jkti=] fgekpy izns'k
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k
fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr
fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr
fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr
fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr
f”keyk]
f”keyk]
f”keyk]
f”keyk] cq/k
cq/k
cq/k
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] 2010
] 2010
] 2010@20202020 Jko.k]
Jko.k]
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1932
1932
1932
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
STATE ELECTION COMMISSION HIMACHAL PRADESH
vkeZlMsy] f'keyk&171002, Armsdale, Shimla-171002 Tel. 0177-2620152, 2620159, 2620154, Fax. 2620152
NOTIFICATION
10th August, 2010
No. SEC: 13-89/2009- 2269-83.—In exercise of the power vested in it under Article 243-
ZA of the constitution of India, Section 10(2) read with Section 22 of the H.P. Municipal (as
amended vide Act. No. 12 of 2010) Act, 1994 and Rule 24 of the H.P. Municipal Election Rule,
1994, The State Election Commission hereby specifies office wise election symbols for allotment
to candidates in the elections to Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats in H.P.:—
(A)
Symbol to be allotted to candidates for Member :
Sr.
No.
Name of Symbols
Sr.
No.
Name of Symbols
1.
Hand Pump
gS.M iEi
14.
Lock & Key
rkyk vkSj pkch
2.
Apple
lsc
15.
Television
VSyhohtu
99&jkti=@2010&11&8&2010
¼3123½
3124
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3.
Sewing Machine
flykbZ e'khu
16.
Ceiling Fan
Nr dk ia[kk
4.
Aeroplane
tgkt
17.
Cot
pkjikbZ
5.
Letter Box
ySVj ckSDl
18.
Spoon
peEp
6.
Railway Engine
jsy dk bZatu
19.
Gas Cylinder
xSl flyS.Mj
7.
Table
est
20.
Ball
xSan
8.
Bench
cSUp
21.
Camera
dSejk
9.
Bus
cl
22.
Chair
dqlhZ
10.
Bat
cYyk
23.
Car
dkj
11.
Pressure Cooker
izS'kj dqdj
24.
Cup-Plate
di&IysV
12.
Book
fdrkc
25.
Almirah
vyekjh
13.
Kite
irax
(B)
Symbol to be allotted to candidates for Vice-President:
Sr.
No.
Name of Symbols
Sr.
No.
Name of Symbols
1.
Star
flrkjk
13.
Black Board
';keiV
2.
Rising Sun
p<rk lwjt
14.
Globe
xyksc
3.
Moon
pk¡n
15.
Water Melon
rjcwt
4.
Radio
jsfM;ks
16.
Mango
vke
5.
Jeep
thi
17.
Baby Doll
xqfM+;k
6.
Balloon
xqCckjk
18.
Umbrella
Nkrk
7.
Hockey & Ball
gkdh vkSj xsan
19.
Tractor
VSªDVj
8.
Ladder
lh<+h
20.
Wheel Barrow
BsykxkM+h
9.
Drum
uxkM+k
21.
Dancing Girl
ukprh yM+dh
10.
Spade
QkoM+k
22.
Tabla (Two)
nks rcys
11.
Candle
eksecrh
23.
Electric Bulb
fctyh dk cYc
12.
Axe
dqYgkM+h
24.
Hurricane Lamp
ykyVsu
25.
Violin
lkjaxh
(C)
Symbol to be allotted to candidates for President:
Sr.
No.
Name of Symbols
Sr.
No.
Name of Symbols
1.
Flower
Qwy
13.
Soldier
flikgh
2.
Fort
fdyk
14.
Table Fan
est dk ia[kk
3.
Harmonium
gkjeksfu;e
15.
Whistle
lhVh
4.
Table Lamp
Vscy ySEi
16.
Box
lUnwd
5.
Bow & Arrow
/kuq"k ck.k
17.
Ring
vaxwBh
6.
Dholak
<ksyd
18.
Scissors
dSaph
7.
Banana
dsyk
19.
Comb
da?kh
8.
Bucket
ckYVh
20.
Carrot
xktj
9.
Coconut Tree
ukfj;y dk isM+
21.
Wrist Watch
gkFk dh ?kM+h
10.
Pencil
iaSfly
22.
Jug
tx
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3125
11.
Sword
ryokj
23.
Truck
Vªd
12.
Motorcycle
eksVj lkbZdy
24.
Diesel Pump
Mhty iEi
25.
Coconut
ukfj;y
This is in suppercession of earlier notification No. SEC-13-78/2002-1592-1615 dated
8th,Oct,2002.
By order,
DEV SWARUP,
State Election Commissioner.
____________
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 175/2006
Date of Institution : 4.12.2006
Date of decision : 28.2.2009
Shri Angat Kumar S/o Shri Gauri Dutt Village Bari, P.O. Khurahal, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division, Sunder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. L.B. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Angat Kumar S/o Shri Gauri Ram workman by the
Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. October,
2003 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If
not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is
entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent in Kangoo Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in June, 1999 and worked as such
upto November, 2003. Alleging the respondent to have suddenly terminated his services orally, the petitioner further
averred that he was not allowed to work for 240 days in any year, even though he had completed 240 days in „each
calendar year.. The respondent, according to the petitioner, had given artificial breaks in his service and retained certain
workmen, who were junior to him, at the time his services were dispensed with. The petitioner, it is further averred,
requested the respondent to re-engage him, but without effect. Left with no option, he later raised an industrial dispute,
which is encompassed in the reference in question. He prays for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in the
same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. He also prays for the grant of
full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including continuity of service.
3.
The respondent in his reply denied the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar
in June, 1999. It is averred that the petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in Kangoo Range of Sundernagar
Forest Division in January, 2000, and that he had completed more than 240 days till October, 2003. The petitioner, it is
further averred, had worked only for 8 days in 2004 and 5 days in 2005, and did not turn up in 2006 and 2007. By a
letter dated July 25, 2004, which was served upon the petitioner on July 27, 2004 through a Beldar namely Ashwani
Kumar, he (petitioner) was called upon to join his work, but he intentionally „avoided to join his work.. Refuting the
3126
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petitioner.s allegation of fictional breaks, the respondent averred that he (petitioner) had not turned up to join his work
„at his own sweet will. and thus lost his seniority as daily waged worker. The petitioner.s allegation that certain
workers junior to him were retained in service, was also refuted by the respondent. On the basis of these averments the
respondent prayed for dismissal of the reference.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief of
service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable.
OPR
3.
Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present petition.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner has no cause of action against the respondent.
OPR
5.
Whether there is no violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
OPR
6.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes, he is entitled to reinstatement and continuity of service from the date his retrenchment.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 : No
Issue 6 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues 1 And 5
7.
These issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
8.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in June, 1999
does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the documentary evidence led by the respondent. The mandays
chart Ex. RW1/B the correctness of which is not disputed by the petitioner, is indicative of the latter having been
engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in January, 2000. The respondent.s claim that the petitioner was
engaged as daily waged Beldar in January, 2000, therefore deserves acceptance and is accepted.
9.
The petitioner.s services are alleged to have been terminated by the respondent orally in October, 2000.
This allegation, to my thinking, appears to be true in view of the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B, which is indicative of the
petitioner having worked upto the month of October, 2003. The Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent
contends with vehemence that the petitioner, who was a casual worker, had abandoned the job on his own in October,
2003, and that in view of this position, no provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) can be said
to have been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. Nowhere in his pleadings did the respondent aver that
the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own in October, 2003. Rather what is inter alia averred in the respondent.s
reply to the petitioner.s statement of claim is:
“……In fact, the applicant was engaged w.e.f. January, 2000 as per record maintained by the
respondents and he completed more than 240 days till October, 2003, but the applicant only worked for
8 days during the year 2004 and for 5 days during the year 2005 and during the year 2006 & 2007, the
applicant never turned up on work at his own volition. …….From the Mandays chart attached herewith
as Annexure-I, it is evident that the applicant was on work during the year 2004, but he worked only for
8 days in the month of July, 2004 and thereafter he did not turn up. Similarly in February, 2005, he
worked for 5 days only and then did not turn-up on work. During the years 2006 and 2007, the
applicant never visited the office of the Range Officer, Kangoo Range at Kangoo…….”
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3127
10. The respondent to establish his claim that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own ought to have
adduced in evidence the muster roll for the month of October, 2003 wherein the latter may have been shown to have
absented from work. But the respondent having failed so to do, it is difficult to accept his claim that the petitioner had
abandoned the job. In view of the mandays chart aforementioned and the respondent.s averments that the petitioner was
engaged as daily waged Beldar in January, 2000 and completed more than 240 days till October, 2003, I have not
hesitation in holding that the services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondent in October, 2003.
11. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has
been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the
notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average [pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months;
and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
12. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25 (B). Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which
is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation or work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer.-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than.-
(i)
ninety-five days, in the case of workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case….”
13. The mandays chart Ex. RW1/B as also the respondent.s pleadings are demonstrative of the petitioner
having worked for more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from
service. There is nothing to suggest that the respondent had at the time of termination of the services of the petitioner
given him one month.s notice or paid him wages in lieu of such notice, along with retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. The petitioner.s removal from service thus being violative of the said
provisions was not proper and justified.
14. In dispensing with the services of the petitioner, the respondent also appears to have violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, which provides:
3128
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“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
15. The daily waged workers whose names figure at serial nos. 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90,91, 92, 93, 95, 96,
98, 99, 101, 102 and 104 in the seniority list Ex. RW1/D adduced in evidence by the respondent, are indubitably junior
to the petitioner. This document is indicative of these workmen having been retained in service at the time the services
of the petitioner were dispensed with in October, 2003. In terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent can
therefore safely be held to have violated the abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as well. The
petitioner is therefore entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services
were unlawfully terminated by the respondent. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (October, 2003). In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he is held entitled to 50% back-wages
as well. Both the issues under discussion are accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2
16. In view of what has been held under the above issues 1 and 5, the petition is perfectly maintainable to
the extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is held accordingly in
favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3
17.
In view of what has been held under the above issues 1 and 5, the petitioner has decidedly locus standi
to raise the industrial dispute encompassed in the reference in question. The issue on hand is therefore held in his
favour and against the respondent.
Issue 4
18. In view of my findings on the above issues 1 and 5, the respondent.s claim that the petitioner has no
cause of action, does not hold water and is therefore rejected. The issue under discussion is therefore held in favour of
the petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
19. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issues 1 and 5, the petition succeeds
partly and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and
continuity of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (October, 2003). The said 50% back-wages shall be
computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act
whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner
within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of February, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. : 367/2002
Date of Institution : 25.11.2002
Date of decision : 17.1.2009
Ms. Anita Devi D/o Sh. Jagdish Chand, Village, Dak Bagra, P.O. Chountra, Tehsil, Joginder Nagar, Distt.
Mandi, H.P.
…Petitioner
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3129
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.S.E.B. Division Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
…....Respondent
For the Petitioner :
Sh. Virender Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. B.K. Sood, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of the services of Ms. Anita Devi (Daily Waged Meter Reader/ Bill
Distributor) D/o Sh. Jagdish Chand w.e.f. 25.7.1986 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.S.E.B Division
Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi without any notice, Charge Sheet and enquiry is proper and justified?
If not, what relief of service benefits the above workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Meter Reader/Bill Distributor on muster roll basis on August 25, 1980, and that she worked
as such under the Assistant Engineer, Electrical Sub Division Chountra upto July 24, 1986. Claiming to have worked
for 1744 days during the period she remained in the employ of the respondent, the petitioner alleged that the respondent
struck out her name from the muster roll w.e.f. July 25, 1998, vide his letter No.JED/A-10/86-87-8305 dated
21.10.1986. Claiming to have completed more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the
date of termination of her services, the petitioner further alleged that in dispensing with her services, the respondent had
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short), for she was not served
with any notice nor was she paid retrenchment compensation at the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, the
respondent, according to her, violated the principle of „last come first go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act,
because certain workmen namely Kiran Sharma, Virender Kumar, Sapna Dhawan and Kuldeep Chand, who were
junior to her, were retained in service at the time of termination of her services. These workmen, it is further averred,
were later regularised as clerk. In dispensing with the services of the petitioner, the respondent also violated the
provisions of Clause 14(2) of the Industrial Establishment Standing Orders (hereinafter referred to as the Standing
Orders) framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Besides, he committed breach of the
provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, according to the petitioner. On the basis of these averments the petitioner prayed
for a direction to the respondent to reinstate her with full back-wages and continuity of service. She also prayed for a
direction to the respondent to fix her seniority as Clerk/Meter Reader/Bill Distributor in the regular pay scale.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as Bill Distributor on
daily wages basis on August 25, 1980, but refuted her allegation that her services were terminated on July 25, 1986.
Denying having terminated the services of the petitioner, the respondent averred that she had worked upto August 18,
1986 and abandoned the job on her own on August 19, 1986 without giving any prior intimation to her superiors. As
the petitioner did not turn up after August 18, 1986, the Assistant Executive Engineer, Electrical Sub Division, HPSEB,
Chountra, informed the Executive Engineer, Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar of her absence and sought guidance in
the matter, vide letter No.957-58 dated August 30, 1986. In response to the letter, the said Executive Engineer
intimated that the name of the petitioner had been struck out from the Seniority Register in the Divisional office on
account of her absence from duty from August 19, 1986 onwards. After abandoning the job on August 19, 1986, the
petitioner, according to the respondent, never approached him for her re-engagement during the period of more than 15
years of her continuous absence from duty. In view of her having abandoned the job on her own, no provision of the
Act or the Standing Orders, according to the respondent, can be said to have been violated. The respondent.s other
contentions relate to limitation, estoppel, misjoinder of the parties and non-joinder of necessary parties.
4.
The petitioner in her rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated her stand
taken in the claim petition. According to her, she was forced to leave the job by the official of the Sub Division, and
that she had approached the respondent “through many correspondences and the respondent did not pay any heed
towards the letter of the workman.”
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner Anita Devi w.e.f.25.7.86 by the respondent is legal
and justified?
OPP
3130
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
2.
If Issue No.1 is not proved, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
3.
Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged?
OPR
4.
Whether the present petition is barred by time as alleged?
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped to file and maintain the present petition in view of the preliminary
objections?
OPR
6.
Whether the petition is bad for misjoinder and nonjoinder of necessary parties, as alleged?
OPR
7.
Relief.
6.
By his award dated March 3, 2006, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office dismissed the petitioner.s claim, inter
alia observing:
“…..Bearing in mind the above discussions hinged upon the verdict of the Hon.ble High Court of H.P.
holding that the belated preferment of claim imbues it with staleness, so, as to render the reference
comprising the dispute to be, also, stale, thereby rendering the reference as not maintainable and while
keeping in mind the delay and latches as have taken place, since, the retrenchment of the workmen
which in took place in the year 1986, the reference as has been made of the dispute by the competent
authority in the year 2001 is manifestly and palpably belated, especially, when of no explanation on
proof of delay thereof exists, hence stale, therefore, on account of staleness of the claim, the claim, as,
preferred before this Tribunal, in my view is not maintainable being barred by delay and latches. Since
the staleness of claim has been held to be not keeping the dispute alive, therefore, the conclusion is that
the workman has acquiesced in it or a dispute as it then was and which ought to have been expeditiously
canvassed by the workman on account of delay can be said to have been effaced or faded, so, also, the
concomitant effect is that inference of abandonment can also be made….”
7.
Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred before the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh a Writ Petition
(CWP No.474/2007). By its order dated November 27, 2008, the Hon.ble High Court set aside the impugned award and
remanded the matter to this Court for decision afresh, inter alia observing:
“…..The Labour Court has rejected the claim petition only on the ground of delay and laches. The
question of delay and laches was never referred to the Labour Court. In the present case neither the
petitioner nor the employer has placed on record any material to show when the conciliation
proceedings commenced and failed. The raising of demand notice, conciliation proceedings and failure
report etc. consumes considerable time. The date of raising the dispute is not the date of the reference
by the State Government. The dispute is raised when the workman protests against the action taken by
the Management. In the present case, the workman has been retrenched on 25.7.1986. She has made
representation Ex. P4 in the year 1986. She made representations to the Executive Engineer in the year
1989 (Ex. P-3) and August, 1989 (Ex. P-2). The representations made by the workman were not heeded
to. The workman has issued the demand notice 9th June, 2001 (Ex. P-5). Thereafter considerable period
has been consumed during the conciliation proceedings. Consequently, it cannot be held that there is
delay of 16 years in the present case.
The Labour Court could not refuse to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it on the ground of delay and laches
when the reference has already been made by the State Government in its own wisdom.
The Labour Court instead of dismissing the claim on the ground of delay could take this fact into
consideration at the time of moulding of the relief. Accordingly, the award dated 23.3.2006 passed by the Presiding
Judge, Labour Court, Dharamshala is quashed and set aside….”
8.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
The petitioner having been proved to have abandoned the job on her own, hers was not a
case of termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
She is not entitled to any relief.
Issue 3 :
Yes
Issue 4 :
The petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
Issue 5 :
Yes
Issue 6 :
No
Issue 7 :
The petition dismissed per operative part of the award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1
9.
The petitioner.s claim of having worked as daily wager Meter Reader/Bill Distributor under the
Assistant Engineer, Electrical Sub Division, Chountra upto July 24, 1986 and her allegation that her services were
suddenly terminated by the respondent on July 25, 1986, do not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the
materials on record. The mandays chart Ex. RW1/A the correctness of which is not disputed by her, is indicative of her
having worked for 24 days during the period from July 25, 1986 to August 24, 1986. Had her services been terminated
by the respondent on July 25, 1986 as alleged by her, she would have not been shown to have worked beyond July 24,
1986 in the mandays chart. Her claim that her services were terminated by the respondent on July 25, 1986, is therefore
nothing but falsity. More so, when she in her cross-examination as PW1 maintained:
“…..My date of suspension of service mentioned in the petition as 25.7.85 is wrong and incorrect; self
stated that it is a clerical mistake….”
10. But nowhere in her pleadings did the petitioner allege that her services were terminated by the
respondent on August 25, 1986. She in her statement of claim mentioned two dates of the alleged termination of her
services; one, 25.07.1985 in paragraph 2, and the other, 25.07.1986 in the relief portion.
11. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of termination of her services, the respondent, on the other hand,
averred that the petitioner, who was engaged as Bill Distributor on daily wages basis on August 25, 1980, had worked
upto August 18, 1986, and that she abandoned the job on her own on August 19, 1986 without giving prior intimation
to her superiors, appears to be true in view of the evidence led by the respondent. The respondent.s witness B.R. Rana,
then Assistant Executive Engineer, Electrical Division, HPSEB, Joginder Nagar, testified as RW1 that petitioner Anita
was not removed from service but she herself absented from work. Ex. RW1/C is a copy of the letter dated August 30,
1986 addressed to the Executive Engineer, Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar, by the Assistant Engineer, Electrical
Division, HPSEB, Chountra. The letter, which was about the petitioner.s absence from duty without intimation, in its
material part reads:
“It is intimate that Smt. Anita Devi W/o Sh. Jagjit Singh working under this Sub-Division as M/Roll
basis as Bill Distributor Helper is absent from duty w.e.f. 18.8.1986 to date. She has neither submitted
any application for leave in this office nor she has verbally taken permission from any body regarding
her absence from duty. There is a continuous absence of 11 days w.e.f. 18.8.86 to date and it is not
known as to when she will turn up for duty.
It may, therefore, kindly be advised whether Smt. Anita Devi W/o Sh. Jagjit Singh daily wages B.D. helper is
to be re- engaged as her joining please.”
12. In response to this letter, the Executive Engineer aforementioned sent to the Assistant Executive
Engineer a letter dated October 21, 1986, a copy whereof which is Ex. PW1/D. The relevant portion of this letter reads:
“In this connection it is intimated that the name of Smt. Anita Devi W/o Sh. Jagjit Singh working under
your Sub-Division on M/Roll basis as B/D helper has been struck off from the seniority Register of
Divisional Office, because of her absence from duty from 18.8.86 onwards.”
13. There being no reason to discredit the correctness of this letter and the one dated August 30, 1986, Ex.
RW1/C, the respondent.s claim that the petitioner had abandoned the job after August 18, 1986, rings true. More so, in
view of the petitioner.s failure to approach the respondent or raise the industrial dispute for years together after August
18, 1986, and the falsity of her following averments in paragraph 2-B of the rejoinder:
“………the applicant/workman did not leave the job at her own but she has been forced to leave the job
by the Deptt. and it is also denied that the applicant/workman did not approach the respondent for the
re-engagement. The applicant/workman approached the respondent through many correspondence and
the respondents did not pay any heed towards the letter of the applicant/workman…..”
14. The petitioner sought to substantiate these averments by adducing in evidence photocopies of three
letters (Ex. P2, Ex. P3 and Ex. P4) she claimed to have written to the Executive Engineer, HPSEB, Joginder Nagar and
the SDO, HPSEB, Chountra. Of these letters, while the one Ex. P4 addressed to the SDO, HPSEB, Chountra bears only
the year „1986. in the place of date and is non-existent in the date and month when the same was written, the other Ex.
P2 addressed to the Executive Engineer, HPSEB, Joginder Nagar shows the same to have been written in „August
1999. and is non-existent in the date. The third letter Ex. P3 addressed to the Executive Engineer, HPSEB, Joginder
Nagar bears the date 24 Mar 1985.. What prevented the petitioner from writing the exact date in the letters Ex. P2 and
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Ex. P4, is inexplicable. It deserves mention that she did not choose to get the originals of these letters requisitioned
from the respondent nor did she choose to put them to the respondent.s aforesaid witness B.R. Rana during his cross-
examination as RW1. To me, the said letters do not appear to be genuine, else the petitioner would have written the
exact date thereon, made a mention thereof in her pleadings, got the originals thereof requisitioned from the respondent
or atleast put them to the respondent.s aforesaid witness B.R. Rana during his cross-examination as RW1. In view of
the falsity of the petitioner.s claim of having entered into correspondence with the respondent for her re-engagement in
service, I am disposed to hold that she did not approach the respondent for years together after August 18, 1986. This
conduct of hers and the raising of the instant industrial dispute by her more than a decade after July 24, 1986 lead me to
hold that her allegation that her services were terminated by the respondent on 24.07.1986/25.07.1986/25.08.1986 (the
first two dates are in her statement of claim and the last one is in her affidavit Ex. P1) is nothing but falsity. More so, in
view of the evidence led by the respondent, which is demonstrative of her having abandoned the job on her own on
August 19, 1986. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against her and in favour of the respondent.
Issue 2
15. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The
issue on hand is held accordingly.
Issue 3
16. In view of my findings on the above issue 1, the petition is not maintainable. The issue on hand is
therefore held in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue 4
17. The petitioner is proved to have abandoned the job on her own on August 19, 1986. The instant
reference made to this Court vide HP Government (Labour Department) Notification No.11-23/84(ySc½ vkbZ
Mh@Hkkx/2002/Mandi dated November 23, 2002, appears to have been based on the report dated October 20, 2001 of
the Labour Inspector-cum-Conciliation Officer, Joginder Nagar. Even if a period of about 5 years is assumed to have
been consumed in conciliation proceedings, the petitioner must have approached the said Labour Inspector in or about
1995, that is, about ten years after July 24, 1986. In view of this position and what has been held under the above issue
1, the petition decidedly suffers from the vice of delay and laches. The issue under discussion is accordingly held
against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.
Issue 5
18. The petitioner, who is held to have abandoned the job on her own, is estopped from raising the industrial
dispute. Her petition is therefore not maintainable. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
Issue 6
19. The instant is not a case of mis-joinder of the parties. Also no such party appears to have been left out as
in the absence of whom the matters in controversy cannot be effectively adjudicated upon. The respondent.s contention
that the petition is bad for mis-joinder of the parties and non-joinder of necessary parties, is therefore not tenable. The
issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
20. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issues 1 and 2, the petition fails and
is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 17th day of January, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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3133
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 3/2008
Date of Institution : 17.1.2008
Date of decision : 26.11.2008
Shri Bahadur Singh S/o Shri Rania Ram, R/o Village Jaskot, P.O. Jhanyari, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
1.
Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
2.
The Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P.
…....Respondents
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the action of the (1) Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. (2)
The Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. to retain junior
workers who are junior to Shri Bahadur Singh S/o Shri Rania Ram workman and to give him break in
service as alleged by the workman without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is proper and justified? If not, what relief of back wages, seniority and service benefits the above
aggrieved workman is entitled from the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged beldar by the respondent 1 on January 4, 1999 and posted to Herbal Garden, Neri in Hamirpur district. Claiming
to have been working at the said place ever since his engagement as daily waged beldar, the petitioner alleged that the
respondents 1 and 2 had been giving fictional breaks in his service so that he could not be able to complete 240 days in
any of the calendar years. His co-workmen namely Pawan Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Ravinder Kumar, Desh Raj, Chaman
Lal, Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand and Milap Chand, who were also working at Herbal Garden, Neri as daily waged
beldar, were also given fictional breaks except one Satish Kumar, who was also engaged as daily wager by the
respondent 1 and working in the said garden. In the case of Satish Kumar, no fictional break, according to the
petitioner, was ever given and the respondents. act of giving fictional breaks in the petitioner.s service and that of his
aforementioned co-workers is violative of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (the Act, for short). Some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt. Saina Devi, Punni
Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla Devi, Baldev Raj,
Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv Ram and Smt. Kala
Devi, who according to the petitioner were also engaged on daily wages basis in another herbal garden of Ayurveda
department namely Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar in Mandi district, were also being given fictional breaks in their
service. In their case, the Incharge, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, was, however, forbidden from giving fictional
breaks by the Director of Ayurveda, vide his letter dated July 18, 1999. Claiming the fictional breaks in his case to be
the intentional act of the respondents, the petitioner further averred that he having never absented from work wilfully
was entitled to continuity of service in view of the provisions of Section 25-B of the Act. Besides, he is entitled to
wages for the period of fictional breaks. He therefore prays for a direction to the respondents to count the period of
fictional breaks towards continuity of his service and pay him wages for the said period along with interest @ 9% per
annum. He also prays for a direction to the respondents to regularise his service on the basis of his seniority.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily
waged beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on January 4, 1999, but refuted his allegation of fictional breaks. Claiming the
work of Herbal Garden, Neri to be a seasonal work, the respondents averred that the petitioner and other workers
namely Chaman Lal, Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand, Baljit Singh, Pawan Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Desh Raj, Ravinder
Kumar, Chander Kant, Ravinder Kumar and Madan Lal were engaged on daily wages basis at the said garden subject
to availability of work and budget, and no fictional break was ever given in their service. As for Satish Kumar, he was
in fact engaged as daily waged worker at Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on 1.7.1996 and he being deft in nursery
development work was temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 to carry out the said work and other
related works there. About four years later he was called back to Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar after the other workers
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of Herbal Garden, Neri gained knowledge of nursery development work upto the desired level. On the basis of these
averments the respondents pray for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the respondents have been giving fictional breaks in the service of the petitioner.
OPP
2.
Whether Satish Kumar is junior to the petitioner, as alleged.
OPP
3.
If the above issues 1 and 2 are proved, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes partly, as the respondents have been giving breaks in the service of the petitioner.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
The petitioner is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Relief :
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1
7.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on January
4, 1999, is not disputed by the respondents. Also, his claim that he was still working as beldar on daily wages basis at
the said garden, is not denied by the respondents. What is denied by the respondents is his allegation of fictional breaks.
But this denial of theirs appears to be far from truth in view of the materials on record. The Mandays Chart of casual
labourers working in Herbal Garden, Neri is demonstrative of the petitioner having worked for 209 days in 1999, 219.5
days in 2000, 209.5 days in 2001, 219 days in 2002, 212.5 days in 2003, 213 days in 2004, 252 days in 2005, 326 days
in 2006, 296 days in 2007 and 117 days during the period from January 1, 2008 to April, 2008. That there have been
breaks in his service is manifest from this document. In substantiation of his allegation that the breaks in service were
notional/fictional, the petitioner swore an affidavit Ex. PW1/A wherein he alleged that the respondents had been giving
notional/fictional breaks in his service during the period; January, 1999 to April, 2005. Besides, he relied upon a copy
of the letter dated July 18, 1999 addressed to the Incharge, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar by the Director of
Ayurveda, Himachal Pradesh, Annexure P1. This letter in its material part reads:
“You are hereby advised not to give any break after 89 days in future to daily paid Labourers who are
engaged to work in Herbal Garden as such a notional break has been disapproved by the competent
courts also.”
The petitioner.s allegation is that some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt.
Saina Devi, Punni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla
Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv
Ram and Smt. Kala Devi, who were engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were also being
given fictional breaks in their service, and that the Incharge of the said Garden was forbidden from so doing by the
Director of Ayurveda, vide his aforementioned letter dated July 18, 1999, Annexure P1. As to this allegation, the
respondents. averments in paragraph 7 of their joint reply are:
“That the contents of para-7 are admitted to the extent that these workers Sh. Sohan Singh, Lohli Devi,
Ram Singh, Saina Devi, Puni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judhia
Devi, Nirmala Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar,
Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv Ram & Kala Devi were engaged in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar and
their notional breaks were discontinued by the order of Director Ayurveda, H.P. being senior. The
office order issued by the Director Ayurveda to discontinue the breaks is not applicable to the casual
labourers working in Herbal Garden Neri because they are being engaged subject to the availablity of
work & budget, as the work of Herbal Garden Neri is a seasonal work.” (emphasis supplied)
8.
By these averments, what stands admitted by the respondents is that abovenamed workers, who were
engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were being given fictional/notional breaks in their
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3135
service, which practice was discontinued on receipt of an office order issued by the Director Ayurveda. Why the said
Director.s office order to discontinue the breaks in service could not be made applicable to the casual labourers
working in Herbal Garden, Neri, is averred to be their having been engaged subject to the availability of work and
budget, as the work of Herbal Garden, Neri, according to the respondents, is a seasonal work. Going by this claim of
the respondents, the petitioner.s service, or for that matter the service of the workmen engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri
used to be terminated from time to time on account of cessation of work and non-availability of budget. They used to
be re-engaged on the availability of work and budget. Although there is no plausible material on record to lend
assurance to the respondents. claim that the work of Herbal Garden, Neri is only seasonal, and that the petitioner and
his aforementioned co-workers were engaged there as casual workers subject to the availability of work and budget,
even if this claim is assumed to be true, the petitioner is entitled to the relief of continuity of service in view of the
provisions of Section 25-B of the Act, which in its material part says:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault
on the part of the workman…………..”
9.
It is manifest from these provisions that a workman is deemed to be in continuous service for a period if
he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including the service, which may be interrupted on account of sickness
or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due
to any fault on the part of the workman. If to go by the respondents. stand, the breaks in the petitioner.s service were
caused on account of cessation of work and non-availability of funds. But the cessation of work and the non-
availability of funds not been attributable to any fault on the part of the petitioner, he is to be considered in continuous
service ever since his engagement as beldar on daily wages basis (January 4, 1999). The issue under discussion is
accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
Issue 2
10. The petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar having been engaged by the respondents as daily waged beldar
in Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 was junior to him, to my thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in
view of materials on record. The respondents. averments as also the evidence led by them are indicative of Satish
Kumar having been engaged as daily waged beldar in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on July 1, 1996 and his having
been temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 to carry out the nursery development work there.
According to the respondents, the reason why Satish Kumar was temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri, was his
being deft in nursery development work and the casual workers engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri not being in the know
of that work. About four years later, Satish Kumar was called back to Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar after the other
workers of Herbal Garden, Neri gained knowledge of nursery work upto the desired level. There being no reason to
discredit this claim of the respondents, the petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar is junior to him cannot to be accepted
and is therefore rejected. The issue on hand is accordingly held against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.
Issue 3
11. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and my findings on the foregoing issues, the petitioner
is entitled to only the relief of continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar (4.1.1999).
The issue on hand is held accordingly.
RELIEF
12.
Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. The petitioner is held entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar
(4.1.1999). He is, however, held not entitled to wages for the periods of break in his service. Also, his claim that certain
workers junior to him were retained is rejected. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to
the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 91/2005
Date of Institution : 18.6.2005
Date of decision : 20.12.2008
Shri Baldev Dass S/o Shri Sant Ram, Village Dakhyat, P.O. Dangar, Tehsil Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Baldev Dass S/o Shri Sant Ram workman by the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, H.P. w.e.f. 28.2.98 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and whereas junior to him are retained
by the department is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and compensation the
above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on June 1, 1997, and that he worked as such upto February 28, 1998 when his
services were terminated by therespondent orally. Claiming to have worked for more than 240 days during each
completed year of service, the petitioner further averred that in dispensing with his services, the respondent violated the
provisions of Section 25- F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short), because no notice was served upon
him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation. Besides, the respondent violated the principle of „first come last
go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. The respondent, it is further alleged, also violated the provisions of
Section 25-H of the Act, because the persons namely Raghunath, Jitender Singh, Chain Singh, Om Prakash, Rakesh
Kumar, Ramesh Chand, Thakur Dass, Bali Ram, Data Ram, Surender Kumar, Bhagwan Dass, Subhash Chand, Vidhi
Chand, Anand Kumar, Sarju Ram and Jaisee Ram, who were engaged after the termination of services of the petitioner
and no opportunity to offer himself for employment was given to him by the respondent before engaging them.
According to the petitioner, the respondent also violated the provisions of Section 25-N of the Act, because no prior
approval of the State Government was sought for termination of his services. The petitioner prayed for a direction to
the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages and continuity of service.
3.
Admitting the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar on June 1, 1997, the
respondent averred that he having been engaged only for a period of 100 days under the Employment Assurance
Scheme was not covered by the principle of „first come last go.. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for
more than 240 days during each completed year of service, the respondent further averred that he had worked for 179
days in 1997 and 55 days in 1998, and that in view his working days, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act could
not therefore be said to have been violated. The petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen junior to him were retained
in service at the time his services were dispensed with, was also repudiated by the respondent. However, his allegation
that the persons namely Raghunath, Jitender Singh, Chain Singh, Om Prakash, Rakesh Kumar, Ramesh Chand, Thakur
Dass, Bali Ram, Data Ram, Surender Kumar, Bhagwan Dass, Subhash Chand, Vidhi Chand, Anand Kumar, Sarju Ram
and Jaisee Ram were engaged after the termination of his services, was admitted to be correct by the respondent. It is
further averred that these persons were engaged on the basis of the orders of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal. On the
basis of these averments, the respondent prayed for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office:
1.
Whether the services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondent w.e.f. 28.2.98 without
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, is an improper and unjustified manner?
OPP
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3137
2.
If issue 1 is not proved in the affirmative, what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
3.
Whether the petitioner was engaged by the respondent under the Employment Assurance Scheme for
which the funds were provided by the Central Govt. to the respondent. If so, its effect?
OPR
4. Relief.
5. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes
Issue 2 :
He is entitled to reinstatement, 25% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of his services.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1 And 3
6.
These issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
7.
The respondent in his reply averred that the petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar only for 100
days under the Employment Assurance Scheme. But this claim, to my mind, does not ring true in view of the mandays
chart (Annexure R1), which is demonstrative of the petitioner having worked for 179 days in 1997 and 55 days in 1998.
Had the respondent.s claim of having engaged the petitioner only for 100 days under the scheme aforementioned been
true, the latter would have not been allowed to work after the expiration of the period of time for which he was
allegedly engaged. I am therefore not disposed to accept the respondent.s claim that the petitioner was engaged only for
100 days under the Employment Assurance Scheme.
8.
Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, reads:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
9.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(2) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(3) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
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(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
10. However, the petitioner.s claim of having been in continuous service for not less than one year or say his
claim of having completed 240 days “in each service year”, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the
evidence led by the respondent. The mandays chart (Annexure R1) the correctness of which is not disputed by the
petitioner, is demonstrative of his having not worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding
the date of his retrenchment. The respondent was therefore not obliged to serve with him one month.s notice and pay
him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. The petitioner.s contention that in
retrenching him the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act cannot therefore be accepted.
11. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, appears to be tenable. Section 25-G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
12. The respondent.s witness Lekh Ram Mehla, then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Ghumarwin, in
paragraph 5 of his affidavit Ex. RW1/A deposed:
“That the other labourers who are junior to the petitioner are working in the department, as per order
of Administrative Tribunal Shimla, H.P.”
13. This deposition is indicative of certain workmen junior to the petitioner having been retained in service.
No such orders of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal have been brought on record as may lend assurance to the
respondent.s claim that the workmen junior to the petitioner were working in the department on the basis thereof. As
the respondent on his own showing established on record that certain workmen junior to the petitioner were retained in
service at the time the latter.s services were dispensed with, he (respondent) can safely be held to have violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. But the respondent also appears to have violated the provisions of Section 25-H
of the Act, which says:
“25 (H). Re-employment of retrenched workman. – Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer
proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an
opportunity [to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for reemployment, and
such retrenched workmen] who offer themselves for reemployment shall have preference over other persons”.
14. In paragraph 2 of his statement of claim, the petitioner averred:
“That the employer, after my termination, following new worker appointed who are still in service,
Raghunath, Jitender Singh, Chain Singh, Om Prakash, Rakesh Kumar, Ramesh Chand, Thakur Dass,
Bali Ram, Data Ram, Surender Kumar, Bhagwan Dass, Subhash Chand, Vidhi Chand, Anand Kumar,
Sarju Ram and Jaisee Ram.”
15. Admitting these averments to be correct, the respondent in his reply averred:
“That the labourer as: Raghu Nath, Jitender Singh, Chain Singh, Om Prakash, Rakesh Kumar,
Ramesh Chand, Thakur Dass, Bali Ram, Data Ram, Surinder Kumar, Bhagwan Dass, Vidhi
Chand, Anand Kumar, Sarju Ram and Jaisee Ram are still working in the deptt. But it is
pertinent to note here that all these labourer are working as per the order of the Hon.ble
Administrative Tribunal at Shimla, H.P.”
16. In substantiation of these averments, the respondent, however, did not choose to bring on record such
orders of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal as may show that the abovementioned workmen were engaged on the basis
thereof. Since the persons mentioned in the afore-reproduced paragraph 2 of the petitioner.s statement of claim were
admittedly engaged after the termination of his services and there is nothing indicative of the respondent having given
the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment before taking the said persons into his employ, he
decidedly violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. As a result, both the issues under discussion are held in
favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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3139
Issue 2
17. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issues, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the
same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is entitled to continuity
of service from the date of his retrenchment (February 28, 1998). In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he
is held entitled to 25% back-wages from the date of termination of his services. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
RELIEF
18. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the
time his services were terminated. (February 28, 1998). Besides, he is held entitled to 25% back-wages and continuity
of service from the said date. The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the
minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the
petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference
is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette.
The file after completion be consigned to the record room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of December, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 632/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Bansi Lal S/o Shri Mahajan R/o Village Kapahi P.O. Sari, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Bansi Lal S/o Shri Mahajan, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
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Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the
petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
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3141
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner's Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding
twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
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10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.
(1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
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3143
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(b) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
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any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice. However, the
retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner's Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
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3145
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No. 95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9898 dated 30.11.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 29, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
3146
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT BILASPUR)
Ref No. : 157/2006
Date of Institution : 2.11.2006
Date of decision : 21.1.2009
Smt. Bimla Devi W/o late Shri Darshan Ram Village Halel, P.O. Kanaid, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, District
Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Deputy Director of Industries (Sericulture) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Division, Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. L.B. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the action of the (1) Deputy Director of Industries (Sericulture) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (2)
The Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Division, Mandi, H.P. to give break in service to Smt. Bimla Devi
W/o Late Sh. Darshan Ram, workman during her service period time and again and finally terminated w.e.f.
09.06.2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If
not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondents as daily waged Beldar in 1994, and that she worked as such upto July 20, 2004. Thereafter the respondents
suddenly terminated her services orally without giving her an opportunity of being heard. Claiming to have worked for
240 days in each calendar year, the petitioner alleged that the respondents, who had been giving fictional breaks in her
service, never allowed her to complete 240 days in any calendar year, and that she having not been served with any
notice before termination of her services, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947
(the Act, for short). The respondents, according to the petitioner, also violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the
Act, because certain workmen, who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time of her retrenchment. The
respondent, it is further alleged, also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The petitioner therefore prayed
for a direction to the respondents to re-engage her in the same capacity as in which she was working at the time of
termination of her services. She also prayed for a direction to the respondents to pay her full back-wages and count the
“intervening period between re-engagement and dis-engagement” towards her seniority.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily
waged Beldar in 1994, but refuted her allegation of fictional breaks in her service. The petitioner.s allegation that her
services were terminated on July 20, 2004, was also repudiated by the respondents. Claiming the petitioner to have
been engaged as against a seasonal work, which was purely of temporary nature, the respondents averred that she had
worked only for 9 days in 1994 and thereafter never completed 240 days in any year, and that she did not turn up after
July, 2004. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation that certain workers junior to her were retained and working in the
department, the respondents averred that “no junior persons to the applicant has ever been engaged or allowed to be
continued by the respondents, as alleged rather all those who are working in the unit are seniors to the applicant.” On
the basis of these averments, the respondents prayed for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in her rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated her stand
taken in the claim petition. Claiming to have worked for 9 days in 1994, she alleged that the Mandays Chart prepared
by the respondents was wrong, and the certain workers junior to her were still working in the respondents. department.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the respondent had been giving fictional breaks in the petitioner.s service. If so, to what effect?
. .OPP
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3147
2.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents is unlawful. If so, what relief of
service benefits and the amount of compensation she is entitled to?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
Yes. She is entitled to the relief as mentioned under this issue.
Issue 3 :
No
Relief :
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
The respondents. claim in their joint reply that the petitioner was engaged as against a seasonal work,
which was purely of a temporary nature, to my thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the
materials on record. Nowhere in his affidavit Ex. RW1/A or cross-examination as RW1 did the respondents. witness
Piar Singh, Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Department, Mandi, maintain that the petitioner was engaged as
against a seasonal work. Also, the Mandays Chart (Annexure R-1) produced by the respondents is not indicative of the
petitioner having been engaged as against a seasonal work. The respondents. claim that the petitioner was engaged as
against a seasonal work cannot therefore be taken without a pinch of salt.
7.
But the petitioner.s allegation that the respondents had been giving fictional breaks in her service, also,
to my mind, does not ring true for want of plausible evidence. She in her affidavit Ex. PW1/A inter alia deposed:
“Moreover the respondent No.3 willfully and intentionally did not allow the applicant to complete 240 days initially
upto 1997 after that applicant has completed 240 days, but the mandays chart has been prepared arbitrarily as no month
wise mandays chart has been given as applicant has worked for whole of the year so the termination order is void,
abinitio…..”
8.
This deposition, to my mind, appears to be far from truth, for the mandays chart is indicative of her
having worked for 9, 8, 159, 155, 190, 168, 181, 168, 161 and 65 days during the years 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively.
9.
The petitioner.s allegation that the mandays chart has been prepared arbitrarily, and that the respondent
3 (respondent 2 in the reference) had not allowed her to complete 240 days in any calendar year, cannot be accepted,
because no such suggestion was put to the latter during his cross-examination RW1 as may show that he had prepared
the mandays chart arbitrarily and not allowed the petitioner to complete 240 days in any calendar year. The allegation
of fictional breaks cannot therefore be said to have been substantiated. The issue under discussion is accordingly held
in the negative.
ISSUE 2
10. The petitioner in her affidavit Ex. PW1/A deposed that she had worked upto July 20, 2004 when all of a
sudden her services were orally terminated by the respondents. This deposition of hers having not specifically been
challenged during her cross-examination by the respondents deserves acceptance and is accepted. The respondents.
claim in their joint reply that the petitioner had abandoned the job after July, 2004, is therefore nothing but falsity.
More so, when they did not choose to lead such documentary evidence as may show her to have absented from work or
abandoned the job after July 20, 2004.
11. The petitioner.s allegation that in terminating her services, the respondents had violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act, to my mind, does not appear to be tenable, because the materials on record are not
demonstrative of her having worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her
retrenchment.
12. However, in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondents appear to have violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, which reads:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
3148
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retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
13. The petitioner in her affidavit Ex. PW1/A deposed that the workmen namely Goverdhan Singh, Bimla
Devi, Uttam Chand, Mahant Ram, Nilima, Hans Raj and Rattan, who were junior to her, were still working at Pandoh,
Nagwain, Mumail, Mohin and Mandi. This claim of the petitioner having not specifically been disputed during her
cross-examination by the respondents appears to be true. More so, when the seniority list Ex. RA adduced in evidence
by the respondents is also indicative of the said workmen being junior to the petitioner and their having been retained in
service at the time of termination of her services. The respondents are therefore proved to have violated the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. In view of the respondents having been found to have violated
the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she
was working at the time of termination of her services. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of
her unlawful retrenchment (July 20, 2004). However, she is held not entitled to back-wages, because her pleadings as
also the evidence led by her are non-existent in such averments as may show that she was not gainfully employed after
her retrenchment. The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
ISSUE 3
14. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issues, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
RELIEF
15. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issues 2, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she
was working at the time of termination of her services (July 20, 2004). Besides, she is held entitled to continuity of
service from the date of her retrenchment. She is, however, held not entitled to any back-wages. The respondents are
directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A
copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion
consigned to the record room.
Announced in the open Court today this 21st day of January, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 574/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Biri Datt S/o Shri Dido, Village Jajari, PO Baradla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
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3149
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Biri Datt S/o Shri Dido by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the
petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
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2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(iv) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(v) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(vi) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
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3151
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
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“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or
six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
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3153
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
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matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1019/2007-9312, dated 15.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 16, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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RELIEF
29.
Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
(S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 117/2007
Date of Institution : 12.9.2007
Date of decision : 2.12.2008
Shri Bishan Dass S/o Shri Kirpa Ram, Village Jamula, P.O. Rajhoon, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Director, Indo-German Changer Project, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Bishan Dass S/o Shri Kirpa Ram workman by the Director, Indo-
German Changer Project, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. w.e.f. 01.01.2002 without complying the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount
of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent on September 5, 1993, and that he worked as such upto December 31, 2001. On
January 1, 2002, his services were terminated by the respondent. Claiming to have worked for 252 days in 1995, 311
days in 1996, 354 days in 1997, 327 days in 1998, 320 days in 1999, 355 days in 2000 and 344 days in 2001, the
petitioner further averred that he having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the
date of his retrenchment could not be removed from service without being served with one month.s notice and paid
retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short).
But, the respondent having failed to comply with the said provisions, the termination by him by him of the services of
the petitioner was unlawful. In retrenching the petitioner, it is further averred, not only did the respondent violate the
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act but also violated the principle of „last come first go. as envisaged under Section
25-G of the Act, because he retained in service the workmen namely Mangla Devi, Subhash Chand, Kishori Lal, Pritam
Singh and Mangal Singh, who were junior to the petitioner, at the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, the
respondent also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act by appointing new workers after the termination of
the services of the petitioner without giving him an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment. The respondent
also committed breach of the provisions of Section 25-N of the Act, because no permission for retrenching the
petitioner was obtained from the appropriate Government. The petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the
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respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages and continuity of service. He also prayed for a direction to the
respondent to regularise his services “in the status of work charge/regular Beldar on regular pay scale as per policy
framed by the State Government.”
3.
Admitting the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar on September 5, 1993
and his having worked as such upto December 31, 2001, the respondent in his reply averred that his (petitioner)
services were never terminated but he had abandoned the job on his own after December 31, 2001. Refuting the
petitioner.s allegation that Mangla Devi, Subhash Chand, Kishori Lal, Pritam Singh and Mangal Singh, who were
junior to him, were retained in service by the H.P. Forest Department, the respondent averred that in view of the
petitioner having himself abandoned the job, no provision of the Act could be said to have been violated. It is also
averred that the project (Indo-German Changer Project) under which the petitioner was taken into employ by the
respondent, came to an end on March 31, 2006, and that in view of this position also, the petitioner is not entitled to
any relief.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the disengagement from the service of the petitioner by the respondent is proper and justified? .
.OPP
2.
If the above issue is proved in the affirmative, what relief the petitioner is entitled to from the
respondent?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the relief as asserted by the claimant against the respondent is not maintainable in view of
closure of the undertaking?
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on theses issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
He is entitled to reinstatement, continuity of service and back-wages as mentioned in this
issue.
Issue 3 :
Indo-German Changer Project having come to an end and the charge in respect thereof
having been given to the Divisional Forest Officer, Palampur, the liability to comply with
the award is of the latter.
Issue 4 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
In the statement of claim, the Director, Indo-German Changer Project, Palampur (respondent) is averred
to have taken the petitioner into his employ as daily waged Beldar on September 5, 1993. There is no gainsaying fact
that the petitioner worked in the said project from September 5, 1993 to December 31, 2001. Also, there is no denying
the fact that the project in which the petitioner worked during the said period, came to an end on March 31, 2006. But
before the project came to an end, the petitioner, who felt aggrieved by his retrenchment, raised an industrial dispute
which was referred to this Court by the appropriate Government on September 6, 2007, that is, after the project came to
a close. During the pendency of the matter, the petitioner.s counsel made an application dated November 26, 2007 for
correction of the respondent.s address. In the application, it was inter alia averred that “the respondent has handed over
the charge to the Divisional Forest Officer, Division Office, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.” On the basis of this
averment, the respondent was sought to be served at the following address: “The Director, Changer Project, Palampur,
C/o Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division Office, Palampur, District Kangra (H.P.)” The petitioner.s prayer, it
appears, found favour with my Ld. Predecessor-in-office, and upon a notice ordered to be served upon the Divisional
Forest Officer, Division Office, Palampur, he filed his aforementioned reply and contested the petitioner.s claim.
8.
One of the main contentions of the respondent is that the petitioner having himself abandoned the job on
January 1, 2002, no provision of the Act can be said to have been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. The
reason being that in substantiation of his claim that the petitioner had himself abandoned the job, the respondent did not
choose to bring on record the muster roll wherein the petitioner may have been marked absent after December 31,
2001. It is therefore difficult to accept the respondent.s claim. More so, in view of the evidence led by the petitioner,
which is demonstrative of his services having been terminated by the respondent on January 1, 2002.
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9.
Now the question: Whether in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. The answer, to my thinking, is in the affirmative in view of the
materials on record.
10. Claiming to have worked for 252 days in 1995, 311 days in 1996, 354 days in 1997, 327 days in 1998,
320 days in 1999, 355 days in 2000 and 344 days in 2001, the petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A claimed to have
thus completed 240 days in each of the said calendar years. This claim having not been challenged during his cross-
examination by the respondent deserves acceptance. More so, in view of the mandays chart Ex. PW1/B the correctness
of which has not disputed by the respondent. The said document is indicative of the petitioner having worked for 58
days in 1992, 260 days in 1994, 252 days in 1995, 311 days in 1996, 354 days in 1997, 327 days in 1998, 320 days in
1999, 355 days in 2000 and 344 days in 2001 in the project in question. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to
have been violated by the respondent, says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
11. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(d) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
12. Since the petitioner is proved to have completed more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar
months preceding the date of his retrenchment, his services could not be terminated unless he was served with one
month.s notice and paid retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. But the respondent
having undeniably failed so to do decidedly violated the said provisions.
13. In terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent appears to have violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act as well. The said Section provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
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14. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his affidavit Ex. PW1/A, which was tendered by way of his
examination-in-chief, maintained that at the time his services were terminated, the workmen namely Mangla Devi,
Subhash Chand, Kishori Lal, Pritam Singh and Mangal Singh, who were junior to him, were retained in service by the
respondent. This deposition having not being specifically challenged during his cross-examination by the respondent,
the respondent can safely be held to have violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as well.
15. However, the petitioner.s allegation that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-H and
25-N of the Act as well, to my mind, does not appear to have been substantiated. The petitioner.s affidavit Ex. PW1/A
as also his cross-examination as PW1 are non-existent in the names of the persons who were allegedly appointed by the
respondent after his retrenchment. The materials on record thus being too scanty and nebulous to lend assurance to his
allegation that new workers were appointed after the termination of his services, the respondent cannot be said to have
been proved to have violated the provisions of the Section 25-H of the Act. Also, the allegation of violation of the
provisions of Section 25-N of the Act cannot be said to have been established for want of plausible evidence.
16. The upshot is that in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent violated the provisions of
Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. In other words, the termination of the services of the petitioner was unlawful. The
issue under discussion is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
17. Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent canvassed with considerable fervor that as the project in
which the petitioner was engaged came to an end on March 31, 2006, no relief could in law be granted in favour of the
petitioner. This contention, to my mind, appears to be ill conceived for two reasons. One; the petitioner.s employment
had not come to an end simultaneously with the termination of the project, but his services were terminated on January
1, 2002, that is, before the project came to an end. Two; non-existence of such evidence as may indicate that the
petitioner was employed in the project in question for a temporary duration or until the expiration of the project period,
and he was made aware of his having been so employed at the commencement of his employment. The contention
raised therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
18. In view of what has been held under the above issue 1, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the
same capacity as in which he was working at the time of termination of his services. Besides, he is entitled to continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment. He in is affidavit Ex. PW1/A inter alia deposed:
“That it is specifically submitted here that after termination the services of applicant the applicant is
still unemployed and not gainfully employed anywhere in Government or Semi Government,
Corporation, Board and in any Private Establishment it is again submitted here that the applicant was
getting Rs.55/- Per Day as minimum wages fixed by the State Government to the daily wager workers of
State Government.”
This deposition having not been challenged during his cross-examination by the respondent and there being no
materials on record to show that he was gainfully employed after his retrenchment, I have no hesitation in holding that
he is entitled to back-wages from the date of termination of his services. (January 1, 2002). The issue under discussion
is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
19. No doubt the project in which the petitioner was employed came to an end on March 31, 2006, but the
liability to satisfy the award on behalf of the respondent (Director, Indo-German Changer Project, Palampur) is of the
Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Palampur in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The
respondent.s witness R.S. Banyal, Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Palampur, maintained in his cross-
examination as RW1 that the Changer Project came to an end on March 31, 2006 whereafter the seniority list (in
respect of the workmen engaged in the project) was handed over in the Divisional Forest Office, Palampur. He also
testified that the record in respect of the project was available in the office of Divisional Forest Officer, Palampur. This
deposition is indicative of the entire record, which was maintained in respect of the workers employed in the project in
question, having been handed over to the Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Palampur. Evidently thus, the
Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Palampur, who stood saddled with the responsibility of taking charge of the
entire record of the project, was essentially involved in the project work, which was undertaken following an agreement
entered into by the State Government. So, it is in fact the State Government which is liable to redress the petitioner.s
grievance. However, the Divisional Forest Officer, Palampur, who is in the employ of the State Forest Department and
who was essentially involved in the project work in question and also saddled with the responsibility of the taking
charge of the entire record of the project, can in law be fastened with the liability of satisfying the award on behalf of
the respondent (Director, Indo-German Changer Project, Palampur) and I order accordingly. The issue under discussion
is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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RELIEF
20. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. The petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his
services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service and full back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment (January 1, 2002). The respondent is directed to reinstate him within a period of 90 days from
today. The said full back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages
permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The
reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official
gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 2nd day of December, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN.
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 120/2005
Date of Institution : 2. 8. 2005
Date of decision : 28.2.2009
Shri Dahlu Ram S/o Shri Gopala Ram, Vill. Dooka, P.O. Seri-Kothi, Tehsil, Sundernagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Sundernagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. M.L. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Dahlu Ram S/o Shri Gopala Ram workman by the Divisional
Forest Officer, Forest Division, Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 1-4-2003 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits
and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent in Kangoo Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in 1998-99, and that he worked as
such till the end of March, 2003. On April 1, 2003, his services were suddenly terminated by the respondent. Claiming
to have worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year, the petitioner averred that at the time his services were
dispensed with no notice was given to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). In terminating his services, the respondent, according to
the petitioner, also violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, because certain workmen, who were junior to
him, were retained in service at the time his services were terminated. Claiming to have requested the respondent as
also the Forest Range Officer concerned to re-engage him, the petitioner further averred that as his requests for re-
engagement fell on a deaf ear, he served the respondent with a notice under Section 2-A of the Act, but without effect.
Left with no option, he later raised an industrial dispute, which is encompassed in the reference in question. He prays
for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his
services were dispensed with. He also prays for the grant of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits
including continuity of service.
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3.
The respondent in his reply averred that the petitioner was engaged as a daily waged Mazdoor on muster
roll basis for casual and seasonal forestry works in Kangoo Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in June, 1999 and
dis-engaged on completion of the works in July, 2005. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been dis-engaged in
the year 2003, the respondent further averred that the petitioner had not completed 240 days in each calendar year
except the year 2002; that the forestry works against which he was engaged was of a seasonal nature, and that he had
worked upto July, 2005 intermittently keeping in view the availability of works and funds. There, therefore, exists no
industrial dispute and the reference is not covered under the Act.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondent on April 1, 2003.
. .OPP
2.
If the above issue 1 is proved, whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the
respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the petitioner was engaged as daily waged labourer for seasonal forestry works subject
to availability of work and funds and dis-engaged on completion of the works as alleged.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1
No
Issue 2
Issue 1 having not been proved, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.
Issue 3
No
Issue 4
The petition dismissed per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
The petitioner's claim of having been engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in Kangoo
Forest Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in 1999, is not disputed by the respondent. What is disputed by the
respondent is his claim of having been retrenched w.e.f. April, 2003. The respondent.s claim that the services of the
petitioner were not terminated in April, 2003, to my thinking, appears to having a ring of truth in view of the materials
on record. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A inter alia maintained that he had worked as daily waged Beldar in
Kangoo Forest Range of Sundernagar Forest Division till the end of March, 2003, and that his services were terminated
by the respondent orally w.e.f. April, 2003. But his claim of having worked „till the end of March, 2003. does not find
assurance from the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B, which is indicative of his having not worked even for a single day in the
month of March, 2003. Also, his claim that the respondent had terminated his services orally w.e.f. April, 2003, stands
falsified by what he maintained in his cross-examination as PW1. He in his cross-examination as PW1 deposed that he
had worked for 240 days every year from 2001 to 2005. If to go by this deposition of his, his claim that his services
were terminated w.e.f. April, 2003 cannot be taken without a pinch of salt. More so, in view of the aforementioned
mandays chart which is demonstrative of his having not worked even for a single day in the months of March, April,
May, June, August and December, 2003. In the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B, he is shown to have worked for 23, 15, 10,
11, 14, 11, 24, 3, 4, 17, 5 and 13 days in the months of January, February, July, September, October and November,
2003, August and December, 2004 and January, February, March and July, 2005 respectively.
7.
In view of the above, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to substantiate
his allegation that his services were terminated by the respondent w.e.f. April, 2003. The issue under discussion is
therefore held in the negative.
ISSUE 2
8.
In view of the above issue 1 having not been proved, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The issue
under discussion is held accordingly.
ISSUE 3
9.
In the respondent.s reply as also in his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, the petitioner is stated to have been
engaged as daily waged Mazdoor on muster roll basis for casual and seasonal forestry works in Kangoo Range of
Sundernagar Forest Division during June, 1999. The respondent to establish this claim ought to have adduced in
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3161
evidence the muster roll for the month of June, 1999, or any other document wherein the petitioner may have been
shown to have been engaged for „seasonal forestry works., but he failed so to do. Also, the respondent to substantiate
his claim that the services of the petitioner were dispensed with on completion of the work as against which he was
engaged, ought to have led documentary evidence including the muster roll for the month of July, 2005, but he failed to
do even this. It is therefore difficult to accept his claim that the petitioner was engaged for „casual and seasonal forestry
works., and that his services were terminated on completion of the works in July, 2005. More so, in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C, which is indicative of certain workmen having worked for more than 240 days every calendar
year from 1997 to 2006. Had the respondent been true in his claim that the petitioner was engaged as against seasonal
forestry works, and that such works came to an end in July, 2005, certain workmen would not have been shown to have
worked almost whole of the year during the calendar years from 1997 to 2006 in the seniority list Ex. RW1/C. The
inescapable conclusion therefore is that the respondent.s claim of having engaged the petitioner as against seasonal
forestry works and terminated his services on completion of these works in July, 2005, is nothing but falsity. The issue
under discussion is therefore held in the negative.
RELIEF
10. Judged in the light of my findings on the above issue 1, the claim petition fails and the petitioner is held
not entitled to any relief. As a result, the reference is dismissed. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt.
for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of February, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 60/2006
Date of Institution : 20.3.2006
Date of decision : 31.12.2008
Sh. Dalbir Singh Rana S/o Sh. Baldev Singh, workman, Village and P.O. Gehi Lamod, Nurpur, Distt. Kangra,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The General Manager and Sale Manager, M/s. Amritsar Beverages Limited.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. V.S. Mandeel, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. B.K. Sood, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Sh. Dalbir Singh Rana s/o Sh. Baldev Singh, workman by the (1)
The General Manager, M/s. Amritsar Beverages Limited, Amritsar, Punjab and (2) The Sale Manger, M/s.
Amritsar Beverages Limited, G.T. Road, Kandwal, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. w.e.f. 4.7.2002
without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what
relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was appointed by the
respondents on a monthly salary of Rs.2500/- in the month of March, 1998. In June, 2002, he suffered from fever and
could not therefore join his duties for three days. His services were later dispensed with by the respondents by a letter
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dated July 4, 2002, even though he had been performing his duties efficiently and with devotion. At the time of his
retrenchment, he, according to him, was getting a monthly salary of Rs.3900/-, besides, T.A. and other benefits.
Claiming to have worked for more than 240 days „in a calendar year., the petitioner alleged that in terminating his
services, the respondents violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for
short) because no prior notice was served for him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation. Not only that, the
respondents did not pay him even his outstanding dues amounting to more than Rs.95,100/-. The petitioner therefore
prayed for a direction to the respondents to re-engage him in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time
his services were dispensed with. He also prayed for the grant of full back-wages and other consequential service
benefits including seniority etc.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged for accounts
work in March, 1998. They also admitted that his services were dispensed with on July 4, 2002. The reason for the
termination of his services, according to the respondents, was his negligent attitude and frequent absence from work
without leave. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in a „completed year., the
respondents averred that in terminating his services, they did not violate any provision of the Act. They therefore
prayed for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the termination from the service of the petitioner by the respondent is proper and
justified?
. .OPP
2.
If the above issue is proved in the affirmative, what relief of service benefit the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is maintainable before this Court? OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes
Issue 2 :
He is not entitled to any relief.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
The petition is dismissed per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged by the respondents for doing accounts work in the month
of March, 1998, is not disputed by the latter. Also his allegation that his services were dispensed with on July, 2002, is
not denied by them. What is disputed by the respondents is the petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240
days „in a calendar year.. Section 25-F of the Act, which alleged to have been violated by the respondents, provides:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(i)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(ii) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(iii) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
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3163
8.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(9) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(10) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
11. The respondents. denial of the petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days „in a calendar
year., to my thinking, does not appear to be without substance. Nowhere in his pleadings did the petitioner aver that he
had completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. Also,
nowhere in his statement as PW1 did he maintain that he had worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar
months preceding the date of termination of his services. There being thus no proof of his having worked for 240 days
during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the respondents were not obliged to
serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the
Act. The petitioner.s contention that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of
the Act cannot therefore be accepted. So, the termination of his services by the respondents cannot be said to be
improper or unjustified. More so, when the evidence led by the respondents is demonstrative of his being negligent in
the execution of his work and his having remained absent from time to time without obtaining leave. The issue under
discussion is therefore held in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner.
ISSUE 2
12. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issues the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The
issue on hand is held accordingly.
ISSUE 3
13. In view of my findings on the above issue 1, the claim petition is not maintainable. The issue under
discussion is therefore held in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner.
RELIEF
14. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition fails and is
hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be
sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records
after due completion.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of December, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 665/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Deep Kumar S/o Shri Amar Singh, Village Rakheda, PO Baroti, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Deep Kumar S/o Shri Amar Singh, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
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3165
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
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(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner's Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner's Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to
my thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
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heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(7) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
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14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2)
where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
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3169
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24.
In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
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947/2007-9374, dated 25.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated September 5, 2008.
In view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 99/2007
Date of Institution : 3.9.2007
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Devinder Kumar S/o Shri Sukru Ram, Vill. Saul, P.O. Khural, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
Divisional Forest Officer, Wild Life Division, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P.
. .Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Devinder Kumar S/o Shri Sukru Ram workman by the
Divisional Forest Officer, Wild Life Division, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. w.e.f. June, 2003 without
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3171
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 whereas junior to him are retained by the
employer is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the
above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in the month of January, 1998, and that he worked as such in
Wild Life Division, Kullu until September, 2003. His services were, however, terminated by the respondent w.e.f.
September, 2003 without giving him one month.s notice and paying him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have never absented from
work, the petitioner further averred that during the period of his employment, the respondent had been giving fictional
breaks in his service, even though there was availability of work and funds. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent, it is further averred, also violated the principle of „Last Come First Go. as envisaged under Section 25G
of the Act, because the workmen namely Chander, Brij Lal, Santosh Kumar, Salig Ram and others, who were junior to
him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, the respondent violated the
provisions of Section 25N of the Act, because no prior permission for termination of services of the petitioner was
obtained from the appropriate Government nor was he paid retrenchment compensation. It is also averred that the
respondent had after the petitioner.s retrenchment engaged new workers on daily wage basis without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment and thus violated the provisions of Section 25H of the Act
as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages,
continuity of service and other consequential service benefits. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to take
into account the periods of break in his service towards continuity of service.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in the month of January, 1998, but denied having terminated his services from September,
2003 unlawfully. Claiming the work of his department to be of a seasonal nature, the respondent averred that the
petitioner was engaged as casual worker subject to availability of work/funds and that he had worked intermittently.
Denying having given fictional breaks in the service of the petitioner, the respondent further averred that the petitioner
had worked intermittently “depending upon the availability of funds/works” upto August, 2007 whereafter he on his
own did not turn up for work. No workman junior to the petitioner, according to the respondent, was retained in service
nor was any new worker engaged on muster roll basis after the petitioner abandoned the job on his own. In view of the
seasonal nature of the work for which the petitioner was engaged as causal worker subject to availability of work and
funds, no provision of the Act, according to the respondent, can be said to have been violated. More so, when he on his
own did not turn up for work after August, 2007. It is also averred that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri and the
petition not maintainable in the present form.
4. The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand taken
in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
The respondent is not proved to have terminated the services of the petitioner w.e.f. June,
2003 as mentioned in the Reference. He is therefore not entitled to the relief he prayed for.
Issue 2 :
Yes.
Issue 3 :
Yes.
Relief. :
Petition dismissed per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
In the Reference, which appears to have been based on the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour Inspector.s
report no. 694-95 dated December 31, 2005, services of the petitioner are stated to have been terminated w.e.f. June,
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2003. But nowhere in his statement of claim did the petitioner allege that his services were terminated w.e.f. June,
2003. What is inter alia averred by him is that he was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in the month of
January, 1998, and that his services were illegally terminated by the respondent from September, 2003. But belying his
claim that his services were terminated from September, 2003, the petitioner in paragraph 1 of his affidavit Ex. PW1/A,
however, maintained that he had continuously worked upto September, 2003. In paragraphs 3 and 8 of his affidavit, he,
however, belied even this claim of his by stating that his services were terminated in the month of/from June, 2003. But
the materials on record are not demonstrative of his services having been terminated with effect from June, 2003. The
mandays chart Ex. PW1/E the correctness of which is not disputed by the petitioner, is indicative of his having worked
for 161, 224, 228, 240 and 271 days in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively and 31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 20, 19 and
4 days in the months of January, February, March, April, May, June, August and September, 2003 respectively. In view
of this document, the respondent.s denial of having terminated the services of the petitioner and the latter.s inconsistent
stand as to the date of termination of his services, I have no hesitation in holding that his services were not terminated
with effect from June, 2003, not to speak of the alleged illegality in the termination of his services w.e.f. the said point
of time as mentioned in the Reference. He is therefore not entitled to the relief he prayed for. The issue under
discussion is accordingly held against him and in favour of the respondent.
ISSUE 2
8.
In view of what has been observed under the foregoing issue, the petitioner is decidedly guilty of
suppressio veri. The issue on hand is therefore held in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
ISSUE 3
9.
In view of my findings on the above issue 1, the petition is not maintainable. The issue on hand is
therefore held in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
RELIEF
10. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the claim petition fails and is
hereby dismissed. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for
publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 163/2007
Date of Institution : 1.11.2007
Date of decision : 24.11.2008
Shri Devki Nandan S/o Shri Dhani Ram, Village Kalother, P.O. Badgaon, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, vice AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. Gaurav Sharma, vice Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Shri Devki Nandan S/o Shri Dhani Ram workman by the
Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 25.4.2000 without
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complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereas junior to him were retained by the
employer as alleged by the workman is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and
amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent on November 3, 1997, and that he worked as such in Saigloo Sub Division of
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division) upto April 15, 2000. On April 25, 2000, his services
were terminated by the respondent by serving with him a notice dated February 23, 2000. Claiming to have worked for
240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service, the petitioner further
averred that he having not been paid any compensation, the termination of his services was violative of the provisions
of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) as also the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 (Standing Orders, for short). In terminating his services, the respondent, according to the petitioner,
also violated the provisions of section 25-G of the Act, because certain workers namely Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul
Singh, Ramesh, Shive Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time his services were dispensed
with. Not only that, the respondent also violated the provisions of section 25-H of the Act, for, after the petitioner.s
retrenchment some persons were engaged without giving the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-
employment. Claiming to have visited the respondent.s office a number of times after his removal from service, the
petitioner averred that on being requested by him to re-engage him, the concerned official in the respondent.s office
gave an assurance that he would be called back in the job. The petitioner, however, kept on waiting for a call till
February, 2005 whereafter he raised the industrial dispute, which later came to be referred to this Court for
adjudication. On the basis of these averments, the petitioner prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in
the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. He also prayed for the grant
of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including seniority etc.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on November 3, 1997, the respondent in his
reply averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as beldar on daily wages basis as against a specific construction work on
October 25, 1997, and that he had worked upto April 24, 2000 with certain interruptions/breaks caused on account of
his wilful absence from work. Claiming to have told the respondent at the time of his engagement as casual beldar that
he was being engaged as against a specific construction work, and that his services would automatically come to an end
on completion of the work, the respondent further averred that his services having been dispensed with on completion
of the work, no provision of the Act was violated. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for 240 days
during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date on which his services were dispensed with, the respondent
averred that he having not completed 240 days during the period he remained in his employ, he was not required to be
served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and the provisions of this Section cannot therefore be
said to have been violated. As to the petitioner.s allegation that certain persons namely Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul Singh,
Ramesh, Pawan, Shive Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time of his retrenchment, the
respondent.s contention is that these persons, who were also engaged as casual beldar for execution a specific work,
were also removed from service on completion of the work, and that they were later re-engaged in obedience to an
order dated October 8, 1999 of the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner.s claim that after his
removal from service he had visited the respondent.s office, is also refuted by the respondent. It is averred that at no
point of time did the petitioner visit the respondent.s office nor did he make any representation after his removal from
service, and the petition is therefore barred by time. As for the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the Standing
Orders, the respondent.s contention is that this allegation is also unfounded and baseless, because the establishment of
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide
Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992. The respondent.s other contentions
relate to estoppel and maintainability of the petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
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6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Relief :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on November 3, 1997, the respondent averred
that he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged beldar on October 25, 1997, and that he had worked as such upto April
24, 2000. This averment having been admitted by the petitioner to be true in his cross-examination as PW1 deserves
acceptance.
8.
Ld. counsel for the respondent contends that the petitioner was engaged as against a specific work, his
removal from service on completion of the work did not amount to retrenchment as defined under clause (oo) of
Section 2 of the Act. But this contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived in view of the materials on record.
The petitioner in his cross-examination as PW1 categorically denied the respondent.s suggestion that at the time of his
employment he was told that he was engaged as against a temporary work, and that his services would be deemed to
have come to an end on completion of the work started under a scheme. The respondent.s witness T.K. Sharma, then
Assistant Engineer in Saigloo Sub Division of HPSEB, though in his examination-in-chief as RW1 maintained that the
petitioner was engaged in a specific work, and that he was told that his service would come to an end on completion of
the work, he in his cross-examination expressed his inability to furnish such proof as may show that the petitioner was
engaged in a specific scheme work. Having deposed so, he, however, hastened to add that the factum of the petitioner
having been engaged in a specific scheme was shown in the muster roll. But the muster roll, which would have
constituted a vital piece of evidence in substantiation of the respondent.s claim, having not been brought on record, it is
difficult to hold that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work.
9.
But even if it is assumed that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work, there
is no plausible material to show that his employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme
or completion of the work.
10. In S. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553, the principal
question that arose before the Hon.ble Supreme Court of India was:
“Whether the workmen recruited for discharging temporary job under a project can insist on
compliance of section 25-F of the Act if their services are dispensed with on the project coming to an
end.”
11. Having examined the scope of Sections 2(oo) and 25-F of the Act, the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia
ruled:
“12. “Retrenchment” in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work
itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial pieces of legislation are to
be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to take two views of a provision. It
is also well settled that the Parliament has employed the expression “the termination by the employer of the service of a
workman for any reason whatsoever” while defining the term “retrenchment”, which is suggestive of the legislative
intent to assign the term „retrenchment. a meaning wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There
are four exceptions carved out of the artificially extended meaning of the term „retrenchment., and therefore,
termination of service of a workman so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the
meaning of „retrenchment. dehors the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of
„retrenchment. the termination of service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service
which does not fall within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment.
13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to
retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:-
(i)
that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that
the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
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(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and
consistently with the terms of the contract.
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the
commencement of employment.”
12. The respondent having failed to satisfy these conditions, the termination of services of the petitioner, to
my thinking, decidedly amount to retrenchment within the meaning of clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act. The
respondent.s contention therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
13. The petitioner in his pleadings as also in evidence claimed to have worked for 240 days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. According to him, he having not been
served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act, the termination of his service was unlawful. More so,
when no notice under the Standing Orders was given to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation. This
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. Be it stated that the establishment of Himachal Pradesh
State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85
Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992.
14. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
15. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or
six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
16. However, the petitioner.s claim of having been in continuous service for not less than one year, or say
his claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal
from service, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the evidence led by the respondent. The mandays
chart Ex. RW1/A, which is adduced in evidence by the respondent and admitted to be correct by the petitioner in his
cross-examination as PW1, is demonstrative of the petitioner having not worked for 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment. The respondent was therefore not obliged to serve him with a
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one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. The
petitioner.s contention that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
cannot be therefore accepted.
17. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, appears to be tenable. Kesar Singh, then Junior Engineer in the office of
Executive Engineer, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division), Mandi, who has been examined by
the petitioner as PW2, testified:
“As per the record, Devki Nandan (petitioner) was engaged on 25.10.1997 and he worked upto
24.4.2000. As per the record, Uma Devi was engaged on 2.12.1998 and was still working. Jagdish Chand,
S/o Sh. Jeevan Lal was engaged on 15.10.1998 and was still working. As per the record, Kaul Ram, S/o
Jyoti Singh was engaged on 18.6.1998 and was still working. Ramesh Chand, S/o Sh. Khem Chand was
engaged on 16.5.1998 and was still working. Pawan Kumar, S/o Sh. Hem Raj was engaged on 3.11.1997
and was still working. Shive Ram, S/o Sh. Balku Ram was engaged on 28.10.1997 and was still working.
As per the record, Sh. Chand Lal was engaged on 3.9. 1997 and was still working. In the division, more
than three hundred workers are working…..”
18. The respondent.s aforementioned witness T.K. Sharma categorically admitted in his cross-examination
as RW1 that Uma Devi and Jagdish were junior to the petitioner, and that they were still in the employ of the
respondent. He also admitted in no ambiguous words that when the petitioner was removed from service Uma Devi and
Jagdish were not retrenched. In other words, the latter two were retained at the time the services of the petitioner were
terminated. Section 25-G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
19. Since Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were undeniably junior to the petitioner, were retained by the
respondent at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the principle of „Last Come First Go. as
envisaged in the abovementioned provisions can safely be held to have been violated by the respondent.
20. Ld. counsel for the respondent contends with vehemence that Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were also
retrenched, having been re-engaged in obedience to the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal, they could
not be retrenched at the time of termination of services of the petitioner, and the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act
cannot therefore be said to have been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. The reason being that re-
engagement of Uma Devi and Jagdish on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal can by no
stretch of reasoning be interpreted to mean that they have become permanent employees cannot therefore be retrenched
even if there arises an occasion for the employer to follow the principle of „Last Come First Go.. I am therefore of the
considered view that re-engagement of the said workers on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative
Tribunal notwithstanding, the respondent could in law violate the principle of „Last Come First Go. at the time the
services of the petitioner were dispensed with. The contention aforementioned has therefore been raised only to be
rejected.
21. The upshot therefore is that in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent violated the provisions of
section 25-F of the Act, and he (petitioner) is therefore entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of his retrenchment. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement
(25.10.1997). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages, because nowhere in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A and cross-
examination as PW1 did he maintain that he was not a gainfully employed or that he remained idle after his
retrenchment. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
ISSUE 2
22. The materials on record are indicative of the petitioner having approached the respondent from time to
time after his retrenchment and requested for his re-engagement but of no avail. Left with no option, he later raised an
industrial dispute which came to be referred to this Court for adjudication under Section 10 (1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) I.D./07-Mandi dated October 9, 2007.
23. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs. Garibu Ram, latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more
than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated. Having
the surveyed various rulings on the point, the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh inter alia observed:
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“….....While taking note of the entire case law with regard to the delay and laches, this Court
consistently has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply but, however, depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principles of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. A delay of even 14 years has been held not to come in the way of the poor man, whose services
have been illegally terminated in claiming his relief under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
In Deepa Ram.s case (supra), there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand.s case (supra) there was a
delay of 9 years. In Mohinder Kumar.s case (supra), there was a delay of 14 years……..”
24. The petitioner, who is undeniably poverty-stricken, is stated to be illiterate. In view of the facts and
circumstances of this case, the principle of delay and laches cannot be held applicable to his case. The issue under
discussion is therefore held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The facts and circumstances of this case do not attract the rule of estoppel. The respondent.s counsel has
also not been able to show how the rule of estoppel is attracted in this case. The issue on hand is therefore held against
the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
26. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. The petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working
at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to seniority from the date of his engagement as
daily waged beldar (25.10.1997). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages or compensation in view of the facts
and circumstances of the case. The respondent is directed to reinstatement him within a period of 90 days from today
failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to 25% back-wages with effect from the date of his unlawful retrenchment
(25.4.2000). The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages
permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The
reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official
gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 119/2005
Date of Institution : 2. 8. 2005
Date of decision : 28.2.2009
Shri Dhungal Ram S/o Shri Durga Ram, Vill. Ropa, P.O. Seri-Kothi, Tehsil, Sundernagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Sundernagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. M.L. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Dhungal Ram S/o Shri Durga Ram workman by the
Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 1-4-2003 without
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complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of
service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent in Kangoo Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in 2000, worked as such for two
months and re-engaged in May, 2001. Claiming to have worked till the end of March, 2003, the petitioner alleged that
on April 1, 2003, his services were suddenly terminated by the respondent. Claiming to have worked for more than 240
days in each calendar year, the petitioner averred that at the time his services were dispensed with no notice was given
to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (the Act, for short). In terminating his services, the respondent, according to the petitioner, also violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, because certain workmen, who were junior to him, were retained in service at
the time his services were terminated. Claiming to have requested the respondent as also the Forest Range Officer
concerned to re-engage him, the petitioner further averred that as his requests fell on a deaf ear, he served the
respondent with a notice under Section 2-A of the Act on May 8, 2003, but without effect. Left with no option, he later
raised an industrial dispute, which is encompassed in the reference in question. He prays for a direction to the
respondent to reinstate him in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed
with. He also prays for the grant of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including continuity of
service.
3.
The respondent in his reply averred that the petitioner was engaged as a daily waged Mazdoor on muster
roll basis for casual and seasonal forestry works in Kangoo Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in May, 2001 and
dis-engaged on completion of the works in July, 2005. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been dis-engaged in
the year 2003, the respondent further averred that the petitioner had not completed 240 days in each calendar year
except the year 2002; that the forestry works against which he was engaged was of a seasonal nature, and that he had
worked upto February, 2005 intermittently keeping in view the availability of works and funds. There, therefore, exists
no industrial dispute and the reference is not covered under the Act.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondent on April 1, 2003.
. .OPP
2.
If the above issue 1 is proved, whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the
respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the petitioner was engaged as daily waged labourer for seasonal forestry works subject
to availability of work and funds and dis-engaged on completion of the works as alleged.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1
No
Issue 2
Issue 1 having not been proved, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.
Issue 3
No
Issue 4
The petition dismissed per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in Kangoo
Forest Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in May, 2001, is not disputed by the respondent. What is disputed by the
respondent is his claim of having been retrenched w.e.f. April, 2003. The respondent.s claim that the services of the
petitioner were not terminated in April, 2003, to my thinking, appears to be having a ring of truth in view of the
materials on record. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A inter alia maintained that he had worked as daily waged
Beldar in Kangoo Forest Range of Sundernagar Forest Division till the end of March, 2003, and that his services were
terminated by the respondent orally w.e.f. April 1, 2003. But his claim of having worked „till the end of March, 2003.
does not find assurance from the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B, which is indicative of his having not worked even for a
single day in the months of January, February and March, 2003. Also, his claim that the respondent had terminated his
services orally w.e.f. April, 2003, stands falsified by what he maintained in his cross-examination as PW1. He in his
cross-examination as PW1 deposed that he had worked for 240 days every year from 2001 to 2005. If to go by this
deposition of his, his claim that his services were terminated w.e.f. April, 2003 cannot be taken without a pinch of salt.
More so, in view of the aforementioned mandays chart which is demonstrative of his having not worked even for a
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single day in the months of January, February, March, April, May, June, August and December, 2003. In the mandays
chart Ex. RW1/B, he is shown to have worked for 6, 13, 15, 5, 3, 5, 22 and 11 days in the months of July, September,
October and November, 2003, December, 2004 and January, February and November, 2005 respectively.
7.
In view of the above, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to substantiate
his allegation that his services were terminated by the respondent w.e.f. April, 2003. The issue under discussion is
therefore held in the negative.
ISSUE 2
8.
In view of the above issue 1 having not been proved, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The issue
under discussion is held accordingly.
ISSUE 3
9.
In the respondent.s reply as also in his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, the petitioner is stated to have been
engaged as daily waged Mazdoor on muster roll basis for casual and seasonal forestry works in Kangoo Range of
Sundernagar Forest Division during May, 2001. The respondent to establish this claim ought to have adduced in
evidence the muster roll for the month of May, 2001, or any other document wherein the petitioner may have been
shown to have been engaged for „seasonal forestry works., but he failed so to do. Also, the respondent to substantiate
his claim that the services of the petitioner were dispensed with on completion of the work as against which he was
engaged, ought to have led documentary evidence including the muster roll for the month of July, 2005, but he failed to
do even this. It is therefore difficult to accept his claim that the petitioner was engaged for „casual and seasonal forestry
works., and that his services were terminated on completion of the works in July, 2005. More so, in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C, which is indicative of certain workmen having worked for more than 240 days every calendar
year from 1997 to 2006. Had the respondent been true in his claim that the petitioner was engaged as against seasonal
forestry works, and that such works came to an end in July, 2005, certain workmen would not have been shown to have
worked almost whole of the year during the calendar years from 1997 to 2006 in the seniority list Ex. RW1/C. The
inescapable conclusion therefore is that the respondent.s claim of having engaged the petitioner as against seasonal
forestry works and terminated his services on completion of these works in July, 2005, is nothing but falsity. The issue
under discussion is therefore held in the negative.
RELIEF
10. Judged in the light of my findings on the above issue 1, the claim petition fails and the petitioner is held
not entitled to any relief. As a result, the reference is dismissed. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt.
for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of February, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 605/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Gandhi Ram S/o Shri Mahajan Ram, Village Kapahi, PO Sari, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
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For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Gandhi Ram S/o Shri Mahajan Ram, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
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3181
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
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(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit
belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9. The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works Department
to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein
was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily
so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some manufacturing process is/was
being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore difficult to accept the Ld. Dy.
D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of Section
25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does not suffer from any illegality.
Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of Section
25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned contention deserves acceptance and is
accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- (1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.…………………
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
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3183
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or
six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
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(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
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3185
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman
merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd.
1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1063/2007-9373, dated 25.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly and
is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity of
service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on the
basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher
till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of
90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for
publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 628/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Gian Chand S/o Shri Tonshu Ram, R/o Village Jajarkukain P.O. Baradla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Gian Chand S/o Shri Tonshu Ram, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
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as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit
belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
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3189
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
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authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
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3191
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari
Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner) services
were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dharampur,
in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior to him
(petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared the
seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9897 dated 30.11.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated October 10, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before
the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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3193
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 630/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Gian Chand S/o Shri Sant Ram R/o Village Jajar Kukaom P.O. Baradla Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Gian Chand S/o Shri Sant Ram, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
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effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
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3195
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to
my thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
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heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
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14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or
six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
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according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9901 dated 30.11.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
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Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated October 3, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before
the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 179/2007
Date of Institution : 1.11.2007
Date of decision : 24.11.2008
Shri Gopal Singh S/o Shri Dhani Ram, Village Kalothar, P.O. Bhargaon, Tehsil Kotli, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, vice AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. Gaurav Sharma, vice Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Gopal Singh S/o Shri Dhani Ram workman by the Senior
Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 16.4.2000 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of
service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
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2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent on September 24, 1997, and that he worked as such in Saigloo Sub Division of
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division) upto April 15, 2000. On April 16, 2000, his services
were terminated by the respondent by serving with him a notice dated February 23, 2000. Claiming to have worked for
240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service, the petitioner further
averred that he having not been paid any compensation, the termination of his services was violative of the provisions
of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) as also the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 (Standing Orders, for short). In terminating his services, the respondent, according to the petitioner,
also violated the provisions of section 25-G of the Act, because certain workers namely Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul
Singh, Ramesh, Shive Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time his services were dispensed
with. Not only that, the respondent also violated the provisions of section 25-H of the Act, for, after the petitioner.s
retrenchment some persons were engaged without giving the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-
employment. Claiming to have visited the respondent.s office a number of times after his removal from service, the
petitioner averred that on being requested by him to re-engage him, the concerned official in the respondent.s office
gave an assurance that he would be called back in the job. The petitioner, however, kept on waiting for a call till
February, 2005 whereafter he raised the industrial dispute, which later came to be referred to this Court for
adjudication. On the basis of these averments, the petitioner prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in
the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. He also prayed for the grant
of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including seniority etc.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on September 24, 1997, the respondent in his
reply averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as beldar on daily wages basis as against a specific construction work on
September 25, 1997, and that he had worked upto April 18, 2000 with certain interruptions/breaks caused on account of
his wilful absence from work. Claiming to have told the respondent at the time of his engagement as casual beldar that
he was being engaged as against a specific construction work, and that his services would automatically come to an end
on completion of the work, the respondent further averred that his services having been dispensed with on completion
of the work, no provision of the Act was violated. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for 240 days
during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date on which his services were dispensed with, the respondent
averred that he having not completed 240 days during the period he remained in his employ, he was not required to be
served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and the provisions of this Section cannot therefore be
said to have been violated. As to the petitioner.s allegation that certain persons namely Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul Singh,
Ramesh, Pawan, Shiv Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time of his retrenchment, the
respondent.s contention is that these persons, who were also engaged as casual beldar for execution a specific work,
were also removed from service on completion of the work, and that they were later re-engaged in obedience to an
order dated October 8, 1999 of the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner.s claim that after his
removal from service he had visited the respondent.s office, is also refuted by the respondent. It is averred that at no
point of time did the petitioner visit the respondent.s office nor did he make any representation after his removal from
service, and the petition is therefore barred by time. As for the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the Standing
Orders, the respondent.s contention is that this allegation is also unfounded and baseless, because the establishment of
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide
Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992. The respondent.s other contentions
relate to estoppel and maintainability of the petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Relief :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on September 24, 1997, the respondent averred
that he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged beldar on September 25, 1997, and that he had worked as such upto
April 18, 2000. This averment having been admitted by the petitioner to be true in his cross-examination as PW1
deserves acceptance.
8.
Ld. counsel for the respondent contends that the petitioner was engaged as against a specific work, his
removal from service on completion of the work did not amount to retrenchment as defined under clause (oo) of
Section 2 of the Act. But this contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived in view of the materials on record.
The petitioner in his cross-examination as PW1 categorically denied the respondent.s suggestion that at the time of his
employment he was told that he was engaged as against a temporary work, and that his services would be deemed to
have come to an end on completion of the work started under a scheme. The respondent.s witness T.K. Sharma, then
Assistant Engineer in Saigloo Sub Division of HPSEB, though in his examination-in-chief as RW1 maintained that the
petitioner was engaged in a specific work, and that he was told that his service would come to an end on completion of
the work, he in his cross-examination expressed his inability to furnish such proof as may show that the petitioner was
engaged in a specific scheme work. Having deposed so, he, however, hastened to add that the factum of the petitioner
having been engaged in a specific scheme was shown in the muster roll. But the muster roll, which would have
constituted a vital piece of evidence in substantiation of the respondent.s claim, having not been brought on record, it is
difficult to hold that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work.
9.
But even if it is assumed that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work, there
is no plausible material to show that his employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme
or completion of the work.
10. In S. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553, the principal
question that arose before the Hon.ble Supreme Court of India was:
“Whether the workmen recruited for discharging temporary job under a project can insist on
compliance of section 25-F of the Act if their services are dispensed with on the project coming to an
end.”
11. Having examined the scope of Sections 2(oo) and 25-F of the Act, the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia
ruled:
“1.
“Retrenchment” in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work
itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial pieces of
legislation are to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to take
two views of a provision. It is also well settled that the Parliament has employed the expression “the
termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever” while defining the term
“retrenchment”, which is suggestive of the legislative intent to assign the term „retrenchment. a meaning
wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There are four exceptions carved out of the
artificially extended meaning of the term „retrenchment., and therefore, termination of service of a workman
so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment. dehors
the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of „retrenchment. the termination of
service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service which does not fall
within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of, retrenchment.
2.
The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to
retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:-
(i)
that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that
the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and
consistently with the terms of the contract.
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the
commencement of employment.”
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12. The respondent having failed to satisfy these conditions, the termination of services of the petitioner, to
my thinking, decidedly amount to retrenchment within the meaning of clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act. The
respondent.s contention therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
13. The petitioner in his pleadings as also in evidence claimed to have worked for 240 days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. According to him, he having not been
served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act, the termination of his service was unlawful. More so,
when no notice under the Standing Orders was given to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation. This
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. Be it stated that the establishment of Himachal Pradesh
State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85
Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992.
14. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
15. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or
six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
16. However, the petitioner.s claim of having been in continuous service for not less than one year, or say
his claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal
from service, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the evidence led by the respondent. The mandays
chart Ex. RW1/A, which is adduced in evidence by the respondent and admitted to be correct by the petitioner in his
cross-examination as PW1, is demonstrative of the petitioner having not worked for 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment. The respondent was therefore not obliged to serve him with a
one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. The
petitioner.s contention that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
cannot be therefore accepted.
17. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, appears to be tenable. Kesar Singh, then Junior Engineer in the office of
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3203
Executive Engineer, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division), Mandi, who has been examined by
the petitioner as PW2, testified:
“As per the record, Gopal Singh (petitioner) was engaged on 25.9.1997 and he worked upto 18.4.2000.
As per the record, Uma Devi was engaged on 2.12.1998 and was still working. Jagdish Chand, S/o Sh.
Jeevan Lal was engaged on 15.10.1998 and was still working. As per the record, Kaul Ram, S/o Jyoti
Singh was engaged on 18.6.1998 and was still working. Ramesh Chand, S/o Sh. Khem Chand was
engaged on 16.5.1998 and was still working. Pawan Kumar, S/o Sh. Hem Raj was engaged on 3.11.1997
and was still working. Shive Ram, S/o Sh. Balku Ram was engaged on 28.10.1997 and was still working.
As per the record, Sh. Chand Lal was engaged on 3.9. 1997 and was still working. In the division, more
than three hundred workers are working…..”
18. The respondent.s aforementioned witness T.K. Sharma categorically admitted in his cross-examination
as RW1 that Uma Devi and Jagdish were junior to the petitioner, and that they were still in the employ of the
respondent. He also admitted in no ambiguous words that when the petitioner was removed from service Uma Devi and
Jagdish were not retrenched. In other words, the latter two were retained at the time the services of the petitioner were
terminated. Section 25-G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
19. Since Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were undeniably junior to the petitioner, were retained by the
respondent at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the principle of „Last Come First Go. as
envisaged in the abovementioned provisions can safely be held to have been violated by the respondent.
20. Ld. counsel for the respondent contends with vehemence that Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were also
retrenched, having been re-engaged in obedience to the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal, they could
not be retrenched at the time of termination of services of the petitioner, and the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act
cannot therefore be said to have been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. The reason being that re-
engagement of Uma Devi and Jagdish on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal can by no
stretch of reasoning be interpreted to mean that they have become permanent employees cannot therefore be retrenched
even if there arises an occasion for the employer to follow the principle of „Last Come First Go.. I am therefore of the
considered view that re-engagement of the said workers on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative
Tribunal notwithstanding, the respondent could in law violate the principle of „Last Come First Go. at the time the
services of the petitioner were dispensed with. The contention aforementioned has therefore been raised only to be
rejected.
21. The upshot therefore is that in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent violated the provisions of
section 25-F of the Act, and he (petitioner) is therefore entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of his retrenchment. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement
(24.9.1997). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages, because nowhere in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A and cross-
examination as PW1 did he maintain that he was not a gainfully employed or that he remained idle after his
retrenchment. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
ISSUE 2
22. The materials on record are indicative of the petitioner having approached the respondent from time to
time after his retrenchment and requested for his re-engagement but of no avail. Left with no option, he later raised an
industrial dispute which came to be referred to this Court for adjudication under Section 10 (1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) I.D./07-Mandi dated October 9, 2007.
23. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs. Garibu Ram, latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more
than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated. Having
the surveyed various rulings on the point, the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh inter alia observed:
“….....While taking note of the entire case law with regard to the delay and laches, this Court
consistently has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply but, however, depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principles of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. A delay of even 14 years has been held not to come in the way of the poor man, whose services
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have been illegally terminated in claiming his relief under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
In Deepa Ram.s case (supra), there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand.s case (supra) there was a
delay of 9 years. In Mohinder Kumar.s case (supra), there was a delay of 14 years……..”
24. The petitioner, who is undeniably poverty-stricken, is stated to be illiterate. In view of the facts and
circumstances of this case, the principle of delay and laches cannot be held applicable to his case. The issue under
discussion is therefore held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The facts and circumstances of this case do not attract the rule of estoppel. The respondent.s counsel has
also not been able to show how the rule of estoppel is attracted in this case. The issue on hand is therefore held against
the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
26. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. The petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working
at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to seniority from the date of his engagement as
daily waged beldar (24.9.1997). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages or compensation in view of the facts
and circumstances of the case. The respondent is directed to reinstatement him within a period of 90 days from today
failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to 25% back-wages with effect from the date of his unlawful retrenchment
(16.4.2000). The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages
permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The
reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official
gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 611/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Harnam Singh S/o Shri Bharepatu Ram, Village Gorat, PO Sayoh, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Harnam Singh S/o Shri Bharepatu Ram, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
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3205
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
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4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
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3207
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.…
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
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(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
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3209
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
3210
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matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1032/2007-9269, dated 12.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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3211
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 654/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Hem Raj S/o Shri Hari Lal, R/O Village Mashdhan, P.O. Deo Baradla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Hem Raj S/o Shri Hari Lal by the Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the provisions of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
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being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
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3213
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
3214
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notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
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3215
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of
notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(a)
the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(b) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
3216
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him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of being senior to
him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of Shashi Lal
having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on record that
the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the respondent at the
time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus proved to have
violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provision of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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3217
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9266 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 5, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 3/2003
Date of Institution : 10.1.2003
Date of decision : 26.11.2008
Sh. Hem Raj S/o Sh. Som Nath Village, Machkehad, P.O. Ahju, Tehsil, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPSEB Division Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv. vice
For the Respondent :
Sh. Gaurav Sharma, Adv. vice
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of the services of Sh. Hem Raj S/o Sh. Som Nath w.e.f. 21.7.2000 by the
Executive Engineer, HPSEB Division Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P. without complying the provisions
of section 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; where as work and funds are available as
alleged by workman, is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits the aggrieved workman is
entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar in Joginder Nagar Division of HPSEB in 1993, and that he worked as such upto
2003. Later his services were dispensed with by the respondent orally without complying with the provisions of Section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) even though he had worked for 240 days during the period
of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. In dispensing with the services of the petitioner,
the respondent also violated the principle of „last come first go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. Not only
that, the respondent, according to the petitioner, also committed breach of the provisions of Section 25(vi) of the Act by
making fresh recruitments without taking into consideration the petitioner.s seniority. The petitioner therefore prayed
for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with all consequential service benefits.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1993, the respondent
in his reply averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged Beldar on May 25, 1994 and worked as such upto
July 20, 2000 with interruptions/breaks caused by him in his service on his own. Thereafter, he abandoned the job
without informing the respondent. In view of his having abandoned the job on his own, his allegation of termination of
his services, according to the respondent, is nothing but falsity. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for
240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination of his services, the respondent
further averred that he had worked only for a short period of 149 days. In view of the petitioner himself having
abandoned the job, his allegation of violation of the principle of „last come first go., according to the respondent, is
absolutely untenable. Also, his allegation that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25(vi) of the Act, is
false and baseless, for no fresh recruitment was made after abandonment of the job by him. The respondent.s other
averments relate to estoppel, limitation, misjoinder of parties and non-joinder of necessary parties.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition. He averred that the workmen namely Kashmir Singh S/o Karam Chand, Tara Chand S/o
Durga Ram, Subhash Chand S/o Duni Chand, Rajinder S/o Biri Singh, and Balbir Singh s/o Shvi Pal, who were junior
to him, having been retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with, the respondent had violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. Besides, the respondent also violated the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-H
of the Act and Clause 14(2) of the Industrial Establishment Standing Orders (hereinafter referred to as the Standing
Orders) framed under the Industrial Employment Act, 1946.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office:
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3219
1.
Whether the services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondent w.e.f. 21.7.2000
without complying with the provisions of I.D. Act, despite availability of the work in an illegal
and unjustified manner?
. .OPP
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled including
compensation if any?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the petitioner has no right to maintain the present petition as alleged?
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petition is not within time?
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties?
. .OPR
6.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition his act, conduct and
acquiescence as alleged.
. .OPR
7.
Relief.
6.
Be it stated that holding issue 1 in the affirmative and issues 3 to 6 in the negative, my Ld. Predecessor-
in-office allowed the claim petition, vide award dated September 6, 2005. The relief granted was:
“In view of my findings on issues above, especially issues No.1 and 2 above, the dis-engagement of the
petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. 20.7.2000 is in contravention of section 25-G of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and also clause 14-2 of the Standing Orders of the respondent, therefore, the
petitioner is entitled for his re-engagement in his original service in the same terms and conditions in
which he was working prior to his dis-engagement. The petitioner is held entitled for his re-engagement
with all consequential service benefits except back wages. The respondent is directed to re-engage the
petitioner within a period of three months from the date of announcement of this award, failing which
the petitioner shall be entitled for full back wages.”
7.
Aggrieved, the respondent preferred before the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh a Civil Writ
Petition (CWP No.1382/2005) on various grounds. One of the grounds was that the HPSEB having been exempted
from the applicability of the provisions of Standing Orders, reliance thereupon by the Tribunal was illegal. Upholding
this contention, the Hon.ble High Court disposed the Writ Petition along with two other Civil Writ Petitions by a
common judgment dated May 18, 2007. It was inter alia observed:
“…..In this view of the matter, the Tribunal wrongly relied upon the provisions of the Standing Orders
Act to hold that the disengagement is bad for want of issuance of notice giving 10 clear days to the
employees. Admittedly, the employees had not completed 240 days and the Tribunal could not have
come to the rescue of the employee. With regard to the plea of delay and laches, in my view, the
Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that there is no inordinate delay in the respondents
exercising their statutory rights for pursuing their remedies……………..During the course of hearing, it
was further argued by the counsel for the respondents that in some of the matters there is admission on
record that juniors have been retained in service and also employment has been given to new persons,
thus violating Section 25G and 25H of the Act. According to the petitioner, it is disputed question, which
cannot be gone into by this Court…………………………………….However, perusal of award shows
that there is no finding on this aspect at all. Therefore, on this limited ground as to whether there is
violation of provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act, all the matters are remanded back for
consideration by the Tribunal…………………..…..Even though the plea of limitation/delay and laches
has been decided against the petitioner, however, while considering the issue of back wages, it would be
open for the Tribunal to consider the same and decide accordingly…..”
8.
In view of these orders, the question that is required to be determined by this Court is:
“Whether there is violation of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act.”
9.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my answer to this question is in the affirmative.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
10. The petitioner in his statement of claim inter alia averred that his services were dispensed with by the
respondent orally without complying with the mandatory provisions of the Act. Refuting this allegation, the respondent,
on the other hand, averred that the services of the petitioner were never terminated, but he had abandoned the job on his
3220
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own after July 20, 2000, and no provision of the Act could therefore be said to have been violated. But this claim, to
my mind, does not ring true in view of the materials on record, particularly the muster roll Ex. R4, which is
demonstrative of the same having been issued for the period from June 21, 2000 to July 20, 2000. By this document
eight workmen including the petitioner whose name figures at serial no.3, were engaged, but the period of their
employment, or say the period during which they worked, did not extend beyond July 10, 2000. None of the said 8
workers has been marked absent or shown to be present in the muster roll Ex. R4 after July 10, 2000, nor did the
respondent bring on record the subsequently issued muster roll wherein the petitioner may have been shown absent.
The respondent.s claim that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own after July 20, 2000 cannot therefore be
taken without a pinch of salt. So, the petitioner.s claim in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A that his services were terminated by
the respondent, to my thinking, deserves acceptance and is accepted.
11. In his statement of claim, the petitioner alleged that in terminating his services, the respondent had failed
to observe the principle of „last come first go.. In substantiation of this allegation, he swore an affidavit Ex. PW1/A
wherein he alleged that the workmen namely Ram Chander S/o Lachhi Ram, Sambhu Ram S/o Kala Ram, Ami Chand
S/o Moti Ram, Mohinder Kumar S/o Bir Singh, Dan Singh S/o Mouzi Ram, Sambhu Ram S/o Alam Ram, Dhiyan
Chand S/o Haria Ram, Megh Singh S/o Balak Ram, Dan Singh S/o Gulab Chand, Tek Chand S/o Durga Ram, Kashmir
Singh and Balbir Singh S/o Shiv Pal, who were junior to him, were retained in service by the respondent at the time of
termination of his services. During the petitioner.s cross-examination as PW1, the respondent suggested that some of
the 12 workmen named in his affidavit were senior to him and some engaged on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble
Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. Although the petitioner admitted this claim of the respondent to be correct,
the suggestion, to my thinking, is indicative of some of the 12 workmen to be junior to the petitioner. The respondent.s
witness B.R. Rana, then Assistant Engineer, Electrical Division Chountra, testified in his cross-examination RW1 that
no person junior to the petitioner was retained. Having deposed so, he, however, maintained that some of the Beldars
shown at serial nos. 1 to 12 in the petitioner.s affidavit Ex. PW1/A
might be junior to him. There is no denying the fact that the 12 workmen named in the petitioner.s affidavit Ex. PW1/A
are still in the employ of the respondent as Beldar. So, some of them, who were junior to the petitioner, having been
retained at the time the petitioner.s services were terminated, the respondent can safely be held to have violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, which reads:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
12. However, as for the alleged violation of the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, the same, to my
mind, goes without proof, for no such plausible material has been brought on record as may lend assurance to the
petitioner.s allegation that after his removal from service the respondent had engaged fresh workmen. The respondent
cannot therefore be said to have violated the said provisions of the Act.
13. The respondent having been found to have violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, the point
under discussion is partly held in the affirmative.
RELIEF
14. In view of the respondent having been found to have violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act,
the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner his held to reinstatement in the same
capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were terminated. He is also held entitled to continuity of
service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment. Besides, he is held entitled to 25% back-wages from the date of his
retrenchment (July 21, 2000). The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the
minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the
petitioner. The reason why he is held entitled to 25% back-wages is non-existence of such evidence as may show that
he was not gainfully employed after his retrenchment. The respondent is directed to re-engage him within a period of
90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for
publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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3221
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 190/2007
Date of Institution : 27.11.2007
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Hoshiar Singh S/o Shri Prabhu Ram, Vill. Bhuwan, P.O. Talwana, Tehsil Ghumarwain, District Bilaspur,
H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, H.P.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Hoshiar Singh S/o Shri Prabhu Ram workman by the
Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. w.e.f. October, 1999 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereas junior persons to him have been
retained by the employer is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar in HPPWD Sub Division, Bharari in Ghumarwin Tehsil in April, 1997, and that his
services were terminated by the respondent in December, 1999. During the period of his employment, intermittent
breaks were given in his service and he was not allowed to complete 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months
preceding the date of his dis-engagement. In terminating his services, the respondent, it is further averred, violated the
principle of „last come first go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act, 1947 (the Act, for short), because the
workmen namely Piar Singh, Subhash Kumar, Sanjeev Kumar, Prakash Chand and others, who were junior to him,
were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. On the basis of these averments the petitioner
prayed for a direction to the respondent to re-engage him with all consequential benefits.
3.
Admitting the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in April, 1997, the
respondent averred that he (petitioner) was engaged only for a period of 100 days under the Employment Assurance
Scheme and there could therefore be no question of his completing 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months
preceding the date of his removal from service. Services of the petitioner, according to the respondent, automatically
stood terminated on termination of the scheme under which he was engaged for a period of 100 days. As to the
petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, the respondent.s reply is:
“……It is submitted that the junior persons are working in the department as per the order of the
Hon.ble Administrative Tribunal Shimla H.P. The engagement of the petitioner is holy come into the
perview of the Employment Assurance Scheme for 100 days then the question of dis-engagement of the
petitioner in arbitrary in nature does not arise at all. ……it is admitted that Sh. Piar Singh, Satish
Kumar, Sanjeev Kumar are still working this Department Sh. Parkash Chand has expired now while in
service. It is also admitted that the applicant was engaged prior to the above mentioned persons.
However, it is denied that the applicant is senior to the above person, as seniority is counted only if the
worker completes 240 days in a calendar year. The applicant has never completed 240 days of
continuous service in any calendar year, therefore, his claim of seniority is wrong…..”
On the basis of these averments, the respondent prayed for rejection of the petitioner.s claim.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the statement of claim.
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5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petitioner was engaged under the Employment Assurance Scheme for 100 days
only. If so, to what effect?
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition is not maintainable.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 25% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES 1 and 2
7.
These issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
8.
The respondent.s claim that the petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar only for 100 days under
the Employment Assurance Scheme, to my thinking, does not ring true in view of the mandays chart (Annexure R-2),
which is demonstrative of the latter having worked for 175 days in 1997, 141 days in 1998 and 15 days in 1999. Had
the respondent.s claim of having engaged the petitioner only for 100 days under the said scheme been true the latter
would not have been allowed to work after the expiration of the period of time for which he was allegedly engaged. I
am therefore not disposed to accept the respondent.s claim that the petitioner was engaged only for a period of 100 days
under the Employment Assurance Scheme. More so, in view of the respondent.s failure to lead such documentary
evidence as may lend assurance to his claim.
9.
The petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section
25-G of the Act, to my mind, appears to be tenable. Section 25-G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
10. Denying having violated these provisions, the respondent in his reply inter alia averred that “the junior
persons are working in the department as per the order of the Hon.ble Administrative Tribunal Shimla H.P.” The
respondent.s witness Lekh Ram Mehla, then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Ghumarwin, also deposed in his
affidavit Ex. RW1/A:
“That the other labourers who are junior to the petitioner are working in the department, as per order
of Administrative Tribunal Shimla H.P.”
11. This deposition as also the respondent.s aforementioned reply lend credence only to the petitioner.s
allegation that at the time his services were dispensed with certain workers, who were junior to him, were retained in
service by the respondent. No such orders of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal have been brought on record as may lend
assurance to the respondent.s claim that the workmen junior to the petitioner were working in the department on the
basis thereof. As the respondent on his own showing established on record that certain workmen junior to the petitioner
were retained in service at the time the latter.s services were dispensed with, he (respondent) can safely be held to have
violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. The petitioner is therefore entitled to reinstatement in the same
capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of
service from the date of his retrenchment (October, 1999). In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he is held
entitled to 25% back-wages from the date of termination of his services. Both the issues under discussion are
accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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3223
ISSUE 3
12. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issues, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
13.
Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the
time his services were terminated in October, 1999. Besides, he is held entitled to 25% back-wages and continuity of
service from the said date. The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the
minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the
petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference
is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette.
The file after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.Sen,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 61/2002
Date of Institution : 16.2.2002
Date of decision : 2.12.2008
Hoshiyara Ram S/o Sh. Maan Singh, Village-Nirohi P.O. Salooni, Distt. Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Salooni, Distt. Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. Manoj Kumar, adv. vice
For the Respondent :
Sh. Kuldeep Sen, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the oral termination w.e.f. 01-12-1998 of Sh. Hoshiyara Ram S/o Sh. Man Singh by the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Salooni, Tehsil Salooni, Distt. Chamba, H.P. and intermittent
break in service given to the concerned workman during the period 1995 to 1998 is legal and justified? If
not, what seniority, service benefit and relief Sh. Hoshiyara Ram S/o Sh. Man Singh workman is entitled
to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent in HPPWD, Salooni Sub Division on November 7, 1995, and that he worked as such
till December 1, 1998 when his services were terminated by the respondent orally. Alleging the respondent to have
given intermittent breaks in his service during the period from 1995 to 1998, the petitioner further averred that he could
not be able to complete 240 days in any calendar year and was thus deprived of the protection as envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act). Besides, on account of the intermittent breaks in
his service he could not be able to get the benefit of regularisation of his service as per policy of the State Government.
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In terminating his services, the respondent, it is further alleged, violated the principle of „last come first go. as
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act, because the workmen namely Dharmender, Suresh Kumar and Bhanu who
were junior to him, were retained at the time his services were dispensed with. The petitioner therefore prayed for a
direction to the respondent to reinstate him in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services
were terminated. Besides, he prayed for the grant of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including
seniority etc. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to take into account the period of intermittent breaks in
his service in order to make him eligible for regularization of his service in future.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
beldar in November 1, 1995, but denied his allegation of termination of his service. The respondent also refuted the
petitioner.s allegation that intermittent breaks were given in his service. Alleging the petitioner to be a habitual
absentee, the respondent averred that no intermittent break was given in his service, but he had himself absented from
time to time and never completed “the criteria of 240 days in any of the calendar years from 1995 to 2001”, and that he
had abandoned the job on his own. Claiming the petitioner to have remained on the rolls of the respondent department
upto March, 2001, the respondent further averred that he (petitioner) did not turn up thereafter, and that he having not
worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of abandonment of the job by him, the
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act could not be said to have been violated. Also, there was no violation of the
provisions of Section 25-G, for no workman junior to the petitioner was retained by the respondent. On the basis of
these averments the respondent prayed for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition. He averred:
“However, it is further averred that the persons employed later than applicant are still on the service of
respondent. The name of such persons are as under: (1) Dharmender son of Chamaru (2) Suresh
Kumar son of Baldev and (3) Bhanu son of Barfi etc. …..”
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office:
1.
Whether the action of termination of petitioner by respondent by giving breaks without
complying the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified?
. .OPP
2.
Whether there is violation of provisions of Section 25-F and 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947?
. .OPP
3.
If Issue No.1 is not proved, to what releif of service benefits, the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
4.
Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged in preliminary objection No.1 ?
. .OPR
5.
Relief.
6.
The petitioner.s allegation that the respondent had given intermittent breaks in his service, did not find
favour with this Court. Also, his allegation that termination of his service by the respondent was violative of the
provisions of the Act, did not commend itself to this Court. His claim encompassed in issue 2 was also found untenable
and the petition was therefore dismissed, vide award dated January 3, 2006. Aggrieved, the petitioner laid challenge to
the award before the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh by preferring a Civil Writ Petition titled Hoshiara Ram
Vs. State of H.P. and Anr. (CWP No.1274/2006). The Hon.ble High Court by its judgment dated July 26, 2007 upheld
the impugned award to the extent the same relates to the finding that the petitioner had not completed 240 days during
the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. This Court.s findings that there was
no violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act were, however, found unsustainable and were therefore set
aside. The Hon.ble High Court therefore allowed the writ petition partly and remanded the matter to this Court with a
direction to decide the issue: “Whether the workman is entitled to the protection of Section 25-G of the Act or not in
view of the material placed before it by the parties afresh.” For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on
this issue are that in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-
G of the Act.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
7.
The petitioner who was undeniably engaged by the respondent as daily waged beldar in HPPWD,
Salooni Sub Division on November 7, 1995, alleged that his services were terminated by the respondent orally on
December 1, 1998. Refuting this allegation, the respondent, on the other hand, averred that the petitioner, who was a
habitual absentee, had abandoned the job on his own. But his claim of the respondent, to my thinking, cannot be taken
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3225
without a pinch of salt in view of the materials on record. The respondent in his reply averred that “he (petitioner)
remained on roll of the respondent department upto 3/2001 and thereafter did not turn up till date”. As against this
averment, the respondent.s witness P.C. Malhotra, then Assistant Engineer, EE Salooni, however, maintained as RW1
that the petitioner had left his job after January, 2001. The respondent.s pleadings thus being at variance with the
evidence led by him cannot be said to have been established. More so, in view of his failure to adduce in evidence such
document(s) as may lend assurance to his claim that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own after March, 2001.
The petitioner in his statement as PW1 maintained that he was engaged by the respondent as daily waged beldar in
November, 1995 and worked as such upto 1.12.1998 when his services were dispensed with by the respondent without
any notice and payment of retrenchment compensation. There being no reason to discredit this deposition, I have no
hesitation to holding that the services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondent on December 1, 1998.
8.
Now the question: Whether or not the respondent had retained any workman junior to the petitioner at
the time his services were dispensed with on December 1, 1998. The answer to this is in the affirmative in view of the
petitioner.s deposition and the seniority list Ex. PB. The petitioner in his statement as PW1 maintained that Suresh
Kumar, Dharamender, Bhanu and others, who were junior to him, were still in the employ of the respondent. This
deposition of his having not been challenged during his cross-examination by the respondent deserves acceptance.
More so, in view of the seniority list Ex. PB, which is demonstrative of at least two workmen namely Dharmender and
Suresh Kumar, whose names figure at serial nos. 2 and 10 respectively in the seniority list pertaining to Salooni
Division, being junior to the petitioner and their having been retained in service even after termination of the
petitioner.s services. Section 25-G of the Act reads:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
9.
Since the respondent is proved to have retained the aforementioned workmen, who were junior to the
petitioner, at the time the latter.s services were terminated, the respondent can safely be held to have violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. The issue on hand is therefore held in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
RELIEF
10. In view of the earlier award dated January 3, 2006 of this Court having been partly upheld by the
Hon.ble High Court by its judgment dated July 26, 2007 in CWP No.1274/2006 and what has been held by me on the
issue aforementioned, the claim petition succeeds partly and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held
entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time of termination of his services.
Besides, he is held entitled to 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment.
The reason why he is held entitled to 50% back-wages is non-existence of such evidence as may show that he was not a
gainfully employed after his retrenchment. The respondent is directed to re-engage him within a period of 90 days from
today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in
the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 2nd day of December, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 497/2004
Date of Institution : 6.11.2004
Date of decision : 20.12.2008
Shri Ishwar Singh S/o Shri Kanshi Ram, Village Dohru, P.O. Dadhol, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur,
H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, Vice AR.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of service of Shri Ishwar Singh S/o Shri Kanshi Ram, workman by the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. w.e.f. 11.10.2001 without complying
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and whereas junior to him are retained by the
department is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits the above aggrieved workman is
entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on June 17, 1997, and that he worked as such upto October 11, 2001 when his
services were dispensed with by the respondent orally. Claiming to have worked for 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner averred that in dispensing with his services, the
respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short), because
no notice was given to him nor was he paid retrenchment compensation. Besides, the respondent violated the principle
of „last come first go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act, because certain workmen junior to him were
retained at the time of termination of his services. The petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the respondent to
reinstate him with full back-wages and continuity of service.
3.
Admitting the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar on June 17, 1997, the
respondent in his reply averred that he was engaged only for a short period of 100 days under the Employment
Assurance Scheme, and that his services were later dispensed with. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed before the H.P.
Administrative Tribunal an application. Claiming to have re-engaged the petitioner on the basis of the order dated
September 27, 2000 passed by the said Tribunal, the respondent averred that he (petitioner) had worked for 284 days in
2001. On October 11, 2001, the petitioner.s services, according to the respondent, were dispensed with on the basis of
the orders dated August 20, 2001 passed by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in a Civil Writ Petition
preferred by the respondent against the aforementioned order of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal. Claiming to have
rightly dispensed with the services of the petitioner, the respondent averred that the claim petition was not
maintainable.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. 11.10.2001 without
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and retaining the Juniors of the
petitioner, in violation of section 25-G of the I.D. Act, is illegal & Unjustified, as alleged?
. .OPP
2.
If issue No. 1 is to proved in the affirmative, what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR
4.
Whether the Labour Court has no jurisdiction, as alleged?
. .OPR
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3227
5.
Whether the petitioner was employed as daily wager under (EAS) Employment Assurance Scheme
for 100 days, if so its effect?
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
My Ld. Predecessor-in-office held the reference to be bad and not maintainable, vide award dated
January 17, 2006. Aggrieved, the petitioner laid challenge to the said award by preferring before the Hon.ble High
Court of Himachal Pradesh a Writ Petition (CWP No.1291/2006). By its judgment dated July 31, 2008, the Hon.ble
High Court set aside the impugned award and remanded the matter to this Court for decision afresh in accordance with
law.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on the issues aforementioned as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes
Issue 2 :
He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
his retrenchment.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Issue 6 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES 1 AND 5
7.
Both these issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
8.
The respondent.s claim of having engaged the petitioner as daily waged Beldar only for 100 days under
the Employment Assurance Scheme of the Government, to my thinking, does not appear to be ring having a of truth in
view of the mandays chart (Annexure R-III), which is demonstrative of the petitioner having worked for 158 days
during the year 1997 and 137 days in 1998. Had the respondent.s claim of having engaged the petitioner only for 100
days under the aforesaid scheme been true, the petitioner would have not been allowed to work beyond 100 days from
the date of his employment (June 17, 1997). I am therefore not disposed to accept the said claim of the respondent.
Issue 5 is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
9.
Although nowhere in his pleadings did the respondent claim to have dispensed with the services of the
petitioner before October 11, 2001, the mandays chart (Annexure R-III) is indicative of the respondent having
terminated the services of the petitioner in or about July, 1998 and re-engaged him in October, 2000 on the basis of the
order dated September 27, 2000 of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal. Aggrieved by the said Tribunal.s orders, the
respondent, it appears, laid challenge thereto by preferring before the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh a Civil
Writ Petition (CWP No. 671/2001). By its order dated August 20, 2001, the Hon.ble High Court made the following
orders:
“Notice returnable after six weeks. Meanwhile, order passed by the Tribunal is stayed.”
10. On the basis of this order, the Assistant Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Sub Division, Bharari by his letter dated
October 10, 2001 terminated the services of the petitioner with immediate effect. The relevant portion of the said letter
may be reproduced with advantage:
“In compliance to the order dated 27.9.2001 passed by the Hon.ble HP Administrative Tribunal you
were re-employed by this department on M/Roll basis w.e.f. 17.10.2000 and lateron the department has
filed an application before the Hon.ble HP High Court agaisnt the above said order. According the
Hon.ble H.P. High Court stayed the order passed by the Hon.ble Tribunal. Meanwhile on dated
26.8.2001(photo copy attached). In compliance to the order passed by the Hon.ble High Court on dated
26.8.2001 yours services is hereby terminated with immediate effect till further orders.”
11. The order dated July 31, 2008 passed by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the Civil Writ
Petition 1291/2006 would reveal that the respondent.s Civil Writ Petition (CWP No.671/2001) laying challenge to the
H.P. Administrative Tribunal.s orders dated September 27, 2000 was allowed by the Hon.ble High Court by its
judgment dated April 17, 2002. But the setting aside by the Hon.ble High Court of H.P. of the H.P. Administrative
Tribunal.s orders dated September 27, 2000 on the basis of which the petitioner was re-engaged by the respondent in
October, 2000, notwithstanding, the fact remains that the petitioner, who was re-engaged by the respondent in October,
2000, worked in the respondent.s department until his services were dispensed with on October 11, 2001. The mandays
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chart is demonstrative of his having worked for more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months before the
date of his retrenchment (October 11, 2001) . Section 25-F of the Act reads:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
12. Admittedly in the respondent.s witness Karamjeet Singh.s cross-examination as RW1, no notice was
given to the petitioner nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation on or before the date of termination of his
services. In dispensing with the services of the petitioner, the respondent therefore violated the abovementioned
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. But not only did the respondent violate the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act,
he also violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, which provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
13. The petitioner in his statement as PW1 maintained that the workers namely Jitender, Chain Singh,
Raghunath, Om Prakash, Rakesh Kumar, Ramesh Chand, Thakur Dass, Baliram, Data Ram, Surinder, Bhagwan Dass,
Subhash Chand, Bidi Chand, Anand Kumar and Sarju Ram, who were junior to him, were retained in service by the
respondent. This deposition having not been challenged during his cross-examination by the respondent deserves
acceptance. The respondent.s witness Karamjeet Singh maintained in his cross-examination as RW1 that the workmen,
who were junior to the petitioner, were retained in service on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble Court. But in
substantiation of this claim, the respondent did not choose to bring on record such orders of the Court as may show that
the workmen junior to the petitioner were retained in service on the basis thereof. The respondent having undeniably
retained in service certain workmen, who were junior to the petitioner, at the time his services were dispensed with, the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the Act are proved to have been violated.
14. The upshot is that in dispensing with the services of the petitioner, the respondent violated the
provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act. The issue 1 is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against
the respondent.
ISSUE 2
15. In view of my findings under the forging issues, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same
capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. He is also entitled to continuity of
service from the date of termination of his services (October 11, 2001). Besides, he is entitled to 50% back-wages in
view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
ISSUE 3
16. In view of what has been held under the above issues, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the extent
the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
ISSUE 4
17. In view of the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner, the jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate upon
the same is not excluded. The respondent.s counsel has not been able to show how the jurisdiction of this Court to
adjudicate upon the reference on hand stands ousted. The issue under discussion is therefore held in favour of the
petitioner and against the respondent.
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3229
RELIEF
18. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issues 1 and 2, the petition succeeds
partly and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in
which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is held entitled to 50% back-wages and
continuity of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (October 11, 2001). The said 50% back-wages shall be
computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act
whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner
within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette. The file after completion be consigned to the record room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of December, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 476/2004
Date of Institution : 23.9.2004
Date of decision : 20.12.2008
Shri Jagat Pal S/o Shri Munshi Ram, VPO, Dakhot, Tehsil Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, H.P.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, Vice AR.
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of service of Shri Jagat Pal S/o Sh. Munshi Ram, workman by the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. w.e.f. July, 1998 without complying
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and whereas junior to him are retained by the
department is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and compensation the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar in H.P.P.W.D. Sub Division, Bharari, in April, 1997, and that his services were
orally terminated by the respondent in November, 1998. Claiming to have worked for 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of termination of his services, the petitioner averred that as he is never absented
from work, his removal from service was unlawful. In dispensing with his services, the respondent, according to the
petitioner, violated the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short), because certain
workmen namely Jaisi Ram, Nikki Devi, Raj Kumar, Anil Kumar and Raghu Nath, who were junior to him, were
retained in service at the time of his unlawful retrenchment. The petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the
respondent to reinstate him with all consequential service benefits. 3. The respondent in his reply admitted the
petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in April, 1997, but refuted his claim of having worked
for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. Claiming the
petitioner to have been engaged as unskilled labourer only for 100 days under the Employment Assurance Scheme, the
respondent averred that in view of the petitioner having been engaged for a specific period of time, there was no
question of his having completed 240 days as claimed by him. As for the petitioner.s allegation that the workmen
namely Jaisi Ram, Nikki Devi, Raj Kumar, Anil Kumar and Raghu Nath, who were junior to him, were retained in
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service at the time of his retrenchment, the respondent.s contention is that the services of these workmen were also
terminated, and that they having been re-engaged in compliance with the orders of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal, no
provisions of the Act can be said to have been violated.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office:
15. Whether the disengagement of the petitioner by the respondent is legally justified or not?
. .OPP
16. If the above issue no.1 is proved in the affirmative, what relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
17. Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned under this issue.
Issue 3 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
The respondent.s claim that the petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar just for 100 days under
the Employment Assurance Scheme of the Government, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the
respondent.s witness Raj Kumar Sood.s affidavit Ex. RW1/A, which is indicative of the petitioner having worked for
169 days in 1997 and 137 days in 1998. The mandays chart (Annexure R-2) produced by the respondent is also
demonstrative of the petitioner having worked for 169 days during the year 1997 and 137 days in 1998. Had the
respondent.s claim of having engaged the petitioner for a limited period of 100 days under the scheme aforementioned
been true the petitioner would have not been allowed to work beyond the said period of time. As the respondent on his
own showing established it in record that the petitioner had worked for more than 100 days in 1997 as also in 1998, his
claim that the petitioner was engaged just for 100 days under the Employment Assurance Scheme stands belied and
cannot therefore be accepted.
8.
But the petitioner.s claim of having worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months
preceding the date of his retrenchment also does not ring true, because the mandays chart (Annexure R-2) the
correctness of which is not been disputed by him, does not lend assurance to his claim. The petitioner having thus not
been proved to have been in „continuous service for a period of one year. as defined under Section 25-B of the Act, the
respondent cannot be said to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, which reads:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
9.
Now the question: „Whether or not the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Section
25-G of the Act. The answer, to my thinking, is in the affirmative in view of the materials of the record. Section 25-G
of the Act provides:
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3231
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
10. The petitioner in his statement of claim alleged that his services were terminated by the respondent in
November, 1998. But this averment, to my mind, appears to be far from truth in view of the reference on hand, wherein
his services are alleged to have been terminated w.e.f. July, 1998. The mandays chart is also indicative of the petitioner
having worked upto July, 1998. So, not in November, 1998, but it was in July, 1998 when his services were terminated.
11. The petitioner in his statement of claim averred that certain workmen namely Jaisi Ram, Nikki Devi, Raj Kumar,
Anil Kumar and Raghu Nath, who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed
with by the respondent. This averment to the extent the same relates to the said workmen being junior to the petitioner,
is not disputed in the respondent.s reply. What is contended by the respondent is that the said workmen having been
engaged in compliance with the orders of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal, no provision of the Act can be said to have
been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. Of the aforesaid five workmen (Jaisi Ram, Nikki Devi, Raghu
Nath, Raj Kumar and Anil Kumar), the latter two appear to have been retrenched by the respondent in October 1998,
vide orders dated August 30, 1999 (Annexure R-5) and September 6, 1999 (Annexure R-6) of the H.P. Administrative
Tribunal, Shimla. Of the remaining three workmen, while Raghu Nath appears to have been retrenched in the same
month as the petitioner, vide order dated November 3, 1999 of the said Tribunal (Annexure R-7), the point of time
when the services of Jaisi Ram, Nikki Devi were terminated is not known. So, what stands established on record is that
Raj Kumar and Anil Kumar, who were undeniably junior to the petitioner, were retained in service when the services of
the petitioner were dispensed with in July, 1998. In terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent is
therefore proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. The termination of services of the
petitioner thus not being legally justified, the issue under discussion is held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
12. In view of my findings on the foregoing issue, the petitioner is entitled to re-instatement in the same
capacity as in which he was working at the time of termination of his services in July 1998. Besides, he is entitled to
continuity of service from the date of his retrenchment (July, 1998). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages,
because his pleadings as also the evidence led by him are non-existent in averments as may show that he was not
gainfully employed or working for gain after his retrenchment. The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
RELIEF
13. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the
time of termination of his services (July 1998). Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment. He is, however, held not entitled to any back-wages. The respondent is directed to re-engage the
petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent
to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette. The file after completion be consigned to the record
room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of December, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 160/2007
Date of Institution : 1.11.2007
Date of decision : 24.11.2008
Shri Jagdish Chand S/o Shri Govind Ram, Village & P.O. Saigloo, Tehsil Sadar, Distrcit Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
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Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, vice AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. Gaurav Sharma, vice Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Shri Jagdish Chand S/o Shri Govind Ram workman by
the Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 1.1.2000
without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereas junior to him were
retained by the employer as alleged by the workman is proper and justified? If not, what relief of
service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent on January, 1999, and that he worked as such in Saigloo Sub Division of Himachal
Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division) upto December 31, 1999. On January 1, 2000, his services were
terminated by the respondent by serving with him a notice dated December 20, 1999. Claiming to have worked for 240
days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service, the petitioner further
averred that he having not been paid any compensation, the termination of his services was violative of the provisions
of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) as also the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 (Standing Orders, for short). In terminating his services, the respondent, according to the petitioner,
also violated the provisions of section 25-G of the Act, because certain workers namely Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul
Singh, Ramesh, Shive Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time his services were dispensed
with. Not only that, the respondent also violated the provisions of section 25-H of the Act, for, after the petitioner.s
retrenchment some persons were engaged without giving the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-
employment. Claiming to have visited the respondent.s office a number of times after his removal from service, the
petitioner averred that on being requested by him to re-engage him, the concerned official in the respondent.s office
gave an assurance that he would be called back in the job. The petitioner, however, kept on waiting for a call till
February, 2005 whereafter he raised the industrial dispute, which later came to be referred to this Court for
adjudication. On the basis of these averments, the petitioner prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in
the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. He also prayed for the grant
of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including seniority etc.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on January, 1999, the respondent in his reply
averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as beldar on daily wages basis as against a specific construction work on June
25, 1998, and that he had worked upto December 31, 1999 with certain interruptions/breaks caused on account of his
wilful absence from work. Claiming to have told the respondent at the time of his engagement as casual beldar that he
was being engaged as against a specific construction work, and that his services would automatically come to an end on
completion of the work, the respondent further averred that his services having been dispensed with on completion of
the work, no provision of the Act was violated. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for 240 days during
the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date on which his services were dispensed with, the respondent averred
that he having not completed 240 days during the period he remained in his employ, he was not required to be served
with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and the provisions of this Section cannot therefore be said to
have been violated. As to the petitioner.s allegation that certain persons namely Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul Singh,
Ramesh, Pawan, Shiv Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time of his retrenchment, the
respondent.s contention is that these persons, who were also engaged as casual beldar for execution a specific work,
were also removed from service on completion of the work, and that they were later re-engaged in obedience to an
order dated October 8, 1999 of the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner.s claim that after his
removal from service he had visited the respondent.s office, is also refuted by the respondent. It is averred that at no
point of time did the petitioner visit the respondent.s office nor did he make any representation after his removal from
service, and the petition is therefore barred by time. As for the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the Standing
Orders, the respondent.s contention is that this allegation is also unfounded and baseless, because the establishment of
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide
Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992. The respondent.s other contentions
relate to estoppel and maintainability of the petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
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3233
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
3.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition by his act and conduct.
OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Relief :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on January, 1999, the respondent averred that
he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged beldar on June 25, 1998, and that he had worked as such upto December 31,
1999. This averment having been admitted by the petitioner to be true in his cross-examination as PW1 deserves
acceptance.
8.
Ld. counsel for the respondent contends that the petitioner was engaged as against a specific work, his
removal from service on completion of the work did not amount to retrenchment as defined under clause (oo) of
Section 2 of the Act. But this contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived in view of the materials on record.
The petitioner in his cross-examination as PW1 categorically denied the respondent.s suggestion that at the time of his
employment he was told that he was engaged as against a temporary work, and that his services would be deemed to
have come to an end on completion of the work started under a scheme. The respondent.s witness T.K. Sharma, then
Assistant Engineer in Saigloo Sub Division of HPSEB, though in his examination-in-chief as RW1 maintained that the
petitioner was engaged in a specific work, and that he was told that his service would come to an end on completion of
the work, he in his cross-examination expressed his inability to furnish such proof as may show that the petitioner was
engaged in a specific scheme work. Having deposed so, he, however, hastened to add that the factum of the petitioner
having been engaged in a specific scheme was shown in the muster roll. But the muster roll, which would have
constituted a vital piece of evidence in substantiation of the respondent.s claim, having not been brought on record, it is
difficult to hold that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work.
9.
But even if it is assumed that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work, there
is no plausible material to show that his employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme
or completion of the work.
10. In S. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553, the principal
question that arose before the Hon.ble Supreme Court of India was:
“Whether the workmen recruited for discharging temporary job under a project can insist on compliance of
section 25-F of the Act if their services are dispensed with on the project coming to an end.”
11. Having examined the scope of Sections 2(oo) and 25-F of the Act, the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia
ruled:
“1.
“Retrenchment” in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work
itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial pieces of
legislation are to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to take
two views of a provision. It is also well settled that the Parliament has employed the expression “the
termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever” while defining the term
“retrenchment”, which is suggestive of the legislative intent to assign the term „retrenchment. a meaning
wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There are four exceptions carved out of the
artificially extended meaning of the term „retrenchment., and therefore, termination of service of a workman
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so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment. dehors
the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of „retrenchment. the termination of
service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service which does not fall
within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment.
2.
The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to
retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:-
(i)
that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that
the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and
consistently with the terms of the contract.
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the
commencement of employment.”
12. The respondent having failed to satisfy these conditions, the termination of services of the petitioner, to
my thinking, decidedly amount to retrenchment within the meaning of clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act. The
respondent.s contention therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
13. The petitioner in his pleadings as also in evidence claimed to have worked for 240 days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. According to him, he having not been
served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act, the termination of his service was unlawful. More so,
when no notice under the Standing Orders was given to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation. This
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. Be it stated that the establishment of Himachal Pradesh
State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85
Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992.
14. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
15. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
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3235
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
16. However, the petitioner.s claim of having been in continuous service for not less than one year, or say
his claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal
from service, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the evidence led by the respondent. The mandays
chart Ex. RW1/A, which is adduced in evidence by the respondent and admitted to be correct by the petitioner in his
cross-examination as PW1, is demonstrative of the petitioner having not worked for 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment. The respondent was therefore not obliged to serve him with a
one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. The
petitioner.s contention that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
cannot be therefore accepted.
17. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, appears to be tenable. Kesar Singh, then Junior Engineer in the office of
Executive Engineer, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division), Mandi, who has been examined by
the petitioner as PW2, testified:
“As per the record, Jagdish Chand (petitioner) was engaged on 25.6.1998 and he worked upto
31.12.1999. As per the record, Uma Devi was engaged on 2.12.1998 and was still working. Jagdish
Chand, S/o Sh. Jeevan Lal was engaged on 15.10.1998 and was still working. As per the record, Kaul
Ram, S/o Jyoti Singh was engaged on 18.6.1998 and was still working. Ramesh Chand, S/o Sh. Khem
Chand was engaged on 16.5.1998 and was still working. Pawan Kumar, S/o Sh. Hem Raj was engaged
on 3.11.1997 and was still working. Shive Ram, S/o Sh. Balku Ram was engaged on 28.10.1997 and was
still working. As per the record, Sh. Chand Lal was engaged on 3.9. 1997 and was still working. In the
division, more than three hundred workers are working…..”
18. The respondent.s aforementioned witness T.K. Sharma categorically admitted in his cross-examination
as RW1 that Uma Devi and Jagdish were junior to the petitioner, and that they were still in the employ of the
respondent. He also admitted in no ambiguous words that when the petitioner was removed from service Uma Devi and
Jagdish were not retrenched. In other words, the latter two were retained at the time the services of the petitioner were
terminated. Section 25-G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
19. Since Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were undeniably junior to the petitioner, were retained by the
respondent at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the principle of „Last Come First Go. as
envisaged in the abovementioned provisions can safely be held to have been violated by the respondent.
20. Ld. counsel for the respondent contends with vehemence that Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were also
retrenched, having been re-engaged in obedience to the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal, they could
not be retrenched at the time of termination of services of the petitioner, and the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act
cannot therefore be said to have been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. The reason being that re-
engagement of Uma Devi and Jagdish on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal can by no
stretch of reasoning be interpreted to mean that they have become permanent employees cannot therefore be retrenched
even if there arises an occasion for the employer to follow the principle of „Last Come First Go.. I am therefore of the
considered view that re-engagement of the said workers on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative
Tribunal notwithstanding, the respondent could in law violate the principle of „Last Come First Go. at the time the
services of the petitioner were dispensed with. The contention aforementioned has therefore been raised only to be
rejected.
21. The upshot therefore is that in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent violated the provisions of
section 25-F of the Act, and he (petitioner) is therefore entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of his retrenchment. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement
(25.6.1998). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages, because nowhere in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A and cross-
examination as PW1 did he maintain that he was not a gainfully employed or that he remained idle after his
retrenchment. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
3236
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ISSUE 2
22. The materials on record are indicative of the petitioner having approached the respondent from time to
time after his retrenchment and requested for his re-engagement but of no avail. Left with no option, he later raised an
industrial dispute which came to be referred to this Court for adjudication under Section 10 (1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) I.D./07-Mandi dated October 9, 2007.
23. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs. Garibu Ram, latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more
than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated. Having
the surveyed various rulings on the point, the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh inter alia observed:
“….....While taking note of the entire case law with regard to the delay and laches, this Court
consistently has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply but, however, depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principles of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. A delay of even 14 years has been held not to come in the way of the poor man, whose services
have been illegally terminated in claiming his relief under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
In Deepa Ram.s case (supra), there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand.s case (supra) there was a
delay of 9 years. In Mohinder Kumar.s case (supra), there was a delay of 14 years……..”
24. The petitioner, who is undeniably poverty-stricken, is stated to be illiterate. In view of the facts and
circumstances of this case, the principle of delay and laches cannot be held applicable to his case. The issue under
discussion is therefore held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The facts and circumstances of this case do not attract the rule of estoppel. The respondent.s counsel has
also not been able to show how the rule of estoppel is attracted in this case. The issue on hand is therefore held against
the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
26. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. The petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working
at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to seniority from the date of his engagement as
daily waged beldar (25.6.1998). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages or compensation in view of the facts
and circumstances of the case. The respondent is directed to reinstatement him within a period of 90 days from today
failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to 25% back-wages with effect from the date of his unlawful retrenchment
(1.1.2000). The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages
permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The
reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official
gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT BILASPUR)
Ref No. : 107/2006
Date of Institution : 30.8.2006
Date of decision : 21.1.2009
Shri Jagdish Kumar S/o Shri Ganga Ram Village Bhaur, P.O. Kanaid, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, District Mandi,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
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3237
1.
The Deputy Director of Industries (Sericulture) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Division, Mandi, H.P
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. L.B. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the action of the (1) Deputy Director of Industries (Sericulture) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
(2) The Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Division, Mandi, H.P. to give break in service to Shri
Jagdish Kumar S/o Shri Ganga Ram workman during his service period time and again and finally
terminated w.e.f. 09.06.2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper
and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved
workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondents as daily waged Beldar on September 28, 1994, and that he worked as such upto July 20, 2004. Thereafter
the respondents suddenly terminated his services orally without giving him an opportunity of being heard. Claiming to
have worked for 240 days in each calendar year, the petitioner alleged that the respondents, who had been giving
fictional breaks in his service, never allowed him to complete 240 days in any calendar year, and that he having not
been served with any notice before termination of his services, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section
25-F of the Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). The respondents, according to the petitioner, also violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act, because certain workmen, who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time of his
retrenchment. The respondent, it is further alleged, also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The
petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the respondents to re-engage him in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of termination of his services. He also prayed for a direction to the respondents to pay him full
back-wages and count the “intervening period between re-engagement and dis-engagement” towards his seniority.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily
waged Beldar on September 28, 1994, but refuted his allegation of fictional breaks in his service. The petitioner.s
allegation that his services were terminated on July 20, 1994, was also repudiated by the respondents. Claiming the
petitioner to have been engaged as against a seasonal work, which was purely of temporary nature, the respondents
averred that he had worked only for 56 days in 1994 and thereafter never completed 240 days in any year, and that he
did not turn up after July, 2004. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation that certain workers junior to him were retained and
working in the department, the respondents averred that “no junior person to the applicant has ever been engaged or
allowed to be continued by the respondents, as alleged rather all those who are working in the unit are seniors to the
applicant.” On the basis of these averments, the respondents prayed for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition. Claiming to have worked for 56 days in 1994, the petitioner alleged that the mandays chart
prepared by the respondents was wrong, and that certain workers junior to him were still working in the respondents.
department.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
18. Whether affording to breaks in service of the petitioner by the respondent and ultimately
terminating him is legal and justified?
. .OPP
19. If the above issue is proved in the affirmative, what relief the claimant is entitled to?
. .OPR
20. Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned under this issue.
Relief :
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
3238
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
The respondents. claim in their joint reply that the petitioner was engaged as against a seasonal work,
which was purely of a temporary nature, to my thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the
materials on record. Nowhere in his affidavit Ex. RW1/A or cross-examination as RW1 did the respondents. witness
Piar Singh, Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Department, Mandi, maintain that the petitioner was engaged as
against a seasonal work. Also, the mandays chart produced by the respondents is not indicative of the petitioner having
been engaged as against a seasonal work. The respondents. claim that the petitioner was engaged as against a seasonal
work cannot therefore be taken without a pinch of salt.
8.
But the petitioner.s allegation that the respondents had been giving fictional breaks in his service, also,
to my mind, does not ring true for want of plausible evidence. He in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A inter alia deposed:
“Moreover the respondent No.3 willfully and intentionally did not allow the applicant to complete 240 days initially
upto 1997 after that applicant has completed 240 days, but the mandays chart has been prepared arbitrarily as no month
wise mandays chart has been given as applicant has worked for whole of the year so the termination order is void,
abinitio…..”
9.
This deposition, to my mind, appears to be far from truth, for the mandays chart is indicative of his
having worked for 56, 114, 95, 165, 156, 195, 168, 186, 207, 168 and 75 days during the years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively.
10. The petitioner.s allegation that this document has been prepared arbitrarily, and that the respondent 3
(respondent 2 in the reference) had not allowed him to complete 240 days in any calendar year cannot be accepted,
because no such suggestion was put to the latter during his cross-examination RW1 as may show that he had prepared
the mandays chart arbitrarily and not allowed the petitioner to complete 240 days in any calendar year. The allegation
of fictional breaks cannot therefore be said to have been substantiated. The issue under discussion is accordingly held
in the negative.
ISSUE 2
11. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A deposed that he had worked upto July 20, 2004 when all of a
sudden his services were orally terminated by the respondents. This deposition of his having not specifically been
challenged during his cross-examination by the respondents deserves acceptance and is accepted. The respondents.
claim in their joint reply that the petitioner had abandoned the job after July, 2004, is therefore nothing but falsity.
More so, when they did not choose to adduce in evidence any such muster roll or other document as may show the
petitioner to have absented from work or abandoned the job after July, 2004.
12. The petitioner.s allegation that in terminating his services, the respondents had violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act, to my mind, does not appear to be tenable, because the materials on record are demonstrative
of his having worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment.
12. However, in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondents appear to have violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act, which reads:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
13. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A deposed that the workmen namely Goverdhan Singh, Bimla
Devi, Uttam Chand, Mahant Ram, Nilima, Hans Raj and Rattan, who were junior to him, were still working at Pandoh,
Nagwain, Mumail, Mohin and Mandi. This claim of the petitioner having not specifically been disputed during his
cross-examination by the respondents appears to be true. More so, when the seniority list marked A adduced in
evidence by the respondents is also indicative of the said workmen being junior to the petitioner and their having been
retained in service at the time of termination of his services. The respondents are therefore proved to have violated the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. In view of the respondents having been found to have violated
the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time of termination of his services. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of
his unlawful retrenchment (July 20, 2004). However, he is held not entitled to back-wages, because his pleadings as
also the evidence led by him are non-existent in such averments as may show that he was not gainfully employed after
his retrenchment. The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
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3239
RELIEF
14. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issues 2, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time of termination of his services (July 20, 2004). Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of
service from the date of his retrenchment. He is, however, held not entitled to any back-wages. The respondents are
directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A
copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion
consigned to the record room.
Announced in the open Court today this 21st day of January, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 176/2006
Date of Institution : 4.12.2006
Date of decision : 28.2.2009
Shri Jai Lal S/o Shri Gauri Dutt Village Bari, P.O. Khural, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division, Sunder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. L.B. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Jai Lal S/o Shri Gauri Dutt workman by the Divisional Forest
Officer, Suket Forest Division Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 1.4.2003 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits
and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent in Kangoo Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in June, 2002 and worked as such
upto April 1, 2003 when his services were orally terminated by the respondent. Alleging the respondent to have given
fictional breaks in his service and not allowed him to complete 240 days in any calendar year, the petitioner further
averred that he had otherwise completed 240 days in each calendar year, and that the respondent.s action was highly
illegal and unlawful. In terminating his services, the respondent violated not only the provisions of Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) but also violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, because
certain workers, who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with.
Claiming to have requested the respondent to re-engage him, the petitioner further averred that after his requests fell on
a deaf ear he raised an industrial dispute, which is encompassed in the reference in question. He prays for a direction to
the respondent to reinstate him in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were
terminated. He also prays for the grant of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including seniority
etc.
3240
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3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar in Kangoo Forest Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in June, 2002. The petitioner.s claim of having worked
as labourer in the said Forest Range upto April 1, 2003, is also admitted by the respondent. The respondent, however,
denied having dis-engaged the petitioner and alleged that he had not turned up after 2003. It is also averred that “The
work on which the applicant was engaged was of a seasonal nature and when the works were over, the applicant was
given break”. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of fictional breaks, the respondent further averred that the petitioner
“at his own sweet will did not turn up on work”, and that he being a casual worker, his continuity in service depended
upon the availability of work and funds. As to the petitioner.s allegation that at the time his services were dispensed
with certain workers junior to him were retained in service, the respondent.s reply is that no workmen junior to the
petitioner was allowed to continue nor was any new person engaged as daily wager. On the basis of these averments,
the respondent prayed for dismissal of the reference.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the dis-engagement from the service of the petitioner by the respondent is proper and
justified?
. .OPP
2.
If the above issue is proved in the affirmative, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the petition is not maintainable before this Court?
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
He is entitled to reinstatement, continuity of service and 50% back-wages from the date of
his retrenchment.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in Kangoo
Forest Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in June, 2002 and worked upto April 1, 2003 is not disputed by the
respondent. What is disputed by the respondent is his claim of having been retrenched on April 1, 2003. The petitioner,
according to the respondent, had abandoned the job on his own, and no provision of the Act can therefore be said to
have been violated. But this contention of the respondent, to my mind, does not appear to be tenable in view of the
materials on record. Nowhere in his pleadings did the respondent allege that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his
own on April 1, 2003. What is inter alia averred by him in his reply is:
“…..In fact, the applicant was not dis-engaged by the department, but he at this belated stage can not
take advantage through this Hon.ble Tribunal-cum-Court of his own wrongs. …. It is also submitted
that the applicant was a casual worker and his continuity in work depended upon the availability of
work and funds. …….It is also denied that the respondents gave any fictional breaks in the service.
When the applicant at his own sweet will did not turn up on work and the application on this score is
also liable to be dismissed…..”
8.
In paragraph 1 of his reply to the petitioner.s statement of claim, the respondent, however, inter alia
averred that “the work on which the applicant was engaged was of a seasonal nature and when the works were over, the
applicant was given break”. This averment not being consistent with the afore-reproduced averments of the respondent,
the latter.s claim that the services of the petitioner were never terminated but he had abandoned the job on his own,
cannot be taken without a pinch of salt. More so, in view of the evidence led by the petitioner, which is demonstrative
of his services having been terminated by the respondent on April 1, 2003, and the latter.s failure to adduce in evidence
such documents as may lend assurance to his claim that the petitioner had abandoned the job on April 1, 2003. The
respondent to establish his claim ought to have brought on record atleast the muster roll for the month of April, 2001
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3241
wherein the petitioner may have been shown to have absented from work w.e.f. April 1, 2003, but he (respondent)
failed so to do. It is therefore difficult to accept the respondent.s claim.
9.
The respondent.s claim that the work for which the petitioner was engaged was of a seasonal nature, and
that break was given in his service on completion of the work, also, to my mind, does not ring true in view of the
materials on record. No such documentary evidence has been led by the respondent as may show that the petitioner was
engaged for a seasonal work. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C in respect of the daily waged workers engaged in the Forest
Division in question is indicative of many of them having worked for almost whole of the year during the calendar
years from 1999 to 2006. Had the respondent been true in his claim that the work in the Forest Division in question was
of a seasonal nature, many of the workmen named in the said seniority list would not have been shown to have worked
almost whole of the year during the said period. I am therefore not disposed to accept the respondent.s claim that the
petitioner was engaged for a seasonal forestry work, and that his services were dispensed with on completion of the
work.
10. The upshot therefore is that the respondent.s claim that the petitioner was engaged for a seasonal
forestry work, and that his services were dispensed with on completion of the work, is far from truth. Also, the
respondent.s claim that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own, is nothing but falsity. The respondent is
proved to have terminated the services of the petitioner w.e.f. April 1, 2003.
11. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen- No workman employed in any industry who has
been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer
until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average [pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess
of six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
12. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25 (B). Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(a)
a workman shall be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or
a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation or work which is not due to any fault on the part
of the workman;
(b) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer.-
(c) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(d) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than.-
3242
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(i)
ninety-five days, in the case of workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case….”
13. The petitioner.s claim of having been in continuous service for not less than one year, or say his claim of
having completed more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from
service finds assurance from the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B adduced in evidence by the respondent. There is nothing to
suggest that the respondent had at the time of termination of the services of the petitioner given him one month.s notice
or paid him wages in lieu of such a notice, along with retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of
the Act. In terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent therefore violated the said provisions of the Act.
14. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in terminating his services, the respondent violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as well, to my thinking, does not appear to have been substantiated. The said
Section of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
15. Nowhere in his pleadings or evidence did the petitioner name the workmen who were allegedly junior to
him and retained in service by the respondent at the time of termination of his services. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C
the correctness which is not disputed by the petitioner, also does not lend credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the
respondent had at the time of termination of his services retained in service certain workmen who were junior to him
(petitioner). The respondent is therefore not proved to have violated the abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act.
16. Since the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act in terminating
the services of the petitioner, the latter.s dis-engagement from service on April, 2003 was not justified. The issue under
discussion is therefore held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
17. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and what has been held under the foregoing issue, the
petitioner, to my thinking, is entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
his unlawful retrenchment (April 1, 2003). The issue on hand is held accordingly.
ISSUE 3
18. view of what has been held under the above issues 1 and 2, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on
hand is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
19. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issues 1 and 2, the petition succeeds
partly and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in
which he was working at the time of termination of his services. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service and
50% back-wages from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (April 1, 2003). The said 50% back-wages shall be
computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act
whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner
within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of February, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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3243
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 1/2008
Date of Institution : 17.1.2008
Date of decision : 26.11.2008
Shri Jasbir Singh S/o Shri Prakash Chand, R/o Village Saroon, P.O. Jhanyari, Tehsil and District, Hamirpur,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
2.
The Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Respondents.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the action of the (1) Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. (2) The
Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. to retain junior workers who
are junior to Shri Jasbir Singh S/o Shri Prakash Chand workman and to give him break in service as alleged by
the workman without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If
not, what relief of back wages, seniority and service benefits the above aggrieved workman is entitled from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged beldar by the respondent 1 on September, 1999 and posted to Herbal Garden, Neri in Hamirpur district.
Claiming to have been working at the said place ever since his engagement as daily waged beldar, the petitioner alleged
that the respondents 1 and 2 had been giving fictional breaks in his service so that he could not be able to complete 240
days in any of the calendar years. His co-workmen namely Pawan Kumar, Ravinder Kumar, Desh Raj, Chaman Lal,
Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand and Milap Chand, who were also working at Herbal Garden, Neri as daily waged beldar,
were also given fictional breaks except one Satish Kumar, who was also engaged as daily wager by the respondent 1
and working in the said garden. In the case of Satish Kumar, no fictional break, according to the petitioner, was ever
given and the respondents. act of giving fictional breaks in the petitioner.s service and that of his aforementioned co-
workers is violative of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for
short). Some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt. Saina Devi, Punni Devi, Sher Singh,
Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh
Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv Ram and Smt. Kala Devi, who
according to the petitioner were also engaged on daily wages basis in another herbal garden of Ayurveda department
namely Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar in Mandi district, were also being given fictional breaks in their service. In their
case, the Incharge, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, was, however, forbidden from giving fictional breaks by the
Director of Ayurveda, vide his letter dated July 18, 1999. Claiming the fictional breaks in his case to be the intentional
act of the respondents, the petitioner further averred that he having never absented from work wilfully was entitled to
continuity of service in view of the provisions of Section 25-B of the Act. Besides, he is entitled to wages for the period
of fictional breaks. He therefore prays for a direction to the respondents to count the period of fictional breaks towards
continuity of his service and pay him wages for the said period along with interest @ 9% per annum. He also prays for
a direction to the respondents to regularise his service on the basis of his seniority.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily
waged beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on September 7, 1998, but refuted his allegation of fictional breaks. Claiming the
work of Herbal Garden, Neri to be a seasonal work, the respondents averred that the petitioner and other workers
namely Chaman Lal, Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand, Baljit Singh, Pawan Kumar, Desh Raj, Ravinder Kumar, Chander
Kant, Ravinder Kumar and Madan Lal were engaged on daily wages basis at the said garden subject to availability of
work and budget, and no fictional break was ever given in their service. As for Satish Kumar, he was in fact engaged as
daily waged worker at Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on 1.7.1996 and he being deft in nursery development work was
temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 to carry out the said work and other related works there.
About four years later he was called back to Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar after the other workers of Herbal Garden,
3244
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Neri gained knowledge of nursery development work upto the desired level. On the basis of these averments the
respondents pray for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the respondents have been giving fictional breaks in the service of the petitioner.
. .OPP
2.
Whether Satish Kumar junior to the petitioner, as alleged.
. .OPP
3.
If the above issues 1 and 2 are proved, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes partly, as the respondents have been giving breaks in the service of the petitioner.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
The petitioner is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Relief :
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on
September, 1999, is not disputed by the respondents. Also, his claim that he was still working as beldar on daily wages
basis at the said garden, is not denied by the respondents. What is denied by the respondents is his allegation of
fictional breaks. But this denial of theirs appears to be far from truth in view of the materials on record. The Mandays
Chart of casual labourers working in Herbal Garden, Neri is demonstrative of the petitioner having worked for 70 days
in 1998, 146 days in 1999, 179 days in 2000, 186 days in 2001, 213.5 days in 2002, 184.5 days in 2003, 195 days in
2004, 229 days in 2005, 330 days in 2006 297 days in 2007 and 117 days during the period from January 1, 2008 to
April, 2008. That there have been breaks in his service is manifest from this document. In substantiation of his
allegation that the breaks in service were notional/fictional, the petitioner swore an affidavit Ex. PW1/A wherein he
alleged that the respondents had been giving notional/fictional breaks in his service during the period; January, 1999 to
April, 2005. Besides, he relied upon a copy of the letter dated July 18, 1999 addressed to the Incharge, Herbal Garden,
Joginder Nagar by the Director of Ayurveda, Himachal Pradesh, Annexure P1. This letter in its material part reads:
“You are hereby advised not to give any break after 89 days in future to daily paid Labourers who are engaged
to work in Herbal Garden as such a notional break has been disapproved by the competent courts also.”
The petitioner's allegation is that some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt.
Saina Devi, Punni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla
Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv
Ram and Smt. Kala Devi, who were engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were also being
given fictional breaks in their service, and that the Incharge of the said Garden was forbidden from so doing by the
Director of Ayurveda, vide his aforementioned letter dated July 18, 1999, Annexure P1. As to this allegation, the
respondents. averments in paragraph 7 of their joint reply are:
“That the contents of para-7 are admitted to the extent that these workers Sh. Sohan Singh, Lohli Devi,
Ram Singh, Saina Devi, Puni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judhia
Devi, Nirmala Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar,
Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv Ram & Kala Devi were engaged in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar and
their notional breaks were discontinued by the order of Director Ayurveda, H.P. being senior. The
office order issued by the Director Ayurveda to discontinue the breaks is not applicable to the casual
labourers working in Herbal Garden Neri because they are being engaged subject to the availablity of
work & budget, as the work of Herbal Garden Neri is a seasonal work.”
(emphasis supplied)
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3245
8.
By these averments, what stands admitted by the respondents is that abovenamed workers, who were
engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were being given fictional/notional breaks in their
service, which practice was discontinued on receipt of an office order issued by the Director Ayurveda. Why the said
Director.s office order to discontinue the breaks in service could not be made applicable to the casual labourers
working in Herbal Garden, Neri, is averred to be their having been engaged subject to the availability of work and
budget, as the work of Herbal Garden, Neri, according to the respondents, is a seasonal work. Going by this claim of
the respondents, the petitioner.s service, or for that matter the service of the workmen engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri
used to be terminated from time to time on account of cessation of work and non-availability of budget. They used to
be re-engaged on the availability of work and budget. Although there is no plausible material on record to lend
assurance to the respondents. claim that the work of Herbal Garden, Neri is only seasonal, and that the petitioner and
his aforementioned co-workers were engaged there as casual workers subject to the availability of work and budget,
even if this claim is assumed to be true, the petitioner is entitled to the relief of continuity of service in view of the
provisions of Section 25-B of the Act, which in its material part says:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault
on the part of the workman…………..”
9.
It is manifest from these provisions that a workman is deemed to be in continuous service for a period if
he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including the service, which may be interrupted on account of sickness
or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due
to any fault on the part of the workman. If to go by the respondents. stand, the breaks in the petitioner.s service were
caused on account of cessation of work and non-availability of funds. But the cessation of work and the non-
availability of funds not been attributable to any fault on the part of the petitioner, he is to be considered in continuous
service ever since his engagement as beldar on daily wages basis (September 7, 1998). The issue under discussion is
accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
ISSUE 2
10. The petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar having been engaged by the respondents as daily waged beldar
in Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1996 was junior to him, to my thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in
view of materials on record. The respondents. averments as also the evidence led by them are indicative of Satish
Kumar having been engaged as daily waged beldar in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on July 1, 1996 and his having
been temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 to carry out the nursery development work there.
According to the respondents, the reason why Satish Kumar was temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri, was his
being deft in nursery development work and the casual workers engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri not being in the know
of that work. About four years later, Satish Kumar called back to Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar after the other
workers of Herbal Garden, Neri gained knowledge of nursery work upto the desired level. There being no reason to
discredit this claim of the respondents, the petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar is junior to him cannot to be accepted
and is therefore rejected. The issue on hand is accordingly held against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.
ISSUE 3
11. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and my findings on the foregoing issues, the petitioner
is entitled to only the relief of continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar (7.9. 1998).
The issue on hand is held accordingly.
12. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. The petitioner is held entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar
(7.9.1998). He is, however, held not entitled to wages for the periods of break in his service. Also, his claim that certain
workers junior to him were retained is rejected. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to
the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
3246
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 591/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Kamal Dev S/o Shri Lohku Ram, Village Jajar Kukain, P.O. Baradla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Kamal Dev S/o Shri Lohku Ram by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
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3247
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
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(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- (1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
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opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of that
authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
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14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
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3251
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1018/2007-9308, dated 15.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
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Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 24, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 148/2007
Date of Institution : 1.11.2007
Date of decision : 24.11.2008
Shri Kartar Singh S/o Shri Narotam Ram, Village Chaloh, P.O. Saigloo, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, vice AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. Gaurav Sharma, vice Adv.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Kartar Singh S/o Shri Narotam Ram workman by the Executive
Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 25.4.2000 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereas junior to him were retained by the employer as
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3253
alleged by the workman is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent on September 29, 1997, and that he worked as such in Saigloo Sub Division of
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division) upto April 24, 2000. On April 25, 2000, his services
were terminated by the respondent by serving with him a notice dated February 23, 2000. Claiming to have worked for
240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service, the petitioner further
averred that he having not been paid any compensation, the termination of his services was violative of the provisions
of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) as also the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 (Standing Orders, for short). In terminating his services, the respondent, according to the petitioner,
also violated the provisions of section 25-G of the Act, because certain workers namely Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul
Singh, Ramesh, Shive Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time his services were dispensed
with. Not only that, the respondent also violated the provisions of section 25-H of the Act, for, after the petitioner.s
retrenchment some persons were engaged without giving the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-
employment. Claiming to have visited the respondent.s office a number of times after his removal from service, the
petitioner averred that on being requested by him to re-engage him, the concerned official in the respondent.s office
gave an assurance that he would be called back in the job. The petitioner, however, kept on waiting for a call till
February, 2005 whereafter he raised the industrial dispute, which later came to be referred to this Court for
adjudication. On the basis of these averments, the petitioner prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in
the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. He also prayed for the grant
of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including seniority etc.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on September 29, 1997, the respondent in his
reply averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as beldar on daily wages basis as against a specific construction work on
September 25, 1997, and that he had worked upto April 24, 2000 with certain interruptions/breaks caused on account of
his wilful absence from work. Claiming to have told the respondent at the time of his engagement as casual beldar that
he was being engaged as against a specific construction work, and that his services would automatically come to an end
on completion of the work, the respondent further averred that his services having been dispensed with on completion
of the work, no provision of the Act was violated. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for 240 days
during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date on which his services were dispensed with, the respondent
averred that he having not completed 240 days during the period he remained in his employ, he was not required to be
served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and the provisions of this Section cannot therefore be
said to have been violated. As to the petitioner.s allegation that certain persons namely Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul Singh,
Ramesh, Pawan, Shiv Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time of his retrenchment, the
respondent.s contention is that these persons, who were also engaged as casual beldar for execution a specific work,
were also removed from service on completion of the work, and that they were later re-engaged in obedience to an
order dated October 8, 1999 of the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner.s claim that after his
removal from service he had visited the respondent.s office, is also refuted by the respondent. It is averred that at no
point of time did the petitioner visit the respondent.s office nor did he make any representation after his removal from
service, and the petition is therefore barred by time. As for the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the Standing
Orders, the respondent.s contention is that this allegation is also unfounded and baseless, because the establishment of
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide
Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992. The respondent.s other contentions
relate to estoppel and maintainability of the petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
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6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Relief :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on September 29, 1997, the respondent averred
that he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged beldar on September 25, 1997, and that he had worked as such upto
April 24, 2000. This averment having been admitted by the petitioner to be true in his cross-examination as PW1
deserves acceptance.
8.
Ld. counsel for the respondent contends that the petitioner was engaged as against a specific work, his
removal from service on completion of the work did not amount to retrenchment as defined under clause (oo) of
Section 2 of the Act. But this contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived in view of the materials on record.
The petitioner in his cross-examination as PW1 categorically denied the respondent.s suggestion that at the time of his
employment he was told that he was engaged as against a temporary work, and that his services would be deemed to
have come to an end on completion of the work started under a scheme. The respondent.s witness T.K. Sharma, then
Assistant Engineer in Saigloo Sub Division of HPSEB, though in his examination-in-chief as RW1 maintained that the
petitioner was engaged in a specific work, and that he was told that his service would come to an end on completion of
the work, he in his cross-examination expressed his inability to furnish such proof as may show that the petitioner was
engaged in a specific scheme work. Having deposed so, he, however, hastened to add that the factum of the petitioner
having been engaged in a specific scheme was shown in the muster roll. But the muster roll, which would have
constituted a vital piece of evidence in substantiation of the respondent.s claim, having not been brought on record, it is
difficult to hold that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work.
9.
But even if it is assumed that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work, there
is no plausible material to show that his employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme
or completion of the work.
10. In S. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553, the principal
question that arose before the Hon.ble Supreme Court of India was:
“Whether the workmen recruited for discharging temporary job under a project can insist on
compliance of section 25-F of the Act if their services are dispensed with on the project coming to an
end.”
11. Having examined the scope of Sections 2(oo) and 25-F of the Act, the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia
ruled:
“1.
“Retrenchment” in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work
itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial pieces of
legislation are to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to take
two views of a provision. It is also well settled that the Parliament has employed the expression “the
termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever” while defining the term
“retrenchment”, which is suggestive of the legislative intent to assign the term „retrenchment. a meaning
wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There are four exceptions carved out of the
artificially extended meaning of the term „retrenchment., and therefore, termination of service of a workman
so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment. dehors
the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of „retrenchment. the termination of
service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service which does not fall
within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of retrenchment.
2.
The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to
retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:-
(i)
that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that
the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
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(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and
consistently with the terms of the contract.
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the
commencement of employment.”
12. The respondent having failed to satisfy these conditions, the termination of services of the petitioner, to
my thinking, decidedly amount to retrenchment within the meaning of clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act. The
respondent.s contention therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
13. The petitioner in his pleadings as also in evidence claimed to have worked for 240 days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. According to him, he having not been
served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act, the termination of his service was unlawful. More so,
when no notice under the Standing Orders was given to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation. This
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. Be it stated that the establishment of Himachal Pradesh
State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85
Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992.
14. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
15. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
16. However, the petitioner.s claim of having been in continuous service for not less than one year, or say
his claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal
from service, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the evidence led by the respondent. The mandays
chart Ex. RW1/A, which is adduced in evidence by the respondent and admitted to be correct by the petitioner in his
cross-examination as PW1, is demonstrative of the petitioner having not worked for 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment. The respondent was therefore not obliged to serve him with a
one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. The
petitioner.s contention that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
cannot be therefore accepted.
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17. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, appears to be tenable. Kesar Singh, then Junior Engineer in the office of
Executive Engineer, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division), Mandi, who has been examined by
the petitioner as PW2, testified:
“As per the record, Kartar Singh (petitioner) was engaged on 25.9.1997 and he worked upto 24.4.2000.
As per the record, Uma Devi was engaged on 2.12.1998 and was still working. Jagdish Chand, S/o Sh.
Jeevan Lal was engaged on 15.10.1998 and was still working. As per the record, Kaul Ram, S/o Jyoti
Singh was engaged on 18.6.1998 and was still working. Ramesh Chand, S/o Sh. Khem Chand was
engaged on 16.5.1998 and was still working. Pawan Kumar, S/o Sh. Hem Raj was engaged on 3.11.1997
and was still working. Shive Ram, S/o Sh. Balku Ram was engaged on 28.10.1997 and was still working.
As per the record, Sh. Chand Lal was engaged on 3.9. 1997 and was still working. In the division, more
than three hundred workers are working…..”
18. The respondent.s aforementioned witness T.K. Sharma categorically admitted in his cross-examination
as RW1 that Uma Devi and Jagdish were junior to the petitioner, and that they were still in the employ of the
respondent. He also admitted in no ambiguous words that when the petitioner was removed from service Uma Devi and
Jagdish were not retrenched. In other words, the latter two were retained at the time the services of the petitioner were
terminated. Section 25-G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
19. Since Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were undeniably junior to the petitioner, were retained by the
respondent at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the principle of „Last Come First Go. as
envisaged in the abovementioned provisions can safely be held to have been violated by the respondent.
20. Ld. counsel for the respondent contends with vehemence that Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were also
retrenched, having been re-engaged in obedience to the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal, they could
not be retrenched at the time of termination of services of the petitioner, and the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act
cannot therefore be said to have been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. The reason being that re-
engagement of Uma Devi and Jagdish on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal can by no
stretch of reasoning be interpreted to mean that they have become permanent employees cannot therefore be retrenched
even if there arises an occasion for the employer to follow the principle of „Last Come First Go.. I am therefore of the
considered view that re-engagement of the said workers on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative
Tribunal notwithstanding, the respondent could in law violate the principle of „Last Come First Go. at the time the
services of the petitioner were dispensed with. The contention aforementioned has therefore been raised only to be
rejected.
21. The upshot therefore is that in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent violated the provisions of
section 25-F of the Act, and he (petitioner) is therefore entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of his retrenchment. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement
(25.9.1998). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages, because nowhere in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A and cross-
examination as PW1 did he maintain that he was not a gainfully employed or that he remained idle after his
retrenchment. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
ISSUE 2
22. The materials on record are indicative of the petitioner having approached the respondent from time to
time after his retrenchment and requested for his re-engagement but of no avail. Left with no option, he later raised an
industrial dispute which came to be referred to this Court for adjudication under Section 10 (1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) I.D./07-Mandi dated October 9, 2007.
23. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs. Garibu Ram, latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more
than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated. Having
the surveyed various rulings on the point, the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh inter alia observed:
“….....While taking note of the entire case law with regard to the delay and laches, this Court
consistently has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply but, however, depending
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3257
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principles of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. A delay of even 14 years has been held not to come in the way of the poor man, whose services
have been illegally terminated in claiming his relief under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
In Deepa Ram.s case (supra), there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand.s case (supra) there was a
delay of 9 years. In Mohinder Kumar.s case (supra), there was a delay of 14 years……..”
24. The petitioner, who is undeniably poverty-stricken, is stated to be illiterate. In view of the facts and
circumstances of this case, the principle of delay and laches cannot be held applicable to his case. The issue under
discussion is therefore held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The facts and circumstances of this case do not attract the rule of estoppel. The respondent.s counsel has
also not been able to show how the rule of estoppel is attracted in this case. The issue on hand is therefore held against
the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
26. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. The petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working
at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to seniority from the date of his engagement as
daily waged beldar (25.9.1997). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages or compensation in view of the facts
and circumstances of the case. The respondent is directed to reinstatement him within a period of 90 days from today
failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to 25% back-wages with effect from the date of his unlawful retrenchment
(25.4.2000). The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages
permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The
reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official
gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 580/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Kashmir Singh S/o Shri Roop Singh, Village Saras-kana, PO Baroti, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Kashmir Singh S/o Shri Roop Singh, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
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provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
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3259
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
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9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. -(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
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3261
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
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abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari
Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner) services
were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dharampur,
in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior to him
(petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared the
seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
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the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1047/2007-9311, dated 15.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 16, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
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period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 647/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Kashmir Singh S/o Shri Puran Chand, R/o Village Hukal, P.O. Longani, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Kashmir Singh S/o Shri Puran Chand by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
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3265
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
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to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit
belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
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3267
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the
notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified authority) has
been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
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“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
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“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari
Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner) services
were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dharampur,
in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior to him
(petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared the
seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
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considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman
merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd.
1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9318 dated 15.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated nil. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter
came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005,
cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer
from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected.
The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly and
is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity of
service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on the
basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher
till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of
90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for
publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S. Sen,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 177/2005
Date of Institution : 19.11.2005
Date of decision : 28.2.2009
Shri Kulvinder Singh S/o Shri Basant Singh, R/o House No.28/4, Near Gurdwara Road, Dharamshala, Distt.
Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
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3271
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dehra, Distt. Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. Dinesh Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Kulvinder Singh S/o Shri Basant Singh workman by the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. w.e.f. Dec., 1985 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of
service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar/Mate by the respondent in HPPWD Sub Division, Jawalamukhi in May, 1983, and that his work and
conduct being upto the mark, he never gave the respondent an occasion to complain against him. In the month of
December, 1985, his services were, however, orally terminated by the respondent without any reason or rhyme.
Claiming to have worked for more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of
termination of his service, the petitioner further averred that at the time his services were dispensed with, he was told
by the respondent that no vacancy of the post of Beldar/Mate was available in the Sub Division, and that he would be
engaged a few days later. In view of the assurance given by the respondent, the petitioner went to the respondent.s
office from time to time to get the job and he was again engaged as Beldar in August, 1986. However, a few months
later his services were again terminated by the respondent. In terminating his services in December, 1985, the
respondent, according to the petitioner, violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act (the Act, for short) because at
the time his services were dispensed with no notice was given to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation.
Besides, the respondent violated the principle of „last come first go., because certain workmen junior to him were
retained in service at the time his services were terminated. He therefore prayed for a direction to the respondent to
reinstate him in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. He also
prayed for the grant of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including seniority etc.
3.
The respondent in his reply disputed the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar/Mate in the month of May, 1983. The petitioner.s allegation that his services were terminated in December,
1985, is also repudiated by the respondent. It is averred that the petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar/Mate in
the month of January, 1984 and worked as such upto October, 1984. In November, 2004, he abandoned the job on his
own and did not return for duty upto December 31, 1984. He, however, joined his duty in the month of January, 1985
and worked upto November, 1985 intermittently. According to the respondent, the petitioner, who was in the habit of
remaining absent from work, remained absent in the months of November and December, 1984 and June and
September, 1985. In December, 1985, the petitioner abandoned the job on his own without an intimation to the
respondent. In view of his habit of remaining absent from work and his having abandoned the job on his own in
December, 1985, the respondent was not obliged to give him one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment
compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. The respondent.s other contentions relate to limitation,
suppressio veri, estoppel and the petitioner.s locus standi to file the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition. He emphatically refuted the respondent.s allegation that he had abandoned the job on his
own.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the dis-engagement from service of the claimant by the respondent is proper and justified?
. .OPP
2.
If the above issue is proved in the affirmative, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is time barred. If so, its effect?
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
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6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1
No
Issue 2
He is entitled to reinstatement. However, he is held not entitled to back-wages and
continuity of service.
Issue 3
The petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
Issue 4
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar/Mate by the respondent in May,
1983 does not ring true in view of the evidence led by the respondent. The respondent.s witnesses B.S. Bhardwaj, then
Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dehra, and D.R. Verma, then AAE, HPPWD Sub Division, Jawalamukhi, are
unanimous in stating as RW1 and RW2 respectively that the petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in January,
1984. This deposition finds assurance from the mandays chart Ex. RW2/A, which is indicative of the petitioner having
been engaged in January, 1984. The petitioner.s claim that he was engaged in May, 1983, is therefore nothing but
falsity.
8.
The respondent.s claim in his pleadings as also in the evidence led by him is that the petitioner, who was
engaged as daily waged Beldar/Mate in January, 1984, worked upto October, 1984 and abandoned the job thereafter.
He returned to work in January, 1985 and worked upto May, 1985. Thereafter he worked in the months of July, August,
October and November, 1985 and abandoned the job thereafter.
9.
Refuting the respondent.s allegation of abandonment of job, the petitioner.s counsel, on the other hand,
contends that in the months of November and December, 1984 as also in the months of June and September, 1985, no
muster roll was issued by the respondent in favour of his client, and that his services were ultimately terminated by the
respondent in the month of December, 1985.
10. I have given my considered thought to the rival contentions raised and I understand that the materials on
record are not sufficient to establish the respondent.s claim that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own in
December, 1985. No doubt in the mandays chart Ex. RW2/A, the petitioner is not shown to have worked in the months
of November and December, 1984 and June, September and December, 1985, but the respondent to establish his claim
of abandonment of the job by the petitioner ought to have adduced in evidence atleast the muster roll for the month of
December, 1985 wherein the latter may have been shown to have absented from work, but he failed so to do. It is
therefore difficult to accept the respondent's claim.
11. But even if the respondent.s claim as to the petitioner.s alleged absence from work is assumed to be true,
the plea of abandonment of job can still not be said to have been established, because absence from duty indubitably
amounts to misconduct, which calls for holding of a domestic inquiry by the employer in accordance with the
principles of natural justice. In D.K. Yadav Vs. JMA Industries Limited, 1993 (1) Services Law Judgments page 221,
the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia observed:
“Even executive authorities, which taken administrative action involving any deprivation of or
restriction on inherent fundamental rights of citizen, must take care to see that justice is not only done.
But manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the
appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness, or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is
patently impartial and meets the requirements of natural justice”.
12. The Hon.ble Supreme Court further held as under:
“It is well settled law that right to life enshrined under Art. 21 of Constitution would include right to
livelihood. The order of termination of the service of an employee/workman visits with civil
consequence of jeoparding not only his livelihood but also career and livelihood of dependents.
Therefore, before taking any action putting an end to the tenure of a workman fair play requires that a
reasonable opportunity to put forth his case is given and in case of any misconduct i.e. absence from
duty or unauthorised absence from duty, domestic enquiry be conducted complying with the principle
of natural justice.”
13. In case the petitioner had absented from work, the respondent ought to have conducted a domestic
inquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, but he failed so to do. His claim that the petitioner had
abandoned the job on his own in December, 1985, therefore, deserves to be negatived on this count as well.
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3273
14. The mandays chart aforementioned would show the petitioner to have worked for 302 days in 1984 and
273 days in 1985. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A maintained that his services were terminated by the
respondent in December, 1985 without any rhyme or reason. There being no reason to discredit his deposition, I have
no hesitation in holding that his services were terminated by the respondent in December, 1985.
15. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen- No workman employed in any industry who has
been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer
until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average [pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess
of six months; and
(i) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
16. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25 (B). Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which
is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation or work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer.-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than.-
(i)
ninety-five days, in the case of workman employed below ground in a mine; and one hundred and
twenty days, in any other case….”
17. The mandays chart Ex. RW2/A is demonstrative of the petitioner having worked for more than 240 days
during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination of his services. There is nothing to suggest
that the petitioner had at the time of termination of the services of the petitioner given him one month.s notice and paid
retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent therefore violated the said provisions. So, the termination by the respondent of the petitioner.s services
in December, 1985 is not justified. The issue under discussion is therefore answered in the negative.
ISSUES 2 and 3
18. These issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
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19. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Dharamshala appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings in or about 2003. On failure of the conciliation
move, the Conciliation Officer referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, HP, vide his report No. 3169 dated
December 9, 2003. On the basis of the said report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court, under
Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-1/85 (LAB)ID/05-KANGRA, Himachal Pradesh Government,
„Labour Department. dated November 2, 2005. The petitioner, who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment in
December, 1985, thus does not appear to have taken steps for the redressal of his grievance until he approached the
Conciliation-cum-Labour Officer, Dharamshala in or about 2003. There being no plausible explanation for the delay of
about 17 years in his raising the industrial dispute in question, his claim decidedly suffers from the vice of delay and
laches. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr., 2008(1) SLJ, 425, our own High Court inter alia observed:
“……It is also well settled by now that the Labour court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of
delay and laches once the same has been referred to it by the state Government. The Labour Court at
the most can take into consideration delay, if any, in raising the dispute at the time of granting the
relief.”
20. In view of the respondent having been held to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act in
terminating the services of the petitioner, the latter is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time his services were dispensed with in December, 1985. However, the petitioner, to my thinking, is
not entitled to any back-wages or continuity of service in view of his claim having been found to be suffering from the
vice of delay and laches. Both the issues under discussion are held accordingly.
RELIEF
21. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the
time his services were terminated by the respondent in December, 1985. However, he is held not entitled to any back-
wages or continuity of service/seniority in view of his claim having been found to be utterly stale. The respondent is
directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A
copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion
consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of February, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 2/2008
Date of Institution : 17.1.2008
Date of decision : 26.11.2008
Shri Madan Lal S/o Shri Puran Chand, R/o Village Neri, P.O. Khaggal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
5.
Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
6.
The Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Respondents.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
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3275
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the action of the (1) Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. (2) The
Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. to retain junior workers who
are junior to Shri Madan Lal S/o Shri Puran Chand workman and to give him break in service as alleged by
the workman without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If
not, what relief of back wages, seniority and service benefits the above aggrieved workman is entitled from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged beldar by the respondent 1 on February 10, 1999 and posted to Herbal Garden, Neri in Hamirpur district.
Claiming to have been working at the said place ever since his engagement as daily waged beldar, the petitioner alleged
that the respondents 1 and 2 had been giving fictional breaks in his service so that he could not be able to complete 240
days in any of the calendar years. His co-workmen namely Pawan Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Ravinder Kumar, Desh Raj,
Chaman Lal, Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand and Milap Chand, who were also working at Herbal Garden, Neri as daily
waged beldar, were also given fictional breaks except one Satish Kumar, who was also engaged as daily wager by the
respondent 1 and working in the said garden. In the case of Satish Kumar, no fictional break, according to the
petitioner, was ever given and the respondents. act of giving fictional breaks in the petitioner.s service and that of his
aforementioned co-workers is violative of the provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(the Act, for short). Some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt. Saina Devi, Punni Devi,
Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni
Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv Ram and Smt. Kala Devi,
who according to the petitioner were also engaged on daily wages basis in another herbal garden of Ayurveda
department namely Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar in Mandi district, were also being given fictional breaks in their
service. In their case, the Incharge, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, was, however, forbidden from giving fictional
breaks by the Director of Ayurveda, vide his letter dated July 18, 1999. Claiming the fictional breaks in his case to be
the intentional act of the respondents, the petitioner further averred that he having never absented from work wilfully
was entitled to continuity of service in view of the provisions of Section 25-B of the Act. Besides, he is entitled to
wages for the period of fictional breaks. He therefore prays for a direction to the respondents to count the period of
fictional breaks towards continuity of his service and pay him wages for the said period along with interest @ 9% per
annum. He also prays for a direction to the respondents to regularise his service on the basis of his seniority.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily
waged beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on February 10, 1999, but refuted his allegation of fictional breaks. Claiming the
work of Herbal Garden, Neri to be a seasonal work, the respondents averred that the petitioner and other workers
namely Chaman Lal, Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand, Baljit Singh, Pawan Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Desh Raj, Ravinder
Kumar, Bahadur Singh, Chander Kant, Ravinder Kumar, Madan Lal and Vijay Singh were engaged on daily wages
basis at the said garden subject to availability of work and budget, and no fictional break was ever given in their
service. As for Satish Kumar, he was in fact engaged as daily waged worker at Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on
1.7.1996 and he being deft in nursery development work was temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999
to carry out the said work and other related works there. About four years later he was called back to Herbal Garden,
Joginder Nagar after the other workers of Herbal Garden, Neri gained knowledge of nursery development work upto
the desired level. On the basis of these averments the respondents pray for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the respondents have been giving fictional breaks in the service of the petitioner.
. .OPP
2.
Whether Satish Kumar is junior to the petitioner, as alleged.
. .OPP
3.
If the above issues 1 and 2 are proved, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes partly, as the respondents have been giving breaks in the service of the petitioner.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
The petitioner is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Relief :
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
3276
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on
February 10, 1999, is not disputed by the respondents. Also, his claim that he was still working as beldar on daily
wages basis at the said garden, is not denied by the respondents. What is denied by the respondents is his allegation of
fictional breaks. But this denial of theirs appears to be far from truth in view of the materials on record. The Mandays
Chart of casual labourers working in Herbal Garden, Neri is demonstrative of the petitioner having worked for 188
days in 1999, 210.5 days in 2000, 186 days in 2001, 199.5 days in 2002, 209 days in 2003 202 days in 2004, 246 days
in 2005, 328 days in 2006, 296 days in 2007 and 117 days during the period from January 1, 2008 to April, 2008. That
there have been breaks in his service is manifest from this document. In substantiation of his allegation that the breaks
in service were notional/fictional, the petitioner swore an affidavit Ex. PW1/A wherein he alleged that the respondents
had been giving notional/fictional breaks in his service during the period; January, 1999 to April, 2005. Besides, he
relied upon a copy of the letter dated July 18, 1999 addressed to the Incharge, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar by the
Director of Ayurveda, Himachal Pradesh, Annexure P1. This letter in its material part reads:
“You are hereby advised not to give any break after 89 days in future to daily paid Labourers who are
engaged to work in Herbal Garden as such a notional break has been disapproved by the competent
courts also.”
The petitioner.s allegation is that some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt.
Saina Devi, Punni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla
Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv
Ram and Smt. Kala Devi, who were engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were also being
given fictional breaks in their service, and that the Incharge of the said Garden was forbidden from so doing by the
Director of Ayurveda, vide his aforementioned letter dated July 18, 1999, Annexure P1. As to this allegation, the
respondents. averments in paragraph 7 of their joint reply are:
“That the contents of para-7 are admitted to the extent that these workers Sh. Sohan Singh, Lohli Devi,
Ram Singh, Saina Devi, Puni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judhia
Devi, Nirmala Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar,
Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv Ram & Kala Devi were engaged in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar and
their notional breaks were discontinued by the order of Director Ayurveda, H.P. being senior. The
office order issued by the Director Ayurveda to discontinue the breaks is not applicable to the casual
labourers working in Herbal Garden Neri because they are being engaged subject to the availablity of
work & budget, as the work of Herbal Garden Neri is a seasonal work.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.
By these averments, what stands admitted by the respondents is that abovenamed workers, who were
engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were being given fictional/notional breaks in their
service, which practice was discontinued on receipt of an office order issued by the Director Ayurveda. Why the said
Director.s office order to discontinue the breaks in service could not be made applicable to the casual labourers
working in Herbal Garden, Neri, is averred to be their having been engaged subject to the availability of work and
budget, as the work of Herbal Garden, Neri, according to the respondents, is a seasonal work. Going by this claim of
the respondents, the petitioner.s service, or for that matter the service of the workmen engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri
used to be terminated from time to time on account of cessation of work and non-availability of budget. They used to
be re-engaged on the availability of work and budget. Although there is no plausible material on record to lend
assurance to the respondents. claim that the work of Herbal Garden, Neri is only seasonal, and that the petitioner and
his aforementioned co-workers were engaged there as casual workers subject to the availability of work and budget,
even if this claim is assumed to be true, the petitioner is entitled to the relief of continuity of service in view of the
provisions of Section 25-B of the Act, which in its material part says:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault
on the part of the workman…………..”
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3277
9.
It is manifest from these provisions that a workman is deemed to be in continuous service for a period if
he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including the service, which may be interrupted on account of sickness
or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due
to any fault on the part of the workman. If to go by the respondents. stand, the breaks in the petitioner.s service were
caused on account of cessation of work and non-availability of funds. But the cessation of work and the non-
availability of funds not been attributable to any fault on the part of the petitioner, he is to be considered in continuous
service ever since his engagement as beldar on daily wages basis (February 10, 1999). The issue under discussion is
accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
ISSUE 2
10. The petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar having been engaged by the respondents as daily waged beldar
in Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 was junior to him, to my thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in
view of materials on record. The respondents. averments as also the evidence led by them are indicative of Satish
Kumar having been engaged as daily waged beldar in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on July 1, 1996 and his having
been temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 to carry out the nursery development work there.
According to the respondents, the reason why Satish Kumar was temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri, was his
being deft in nursery development work and the casual workers engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri not being in the know
of that work. About four years later, Satish Kumar was called back to Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar after the other
workers of Herbal Garden, Neri gained knowledge of nursery work upto the desired level. There being no reason to
discredit this claim of the respondents, the petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar is junior to him cannot to be accepted
and is therefore rejected. The issue on hand is accordingly held against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.
ISSUE 3
10. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and my findings on the foregoing issues, the petitioner
is entitled to only the relief of continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar (10.2.1999).
The issue on hand is held accordingly.
11. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. The petitioner is held entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar
(10.2.1999). He is, however, held not entitled to wages for the periods of break in his service. Also, his claim that
certain workers junior to him were retained is rejected. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be
sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 506/2004
Date of Institution : 30.12.2004
Date of decision : 26.12.2008
Shri Mast Ram S/o Shri Dumnu Ram, V.P.O. Tikri, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. K.S. Guleria, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
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AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Mast Ram S/o Shri Dumnu Ram, daily wages beldar by the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 31.5.2001 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of
service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar, and that he was allowed to work only for 7 days in the month of September, 2000.
On September 16, 2000, his services, according to him, were illegally terminated by the respondent. Claiming to have
been re-engaged by the respondent for 12 days in the month of October, 2000, the petitioner further averred that his
services were unlawfully terminated by the respondent on May 31, 2001. Aggrieved, he filed before the Himachal
Pradesh Administrative Tribunal an original application (OA No.65/2001), which was dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. Claiming to have worked for more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the
date of termination of his services, the petitioner further averred that during the period he remained in the employ of the
respondent, artificial breaks were given in his service, for no fault of his, and the period of interrupted service was
liable to be counted towards „continuous service. as defined under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(the Act, for short). In dispensing with the services of the petitioner, the respondent not only violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act but also violated the principle of first come last go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act,
because certain workmen namely Pyar Chand, Dhmaswer, Parma Ram, Blabir Singh, Satish Kumar and others, who
were junior to the petitioner, were retained in service at the time of termination of his services. On the basis of these
averments, the petitioner prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages and all other
consequential service benefits. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to count the period of artificial breaks
towards continuous service and maintain a seniority list for the purpose of regularisation of his service as per the policy
of the Government.
3.
Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of artificial breaks in his service, the respondent in his reply averred
that he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged Beldar as against „seasonal works. in the month of September, 1993,
and that his services were never terminated, but he had abandoned the job on his own during the year 2001-2002 and
thus lost his seniority. Claiming the petitioner to have worked for 228½ days in 2000 and 89 days in 2001, the
respondent further averred that the petitioner never completed 240 days „which is the criteria for continuance of
service.. As for the petitioner.s allegation that the workmen namely Pyar Chand, Dhmaswer, Parma Ram, Blabir Singh
and Satish Kumar, who were junior to him, were retained in service, the respondent.s contention is that these persons
having worked for 235, 233, 245 ½, 296 and 269 days respectively during the year 2000 and being still in service are
considered senior to the petitioner. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the principle of „last come first
go., the respondent averred that this principle could not be said to have been violated in view of the petitioner having
abandoned the job on his own. On the basis of these averments, the respondent prayed for dismissal of the claim
petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the respondent had been giving fictional breaks in the service of the petitioner.
. .OPP
3.
Whether the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own in 2001.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes he is entitled to reinstatement, continuity of service and 50% back-wages as mentioned
under this issue.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
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3279
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES 1, 2 and 3
7.
These issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
8.
The materials on record are indicative of the petitioner having been engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in September, 1993 and his having worked as such upto May, 2001. Claiming to have worked for more
than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination of his services, the petitioner
averred that during the period he remained in the employ of the respondent, artificial breaks were given in his service
for no fault of his, and that the period of interrupted service was liable to be counted towards „continuous service. as
defined under Section 25-B of the Act. But these averments, to my thinking, do not appear to have been established in
view of the materials on record. The petitioner.s claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar
months preceding the date of his retrenchment does not find assurance from the mandays chart Ex. PW1/C, which is
indicative of his having worked for about 201 days during the period from May, 2000 to May, 2001. It is therefore
difficult to accept his claim. Also, his allegation of fictional breaks cannot be said to have been established, for in
substantiation thereof, he did not choose to adduce in evidence such muster rolls or any other document as may show
that fictional breaks were given in his service. Another reason why this allegation of his cannot be said to have been
substantiated is his failure to particularise the periods of the alleged fictional breaks during the period he remained in
the employ of the respondent. The issue 2 is therefore held against him and in favour of the respondent.
9.
But the respondent.s claim, on the other hand that the services of the petitioner were never terminated
but he had abandoned the job on his own in May, 2001, also, to my mind, goes without proof. The respondent to
establish this claim ought to have brought on record the muster roll wherein the petitioner may have been marked
absent or shown to have abandoned the job in May, 2001. But the respondent having failed so to do, it is difficult to
accept his claim. More so, in view of the evidence led by the petitioner, which is demonstrative of his services having
been terminated by the respondent in May, 2001. The issue 3 is therefore held in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
10. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
11. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
3280
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(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
12. As already observed, the petitioner.s claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment in May, 2001 does not ring true in view of the mandays chart
Ex. PW1/C, which is indicative of his having worked for about 201 days during the period; May, 2000 to May, 2001.
He having thus not remained in „continuous service for one year. as defined under Section 25-B of the Act, the
respondent was not obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act. The said provisions cannot therefore be said to have been violated.
13. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, appears to be tenable in view of the materials on record. Section 25-G of
the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.”
14. The petitioner in his statement as PW1 claimed the workmen namely Pyar Chand, Dhameshwar, Parma
Ram, Kanshi Ram, Rajinder, Blabir Singh, Satish Kumar etc. to be junior to him and their having been made regular
employees. This claim of his having not been challenged during his cross-examination by the respondent deserves
acceptance. More so, when the document Ex. RW2/A as also the seniority list of additional labour are indicative of the
workmen namely Pyar Chand, Satish Kumar, Balbir Singh, Parma Ram and Dhameshwar being junior to the petitioner.
Besides these workmen, Kanshi Ram and Rajinder were also junior to the petitioner, and this fact is manifest from the
document Ex. RW2/A (also Ex. PW1/C). The aforementioned list of Additional Labour is demonstrative of the
workmen namely Pyar Chand, Satish Kumar, Balbir Singh, Parma Ram and Dhameshwar Singh having been retained
in service at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner, the
respondent is therefore proved to have violated the abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. The
termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent was therefore unlawful. As a result, the petitioner is entitled
to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. Besides,
he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his retrenchment in May, 2001. In view of the facts and the
circumstances of the case, he, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of termination of his services.
The issue 1 is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
15. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service from the date
of his retrenchment in May, 2001. He is also held entitled to 50% back-wages from the said date. The said 50% back-
wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum
Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to reinstate the
petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent
to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of December, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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3281
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 101/2007
Date of Institution : 3.9.2007
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Mauji Ram S/o Shri Manglu Ram, Vill. Saul, P.O. Khural, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
Divisional Forest Officer, Wild Life Division, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Mauji Ram S/o Shri Manglu Ram workman by the Divisional
Forest Officer, Wild Life Division, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. w.e.f. June, 2003 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 whereas junior to him are retained by the employer is proper
and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved
workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in the month of January, 1998, and that he worked as such in
Wild Life Division, Kullu until September, 2003. His services were, however, terminated by the respondent w.e.f.
September, 2003 without giving him one month.s notice and paying him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have never absented from
work, the petitioner further averred that during the period of his employment, the respondent had been giving fictional
breaks in his service, even though there was availability of work and funds. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent, it is further averred, also violated the principle of „Last Come First Go. as envisaged under Section 25-
G of the Act, because the workmen namely Chander, Brij Lal, Santosh Kumar, Salig Ram and others, who were junior
to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, the respondent violated the
provisions of Section 25-N of the Act, because no prior permission for termination of services of the petitioner was
obtained from the appropriate Government nor was he paid retrenchment compensation. It is also averred that the
respondent had after the petitioner.s retrenchment engaged new workers on daily wage basis without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment and thus violated the provisions of Section 25H of the Act
as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages,
continuity of service and other consequential service benefits. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to take
into account the periods of break in his service towards continuity of service.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in the month of January, 1998, but denied having terminated his services from September,
2003 unlawfully. Claiming the work of his department to be of a seasonal nature, the respondent averred that the
petitioner was engaged as casual worker subject to availability of work/funds and that he had worked intermittently.
Denying having given fictional breaks in the service of the petitioner, the respondent further averred that the petitioner
had worked intermittently “depending upon the availability of funds/works” upto August, 2007 whereafter he on his
own did not turn up for work. No workman junior to the petitioner, according to the respondent, was retained in service
nor was any new worker engaged on muster roll basis after the petitioner abandoned the job on his own. In view of the
seasonal nature of the work for which the petitioner was engaged as causal worker subject to availability of work and
funds, no provision of the Act, according to the respondent, can be said to have been violated. More so, when he on his
own did not turn up for work after August, 2007. It is also averred that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri and the
petition not maintainable in the present form.
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4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
The respondent is not proved to have terminated the services of the petitioner w.e.f. June,
2003 as mentioned in the Reference. He is therefore not entitled to the relief he prayed for.
Issue 2 :
Yes
Issue 3 :
Yes.
Relief. :
Petition dismissed per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
In the Reference, which appears to have been based on the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour Inspector.s
report no. 698-99 dated December 31, 2005, services of the petitioner are stated to have been terminated w.e.f. June,
2003. But nowhere in his statement of claim did the petitioner allege that his services were terminated w.e.f. June,
2003. What is inter alia averred by him is that he was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in the month of
January, 1998, and that his services were illegally terminated by the respondent from September, 2003. He in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of his affidavit Ex. PW1/A claimed to have worked continuously from January, 1998 to September,
2003 and alleged in paragraphs 3 and 8 that his services were illegally terminated by the respondent in the month of
September, 2003. However, in the prayer clause, he prayed for setting aside the periods of break in his service from
January, 1998 to September, 2003 and illegal termination from June, 2003. But the materials on record are not
demonstrative of his services having been terminated w.e.f. June, 2003. The mandays chart Ex. PW1/E the correctness
of which is not disputed by the petitioner, is indicative of his having worked for 8, 107, 149, 218, 271 days in 1998,
1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively and 31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30, 12, 26 and 4 days in the months of January,
February, March, April, May, June, July, August and September, 2003 respectively. In view of this document, the
respondent.s denial of having terminated the services of the petitioner and the latter.s inconsistent stand as to the date of
termination of his services, I have no hesitation in holding that his services were not terminated w.e.f. June, 2003, not
to speak of the alleged illegality in the termination of his services w.e.f. the said point of time as mentioned in the
Reference. He is therefore not entitled to the relief he prayed for. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against
him and in favour of the respondent.
ISSUE 2
8.
In view of what has been observed under the foregoing issue, the petitioner is decidedly guilty of
suppressio veri. The issue on hand is therefore held in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
ISSUE 3
9.
In view of my findings on the above issue 1, the petition is not maintainable. The issue on hand is
therefore held in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
RELIEF
10. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the claim petition fails and is
hereby dismissed. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for
publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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3283
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 385/2002
Date of Institution : 16.12.2002
Date of decision : 20.11.2008
Sh. Mohan Singh S/o Shri Mani Ram, Village Jimjima, P.O. Dul, Tehsil, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR.
For the Respondent :
Sh. B.K. Sood, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
^^D;k Jh eksgu flag nSfud osru csynkj dks vf/k"kklh vfHk;Urk] fg0 iz0 jkT; fo|qr cksMZ e.My] tksfxUnzuxj
}kjk fdlh dkj.k vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e 1947 dh /kkjk 25&th o 25&,p dh vuqikyuk fd, fcuk ukSdjh ls
fnukad 21&10&1999 dks fudkyk tkuk oS| gS ;k voS|? ;fn ugha rks dkexkj fdl jkgr ,oa {kfriwfrZ dk gdnkj
gS?**
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster rolls on February 25, 1999, and that he worked as such upto October 20,
1999. On October, 21, 1999, his services, according to the petitioner, were terminated by the respondent orally.
Claiming to have worked for 60 days during the period he remained in the employ of the respondent, the petitioner
alleged that the respondent had given artificial breaks of 305 days in his service during the period from February 25,
1999 to October 20, 1999. The artificial breaks having been given without any reason, the petitioner was entitled to the
benefit of continuity of service in view of the provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act (the Act, for
short). In dispensing with the petitioner.s services, the respondent, it is further alleged, violated the provisions of Clause
14(2) of the HPSEB Establishment Standing Orders (hereinafter referred as to the Standing Orders) framed under the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, for he was not served with any notice nor was he paid
retrenchment compensation. Also, no inquiry was conducted before retrenching him. The respondent, according to the
petitioner, also failed to observe the principle of „last come first go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act, for the
workers namely Man Singh S/o Kalyan Siingh, Prithi Chand S/o Bhoop Singh, Safi Mohammad S/o Hamid Ahmed,
Durga Dass S/o Kalu Ram and others, who were junior to him were retained in service at the time of his retrenchment.
Besides, the respondent violated the provisions of Sections 25-H and 25-N of the Act. The petitioner therefore prayed
for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages and continuity of service.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on February 25, 1999, but refuted his allegation of fictional breaks. Claiming the respondent to have worked for
a short period of 60 days during the period from February 25, 1999 to October 20, 1999, the respondent averred that he
(petitioner) used to remain absent from work and ultimately abandoned the job after October 20, 1999. So, it was in
view of these circumstances that he was neither charge-sheeted nor was he paid any compensation. Claiming the
petitioner to be a Beldar of casual nature, the respondent further averred that in view of his wilful absence from work
from time to time, his case was not covered by the provisions of Section 25-B of the Act. Further, in view of the
petitioner having not worked for 90 days during the period he remained in the employ of the respondent, his name was
not included in the list of temporary workmen. The workmen namely Man Singh, Prithi Chand, Safi Mohamad and
Durga Das, who are alleged have been retained in service, had not abandoned the job and that was why they were still
in the employ of the respondent. Since the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own, the respondent cannot be said
to have violated the principle of „last come first go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act, nor can he be said to
have committed breach of Clause 14(2) of the Standing Orders. Also, the provisions of Section 25-N of the Act cannot
be said to have been violated in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The respondent.s other contentions
relate to limitation, maintainability of the claim, misjoinder of the parties and non-joinder of necessary parties.
3284
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4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. 21.10.1999 is
violative of the provisions of the I.D. Act, 1947 and certified Standing Orders framed by State
Electricity Board?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition is barred by time?
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the petition due to his act and conduct?
. .OPR
5.
Relief.
6.
The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own, did not find favour
with my Ld. Predecessor-in-office. In terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent was held to have
violated the provisions of Clause 14 (2) of the Standing Orders and Issue 1 was therefore held in the affirmative. Issues
2 to 4 were held in the negative, and in view of these findings, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office allowed the claim petition
partly, vide his award dated June 1, 2005. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred before the Hon.ble High Court of
Himachal Pradesh a Civil Writ Petition (CWP No.1384/2005). The Hon.ble High Court held that the Establishment of
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board having been exempted from the applicability of the provisions of the
Standing Orders, “the Labour Court could not pass the award on the basis of Clause 14(2) of the Standing Orders
framed by the Board under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.” The impugned award dated June
1, 2005 was therefore set aside and the matter remitted to this Court for decision afresh in accordance with law, vide
judgment dated March 24, 2008 of the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on the issues aforementioned are as under:
Issue 1
Yes partly, because the respondent is found to have violated the provisions of Sections 25-
G and 25-H of the Act.
Issue 2
No
Issue 3
No
Issue 4
No
Relief
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
8.
Recounting the material facts averred in the claim petition, the petitioner in his statement as PW1
maintained that he was engaged by the respondent as Beldar and worked as such from 25.2.1999 to 20.10.1999. His
services, according to him, were dispensed with by the respondent on October 21, 1999 without any notice, charge-
sheet and payment of compensation. Refuting this allegation, the respondent, on the other hand, averred that the
services of the petitioner were never terminated, but he used to remain absent from work and ultimately abandoned the
job on his own after October 20, 1999. But this claim, to my mind, does not ring true in view of the respondent.s failure
to lead such documentary evidence as may show that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own. The petitioner.s
claim that his services were terminated by the respondent orally on October 21, 1999, therefore deserves acceptance
and is accepted.
9.
However, the petitioner.s allegation that the respondent had given fictional breaks of 305 days during
the period of his employment that is February 25, 1999 to October 20, 1999, to my thinking, does not carry conviction
in view of the petitioner.s admission of the respondent.s suggestion put to him during his cross-examination as PW1
that he had not completed 240 days. The mandays chart Annexure RA (Ex. RW1/C) the correctness of which has been
admitted by the petitioner in his cross-examination as PW1, is indicative of his having worked for; 25 days during the
period from 25.2.1999 to 24.3.1999; 7 days during the period from 25.3.1999 to 31.3.1999; 20 days during the period
from 1.4.199 to 20.4.1999 and 8 days during the period from 11.10.1999 to 20.10.1999. In view of these working days
the respondent.s allegation that the petitioner used to remain absent from work, to my mind, appears to having a ring of
truth. The petitioner.s allegation that the respondent had given fictional breaks of 305 days in his service cannot
therefore be accepted and is rejected.
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3285
10. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in terminating his services, the respondent had violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, does not appear to be without substance in view of the materials
on record. The petitioner in his statement as PW1 inter alia alleged “After my services were dispensed with, the
respondent retained number of junior persons namely Safi Mohammad, Prithi Chand and Gian Chand etc.” This
allegation appears to be true in view of the documentary evidence, particularly the seniority list issued by the
Additional Superintending Engineer, Electrical Division HPSEB, Jonginder Nagar, vide his letter dated September 5,
2002 Ex. PA. The said seniority list is demonstrative of Man Singh, Prithi Chand, Safi Mohammad, Durga Dass and
Gian Chand, whose names figure at serial nos. 112B, 113, 114, 115 and 116, and who are shown to have been engaged
on 1.5.1999, 21.6.1999, 21.7.1999, 21.9.1999 and 11.10.1999 respectively, being junior the petitioner. The
respondent.s witness V.S.Thakur.s claim in his statement as RW1 that Man Singh, Prithi Chand and Safi Mohammad
were senior to the petitioner, is therefore nothing but falsity. More so, in view of his categorical admission of the
petitioner.s suggestion put to him during his cross-examination as RW1 “that names of persons mentioned in the
seniority list at serial nos. 112 to 122, their date of joining mentioned in the seniority list and these dates are about the
date of their joining”. There is no gainsaying the fact that the aforesaid workmen, who were junior to the petitioner,
were retained in service at the time of termination of his services on October 21, 1999. The respondent is therefore
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, which reads:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
11. But the respondent is also proved to have failed to observe the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act,
which says:
“25 (H). Re-employment of retrenched workman. – Where any workmen are retrenched, and the
employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed,
give an opportunity [to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for
reemployment, and such retrenched workmen] who offer themselves for reemployment shall have
preference over other persons”.
12. The seniority list aforementioned is indicative of Raj Kumar, Tara Chand, Chatter Singh, Birbal, Om
Prakash, Subhash Chand and Sanjay Kumar, whose names figure at serial nos. 117, 118, 119, 120B 121C, 122C and
123L respectively, having been engaged as daily waged Beldar, Electrical Division, HPSEB, Joginder Nagar after
termination of the services of the petitioner.
13. Ld. counsel for the respondent contends with vehemence that the workers whose names figure at serial
nos. 112 to 122 in the seniority list, were also retrenched and later re-engaged in compliance with the orders of H.P.
Administrative Tribunal, Shimla, and that in view of this position, the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act cannot be
said to have been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. Of the aforesaid 11 workmen, only 5 namely Prithi
Chand, Safi Mohammad, Raj Kumar, Om Prakash and Subhash Chand were ordered to be re-engaged along with 3
others by the H.P. Administrative Tribunal by its judgment dated January 10, 2001 Ex. RW1/A. There being no
material on record to show that Tara Chand, Chatter Singh, Birbal and Sanjay Kumar, whose names figure at serial nos.
118C, 119, 120B and 123L respectively in the seniority list, were engaged by the respondent on the basis of the orders
of H.P. Administrative Tribunal, the respondent.s counsel.s contention merits rejection and is rejected. There being
nothing to suggest that before engagement of these persons the petitioner was given an opportunity to offer himself for
re-employment, the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act can safely be held to have been violated.
14. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in dispensing with his services, the respondent had also violated
the provisions of the Standing Orders, is not tenable, because the establishment of HPSEB stands exempted from the
applicability of the Standing Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22,
1992.
15. The upshot is that in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated
the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. Besides, he failed to observe the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The
issue under discussion is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
16. In view of my findings on the foregoing issue, the petition is decidedly maintainable. The issue on hand
is therefore held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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ISSUE 3
17. The Himachal Pradesh Government.s notification whereby the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner
was referred to this Court would reveal that after the termination of his services, the petitioner approached the Labour
Inspector-cum-Conciliation Officer, Joginder Nagar for the redressal of his grievance. On failure of the conciliation
proceedings, which must have taken some time, the said officer referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner,
Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LI/JNR/I.D./2001-168, dated 6.6.2002. In view of these facts and circumstances,
the petitioner.s claim cannot be said to be suffering from the vice of delay and lacehs. The issue under discussion is
therefore held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 4
18. The facts of this case do not attract the rule of estoppel. The respondent.s counsel has also not been able
to show how the petitioner was estoppel form filing the claim petition. The issue on hand is therefore held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
19. Judged in the light of findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly and
is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of his retrenchment. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he is, however, held not
entitled to continuity of service. Also, he is held not entitled to back-wages because of his failure to lead such evidence
as may show that he was not gainfully employed after his retrenchment. The respondent is directed to re-engage the
petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent
to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in
the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 644/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Moti Lal S/o Shri Raghu Ram, R/o Village Masalwan, P.O. Bradla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
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3287
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Moti Lal S/o Shri Raghu Ram by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
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4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried
on, or
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3289
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. -(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
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“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry
who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by
that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault
on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
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(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
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21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9321 dated 15.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 5, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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3293
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT MANDI)
Ref No. : 86/2005
Date of Institution : 18.6.2005
Date of decision : 20.1.2009
Sh. Muni Lal S/o Shri Mast Ram, Village Sumnu, P.O. Ghiri, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, I. & P.H. Division, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. L.B. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Muni Lal S/o Sh. Mast Ram workman by the Executive
Engineer, I&PH Division, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f.16.12.2002 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits
and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent (Executive Engineer, I.& P.H. Division Sunder Nagar District Mandi) as daily waged Beldar in 1981 and
worked as such upto the year 1995. In 1995, his services, according to him, were orally terminated by the respondent.
Aggrieved, he preferred before the H.P. Administrative Tribunal an application (O.A. No.721/1995) and obtained stay
orders. On the basis of the say orders he was re-engaged by the respondent in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of termination of his services. Claiming to have completed more than 240 days „in each calendar
year., the petitioner further averred that his application was later dismissed by the said Tribunal for want of jurisdiction.
On account of dismissal of his application the respondent dispensed with his services on December 17, 2002. Alleging
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the termination of his services to be unlawful, the petitioner further averred that “the similar situated persons are
working in the same place and juniors are also working/retained and are still working under the respondents.” On the
basis of these averments, the petitioner prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in the same capacity as
in which he was working at the time his services were terminated. He also prayed for the grant of full back-wages and
other consequential service benefits including seniority etc.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1981, the respondent
in his reply averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as daily wager in the month of March, 1982, and that he worked as
such intermittently upto June, 1987. In June, 1987, the petitioner, according to the respondent, abandoned the job on his
own. Having remained absent for about 8 years, he later filed before the H.P. Administrative Tribunal an O.A.
No.721/1995 and succeeded in obtaining interim orders dated September 8, 1995 by misrepresenting the facts. In
compliance with the Tribunal.s orders of re-engagement, the petitioner was re-engaged in September, 1995 subject to
the decision in the OA aforementioned. Upon dismissal of the petitioner.s application by the H.P. Administrative
Tribunal, his services, according to the respondent, automatically stood terminated and his disengagement w.e.f.
December 16, 2002 therefore did not attract the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). The
respondent.s other contentions relate to limitation and maintainability of the reference in question.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition. Claiming to have worked in the respondent.s department without any break in service from
1981 to 1990 and with breaks in his service from 1990 to 1995, the petitioner averred that his services were terminated
by the respondent on September 8, 1995. Aggrieved by the termination of his services, he approached the H.P.
Administrative Tribunal and obtained stay orders. However, his services, according to him, were again terminated by
the respondent on December 17, 2002.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-officer framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the retrenchment of the service of the claimant is in contravention of the provisions of
Section 25-F of I.D. Act and the provisions of 25-G of the I.D. Act?
. .OPP
2.
In case issue No.1 is proved in the affirmative, what service benefits the claimant is entitled to? .
.OPP.
3.
Relief.
6.
Be it stated that the petitioner.s claim encompassed in issue 1 did not find favour with this Court. So,
holding issues 1 and 2 in the negative, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office dismissed the claim petition, vide award dated
June 8, 2007. Aggrieved, the petitioner laid challenge to the award by preferring before the Hon.ble High Court of
Himachal Pradesh a Civil Writ Petition (CWP No.1209/2007). The Hon.ble High Court allowed the petition and set
aside the impugned award dated June 8, 2007 and remanded the matter to this Court for decision afresh on the basis of
Annexure P-4 and Annexure P-8. It was inter alia observed:
“……The sum and substance of the workman.s case before the learned Labour Court was that he had
completed 240 days in a block of 12 calendar months before his retrenchment on 16.12.2002. The employer
had placed on record the copy of mandays chart of one Shri Mann Singh before the learned Labour Court. The
employer should have placed on record the mandays chart of the workman, who had filed the claim petition
before the learned Labour Court. It is evident from Annexure P-4 placed on record with this petition that the
workman had completed 362 days in the year 1996, 349 days in the year 1997, 357 days in the year 1998, 325
days in the year 1999, 309 days in the year 2000, 365 days in the year 2001 and 351 days in the year 2002. It
is evident from Annexure P-4 supplied by the employer to the workman that he completed 240 days preceding
his retrenchment. The employer was duty bound to issue show cause notice to the workman or to pay
compensation to him. Admittedly, neither any notice has been issued to the workman nor any compensation
was paid to him. It was the duty cast upon the learned Labour Court to call upon the Management to file the
mandays chart of the workman instead of Shri Mann Singh. The learned Labour Court only on the basis of the
mandays chart of Shri Mann Singh has come to the conclusion that the workman had not completed 240 days
preceding his retrenchment. One Shri Amar Chand was also re-engaged after the orders passed by the learned
H.P. Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.720 of 1995. The learned Labour Court has granted relief to the
similarly situated workmen as per the details given in paragraph 4 of the petition. These averments have not
been denied by the employer/State in its reply. The averment contained in the reply to this paragraph is that
the matter was under examination with the Labour Department and action would be taken accordingly. The
judicial and quasi-judicial authorities are liable to pass consistent orders based on the same and the similar
facts. It is evident from the pleadings of the parties that the case of the petitioner was at par with the other
workmen whose details are given in paragraph 4 of the petition. However, the claim of the petitioner has been
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3295
rejected on the basis of the mandays chart of Shri Mann Singh and not of the petitioner. The Court has seen
the original record. Admittedly, instead of mandays chart of the petitioner-Shri Muni Lal, the mandays chart
of Shri Mann Singh has been filed by the employer before the learned Labour Court.
There is no force in this contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that no notice was required to
be issued to the workman under Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 since the workman was engaged
pursuant to the orders dated 8.9.1995 passed by the learned H.P. Administrative Tribunal. It is true that the workman
was re-engaged on 20.9.1995 on the basis of order dated 8.9.1995. However, the fact of the matter is that he has
continuously worked from 20.9.1995 to 16.12.2002 and has completed 240 days in a block of 12 calendar months each
calendar year. He has completed 240 days preceding his date of retrenchment, i.e. 16.12.2002. The Original
Application preferred by the workman was dismissed on 7.1.2002 and the office order whereby the petitioner has been
terminated is dated 16.12.2002. He had continued to work for eleven months even after the dismissal of his petition on
7.1.2002. The learned Labour Court is required to see whether the workman had completed the requisite days as
required under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned Labour Court should have granted the
same relief to the petitioner-workman which has been granted to similarly situated workmen, as noticed above.”
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on the issues aforementioned are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes partly.
Issue 2 :
He is entitled to reinstatement and continuity of service as mentioned under this issue
Relief :
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
8.
The materials on record would reveal that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged
Beldar in the month of March, 1982 and worked as such upto June, 1987. He was re-engaged in 1995. However, in the
same year, the respondent dispensed with his services. Aggrieved, he preferred before the H.P. Administrative Tribunal
an application (OA No.721/1995) on the basis of which interim orders were passed in his favour on September 8, 1995.
In compliance with the said orders, he was re-engaged as daily waged Beldar by the respondent on September 20, 1995.
His application aforementioned was, however, dismissed by the H.P. Administrative Tribunal on January 7, 2002.
Thereafter the respondent issued order dated December 16, 2002 terminating the services of the petitioner. The
petitioner.s grievance is that in terminating his services, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of
the Act. The said Section reads:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
9.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
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(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
10. The petitioner claims to have completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the
date of his retrenchment (December 16, 2002). This claim of his appears to be having a ring of truth in view of the
mandays chart Ex. PA, which is demonstrative of his having worked for 351 days during the period from January 1,
2002 to December 31, 2002. In view of his having thus remained in continuous service for not less than one year
preceding the date of his retrenchment, the respondent was obliged to serve him with month.s notice and pay him
retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. But the respondent having undeniably failed so
to do clearly violated the said provisions while terminating the services of the petitioner on December 16, 2002.
11. Ld. counsel for the respondent canvassed with considerable fervor that the petitioner having been re-
engaged in compliance with the interim orders dated September 8, 1995 of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal and later
removed from service upon dismissal by the said Tribunal of his application (O.A. No.721/1995), the respondent was
not obliged to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill
conceived. The reason being that re-engaged of the petitioner in compliance with the aforementioned interim orders of
the H.P. Administrative Tribunal cannot in law be interpreted to mean that the respondent stood absolved of his
obligation to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act even if the petitioner had worked for more than 240
days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination of his services. In the Civil Writ
Petition (CWP NO.1209/2007) preferred before the Hon.ble High Court of H.P. by the petitioner, one of the
contentions raised by the Ld. Additional Advocate General was that in view of the petitioner having been re-engaged
pursuant to the orders dated September 8, 1995 passed by the H.P. Administrative Tribunal, no notice was required to
be issued to the petitioner. Negativing this contention, the Hon.ble High Court in its judgment dated October 22, 2008
inter alia held:
“There is no force in this contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that no notice was
required to be issued to the workman under Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 since the
workman was engaged pursuant to the orders dated 8.9.1995 passed by the learned H.P. Administrative
Tribunal. It is true that the workman was re-engaged on 20.9.1995 on the basis of order dated 8.9.1995.
However, the fact of the matter is that he has continuously worked from 20.9.1995 to 16.12.2002 and has
completed 240 days in a block of 12 calendar months each calendar year. He has completed 240 days
preceding his date of retrenchment, i.e. 16.12.2002.”
12. The contention raised by the Ld. counsel for the respondent therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
13. However, the petitioner.s another allegation that in dispensing with his services, the respondent had
violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, to my mind, does not appear to have been substantiated. Section 25-
G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
14. Nowhere in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A or cross-examination as PW1 did the petitioner allege that certain
workmen, who were junior to him, were retained in service by the respondent at the time of termination of his services.
What is inter alia deposed by him is:
“….as the similar situated persons are still working with the respondents. Their names are Upender,
Mani Ram, Daulat Ram, Bhup Singh etc….”
15. As there is no plausible evidence to show that certain workmen were junior to the petitioner and retained
in service by the respondent at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the abovementioned
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act cannot be said to have been violated.
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3297
16. The upshot is that in terminating the services of the petitioner on December 16, 2002, the respondent
had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in favour of the
petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
17. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the
same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is entitled to continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (December 16, 2002). However, he is not entitled to back-wages
because his pleadings are non-extent in such averments as may show that he remained idle or was not gainfully
employed after his retrenchment. Also nowhere in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A or cross-examination as PW1 did he utter a
word on these lines. The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
RELIEF
18. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the
time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service from the date of his retrenchment
(December 16, 2002). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages. The respondent is directed to re-engage him
within a period of 90 days, failing which he shall be entitled to 25% back-wages from the date of his unlawful
retrenchment (December 16, 2002). The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or
the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of
the petitioner. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for
publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT MANDI)
Ref. No. : 33/2006
Date of Institution : 20.3.2006
Date of decision : 27.12.2008
Sh. Manish Kumar S/o Chattar Singh, Village Kothi, P.O. Thara, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P. .
.Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, HPSEB (E) Division, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent
For the Petitioner :
Sh. K.S. Guleria, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. J.S. Chauhan, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Manish Kumar S/o Shri Chattar Singh workman by the
Executive Engineer, HPSEB (E) Division, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f.25.5.1998 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Rule 14(2) of the Certified Standing
Orders of the board is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and compensation the
above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
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2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily wager on muster roll basis on October 17, 1996, and that he worked as such upto May 24, 1998. On
May 25, 1998, his services were, however, terminated by the respondent orally without complying with the relevant
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) and the rules made thereunder. In dispensing with
his services, the respondent according to the petitioner, also violated the provisions of Clause 14(2) of the Industrial
Establishment Standing Orders (hereinafter referred to as the Standing Orders) framed under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Alleging the respondent to have given artificial breaks in his service, the
petitioner averred that the breaks given on account of cessation of work were not due to any fault of his, and that the
period of breaks in his service was liable to be counted towards the continuity of his service. In terminating his
services, the respondent, according to the petitioner, violated the principle of „last come first go. as envisaged under
Section 25-G of the Act, for certain workers namely Molak Ram, Om Chand, Dalip Singh, Damodar Dass and Vijay
Kumar, who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, the
respondent violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, because after the petitioner.s removal from service
certain workers were engaged without giving him an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment. The petitioner
therefore prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with back-wages. He also prayed for a direction to
the respondent to take into account the period of interrupted service towards continuity of service.
3.
Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of artificial breaks in his service, the respondent in his reply averred
that the petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged Beldar as against a specific scheme/work; “providing of 11KV,
HT Line to 63 KVA, Sub Station Tullah-II etc” on September 25, 1996, and that on completion of the work on May 24,
1998, his services automatically stood terminated. In view of the petitioner having been engaged as against the work
started under a specific scheme and the automatic termination of his services on completion of the work, no provision
of the Act can be said to have been violated, according to the respondent. As for the allegation of violation of the
provisions of the Standing Orders, the respondent.s contention is that this allegation is untenable, for the establishment
of the HPSEB stands exempted from the applicability of the Standings Orders. As to the petitioner.s allegation that the
workmen namely Molak Ram, Om Chand, Dalip Singh, Damodar Dass and Vijay Kumar, who were junior to him,
were retained at the time his services were dispensed with, the respondent averred:
“….It is denied that the services of the workmen alleged to be senior to him were kept continued. Their
services were also dispensed with on completion of the said scheme. But, they remained in touch with
replying respondent for knowing the availability of other works. But, the applicant never approached to
replying respondent for his re-engagement.”
4.
The respondent.s other contentions relate to estoppel, limitation, misjoinder of the parties and non-
joinder of necessary parties.
5.
The petitioner in his rejoinder admitted the respondent.s claim that he was engaged as daily waged
Beldar on September 25, 1996 and worked as such upto May, 24, 1998. Rest of the respondent.s contentions, were,
however, controverted by him.
6.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the disengagement from the service of the claimant by the respondent is proper and
justified?
. .OPP
2.
If the above issue is proved in the affirmative to what relief of service benefit the claimant is
entitled to the respondent?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is barred by delay and laches?
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
The petitioner is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 3 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
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3299
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES 1.
8. The respondent.s claim that the petitioner was engaged as against a specific work started under a scheme,
and that his services automatically stood terminated on completion of the work, to my thinking, does not appear to be
holding water in view of what has been deposed to by the respondent.s witness S.S. Guleria, then Assistant Engineer,
Electrical Sub Division, Makrari, Tehsil, Joginder Nagar, as RW1. This witness inter alia testified:
…The petitioner was engaged on October 17, 1996, vide muster roll issued on September 25, 1996. He was
engaged on temporary basis as against the work namely „Lift Irrigation Scheme for supply of 11KV, HT Line. in our
Sub Division and he worked upto May 24, 1998. During this period, he used to come to work at his own will and
remained absent from time to time.
….After May 24, 1998, the petitioner abandoned the job on his own and the remaining workers who were
regular in job, became senior to him……..”
9.
But nowhere in his reply did the respondent aver that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own
after May 24, 1998. What is claimed by the respondent is that the petitioner was engaged as against a specific work on
September 25, 1996, and that his services automatically stood terminated on completion of the work on May 24, 1998.
By examining the aforesaid witness (S.S.Guleria), the respondent on his own showing belied his claim that the
petitioner.s services automatically came to an end on completion of the specific work on May 24, 1998.
10. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A deposed that he was engaged as daily waged Beldar on muster
roll basis on September 25, 1996, and that his services were orally terminated by the respondent on May 25, 1998.
There being no reason to discredit this deposition of his, I am disposed to hold that the termination of his services
amount to retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of the Act. More so, when the materials on record, particularly
the evidence led by the respondent, is not indicative of the petitioner having been made aware of his having been
engaged as against a specific work at the commencement of his employment and his employment having come to an
end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme under which the work was undertaken.
11. The petitioner alleged that his services were terminated by the respondent without serving him with a
prior notice. This allegation is no doubt true, but there being nothing suggestive of his having worked for 240 days
during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the respondent was not obliged to serve
with him a one month.s notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. In dispensing with the services of the
petitioner without serving with him any notice, the respondent cannot therefore be said to have committed any
illegality.
12. As for the petitioner.s claim that the respondent had been giving fictional breaks in his service, and that
the period of fictional breaks is liable be counted towards his continuity in service, the same, to my thinking, does not
appear to be holding water for want of plausible evidence. This claim of his therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
13. However, the petitioner.s allegation that the workmen namely Molak Ram, Om Chand, Dalip Singh, Damodar Dass
and Vijay Kumar were junior to him and retained at the time his services were dispensed with, to my mind, appears to
be having a ring of truth in view of the materials on record. In paragraph (III) of his statement of claim, the petitioner
inter alia averred:
“….The junior to the applicant has been allowed to work, but the service of the applicant was illegally
terminated against the principle of First Come Last Go. The respondents have retained many junior
person namely Molak Ram, S/o Ram Lal, Om Chand S/o Dodu, Dalip Singh, Damodar Dass, Vijay
Kumar, etc. & allowed them to complete 240 days & the applicant was terminated illegally without
complying the provisions of Chapter-B & Sec.25-G of I.D. Act….”
14. In his reply, the respondent, instead of refuting the petitioner.s claim that Molak Ram, Om Chand, Dalip
Singh, Damodar Dass and Vijay Kumar were junior to him and retained in service at the time his services were
dispensed with, averred:
“….It is denied that the services of the workmen alleged to be senior to him were kept continued. Their
services were also dispensed with on completion of the said scheme. But, they remained in touch with
replying respondent for knowing the availability of other works. But, the applicant never approached to
replying respondent for his re-engagement.”
15. In view of these averments, the respondent.s failure to bring on record the relevant seniority list and the
evidence led by the petitioner, I have no hesitation in holding that Molak Ram, Om Chand, Dalip Singh, Damodar Dass
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and Vijay Kumar were junior to the petitioner and retained in service at the time of termination of his services. More
so, in view of the respondent.s witness S.S. Guleria.s denial of knowledge in his cross-examination as RW1 that Molak
Ram, Dalip Singh and Damodar Dass were junior to the petitioner. Section 25-G of the Act reads:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
16. Since the materials on record is demonstrative of Molak Ram, Om Chand, Dalip Singh, Damodar Dass
and Vijay Kumar being junior to the petitioner and their having been retained in service at the time the services of the
petitioner were dispensed with on May 25, 1999, the respondent can safely be held to have violated the principle of
„last come first go. as envisaged under the abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. The termination of
the petitioner.s service was therefore unlawful. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in favour of the
petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
17. In view of my findings on the foregoing issues, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same
capacity as in which he was working at the time of his unlawful retrenchment. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity
of service from the date of his retrenchment. However, he is held not entitled to back-wages, for there is no plausible
material on record to show that he was not gainfully employed after his retrenchment. The issue under discussion is
held accordingly.
ISSUE 3
18. Aggrieved by the unlawful termination of his service by the respondent on May 25, 1998, the petitioner
appears to have preferred before the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal an application under Section 19 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. However, that application was dismissed by the said Tribunal on account of its
jurisdictional ouster to entertain the same, vide its order dated February 26, 2002 Ex. PW1/B. Thereafter the petitioner
approached the Labour Officer, Mandi for the redressal of his grievance. The dispute raised by him later came to be
referred to this Court, vide the H.P. Government Notification No.11-23/84(LAB) I.D./05-MANDI dated January 31,
2006. In view of these facts and circumstances, the petitioner.s claim cannot be held to be suffering from the vice of
delay and laches. The issue under discussion is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
19. Judged in the light of findings on the issues above, particularly issues 1 and 2, the petition succeeds
partly and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in
which he was working at the time of his retrenchment. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service from the date
on which his services were unlawfully terminated by the respondent (May 25, 1998). In view of the facts and
circumstances of the case, he is, however, held not entitled to back-wages. The respondent is directed to re-engage the
petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent
to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 27th day of December, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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3301
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 573/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Naveen Kumar S/o Shri Prem Chand, Village Sandoa, Post Office Baradla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt.
Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Naveen Kumar S/o Shri Prem Chand by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
Employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
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retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
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3303
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
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(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
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3305
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17.
The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
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to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
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3307
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1008/2007-9316, dated 15.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 10, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 634/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Om Chand S/o Shri Diwan Chand, R/O Village Baradla, P.O. Dev Baradla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt.
Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
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The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Om Chand S/o Shri Diwan Chand, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
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3309
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
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1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11.
In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
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3311
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
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(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
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3313
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9929 dated 30.11.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 16, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 162/2007
Date of Institution : 1.11.2007
Date of decision : 24.11.2008
Shri Prakash Chand S/o Shri Bhikam Ram, Village Badgaon, P.O. Veer (Thungal), Tehsil Sadar, District
Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, vice AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. Gaurav Sharma, vice Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Shri Prakash Chand S/o Shri Bhikam Ram workman by the
Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 1.1.2000 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereas junior to him were retained by the
employer as alleged by the workman is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and
amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent on September 29, 1998, and that he worked as such in Saigloo Sub Division of
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division) upto December 31, 1999. On January 1, 2000, his
services were terminated by the respondent by serving with him a notice dated December 20, 1999. Claiming to have
worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service, the
petitioner further averred that he having not been paid any compensation, the termination of his services was violative
of the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) as also the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Standing Orders, for short). In terminating his services, the respondent,
according to the petitioner, also violated the provisions of section 25-G of the Act, because certain workers namely
Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul Singh, Ramesh, Shive Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time his
services were dispensed with. Not only that, the respondent also violated the provisions of section 25-H of the Act, for,
after the petitioner.s retrenchment some persons were engaged without giving the petitioner an opportunity to offer
himself for re-employment. Claiming to have visited the respondent.s office a number of times after his removal from
service, the petitioner averred that on being requested by him to re-engage him, the concerned official in the
respondent.s office gave an assurance that he would be called back in the job. The petitioner, however, kept on waiting
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3315
for a call till March, 2005 whereafter he raised the industrial dispute, which later came to be referred to this Court for
adjudication. On the basis of these averments, the petitioner prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in
the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. He also prayed for the grant
of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including seniority etc.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on September 29, 1998, the respondent in his
reply averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as beldar on daily wages basis as against a specific construction work on
September 25, 1998, and that he had worked upto December 31, 1999 with certain interruptions/breaks caused on
account of his wilful absence from work. Claiming to have told the respondent at the time of his engagement as casual
beldar that he was being engaged as against a specific construction work, and that his services would automatically
come to an end on completion of the work, the respondent further averred that his services having been dispensed with
on completion of the work, no provision of the Act was violated. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for
240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date on which his services were dispensed with, the
respondent averred that he having not completed 240 days during the period he remained in his employ, he was not
required to be served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and the provisions of this Section cannot
therefore be said to have been violated. As to the petitioner.s allegation that certain persons namely Uma Devi, Jagdish,
Kaul Singh, Ramesh, Pawan, Shiv Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time of his
retrenchment, the respondent.s contention is that these persons, who were also engaged as casual beldar for execution a
specific work, were also removed from service on completion of the work, and that they were later re-engaged in
obedience to an order dated October 8, 1999 of the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner.s claim
that after his removal from service he had visited the respondent.s office, is also refuted by the respondent. It is averred
that at no point of time did the petitioner visit the respondent.s office nor did he make any representation after his
removal from service, and the petition is therefore barred by time. As for the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the
Standing Orders, the respondent.s contention is that this allegation is also unfounded and baseless, because the
establishment of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing
Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992. The respondent.s other
contentions relate to estoppel and maintainability of the petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Relief :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on September 29, 1998, the respondent averred
that he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged beldar on September 25, 1998, and that he had worked as such upto
December 31, 1999. This averment having been admitted by the petitioner to be true in his cross-examination as PW1
deserves acceptance.
8.
Ld. counsel for the respondent contends that the petitioner was engaged as against a specific work, his
removal from service on completion of the work did not amount to retrenchment as defined under clause (oo) of
Section 2 of the Act. But this contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived in view of the materials on record.
The petitioner in his cross-examination as PW1 categorically denied the respondent.s suggestion that at the time of his
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employment he was told that he was engaged as against a temporary work, and that his services would be deemed to
have come to an end on completion of the work started under a scheme. The respondent.s witness T.K. Sharma, then
Assistant Engineer in Saigloo Sub Division of HPSEB, though in his examination-in-chief as RW1 maintained that the
petitioner was engaged in a specific work, and that he was told that his service would come to an end on completion of
the work, he in his cross-examination expressed his inability to furnish such proof as may show that the petitioner was
engaged in a specific scheme work. Having deposed so, he, however, hastened to add that the factum of the petitioner
having been engaged in a specific scheme was shown in the muster roll. But the muster roll, which would have
constituted a vital piece of evidence in substantiation of the respondent.s claim, having not been brought on record, it is
difficult to hold that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work.
9.
But even if it is assumed that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work, there
is no plausible material to show that his employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme
or completion of the work.
10. In S. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553, the principal
question that arose before the Hon.ble Supreme Court of India was:
“Whether the workmen recruited for discharging temporary job under a project can insist on
compliance of section 25-F of the Act if their services are dispensed with on the project coming to an
end.”
11. Having examined the scope of Sections 2(oo) and 25-F of the Act, the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia
ruled:
“1.
“Retrenchment” in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work
itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial pieces of legislation are to
be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to take two views of a provision. It
is also well settled that the Parliament has employed the expression “the termination by the employer of the service of a
workman for any reason whatsoever” while defining the term “retrenchment”, which is suggestive of the legislative
intent to assign the term „retrenchment. a meaning wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There
are four exceptions carved out of the artificially extended meaning of the term „retrenchment., and therefore,
termination of service of a workman so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the
meaning of „retrenchment. dehors the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of
„retrenchment. the termination of service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service
which does not fall within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment.
2.
The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to
retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:-
(i)
that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that
the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and
consistently with the terms of the contract.
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the
commencement of employment.”
12. The respondent having failed to satisfy these conditions, the termination of services of the petitioner, to
my thinking, decidedly amount to retrenchment within the meaning of clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act. The
respondent.s contention therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
13. The petitioner in his pleadings as also in evidence claimed to have worked for 240 days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. According to him, he having not been
served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act, the termination of his service was unlawful. More so,
when no notice under the Standing Orders was given to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation. This
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. Be it stated that the establishment of Himachal Pradesh
State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85
Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992.
14. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced with
advantage:
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“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
15. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
16. However, the petitioner.s claim of having been in continuous service for not less than one year, or say
his claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal
from service, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the evidence led by the respondent. The mandays
chart Ex. RW1/A, which is adduced in evidence by the respondent and admitted to be correct by the petitioner in his
cross-examination as PW1, is demonstrative of the petitioner having not worked for 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment. The respondent was therefore not obliged to serve him with a
one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. The
petitioner.s contention that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
cannot be therefore accepted.
17. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, appears to be tenable. Kesar Singh, then Junior Engineer in the office of
Executive Engineer, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division), Mandi, who has been examined by
the petitioner as PW2, testified:
“As per the record, Prakash (petitioner) was engaged on 25.9.1998 and he worked upto 31.12.1999. As
per the record, Uma Devi was engaged on 2.12.1998 and was still working. Jagdish Chand, S/o Sh.
Jeevan Lal was engaged on 15.10.1998 and was still working. As per the record, Kaul Ram, S/o Jyoti
Singh was engaged on 18.6.1998 and was still working. Ramesh Chand, S/o Sh. Khem Chand was
engaged on 16.5.1998 and was still working. Pawan Kumar, S/o Sh. Hem Raj was engaged on 3.11.1997
and was still working. Shive Ram, S/o Sh. Balku Ram was engaged on 28.10.1997 and was still working.
As per the record, Sh. Chand Lal was engaged on 3.9. 1997 and was still working. In the division, more
than three hundred workers are working…..”
18. The respondent.s aforementioned witness T.K. Sharma categorically admitted in his cross-examination
as RW1 that Uma Devi and Jagdish were junior to the petitioner, and that they were still in the employ of the
respondent. He also admitted in no ambiguous words that when the petitioner was removed from service Uma Devi and
Jagdish were not retrenched. In other words, the latter two were retained at the time the services of the petitioner were
terminated. Section 25-G of the Act provides:
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“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
19. Since Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were undeniably junior to the petitioner, were retained by the
respondent at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the principle of „Last Come First Go. as
envisaged in the abovementioned provisions can safely be held to have been violated by the respondent.
20. Ld. counsel for the respondent contends with vehemence that Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were also
retrenched, having been re-engaged in obedience to the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal, they could
not be retrenched at the time of termination of services of the petitioner, and the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act
cannot therefore be said to have been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. The reason being that re-
engagement of Uma Devi and Jagdish on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal can by no
stretch of reasoning be interpreted to mean that they have become permanent employees cannot therefore be retrenched
even if there arises an occasion for the employer to follow the principle of „Last Come First Go.. I am therefore of the
considered view that re-engagement of the said workers on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative
Tribunal notwithstanding, the respondent could in law violate the principle of „Last Come First Go. at the time the
services of the petitioner were dispensed with. The contention aforementioned has therefore been raised only to be
rejected.
21. The upshot therefore is that in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent violated the provisions of
section 25-F of the Act, and he (petitioner) is therefore entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of his retrenchment. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement
(25.9.1998). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages, because nowhere in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A and cross-
examination as PW1 did he maintain that he was not a gainfully employed or that he remained idle after his
retrenchment. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
ISSUE 2
22. The materials on record are indicative of the petitioner having approached the respondent from time to
time after his retrenchment and requested for his re-engagement but of no avail. Left with no option, he later raised an
industrial dispute which came to be referred to this Court for adjudication under Section 10 (1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) I.D./07-Mandi dated October 9, 2007.
23. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs. Garibu Ram, latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more
than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated. Having
the surveyed various rulings on the point, the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh inter alia observed:
“….....While taking note of the entire case law with regard to the delay and laches, this Court
consistently has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply but, however, depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principles of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. A delay of even 14 years has been held not to come in the way of the poor man, whose services
have been illegally terminated in claiming his relief under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
In Deepa Ram.s case (supra), there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand.s case (supra) there was a
delay of 9 years. In Mohinder Kumar.s case (supra), there was a delay of 14 years……..”
24. The petitioner, who is undeniably poverty-stricken, is stated to be illiterate. In view of the facts and
circumstances of this case, the principle of delay and laches cannot be held applicable to his case. The issue under
discussion is therefore held in his favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The facts and circumstances of this case do not attract the rule of estoppel. The respondent.s counsel has also not
been able to show how the rule of estoppel is attracted in this case. The issue on hand is therefore held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
26. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. The petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working
at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to seniority from the date of his engagement as
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daily waged beldar (25.9.1998). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages or compensation in view of the facts
and circumstances of the case. The respondent is directed to reinstatement him within a period of 90 days from today
failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to 25% back-wages with effect from the date of his unlawful retrenchment
(1.1.2000). The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages
permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The
reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official
gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT MANDI)
Ref No. : 46/2006
Date of Institution : 20.3.2006
Date of decision : 20.1.2009
Shri Prakash Chand S/o Sh. Ram Krishan, Village Chhota Samahal, P.O. Gahar, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District
Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.S.E.B. (Electrical) Division, Sarkaghat, District Mandi.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. K.S. Guleria, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. J.S. Chauhan, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Sh. Parkash Chand S/o Sh. Ram Krishan workman by the
Executive Engineer (E) Division, Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 21.6.2000 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits
and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to.?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis on November 28, 1994. His services were, however, time and
again interrupted on account of lock out or cessation of work which was not due to any fault on his part. So, the period
of interrupted service is liable to be counted towards „continuous service. in view of the provisions of Section 25-F of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have filed before the H.P. Administrative Tribunal an
application (OA No.324/1999), the petitioner further averred that his application was allowed by the Tribunal by an
order dated May 10, 2000. On the basis of this order he was re-engaged by the respondent. However, on June 21, 2000,
the respondent terminated his services by serving him with a notice dated June 19, 2000. In terminating his services, the
respondent, according to the petitioner, violated the principle of „first come last go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of
the Act, because the workmen namely Krishan Chand, Ranjit Singh, Bansi Lal, Yaspal and others, who were junior to
him, were allowed to complete 240 days and retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. The
respondent, it is further alleged, also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Aggrieved by his retrenchment,
the petitioner again preferred before the Tribunal aforementioned an application (OA No.4069/2000). The said
application was, however, dismissed by the Tribunal for want of jurisdiction, vide order dated April 29, 2002. Claiming
to have remained unemployed during the period of interrupted service, the petitioner further averred that his removal
from service was unlawful. He therefore prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with back-wages and
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other consequential service benefits. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to take into account the period of
interrupted service towards continuity of service for the purpose of regularisation of his service in accordance with the
policy of the State Government.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis on November 28, 1994, but denied his allegation of artificial breaks in his service. The
petitioner, who according to the respondent was engaged as against a work of casual nature and whose services „were
taken as and when required, subject to availability of the work., had worked upto May 20, 1997 with certain
interruptions in his service caused by him on his own. Thereafter he abandoned the job on his own and did not report
for duty, even though a letter dated May 31, 1997 was sent to him, directing him to join his duty. He later filed before
the H.P. Administrative Tribunal an application (OA No.324/1999). The said Tribunal by its orders dated May 10, 2000
directed the respondent to re-engage the petitioner „in the same place from where his services were disengaged.. In
compliance with these orders, the petitioner was re-engaged on May 20, 2000. By a notice dated June 19, 2000, his
services were terminated in accordance with the provisions of Clause 14(2) of the Industrial Establishment Standing
Orders (hereinafter referred to as the „Standing Orders.) framed under the Industrial Employment Act, 1946 w.e.f. June
21, 2000. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation that the workmen namely Krishan Chand, Ranjit Singh, Bansi Lal, Yaspal
etc were junior to him and retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with, the respondent further
averred that the said workmen were re-engaged „as per the orders of the Tribunal dated 20.4.1999.. So, no provision of
the Act, according to the respondent, was violated in terminating the services of the petitioner w.e.f. June 21, 2000 and
he is therefore not entitled to any relief. Another count on which he is not entitled to any relief is the filing of the
application by him at a later stage and beyond the period of limitation.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
1.
Whether the disengagement from the service of the claimant by the respondent is proper and
justified? . .OPP
2.
If the above issue is proved in the affirmative, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to from the respondent?
. .OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable before this Court being time barred?
. .OPR
4.
Relief.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
The petitioner is proved to have abandoned his job w.e.f. 20.5.1997. The termination of his
services by the respondent w.e.f. June 21, 2000 was not unlawful.
Issue 2 :
He is not entitled to any relief.
Issue 3 :
The claim petition is though not maintainable, the same is not barred by time.
Relief. :
The petition dismissed per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
7.
The respondent.s claim that the petitioner had without giving intimation to the department abandoned
the job on his own in 1997, to my thinking, appears to be having a ring of truth in view of the materials on record. The
respondent.s witness Yashpal Thakur, then Assistant Engineer, HPSEB, Sub Division, Badharbar, inter alia deposed as
RW1:
“……I am conversant with the facts of this case. The petitioner was engaged as casual Beldar under a
specific scheme on 28.11.1994. He worked upto May 20, 1997, and during this period he used to remain
absent on his own………… After 1997, the petitioner without informing the department abandoned the
job on his own and thereafter did not turn up. The department had in writing asked him to join his
duty, vide letter dated May 31, 1997 a copy of which is Ex. RW1/A. Thereafter the petitioner filed a
petition in 2000, a copy whereof is Ex. RW1/B. He was re-engaged in accordance with the orders of the
Court……..”
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3321
8.
This deposition, to my mind, does not appear to be far from truth in view of the documentary evidence
led by the respondent. The mandays chart Ex. RW1/C the correctness of which is not disputed by the petitioner, is
indicative of his having worked with the respondent in two spells of time; One, during the period from 28.11.1994 to
May 20, 1997, and the other, during the period from May 20, 2000 to June 20, 2000. The letter dated May 31, 1997, a
copy of which is Ex. RW1/A, would reveal that the petitioner absented from work w.e.f. May 20, 1997 onwards
without intimation to his superiors. By this letter, which was despatched on May 31, 1997, vide the relevant extract of
the Despatch Register Ex. RW1/E, the Assistant Executive Engineer, Electrical Sub Division, HPSEB, Badharbar,
directed the petitioner to join his duty and „submit the reason of wilful absence immediately.. The petitioner, it appears,
did not respond to the letter nor did he join his duty. There being no reason to discredit the said letter Ex. RW1/A and
the aforementioned mandays chart Ex. RW1/C, I have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner had abandoned the job
on his own after May 20, 1997.
9.
However, about two years later, that is, in 1999, he filed before the H.P. Administrative Tribunal an
application (OA No.324/1999). The said Tribunal allowed the application by its order dated May 10, 2000 Ex. RW1/B
which in its material part reads:
“Learned counsel for the parties represent that the present O.A. is covered by the decision of OA(M)
198/98 and OA(M) 197/98 decide on 24.4.1999. That being so, the respondents are directed to re-engage
the applicant in the same place from where his services were dis-engaged. The applicant, in that event,
shall not be entitled for back wages. However, the period of absence between his dis-engagement and re-
engagement would be counted for seniority.”
10. It was in compliance with these orders that the respondent re-engaged the petitioner. However, by a one
month.s notice dated June 19, 2000 Ex. RW1/D, the respondent terminated the services of the petitioner. The said
notice in its material part reads:
“Since the work against which you have been engaged are going to be completed and there is no another
work against which your services can be continued further, hence in view of non availability of work
your services is not longer required. You are hereby given one month notice of retrenchment of services
under standing order clause 14 which will commenced on 21.6.2000 to 20.7.2000.”
11. Ld. counsel for the petitioner strenuously argues that in view of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal.s
orders dated May 10, 2000 whereby not only was the petitioner ordered to be re-engaged but the period of his absence
„between his dis-engagement and re-engagement. was also ordered to be counted towards seniority, his client is to be
considered in continuous service right from the date of his initial engagement as daily waged Beldar (November 28,
1994). This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. No doubt the H.P. Administrative Tribunal by its
orders aforementioned ordered the period between the petitioner.s dis-engagement and re-engagement to be counted
towards his seniority, but by no stretch of reasoning can this order be interpreted to mean that the petitioner is to be
considered in continuous service from the date of his initial engagement (November 28, 1994). The expression
“continuous service” is defined under Section 25-B of the Act, which its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
12. The petitioner.s allegation that the respondent had given fictional breaks in his service, to my mind, does
not appear to have been substantiated. He to establish this allegation ought to have adduced in evidence copies of such
muster rolls as may be indicative of fictional breaks having been given in his service. But he having failed so to do, I
am not disposed to hold his allegation to have been substantiated. More so, in view of his failure to particularise the
periods of the alleged fictional break in his service, and the respondent.s evidence which is demonstrative of his having
remained absent from work from time to time.
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13. Nowhere in his pleadings or evidence did the petitioner allege the respondent to have terminated his
services on May 20 or 21, 1997, even though he claimed to have preferred before the H.P. Administrative Tribunal an
application (OA NO.324/1999) laying challenge to his dis-engagement. I have already held him to have abandoned the
job on his on after May 20, 1997. In view of this finding of mine and the petitioner.s failure to establish his allegation
of fictional breaks in his service, his counsel.s contention that his client is to be considered in “continuous service”
from the date of his initial engagement in view of the H. P. Administrative Tribunal.s orders dated May 10, 2000,
merits rejection and is rejected.
14. Now the question: Whether in terminating the services of the petitioner by a „one month.s notice. dated
June 19, 2000 Ex. RW1/D (also Ex. RW1/F), the respondent violated the provisions of Section 25-F or 25-G of the Act.
The answer, to my mind, is in the negative in view of the materials on record. Section 25-F reads:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
15. There is nothing suggestive of the petitioner having remained in continuous service for one year, or say
his having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination of his
services (in the reference, the date of termination of his services is stated to be June 21, 2000. However, it ought to be
July 20, 2000 in view of the notice dated June 19, 2000 Ex. RW1/D). The respondent was therefore not obliged to serve
him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under the abovementioned
provisions of section 25-F of the Act. So, the said provisions cannot be said to have been violated.
16. But the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act also, to my thinking, do not appear to have been violated
by the respondent. The said Section provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. Although the petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A alleged that “the juniors namely Krishan Chand,
Ranjit Singh, Bansi Lal, Yashpal etc. were engaged, continued & allowed to complete 240 days”, he in substantiation
of this allegation did not choose to adduce in evidence the seniority list or such other document as may show that the
said workmen were junior to him and retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent
by the notice aforementioned Ex. RW1/D. It is therefore difficult to hold that in terminating his services, the respondent
had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act.
18. As for the allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, the same also does not
appear to have been substantiated, because there is no plausible material to show that the respondent had engaged some
workmen after the termination of services of the petitioner.
19. The upshot therefore is that in dispensing with the services of the petitioner, the respondent did not
violate any provision of the Act. In other words, the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent was not
improper and unjustified. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the petitioner and in favour of the
respondent.
ISSUE 2
20. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The
issue on hand is held accordingly.
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3323
ISSUE 3
21. As no time limit is prescribed by law for raising an industrial dispute, the respondent.s claim that the
petition is barred by time, is not tenable. But this observation of mine notwithstanding, the claim petition is not
maintainable in view of what has been held under the above issue 1. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
RELIEF
22. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition fails and is
hereby dismissed. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for
publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 658/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Prem Chand S/o Shri Gurdev, R/O Village Lawan Pur, P.O. Baroti, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Prem Chand S/o Shri Gurdev by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
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relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
. .OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
. .OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
. .OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
. .OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
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HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.……………………………………………………….
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
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authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
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establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari
Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner) services
were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dharampur,
in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior to him
(petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared the
seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provision of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
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ISSUE 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9320 dated
15.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1)
of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 9, 2008. In view of the period of time
that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful
retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His
claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy. D.A..s aforementioned contention
merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of
the petitioner.
ISSUE 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
ISSUE 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT BILASPUR)
Ref No. : 168/2006
Date of Institution : 4.12.2006
Date of decision : 21.1.2009
Shri Prem Sukh S/o Shri Nika Ram, Village Bhaur, P.O. Kanaid, Tehsil, Sunder Nagar, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
1. The Deputy Director of Industries (Sericulture) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
2. The Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Division, Mandi, H.P.
..Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. R.K. Raghu, Adv. Vice
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the action of the (1) Deputy Director of Industries (Sericulture) Palampur, District Kangra,
H.P. (2) The Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Division, Mandi, H.P. to give break in service to
Shri Prem Sukh S/o Shri Nikka Ram workman during his service period time and again and finally
terminated w.e.f. 09.06.2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is
proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondents as daily waged Beldar in 1994, and that he worked as such upto July 20, 2004. Thereafter the respondents
suddenly terminated his services orally without giving him an opportunity of being heard. Claiming to have worked for
240 days during each calendar year, the petitioner alleged that the respondents, who had been giving fictional breaks in
his service, never allowed him to complete 240 days in any calendar year, and that he having not been served with any
notice before termination of his services, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947
(the Act, for short). The respondents, according to the petitioner, also violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the
Act, because certain workmen, who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time of his retrenchment. The
respondent, it is further alleged, also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The petitioner therefore prayed
for a direction to the respondents to re-engage him in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time of
termination of his services. He also prayed for a direction to the respondents to pay him full back-wages and count the
“intervening period between re-engagement and dis-engagement” towards his seniority.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily
waged Beldar in 1994, but refuted his allegation of fictional breaks. The petitioner.s allegation that his services were
terminated on July 20, 2004, was also repudiated by the respondents. Claiming the petitioner to have been engaged as
against a seasonal work, which was purely of temporary nature, the respondents averred that he had worked only for 13
days in 1994 and thereafter never completed 240 days in any year, and that he did not turn up after July, 2004. Refuting
the petitioner.s allegation that certain workers junior to him, were retained and working in the department, the
respondents averred that “no junior persons to the applicant has ever been engaged or allowed to be continued by the
respondents, as alleged rather all those who are working in the unit are seniors to the applicant.” On the basis of these
averments, the respondents prayed for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition. Claiming to have worked for 56 days in 1994, the petitioner alleged that the mandays chart
prepared by the respondents was wrong, and that certain workers junior to him were still working in the respondents.
department.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the respondent had been giving fictional breaks in the petitioner.s service. If so, to
what effect?
..OPP.
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3331
2.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents is unlawful. If so,
what relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation he is entitled to?
..OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable?
..OPR.
4.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : No
Issue 2 : Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned under this issue.
Issue 3 : No
Relief : The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
The respondents. claim in their joint reply that the petitioner was engaged as against a seasonal work,
which was purely of a temporary nature, to my thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the
materials on record. Nowhere in his affidavit Ex. RW1/A or cross-examination as RW1 did the respondents. witness
Piar Singh, Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Department, Mandi, maintain that the petitioner was engaged as
against a seasonal work. Also, the mandays Chart (Annexure R-1) produced by the respondents is not indicative of the
petitioner having been engaged as against a seasonal work. The respondents. claim that the petitioner was engaged as
against a seasonal work cannot therefore be taken without a pinch of salt.
7.
But the petitioner.s allegation that the respondents had been giving fictional breaks in his service, also,
to my mind, does not ring true for want of plausible evidence. He in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A inter alia deposed:
“Moreover the respondent No.3 willfully and intentionally did not allow the applicant to complete 240
days initially upto 1997 after that applicant has completed 240 days, but the mandays chart has been
prepared arbitrarily as no month wise mandays chart has been given as applicant has worked for whole
of the year so the termination order is void, abinitio…..”
8.
This deposition, to my mind, appears to be far from truth, for the mandays chart is indicative of his
having worked for 13, 80, 90, 161, 156, 190, 168, 182, 202, 168, and 74 days during the years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004.
9.
The petitioner.s allegation that the mandays chart has been prepared arbitrarily, and that the respondent
3 (respondent 2 in the reference) had not allowed him to complete 240 days in any calendar year cannot be accepted,
because no such suggestion was put to the latter during his cross-examination RW1 as may show that he had prepared
the mandays chart arbitrarily and not allowed the petitioner to complete 240 days in any calendar year. The allegation
of fictional breaks cannot therefore be said to have been substantiated. The issue under discussion is accordingly held
in the negative.
Issue 2:
10. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A deposed that he was engaged by the respondent 3 (respondent 2 in the
reference) in December, 1994, and that he worked upto July 20, 2004 when all of a sudden his services were orally
terminated by the respondents. This deposition of his having not specifically been challenged during his cross-
examination by the respondents deserves acceptance and is accepted. The respondents. claim in their joint reply that the
petitioner had abandoned the job after July, 2004, is therefore nothing but falsity. More so, when they did not choose to
adduce in evidence such muster roll or any other document as may show the petitioner to have absented from work or
abandoned his job after July, 2004.
11. The petitioner.s allegation that in terminating his services, the respondents had violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act, to my mind, does not appear to be tenable, because the materials on record are demonstrative
of his having worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment.
12.
However, in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondents appear to have violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, which reads:
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“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
13. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A deposed that the workmen namely Goverdhan Singh, Bimla
Devi, Uttam Chand, Mahant Ram, Nilima, Hans Raj and Rattan, who were junior to him, were still working at Pandoh,
Nagwain, Mumail, Mohin and Mandi. This claim of the petitioner having not specifically been disputed during his
cross-examination by the respondents appears to be true. More so, when the seniority list Ex. RA adduced in evidence
by the respondents is also indicative of the said workmen being junior to the petitioner and their having been retained in
service at the time of termination of his services. The respondents. are therefore proved to have violated the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. In view of the respondents having been found to have violated
the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time of termination of his services. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of
his unlawful retrenchment (July 20, 2004). However, he is held not entitled to back-wages, because his pleadings as
also the evidence led by him are non-existent in such averments as may show that he was not gainfully employed after
his retrenchment. The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
Issue 3:
14. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issues, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
RELIEF
15. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 2, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time of termination of his services (July 20, 2004). Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of
service from the date of his retrenchment. He is, however, held not entitled to any back-wages. The respondents are
directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A
copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion
consigned to the record room.
Announced in the open Court today this 21st day of January, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 610/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Punnu Ram S/o Shri Hirda Ram, Village & P.O. Baradta, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
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3333
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Punnu Ram S/o Shri Hirda Ram, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
Employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
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2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged
OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of termination of
his services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means.—
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof.—
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
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3335
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, tomy
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(ii)
the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
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“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault
on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine;
and
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3337
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
3338
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allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22.
Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1090/2007-9372, dated 25.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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3339
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 106/2007
Date of Institution : 7.9.2007
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Raj Kumar S/o Shri Tulsi Ram, Vill. Saul, P.O. Khural, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
Divisional Forest Officer, Wild Life Division, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Raj Kumar S/o Shri Tulsi Ram workman by the Divisional
Forest Officer, Wild Life Division, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. w.e.f. June, 2003 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 whereas junior to him are retained by the employer is
proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in the month of January, 1998, and that he worked as such in
Wild Life Division, Kullu until September, 2003. His services were, however, terminated by the respondent w.e.f.
September, 2003 without giving him month.s notice and paying him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act (the Act, for short). Claiming to have never absented, from work, the petitioner further averred
that during the period of his employment, the respondent had been giving fictional breaks in his service, even tough
there was availability of work and funds. In terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent, it is further
averred, also violated the principle of „Last Come First Go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act, because the
workmen namely Chander, Brij Lal, Santosh Kumar, Salig Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained in
service at the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, the respondent violated the provisions of Section 25-N of
the Act, because no prior permission for termination of the services of the petitioner was obtained from the appropriate
Government nor was he paid retrenchment compensation. It is also averred that the respondent had after the petitioner.s
retrenchment engaged new workers on daily wages basis without giving the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself
for re-employment and thus violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed
3340
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for a direction to the respondent to reinstatement him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other
consequential service benefits. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to take into account the period of break
in his services towards continuity of service.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in the month of January, 1998, but denied having terminated his services from September,
2003 unlawfully. Claiming the work of his department to be of a seasonal nature, the respondent averred that the
petitioner was engaged as casual worker subject to availability of works/funds and that he had worked intermittently
and only for 63 days in 1998. Denying having given fictional breaks in the services of the petitioner, the respondent
further averred that the petitioner had worked intermittently “depending upon the availability of funds/works” upto
August, 2007 whereafter he on his own did not turn up for work. No workman junior to the petitioner, according to the
respondent, was retained in service nor was any new worker engaged on muster roll basis after the petitioner
abandoned the job on his own. In view of the seasonal nature of the work for which the petitioner was engaged as
causal worker subject to availability of work and funds, no provision of the Act, according to the respondent, can be
said to have been violated. More so, when, he on his own did not turn up for work for August, 2007. It is also averred
that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri and the petition not maintainable in the present form.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so,
what relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable.
..OPR.
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
The respondent is not proved to have terminated the services of the petitioner w.e.f. June, 2003 as
mentioned in the Reference. He is therefore not entitled to the relief he prayed for.
Issue 2 :
Yes
Issue 3 :
Yes.
Relief. :
Petition dismissed per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
7.
In the Reference, which appears to have been based on the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour Inspector.s
report no. 696-97 dated December 31, 2005, services of the petitioner are stated to have been terminated w.e.f. June,
2003. But nowhere in his statement of claim did the petitioner allege that his services were terminated w.e.f. June,
2003. What is inter alia averred by him is that he was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in the month of
January, 1998, and that his services were illegally terminated by the respondent from September, 2003. But belying his
claim that his services were terminated from September, 2003, the petitioner in paragraph 1 of his affidavit Ex. PW1/A,
however, maintained that he had continuously worked upto September, 2003. In paragraph 8 of his affidavit, he,
however, belied even this claim of his by stating that his services were terminated in the month of/from June, 2003. But
the materials on record are not demonstrative of his services having been terminated with effect from June, 2003. The
mandays chart Ex. PW1/E the correctness of which is not disputed by the petitioner, is indicative of his having worked
for 109, 157, 121, 240 and 303 days in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively and 31, 27, 31, 30, 31, 30, 12, 26
and 4 days in the months of January, February, March, April, May, June, July, August and September, 2003
respectively. In view of this document, the respondent.s denial of having terminated the services of the petitioner and
the latter.s inconsistent stand as to the date of termination of his services, I have no hesitation in holding that his
services were not terminated with effect from June, 2003, not to speak of the alleged illegality in the termination of his
services w.e.f. the said point of time as mentioned in the Reference. He is therefore not entitled to the relief he prayed
for. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against him and in favour of the respondent.
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3341
Issue 2:
8.
In view of what has been observed under the foregoing issue, the petitioner is decidedly guilty of
suppressio veri. The issue on hand is therefore held in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
issue 3:
9.
In view of my findings on the above issue 1, the petition is not maintainable. The issue on hand is
therefore held in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
RELIEF
10. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the claim petition fails and is
hereby dismissed. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for
publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT BILASPUR)
Ref No. : 94/2006
Date of Institution : 30.8.2006
Date of decision : 21.1.2009
Shri Raj Kumar S/o Shri Bhagat Ram, Village Dadaur, P.O. Dhaban, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi,H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Deputy Director of Industries (Sericulture) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Division, Mandi,H.P.
..Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. L.B. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the action of the (1) Deputy Director of Industries (Sericulture) Palampur, District Kangra,
H.P. (2) The Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Division, Mandi, H.P. to give break in service to
Shri Raj Kumar S/o Shri Bhagat Ram workman during his/her service period time and again and
finally terminated w.e.f. 09.06.2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the
above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondents as daily waged Beldar on March 16, 1993, and that he worked as such upto July 20, 2004. Thereafter the
respondents suddenly terminated his services orally without giving him an opportunity of being heard. Claiming to
have worked for 240 days in each calendar year, the petitioner alleged that the respondents, who had been giving
fictional breaks in his service, never allowed him to complete 240 days in any calendar year, and that he having not
been served with any notice before termination of his services, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section
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jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
25-F of the Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). The respondents, according to the petitioner, also violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act, because certain workmen, who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time of his
retrenchment. The respondent, it is further alleged, also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The
petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the respondents to re-engage him in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of termination of his services. He also prayed for a direction to the respondents to pay him full
back-wages and count the “intervening period between re-engagement and dis-engagement” towards his seniority.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily
waged Beldar on March 16, 1993, but refuted his allegation of fictional breaks in his service. The petitioner.s allegation
that his services were terminated on July 20, 1994, was also repudiated by the respondents. Claiming the petitioner to
have been engaged as against a seasonal work, which was purely of temporary nature, the respondents averred that he
had worked only for 4 days in 1993 and thereafter never completed 240 days in any year, and that he did not turn up
after July, 2004. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation that certain workers junior to him were retained and working in the
department, the respondents averred that “no junior persons to the applicant has ever been engaged or allowed to be
continued by the respondents, as alleged rather all those who are working in the unit are seniors to the applicant.” On
the basis of these averments, the respondents prayed for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition. Claiming to have worked for 56 days in 1994, the petitioner alleged that the Mandays Chart
prepared by the respondents was wrong, and that certain workers junior to him were still working in the respondents.
department.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether affording to breaks in service of the petitioner by the respondent and ultimately
terminating him is legal and justified?
..OPP.
2.
If the above issue is proved in the affirmative, what relief the claimant is entitled to? ..OPR.
3.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned under this issue.
Relief :
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
The respondents. claim in their joint reply that the petitioner was engaged as against a seasonal work,
which was purely of a temporary nature, to my thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the
materials on record. Nowhere in his affidavit Ex. RW1/A or cross-examination as RW1 did the respondents. witness
Piar Singh, Technical Officer (Tassar) Sericulture Department, Mandi, maintain that the petitioner was engaged as
against a seasonal work. Also, the mandays chart produced by the respondents is not indicative of the petitioner having
been engaged as against a seasonal work. The respondents. claim that the petitioner was engaged as against a seasonal
work cannot therefore be taken without a pinch of salt.
7.
But the petitioner.s allegation that the respondents had been giving fictional breaks in his service, also,
to my mind, does not ring true for want of plausible evidence. He in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A inter alia deposed:
“Moreover the respondent No.3 willfully and intentionally did not allow the applicant to complete 240
days initially upto 1997 after that applicant has completed 240 days, but the mandays chart has been
prepared arbitrarily as no month wise mandays chart has been given as applicant has worked for whole
of the year so the termination order is void, abinitio…..”
8.
This deposition, to my mind, appears to be far from truth, for the mandays chart is indicative of his
having worked for 4, 34, 117, 93, 163, 158, 190, 168, 182, 198, 165 and 75 days during the years 1993, 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively.
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3343
9.
The petitioner.s allegation that the mandays chart has been prepared arbitrarily, and that the respondent
3 (respondent 2 in the reference) had not allowed him to complete 240 days in any calendar year, cannot be accepted,
because no such suggestion was put to the latter during his cross-examination RW1 as may show that he had prepared
the mandays chart arbitrarily and not allowed the petitioner to complete 240 in any calendar year. The allegation of
fictional breaks cannot therefore be said to have been substantiated. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in
the negative.
Issue 2:
10. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A deposed that he had worked upto July 20, 2004 when all of a
sudden his services were orally terminated by the respondents. This deposition of his having not specifically been
challenged during his cross-examination by the respondents deserves acceptance and is accepted. The respondents.
claim in their joint reply that the petitioner had abandoned the job after July, 2004, is therefore nothing but falsity.
More so, when they did not choose to adduce in evidence any such muster roll or other document as may show that the
petitioner absented from work as abandoned the job after July 20, 2004.
11. The petitioner.s allegation that in terminating his services, the respondents had violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act, to my mind, does not appear to be tenable, because the materials on record are not
demonstrative of his having worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his
retrenchment.
12. However, in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondents appear to have violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, which reads:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
13. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A deposed that the workmen namely Goverdhan Singh, Bimla
Devi, Uttam Chand, Mahant Ram, Nilima, Hans Raj and Rattan, who were junior to him, were still working at Pandoh,
Nagwain, Mumail, Mohin and Mandi. This claim of the petitioner having not specifically been disputed during his
cross-examination by the respondents appears to be true. More so, when the seniority list Ex. RW1/A adduced in
evidence by the respondents is also indicative of the said workmen being junior to the petitioner and their having been
retained in service at the time of termination of his services. The respondents are therefore proved to have violated the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. In view of the respondents having been found to have violated
the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time of termination of his services. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of
his unlawful retrenchment (July 20, 2004). However, he is held not entitled to back-wages, because his pleadings as
also the evidence led by him are non-existent in such averments as may show that he was not gainfully employed after
his retrenchment. The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
RELIEF
14. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issues 2, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time of termination of his services (July 20, 2004). Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of
service from the date of his retrenchment. He is, however, held not entitled to any back-wages. The respondents are
directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A
copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion
consigned to the record room.
Announced in the open Court today this 21st day of January, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S. S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. : 71/2007
Date of Institution : 2.6.2007
Date of decision : 31.12.2008
Shri Ram Chand S/o Shri Nek Ram, Village Bina, P.O. Kalohad, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
1.
Director of Agriculture, H.P. Shimla.
2.
The Deputy Director of Agriculture, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.
3.
The Assistant Soil Survey Officer, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
..Respondents.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR.
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Ram Chand S/o Shri Nek Ram workman by the Director
of Agriculture, H.P. Shimla-5 (2) The Deputy Director of Agriculture, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (3)
The Assistant Soil Survey Officer, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. July, 1994 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 where as new persons have been
appointed during the year, 2001 by the above employer as alleged by the workman is proper and
justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved
workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as Junior
Draughtsman on daily wages basis in the office of the Assistant Soil Survey Officer, Sunder Nagar in Mandi district in
the month of October, 1987, and that he worked as such upto June 2, 1992. On June 3, 1992, the respondent 3
terminated the services of the petitioner, vide letter No.Agr. Estt. 92-76 dated June 3, 1992. Aggrieved, the petitioner
approached the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. On October 1, 1992, the said Tribunal granted stay orders
on the basis of which the petitioner was allowed to continue in service till July, 1994. In that month, the Tribunal,
however, vacated the stay orders. Claiming to have completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months
preceding the date of his retrenchment in July, 1994, the petitioner averred that in dispensing with his services, the
respondent violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, (the Act, for short), for at the time his
retrenchment no notice was given to him nor was he paid retrenchment compensation for the period from June 1992 to
July 1994. Besides, the respondents violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, because seven persons namely
Joginder Singh, Krishan Dev, Kusum Lata, Vidya Sagar, Inder Singh, Surender Kumar and Niranjan Singh were
appointed in the respondents. department as Junior Draughtsman in 2001 without giving the petitioner an opportunity
to offer himself for re-employment. The petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the respondents to reinstate him
with full back-wages and continuity of service. He also prayed for a direction to the respondents to “give the
employment to the applicant on the basis of person appointed in 2001 on regular pay scale to the post of JDM and pay
him all arrear of payments and other consequential service benefits from the date the person appointed on regular
basis.”
3.
The respondents in their joint reply averred that the petitioner was engaged under U.S. Aid Project on
daily wages basis, and that upon the project coming to an end on September 30, 1992, his services were dispensed with
in accordance with law. It is averred that as one month.s notice and retrenchment compensation were given to the
petitioner at the time his services were dispensed with, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act cannot be said to have
been violated. Denying having violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, the respondents further averred:
“…..The applicant was engaged under the U.S. Aid Project and the said project ended on 30.9.1992.
Consequently his service was dispensed with in accordance with law. It is further submitted that the applicant
was daily wages on particular project and his O.A. No. 1212/92 stand disposed off on merit on 26.5.1994.
There was no direction for consideration or for his re-employment at all. Re-employment constituted a
different cause of action even if reference is to be made to the valid termination and not otherwise. The
applicant applied for the civil post advertised which was no relation on nuxes with the valid termination. It
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3345
cannot be described as a matter of incidental to. The daily paid labourer do not hold any civil post and cannot
claim their appointment against any civil post as a matter of right. The applicant challenges/appointment of
fresh appointee requisite in 2000-2001 who have been required after following procedure laid down in the rule
and law and the same breath claiming re-employment of daily wages badly re-terminated/retrenchment. Hence
the claim of the applicant is illegal, unjust and against law & procedure.”
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition. He averred that he was engaged under U.S. Aid Project on daily wages basis in the year
1987 and worked upto September 30, 1992. He later filed before the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal O.A.
No.1212/1992; that stay orders were granted in his favour and that the O.A. was disposed of on May 26, 1994. On the
same day (May 26, 1999) the respondent terminated his services without giving him one month.s notice and
retrenchment compensation. The petitioner.s services, it is further averred, were again terminated by the respondents in
the month of July, 1994 without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the disengagement from the service of the claimant by the respondent is proper and
justified?
..OPP.
2.
If the above issue is proved in the affirmative, what relief of service benefit the petitioner is entitled
to?
..OPP.
3.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
He is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 3 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
7.
Recounting the material facts averred in the claim petition, the petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A
deposed that he was engaged as junior Draughtsman/Tracer on daily wages basis in the office of Assistant Soil Survey
Officer, Sunder Nagar in Mandi district in October, 1987, and that he worked as such upto June 2, 1994. On June 3,
1992, his services were terminated by the respondent 3, vide letter No. Agr. Estt. 92-76 dated June 3, 1992. This
deposition of the petitioner having not been challenged during his cross-examination by the respondents deserves
acceptance and is accepted.
8.
The materials on record would reveal that aggrieved by his retrenchment, the petitioner preferred before
the H.P. Administrative Tribunal an application (O.A. No.1212/1992) on the basis of which stay orders were granted in
his favour on October 1, 1992. Later the said Tribunal dismissed the petitioner.s application and vacated the stay
orders, vide order dated May 26, 1994 Ex. RW1/D. The petitioner.s claim in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A that on the basis
of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal.s stay orders dated October 1, 1992, he was allowed by the respondents to continue
in service till July, 1994, and that on vacation of the stay orders his services were dispensed with in July, 1994, has not
been disputed during his cross-examination by the respondents. The respondents. witness Tilak Raj, then Assistant
Survey Officer, Sunder Nagar, inter alia testified as RW1:
“…. Ram Chand (petitioner) was employed in U.S. Aid Project, which had commenced in 1987. The
petitioner was engaged as Tracer. The project came to an end on 30.9.1992 and the petitioner was paid
retrenchment compensation and one month.s salary, amounting to Rs.5436/- by way of cheque No. 805513
dated June 3, 1992 after being given a notice in May, 1992. A copy of the notice given to the petitioner is Ex.
RW1/A. Before this, the petitioner had filed before the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal O.A.
No.1212/1992, a copy of which is Ex. RW1/B. A copy of another O.A. (No.310/2003) preferred before the
Tribunal is Ex. RW1/C. A copy of the order dated May 26, 1994 passed in O.A. No.1212/1992 is Ex. RW1/D.
The project continued for a limited period, vide copy of the letter Ex. RW1/E. No provisions of the I.D. Act
was violated by the respondents.”
3346
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9.
During his cross-examination, this witness categorically admitted the petitioner.s suggestions that no
appointment letter was given when he (petitioner) was engaged as daily wager on muster roll basis; that for
appointment as Tracer, „Draughtsman Civil. is an essential qualification; that the petitioner was a Junior Draughtsman;
that on October 1, 1992, stay orders were granted by the Administrative Tribunal in favour of the petitioner in O.A.
No.1212/1992, and that the petitioner was re-engaged in compliance with the orders of the Court. Having deposed so,
Tilak Raj hastened to add that on vacation of the stay orders, May 26,1994, the petitioner.s services came to an end.
The petitioner continued to work during the stay orders.
10. Now, what emerges from the abovediscussed evidence is that the petitioner, who admittedly in the cross-
examination of the respondent.s witness Tilak Raj (RW1) is holder of a draughtsman diploma, was engaged by the
respondent as Junior Draughtsman/Tracer on daily wages basis in the office of Soil Survey Officer, Sunder Nagar in
Mandi district in October, 1987. The work as against which he was engaged as Junior Draughtsman/Tracer was of an
U.S.Aid project, which was completed by end of September, 1992, vide letter dated May, 20, 1992, a copy of which is
Ex. RW1/E. The services of the petitioner were dispensed with by the respondent 3 on June 3, 1992, vide letter No.
Agr. Estt. 92-76 dated June 3, 1992. There is no gainsaying fact that at the time of termination of his services on June 3,
1992, the petitioner was served with a prior notice in May, 1992 and paid retrenchment compensation and one month.s
salary, amounting to Rs.5436/-. However, aggrieved by the termination of his services the petitioner filed before the
H.P. Administrative Tribunal an application (O.A. No.1212/1992) on the basis of which interim stay orders were
granted in his favour on October 1, 1992. It was on the basis of these orders that he was re-engaged in the same
capacity as in which he was working at the time of termination of his services on June 3, 1992. The interim stay orders
aforementioned were, however, vacated by the Tribunal aforementioned, vide order dated May 26, 1994 EX. RW1/D,
which in its material part reads:
“The respondents have taken a specific stand that during April/May, 1990 when survey/work under which the
applicants were initially engaged i.e. U.S. Aid Project was completed, the Assistant Soil Survey Officer,
Sundernagar retrenched the services of the applicants. In view of specific averments of the respondents that
the applicants were engaged initially under U.S. Aid Scheme and the said scheme has been completed, the
posts of the applicants are no longer under this project, which has come to an end. Hence, they are not entitled
to serve under the said project. We seek further support from the order passed by the Apex Court in State of
H.P. Vs. Sanjay Sharma & others in SLP(C) No. 13957 of 1993 decided on November 1, 1993 by the Hon.ble
Supreme Court. In view of above, this application is rejected with no order as to costs. The stay granted on
October, 1992 is hereby vacated.”
11. It was on vacation of the interim stay orders that the services of the petitioner were dispensed with in
July, 1994. Admittedly in the cross-examination of the respondent.s witness Tilak Raj (RW1), no notice or
retrenchment compensation was given to the petitioner when he was removed from service in July, 1994 on vacation of
the stay orders by the H.P. Administrative Tribunal.
12. Now the question that arises is; whether in the circumstances where the petitioner was engaged as daily
waged Junior Draughtsman/Tracer in October, 1987 as against a project work which was time-bound; where his
services were dispensed with on June 3, 1992 after he was served with a retrenchment notice and paid retrenchment
compensation; where he was re-engaged on the basis of the interim stay orders dated October 1, 1992 passed by the
H.P. Administrative Tribunal on his application (O.A. No.1212/1992), and where on vacation of the stay orders his
services were terminated by the respondents in July, 1994, the respondents were obliged to comply with the provisions
of Section 25-F of the Act at the time of termination of his services in July, 1994. The answer, to my thinking, is in the
affirmative. The petitioner whose services undeniably stood terminated on June 3, 1992, was later re-engaged, though
on the basis of the aforementioned interim stay orders passed by the H.P. Administrative Tribunal. So, on his re-
engagement, it was fresh commencement of his service in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his
services were dispensed with on June 3, 1992. He in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A claimed to have completed 240 days
during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment in July, 1994. This claim of his having
not been disputed during his cross-examination by the respondents deserves acceptance and is accepted. Section 25-F
of the Act provides:
“25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(i) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice;
(ii) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent
to fifteen days. average [pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
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3347
(iii) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
13. In view of the petitioner having been re-engaged by the respondents as daily waged Junior
Draughtsman/Tracer and his having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of
termination of his services in July, 1994, the respondents were enjoined upon by the abovementioned provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act to give him one month.s notice or pay him wages for the period of the notice along with
retrenchment compensation. But the respondents having failed so to do decidedly violated the said provisions. So, the
termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent in July, 1994 was not proper and justified. The issues
under discussion is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
14. In view of my findings on the foregoing issue, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same
capacity as in which he was working at the time of termination of his services in July, 1994. Besides, he is entitled to
the benefit of continuity of service as daily waged Junior Draughtsman/Tracer from the date of his retrenchment in the
said month. He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages because of his failure to lead such evidence as may show
that he was not gainfully employed or that he remained idle after his retrenchment in July, 1994. The issue under
discussion is held accordingly.
RELIEF
15. Judged in the light of findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in part.
Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time
of his retrenchment in July, 1994. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service from the date on which his
services were terminated in the said month. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he is, however, held not
entitled to back-wages. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today.
The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the
official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of December, 2008.
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H. P.
Ref No. : 118/2005
Date of Institution : 2. 8. 2005
Date of decision : 28.2.2009
Shri Ram Saran S/o Shri Adam Ram, Vill. Samila, P.O. Seri-Kothi, Tehsil, Sundernagar, Distt. Mandi.
..Petitioner.
Versus
Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Sundernagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. M.L. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Ram Saran S/o Shri Adam Ram workman by the
Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 1-4-2003 without
3348
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complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief
of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent in Kangoo Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in 2000, and that he worked as such
till the end of March, 2003. On April 1, 2003, his services were suddenly terminated by the respondent. Claiming to
have worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year, the petitioner averred that at the time his services were
dispensed with no notice was given to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). In terminating his services, the respondent, according to
the petitioner, also violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, because certain workmen, who were junior to
him, were retained in service at the time his services were terminated. Claiming to have requested the respondent as
also the Forest Range Officer concerned to re-engage him, the petitioner further averred that as his requests for re-
engagement fell on a deaf ear, he served the respondent with a notice under Section 2-A of the Act on May 8, 2003, but
without effect. Left with no option, he later raised an industrial dispute, which is encompassed in the reference in
question. He prays for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. He also prays for the grant of full back-wages and other consequential
service benefits including continuity of service.
3.
The respondent in his reply averred that the petitioner was engaged as a daily waged Mazdoor on muster
roll basis for casual and seasonal forestry works in Kangoo Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in October, 2000 and
dis-engaged on completion of the works in July, 2005. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been dis-engaged in
the year 2003, the respondent further averred that the petitioner had not completed 240 days in each calendar year
except the year 2002; that the forestry works against which he was engaged was of a seasonal nature, and that he had
worked upto July, 2005 intermittently keeping in view the availability of works and funds. There, therefore, exists no
industrial dispute and the reference is not covered under the Act.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondent on April 1, 2003.
..OPP.
2.
If the above issue 1 is proved, whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the
respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
3.
Whether the petitioner was engaged as daily waged labourer for seasonal forestry works subject to
availability of work and funds and dis-engaged on completion of the works as alleged
..OPR.
10. Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
Issue 1 having not been proved, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
The petition dismissed per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in Kangoo
Forest Range of Sundernagar Forest Division in 2000, is not disputed by the respondent. What is disputed by the
respondent is his claim of having been retrenched w.e.f. April, 2003. The respondent.s claim that the services of the
petitioner were not terminated in April, 2003, to my thinking, appears to having a ring of truth in view of the materials
on record. The petitioner in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A inter alia maintained that he had worked as daily waged Beldar in
Kangoo Forest Range of Sundernagar Forest Division till the end of March, 2003, and that his services were terminated
by the respondent orally w.e.f. April, 2003. But his claim of having worked „till the end of March, 2003. does not find
assurance from the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B, which is indicative of his having not worked even for a single day in the
month of March, 2003. Also, his claim that the respondent had terminated his services orally w.e.f. April, 2003, stands
falsified by what he maintained in his cross-examination as PW1. He in his cross-examination as PW1 deposed that he
had worked for 240 days every year from 2001 to 2005. If to go by this deposition of his, his claim that his services
were terminated w.e.f. April, 2003 cannot be taken without a pinch of salt. More so, in view of the aforementioned
mandays chart which is demonstrative of his having not worked even for a single day in the months of January, March,
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3349
April, May, June, August and December, 2003. In the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B, he is shown to have worked for 25,
5, 13, 15, 7, 23, 2, 17, 4, 9 and 11 days in the months of February, July, September, October and November, 2003,
August, 2004 and January, February, March, July and November, 2005 respectively.
7.
In view of the above, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to substantiate
his allegation that his services were terminated by the respondent w.e.f. April, 2003. The issue under discussion is
therefore held in the negative.
Issue 2:
8.
In view of the above issue 1 having not been proved, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The issue
under discussion is held accordingly.
Issue 3:
9.
In the respondent.s reply as also in his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, the petitioner is stated to have been
engaged as daily waged Mazdoor on muster roll basis for casual and seasonal forestry works in Kangoo Range of
Sundernagar Forest Division during October, 2000. The respondent to establish this claim ought to have adduced in
evidence the muster roll for the month of October, 2000, or any other document wherein the petitioner may have been
shown to have been engaged for „seasonal forestry works., but he failed so to do. Also, the respondent to substantiate
his claim that the services of the petitioner were dispensed with on completion of the work as against which he was
engaged, ought to have led documentary evidence including the muster roll for the month of July, 2005, but he failed to
do even this. It is therefore difficult to accept his claim that the petitioner was engaged for „casual and seasonal forestry
works., and that his services were terminated on completion of the works in July, 2005. More so, in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C, which is indicative of certain workmen having worked for more than 240 days every calendar
year from 1997 to 2006. Had the respondent been true in his claim that the petitioner was engaged as against seasonal
forestry works, and that such works came to an end in July, 2005, certain workmen would not have been shown to have
worked almost whole of the year during the calendar years from 1997 to 2006 in the seniority list Ex. RW1/C. The
inescapable conclusion therefore is that the respondent.s claim of having engaged the petitioner as against seasonal
forestry works and terminated his services on completion of these works in July, 2005, is nothing but falsity. The issue
under discussion is therefore held in the negative.
RELIEF
10. Judged in the light of my findings on the above issue 1, the claim petition fails and the petitioner is held not entitled
to any relief. As a result, the reference is dismissed. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for
publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of February, 2009.
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 633/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Ramesh Kumar S/o Shri Masadi Lal R/o Village Bahladai, P.O. Kot, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
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AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Ramesh Kumar S/o Shri Masadi Lal, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
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3351
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
3352
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(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. (1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than
one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11.
In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
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3353
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(i)
a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault
on the part of the workman;
(ii) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
3354
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(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii)
two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16.
But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash Chand,
Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to him,
were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the respondent
thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply, the
respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
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3355
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22.
Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the extent
the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour of the
petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9900 dated 30.11.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 20, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
3356
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Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 621/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Rattan Chand S/o Shri Sher Singh, VPO Baradla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Rattan Chand S/o Shri Sher Singh, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
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3357
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of termination of
his services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
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Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii)
a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii)
whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding
twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the
aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel,
restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
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3359
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be
served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity
of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may,
having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the
workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to
grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the
notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under
any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
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head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident
or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of
the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
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3361
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provision of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
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23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24.
In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1097/2007-9271, dated 12.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated August 9, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
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3363
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 46/2001
Date of Institution : 25.5.2001
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Sh. Roop Chand, s/o Shri Medu Ram, Village & P.O. Tulah, Tehsil Ladbharol, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
1.
Secretary, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, Shimla-4.
2.
Executive Engineer, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, Jogindernagar Division, Jogindernagar,
Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. B.K. Sood, Adv.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of the workman Roop Chand by the employer, Executive
Engineer, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, Jogindernagar Division, Jogindernagar, without
notice is lawful or unlawful under section 25(H) or 25(N) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. If
unlawful, what relief and service benefits the workman is entitled to”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the
Respondent 2) as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in Makriri Sub Division of HPSEB Electrical Division,
Joginder Nagar on February 15, 1995 and worked as such from February 25, 1995 to July 24, 1995. On July 25, 1995
his services were terminated by the respondent in violation of the provisions of Clause 14(2) of the Industrial
Establishment Standing Orders (hereinafter referred to as the Standing Orders) framed under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Claiming to have been re-engaged by the respondent 2 as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in the aforesaid Sub Division on September 25, 1997, the petitioner further averred that on
October 5, 1997, his services were again dispensed with by the respondent 2 orally. In terminating his services, the
respondent 2 violated the principle of „Last Come First Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) because certain workers namely Partap Chand, Sanjay Kumar, Damodar, Ramesh Chand,
Durga Dass, Ram Chander, Om Parkash, Prithi Chand, Rajmal, Ghanshyam Dass and Smt. Kanta Devi, who were
junior to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services. Besides, the respondent
violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, because he after terminating the services of the petitioner engaged
fresh workers without giving the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment. The petitioner therefore
prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages and continuity of service. He also prayed
for the grant of other consequential service benefits.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar on February 15, 1995
and worked from February 25, 1995 to July 24, 1995, the respondents in their joint reply avered that he was first
engaged as causal Beldar on March 13, 1995 in Makriri Sub Division of HPSEB Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar,
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and that he worked under muster roll No.744 w.e.f. 25.2.1995 to 24.3.1995. In paragraph 2 of the reply, the
respondents, however, further averred that “in fact the petitioner worked w.e.f. 13.3.95 to 14.7.1995 with certain willful
absence and interruption and w.e.f. 14.7.1995 to 30.9.1997, the petitioner remain willfully absent”. Claiming to have
re-engaged the petitioner on October 1, 1997, vide muster roll no.262 for the period from 25.9.1997 to 24.10.1997, the
respondents averred that this time he worked only for 10 days and abandoned the job on his own on October 15, 1997.
Denying having violated the principle of „Last Come First Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act, the
respondents further averred that “the junior persons named S/Sh. Partap Chand, Ram Chander, Om Prakash, Prithi
Chand, Raj Mal, Ghanshyam Dass and Kanta Devi have not been terminated as per Court order”. The workers namely
Pratap Chand and Davinder, according to the respondents, were casually engaged by the Assistant Engineer, HPSEB
Electrical Sub Division, Makriri, in September, 1996 and February, 1997 respectively. It is also averred that no worker
was engaged after the petitioner abandoned the job on October 15, 1997. In view of the abandonment by the petitioner
of the job on his own, no provision of the Act or Clause of the Standing Orders, according to the respondents, can be
said to have been violated. They therefore prayed for rejection of the petitioner.s claim.
4. The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand taken
in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents is violative of Sections
25H and 25N of the I.D.Act, 1947.
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable in view of the preliminary objections.
..OPR.
3.
Relief.
6.
Be it stated that my Ld. Predecessor-in-office dismissed the claim petition chiefly on the grounds of
delay and laches, vide award dated March 22, 2006. Aggrieved, the petitioner laid challenge to the award by preferring
before the Hon.ble High Court of H.P. a writ petition (CWP No.577/2006). By its judgment dated November 21, 2007,
the Hon.ble High Court accepted the writ petition, set aside the impugned award and remanded the matter to this Court
for decision afresh.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on the aforementioned issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes partly, because the respondent 2 is proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25H of the Act.
Issue 2 :
No
Relief :
Petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
8.
Belying his claim of having been engaged by the respondent 2 as daily waged Beldar on February 15,
1995, the petitioner in his cross-examination as PW1 admitted the respondents. suggestion that he was for the first time
engaged on muster roll basis for the period from March 13, 1995 to July 14, 1995. Having admitted the correctness of
the muster rolls marked A to G which are indicative of his having worked intermittently during the period from March
13, 1995 to July 14, 1995, the petitioner admitted the respondents. another suggestion that he was again engaged as
daily waged Beldar on October 1, 1997. The respondents. claim is that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own
on October 15, 1997. This claim, to my thinking, does not ring true in view of the materials on record. In the muster
roll no.262 marked H (Ex.RW1/I) the petitioner is shown to have worked upto October 15, 1997 and absented from
work thereafter. He denies having abandoned the job on his own. According to him, his services were dispensed with
by the Assistant Engineer of Makriri Sub Division of HPSEB Electrical Division, Jogindernagar.
9.
Placing heavy reliance on the aforementioned muster roll Ex. RW1/I, the respondents. counsel, on the
other hand, contends with vehemence that this document being indicative of the petitioner having absented from work
with effect from October 16, 1997, he can safely be said to have abandoned the job on that day. I am not impressed
with this contention, because the absence from duty cannot be equated to abandonment of service. In this view I am
fortified by the authority of the case titled Sita Ram vs. Labour Court, Patiala, and others, reported in Factories Journal
Reports, Vol. 88, page 516. In that case, one of the issues framed by the Labour Court was: Whether the order of
termination of services of the workman is justified and in order. The said Court while deciding this issue held that as
the workman had absented from duty with effect from January 28, 1988, the management was justified in terminating
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his services on March 25, 1988. It was concluded that the case of the workman was of abandonment of service and not
retrenchment. Having referred to Section 2(oo) of the Act wherein is defined the expression “retrenchment”, the
Hon.ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana inter alia ruled:
“Absence from duty is not covered by any of the exceptions as enumerated in sub-clauses (a), (b),(bb) and (c).
Absence from duty can at the most be held to mean to be a misconduct. The termination of services on the
ground of misconduct could not be resorted to without holding an enquiry or complying with the provisions of
the Act………………………………
The “absence” simpliciter by itself cannot be equated with abandonment of service. According to the
dictionary, “absent” means “not present”. It also means not being in a particular place at a certain time. The
absence, therefore, means to be absent from specified position and not physically present. Abandoned on the
other hand connotes a conscious decision of a person who relinquishes the position held by him. It means
complete leaving of things as a final rejection of one.s responsibilities. According to the Oxford Dictionary, it
means, to let go, give up, renounce, leave off, to cease to hold, use or precise. The meaning of the word
“abandoned” depends upon the context in which it, is intended to be used. The Labour Court appears to have
completely ignored the settled provisions of law and passed a judgment merely on hypothesis….”
10. So, even if the respondents. claim as to the petitioner.s alleged absence from work is assumed to be true,
the plea of abandonment of job can still not be said to have been established, because absence from duty indubitably
amounts to misconduct, which calls for holding of a domestic inquiry by the employer in accordance with the
principles of natural justice. In D.K. Yadav Vs. JMA Industries Limited, 1993 (1) Services Law Judgments page 221,
the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia observed:
“Even executive authorities, which taken administrative action involving any deprivation of or
restriction on inherent fundamental rights of citizen, must take care to see that justice is not only done.
But manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the
appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness, or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is
patently impartial and meets the requirements of natural justice”.
11. The Hon.ble Supreme Court further held as under:
“It is well settled law that right to life enshrined under Art. 21 of Constitution would include right to
livelihood. The order of termination of the service of an employee/workman visits with civil consequence of
jeoparding not only his livelihood but also career and livelihood of dependents. Therefore, before taking any
action putting an end to the tenure of a workman fair play requires that a reasonable opportunity to put forth
his case is given and in case of any misconduct i.e. absence from duty or unauthorised absence from duty,
domestic enquiry be conducted complying with the principle of natural justice.”
12. Since the respondent 2 failed to conduct domestic inquiry into the reasons for the petitioner.s absence
from work, the respondents. claim that he had abandoned the job on his own on October 15, 1997, deserves to be
negatived. So, what stands established on record is that the respondent 2 had in fact terminated the services of the
petitioner on October 15/16, 1997.
13. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced with
advantage:
“25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average [pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
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15. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25 (B). Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or
a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation or work which is not due to any fault on the part
of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer.-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than.-
(i) ninety-five days, in the case of workman employed below ground in a mine; and one hundred
and twenty days, in any other case….”
16. Nowhere in his affidavit or cross-examination did the petitioner claim to have worked for 240 days
during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment. The mandays chart Ex. RW1/A the
correctness of which is not disputed by the petitioner, is also not indicative of his having the worked for 240 days
during the said period. The respondent 2 was therefore not obliged to give the petitioner one month.s notice and pay
him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
17. As for the alleged violation by the respondent 2 of the provisions of Section 25N of the Act, the same
also, to my mind, does not appear to have been established. This Section in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
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3367
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
18. Since the petitioner is not proved to have been in continuous service for not less than one year, the
respondent 2 was not obliged to obtain prior permission of the appropriate Government for his retrenchment. In
terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent 2 cannot therefore be said to have violated the provisions of
Section 25N of the Act.
19. As for the allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25H of the Act, the same, however,
appears to have been established. The petitioner, as already observed, is proved to have been retrenched by the
respondent 2 with effect from October 16, 1997. In Paragraph 3 of his affidavit Ex.P4, the petitioner inter alia
maintained:
“That after termination/retrenchment my service the Assistant Engineer have been appointed new
persons namely Sh. Chuni Lal, Dalip Singh, Man Singh, Roop Lal, Ram Lal, Gopi Ram, Molak Ram
and Davinder Singh in the years 1997 and 1998, but I have not recalled and not given me opportunity as
senior workman…”
20. This deposition having not been specifically challenged during his cross-examination by the respondents
deserves acceptance. More so, in view of the respondents. suggestion put to the petitioner during his cross-examination
that after his retrenchment some persons were engaged on the basis of Court orders and some on compassionate
grounds.
21. As to the employment of some workmen allegedly on compassionate grounds, the respondents,
however, did not choose to adduce any documentary evidence. It is therefore difficult to place reliance on their bald
claim that employment of some persons after the petitioner.s retrenchment was on compassionate grounds.
22. Paragraph 4 of a letter dated November 1, 2000 Ex. P3 addressed to the Labour-cum-Conciliation
Officer, Mandi Zone at Jogindernagar by the Senior Executive Engineer, Electrical Division, HPSEB, Jogindernagar, in
response to the petitioner.s demand notice may be reproduced with advantage:
“The averments made in this para are wrong and hence denied. In reply it is submitted that no such
named persons Kail Dass and Om Parkash had ever worked under Electircal Sub-Division, HPSEB,
Makriri but One Sh. Partap Chand was engaged during 10/96 when the applicant had already left the
job during 15.7.95 and had worked in different spell whereas Sh. Partap Chand is working continuously
and is still continue working as daily rated in the capacity of beldar. It is, therefore, stated that it is not
possible to re-engage the applicant in the belated stage of time where there is no work and funds
available with the replying respondent.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. I have already negatived the respondents. allegation that the petitioner had abandoned the job on
October 15, 1997. The respondents. above reply to the petitioner.s demand notice, is demonstrative of one Partap
Chand having been engaged by the respondent 2 after the petitioner.s retrenchment. Section 25H of the Act provides:
“25-H. Re-employment of retrenched workman. – Where any workmen are retrenched, and the
employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed,
give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for
reemployment, and such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for reemployment shall have
preference over other persons”.
24. There is nothing to indicate that before taking Partap Chand into his employ the respondent 2 had given
the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment. The provisions of Section 25H of the Act can
therefore safely be held to have been violated by the said respondent.
25. The upshot is that in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent 2 is not proved to have
violated the provisions of Section 25F or 25N of the Act. He is, however, proved to have violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act. The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
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Issue 2:
26. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is decidedly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to violation by the respondent 2 of the provisions of Section 25H of the Act.
RELIEF
27.
Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time of his retrenchment. He is, however, held not entitled to any back-wages, because the materials
on record are demonstrative of his having work for gain after his retrenchment. The respondents are directed to re-
engage him within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent
to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 8/2005
Date of Institution : 1.1.2005
Date of decision : 27.12.2008
Shri Roshan Lal S/o Shri Munshi Ram, Village Kalther, P.O. Bahanu, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. K.S. Guleria, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of the Shri Roshan Lal S/o Shri Munshi Ram, Ex. daily wages
beldar by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. April,
2001 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and whereas junior to him
are retained by the department as alleged by the workman is proper and justified? If not, what relief of
service benefits Shri Roshan Lal is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar in February, 1994, and that his services were orally terminated on April 30, 2001.
Alleging the respondent to have terminated his services without compliance with the provisions of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (the Act, for short), the petitioner further averred that his services were time and again interrupted by the
respondent on account of lock out or cessation of work, which was not due to any fault on his part, and that the period
of artificial breaks in his service was liable to be counted towards „continuous service. in view of the provisions of
Section 25-B of the Act. The workmen namely Pyar Chand, Dhameshwar, Parma Ram, Kanshi Ram, Rajinder Pal,
Balbir Singh, Satish Kumar and others, who according to the petitioner were junior to him, were retained in service by
the respondent at the time of termination of his services. On the basis of these averments, the petitioner prayed for a
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3369
direction to the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages and all other consequential service benefits. He also
prayed for a direction to the respondent to count the period of artificial breaks towards continuous service and maintain
a seniority list for the purpose of regularisation of his service as per the policy of the State Government.
3.
Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of artificial breaks in his service, the respondent in his reply averred
that he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged Beldar as against „seasonal works. in the month of February, 1994, and
that his services were never terminated, but he had abandoned the job on his own in the month of May, 2001 and thus
lost his seniority. Claiming the petitioner to have worked from 2/1994 to 31.5.2001 on the works of intermittent nature,
the respondent further averred that the petitioner never completed 240 days „which is the criteria for continuance of
service.. As for the petitioner.s allegation that the workmen namely Pyar Chand, Dhmaswer, Parma Ram, Kanshi Ram,
Rajinder Pal, Balbir Singh and Satish Kumar were junior to him and retained in service, the respondent.s contention is
that these persons having worked for 235 233, 245 ½ , 313, 319, 296 and 269 days respectively during the year 2000
and being still in service are considered senior to the petitioner. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the
principle of „last come first go., the respondent averred that this principle could not be said to have been violated in
view of the petitioner having abandoned the job on his own. On the basis of these averments, the respondent prayed for
dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
4.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
5.
Whether the respondent had been giving fictional breaks in the service of the petitioner
..OPP.
6.
Whether the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own in May, 2001
..OPR.
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, continuity of service and 50% back-wages as mentioned under this
issue.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues 1, 2 and 3:
7.
These issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
8.
The materials on record are indicative of the petitioner having been engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in February, 1994 and his having worked as such upto May, 2001. Claiming to have worked for more
than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination of his services, the petitioner
averred that during the period he remained in the employ of the respondent, artificial breaks were given in his service
for no fault of his, and that the period of interrupted service was liable to be counted towards „continuous service. as
defined under Section 25-B of the Act. But these averments, to my thinking, do not appear to have been established in
view of the materials on record. The petitioner.s claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar
months preceding the date of his retrenchment does not find assurance from the mandays chart Ex. RW1/A, which is
indicative of his having worked for less than 240 days during the period from May, 2000 to May, 2001. It is therefore
difficult to accept his claim. Also, his allegation of fictional breaks cannot be said to have been established, for in
substantiation thereof, he did not choose to adduce in evidence such muster rolls or any other document as may show
that fictional breaks were given in his service. Another reason why this allegation of his cannot be said to have been
substantiated is his failure to particularise the periods of the alleged fictional breaks during the period he remained in
the employ of the respondent. The issue 2 is therefore held against him and in favour of the respondent.
9.
But the respondent.s claim on the other hand that the services of the petitioner were never terminated but
he had abandoned the job on his own in May, 2001, also, to my mind, goes without proof. The respondent to establish
this claim ought to have brought on record the muster roll wherein the petitioner may have been marked absent or
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shown to have abandoned the job in May, 2001. But the respondent having failed so to do, it is difficult to accept his
claim. More so, in view of the evidence led by the petitioner, which is demonstrative of his services having been
terminated by the respondent in May, 2001. The issue 3 is therefore held in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
10. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
11. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault
on the part of the workman;
(2)
where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
12. As already deserved, the petitioner.s claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment in May, 2001 does not ring true in view of the mandays chart
Ex. PW1/C, which is indicative of his having worked for less than 240 days during the period; May, 2000 to May,
2001. He having thus not remained in „continuous service for one year. as defined under Section 25-B of the Act, the
respondent was not obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25-F Act. The said provisions cannot therefore be said to have been violated.
13. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, appears to be tenable in view of the materials on record. Section 25-G of
the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.”
14.
The petitioner in his statement as PW1 claimed the workmen namely Pyar Chand, Dhmaswer, Parma
Ram, Kanshi Ram, Rajinder, Blabir Singh, Satish Kumar etc. to be junior to him and their having been made regular
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3371
employees. This claim of his having not been challenged during his cross-examination by the respondent deserves
acceptance. More so, when the document Ex. RW2/A as also the seniority list of daily wagers of Baldwara Sub
Division are indicative of the workmen namely Satish Kumar, Balbir Singh, Rajinder Kumar, Parma Ram, Kanshi Ram
and Dhmaswar being junior to the petitioner. The aforementioned seniority list is demonstrative of the workmen
namely Satish Kumar, Balbir Singh, Rajinder Kumar, Parma Ram, Kanshi Ram and Dhmaswar Singh having been
retained in service at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the
petitioner, the respondent is therefore proved to have violated the abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the
Act. The termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent was therefore unlawful. As a result, the petitioner is
entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with.
Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his retrenchment in May, 2001. In view of the facts and
circumstances of the case, he, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of termination of his services.
The issue 1 is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
15. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service from the date
of his retrenchment in May, 2001. He is also held entitled to 50% back-wages from the said date. The said 50% back-
wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum
Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to reinstate the
petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent
to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 27th day of December, 2008.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 640/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Roshan Lal S/o Shri Achhar Ram, Village Sihal, PO Risha, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Roshan Lal S/o Shri Achhar Ram, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
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2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
..OPR.
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6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii)
a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
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power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b)
the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii)
in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
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3375
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b)
the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter.—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which
may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or
a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15.
The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
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16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provision of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
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3377
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1013/2007-9368, dated 25.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated September 5, 2008.
In view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
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period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 635/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Salig Ram S/o Shri Damodar Dass, R/o Village Madhwarda, P.O. Deo Baradla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt.
Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Salig Ram S/o Shri Damodar Dass by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
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3379
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
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What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
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3381
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
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13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which
may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or
a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
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3383
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provision of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9317 dated 15.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab)1D/08-Mandi dated September 5, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before
the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29.
Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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3385
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 166/2007
Date of Institution : 1.11.2007
Date of decision : 24.11.2008
Shri Sanjeev Kumar S/o Shri Uttam Singh, Village Sani Mohari, P.O. Althu, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi,
H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, vice AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Gaurav Sharma, vice Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Shri Sanjeev Kumar S/o Shri Uttam Singh workman by
the Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 1.1.2000 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereas junior to him were retained by
the employer as alleged by the workman is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits
and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Beldar by the respondent on January, 1998, and that he worked as such in Saigloo Sub Division of Himachal
Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division) upto December 31, 1999. On January 1, 2000, his services were
terminated by the respondent by serving with him a notice dated December 20, 1999. Claiming to have worked for 240
days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service, the petitioner further
averred that he having not been paid any compensation, the termination of his services was violative of the provisions
of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) as also the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 (Standing Orders, for short). In terminating his services, the respondent, according to the petitioner,
also violated the provisions of section 25-G of the Act, because certain workers namely Uma Devi, Jagdish, Kaul
Singh, Ramesh, Shive Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time his services were dispensed
with. Not only that, the respondent also violated the provisions of section 25-H of the Act, for, after the petitioner.s
retrenchment some persons were engaged without giving the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-
employment. Claiming to have visited the respondent.s office a number of times after his removal from service, the
petitioner averred that on being requested by him to re-engage him, the concerned official in the respondent.s office
gave an assurance that he would be called back in the job. The petitioner, however, kept on waiting for a call till
February, 2005 whereafter he raised the industrial dispute, which later came to be referred to this Court for
adjudication. On the basis of these averments, the petitioner prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him in
the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed with. He also prayed for the grant
of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including seniority etc.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on January, 1998, the respondent in his reply
averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as beldar on daily wages basis as against a specific construction work on
January 25, 1998, and that he had worked upto December 31, 1999 with certain interruptions/breaks caused on account
of his wilful absence from work. Claiming to have told the respondent at the time of his engagement as casual beldar
that he was being engaged as against a specific construction work, and that his services would automatically come to an
end on completion of the work, the respondent further averred that his services having been dispensed with on
completion of the work, no provision of the Act was violated. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for 240
days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date on which his services were dispensed with, the
respondent averred that he having not completed 240 days during the period he remained in his employ, he was not
required to be served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and the provisions of this Section cannot
therefore be said to have been violated. As to the petitioner.s allegation that certain persons namely Uma Devi, Jagdish,
Kaul Singh, Ramesh, Pawan, Shive Ram and others, who were junior to him, were retained at the time of his
retrenchment, the respondent.s contention is that these persons, who were also engaged as casual beldar for execution a
specific work, were also removed from service on completion of the work, and that they were later re-engaged in
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obedience to an order dated October 8, 1999 of the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner.s claim
that after his removal from service he had visited the respondent.s office, is also refuted by the respondent. It is averred
that at no point of time did the petitioner visit the respondent.s office nor did he make any representation after his
removal from service, and the petition is therefore barred by time. As for the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the
Standing Orders, the respondent.s contention is that this allegation is also unfounded and baseless, because the
establishment of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing
Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992. The respondent.s other
contentions relate to estoppel and maintainability of the petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition by his act and conduct
..OPR.
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Relief :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
7.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged on January, 1998, the respondent averred that
he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged beldar on January 25, 1998, and that he had worked as such upto December
31, 1999. This averment having been admitted by the petitioner to be true in his cross-examination as PW1 deserves
acceptance.
8.
Ld. counsel for the respondent contends that the petitioner was engaged as against a specific work, his
removal from service on completion of the work did not amount to retrenchment as defined under clause (oo) of
Section 2 of the Act. But this contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived in view of the materials on record.
The petitioner in his cross-examination as PW1 categorically denied the respondent.s suggestion that at the time of his
employment he was told that he was engaged as against a temporary work, and that his services would be deemed to
have come to an end on completion of the work started under a scheme. The respondent.s witness T.K. Sharma, then
Assistant Engineer in Saigloo Sub Division of HPSEB, though in his examination-in-chief as RW1 maintained that the
petitioner was engaged in a specific work, and that he was told that his service would come to an end on completion of
the work, he in his cross-examination expressed his inability to furnish such proof as may show that the petitioner was
engaged in a specific scheme work. Having deposed so, he, however, hastened to add that the factum of the petitioner
having been engaged in a specific scheme was shown in the muster roll. But the muster roll, which would have
constituted a vital piece of evidence in substantiation of the respondent.s claim, having not been brought on record, it is
difficult to hold that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work.
9.
But even if it is assumed that the petitioner was engaged in a scheme or as against a specific work, there
is no plausible material to show that his employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme
or completion of the work.
10. In S. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553, the principal
question that arose before the Hon.ble Supreme Court of India was:
“Whether the workmen recruited for discharging temporary job under a project can insist on
compliance of section 25-F of the Act if their services are dispensed with on the project coming to an
end.”
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11. Having examined the scope of Sections 2(oo) and 25-F of the Act, the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia
ruled:
“1.
“Retrenchment” in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work
itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial pieces of
legislation are to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to
take two views of a provision. It is also well settled that the Parliament has employed the expression
“the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever” while defining
the term “retrenchment”, which is suggestive of the legislative intent to assign the term „retrenchment. a
meaning wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There are four exceptions carved
out of the artificially extended meaning of the term „retrenchment., and therefore, termination of service
of a workman so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the meaning of
retrenchment. dehors the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of
retrenchment. the termination of service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A
termination of service which does not fall within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within
the meaning of retrenchment."
2.
The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to
retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:-
(i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia
that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and
consistently with the terms of the contract.
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at
the commencement of employment.”
12. The respondent having failed to satisfy these conditions, the termination of services of the petitioner, to
my thinking, decidedly amount to retrenchment within the meaning of clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act. The
respondent.s contention therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
13. The petitioner in his pleadings as also in evidence claimed to have worked for 240 days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service. According to him, he having not been
served with a notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act, the termination of his service was unlawful. More so,
when no notice under the Standing Orders was given to him nor was he paid any retrenchment compensation. This
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. Be it stated that the establishment of Himachal Pradesh
State Electricity Board stood exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85
Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992.
14.
Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b)
the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
15.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
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indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which
may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or
a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
16. However, the petitioner.s claim of having been in continuous service for not less than one year, or say
his claim of having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal
from service, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the evidence led by the respondent. The mandays
chart Ex. RW1/A, which is adduced in evidence by the respondent and admitted to be correct by the petitioner in his
cross-examination as PW1, is demonstrative of the petitioner having not worked for 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment. The respondent was therefore not obliged to serve him with a
one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. The
petitioner.s contention that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
cannot be therefore accepted.
17. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in retrenching him, the respondent had violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, appears to be tenable. Kesar Singh, then Junior Engineer in the office of
Executive Engineer, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Electrical Division), Mandi, who has been examined by
the petitioner as PW2, testified:
“As per the record, Sanjeev Kumar (petitioner) was engaged on 25.1.1998 and he worked upto 31.12.1999. As
per the record, Uma Devi was engaged on 2.12.1998 and was still working. Jagdish Chand, S/o Sh. Jeevan Lal
was engaged on 15.10.1998 and was still working. As per the record, Kaul Ram, S/o Jyoti Singh was engaged
on 18.6.1998 and was still working. Ramesh Chand, S/o Sh. Khem Chand was engaged on 16.5.1998 and was
still working. Pawan Kumar, S/o Sh. Hem Raj was engaged on 3.11.1997 and was still working. Shive Ram,
S/o Sh. Balku Ram was engaged on 28.10.1997 and was still working. As per the record, Sh. Chander Lal was
engaged on 3.9. 1997 and was still working. In the division, more than three hundred workers are
working…..”
18. The respondent.s aforementioned witness T.K. Sharma categorically admitted in his cross-examination
as RW1 that Uma Devi and Jagdish were junior to the petitioner, and that they were still in the employ of the
respondent. He also admitted in no ambiguous words that when the petitioner was removed from service Uma Devi and
Jagdish were not retrenched. In other words, the latter two were retained at the time the services of the petitioner were
terminated. Section 25-G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
19. Since Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were undeniably junior to the petitioner, were retained by the
respondent at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the principle of „Last Come First Go. as
envisaged in the abovementioned provisions can safely be held to have been violated by the respondent.
20. Ld. counsel for the respondent contends with vehemence that Uma Devi and Jagdish, who were also
retrenched, having been re-engaged in obedience to the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal, they could
not be retrenched at the time of termination of services of the petitioner, and the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act
cannot therefore be said to have been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. The reason being that re-
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3389
engagement of Uma Devi and Jagdish on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal can by no
stretch of reasoning be interpreted to mean that they have become permanent employees cannot therefore be retrenched
even if there arises an occasion for the employer to follow the principle of „Last Come First Go.. I am therefore of the
considered view that re-engagement of the said workers on the basis of the orders of the Hon.ble H.P. Administrative
Tribunal notwithstanding, the respondent could in law violate the principle of „Last Come First Go. at the time the
services of the petitioner were dispensed with. The contention aforementioned has therefore been raised only to be
rejected.
21. The upshot therefore is that in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent violated the provisions of section
25-F of the Act, and he (petitioner) is therefore entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was
working at the time of his retrenchment. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement
(25.1.1998). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages, because nowhere in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A and cross-
examination as PW1 did he maintain that he was not a gainfully employed or that he remained idle after his
retrenchment. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
Issue 2:
22. The materials on record are indicative of the petitioner having approached the respondent from time to
time after his retrenchment and requested for his re-engagement but of no avail. Left with no option, he later raised an
industrial dispute which came to be referred to this Court for adjudication under Section 10 (1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) I.D./07-Mandi dated October 9, 2007.
23. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs. Garibu Ram, latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more
than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated. Having
the surveyed various rulings on the point, the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh inter alia observed:
“….....While taking note of the entire case law with regard to the delay and laches, this Court
consistently has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply but, however, depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principles of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. A delay of even 14 years has been held not to come in the way of the poor man, whose services
have been illegally terminated in claiming his relief under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
In Deepa Ram.s case (supra), there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand.s case (supra) there was a
delay of 9 years. In Mohinder Kumar.s case (supra), there was a delay of 14 years……..”
24. The petitioner, who is undeniably poverty-stricken, is stated to be illiterate. In view of the facts and
circumstances of this case, the principle of delay and laches cannot be held applicable to his case. The issue under
discussion is therefore held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The facts and circumstances of this case do not attract the rule of estoppel. The respondent.s counsel has
also not been able to show how the rule of estoppel is attracted in this case. The issue on hand is therefore held against
the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
26. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. The petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working
at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to seniority from the date of his engagement as
daily waged beldar (25.1.1998). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages or compensation in view of the facts
and circumstances of the case. The respondent is directed to reinstatement him within a period of 90 days from today
failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to 25% back-wages with effect from the date of his unlawful retrenchment
(1.1.2000). The said 25% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages
permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The
reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official
gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT MANDI)
Ref No. : 136/2007
Date of Institution : 1.11.2007
Date of decision : 20.1.2009
Shri Sanjeev Kumar S/o Shri Gurcharan Dass, Village Kandi, P.O. Saithural, Tehsil Thural, District Kangra,
H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, I. & P.H. Division, Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR.
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Sanjeev Kumar S/o Shri Gurcharan Dass workman by the
Executive Engineer, I.& P.H. Division, Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. w.e.f. 07/2001 without complying
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service
benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar in Irrigation and Public Health Division, Kaza in Kinnaur district in July, 1997, and
that he worked as such upto October, 1998. In October/November, 1998, he was transferred to Shahpur Sub Division of
Irrigation and Public Health Department where he served upto July, 2001. Thereafter the respondent, according to him,
terminated his services orally without serving him with any notice and paying him retrenchment compensation.
Claiming to have worked for 240 days in each calendar year as also during the period of 12 calendar months preceding
the date of his termination in July, 2001, the petitioner further averred that in dispensing with his services, the
respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short).
Besides, the respondent also violated the principle of „last come first go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act,
because he at the time of termination of the services of the petitioner retained in service certain workmen namely
Pawan Kumar and Mali Ram etc., who were junior to the petitioner. The respondent, it is further alleged, also violated
the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act as he after the petitioner.s retrenchment made fresh recruitments without
giving the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment. The provisions of Section 25-N of the Act,
according to the petitioner, were also violated by the respondent. On the basis these averments, the petitioner prayed for
a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages and continuity of service. He also prayed for
regularisation of his service in the regular pay scale w.e.f. January 1, 2007.
3.
Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged in the month of July, 1997, the respondent in his
reply averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as daily waged Beldar on November 5, 1998 subject to the availability of
work and funds. The petitioner.s claim of having completed 240 days in each calendar year was also disputed by the
respondent. Denying having terminated the services of the petitioner, the respondent averred that he (petitioner) had
abandoned the job on his own and the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act could not therefore be said to have been
violated. The provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, according to the respondent, were also not violated, because no
workman junior to the petitioner was retained in service. The petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of
Section 25-H of the Act was also repudiated by the respondent. Alleging the respondent to be having no locus standi to
file the claim petition, the respondent averred that the petition was barred by time, and that the petitioner was guilty of
suppressio veri.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief of service benefits and the amount of compensation he is entitled to?
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3391
2.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppresio veri
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petitioner left the job on his own.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petition is barred by time.
..OPR.
5.
Relief.
6. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on theses issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Relief :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 386/2002
Date of Institution : 16.12.2002
Date of decision : 26.11.2008
Shri Sanju S/o Sh. Gantu Ram, Village- Dalana, P.O. Balhjoli, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.S.E.B. Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv. vice
For the Respondent : Sh. Gaurav Sharma, Adv. Vice
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of the services of Sh. Sanju S/o Sh. Gantu Ram w.e.f.01-4-2000 by the
Executive Engineer, HPSEB Division Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P. without complying the
provision of section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; where as work and
funds are available as alleged by workman, is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits
the aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster rolls on March 1, 2000, and that he worked as such upto March 31, 2000.
On April 1, 2000, his services were however, terminated by the respondent. Alleging his retrenchment to have been
made without any inquiry and payment of compensation, the petitioner averred that in dispensing with his services, the
respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short),
because certain workmen namely Man Singh S/o Kalyan Singh, Prithi Chand S/o Bhoop Singh, Safi Ahmed S/o Hamid
Ahmed, Durga Dass S/o Kali Ram and Gian Chand S/o Atma Ram, who were junior to him, were retained at the time
of his retrenchment. Besides, the respondent also violated the provisions of Sections 25-H and 25-N of the Act and
Clause 14(2) of the HPSEB Industrial Establishment Standing Orders (hereinafter referred to as the Standing Orders)
framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to
the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages and continuity of service.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as Beldar on daily
wages basis on March 1, 2000, and his having worked as such upto March 31, 2000. The respondent, however, refuted
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the petitioner.s allegation that his services were terminated. It is averred that the petitioner had abandoned the job on
his own after working for a short period of 28 days. In view of his being a Beldar of casual nature and his having
worked only for a short span of time, he, according to the respondent, “was not borne on the list of temporary
workman”. Denying having violated any provision of the Act, the respondent further averred:
“…..It is further submitted that the workman named S/Sh. Man Singh, Prithi Chand, Saffi Muhhamad
& Durga Dass alleged to retain in service did not leave their job and as a result they are still on the rolls
of replying respondent. As such, the replying respondent has not violated section 25-G and 25-H of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947…..”
4.
As to the allegation of violation of clause 14(2) of the Standing Orders, the respondent.s averments are
that in view of the petitioner having abandoned the job on his own, the provisions of the said clause cannot be said to
have been violated. The respondent.s other averments relate to estoppel, limitation, mis-joinder of parties and non-
joinder of necessary parties.
5.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
6.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. 1.4.2000 is violative
of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 and certified Standing Orders framed by the State Electricity
Board?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable?
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition is not barred by time?
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the petition due to his act and conduct?
..OPR.
7.
Be it stated that holding issues 1 and 3 in the affirmative and issues 2 and 4 in the negative, my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office allowed the claim petition, vide award dated September 6, 2005. The relief granted was:
“As a result of my findings on issues above, especially issue No.1, the petitioner is held entitled for his
reinstatement in his original service on the same terms and conditions in which he was working prior to his dis-
engagement, with all consequential service benefits including seniority. However, the back-wages are restricted to the
extent of 10% only, under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The respondent is directed to re-engage the
petitioner within a period of 90 days from the announcement of this award, failing which the petitioner shall be entitled
for full back-wages.”
8.
Aggrieved, the respondent preferred before the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh a Civil Writ
Petition (CWP No.1383/2005) on various grounds. One of the grounds was that the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity
Board having been exempted from the provisions of the Standing Orders, reliance thereupon by the Tribunal was
illegal. Upholding this contention, the Hon.ble High Court disposed of the writ petition along with two other Civil Writ
Petitions by a common judgment dated May 18, 2007. It was inter alia observed:
“…..In this view of the matter, the Tribunal wrongly relied upon the provisions of the Standing Orders Act to
hold that the disengagement is bad for want of issuance of notice giving 10 clear days to the employees.
Admittedly, the employees had not completed 240 days and the Tribunal could not have come to the rescue of
the employee.
With regard to the plea of delay and laches, in my view, the Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that
there is no inordinate delay in the respondents exercising their statutory rights for pursuing their
remedies……………..
During the course of hearing, it was further argued by the counsel for the respondents that in some of the
matters there is admission on record that juniors have been retained in service and also employment has been
given to new persons, thus violating Section 25G and 25H of the Act. According to the petitioner, it is
disputed question, which cannot be gone into by this Court…………………………………….
However, perusal of award shows that there is no finding on this aspect at all. Therefore, on this limited
ground as to whether there is violation of provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act, all the matters are
remanded back for consideration by the Tribunal…………………..
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…..Even though the plea of limitation/delay and laches has been decided against the petitioner, however,
while considering the issue of back wages, it would be open for the Tribunal to consider the same and decide
accordingly…..”
9.
In view of these orders, the question that is required to be determined by this Court is:
“Whether there is violation of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act.”
10. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my answer to this question is: Yes partly, because the
respondent is found to have violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
11. Recounting the material facts averred in the claim petition, the petitioner in his statement as PW1
maintained that he was engaged as Beldar by the respondent, and that he worked as such from 1.3.2000 to 31.3.2000.
His services, according to him, were dispensed with by the respondent w.e.f. 1.4.2000 without any notice, charge-sheet
and payment of compensation. Refuting this allegation, the respondent, on the other hand, averred that services of the
petitioner were never terminated, but he had abandoned the job on his own. But this claim, to my mind, does not ring
true in view of the respondent.s failure to lead such documentary evidence as may show that the petitioner had
abandoned the job on his own. The petitioner.s claim that his services were terminated by the respondent orally on
April 1, 2000, therefore, deserves acceptance and is accepted.
12. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in terminating his services, the respondent had violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record.
The petitioner in his statement as PW1 inter alia alleged; “After my services were dispensed with, the respondent has
retained a number of junior persons namely Saffi Mohammad, Prithi Chand and Gian Chand etc.” But this allegation
does not appear to be having a ring of truth, for the documentary evidence, particularly seniority list Ex. PA relied upon
by the petitioner, is not demonstrative of these persons being junior to him. The respondent.s witness V.S. Thakur, then
Assistant Engineer, HPSEB Sub Division, Joginder Nagar, testified as RW1 that Om Prakash, Raj Kumar, Sajnay
Kumar, Prithi Chand, Safi Mohammad and Man Singh, who were also engaged by the department, were all senior to
the petitioner. There being nothing to discredit this deposition and the documentary evidence not being indicative of
any workman junior to the petitioner having been retained by the respondent at the time the services of the petitioner
were dispensed with, the allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act does not stand and is
therefore rejected.
13. However, in view of the materials on record, particularly the aforementioned seniority list issued vide
letter Ex. PA, the respondent appears to have violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, which reads:
“25H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.–Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer
proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an
opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re-employment, and
such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for re-employment shall have preference over other persons.
14. The petitioner.s services were undeniably terminated on April 1, 2000. The seniority list issued by the
Additional Superintending Engineer, Electrical Division HPSEB, Joginder Nagar, vide his letter dated September 5,
2002 Ex. PA is demonstrative of four persons namely Birbal, Om Prakash, Subhash Chand and Sanjay Kumar having
been engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in Electrical Division HPSEB, Joginder Nagar after the
termination of services of the petitioner.
15. Ld. counsel for the respondent contends with vehemence that Birbal, Om Prakash, Subhash Chand and
Sanjay Kumar, who figure at serial nos. 120B, 121C, 122C and 123L respectively in the seniority list issued vide letter
Ex. PA, were also retrenched and later re-engaged in compliance with the orders of Himachal Pradesh Administrative
Tribunal, Shimla, and that in view of this position, the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act cannot be said to have
been violated. I am not impressed with this contention. The reason being that of the aforesaid four persons, only two
namely Om Prakash and Subhash Chand were ordered to be re-engaged along with seven others by the H.P.
Administrative Tribunal by its judgment dated January 10, 2001 Ex. RW1/A. There being no materials on record to
show that Birbal and Sanjay Kumar were engaged by the respondent on the basis of the orders of the H.P.
Administrative Tribunal, the respondent.s counsel.s contention merits rejection and rejected. There being nothing to
suggest that before engagement of these persons the petitioner was given an opportunity to offer himself for re-
employment, the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act can safely be held to have been violated by the respondent. The
point under discussion is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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RELIEF
16. Judged in the light of findings on the foregoing point, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in part.
Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time
his services were terminated. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he is, however, held not entitled to
back-wages and continuity of service. The respondent is directed to re-engage him within a period of 90 days from
today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in
the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 649/2008
Date of Institution : 26.12.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Sant Ram S/o Shri Bhalakhu, Village Banuhi, PO Baroti, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Sant Ram S/o Shri Bhalakhu, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
Employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
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3395
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
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3397
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the
notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified authority) has
been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government or
the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
3398
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authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which
may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or
a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
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3399
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
3400
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Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1057/2007-9371, dated 25.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated September 5, 2008.
In view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29.
Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3401
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT MANDI)
Ref No. : 16/2003
Date of Institution : 3.2.2003
Date of decision : 27.12.2008
Secretary, Bijlee Majdoor Sangh, Shanan Power House Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Chief Engineer, (Hydel), PSEB, (Shakti Bihar) Patiala, Punjab.
2.
The Resident Engineer, Shanan Power House, Joginder Nagar, PSEB, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
..Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sunil Chaudhary, Adv.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“D;k lfpo] fctyh etnwj la?k
D;k lfpo] fctyh etnwj la?k
D;k lfpo] fctyh etnwj la?k
D;k lfpo] fctyh etnwj la?k (ch0ch0,e0,l0) 'kkuu ikoj gkml] tk
ch0ch0,e0,l0) 'kkuu ikoj gkml] tk
ch0ch0,e0,l0) 'kkuu ikoj gkml] tk
ch0ch0,e0,l0) 'kkuu ikoj gkml] tksfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh]
sfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh]
sfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh]
sfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh]
fg0 iz0 }kjk eq[; vfHk;Urk] gkbZMy&ih0,l0bZ0ch0 'kfDr fogkj ifV;kyk iatkc o LFkkfud
fg0 iz0 }kjk eq[; vfHk;Urk] gkbZMy&ih0,l0bZ0ch0 'kfDr fogkj ifV;kyk iatkc o LFkkfud
fg0 iz0 }kjk eq[; vfHk;Urk] gkbZMy&ih0,l0bZ0ch0 'kfDr fogkj ifV;kyk iatkc o LFkkfud
fg0 iz0 }kjk eq[; vfHk;Urk] gkbZMy&ih0,l0bZ0ch0 'kfDr fogkj ifV;kyk iatkc o LFkkfud
vfHk;Urk gkbZMy 'kkkuu ikoj gkml] ih0,l0bZ0ch0] tksfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh] fg0iz0 ls ;g
vfHk;Urk gkbZMy 'kkkuu ikoj gkml] ih0,l0bZ0ch0] tksfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh] fg0iz0 ls ;g
vfHk;Urk gkbZMy 'kkkuu ikoj gkml] ih0,l0bZ0ch0] tksfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh] fg0iz0 ls ;g
vfHk;Urk gkbZMy 'kkkuu ikoj gkml] ih0,l0bZ0ch0] tksfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh] fg0iz0 ls ;g
ekax djuk fd Jh feyki pUn] odZpktZ QksjeSu dks LiS'ky QksjeSu j
ekax djuk fd Jh feyki pUn] odZpktZ QksjeSu dks LiS'ky QksjeSu j
ekax djuk fd Jh feyki pUn] odZpktZ QksjeSu dks LiS'ky QksjeSu j
ekax djuk fd Jh feyki pUn] odZpktZ QksjeSu dks LiS'ky QksjeSu jsxqyj ds in ij inksUur u
sxqyj ds in ij inksUur u
sxqyj ds in ij inksUur u
sxqyj ds in ij inksUur u
djds muls dfu"B odZpktZ QksjeSu dks LiS'ky QksjeSu jsxqyj ds in ij inksUur djus dh
djds muls dfu"B odZpktZ QksjeSu dks LiS'ky QksjeSu jsxqyj ds in ij inksUur djus dh
djds muls dfu"B odZpktZ QksjeSu dks LiS'ky QksjeSu jsxqyj ds in ij inksUur djus dh
djds muls dfu"B odZpktZ QksjeSu dks LiS'ky QksjeSu jsxqyj ds in ij inksUur djus dh
dk;Zokgh mfpr gS
dk;Zokgh mfpr gS
dk;Zokgh mfpr gS
dk;Zokgh mfpr gS\ ;fn ugha rks Jh feyki pUn] dkexkj fdl frfFk ls LiS'ky QksjeSu ds in ij
;fn ugha rks Jh feyki pUn] dkexkj fdl frfFk ls LiS'ky QksjeSu ds in ij
;fn ugha rks Jh feyki pUn] dkexkj fdl frfFk ls LiS'ky QksjeSu ds in ij
;fn ugha rks Jh feyki pUn] dkexkj fdl frfFk ls LiS'ky QksjeSu ds in ij
inksUufr] iwoZ osru] ofj"Brk] lsok ykHkksa o jkgr dk ik= gS
inksUufr] iwoZ osru] ofj"Brk] lsok ykHkksa o jkgr dk ik= gS
inksUufr] iwoZ osru] ofj"Brk] lsok ykHkksa o jkgr dk ik= gS
inksUufr] iwoZ osru] ofj"Brk] lsok ykHkksa o jkgr dk ik= gS\”
2.
On notice, the petitioner (Bijlee Majdoor Sangh) through whom one of its members, Milap Chand,
raised the industrial dispute encompassed in the above reference, filed the latter.s statement of claim wherein it is
averred that he (Milap Chand) was in the employ of Punjab State Electricity Board (the Board, for short) as T. Mate
from February 9, 1970. He was promoted as workcharge (W/C, for short) Fitter in the regular pay scale on March 31,
1970. On October 14, 1971, he was promoted as W/C Chargeman, and on October 10, 1975 as W/C Forman. He was
further promoted as W/C Special Forman in the regular pay scale on October 1, 1986. On October 29, 1991, he, instead
of being promoted as Special Regular Forman in the pay scale of Rs.2000-3500, was promoted only as regular Forman
in the pay scale of Rs.1800-3200. For the redressal of his grievance he later approached the Superintending Engineer,
Hydel Project, Talwara, Punjab State Electricity Board Circle Mukerian, who told him that the post of Special Regular
Forman having already been abolished, he could not be promoted to that post. Alleging Milap Chand to have been
discriminated against in the matter of promotion, the petitioner further averred that Paramjit Singh, who was also in the
employ of the Board as W/C Forman from April 4, 1984, was junior to Milap Chand. He was made a regular Forman in
1994 and Special Regular Forman on April 30, 1998 in the regular pay scale of Rs.2000-3500, which was revised w.e.f.
January 1, 1996. The revised pay scale of a Special Regular Forman, according to the petitioner, was Rs.6750-11050.
Milap Chand, who was senior to Paramjit Singh, was entitled to be promoted as Special Regular Forman w.e.f. October
29, 1991, that is, prior to the promotion of Paramjit Singh as Special Regular Forman, but the respondent failed so to do
and thus violated the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Besides, the respondents, according to the
petitioner, also violated the principle of „last come first go.. On the basis of these averments, the petitioner prayed for a
direction to the respondents to „designate/upgrade. the workman Milap Chand as Regular Special Foreman from
October 29, 1991 in the regular pay scale of Rs.2000-3500 and revised pay scale of Rs.6750-11050 w.e.f. January 1,
1996. He also prayed for a direction to the respondents to fix his seniority in the said grade.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply averred that Milap Chand who was promoted as W/C Special
Forman vide order No.50 dated May 2, 1988, joined as W/C Special Forman on May 5, 1988. Paramjit Singh having
been promoted as W/C Forman on April 4, 1984 was senior to Milap Chand. The latter, according to the respondents,
was promoted as Regular Forman on October 29, 1991 in the pay scale of Rs.1800-3200. Claiming non-existence of the
post of Special Forman in the regular cadre when some of the W/C employees including Milap Chand were regularised,
the respondents averred that on the basis of the policy decision taken by the Board on August 18, 1994, Paramjit Singh
3402
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
was regularised as Special Forman in the pay scale of Rs.2000-3000. The policy decision, it is further averred “related
to the regularization/adjustment of work charged/daily wage/casual employees of those employees who had completed
10 years service in the particular cadre on “as is where is basis.” Milap Chand and Paramjit Singh, according to the
respondents, thus formed two separate categories, which could not be equated for any purpose whatsoever, and the
former.s claim is therefore not maintainable. The respondents. other contentions relate to the petitioner.s locus standi to
maintain the claim petition, cause of action, mis-joinder of parties and non-joinder of necessary parties. It is also
averred that as the petitioner.s claim relates to „order of 1991. the same is highly belated and time barred.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition. It is inter alia averred that:
“…….the services of Sh. Milap Chand has been promoted by the Board as workcharge Foreman on
10.10.1975, and thus the Milap Chand is senior to Mr. Paramjit Singh. It is again submitted that Sh. Paramjit
Singh who was working as workcharge Foreman w.e.f. 4.4.1984 has been regularised as Spl. Foreman instead
of Foreman after completion of 10 years on the post of workcharged Foreman. It is specifically mentioned
here that Sh. Milap Chand was working as regular Foreman w.e.f. 1991 are entitled his next promotion for the
post of Spl. Foreman in the regular pay scale Rs.2000-3500 from the date of before Mr. Paramjit Singh has
been getting the said pay scale. It is again specifically mentioned here that the services of Sh. Paramjit Singh
has been directly promoted from the post workcharge Foreman to Spl. Foreman (Regular) and the same has
been against the principles of natural justice. It is further as per rules the workcharge Foreman post be
confirmed as Foreman, than promoted as Spl. Foreman regular but in this case he has been directly promoted
as Spl. Foreman. Hence the workman Sh. Milap Chand is entitled his promotion as Spl. Foreman before Sh.
Paramjit Singh i.e. from 1994, and the Milap Chand Foreman has also entitled his pay fixation w.e.f. 25.10.91
and fixed him Spl. Foreman Seniority before Sh. Paramjit and justice be done.”
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to be designated/upgraded as regular workman as special Forman
from 29.10.91 with all consequential benefits, as claimed.
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable for want of non-impleading of necessary parties as
alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petitioner has not cause of action.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petition is not within time.
..OPR.
5.
Relief.
6.
Be it stated that holding issues 2 to 4 in the affirmative and issue 1 partly in the affirmative, my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office dismissed the claim petition, vide award dated June 6, 2006. Aggrieved, the petitioner laid
challenge to the award by preferring before the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh a Civil Writ Petition (CWP
No.1744/2007). The Hon.ble High Court with the consent of the parties remanded the matter to this Court for decision
afresh on merits. It was observed:
“…..It is always desirable that the matters are decided on its merit instead of rejecting the same on delay or
laches. Consequently, the parties are directed to appear before the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour
Court, Dharamshala on 20.11.2008. The learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Dharamshala shall
decide Reference No.16/2003 on or before 31.12.2008.”
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on the issues aforementioned are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes partly, because the post of workman Milap Chand is liable to be designated/upgraded as regular
Special Forman from December 22, 1997, and not from October 29, 1991. He is entitled to the
consequential service benefits that accrue on account of designation/upgradation of his post as Regular
Special Forman w.e.f. December 22, 1997.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3403
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
8.
The petitioner in the statement of claim filed on behalf of Milap Chand, one of its members, claimed
him to be in the employ of the Board as W/C T. Mate from February 2, 1970. It is averred that he was promoted as
W/C Fitter in the regular pay scale on March 31, 1970. On October 14, 1971, he, according to the petitioner was
promoted as W/C Chargeman and on October 10, 1975 as W/C Foreman. On October 1, 1986, he, it is further averred,
was promoted as W/C Special Foreman and on October 29, 1991 as regular Foreman in the pay scale of Rs.1800-3200.
Claiming Milap Chand to be entitled to be promoted as Regular Special Foreman in the pay scale of Rs.2000-3500 as
on October 29, 1991, the petitioner further averred that for the redressal of his grievance he approached the
Superintending Engineer, Hydel Project, Talwara, Punjab State Electricity Board Circle Mukerian, who told him that
the post of Special Regular Forman having already been abolished, he could not be promoted to that post. Alleging
Milap Chand to have been discriminated against in the matter of promotion, the petitioner further averred that Paramjit
Singh who was in the employ of the Board as W/C Foreman from April 4, 1984, was junior to Milap Chand. He was
made a Regular Foreman in 1994 and Special Regular Foreman on April 30, 1998, whereas Milap Chand, who was
promoted as Regular Foreman on October 29, 1991, was not promoted as Special Regular Foreman but was promoted
as Regular Foreman on that date. Disputing the petitioner.s claim that Milap Chand was promoted as W/C Special
Foreman on October 1, 1986 and that he was senior to Paramjit Singh, the respondents, on the other hand, averred that
Milap Chand, who was ordered to be promoted as W/C Special Foreman on May 2, 1988, had joined this post on May
5, 1988, and that Paramjit Singh having been promoted as W/C Foreman on April 4, 1984 was senior to him (Milap
Chand).
9.
In view of the rival claims of the parties and the facts and circumstances of the case, one of the primal
questions that arises for determination is: Whether Milap Chand was senior to Paramjit Singh in the cadre of Regular
Foreman. The answer to this, to my thinking, is in the affirmative in view of the materials on record. There is no
gainsaying the fact that Milap Chand, who was promoted as W/C Foreman on October 10, 1975, was further promoted
as W/C Special Foreman, vide order dated May 2, 1988. Also, there is no denying the fact that thereafter he was
promoted as Regular Foreman on October 29, 1991. On the other hand, Paramjit Singh, who was in the employ of the
Board as W/C Foreman from April 4, 1984, was promoted as Regular Foreman in the year 1996, and this fact is
manifest from the following material admissions made by the respondents. witness Madan Bisht, then Junior Assistant,
Shanan Power House, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P., in his cross-examination as RW1:
“It is correct that the seniority list in respect of the post of Foreman is of State level. It is correct that the next
promotion of a Workcharged Foreman is Regular Foreman. It is correct that Paramjit Singh was made
Foreman in 1996. It is correct that Milap Chand was made a Regular Foreman in the year 1991…….”
10.
In view of this deposition and the factum of Milap Chand having been promoted as Regular Foreman on
October 29, 1991, he was decidedly senior to Paramjit Singh. More so, in view of the respondents. aforesaid witness
Madan Bisht.s categorical admission of the petitioner.s suggestion put to him in his cross-examination as RW1 that
Milap Chand was senior to Paramjit Singh in the regular post (of Foreman).
11. The next question that arises for determination is: Whether Milap Chand, who was promoted as Regular
Foreman on October 29, 1991, was entitled to be promoted as Regular Special Foreman on that date. The answer, to my
thinking, is in the negative, for there is no material on record to suggest that the date on which Milap Chand was
promoted as Regular Foreman, a post of Regular Special Foreman was vacant and he was competent for promotion to
that post on that date. However, he was decidedly entitled to be promoted as Regular Special Foreman atleast on the
date on which Paramjit Singh, who was junior to him in the cadre of Regular Foreman, was promoted as Regular
Special Foreman. Ex. P7 is a copy of the letter dated October 19, 2000 addressed to the Resident Engineer, Shanan
Power House, Punjab State Electricity Board, Joginder Nagar, by the Resident Engineer/Const., RSD, PSEB,
Shahpurkandi. This document would reveal that Paramjit Singh was promoted as Special Foreman on regular basis on
December 22, 1997. However, Milap Chand, who was senior to Paramjit Singh, was not promoted as Regular Special
Foreman on or before the said date, accordingly to the petitioner. There being no reason to discredit this allegation of
the petitioner, I have no hesitation in holding that Milap Chand, who was senior to Paramjit Singh in the cadre of
Regular Foreman, was entitled to be promoted as Regular Special Foreman atleast on December 22, 1997. The issue
under discussion is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
Issue 2:
12. Ld. counsel for the respondents contends with vehemence that Paramjit Singh and Punjab State
Electricity Board being necessary parties, the petition is not maintainable. This contention, to my mind, does not appear
to be tenable, because Punjab State Electricity Board is duly represented by the respondents and the matters in
3404
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
controversy can well be adjudicated upon in the absence of Paramjit Singh. The issue on hand is therefore held against
the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 3:
13.
In view of what has been held under the above issue 1, the petitioner has decidedly an enforceable cause
of action against the respondents. The issue on hand is therefore held against the respondents and in favour of the
petitioner.
Issue 4:
14. As no time limit is prescribed by law for raising an industrial dispute, the respondent.s claim that the
petition is barred by time, is not tenable. The issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the
petitioner.
RELIEF
15. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. The respondents. action of promoting Paramjit Singh, a Workcharge Foreman, as Regular Special Foreman on
December 22, 1997, instead of Milap Chand, who was senior to him (Paramjit Singh) in the cadre of Regular Foreman,
was not justified. Milap Chand is entitled to be promoted as Regular Special Foreman w.e.f. December 22, 1997.
Besides, he is entitled to all the consequential benefits that would have accrued in his favour on account of his
promotion as Regular Special Foreman from the said date. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award
be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to the
record room.
Announced in the open Court today this 27th day of December, 2008.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 63/2008
Date of Institution : 22.2.2008
Date of decision : 26.11.2008
Shri Desh Raj S/o Shri Kanshi Ram, R/o Village Panyala, P.O. Rangus, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur,
H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
1.
Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
2.
The Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P.
..Respondents.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the action of the (1) Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. (2)
The Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. to retain junior
workers who are junior to Shri Desh Raj S/o Shri Kanshi Ram workman and to give him break in
service as alleged by the workman without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is proper and justified? If not, what relief of back wages, seniority and service benefits the above
aggrieved workman is entitled from the above employer?”
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2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged beldar by the respondent 1 on January 4, 1999 and posted to Herbal Garden, Neri in Hamirpur district. Claiming
to have been working at the said place ever since his engagement as daily waged beldar, the petitioner alleged that the
respondents 1 and 2 had been giving fictional breaks in his service so that he could not be able to complete 240 days in
any of the calendar years. His co-workmen namely Pawan Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Ravinder Kumar, Madan Lal, Chaman
Lal, Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand and Milap Chand, who were also working at Herbal Garden, Neri as daily waged
beldar, were also given fictional breaks except one Satish Kumar, who was also engaged as daily wager by the
respondent 1 and working in the said garden. In the case of Satish Kumar, no fictional break, according to the
petitioner, was ever given and the respondents. act of giving fictional breaks in the petitioner.s service and that of his
aforementioned co-workers is violative of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (the Act, for short). Some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt. Saina Devi, Punni
Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla Devi, Baldev Raj,
Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv Ram and Smt. Kala
Devi, who according to the petitioner were also engaged on daily wages basis in another herbal garden of Ayurveda
department namely Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar in Mandi district, were also being given fictional breaks in their
service. In their case, the Incharge, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, was, however, forbidden from giving fictional
breaks by the Director of Ayurveda, vide his letter dated July 18, 1999. Claiming the fictional breaks in his case to be
the intentional act of the respondents, the petitioner further averred that he having never absented from work wilfully
was entitled to continuity of service in view of the provisions of Section 25-B of the Act. Besides, he is entitled to
wages for the period of fictional breaks. He therefore prays for a direction to the respondents to count the period of
fictional breaks towards continuity of his service and pay him wages for the said period along with interest @ 9% per
annum. He also prays for a direction to the respondents to regularise his service on the basis of his seniority.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily
waged beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on January 4, 1999, but refuted his allegation of fictional breaks. Claiming the
work of Herbal Garden, Neri to be a seasonal work, the respondents averred that the petitioner and other workers
namely Chaman Lal, Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand, Baljit Singh, Pawan Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Desh Raj, Ravinder
Kumar, Bahadur Singh, Chander Kant, Ravinder Kumar, Madan Lal and Vijay Singh were engaged on daily wages
basis at the said garden subject to availability of work and budget, and no fictional break was ever given in their
service. As for Satish Kumar, he was in fact engaged as daily waged worker at Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on
1.7.1996 and he being deft in nursery development work was temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999
to carry out the said work and other related works there. About four years later he was called back to Herbal Garden,
Joginder Nagar after the other workers of Herbal Garden, Neri gained knowledge of nursery development work upto
the desired level. On the basis of these averments the respondents pray for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the respondents have been giving fictional breaks in the service of the petitioner. ..OPP.
2.
Whether Satish Kumar is junior to the petitioner, as alleged.
..OPP.
3.
If the above issues 1 and 2 are proved, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPR.
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes partly, as the respondents have been giving breaks in the service of the petitioner.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
The petitioner is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Relief :
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
7.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on January
4, 1999, is not disputed by the respondents. Also, his claim that he was still working as beldar on daily wages basis at
the said garden, is not denied by the respondents. What is denied by the respondents is his allegation of fictional breaks.
3406
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But this denial of theirs appears to be far from truth in view of the materials on record. The Mandays Chart of casual
labourers working in Herbal Garden, Neri is demonstrative of the petitioner having worked for 228.5 days in 1999,
217.5 days in 2000, 211 days in 2001, 227 days in 2002, 224 days in 2003, 213 days in 2004, 252 days in 2005, 330
days in 2006, 296 days in 2007 and 119 days during the period from January 1, 2008 to April, 2008. That there have
been breaks in his service is manifest from this document. In substantiation of his allegation that the breaks in service
were notional/fictional, the petitioner swore an affidavit Ex. PW1/A wherein he alleged that the respondents had been
giving notional/fictional breaks in his service during the period; January, 1999 to April, 2005. Besides, he relied upon a
copy of the letter dated July 18, 1999 addressed to the Incharge, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar by the Director of
Ayurveda, Himachal Pradesh, Annexure P1. This letter in its material part reads:
“You are hereby advised not to give any break after 89 days in future to daily paid Labourers who are
engaged to work in Herbal Garden as such a notional break has been disapproved by the competent
courts also.”
The petitioner.s allegation is that some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt.
Saina Devi, Punni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla
Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv
Ram and Smt. Kala Devi, who were engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were also being
given fictional breaks in their service, and that the Incharge of the said Garden was forbidden from so doing by the
Director of Ayurveda, vide his aforementioned letter dated July 18, 1999, Annexure P1. As to this allegation, the
respondents. averments in paragraph 7 of their joint reply are:
“That the contents of para-7 are admitted to the extent that these workers Sh. Sohan Singh, Lohli Devi,
Ram Singh, Saina Devi, Puni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judhia
Devi, Nirmala Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar,
Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv Ram & Kala Devi were engaged in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar and
their notional breaks were discontinued by the order of Director Ayurveda, H.P. being senior. The
office order issued by the Director Ayurveda to discontinue the breaks is not applicable to the casual
labourers working in Herbal Garden Neri because they are being engaged subject to the availablity of
work & budget, as the work of Herbal Garden Neri is a seasonal work.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.
By these averments, what stands admitted by the respondents is that abovenamed workers, who were
engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were being given fictional/notional breaks in their
service, which practice was discontinued on receipt of an office order issued by the Director Ayurveda. Why the said
Director.s office order to discontinue the breaks in service could not be made applicable to the casual labourers
working in Herbal Garden, Neri, is averred to be their having been engaged subject to the availability of work and
budget, as the work of Herbal Garden, Neri, according to the respondents, is a seasonal work. Going by this claim of
the respondents, the petitioner.s service, or for that matter the service of the workmen engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri
used to be terminated from time to time on account of cessation of work and non-availability of budget. They used to
be re-engaged on the availability of work and budget. Although there is no plausible material on record to lend
assurance to the respondents. claim that the work of Herbal Garden, Neri is only seasonal, and that the petitioner and
his aforementioned co-workers were engaged there as casual workers subject to the availability of work and budget,
even if this claim is assumed to be true, the petitioner is entitled to the relief of continuity of service in view of the
provisions of Section 25-B of the Act, which in its material part says:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which
may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or
a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman…………..”
9.
It is manifest from these provisions that a workman is deemed to be in continuous service for a period if
he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including the service, which may be interrupted on account of sickness
or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due
to any fault on the part of the workman. If to go by the respondents. stand, the breaks in the petitioner.s service were
caused on account of cessation of work and non-availability of funds. But the cessation of work and the non-
availability of funds not been attributable to any fault on the part of the petitioner, he is to be considered in continuous
service ever since his engagement as beldar on daily wages basis (January 4, 1999). The issue under discussion is
accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
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Issue 2:
10. The petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar having been engaged by the respondents as daily waged beldar
in Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 was junior to him, to my thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in
view of materials on record. The respondents. averments as also the evidence led by them are indicative of Satish
Kumar having been engaged as daily waged beldar in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on July 1, 1996 and his having
been temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 to carry out the nursery development work there.
According to the respondents, the reason why Satish Kumar was temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri, was his
being deft in nursery development work and the casual workers engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri not being in the know
of that work. About four years later, Satish Kumar was called back to Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar after the other
workers of Herbal Garden, Neri gained knowledge of nursery work upto the desired level. There being no reason to
discredit this claim of the respondents, the petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar is junior to him cannot to be accepted
and is therefore rejected. The issue on hand is accordingly held against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.
Issue 3:
10. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and my findings on the foregoing issues, the petitioner
is entitled to only the relief of continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar (4.1.1999).
The issue on hand is held accordingly.
RELIEF
11. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. The petitioner is held entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar
(4.1.1999). He is, however, held not entitled to wages for the periods of break in his service. Also, his claim that certain
workers junior to him were retained is rejected. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to
the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 91/2006
Date of Institution : 30.8.2006
Date of decision : 22.12.2008
Smt. Shikha Sahotra/Mehra W/o Shri Ranjeet Singh Mehra, Ganesh Bazar, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.
..Petitioner
.
Versus
1.
Managing Director, H.R.T.C. Parivahan Building Shimla, H.P.
2.
Regional Manger H.R.T.C. Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.
..Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. V.S. Mandeel, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Amit Sood, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Smt. Shikha Sahotra/Mehra W/o Sh. Ranjeet Singh Mehra
workman by the (1) Managing Director Himachal Road Transport Corp. Shimla (2) Regional Manager
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Himachal Pradesh Transport Corp. Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. w.e.f. 16.02.01 without complying
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service
benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondents as Clerk-cum-Typist on daily wages basis in the Jasur office of Himachal Road Transport Corporation
(HRTC, for short) on October 15, 1998; that she was later transferred to HRTC, Baijnath, and that her services were
suddenly dispensed with on March 9, 2001, vide letter No. HO-9E-253/2001(A). T.Class-II dated 9.3.2001. Alleging
the respondents to have given fictional breaks in her service from time to time, the petitioner further averred that the
reason for her removal from service was stated to be the expiration of the contractual period of her service. However,
Ranjit Sharma, who according to her was also working in the same manner as she, has been adjusted against a regular
post. Claiming to have worked for more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of
her retrenchment, the petitioner averred that she having not been served with any notice, the termination of her service
was violative of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). She therefore
prayed for quashing and setting aside the termination order dated March 9, 2001. She also prayed for a direction to the
respondents to re-engage her in the same capacity as in which she was working at the time her services were dispensed
with. She also prayed for the grant of full back-wages and other consequential service benefits including seniority etc.
3. The respondents in their joint reply averred that the petitioner was engaged by way of make-shift arrangement for 89
days; that the work assigned to her was of temporary nature, and that the term of her employment had expired on
February 16, 2001. Claiming to have never employed the petitioner as against a sanctioned post, the respondents further
averred that further sanction for her employment was sought vide letter dated February 14, 2001, but the same was
denied by the authorities on March 9, 2001 on account of availability of a regular Steno-Typist in the office. The
services of the petitioner having thus come to an end on account of non-extension of the work for which she was
initially engaged purely on temporary basis, no provision of the Act can be said to have been violated, according to the
respondents. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of fictional breaks in her service, the respondents further averred that
she having been engaged by way of make-shift arrangement for 89 days, there was no question of giving fictional
breaks in her service, and that she never worked for 240 days in any calendar year. The respondents. other contentions
relate to non-maintainability of the petitioner.s claim and non-accrual of an enforceable cause of action in her favour.
4. The petitioner in her rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated her stand taken
in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the disengagement from the service of the petitioner by the respondent is proper and
justified?
..OPP.
2.
If the above issue is proved in the affirmative, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to from the respondent?
..OPP.
3.
Whether the application is maintainable before this Court?
..OPR.
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on theses issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No.
Issue 2 :
She is entitled to reinstatement and continuity of service as mentioned in this issue.
Issue 3 :
Yes
Issue 4 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
7.
Recounting the materials facts averred in the reply to the claim petition, the respondents. witness Beni
Prashad, Regional Manager, HRTC, Baijnath, testified as RW1:
“Petitioner Shikha Sahrotra was engaged as Steno-Typist in our office by way of make-shift arrangement for
89 days. That post was temporary; the duration of 89 days thereof expired on February 16, 2001. Thereafter
we wrote a letter to Head Office Shimla, seeking advice in the matter. In respect thereof, a letter dated March
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3409
9, 2001 Ex. RW1/A was received from the Head Office wherein it was written that (the post) was discontinued
after 89 days because of the same being contractual, and there was availability of a regular Steno-Typist in the
office. No other post of Steno-cum-Typist was vacant……….. Post on which the petitioner was working,
came to an end on expiration of the period for which the same was sanctioned………”
8.
The respondents to succeed in their claim that the petitioner was engaged by way of make-shift
arrangement for a period of 89 days , and that her post was contractual, ought to have brought on record the contract of
employment. But they having failed so to do, it is difficult to accept their claim. More so, in view of the evidence led
by the petitioner and the mandays chart Ex. RW1/C, which is demonstrative of her having worked for 801 days during
the period from 15.10.1998 to 16.2.2001. Had the respondents. claim of having engaged the petitioner on contractual
basis or by way of make-shift arrangement for 89 days been true she would have not been allowed to work for 801 days
during the said period. It is therefore difficult to accept the respondents. claim that the petitioner.s employment was
contractual and for a short duration of 89 days.
9.
Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F.
Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.—No workman employed in any industry
who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
10. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which
may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or
a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(i)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(iii) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(iii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
11. The mandays chart Ex. RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondents is indicative of the petitioner
having worked for more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment
(February 16, 2001). Admittedly in the respondents. aforesaid witness Beni Prashad.s cross-examination as RW1, no
notice was served upon the petitioner at the time her services were dispensed with. There is nothing to suggest that at
the time of termination of the services of the petitioner she was paid wages in lieu of one month.s notice, which was
required to be served upon her. Also, there is nothing to indicate that she was paid retrenchment compensation by the
respondents. In dispensing with her services, the respondents therefore violated the abovementioned provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act. The termination of the services of the petitioner thus not being proper and justified, the issue
under discussion is held in her favour and against the respondents.
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Issue 2:
12. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the
same capacity as in which she was working at the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to
continuity of service from the date of her retrenchment (February 16, 2001). She is, however, not entitled to back-
wages because nowhere in her pleadings did she aver that she remained idle or was not gainfully employed after her
retrenchment. Also, nowhere in her statement as PW1 did she utter a word on these lines. The issue under discussion is
held accordingly.
Issue 3:
13. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issues, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is held accordingly.
RELIEF
14. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issues 1 and 2, the petition succeeds
partly and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatment in the same capacity as in
which she was working at the time her services were terminated (February 16, 2001). Besides, she is held entitled to
continuity of service from the said date. Her claim of being entitled to back-wages is, however, negatived. The
respondents are directed to reinstate her within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly.
A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion
consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 22nd day of December, 2008.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S. S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 53/2006
Date of Institution : 20.3.2006
Date of decision : 31.12.2008
Shri Shiv Ram S/o Shri Jethu Ram, Village Sheela Khabu, P.O. Thina Galu, Tehsil, Sadar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Secretary, Nagar Panchayat, Rewalsar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Miss. Poonam, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Jitender Thakur, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Shiv Ram S/o Shri Jethu Ram workman by the Secretary,
Nagar Panchayat, Rewalsar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 01.04.2003 without complying the provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and
amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged Sweeper by the respondent in Nagar Panchayat, Rewalsar on December 3, 2001, and that he worked as such
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3411
upto April 30, 2001. On May 1, 2003, his services were terminated by the respondent, even though his work was
satisfactory and there was no complaint against him. Claiming to have worked for atleast 240 days in each calendar
year, the petitioner averred that the termination of his service was unlawful. He therefore prayed for a direction to the
respondent to reinstate him in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were dispensed
with. He also prayed for the grant of the consequential service benefits.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Sweeper in Nagar Panchayat Rewalsar on December 3, 2001, but refuted his allegation that his services were dispensed
with on May 1, 2003. According to the respondent, the petitioner was appointed on contract basis for a period of 89
days, and he had worked upto March 31, 2003 when his services were terminated on account of non-availability of
funds and work. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar
months preceding the date of termination of his services, the respondent further averred that his services were
dispensed with on March 31, 2003 by applying the principle of „last come first go.. The respondent.s other contentions
relate to maintainability of the claim petition, misjoinder of the parties and non-joinder of necessary parties.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the disengagement from service of the claimant by the respondent is proper and justified?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is maintainable before this Court?
..OPR.
3.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
Yes
Issue 3 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
7.
The respondent.s claim that the petitioner was engaged on contract basis for a period of 89 days, to my
thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of the materials on record. The mandays chart Ex. PW1/B
prepared by the Secretary, Nagar Panchayat, Rewalsar, is indicative of the petitioner having worked for 296 days in
2001, 360 days in 2002 and 90 days in 2003. Had the respondent.s claim of having engaged the petitioner on
contractual basis for a period of 89 days been true, the latter would have not been allowed to work after expiration of
the period of time for which he was allegedly engaged. I am therefore not disposed to accept the respondent.s claim.
8.
Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b)
the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
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9.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one months.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which
may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or
a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
10. The mandays chart Ex. PW1/B is demonstrative of the petitioner having worked as daily waged Sweeper
in Nagar Panchayat, Rewalsar for more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his
removal from service. Admittedly in the cross-examination of the respondent.s witness Urwashi Walia (RW1), no
notice was given to the petitioner at the time his services were dispensed with. Also, the materials on record is not
indicative of the respondent having paid the petitioner retrenchment compensation as envisaged under the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. In dispensing with the services of the petitioner, the respondent
therefore violated the said provisions of law. In other words, the termination of services of the petitioner by the
respondent was not proper and justified. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and
against the respondent.
ISSUE 2:
11. In view of the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner, who was indubitably a „workman. as defined
under Section 2(s) of the Act, the petition is perfectly maintainable before this Court. The issue on hand is therefore
held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
12. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time his services were unlawfully terminated by the respondent. Besides, he is held entitled to
continuity of service from the date of his engagement (December 3, 2001) and 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment (March 31, 2003). The respondent is directed to reinstate him within a period of 90 days from
today. The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages
permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The
reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official
gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of December, 2008.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3413
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 76/2006
Date of Institution : 16.5.2006
Date of decision : 20.1.2009
Shri Shiv Singh S/o Sh. Devi Singh, C/o Sh. N.L. Kaundal, Legal Advisor, H. Q. Balakrupi, P.O. Jalpehar,
Tehsil Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi. H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
Additional Superintending Engineer, HPSEB (Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar), District Mandi. H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. J.S. Chauhan, Adv.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Sh. Shiv Singh S/o Sh. Devi Singh workman by the Additional
Superintending Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P. w.e.f.25.3.99
without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and clause 14(2) of the Certified
Standing Orders of the board is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount
of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in the HPSEB, Sub Division, Padhar on September 30, 1996, and
that he worked as such upto November 30, 1996. Thereafter his services were orally dispensed with by the Assistant
Engineer concerned without serving him with any notice or charge-sheet and paying him retrenchment compensation.
Having given artificial breaks of 394 days in the petitioner.s service, the respondent, however, re-engaged him on
October 25, 1997. On November 25, 1997, the respondent again dispensed with his services, but re-engaged him on
February 2, 1998 after giving fictional breaks of 70 days in his service. On March 25, 1998, the respondent again
terminated his services, but re-engaged him on November 23, 1998 after giving artificial breaks of 243 days in his
service. The services of the petitioner, who this time worked upto January 24, 1999, were again dispensed with by the
respondent. However, on February 4, 1999, the petitioner was re-engaged as daily waged Beldar and he worked as such
upto March 24, 1999. On March 25, 1999, the respondent again terminated his services without serving him with a
prior notice and paying him retrenchment compensation. Claiming the period of fictional breaks in his service to be
liable to be counted towards continuity of service in view of the provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (the Act, for short), the petitioner averred that in dispensing with his services, the respondent not only
violated the provisions of Clause 14(2) of the Industrial Establishment Standing Orders (hereinafter referred as the
„Standing Orders.) framed under the Industrial Employment Act, 1946, but also committed breach of the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act by retaining in service the workmen namely Keshar Ram, Subhash Chand, Gian Chand, Pankaj
Raj, Shyam Singh, Om Parkash, Biri Singh, Gulab Singh, Lal Singh, Navel Kishore, Yog Raj, BIttu Ram, Mehar
Singh, Ram Lal, Bhavan Kumar, Dharam Singh, Krishan Chand, Yadvinder Kumar and Sushil Kumar, who were junior
to him, at the time of termination of his services. Besides, the respondent violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the
Act, because he after the petitioner.s retrenchment engaged the workmen namely Man Singh, Prithi Chand, Safi
Mohmmad, Durga Dass, Gian Chand, Raj Kumar, Tara Chand, Chatter Singh, Birbal, Om Prakash, Subhash Chand and
Sanjay Kumar without affording the petitioner an opportunity to himself for re-employment. The petitioner therefore
prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other
consequential service benefits. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to take into account the periods of break
in his service towards continuity of service.
3.
Admitting the petitioner to have been engaged as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis on September
3, 1996, the respondent in his reply averred that he (petitioner) was engaged as against the work started under a specific
scheme, and that his services stood automatically terminated on completion of the work. The petitioner, according to
the respondent, had worked upto November 30, 1996 with certain interruptions/breaks caused due to his own fault. On
October 25, 1997, the petitioner, it is further averred, was again engaged as against a specific work and he worked upto
November 25, 1997. On completion of that work his services automatically stood terminated. He was again engaged as
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against a specific work on February 2, 1998, and worked upto March 24, 1998 whereafter his services automatically
stood terminated on completion of the work. He, according to the respondent, was again engaged in a specific scheme
namely “Providing 11KVA, H.T. Line to proposed 25 KVA Sub-station at village Haron” and worked upto March 24,
1999 with certain breaks caused by him on his own. On termination of that scheme, his services automatically stood
terminated. Thus no fictional break, according to the respondent, was ever given in the petitioner.s service.
4.
As to the allegation of violation of the provisions of Clause 14(2) of the Standing Orders, the
respondent.s contention is that the Establishment of HPSEB having been exempted from these provisions, vide
Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992, no breach thereof can be said to
have been committed. Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, the
respondent averred that of the workmen claimed to be junior to the petitioner and alleged to have been retained in
service at the time of termination of his services, some were senior to him and some engaged in compliance with the
orders of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal. The provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, according to the respondent,
were also not violated, because no workman was engaged after the services of the petitioner were dispensed with,
except the ones who were engaged in compliance with the orders of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal. The respondent.s
other contentions relate to maintainability of the claim petition, estoppel, limitation, mis-joinder of the parties and non-
joinder of necessary parties.
5.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondent and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
6.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1. Whether the disengagement of the petitioner from service is proper and justified?
..OPP.
2. Whether the reference is stale and time barred?
..OPR.
3. Relief.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
No
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
8.
There is no gainsaying fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in
HPSEB Electrical Division, Padhar on September 30, 1996. Also, there is no denying the fact that his services were
ultimately terminated on March 25, 1999. During the period from September 30, 1996 to March 24, 1999, the
respondent, according to the petitioner, had given fictional breaks in his service from time to time as detailed in the
claim petition. Refuting the allegation of fictional breaks, the respondent, on the other hand, claimed to have engaged
the petitioner as daily waged Beldar from time to time as against the works started under a specific scheme during the
period; September 30, 1996 to March 24, 1999. The services of the petitioner having automatically come to an end on
completion of the specific work, his was not a case of termination of services and no provision of the Act can therefore
be said to have been violated, according to the respondent. In S. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager,
Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553, the principal question that arose before the Hon.ble Supreme Court of India was:
“Whether the workmen recruited for discharging temporary job under a project can insist on compliance of
section 25-F of the Act if their services are dispensed with on the project coming to an end.”
9.
Having examined the scope of Sections 2(oo) and 25-F of the Act, the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia
ruled:
“12.“Retrenchment” in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work
itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial pieces of
legislation are to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to take
two views of a provision. It is also well settled that the Parliament has employed the expression “the
termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever” while defining the term
“retrenchment”, which is suggestive of the legislative intent to assign the term „retrenchment. a meaning
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3415
wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There are four exceptions carved out of the
artificially extended meaning of the term „retrenchment., and therefore, termination of service of a workman
so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment. dehors
the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of „retrenchment. the termination of
service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service which does not fall
within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment..
13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to
retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:-
(i)
that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that
the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and
consistently with the terms of the contract.
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the
commencement of employment.
14. The engagement of a workman as a daily wager does not by itself amount to putting the workman on
notice that he was being engaged in a scheme or project which was to last only for a particular length of time or upto
the occurrence of some event, and therefore, the workman ought to know that his employment was short lived. The
contract of employment consciously entered into by the workman with the employer would result in a notice to the
workman on the date of the commencement of the employment itself that his employment was short lived and as per
the terms of the contract the same was liable to termination on the expiry of the contract and the scheme or project
coming to an end. The workman may not therefore, complain that by the act of employer his employment was coming
to an abrupt termination. To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of
retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the abovesaid ingredients so as to attract the applicability of sub clause (bb)
abovesaid. In the case at hand, the respondent-employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of sub-clause
(bb), as stated hereinabove. All that has been proved is that the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily
wagers in a project. For want of proof attracting applicability of sub-clause (bb), it has to be held that the termination of
the services of the appellants amounted to retrenchment….”
(emphasis is mine)
10. Although in substantiation of his claim of having engaged the petitioner from time to time in a specific
scheme, the respondent did not choose to adduce any documentary evidence, even if the claim is assumed to be true,
there is no evidence to show that at the time of engagement of the petitioner as a daily wager he was told that he was
employed in a scheme of temporary duration. Also, there is no plausible material on record to suggest that the
petitioner.s employment had come to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme. There is therefore no
escape from the conclusion that the termination of services of the petitioner at various points of time during the period
from September 30, 1996 to March 24, 1999, and on March 25, 1999 amounts to retrenchment as defined in clause (oo)
of Section 2 of the Act.
11. Section 25-B of the Act in so far as the same bears relevance to this case, may be reproduced with
advantage:
25 (B). Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or
a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation or work which is not due to any fault on the part
of the workman………………”
12. During the aforementioned; September 30, 1996 to March 24, 1999, there has undeniably been cessation
of work for certain periods of time as mentioned in the respondent.s reply. But the cessation of work not being due to
any fault on the part of the petitioner, he is to be considered in continuous service for the aforementioned periods of
break in his service in view of the abovementioned provisions of Section 25-B of the Act.
13. However, the petitioner.s allegation that in dispensing with his services, the respondent violated the
provisions of Clause 14(2) of the Standing Orders, does not appear to be tenable, because the establishment of HPSEB
3416
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stood exempted from the applicability of the Standings Orders, vide Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi
in RHP dated August 22, 1992.
14. However, in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent appears to have violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, which reads:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
15. Admittedly in the cross-examination of the respondent.s witness Parvesh Thakur (RW1), then Senior
Executive Engineer, Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar, Ex. PW1/A is the provisional seniority list issued from the
XEN.s office. This document is indicative of the workmen mentioned at serial nos. 55 to 111 being junior to the
petitioner. Admittedly in the cross-examination of the respondent.s aforesaid witness Parvesh Thakur (RW1), the
seniority list aforementioned was prepared in respect of such daily wagers as worked upto September, 2002. In view of
this deposition, the workmen figuring at serial nos. 55 to 111 in the seniority list Ex. PW1/A can safely be assumed to
have been retained in service at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with on March 25, 1999. In
terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent thus violated the abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G
of the Act.
16. But the respondent also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, which provides:
“25 (H). Re-employment of retrenched workman.—Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer
proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an
opportunity [to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for reemployment, and
such retrenched workmen] who offer themselves for reemployment shall have preference over other persons”.
17. The seniority list Ex. PW1/A is demonstrative of the workmen mentioned at serial nos. 112 to 123
having been engaged by the respondent after the termination of services of the petitioner. There is nothing to suggest
that before engaging these workmen, the respondent had given the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-
employment. Rather the respondent.s witness Parvesh Thakur in his cross-examination as RW1 admitted the
petitioner.s suggestion that he was not called upon to join his work after March 24, 1999. The respondent can therefore
safely be held to have violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act as well.
18. The upshot therefore is that in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. Besides, in re-engaging the aforementioned workmen after the termination of the
services of the petitioner without giving him an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment, the respondent violated
the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and
against the respondent.
Issue 2:
19. Aggrieved by his retrenchment, the petitioner, it appears, approached the Labour Inspector, Joginder
Nagar for the redressal of his grievance. Upon failure of the conciliation proceedings, which must have taken some
time, the Labour Inspector referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, H.P. vide his report No.105 dated May 26,
2004. The industrial dispute raised by the petitioner later came to be referred to this Court, vide Government of H.P.,
Labour Department, Notification No.11-1/7(LAB.)I.D./06-Joginder Nagar dated March 16, 2006. In view of these facts
and the circumstances of the case, the reference, to my mind, cannot be said to be stale. The issue on hand is therefore
held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
20. udged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service from the date
of his engagement as daily waged Beldar (September 30, 1996). He is, however, held not entitled to back-wages
because of his failure to lead such evidence as may show that he remained idle or was not gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today, failing which
he shall be entitled to 25% back-wages from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (March 25, 1999). The said 25%
back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3417
Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The reference is answered
accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file
after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P. (CAMP AT MANDI)
Ref No. : 66/2006
Date of Institution : 20.3.2006
Date of decision : 27.12.2008
Sh. Shyam Singh S/o Late Sh. Sidhu, Village Koti, P.O. Kharihar-Thara, Tehsil Ladbhrol, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
Superintending Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
For the Petitioner : Sh. K.S. Guleria, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. J.S. Chauhan, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of services of Sh. Shyam Singh S/o Late Sh. Sidhu by the Superintending
Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 25.01.1998 as alleged
by the workman without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Clause 14(2)
of the Certified Standing Orders of the Board is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service
benefits and compensation the aggrieved workman is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in HPSEB Sub Divisions Makrari in 1982. Later his services,
according to him, were orally terminated by the respondent. On September 25, 1996, he was, however, again engaged
by the respondent under different schemes and worked till May 25, 1998 when his services were again orally
terminated by the respondent without giving him a prior notice. Alleging the respondent to have given artificial breaks
in his service, the petitioner averred that in dispensing with his services, the respondent had violated the principle of
„last come first go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short), for certain
workers namely Molak Ram and Om Chand, who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time of
termination of his services. The period of breaks in his service, according to the petitioner, is liable to be counted
towards the continuity of his service, because cessation of work was not attributable to him. In terminating his services,
the respondent, according to the petitioner, had also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act and Clause
14(2) of the Industrial Establishment Standing Orders (hereinafter referred to as the Standing Orders) framed under the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the respondent to
reinstate him with back-wages and continuity of service. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to take into
account the period of interrupted service towards continuity of service.
3.
Refuting the petitioner.s allegation of artificial breaks in his service, the respondent in his reply averred
that the petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged Beldar as against a specific scheme/work; “extension for
improvement of voltage system, village Chulla” on November 25, 1983, and that on completion of the work on
November 24, 1984, his services automatically stood terminated. About 12 years later, he was again engaged as daily
waged Beldar as against the work started under a specific scheme in Electrical Sub Division, Makrari on October 25,
1996, and that his services automatically stood terminated on completion of the work on January 24, 1998. In view of
this position, no provision of the Act, according to the respondent, can be said to have been violated. As for the
allegation of violation of the provisions of the Standing Orders, the respondent.s contention is that this allegation is
3418
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untenable, for the establishment of HPSEB stands exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders. As to the
petitioner.s allegation that the workmen namely Molak Ram and Om Chand, who were junior to him, were retained at
the time his services were dispensed with, the respondent.s averments are that of these two workers, Om Chand, who
was engaged in May, 1993, was senior to the petitioner, and that Molak Ram was engaged on muster roll basis on
November 25, 1998, that is, after the disengagement of the petitioner. But the petitioner having never approached the
respondent for his re-engagement, the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act cannot be said to have been violated. The
respondent.s other averments relate to estoppel, limitation and maintainability of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder admitted the respondent.s claim that he (petitioner) was engaged on
November 25, 1983. Rest of the respondent.s contentions were, however, controverted by him.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, my Ld. Predecessor-in-office framed the following issues for
determination:
1.
Whether the disengagement from the service of the claimant by the respondent is proper and
justified?
..OPP.
2.
If the above issue proved in the affirmative, what relief of service benefits the claimant is entitled
to?
..OPP.
3.
Whether the claimant was engaged against a specific work on which completion the service of the
claimant came to an automatic end? If so, its effect?
..OPR.
4. Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes
Issue 2 :
The respondent having been found to have failed to observe the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act,
the petitioner is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Issue 3 :
No
Relief :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues 1 and 3:
7.
These issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
8.
Ld. counsel for the respondent contends that on both the dates (November 25, 1983 and October 25,
1996) the petitioner having been engaged as against the work started under a specific scheme, his services
automatically stood terminated on completion of the work, once on November 24, 1984 and the second time on January
24, 1998. In view of the petitioner.s services having thus been automatically terminated on completion of the work
started under a specific scheme, his removal from service, according to the ld. counsel, cannot be termed as
“retrenchment” as defined under Section 2 (oo) of the Act, which reads:
“2(oo) the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than
as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include-
(a)
voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between
the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulated in that behalf; or
(c)
termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment
between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated
under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(d) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.”
The Ld. counsel.s contention, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of what has been held by
the Hon.ble Apex Court in S. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553. In that
case, the principal question that arose before the Hon.ble Supreme Court of India was:
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3419
“Whether the workmen recruited for discharging temporary job under a project can insist on
compliance of section 25-F of the Act if their services are dispensed with on the project coming to an
end.”
9.
Having examined the scope of Sections 2(oo) and 25-F of the Act, the Hon.ble Apex Court inter alia
ruled:
“1. “Retrenchment” in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or
work itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial
pieces of legislation are to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it
is possible to take two views of a provision. It is also well settled that the Parliament has employed
the expression “the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever” while defining the term “retrenchment”, which is suggestive of the legislative intent to
assign the term „retrenchment. a meaning wider than what it is understood to have in common
parlance. There are four exceptions carved out of the artificially extended meaning of the term
„retrenchment., and therefore, termination of service of a workman so long as it is attributable to
the act of the employer would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment. dehors the reason for
termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of „retrenchment. the termination of service
must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service which does not fall
within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of „retrenchment..
2.
The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to
retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being
satisfied:-
(i)
that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia
that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and
consistently with the terms of the contract.
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at
the commencement of employment.
14. The engagement of a workman as a daily wager does not by itself amount to putting the workman on
notice that he was being engaged in a scheme or project which was to last only for a particular length of time or upto
the occurrence of some event, and therefore, the workman ought to know that his employment was short lived. The
contract of employment consciously entered into by the workman with the employer would result in a notice to the
workman on the date of the commencement of the employment itself that his employment was short lived and as per
the terms of the contract the same was liable to termination on the expiry of the contract and the scheme or project
coming to an end. The workman may not therefore, complain that by the act of employer his employment was coming
to an abrupt termination. To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of
retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the abovesaid ingredients so as to attract the applicability of sub clause (bb)
abovesaid. In the case at hand, the respondent-employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of sub-clause
(bb), as stated hereinabove. All that has been proved is that the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily
wagers in a project. For want of proof attracting applicability of sub-clause (bb), it has to be held that the termination of
the services of the appellants amounted to retrenchment….”
(emphasis is mine)
10. Although there is no plausible material on record to lend assurance to the respondent.s claim that the
petitioner was engaged in a specific scheme, even if this claim is assumed to be true, there is nothing suggest that at the
time of engagement of the petitioner as daily wager he was told that his employment was for a specific work, and that
his services would be dispensed with on completion of the work. Also, there is no plausible evidence to show that at the
time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the work started under the alleged specific scheme stood
completed, or say, his employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme work. There is
therefore no escape from the conclusion that the termination of services of the petitioner amount to retrenchment as
defined under Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act. The respondent.s counsel.s contention aforementioned has therefore
been raised only to be rejected.
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11. The petitioner alleged that his services were terminated by the respondent without serving him with a
prior notice. This allegation of his is no doubt true, but there being nothing suggestive of his having worked for 240
days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the respondent was not obliged to
serve with him a one month.s notice as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. In dispensing with the services of the
petitioner without serving with him any notice, the respondent cannot therefore be said to have committed any
illegality.
12. As for the petitioner.s claim that the respondent had been giving fictional breaks in his services, and that
the period of fictional breaks is liable be counted towards his continuity in service, the same, to my thinking, does not
appear to be holding water for want of plausible evidence. This claim of his therefore merits rejection and is rejected.
13. The petitioner.s allegation that the workmen namely Molak Ram and Om Chand were junior to him, and
that they having been retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with, there was
violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, also, to my mind, does not appear to be tenable. The
respondent.s witness Sangram Singh, then Assistant Engineer, Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar, testified as RW1
that of the two workers namely Molak Ram and Om Chand, the latter was senior to the petitioner. This deposition of
the respondent.s witness having not been challenged during his cross-examination by the petitioner deserves acceptance
and the petitioner.s claim that Om Chand was junior to him merits rejection and is rejected. As for Molak Ram, he
having undeniably been engaged as daily wager on November 25, 1998 (vide the petitioner.s suggestion put to the
respondent.s aforesaid witness during his cross-examination RW1), that is, after the termination of services of the
petitioner, the allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25-G does not stand to reason. To be explicit, Molak
Ram not being in the employ of the respondent at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the latter.s
allegation that Molak Ram was retained in service at the time of termination of his services is absolutely unfounded and
baseless.
14. The upshot therefore is that in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent cannot be said to
have violated any provision of the Act. Also, the respondent cannot be said to have committed breach of the Standing
Orders, because the establishment of HPSEB stands exempted from the applicability of the Standing Orders, vide
Notification No. 12-5/85 Shram published in Hindi in RHP dated August 22, 1992. As a result, while issue 1 is held in
the affirmative, issue 3 is held in the negative.
Issue 2:
15. The respondent.s witness Sangram Singh.s deposition would reveal that Molak Ram was engaged as
daily wager on November 25, 1998, that is, after the termination of services of the petitioner. Section 25-H of the Act
provides:
“25-H. Re-employment of retrenched workman. – Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer
proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an
opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for reemployment, and
such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for reemployment shall have preference over other persons”.
The respondent.s aforesaid witness categorically admitted in his cross-examination RW1 that before Molak
Ram was engaged as daily wager, no notice was given to the petitioner. In view of this admission and the materials on
record not being suggestive of the respondent having given the petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-
employment, the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act can safely be held to have been violated by the respondent. The
petitioner is therefore entitled to reinstatement and continuity of service w.e.f. the date on which Molak Ram was
engaged as daily waged Beldar (25.11.1998). The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
RELIEF
16.
In view of my findings on the above issue 2, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in part.
Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time
of his retrenchment. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service w.e.f. November 25, 1998, that is, the date on
which Molak Ram was engaged by the respondent as daily wager without observing of the provisions of Section 25-H
of the Act. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is, however, held not entitled to back-
wages. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The reference is
answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and
the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 27th day of December, 2008.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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3421
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 589/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Damodari Devi w/o Shri Hukam Chand, R/o Village Kulhana, P.O. Huyun Paihed, Tehsil Sarkaghat,
Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Damodari Devi W/o Shri Hukam Chand by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
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November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
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3423
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii)
whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. (1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
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opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11.
In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii)
in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the
notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months;
and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
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14.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be
said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including
service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the
workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16.
But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari
Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner) services
were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dharampur,
in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior to her
(petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared the
seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
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according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the extent
the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour of the
petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
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referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9256 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated July 24, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the
matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 639/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Dawarki Devi W/o Shri Barfu Ram, R/o Village Barang, P.O. Morala, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Dawarki Devi W/o Shri Barfu Ram by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
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following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
OPR
6.
Relief.
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5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
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difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii)
in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
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12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
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16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall
ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for
reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
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retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
ISSUE 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9254 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 5, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
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period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 596/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Junga Devi W/o Shri Ludar Singh, R/o Village Chowk, P.O. Deo Bradla Chowk, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt.
Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Junga Devi W/o Shri Ludar Singh by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked assuch in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
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3435
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
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relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(iii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
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3437
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
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(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
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18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
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be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9265 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the
matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 613/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Kamla Devi w/o Shri Brij Raj, Village Banehardi, PO-Hiyun Pahed, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
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3441
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Kamla Devi W/o Shri Brij Lal, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
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1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
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3443
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
3444
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specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
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3445
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall
ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for
reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
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21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22.
Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1030/2007-9248, dated 12.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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3447
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 588/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Lajja Devi W/o Shri Prem Singh, Village Morala, PO-Brang(Beari), Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P,
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Lajja Devi W/o Shri Prem Singh, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
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way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
.. OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
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3449
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the precedingtwelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating
place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
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(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11.
In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
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3451
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall
ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for
reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
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Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
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3453
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1033/2007-9263, dated 12.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 24, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 599/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Lakshmi Devi W/o Shri Hari Singh, R/o Village Baneharadi, P.O. Hayun Paihed, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt.
Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
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Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Lakshmi Devi W/o Shri Hari Singh by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
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3455
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
OPR
6.
Relief.
5. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
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(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
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3457
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
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(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall
ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for
reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
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view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22.
Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24.
In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9259 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the
matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues 1 and 3:
7.
These issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
8.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar in July, 1997
does not appear to be having a ring of truth in view of his admission of the respondent.s suggestion put to him in his
cross-examination as PW1 that he was engaged in 1998. The mandays chart Ex. RW1/A the correctness of which is not
disputed by the petitioner, is also indicative of his having been engaged as Beldar in Irrigation & Public Health Sub
Division, Shahpur on November 5, 1998. The respondent.s claim that the petitioner was engaged on November 5, 1998,
therefore, deserves acceptance and is accepted.
9.
However, the respondent.s claim that the petitioner had abandoned the job on his own, to my thinking,
does not appear to be tenable for want of plausible evidence. In substantiation of his claim, the respondent could well
adduce in evidence such muster roll or any other document as may show that the petitioner had absented from work on
his own. But the respondent having failed so to do, it is difficult to accept his claim. More so, when the petitioner in his
cross-examination as PW1 denied the respondent.s suggestion that he (petitioner) had abandoned the job on his own in
2001. The evidence led by the petitioner, on the other hand, lends assurance to his allegation that his services were
terminated by the respondent in 2001. The issue 3 is therefore held in his favour and against the respondent.
10. Section 25-F of the Act, which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, may be reproduced
with advantage:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
11. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
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3461
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
12. The petitioner claims to have worked for more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months
preceding the date of his retrenchment. This claim rings true not only in view of the working days detailed in the
mandays chart Ex. RW1/A but also the categorical admission by the respondent.s witness Raghbir Singh of the
petitioner.s suggestion put to him during his cross-examination as RW1 that he (petitioner) had worked for more than
243 days during the period of 12 calendar months (preceding the date of his removal from service). There is no
gainsaying the fact that at the time the services of the petitioner were dispensed with, he was not served by the
respondent with one month.s notice nor was he paid retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the
Act. In terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent can therefore safely be held to have violated the said
provisions.
13. However, the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, to my
mind, merits rejection, because in substantiation thereof, he did not choose to lead such documentary evidence as may
show that Pawan Kumar and Mali Ram were junior to him, and that they were retained in service at the time his
services were dispensed with. The respondent is therefore not proved to have violated the said provisions. Also, the
allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25-N of the act cannot be said to have been established for want of
plausible evidence.
14. The upshot is that in terminating the services of the petitioner in 2001 the respondent violated the
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. In other words, the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent
was unlawful. As a result, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his retrenchment
in 2001. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the
date of his retrenchment. The issue 1 is held accordingly.
Issue 2:
15.
The materials on record not being suggestive of the petitioner having suppressed the material facts from
this Court, he cannot be held guilty of suppressio veri. The issue on hand is therefore held in his favour and against the
respondent.
Issue 4:
16. The materials on record would reveal that aggrieved by his retrenchment, the petitioner filed before the
H.P. Administrative Tribunal an application (OA (D) 289/2001) in 2001. However, that application was dismissed by
the said Tribunal, vide order dated August 25, 2004, Ex. RW1/B. Thereafter the petitioner approached the Conciliation
Officer-cum-Labour Officer, Dharamshala for the redressal of his grievance. Upon failure of the conciliation
proceedings, the said Officer referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, H.P. The industrial dispute raised by the
petitioner later came to be referred to this Court, vide Government of Himachal Pradesh (Labour Department)
Notification No.11-1/85(Lab)ID/07-Kangra dated September 25, 2007. In view of these facts and the circumstances of
the case the respondent.s allegation that the petition is barred by time merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under
discussion is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
17. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he
was working at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is held entitled to continuity of service and 50%
back-wages from the date of his retrenchment in 2001. The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on the basis of the
3462
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last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is higher till the date of
reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner within a period of 90 days from
today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in
the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 600/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Maraju Devi W/o Shri Shali Ram, Village Jhajar Kakail (Jhajhar Kunain) PO –Deo Bradalai, Tehsil
Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Maraju Devi W/o Shri Shali Ram, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by way
of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the notice of
termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act. But the
respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged under
Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the petitioner.s
retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First Go. as
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3463
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet
Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and unlawfully
retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner, the
respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for setting
aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate her with
full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued to the
respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State Government
in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
.. OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
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this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
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3465
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3)
Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
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(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a
citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf,
the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
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3467
18.
This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22.
Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
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Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1091/2007-9233, dated 12.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 606/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Nirmala Devi W/o Shri Sunder Singh, Village Neda (Lavanpur), PO- Baroti, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt.
Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
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3469
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Nirmala Devi W/o Shri Sunder Singh, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
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2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
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3471
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
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(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2)
where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
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obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall
ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for
reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17.
The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
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22.
Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
1047/2007-9253, dated 12.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28.
The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
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3475
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 650/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Promila Devi W/o Shri Raj Mal, R/o Village & P.O. Saklana, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Promila Devi W/o Shri Raj Mal by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
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petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1. Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief
the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2. Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3. Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4. Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5. Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6. Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
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What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding
twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the
aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
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“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
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13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall
ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for
reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
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respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
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3481
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9261 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 5, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 597/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Rampa Devi W/o Shri Ram Chand, R/o Village & P.O. Kalana, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
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The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Rampa Devi W/o Shri Ram Chand by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
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3483
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
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“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
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3485
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
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which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2)
where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall
ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for
reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18.
This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
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20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman
merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd.
1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9258 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the
matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 577/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Sakuntala Devi w/o Shri Kashmir Singh, R/o Village Harnal, P.O. Panehed, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt.
Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Sakuntala Devi W/o Shri Kashmir Singh by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
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3489
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1. Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief
the petitioner is entitled to?
.. OPP.
2. Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3. Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
.. OPR.
4. Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5. Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6. Relief.
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5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
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difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
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12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
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16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22.
Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
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23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9240 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated July 16, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the
matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 585/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Sakuntla Devi W/o Shri Jai Singh, R/o Village Jangail, P.O. Kot, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Sakuntla Devi W/o Shri Jai Singh by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority,
past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
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Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of her services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
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8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
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(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
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such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall
ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for
reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17
he petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash Chand,
Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to her,
were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the respondent
thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply, the
respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
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have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24.
In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9237 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated July 17, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the
matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not
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3501
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 575/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Sheetla Devi W/o Shri Hem Raj, R/o Village Hawani, P.O. Rupadi, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Sheetla Devi W/o Shri Hem Raj by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
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2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the
petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
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3503
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of termination
of her services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
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within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- (1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
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12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
3506
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16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
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3507
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9235 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated July 15, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the
matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S. S. SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
3508
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 576/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Shiv Devi W/o Shri Nand Lal R/o Village Banwar, P.O. Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Shiv Devi W/o Shri Nand Lal by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
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3509
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of termination
of her services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(i) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
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7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
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3511
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii)
in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has
been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
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14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall
ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for
reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice. However, the
retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
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3513
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds after
the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9239 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated July 15, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the
matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
3514
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2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 609/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Smt. Sarita Devi W/o Shri Dhani Ram, R/o Village & P.O. Bradta, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Smt. Sarita Devi W/o Shri Dhani Ram by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
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3515
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed her statement of claim wherein she averred that she was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that she worked assuch in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, her services were terminated by the respondent by giving her a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to her before the date of her retrenchment and not at the time her services were
dispensed with, the termination of her services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to her, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of her services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid her retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, her retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to her and
unlawfully retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. She also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
her with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating her services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of her services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by her. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by her act and conduct, and that she is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by her act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
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5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. She is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of termination
of her services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of her having been retrenched unlawfully. But this
denial, to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances
of the case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which
relates to special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers
to a workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of
this Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the precedingtwelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
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3517
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii)
in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
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2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of her being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless she has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve her with one month.s notice and pay her retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
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3519
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of her statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
her, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time her services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice. However, the
retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to her, were retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in her affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to her and retained in service at the time her (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to her (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of her services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
her, was retained in service at the time her services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer herself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in her
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after her retrenchment and this allegation of her not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which she was working at
the time her services were dispensed with. Besides, she is entitled to continuity of service from the date of her
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). Her claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
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23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of her statement of claim averred that she was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of her services, and that she was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim she in
her affidavit inter alia deposed that after her illegal retrenchment she was not gainfully employed anywhere and was
still unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of her, her claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date
of her unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in her favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of her grievance, her claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles her to the reliefs she
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9264 dated 12.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before the
matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by her unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of her grievance. Her claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of her having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of her unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 583/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Sukh Ram S/o Shri Narang, Village Darku, PO Longani, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
..Petitioner
.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent..
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Sukh Ram S/o Shri Narang, by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
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November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
..OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
..OPR.
6. Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of termination of
his services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
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3523
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
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opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
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14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service
which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for
not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
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demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
926/2007-9274, dated 12.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 17, 2008. In
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3527
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 595/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Suresh Kumar S/o Shri Gian Chand, Village Siyathi, P.O. Sajao Piplu, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
..Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. ..Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
(1)
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Suresh Kumar S/o Shri Gian Chand, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
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back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what
relief the petitioner is entitled to?
.. OPP.
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
..OPR.
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
..OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
..OPR
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5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
..OPR.
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of termination of
his services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1:
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a
mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant
or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
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HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer
of that authority;”
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3531
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has
been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment
and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,—(1) a workman shall be said to
be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be
interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a
cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the
date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
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16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice. However, the
retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provision of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
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retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2:
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3:
25.
The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC)."
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
907/2007-9246, dated 12.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4:
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5:
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
3534
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period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.\
Ref No. : 629/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Suresh Kumar S/o Shri Sohan Singh R/o Village & P.O. Kamlah, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Suresh Kumar S/o Shri Sohan Singh, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
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3535
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the
petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date
of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
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case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried
on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily
so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile
unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-
(1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
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3537
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the
head of the department;
(ii)
in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the
notice:
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(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months;
and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or
six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(3) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
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3539
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provision of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
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Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9899 dated 30.11.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated October 3, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed before
the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8,
2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not
suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and is
rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5
28.
The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29.
Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 646/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Thakur Singh S/o Shri Jhahru, R/o Vill. Sarskan, P.O. Baroti, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
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3541
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Thakur Singh S/o Shri Jhahru by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without following the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from the above
Employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the
petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
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2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of his services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii)
whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
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3543
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-
(1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
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“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the
notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months;
and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2)
where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(3) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
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15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages
workers are working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were
transferred from other Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts
came to the notice. However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are
surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
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22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3
25. The Ld. Dy. D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact
by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour
Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9280 dated 13.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 5, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
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3547
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 62/2008
Date of Institution : 22.2.2008
Date of decision : 26.11.2008
Shri Vijay Singh S/o Shri Khaimdi Ram, R/o Village Dhunter, P.O. Kuthera, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
1.
Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
2.
The Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P.
…....Respondents
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the action of the (1) Project Officer, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
(2) The Incharge, Herbal Garden, Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. to retain
junior workers who are junior to Shri Vijya Singh S/o Khaimdi Ram workman and to give him break
in service as alleged by the workman without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of back wages, seniority and service benefits the above
aggrieved workman is entitled from the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged as daily
waged beldar by the respondent 1 on February, 1999 and posted to Herbal Garden, Neri in Hamirpur district. Claiming
to have been working at the said place ever since his engagement as daily waged beldar, the petitioner alleged that the
respondents 1 and 2 had been giving fictional breaks in his service so that he could not be able to complete 240 days in
any of the calendar years. His co-workmen namely Pawan Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Ravinder Kumar, Desh Raj, Chaman
Lal, Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand and Milap Chand, who were also working at Herbal Garden, Neri as daily waged
beldar, were also given fictional breaks except one Satish Kumar, who was also engaged as daily wager by the
respondent 1 and working in the said garden. In the case of Satish Kumar, no fictional break, according to the
petitioner, was ever given and the respondents. act of giving fictional breaks in the petitioner.s service and that of his
aforementioned co-workers is violative of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (the Act, for short). Some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt. Saina Devi, Punni
Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla Devi, Baldev Raj,
Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv Ram and Smt. Kala
Devi, who according to the petitioner were also engaged on daily wages basis in another herbal garden of Ayurveda
department namely Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar in Mandi district, were also being given fictional breaks in their
service. In their case, the Incharge, Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, was, however, forbidden from giving fictional
breaks by the Director of Ayurveda, vide his letter dated July 18, 1999. Claiming the fictional breaks in his case to be
the intentional act of the respondents, the petitioner further averred that he having never absented from work wilfully
3548
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was entitled to continuity of service in view of the provisions of Section 25-B of the Act. Besides, he is entitled to
wages for the period of fictional breaks. He therefore prays for a direction to the respondents to count the period of
fictional breaks towards continuity of his service and pay him wages for the said period along with interest @ 9% per
annum. He also prays for a direction to the respondents to regularise his service on the basis of his seniority.
3.
The respondents in their joint reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily
waged beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on February 10, 1999, but refuted his allegation of fictional breaks. Claiming the
work of Herbal Garden, Neri to be a seasonal work, the respondents averred that the petitioner and other workers
namely Chaman Lal, Vijay Kumar, Ramesh Chand, Baljit Singh, Pawan Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Desh Raj, Ravinder
Kumar, Bahadur Singh, Chander Kant, Ravinder Kumar and Madan Lal were engaged on daily wages basis at the said
garden subject to availability of work and budget, and no fictional break was ever given in their service. As for Satish
Kumar, he was in fact engaged as daily waged worker at Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on 1.7.1996 and he being deft
in nursery development work was temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 to carry out the said work
and other related works there. About four years later he was called back to Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar after the
other workers of Herbal Garden, Neri gained knowledge of nursery development work upto the desired level. On the
basis of these averments the respondents pray for dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
The petitioner in his rejoinder controverted the contentions of the respondents and reiterated his stand
taken in the claim petition.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the respondents have been giving fictional breaks in the service of the petitioner.
OPP
2.
Whether Satish Kumar junior to the petitioner, as alleged.
OPP
3.
If the above issues 1 and 2 are proved, what relief of service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPR
4.
Relief.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes partly, as the respondents have been giving breaks in the service of the petitioner.
Issue 2 :
No
Issue 3 :
The petitioner is entitled to the relief as mentioned in the operative part of the award.
Relief :
The claim petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1
7.
The petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar at Herbal Garden, Neri on
February, 1999, is not disputed by the respondents. Also, his claim that he was still working as beldar on daily wages
basis at the said garden, is not denied by the respondents. What is denied by the respondents is his allegation of
fictional breaks. But this denial of theirs appears to be far from truth in view of the materials on record. The Mandays
Chart of casual labourers working in Herbal Garden, Neri is demonstrative of the petitioner having worked for 189
days in 1999, 196.5 days in 2000, 183 days in 2001, 216.6 days in 2002, 206.5 days in 2003, 176 days in 2004, 249
days in 2005, 330 days in 2006, 296 days in 2007 and 119 days during the period from January 1, 2008 to April, 2008.
That there have been breaks in his service is manifest from this document. In substantiation of his allegation that the
breaks in service were notional/fictional, the petitioner swore an affidavit Ex. PW1/A wherein he alleged that the
respondents had been giving notional/fictional breaks in his service during the period; January, 1999 to April, 2005.
Besides, he relied upon a copy of the letter dated July 18, 1999 addressed to the Incharge, Herbal Garden, Joginder
Nagar by the Director of Ayurveda, Himachal Pradesh, Annexure P1. This letter in its material part reads:
“You are hereby advised not to give any break after 89 days in future to daily paid Labourers who are engaged
to work in Herbal Garden as such a notional break has been disapproved by the competent courts also.”
The petitioner.s allegation is that some other workmen namely Sohan Singh, Lohali Devi, Ram Singh, Smt.
Saina Devi, Punni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judiya Devi, Nirmla Devi, Kamla
Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram, Shiv
Ram and Smt. Kala Devi, who were engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were also being
given fictional breaks in their service, and that the Incharge of the said Garden was forbidden from so doing by the
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3549
Director of Ayurveda, vide his aforementioned letter dated July 18, 1999, Annexure P1. As to this allegation, the
respondents. averments in paragraph 7 of their joint reply are:
“That the contents of para-7 are admitted to the extent that these workers Sh. Sohan Singh, Lohli Devi, Ram
Singh, Saina Devi, Puni Devi, Sher Singh, Prem Singh, Kuldeep Chand, Nirmal Kumar, Judhia Devi, Nirmala
Devi, Baldev Raj, Munni Devi, Sukh Ram, Raj Mal, Ramesh Kumar, Mahesh Kumar, Hirda Ram, Mattu Ram,
Shiv Ram & Kala Devi were engaged in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar and their notional breaks were
discontinued by the order of Director Ayurveda, H.P. being senior. The office order issued by the Director
Ayurveda to discontinue the breaks is not applicable to the casual labourers working in Herbal Garden Neri
because they are being engaged subject to the availablity of work & budget, as the work of Herbal Garden
Neri is a seasonal work.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.
By these averments, what stands admitted by the respondents is that abovenamed workers, who were
engaged on daily wages basis in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar, were being given fictional/notional breaks in their
service, which practice was discontinued on receipt of an office order issued by the Director Ayurveda. Why the said
Director.s office order to discontinue the breaks in service could not be made applicable to the casual labourers
working in Herbal Garden, Neri, is averred to be their having been engaged subject to the availability of work and
budget, as the work of Herbal Garden, Neri, according to the respondents, is a seasonal work. Going by this claim of
the respondents, the petitioner.s service, or for that matter the service of the workmen engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri
used to be terminated from time to time on account of cessation of work and non-availability of budget. They used to
be re-engaged on the availability of work and budget. Although there is no plausible material on record to lend
assurance to the respondents. claim that the work of Herbal Garden, Neri is only seasonal, and that the petitioner and
his aforementioned co-workers were engaged there as casual workers subject to the availability of work and budget,
even if this claim is assumed to be true, the petitioner is entitled to the relief of continuity of service in view of the
provisions of Section 25-B of the Act, which in its material part says:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an
accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault
on the part of the workman…………..”
9.
It is manifest from these provisions that a workman is deemed to be in continuous service for a period if
he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including the service, which may be interrupted on account of sickness
or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due
to any fault on the part of the workman. If to go by the respondents. stand, the breaks in the petitioner.s service were
caused on account of cessation of work and non-availability of funds. But the cessation of work and the non-
availability of funds not been attributable to any fault on the part of the petitioner, he is to be considered in continuous
service ever since his engagement as beldar on daily wages basis (February, 1999). The issue under discussion is
accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
Issue 2
9.
The petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar having been engaged by the respondents as daily waged beldar
in Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 was junior to him, to my thinking, does not appear to be having a ring of truth in
view of materials on record. The respondents. averments as also the evidence led by them are indicative of Satish
Kumar having been engaged as daily waged beldar in Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar on July 1, 1996 and his having
been temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri on 12.4.1999 to carry out the nursery development work there.
According to the respondents, the reason why Satish Kumar was temporarily shifted to Herbal Garden, Neri, was his
being deft in nursery development work and the casual workers engaged in Herbal Garden, Neri not being in the know
of that work. About four years later, Satish Kumar was called back to Herbal Garden, Joginder Nagar after the other
workers of Herbal Garden, Neri gained knowledge of nursery work upto the desired level. There being no reason to
discredit this claim of the respondents, the petitioner.s claim that Satish Kumar is junior to him cannot to be accepted
and is therefore rejected. The issue on hand is accordingly held against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.
Issue 3
10. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and my findings on the foregoing issues, the petitioner
is entitled to only the relief of continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar (10.2.1999).
The issue on hand is held accordingly.
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RELIEF
11. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, the petition succeeds partly and is allowed in
part. The petitioner is held entitled to continuity of service from the date of his engagement as daily waged beldar
(10.2.1999). He is, however, held not entitled to wages for the periods of break in his service. Also, his claim that
certain workers junior to him were retained is rejected. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be
sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of November, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 608/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Vinod Kumar S/o Shri Kanhiya Lal, Village Parail, PO Samod, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Vinod Kumar S/o Shri Kanhiya Lal, by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
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3551
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the
petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct. OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of his services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
3552
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denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—
(1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer
until,-
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3553
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such
retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be
communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which
the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
3554
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“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the
notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months;
and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2)
where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(3) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of
any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the
workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer
retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
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3555
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
3556
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Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.LO/MZ/IV/ID/154/06 &
938/2007-9271, dated 12.10.2007. On the basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this
Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/2008-Mandi dated July 27, 2008. In
view of the period of time that elapsed before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt
aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the
redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s
aforementioned contention merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 645/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Vinod Kumar S/o Shri Hari Singh, R/o Village Bhadrana, P.O. Saklana, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
….Petitioner
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 vxLr] 2010@20 Jko.k] 1932
3557
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Vinod Kumar S/o Shri Hari Singh by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1998 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
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that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the
petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 : Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the date of
termination of his services.
Issue 2 : No.
Issue 3 : No
Issue 4 : No
Issue 5 : No
Relief. : The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1998 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
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3559
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
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11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
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3561
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or
six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1998 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. So he is indubitably junior to the petitioner. The said seniority list is also indicative of
the said workman having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. The respondent thus on his
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own showing lent credence to the petitioner.s allegation that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to
him, was retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is
thus proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9278 dated 13.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 5, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
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Issue 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 656/2008
Date of Institution : 29.10.2008
Date of decision : 31.3.2009
Shri Vipan Kumar S/o Shri Hem Raj, R/O Village Maluya, P.O. Sidhpur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether retrenchment of services of Shri Vipan Kumar S/o Shri Hem Raj by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, w.e.f. 08.7.2005 without
following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-Worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999, and that he worked as such in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD upto July 8, 2005. On July 8, 2005, his services were terminated by the respondent by giving him a
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retrenchment notice under Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short). Claiming to have
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July 8, 2005 and completed as many days during the
period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, the petitioner further averred that retrenchment
compensation having been paid to him before the date of his retrenchment and not at the time his services were
dispensed with, the termination of his services was not lawful. More so, when the authority specified by the
Government (Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi) from whom prior permission for retrenchment of
the petitioner is stated to have been obtained under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act, could not in law be notified as
specified authority. Another count on which the termination of services of the petitioner, according to him, is unlawful
relates to the notice of retrenchment being bad in the eye of law. It is averred that the provisions of Section 25N of the
Act under which the notice of retrenchment was issued, apply to a workman employed in an „industrial establishment.
as defined under Section 25L of the Act. The Public Works Department in which was employed the petitioner, not
being an „industrial establishment. within the meaning of Section 25L of the Act, the termination of his services by
way of three months. notice under Section 25N of the Act is unlawful. In the case of Public Works Department, the
notice of termination of services of a workman, according to the petitioner, is envisaged under Section 25F of the Act.
But the respondent having not given the petitioner such a notice and paid him retrenchment compensation as envisaged
under Section 25F of the Act, his retrenchment is unlawful on this count as well. Yet another count on which the
petitioner.s retrenchment is unlawful, is stated to be the violation by the respondent of the principle of „Last Come First
Go. as envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The workmen namely Subhash Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand,
Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, according to the petitioner, were junior to him and
unlawfully retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with. In terminating the services of the petitioner,
the respondent thus violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act as well. The petitioner therefore prayed for
setting aside the retrenchment orders dated July 8, 2005. He also prayed for a direction to the respondent to reinstate
him with full back-wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Another direction sought to be issued
to the respondent is for regularization of the services of the petitioner in accordance with the policy of the State
Government in this behalf.
3.
The respondent in his reply admitted the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged
Beldar on muster roll basis in 1999 and retrenched on July 8, 2005, but denied having violated the provisions of the Act
in terminating his services by a notice under Section 25N of the Act. Explaining the reason why the petitioner was
retrenched, the respondent averred that on creation of Dharampur Division out of Sarkaghat Division of HPPWD with
effect from September 7, 1998, a large number of labourers was indiscriminately engaged during the period from
November, 1998 to June, 1999. The total strength of labour swelled upto 4045, which was being maintained out of
Non-Plan funds. The funds utilized for defrayment of labour wages caused financial hardship, which adversely affected
the maintenance of roads in Mandi district. So, it was under these circumstances that the respondent retrenched the
services of the petitioner and other surplus workers after obtaining permission of the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R)
Central Zone, Mandi, who was notified as the specified authority by the State Government under Section 25N of the
Act. It is averred that the petitioner having been given a three months. notice and paid retrenchment compensation as
envisaged under Section 25N of the Act, the termination of his services is not violative of any provision of the Act. As
to the petitioner.s allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act, the respondent.s contention is that
due to non-availability of senior workers in the newly created Dharampur Division some workers were transferred to
that Division from other Divisions/Sub Divisions. However, when on scrutiny of the „case/seniority. the true position
came to notice, retrenchment notices were issued to the „above juniors., who were also „surplus to the requirement..
Claiming the petitioner.s retrenchment to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the respondent further
averred that the reference was not maintainable and the petitioner not entitled to the relief prayed for by him. It is also
averred that the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches; that the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim
petition by his act and conduct, and that he is guilty of suppressio veri.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is unlawful. If so, what relief the
petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged.
OPR
3.
Whether the petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches.
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri.
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and conduct.
OPR
6.
Relief.
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3565
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes. He is entitled to reinstatement, 50% back-wages and continuity of service from the
date of termination of his services.
Issue 2 :
No.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Relief. :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issue 1
6.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on muster roll basis in 1999 and worked as such in Dharampur Division of HPPWD upto July 7, 2005. Also, there is no
denying the fact that the petitioner was retrenched by the respondent w.e.f. July 8, 2005 under Section 25N of the Act.
What is denied by the respondent is the petitioner.s allegation of his having been retrenched unlawfully. But this denial,
to my thinking, does not appear to be tenable in view of the materials on record and the facts and circumstances of the
case. Section 25N under which the petitioner has been retrenched, appears in Chapter VB of the Act which relates to
special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. This section refers to a
workman employed in any industrial establishment to which applies Chapter VB of the Act. The applicability of this
Chapter is governed by Section 25K which provides that the Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than
one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. The expression
“industrial establishment” is for the purposes of Chapter VB defined by clause (a) of Section 25L, which reads:
“25L (a) “industrial establishment” means-
(i)
a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951);”
7.
The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends with vehemence that Dharampur Division of Public
Works Department not being an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 25L, the
termination of services of the petitioner by a three months. notice as contemplated under Section 25N of the Act is not
lawful.
8.
Per contra, the Ld. Dy. District Attorney appearing for the respondent argues that Dharampur Division
of Public Works Department falls within the definition of “industrial establishment” and the petitioner.s retrenchment
made in accordance with the provisions of Section 25N of the Act cannot therefore be said to be unlawful. But this
contention, to my mind, does not appear to be holding water. The expression “factory” occurring in clause (a) of
Section 25L is defined in Clause 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 thus:
“(m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof-
(i)
whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months,
and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is
ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power,
or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, railway running shed or
a hotel, restaurant or eating place.”
9.
The respondent.s pleadings are non-existent in such averments as may show the Public Works
Department to be a “factory” as defined above. Also, there is nothing to suggest that in Dharampur Division of
HPPWD wherein was engaged the petitioner, some manufacturing process is/was being carried on with the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on. Also, there is nothing to show that in any part of the said Division some
manufacturing process is/was being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. It is therefore
difficult to accept the Ld. Dy. D.A..s contention that Dharampur Division of HPPWD is an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L (a) of the Act and the petitioner.s retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act does
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not suffer from any illegality. Since Dharampur Division of HPPWD is not proved to be an “industrial establishment”
within the meaning of Section 25L(a) of the Act, the petitioner.s Authorised Representative.s aforementioned
contention deserves acceptance and is accepted.
10. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative further contends that another count on which his client.s
retrenchment under Section 25N of the Act cannot be said to be lawful relates to the illegality committed by the State
Government in notifying the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi as the specified authority from
whom prior permission for retrenchment of the petitioner and other workers is stated to have been obtained under
Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The said Chief Engineer, according to the Authorised Representative, being the head of
HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi wherein is comprised the HPPWD Division, Dharampur, could not in law be
notified as the specified authority for the purpose of Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. This contention also, to my
thinking, appears to be having force. Section 25N of the Act in its material part reads:
“25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(i)
the workman has been given three months. notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(ii) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that
Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf”
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed
manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government
or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to
the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any
retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time
being in force as if no notice had been given to him.”
11. In the document Ex. RW1/B, Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi is shown to have
been notified by the State Government as specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act
in relation to HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi. For terminating the services of the petitioner, the Executive
Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Dharampur, is stated to have obtained prior permission from the said specified
authority under Section 25N (1) (b) of the Act. The question that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case
arises is: Whether or not the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi could in law be notified as the
specified authority by the State Government. The answer, to my mind, is in the negative. The expression “employer”
occurring in Section 25N is defined in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act thus:
“(g) “employer” means-
(i)
in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is
prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of
that authority;”
12. The materials on record are not indicative of the respondent (Executive Engineer, B&R Division,
HPPWD, Dharampur) who dispensed with the services of the petitioner w.e.f. July 8, 2005 (vide his orders dated July
2, 2005 Ex. RW1/D a copy whereof was sent to the specified authority Cum-Chief Engineer (CZ) HPPWD Mandi for
favour of information) having been notified as the authority prescribed, or say the “employer” in relation to the industry
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3567
carried on by the Public Works Department in its Dharampur Division. The employer, or say the authority prescribed in
relation to the said Division of HPPWD was therefore the head of the department in view of the abovementioned
provisions of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. The aforementioned Chief Engineer, who was notified by the State
Government as the specified authority for the purposes of Sections 25F, 25M and 25N of the Act, being undeniably the
head of HPPWD (B&R), Central Zone, Mandi, was the employer of the petitioner. But the employer and the specified
authority cannot in law be one and the same person. In notifying the Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the State
Government therefore committed an illegality. More so, when for the sake of fair play and justice the head of the
department/zone in which was employed the retrenched workman, ought not to have been notified as the specified
authority. Since the Chief Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Central Zone, Mandi could not in law be notified as the specified
authority, the permission granted by him for the retrenchment of the petitioner is decidedly no permission in the eye of
law. The petitioner.s retrenchment can therefore safely be held to be illegal in view of the abovementioned provisions
of sub-section (7) of Section 25N of the Act.
13. The respondent to retrench the petitioner on account of his being surplus ought to have taken recourse to
the relevant provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Act, which deals with lay-off and retrenchment. One of the
sections enumerated in this chapter is 25F which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It says:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
14. In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25B of
the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i)
one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
15. The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year from 1999 to July
8, 2005 and completed as many days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment, is
not disputed by the respondent. Before dispensing with the services of the petitioner the respondent was therefore
obliged to serve him with one month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged in the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25F of the Act. But the respondent having failed so to do decidedly violated the
said provisions in terminating the services of the petitioner.
16. But even if Dharampur Division of HPPWD wherein was employed the petitioner, or for that matter the
entire H.P. Public Works Department is assumed to be a “factory” within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories
Act, 1948, or say, an “industrial establishment” as defined under Section 25L of the Act and no fault is found with the
State Government.s action of notifying the aforesaid Chief Engineer as the specified authority, the petitioner.s
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retrenchment is still unlawful on account of the violation by the respondent of the principle of “Last Come First Go” as
envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. Section 25G of the Act provides:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of
India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim alleged that the workmen namely Subhash
Chand, Shashi Kant, Bidhi Chand, Ranjeet Singh, Balak Ram, Dalip Singh, Dharampal and others, who were junior to
him, were unlawfully retained in service by the respondent at the time his services were dispensed with and the
respondent thus violated the principle of “Last Come First Go” as contemplated under Section 25G of the Act. In reply,
the respondent in paragraph 4 averred:
“That the contents of this para partly admitted, and it is submitted that some junior daily wages workers are
working in Dharampur Division due to non availability of seniority of workers were transferred from other
Division/Sub-Division. The case/seniority has scrutinized again when above facts came to the notice.
However, the retrenchment notice to above juniors have also been served who are surplus to the requirement.”
18. This reply of the respondent lends assurance only to the petitioner.s allegation that certain workmen,
who were junior to him, were retained in service at the time his services were dispensed with by the respondent.
19. Further, the petitioner in his affidavit specifically alleged that the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o
Bihari Lal, who was engaged on January 1, 2000, was junior to him and retained in service at the time his (petitioner)
services were terminated. The respondent.s witness Naresh Kumar Sharma, Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division,
Dharampur, in his cross-examination as RW1, however, denied the petitioner.s suggestion that certain workmen junior
to him (petitioner) were retained in service at the time of termination of his services, but admitted to having prepared
the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart in respect of the workman namely Shashi Kant S/o Bihari Lal. Ex. PW1/B,
according this said witness, is a true copy of the seniority list/year-wise mandays chart issued by him. This document is
demonstrative of Shahsi Kant having been engaged as daily waged Beldar in Dharampur Division of HPPWD in the
month of January, 2000 and his being in the employ of the respondent till November, 2008. In another seniority list Ex.
RW1/C adduced in evidence by the respondent, Shashi Lal S/o Bihari Lal, who figures at serial No.646, is shown to
have been engaged on 6.4.1999. The materials on record not being indicative of the said workman Shashi Lal having
been engaged before or on the day the petitioner was taken into employ by the respondent, the petitioner.s claim of
being senior to him (Shashi Lal) deserves acceptance and is accepted. The seniority list Ex. RW1/C is demonstrative of
Shashi Lal having been retained in service at the time the petitioner was retrenched. It therefore stands established on
record that the workman Shashi Kant (Shashi Lal) who was junior to the petitioner, was retained in service by the
respondent at the time the petitioner.s services were dispensed with. In retrenching the petitioner; the respondent is thus
proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25G of the Act.
20. The petitioner.s Authorised Representative contends that the respondent had violated the provision of
Section 25H of the Act as well, because Mamta Devi w/o Hans Raj, who was engaged by the respondent as daily
waged Beldar in 2000 and retrenched along with the petitioner, was later re-engaged in 2007 without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
21. Per contra, the Ld. Dy. D.A. argues that Mamta Devi having been engaged on compassionate grounds
after the demise of her husband, who was also working in HPPWD, the respondent cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Section 25H of the Act. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be holding water in view of the
seniority list Ex. RW1/C which is indicative of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds. In
view of her having been re-engaged on compassionate grounds, the petitioner.s pleadings being non-existent in his
allegation of Mamta Devi having been re-engaged after his retrenchment and this allegation of his not being the subject
matter of the reference on hand, it is difficult to hold that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25H of
the Act.
22. Since in retrenching the petitioner, the respondent is proved to have violated the provisions of Sections
25F and 25G of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in which he was working at
the time his services were dispensed with. Besides, he is entitled to continuity of service from the date of his
retrenchment (July 8, 2005). His claim of being entitled to regularization with the policy of the State Government is,
however, not being adjudicated upon, for the same is not the subject matter of the reference.
23. The petitioner in paragraph 15 of his statement of claim averred that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere after the termination of his services, and that he was still unemployed. In substantiation of this claim he in his
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3569
affidavit inter alia deposed that after his illegal retrenchment he was not gainfully employed anywhere and was still
unemployed. There being no rebuttal to this deposition of his, his claim deserves acceptance and is accepted. In view of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner, to my mind, is entitled to 50% back-wages from the date of his
unlawful retrenchment. The issue under discussion is accordingly held in his favour and against the respondent.
Issue 2
24. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issue, the petition is perfectly maintainable to the
extent the same relates to the reliefs the petitioner is found entitled to. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 3
25. The Ld. Dy.D.A. contends that there being inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the
redressal of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the reliefs he
prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was
considered by the Hon.ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Forest
Corporation, Division Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. vs. Dilu Ram (CWP No.95/2000 decided on 26.8.2004)
wherein it was inter alia held:
“It is well settled that plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypertechnical defence though reference to the Labour Court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay (See Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(82)FLR 137 (SC).
26. Upon an industrial dispute having been raised by the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Officer, Mandi appears to have initiated conciliation proceedings. On failure of the conciliation move, the said Officer
referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, vide his report No.9282 dated 13.10.2007. On the
basis of this report, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to this Court under Section 10(1) of the Act, vide
Notification No.11-23/84(Lab) 1.D/08-Mandi dated September 5, 2008. In view of the period of time that elapsed
before the matter came to be referred to this Court, the petitioner who felt aggrieved by his unlawful retrenchment on
July 8, 2005, cannot be said to have delayed the steps he took for the redressal of his grievance. His claim therefore
does not suffer from the vice of delay and laches. So, the Ld. Dy.D.A..s aforementioned contention merits rejection and
is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 4
27. The respondent.s allegation that the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, does not appear to be having a
ring of truth, because the materials on record are not indicative of his having suppressed such fact(s) as may have vital
bearing on the case. The Issue on hand is therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
Issue 5
28. The rule of estoppel is not attracted in this case. The Ld. Dy. D.A. appearing for the respondent has also
not been able to show how the petitioner is estopped from filing the claim petition. The issue under discussion is
therefore held against the respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
29. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issue 1, the petition succeeds partly
and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement with 50% back-wages and continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (July 8, 2005). The said 50% back-wages shall be computed on
the basis of the last drawn wage or the minimum wages permissible under the Minimum Wages Act whichever is
higher till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a
period of 90 days from today. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
Govt. for publication in the official gazette and the file after completion consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today this 31st day of March, 2009.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.S. SEN PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref No. : 27/2005
Date of Institution : 17. 2. 2005
Date of decision : 26.12.2008
Shri Yudhvir Singh S/o Shri Wazir Chand, Village Chhuhra, P.O. Tilira, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,
H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Electrical Division, Mandi, H.P.
. ….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR.
For the Respondent :
Sh. H.S. Dhiman, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
1.
The following reference was received for adjudication from the appropriate Government:
“Whether the termination of service of Sh. Yudhvir Singh S/o Sh. Wazir Chand Daily paid Labour by
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Electrical Division, Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 25.2.2001 without any
notice, chargesheet, enquiry and without compliance of Section 25-F and 25-H of the Industrial
Dispute Act, 1947 on completion of 240 days continuous service is legal and justified? If not, to what
relief and consequential service benefit including back wages seniority and amount of compensation
of Sh. Yudhvir Singh is entitled to?”
2.
On notice, the petitioner filed his statement of claim wherein he averred that he was engaged by the
respondent as daily waged Beldar on January 13, 1999, and that he worked as such upto February 24, 2001. On
February 25, 2001, his services were, however, orally terminated by the respondent. Claiming to have worked for more
than 240 days “in each completed year of service”, the petitioner further averred that in dispensing with his services,
the respondent violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) because
no prior notice was given to him nor was he paid retrenchment compensation. Besides, the respondent violated the
principle of „last come first go. as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act as certain workmen junior to him were
retained in service at the time of termination of his services. The petitioner therefore prayed for a direction to the
respondent to reinstate him with full back-wages and continuity of service.
3.
Admitting the petitioner.s claim of having been engaged as daily waged Beldar on January 13, 1999, the
respondent in his reply averred that he (petitioner) was engaged on muster roll No.316 for the period from January 13,
1999 to January 31, 1999 as against the work of repair and maintenance of electrical installation of a Government
building under the Electrical Sub Division, Mandi. After February, 2001, his services, according to the respondent,
were dispensed with on account of non-availability of work and funds. Disputing the petitioner.s claim of having
worked for more than 240 days „in each completed year of service., the respondent averred that he had worked for 221
days in 1999, 216 days in 2000 and 56 days in 2001. He having thus not completed 240 days during the period of 12
calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service, the respondent was not obliged to serve him with one
month.s notice and pay him retrenchment compensation as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As for the
allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, the respondent averred that “the junior person to
the petitioner has only engaged on the basis of court decision”. It is also averred that the petitioner is estopped from
filing the claim petition by his act and conduct, and that the petition is barred by delay and laches.
4.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for determination by my Ld.
Predecessor-in-office:
1.
Whether the services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondent w.e.f. 2.2.2001 without notice,
charge sheet and without compliance of section 25-F and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in an
improper and un-justified manner as alleged?
OPP
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2.
If issue No.1 is proved in the affirmative, what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP
3.
Whether the petitioner was disengaged after 2001 due to the reason for non-availability of the work and
funds as alleged?
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner is estopped to file the petition by his act and conduct as alleged?
OPR
5.
Whether the petition is not within time as alleged?
OPR
6.
Relief.
5.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on these issues are as under:
Issue 1 :
Yes partly.
Issue 2 :
He is entitled to reinstatement and continuity of service from the date of his retrenchment.
Issue 3 :
No
Issue 4 :
No
Issue 5 :
No
Issue 6 :
The petition allowed partly per operative part of the award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues 1 And 3
6.
These issues being inter-linked are taken up together.
7.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent as daily waged Beldar
on January 13, 1999, and that he worked as such upto February 24, 2001. On February 25, 2001, his services were
orally terminated by the respondent. The reason for the termination of his services, according to the respondent, was
non-availability of work and funds. But this reason, to my thinking, does not appear to be real, because nowhere in his
statement as RW1 did the respondent.s witness Rajinder Kumar Arora, then Executive Engineer, (Electrical Division)
HPPWD, Mandi, maintain that the services of the petitioner were dispensed with on account of non-availability of
work and funds. He rather testified that the petitioner had abandoned the job in 2001. The reason for his abandoning the
job, according to the respondent.s said witness, was the allotment of less money to the Public Works Department and
the resultant reduction of work on account of the Government policy to allot budget directly to various other
departments. But whether or not there was indeed no work and budget available at the time the services of the
petitioner were dispensed with on February 25, 2001, is anybody.s guess. I am therefore not disposed to accept the
respondent.s claim that the services of the petitioner were terminated on account of non-availability of budget and
work. But even if the respondent.s claim is assumed to be true, the cessation of work, which resulted in the termination
of services of the petitioner, not being due to any fault on his part, his case squarely falls within the ambit of Section
25-B of the Act, which defines „continuous service.
8.
The petitioner.s claim of having worked for more than 240 days „in each year of service., to my mind,
does not appear to be tenable in view of the Mandays Chart Ex. RW1/A, which shows him to have worked for 221 days
in the year 1999, 216 days in 2000 and 56 days in 2001. Also, this document is not indicative of his having worked for
240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment. Section 25-F of the Act,
which is alleged to have been violated by the respondent, provides:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.- No workman employed in any industry who
has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until-
(a)
the workman has been given one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and
the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days. average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of
six months; and
(c)
notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
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9.
In view of these provisions, no workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year, can be retrenched by the employer unless he has been given one month.s notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of notice. The expression “continuous service” has been defined under Section 25-B
of the Act, which in its material part reads:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted
service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike
which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year
or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-
(a)
for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date
with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than-
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case….”
10. Since the petitioner.s claim of having been in continuous service for not less than one year, or say his
having completed 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his removal from service is
found to be far from truth, he is not entitled to the protection of the abovementioned provisions of Section 25-F of the
Act. In dispensing with his services without serving him with one month.s notice and paying him retrenchment
compensation, the respondent cannot therefore be said to have committed breach of the said provisions.
11. However, in terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent, to my mind, appears to have
violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act, which reads:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment. – Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen
of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the
absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily
retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be
recorded the employer retrenches any other workman”.
12. The seniority list Ex. PA is indicative of eleven workmen namely Jeet Singh, Ajay Kumar, Ram
Krishan, Smt. Suman, Surya Bahadur, Harish Kumar, Shayam Lal, Murari Lal, Neka Ram, Baldev Singh and Rakesh
Kumar, whose names figure at serial nos. 26, 27, 28, 29,30,31,32,33,34,35 and 36 respectively, being junior to the
petitioner. Of these workmen, three namely Neka Ram, Murari Lal and Jeet Singh are stated to be still in service. The
respondent.s aforementioned witness Rajinder Kumar Arora in his cross-examination as RW1 categorically admitted
the petitioner.s suggestions that Neka Ram, Murari Lal and Jeet Singh were junior to him, and that they were also
removed from service but later re-engaged on the same post. Having admitted these suggestions, Rajinder Kumar
Arora, however, hastened to add that the aforesaid three workmen were re-engaged on the basis of the orders of Labour
Court. The point of time when Neka Ram, Murari Lal and Jeet Singh, who are undeniably junior to the petitioner, were
removed from service, is not known. In case their services were terminated after the services of the petitioner, were
dispensed with, they having been retained in service at the time of termination of the services of the petitioner, the
respondent violated the abovementioned provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. Section 25-H of the Act provides:
“25 (H). Re-employment of retrenched workman. – Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to
take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity [to the retrenched
workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for reemployment, and such retrenched workmen] who offer
themselves for reemployment shall have preference over other persons”.
13. In case the aforesaid three workmen (Neka Ram, Murari Lal and Jeet Singh) who are claimed to have
been re-engaged in compliance with the orders of Labour Court, were removed from service on the same day as the
petitioner or before the termination of services of the latter, the respondent can be said to have violated the
abovementioned provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, because there is nothing to suggest that before re-engagement
of the said workmen, the petitioner was given an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment.
14. The upshot therefore is that in dispensing with the services of the petitioner, the respondent either
violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act or Section 25-H of the Act. However, he is not proved to have
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Both the issues under discussion are held accordingly.
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3573
Issue 2
15. In view of what has been held under the foregoing issues, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in the
same capacity as in which he was working at the time his services were terminated. Besides, he is entitled to continuity
of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (February 25, 2001). However, he is not entitled to back-wages,
because nowhere in his pleadings or evidence did he maintain that he remained idle or was not working for gain after
the termination of his services. The issue under discussion is held accordingly.
Issue 4
16. The facts and circumstances of this case do not attract the rule of estoppel. The Ld. counsel for the
respondent has also not been able to show how the petitioner was estopped from filing the claim petition by his act and
conduct. The issue on hand is accordingly held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue 5
17. As no time limit is prescribed by law for raising an industrial dispute, the respondent.s claim that the
petition is barred by time, merits rejection and is rejected. The issue under discussion is accordingly held against the
respondent and in favour of the petitioner.
RELIEF
18. Judged in the light of my findings on the issues above, particularly issues 1 and 3, the petition succeeds
partly and is allowed in part. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in the same capacity as in
which he was working at the time of termination of his services (February 25, 2001). Besides, he is held entitled to
continuity of service from the date of his unlawful retrenchment (February 25, 2001). He is, however, held not entitled
to any back-wages. The respondent is directed to re-engage the petitioner within a period of 90 days from today. The
reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication in the official
gazette and the file after completion be consigned to the record room.
Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of December, 2008.
By order,
S.S.SEN,
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.
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