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f”keyk] lkseokj] 22 flrEcj] 2014@31 Hkknzin] 1936

fgekpy izns'k ljdkj

MPP & POWER DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-2, the 10th September, 2014

No. MPP-F(10)-17/2012.—In modification of all previous orders/notifications in this

regard issued by this department from time to time, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, in exercise

of the powers conferred by Section 11(I) of the Himachal Pradesh Electricity (Duty) Act, 2009, as

amended from time to time, is pleased to order reduction in Electricity Duty in respect of industrial

129&jkti=@2014&22&9&2014 ¼3347½

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units in the State of Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1st April, 2014 as below and the revised

rate will be applicable in the following manner:—

Sl.

No.

category

consumers

(Large

Industrial

consumers)

(supply voltage exceeding 33 KV).

17%

15%

Large Industrial consumers (above 100 KW

connected load and supply voltage not

exceeding 33KV).

17% & 15%

13%

3.1 Medium Industrial consumers

15%

13%

3.2. Medium Industrial units set up after 1-4-2012

10%

3.3. New Medium Industrial Units set up after

1-4-2014.

15%

5% for 5 years

4.1. Existing Small Industry consumers

4.2 Small Industry set up after 1-4-2012

4.3 New Small Industries set up after 1-4-2014

2% for 5 years

New Industry including EHT category which

employ more than 300 Himachalis.

2% for 5 years.

By order,

(S. K. B. S NEGI)

Principal Secretary (Power).

__________

LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-2, the 18^th September, 2014

No: Sharm (A) 7-1/2005-Part-File-1.—In exercise of the powers vested under section

17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the

publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court

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Shimla on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment, Government of Himachal

Pradesh.

Sl.

No.

Case No.

Title of the Case

Date of

Award

62/2009

S/Shri Prem Chand V/s Executive Engineer, I&PH

Rampur.

23-08-2014

63/2009

Sh. Ram Sen

V/s

-do-

23-08-2014

64/2009

Sh. Chunni Lal

V/S

-do-

23-08-2014

65/2009

Sh. Sant Ram

V/S

-do-

23-08-2014

66/2009

Sh. Adha Singh

V/s

-do-

23-08-2014

67/2009

Sh. Jawhar Lal

V/s

-do-

23-08-2014

80/2010

Sh. Hardiyal Singh

V/s

-do-

23-08-2014

41/2009

Sh. Krishan Lal Sharma V/s Secty, M/s Bhojia Dental

College & Hospital & Others.

26-08-2014

05/2011

Sh. Lachman Chand V/s M/S VVF Ltd. Baddi.

26-08-2014

10.

54/2010

Sh. Ram Krishan V/s Principal Secty (MPP&Power) &

Others.

29-08-2014

11.

151/2001

Sh. Ranjeet Singh V/s H.P. State Electricity Boards &

Others.

14-08-2014

12.

118/2010

Sh. Ravinder V/s HPPWD, Shimla.

13-08-2014

By order,

(R.D. DHIMAN)

Pr. Secretary ( Labour & Employment).

_________

IN THE COURT OF A.S JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, HP INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-

CUMLABOUR COURT, SHIMLA

Ref no. 62 of 2009

Instituted on 17.8.2009

Re-registered on old no. after remand on 1.7.2014

Decided on 23.8.2014

Prem Chand S/o Shri Pasu Ram R/o Village, Punan, P.O & Sub Tehsil, Nankhari, District Shimla,

H.P.

Petitioner…………….

VS.

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The Executive Engineer, IPH Division Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, HP.

Respondent………….

Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For petitioner: Shri Bhagwan Chand, Advocate.

For respondents: Shri Surender Negi, Dy. DA.

AWARD

The reference for adjudication, is as under:

“Whether termination of the services of ShriPrem Chand S/o Shri Pashu Ram by the

Executive Engineer, IPH Division Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla w.e.f. 29.6.2000

without following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is proper and justified?

If not, what relief of service benefits including seniority and compensation the above

workman is entitled to?”

2. In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that he was engaged as daily waged beldar on

10.10.1996, in IPH Sub-Division, Nankhari, by the respondent. In each calendar year, he had

completed 240 days, including twelve calendar months, preceding his termination/retrenchment,

which took place on 29.6.2000. It is alleged that his services were terminated without issuing any

notice. After his termination, the respondent engaged junior persons namely Prem S/o Shri Sita

Ram and some other persons who are still working with the respondent. In this way, provisions of

section 25 G & H of the Act, were also violated. It is further averred that since his termination i.e

29.6.2000, he had been making requests, orally a well as in writing, to the respondent for his

reinstatement but of no avail. After his termination, he has not been gainfully employed. Against

this back-drop, a prayer has been made for his reinstatement along-with all service benefits.

3. The petition has been contested on having raised preliminary objections qua

maintainability and limitation. It has been specifically averred that although, the petitioner had been

allegedly retrenched in the year, 2000 but he filed his claim, before this Court, after more than nine

years. On merits, it has been asserted that the petitioner, who had been engaged as beldar in

September, 1996, worked intermittently till 2000. He had never worked for 240 days in every

calendar year. In the month of September, 2000, he had abandoned his job. It is further averred that

in the year, 1998, one Shri Prem Chand S/o Shri Sita Ram was engaged as work inspector whose

category is different from the petitioner.

4. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues, which were struck on

15.6.2010.

1. Whether the services of the petitioner have been illegally terminated in contravention

of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged?

OPP……..

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits, the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP……….

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3. Whether this petition is barred by limitation?

OPR………..

4. Relief.

5. Here, I would like to point-out hat vide award dated 25.2.2012, passed by this Court,

whereas issue no.1 was decided in “Yes”, the petitioner was held entitled for reinstatement with

seniority and continuity in service but without back-wages, while deciding issue no.2. The answer

to issue no.3 was in “No”. Consequent, upon the findings, recorded on the aforesaid issues, the

petitioner was held entitled for reinstatement in service with seniority and continuity with effect

from the date of his termination but without wages.

6. From the order dated 23.6.2014, passed by the Hon’ble High Court in LPA No. 87 of

2014 along-with LPA’s No. 88-89-90-91-95 and 96 of 2014, it appears that the award of this Court

dated 25.2.2012, had been challenged/assailed by the State of HP and another by filing six writ

petitions being CWP No. 6591/2012, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another versus Hardyal

Singh, CWP No. 6601/2012, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another versus Ram Sen, CWP

No. 6602/2012, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another versus Sant Ram, 6603/2012, titled

as State of Himachal Pradesh & another versus Jawahar Lal, CWP No.6604/2012, titled as State of

Himachal Pradesh & another versus Chunni Lal and CWP 6605/2012, titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh & another versus Prem Chand, which came to be decided by way of dismissal by common

judgment dated 17.6.2013, of the Hon’ble High Court (Writ Court). It is further borne out from the

order of the Hon’ble High Court dated 23.6.2014, the Writ Court in CWP No. 6599 of 2012, titled

as State of HP and another Vs. Adha Singh, had dismissed the writ petition, filed by State of HP

and another, vide judgment and order dated 18.7.2013.

7. Against the judgment and order dated 18.7.2013, made by the Writ Court in CWP No.

6599 of 2012, an appeal was filed which came to be registered as LPA No. 96 of 2014. Since, the

facts and circumstances involved in the said case (LPA No. 96 of 2014), were found to be similar to

those of other cases/appeals (LPA Nos. 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95 and 96 of 2014), THE Hon’ble High

Court deemed it proper to decide appeal (LPA No. 96 of 2014), alongwith other appeals (LPA Nos.

87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95 and 96 of 2014), by way of common judgment. The Hon’ble High Court

disposed of the writ petitions by remanding the case/references with the direction to this Tribunal to

decide issue no.3, within six weeks. It is relevant to reproduce the order of the Hon’ble High Court,

as under:

“6. We have gone through the impugned judgment, whereby the Writ Court upheld

the awards made by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla, H.P.,

hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”, in Reference No. 80 of 2010, dated

25.02.2010, Reference No. 63 of 2009, dated 25.02.2012, Reference No. 65 of 2009,

dated 25.02.2012, Reference No. 67 of 2009, dated 25.02.2012 and Reference No.

62 of 2009, dated 25.02.2012.

7. While examining the awards passed by the Tribunal, one comes to an inescapable

conclusion that the Tribunal has not determined Issue No. 3, which reads as

under:-

“3. Whether this petition is barred by limitation?

….OPR”

8. After noticing the contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, we asked the

learned Counsel for the respondent(s) to defend the impugned judgment made by

the Writ Court as well as the award made by the Tribunal.

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9. At this stage, learned Counsel for the parties stated at the Bar that the Tribunal

be directed to determine Issue No. 3 within a short period of time and to grant

opportunity to the parties for leading evidence. Ordered accordingly.

10. Accordingly, all the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set-aside.

11. The writ petitions are disposed of by remanding the cases/references with the

direction to the Tribunal to decide Issue No. 3, within six weeks, as indicated

above.

12. Parties to appear before the Tribunal on 1st July, 2014.

13. It is made clear that in case any party feels aggrieved, they are at liberty to

question the findings already returned by the Tribunal along-with the findings on

Issue No. 3.”

8. As directed by the Hon’ble High Court, this Court is to determine issue no.3, which

reads as under:

3. Whether this petition is barred by limitation?

….OPR

4. Relief.

9. Pursuant to the order of Hon’ble High Court, both the parties were afforded

opportunities to lead their evidence on issue no.3. Whereas, respondent examined Shri Rasveer

Singh Negi (RW-2), in support of issue no.3, the petitioner examined Shri Dila Ram (PW-3), Shri

Sohan Lal Jalota (PW-4) and himself (PW-5), in order to rebut the evidence led by the respondent

on this issue.

10. Besides having heard the Ld. Counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the

record of the case carefully.

11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issue no.3 for

determination, my findings on this issue are as under.

Issue No. 3 No.

Relief. Reference stands answered accordingly.

Reasons for findings

Issue No. 3.

12. On behalf of respondent, it has been argued with vehemence that the petition filed by

the petitioner before this Court, is hopelessly time barred because the same was filed after more

than nine years. By referring to the statement of Shri Rasveer Singh Negi (RW- 2), it was further

urged that in the month of June, 2000, the petitioner had not served any demand notice. Only, in the

year, 2008, demand notice had been served. Thus, the petitioner had not served any demand notice

during the period w.e.f. 2000 to 2008. It was further urged that from the evidence of Shri Jasveer

Singh Negi (RW-2), it stands duly proved that the claim of the petitioner is barred by limitation.

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13. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner urged that from the statement of Shri

Sohan Lal Jalota (PW-4), it is abundantly clear that the office of Executive Engineer, IPH Rampur

had received demand notice vide dairy no. 95 dated 10.6.2002 and reply thereto had also been filed.

Thereafter, the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer had issued letter to Prem Chand (petitioner).

Since, at that time, the petitioner was found to have already filed an OA before Administrative

Tribunal, Shimla, the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer temporarily kept in abeyance the

proceedings till further orders and in this regard letter is Ex. PW-4/B. Ld. Counsel further

submitted that when it was known by the petitioner that his OA had been dismissed, he filed

another application to the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, Rampur on 16.5.2008, in order to get

revived the conciliation proceedings. To that application, the respondent had filed reply, during the

course of conciliation proceedings, on 6.6.2008.

Thereafter, a report, under section 12 (4) of the Act, had been submitted to the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla, vide Ex. PW-4/E. Thus, the Ld. Counsel urged that there had been no

delay/latches on the part of the petitioner to pursue his case. Ld. Counsel further urged that even the

petitioner when examined himself as PW-5, also stated that when his services had been terminated,

he approached the Administrative Tribunal, in the year, 2000 and during the pendency of OA, he

had raised demand notice on 30.5.2002 and inconsequence thereof, conciliation proceedings were

initiated before Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer. As per letter dated 28.8.2002, he (PW-5), had

been informed that the conciliation proceedings had been kept in abeyance. From his Advocate, he

had known that in the year, 2004, his case/OA had been dismissed by the Administrative Tribunal,

the copy of which, he procured in the year, 2008 and thereafter filed application for revival of

conciliation proceedings. Ld. Counsel, on the evidence of the petitioner (PW-5), further urged that

the same clearly goes to show that there had been no lapse on the part of the petitioner in order to

pursue his case. Thus, it cannot be said that the claim of the petitioner is barred by limitation.

14. From the evidence of PW-4 (labour Inspector, Rampur), it is quite clear that the

petitioner, after his retrenchment, had raised demand notice, copy of which is Ex. PW-4/A and in

consequence thereof conciliation proceedings had been initiated by Labour-cum-Conciliation

Officer, Rampur. Since, during those proceedings, it had been found that the petitioner had also

filed OA before Administrative Tribunal against his dismissal/retrenchment, the conciliation

proceedings were kept in abeyance and regarding the same the petitioner was informed by letter,

copy of which is Ex. PW- 4/B. The evidence of this witness further makes it clear that on

16.5.2008, the petitioner had again submitted an application for getting revived the conciliation

proceedings.

Undoubtedly, in the evidence of RW-2 (Rasveer Singh Negi), it has come that during the

period w.e.f. 2000 to 2008, the petitioner had not raised any demand notice but his such version

gets falsified from the evidence of Shri Sohan Lal Jalota (PW-4), posted as Labour Inspector

Rampur, who has stated, on the basis of summoned record, brought by him. I may also like to

mention that Ex. PW-4/D, is the copy of demand notice dated 16.5.2008. In this demand notice, the

petitioner has made it clear that after his termination, he had filed a case before HP Administrative

Tribunal and for this reason, he was informed vide letter dated 28.8.2002, by the Labour-cum-

Conciliation Officer, Rampur, that conciliation proceedings could not be taken further as the same

could not have been processed simultaneously in two separate Courts. It has also been clarified in

this notice that regarding the status of his original application, which was dismissed on 6.8.2004, he

had come to know in the month of April, 2008, when he visited the registry of the Administrative

Tribunal.

15. The evidence, aforesaid, as well as documents, referred to above, clearly go to show

that immediately after his dismissal, the petitioner had filed a case, before the Administrate

Tribunal and that during the pendency of the same, he had also raised a demand notice before his

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employer, the copy of which is Ex. PW-4/A, and on its basis, conciliation proceedings had been

initiated by the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, Rampur. The petitioner had been informed vide

letter Ex. PW-4/B, that conciliation proceedings had been kept in abeyance/under-suspension. It

has been rightly argued on behalf of the petitioner that there had been no lapse on his part to pursue

his case either before Administrative Tribunal or the Labour-cum-Conciliation

Officer, Rampur.

16. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gurmail Singh Vs. Principal

Government College of Education and others, (2009) 9 SC 496 that :

“Mere delay in challenging the termination would not be a bar to the adjudication of the

matter but could only deprive the appellant of his back wages for the period of delay in

raising the termination issue.”

17. On the basis of the case law (Supra, it cannot be said that mere delay in challenging the

termination cannot operate as a bar to the adjudication of the dispute/matter. Here, I may refer to

section 10 of the Act, which reads as under:

“Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.- (1) Where the appropriate

Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may

at any time], by order in writing,--

(c ) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the

dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour

Court for adjudication; or ………

18. From the language of this section, it appears that the Government’s power to refer an

industrial dispute for adjudication has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be done only so

long as the dispute exists. In other words, the period envisaged by the enduring expression “at any

time” terminates with the eclipse of the Industrial dispute. Hence, the real test is, was the industrial

dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication.

In considering the factual position whether the dispute did exists on the date of reference,

the Government could take into account factors, inter alia, such as the subsistence of conciliation

proceedings. It is of no consequence that conciliation proceedings were commenced after a long

period.

19. In the instant case, the conciliation proceedings which had been suspended/kept in

abeyance vide letter dated 28.8.2002, copy of which is Ex. PW-4/B, were requested to be revived

by demand notice dated 26.5.2008, copy of which is Ex. PW-4/D. Thereafter, the reference to this

Court was made by the appropriate government on 11.8.2009. This goes to show that in the opinion

of the Government, an industrial dispute existed on the date, when the reference for adjudication

was made.

20. When, the reference came to be made to this Court, by the appropriate government,

notices were issued to both the parties and inconsequence thereof, the petitioner filed his

claim/petition. An objection has been taken by the respondent that his such petition is barred by

limitation. I may mention that consequent upon the making of reference, to this Court, by the

appropriate government, the petitioner has filed statement of claim. It is not understandable as to

how it is barred by limitation. Already, I have stated and observed above that mere delay in

challenging the termination would not be a bar to the adjudication of the dispute/matter. Moreover,

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it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in (1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs.

Sirhind Co-operative Marketing –cum- processing Service Society Limited and Another. that:-

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on

the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved

as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of

delay alone”

21. Having regard to the law laid down (supra) and also my discussion, foregoing, I hold

that the respondent has failed to prove that this petition is barred by limitation. Thus, my answer to

this issue is in “No”.

Relief

Resultantly, as per the directions of Hon’ble High court vide order dated 23.6.2014, as

referred to above, I decide issue no.3 in negative. This award/order shall form part and parcel of

earlier award dated 25.2.2012, passed by this Court. Let a copy of this award/order be sent to the

appropriate government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to

records.

Announced in the open court today on this 23rd day of August, 2014.

By order,

(A.S JASWAL)

Presiding Judge,

Industrial Tribunal-cum-

Labour Court, Shimla.

________

IN THE COURT OF A.S JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, HP INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-

CUMLABOUR COURT, SHIMLA

Ref no. 63 of 2009.

Instituted on 17.8.2009.

Re-registered on old no. after remand on 1.7.2014.

Decided on 23.8.2014.

Ram Sen S/o Shri Muglu Ram, Village Banoga, Sub Tehsil, Nankhari, District Shimla, HP.

Petitioner…………….

VS.

The Executive Engineer, IPH Division Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, H.P.

Respondent………….

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Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For petitioner: Shri Bhagwan Chand, Advocate.

For respondents: Shri Surender Negi, Dy. DA.

AWARD

The reference for adjudication, is as under:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Ram Sen S/o Shri Muglu Ram by the

Executive Engineer, IPH Division Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla w.e.f. 29.6.2000

while workers junior to him have been retained, is proper and justified? If not, what relief

of service benefits including reinstatement and compensation the above workman is

entitled to?”