the objection was decided according to the statute of RP Act.
Reading of the said statement would show that Serveshwar Narendra Bhure who was appointed as Returning
Officer could not have refused the responsibilty and in the alternative if such responsibility was not
discharged, it would be a recognized type of ultravires.
50.
Further the petitoner in her statement at para 72 had referred caste certificate of Ajit Pramod Jogi, father of
respondent no. 1 and stated that the caste certificate was issued to Ajit Jogi on the basis of forged document
and she has received the said information from one Nand Kumar Sai. The said Nand Kumar Sai has not been
examined. It is a hearsay evidence. She has further averred that Ex.P-6 wherein the objection with respect to
the application preferred by the respondent was raised taht it was not in format and the competent person has
not issued the certificate. However, in order to prove the same it has not been substantiated, Ex.P-21 the order
dated 27.06.2017 was referred which was passed by the High Powered Committee against father of R-1
wherein it was declared that the father of R-1 ajit Pramod Kumar was not able to establish that the caste
certificate issued to him was valid.
51.
During the course of arguments the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 30.01.2018 passed in
W.P.(C). No. 2104/2017 was produced. A persual or the said judgement would show that the finding of Ex.P.-
21 wherein it was held that the father of respondent was not having a valid caste certificate was set aside and
therefore the enquiry was ordered with certain observations. The fact remains that the order Ex.P.-21 has been
set aside and it losses its efficacy and Ex.P-21 will merge into the order of Division Bench.
52.
Further the argument which is made by the petitioner that the petitioner was not kanwar and was Christian.
The pleading and evidence in this regard are considered. The petitioner in her deposition at Para 87 stated
that in Kanwar Tribe, the festival of Hareli, Cherchera, Sua, Karma are celebrated. With respect to Nawakhai,
he sated that it is not a festival. She further sated that Nawakhai programme is not a cllective programme.
It is entirely a family programme wherein the members of the family perform worship (Puja) at their home
only. She has furhter voluntarily stated that Ajit Jogi and Amit Gogi celebrate Nawakhai at the temple of
Jogishar village and all the nearby villagers are invited and they perform Nawakhai whereas Kanwar tribe
community do not follow such rituals. She has further stated that the said programmes are done by the Ajit
Jogi, father of returned candidate Amit Jogi. Renu Jogi wife of Ajit Jogi and Richa Jogi wife of R-1 Amit
Jogi to show that they are kanwars.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
688
53.
She has further stated that in programme of Nawakhai which is celebrated by Ajit Jogi and Amit Jogi, large
number of people from the entrie area participate and even from Bilaspur, people go to participate. The said
statement would go to show that Kanwar. Tribe community participates in the programmes conducted by the
respondent family. She has furhter stated that Kanwar community in their marriage, uses to call the other
person also and with respect to respondents, she has stated at Para 91 that respondent Amit Jogi had adopted
Christianity. As for documents Ex.P.-10 to P-18 she has stated at Para 93 that the said documents were given
to Vigilance Committee Raipur in the year 2014 and she sated that in the school living certificate, they are
shown as Christian (Isai). She has stated that since the respondent was a Christian, he cannot be held to be
Kanwar.
54.
The evidence as is on record gives a clear picture that Kanwar community of village participates in the
functions of Nawakhai, Puja etc. conducted by the respondents and therefore what would be the effect if the
person is accepted as a Kanwar though he is a Christian. This aspect whether he loses his right or whether the
Christian cannot be a Kanwar has to be examined. Admittedly the fact that respondent No. 1 is a Christian is
not disputed.
55.
In a book captioned as Law and Society in Modern India written by Marc Galanter, 1997 edition, Third
Impression at Page 105 the legal conception of social structure has been described. The said author has
referred to Judgment rendered in Kartik Oraon V. David Munzni AIR 1964 Patna 201 wherein a challenge in
the election petition was with respect to a candidate for member of Uraon family but he had been a Christian
since his grand father’s time. Therefore, the question was whether a particular person was eligible to contest
the seat reserved for Scheduled Tribe being Christian.
56.
It was ground of challenge that onece a person became a Christian, he cannot be no longer a Uraon. The High
Court founds that the candidates active participation in the civic life of tribe balied the charge of lack of
common interests and aspirations. In the instant patiition, the manner and custom and the evidence shows
that though the respondent has adopted Christianity, but they still continue observance of tribe religion. The
relevant part of judgment reported in kartik Oraon V. David Munzni AIR 1964 Patna 201 (supra) is quoted
herein-below;
(14)
“Tribe” has been defined in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 22, 1961 edition, at page 465, by
W.H.R. Rivers as “a social group of a simple kind, the members of which speak a common dialect,
have a single government, and act together for such common purposes as “warfare”. Other typical
characteristics include a common name, a contiguous territory, a reletively uniform culture or way
of life and a tradition of common descent.. Tribes are usually composed of a number of local
communities, e.g. bands, villages or neighborhoods, and are often aggregated in clusters of a higher
order called nations. The term is seldom applied to societies that have achieved a Strictly territorial
organization in large states but is usually confined to groups whose unity is based primarily upon a
sense of extended kinship ties. It is no longer used for kin groups in the strict sense, such as clans.”
As already observed, the case of the appelant is that two respondents have nothing to do
with the animistic faith and tribal way of life and they did not follow the manners and customs of the
tribes and have no affinity nor any common interest, defence of aspirations with or for the tribal
people and that, in order to be classed as a scheduled tribes, problems of common interest, espira-
tion and defence and must profess the tribal religion (animism) and follow the tribal way of life. In
reply to the above allegation, the respondent, in his written statement, stated that both the respon-
dent were and are members of the Oraon tribe which has been specified as a scheduled Tribe in the
State of Bihar under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 and that having anything to do
with the aimistic faith and tribal way of life was no ingredient of memebrship of Scheduled tribes
within the meaning of the said Order. It was further stated that many memebrs of various Sched-
uled Tribes, professing the Christian faith, have con tested Parliamentary and Assembly seats which
were reserved for memebrs of Scheduled Tribes in the first, second and third general elections in
this county and the successful contestants among them served their full term as members of the
respective legislature without any challenge, and that, as a matter of fact, respondent No. 2 had
successfully contested his particular reserved seat in the general election held in for the full term till
its dissolution on the eve of the general election of 1962.
57.
Likewise in Wilson Reade v. C.S. Booth AIR 1958 Assam Page 128, the election Commission had rejected
nomination papers for a Scheduled Tribe seat from a candidate, whose father was English and mother was a
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
689
Khasi Tribe. In such case in pre-indepence days he had accepted for himself and (his children his wife was
a Khasi) privileges restricted to anglo-Indians. But he was accepted as a Khasi by the tribes people, the
group being matri-lineal and anyone born of a Khasi mother being regarded as a member of Tribe; he had
followd ‘the customs and the way of the of the tribe’, was treated by them as one of themselves and had been
active in Khasi politics. The Assam High Court found that even though he was an ango_Indian within the
Constitutional definition, this did not prevent him from being a member of this tribe or some other community.
Weather he was in fact a Khasi depended not on purity of blood but on his conduct and on the acceptance of
the community.
58.
In exercise of power conferred by Clause (1) of Article 341 of the Constitution of India, the Presedent after
consultation with Governor and Rajpramukhs of the State concerned has issued the ordre which is called as
“The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. Another order called as “The Constituiton (Scheduled
Castes) Order 1950” was also issued by the Presidnet before issuance of the said S.T. Order, Clause (3) of
Scheduled Castes Order 1950 speaks that Notwithstanding anythiing contained in Paragraph 2, no person
who professes a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist regligion shall be deemed to be
memeber of a Schedule Caste. The said restriction is absent in the S.T. order which may be called as
Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) order, 1950. Therefore, necessary inference is that if the tribe converted to
Christianity, the said Tribal status shall continue.
59.
In the instant petition, respondent No. 1 has deposed that he is a kanwar. The petitioner also says that she is
a Kanwar but both of them adopted Christianity which is not in dispute. The entire reading of the petitione
shows that there is no allegation that respondent No. 1 is not a Kanwar but as against this, it is stated that the
certificate so issued to respondent showing him to be a kanwar is fake or it is not correct. Therefore,
necessary ingredients are missing in respect of the same to appreciate the argument of petitioner.
60.
Inview of the aforesaid discussions, the argument advanced by the petitioner that the petioner having adopted
the Christanity has lost his status of Kawar Tibe do not find support from settled law and the S.T. Order 1950
and it can be presumed that even if the respondent adopted the Christianity, his right of status of kanwar
Tribe cannot be taken away.
61.
Now further argument has been advanced that issuance of caste certificate to the respondent was nto according
to the Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social Staus (Cast), Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes (Regulation
of Social Status Certification) Act, 2013 or Rules made thereunder. At para 5 of the Petition, the petitioner
has made the pleading about the procedure. The pleading is silent as to what provisions of Act, 2013 was
violated. No. particulars thereof have been given. Only omnibus averments have been made. On going
through the principles laid down by authorilative pronouncements of different Courts, it is clear that in
election petition, the particulars have to be very much clear and distinct. There cannot be any presumptive
inference.
62.
Rule 2 of Chhattisgarh Scheduled Social Status (Cast), Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes
(Regulation of Social Status Certification) Rules, 2013 prescribes definitions. Rules 2(k) thereof refer to
“Presidential Notification”. which means order issued by the President under Article 341 and Article 342 of
the Constitution of India with respect to the State of Chhattisgarh, and as amended by the Parliament from
time to time.
63.
Likewise 2(L) defines the “Provisional Social Certificate” which reads thus;
“2 (i)
Provisional Social Status Certificate means a Social Status Certificate issued in FORM-4B under
Rule 10”.
64.
Rule 10 of the Rules 2013 provides for Provisional Certificate which is quoted below;
“10.
Provisiaonla Certificate;—
(1)
For the purpose of granting admission to educational institutions upto tenth standard or for
grantiing scholar ship or stipent at such level or for such other purposes, where large num
bers of Certificates are necessary and it is not feasible to issue such Certificate well in time.
the Competent Authority, may issue a provisional certificate in FORM-4B on the basis of
affidavit given by the applicant in FORM-2A within fifteen days from the date of applica
tion;
Provided that the Competent Authority shall maintain the details of provisional
certificates issued in FORM-58.
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
690
(2)
The provisional Certificate shall be valid only for a period of six months or till the date of
issue of permanent Certificate, whichever is earlier.”
65.
Further Social Status Certificates is defined under Rule 9 which reads as under;
“9.
Social Status Certificate,—The Competent Authority after receiving application under sub-rule (1)
of Rule 3 and conducting an inquiry under Rule 8 and in case where himself is not an inquiry
officer, after satisfying himself with the annexed documents and Report of the inquiry officer,
within one month from the date of receipt of application, shall issue the certificate in FORM-4A(1)
to the Applicant of Scheduled Castes, in FORM-FA (2) to the Applicant of Scheduled Tribes and in
FORM-4A (3) to the applicant of Other Backward Classes.”
66.
The form of Affidavit which is to be given is found in 2-A which is as under;
FORM-2A
[See Rule 3(3)(a)]
Affidavit for issue of Social Status Certificate
I Mr./Mrs./Ms................................................................son/daughter of.............................................j
aged........................................................Year.......................................accupation............................................
resident of ................................................Tehsil......................................District..............................................
State.............................................hereby solemnly affirm the following :—
1.
That I have applied for the issuance of Social Status Certificate before the Competent Authority in
FORM-1A.
2.
That I have, according to the prescribed form, attached the copy of ....................................documents
along-with the application letter before the Competent authority. The document mentioned above
has been obtained tawfully by the person(s) authorized by me and I have not made any unauthorized
amendment/omission/change what soever of any kind in the document mentioned above or its
original copy by me o r my well-wishers and according to the best of my knowledge, the above-
mentioned document/documents have not been concocted with any malicious intention.
3.
That I have attached the family tree showing relation with those relatives whose validity certificates
have been attahced with this application.
4.
I hereby declare that, in pursuance of obtaining the Social Status Certificate, the iinformation
rendered by me in the Application presented in the prescribed form before the Competent Authority,
is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and if such information is found false or incorrect, then
proceedings in accordance with Section 8-13 of Chhattisgarh Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
and Other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification) Act, 2013 shall be initiated
against me.
Signature.......................................
Name of the Applicant.................................
Verification
I, Mr./Mrs./Ms.......................................Son/daughter of..............................................hereby verify
that the statements mentioned in Clause 1 to 4 of this affidavit are true to the best of my knowledge
and belief, and I verify them in full consciousness.
Signature.......................................
Name of the Applicant.................................
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
691
67.
In the context of aforesaid provisions, the evidence which is on record is examined, Ex.P-2 is proved by the
petitioner. In respect of the Revenue Order Sheet of Case No. 44/0-121/13-14. This is an order sheet of
Tahsildar, Pendra Raod, Reading of Ex.P-2 as a whole shows that the Tahsildear examined the documents i.e.
(a) Affidavit (b) copy of land holdng certificate; (iii) Patwari Report, Family Tree, certified copy of resolution
of Gram Sabha; (d) Education Certificate/Mark Sheet (e) the Caste Certificate of the applicant’s father and
her sister. The said Ex.P-2 records that the statement of wtness was recorded and the land revenue records,
affidavit. In its entriety was considered and the Tahsildar came to conclusion that the provisional caste
certificate may be issued and therafter, It was forwarded to the SDo, Pendra Road for permanent caste
certificate. Subsequent to that, provisional caste certificate was issued vide Ex.P-3. Furher Ex.P-3 is the
order sheet of the SDO, Pendra Road which shows that all the documents, affidavit, the certificate issued in
favour of the family memebrs of the respondent were duly considered by the SDO and thereafter, the
permanent caste certificate was issued vide Ex.P-4.
68.
The aforesaid documents have been proved by Bhaskar Singh Markam (P.W.5). According to his statement,
different documents as has been described in the order sheet were produced and after recording the statement
of respondent, the certificate was issued, Ex.P-9 is Patwari Report wherein it is stated by the applicant. that
village Sarbahara is the place of birth of respondent Patwari Prakash Patel (P.W.4) who prepared the report
(Ex.P-9) was not confronted with such document. Instead, at Para 30 of her statement, the petitioner has
exhibited the document Ex.P-9 with the objection. Ex.P-9 the original was not brought on record before this
court.
69.
The certified copy of the documents are necessarily need to be confronted with Section 74. Therefore, as
averred it would not satisfy the ingredients of sections 74 & 76 of the Evidence Act. Furhter more, if the
Statement of P.W.5 Bhaskar Singh Markam at Para-5 is considered he has stated that he recorded the
statement of respondent wherein he stated that his place of birth was at Sarbahara whereas the Order Sheet
Ex.P-2 do not record such fact and it contains other details of facts. As such, that part of oral evidence which
did not find place in the order sheet contradicts and cannot be accepted as against the contents of order sheet
dated Ex.P.-2.
70.
Ex.P.-20 the statement of respondent Amit Aishwarwa Jogi would show that he has deposed that after his
birth, he was living at village Sarbahara along-with father and mother. The said statement do not contain the
fact that he was born at Sarbahara. P.W.3 Sarveshwar Narain Bhure who was SDO at the relevant time in his
statement has narrated the entire procedure. The SDO P.W. 3 at Para 10 of his statement has stated that he
had issued the caste certificate. The said certificate was filed during the nomination.
71.
It is not the case of the petitioner that respondent contested the election on the basis of the false caste
certificate. Instead, it is the case of the petitioner that he did not belong to Kanwar Tribe, the said caste
certificate Ex.P.-4 was not cancelled. While dealiing with similar facts situation of the case i.e. E.P. No. 60/
2014 (Dr. Thaneshwar Patela vs. Sarjani Banjari decided on 08.05.2017) this Court has held that with
respect to power conferred to issue the caste certificate, a notification was made by the State of Chhattisgarh
on 24.09.2013 which has been placed for perusal. The notification bears No. F13-22/2012/A.P./1-3 dated
24.09.2013 wherein the power has been given as per Direction No. 4.2 even to issue the certificate on filing
of affidavit when the documents are nto available for caste certificate and after enquiry the caste certificate
can be issued. Further Direction 2.1 requires the list of documents which includes the affidavit, the family
tree issued by the Patwari, the documents of cut-off date to show that the person seeking caste certificate is
residing at Chhattisgarh before the notification and after Reorganization of the State of Madhya Pradesh on
1st November, 2000 and any of the documents i.e., family tree (Mishal), revenue records etc. Further, the
direction 5.3 contained in the notification would show that the SDO has also been given power to issue the
caste certificate. In this case the document Ex.P-2 the order sheet and the statement of Patwari and the SDO
P.W.3 & P.W. 4 would show that the SDO issued the certificate Therefore, it would be according to the
direction 5.3 contained in the notification wherein the SDO is also given power to issue the caste certificate.
72.
With respect to issuance or caste certificate, the petitioner at Paras 3, 4 & 5 and contended that the objection
to the caste certificate was decided on the same day. The application was submitted to Tahsildar and he
forwarded it to the SDO. He was not having a jrisdiction and virtually without any enquiry, the report was
submitted. In statement of the petitioner at Para 5, it is stated that one Shankar Singh Kanwar has filed the
objection whereas in the verifiation of the petitioner it is stated that the statements are belived to be true and
based on records the affidevit would show that the petitioner contended that the objection was filed through
Shanker Singh Kanwar, therefore, it contradicts the virification clause of the petition. With respect to filing of
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
[ ÷ʪ v
692
petition for the caste certificate before the Tahsildar, para 71 of the deposition would show that she too had
filled an application for caste certificate before the Tahsildar Pendra. The entire procedure has been
described in that para. She further disclosed that all the averments which were disclosed in the Advocate
over the same do not find place in the petition. Therefore, it will show that the procedure which was adopted
by the respondent is also supported by the petitioner. She further fortified the fact that after the application
is filed to the Tahsildar, it has to be attanched with the family tree. Missal B-1 Khasra, income certificate
etc., and thereafter the Tahsildar after examining the said records, issues the caste certificate, therefore, the
procedure which is being challenged by the petitioner quo the respondent it shows the petitioner herself had
adopted the same procedure to obtaine the said certificate.
73.
The format which has been prescribed in Rules Form 1A, application for social status certificate do not
prescribe the place of birth. When the same form is considered as per Ex.P.-19 which is an application given
by the petitioner, it runts parallel except certain minor deviation. Therefore, what would be important to
contest the election is that as per Article 173(b) of the Consitutuion, a person can be qualified to contest the
election for the State Legislative Assembly if he is not less than 25 years of age. Section 100 of the RP Act
also do not contain any statutory requirement about the place of birth, therefore, in the facts of this case,
though the petitioner has failed to prove that respondent has given a wrong place of birth, even if it is
accepted as otherwise, the some would be of no consequence.
74.
Section 100(c) of the RP Act, 1951 given certain grounds to declare an election to be void when any
nomination has been improperly rejected and section 100(d) mandates that the election can be declared void
if it is proved that result of election in so far as it relates to a returned candidate has been materially affected
by improper acceptance of any nomination. Now reverting to the petition, nothing is on record to prove those
facts. In para 10 it has been stated that the petitioner was born at USA and in Para 7, the petitioner has stated
the nomination was illegally accepted. Except those, no pleading is on record, in Mahdeo v. Babu Uday
Pratap Singh AIR SC 1966 824 the Supreme Court with legiislative history has explained and held that the
petitioner in election petition has to prove the improper acceptance of nomination paper and how it had
materially affected the election petition. The difference of votes in this case between the petitioner and
respondent No. 1 is about 44,000. Therefore, how acceptance of nomination paper of respondent has
materially affected has not been proved. The pleading is completely silent. The principle has been laid in
AIR 2001 SC 905 Tek Chand v. Dile Ram and AIR 2016 2016 SC 4700 Rjendra Kumar Meshram v.
Vanshmani, that unless and until it is proved that acceptance of nomination has materially affected the
result of election, no relief can be granted.
75.
Further more, the facts would show that the permanent caste certificate was issued on 31.10.2013 vide
Ex.P-4. The returned candidate in its reply stated that at the time of scrutny, the permanent caste certificate
was filed, As per the election petition, scrutiny was done on 02.10.2013. The order of the returning officer
Ex.P.-7 is dated 02.11.2013 which would show that when the scrutiny was made on that date, the original
caste certificate was already produced. The same fact was corroborated by P.W.3 Serveshwar Narendra
Bhure at Para 10 that all the documents were considered and accordingly objections were decided. As such
no doubt can be created.
76.
Lastly, the prayer of the pettioner to declare the election of respondent No. 1 to be void whether can be
granted ? The term of the legislative assembly had already expired as the challenge in this petition is in
respect of the election held in the year 2013.
77.
Learned Senior Counsel Dr. N. K. Shukla, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 who is the author of
book captioned as Discretionary Nature of Opinion Judgments (Written by Dr. N. K. shukhlal has narrated
similar situations and issues therein based on legal principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. It is settled
preposition that the Court should not decide an iissue unless it is a living issue between the parties. The said
proposltion is supported by the decision of Suprem Court in AIR 1987 SC 1577-Dhartipakar Madan Lal
Agrawal Vs. Shri Rajiv Gandhi wherein it has been held that even if the election petition is allowed and the
election cannot be set aside after trial of the election petition, then the relief claiming for setting aside of
election would be rendered in fructurous by lapse of time. Accordingly, apart form the issue raised this fact
also becomes point of prime consideration.
78.
During the course of cross examination of witness Smt. Reena Baba Saheb Kangale, a publication was made
against her by the respondent. Subsequently, the application was filed by counsel for the petitioner u/s 151
of CPC read with Article 215 of the constitution of India and Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act to draw
¿UûÊË‚ª…∏U ⁄UÊ¡¬òÊ, ÁŒŸÊ¢∑§ vy •ªSÃU wÆwÆ
÷ʪ v ]
693
contempt proceeding against respondent No. 1 for releasing a press note by respondent no. 1. Therefore,
during the course of proceeding prima facie, this Court was of the opinion that the pressure was exerted over
the witness while she is being cross examined and on 14.09.2017 this Court has issued show cause notices
as to why criminal proceedings be not drawn against them for uploading the statement of witness though
they were not certified and for making statement to media. Subsequently show cause notices were issued to
respondent No. 1 and also the counsel representing him.
79.
The respondent to the show cause issued by the court was filed, In the reply, unconditional apology has
been tendered assigning reasons and it is stated that no interpolations were made in the statement of
witnesses and further no misreporting was made in newspaper. It was further stated that neither there was
malice nor the respondent or their counsel had any remote knowledge which may give rise to such proceed-
ing. The reply of the concerned advocates is also perused. They have also tendered unconditional apology
and stated that there is no intention to over reach authority of Court and pressurize the witnesses. The reply
is supported by the affidavit.
80.
After reading of the entire explanation made by respondent no. 1 and his counsels and considering the
unqualified and unconditional apology, the court accepts the same and expects that in future they would be
cautious. As a result, no direction is made to initiate any contempt or criminal proceeding against them
pursuant to show cause.
81.
In view of the aforesaid discusson, the court is of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to prove the very
fact with respect to allegations raised in the election petition and no relief can be granted to the petitioner.
82.
In the result, the petiton sans merit and is dismissed.
Sd/-
GOUTAM BHADURI
JUDGE
By order,
Sd/-
(N. N. BUTOLIA)
Principal Secretary,
Election Commission of India.