jkti=] fgekpy izns'k
fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr
lkseokj] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla, the 14th March, 2016
No: Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards) D/Shala.—In exercise of the powers vested under
section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to
order the publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour
Court D/Shala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of
Himachal Pradesh:—
251&jkti=@2016&21&03&2016 ¼8867½
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Sr. No. Ref. No.
Petitioner
Respondent
Date of Award/Order
1.
153/13
Ram Dei
D.F.O. Kullu
07-01-2016
2.
76/14
Man Dass
S.E. I&PH, Sunder Nagar
15-01-2016
3.
106/15
Bindai
I&PH/HPPWD, Killar
15-01-2016
4.
116/15
Devi Chand
I&PH/HPPWD, Killar
15-01-2016
5.
117/15
Om Prakash
I&PH/HPPWD, Killar
15-01-2016
6.
124/15
Devi Singh
I&PH/HPPWD, Killar
15-01-2016
7.
104/15
Uday Chand
I&PH/HPPWD, Killar
15-01-2016
8.
127/15
Lekh Ram
I&PH/HPPWD, Killar
15-01-2016
9.
241/13
Naresh Kumar
D.F.O. Suket
19-01-2016
10.
37/13
Manoj Kumar
M/s Surya Resort
19-01-2016
11.
12/14
Kehar Singh
Pradhan, Anu Co-opt.Agri.
Society
19-01-2016
12
95/15
Devi Singh
HPPWD, Killar
20-01-2016
13
119/15
Kushu Ram
HPPWD, Killar
20-01-2016
14
159/15
Man Dass
HPPWD, Killar
20-01-2016
15
169/15
Dharam Singh
HPPWD, Killar
20-01-2016
16
170/15
Hira Lal
HPPWD, Killar
20-01-2016
17
175/15
Chet Ram
HPPWD, Killar
20-01-2016
18
202/15
Ram Lal
HPPWD, Killar
20-01-2016
By order,
Sd/-
Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.).
___________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 153/2013
Date of Institution : 09.09.2013
Date of decision : 07.01.2016
Smt. Ram Dei w/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o Village Talogi, P.O. Bari, Tehsil and Distirct
Kullu, H.P.
…Petitioner
Versus
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The Divisional Forest Officer, Kullu Forest Division, District Kullu, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. Vipul Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Smt. Ram Dei, W/O Shri Puran Chand,
R/O Village Talogi, P.O. Bari, Tehsil and District Kullu, H.P. during 2002 to 2009 and
finally w.e.f. 28-4-2012 by the Divisional Forest Officer, Kullu Forest Division, District
Kullu, H.P. without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal
and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner had filed statement of claim before this court.
3.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that the services of petitioner were
engaged by the Forest Department as a daily wage worker w.e.f. January, 1990 and on the date of
institution of claim petition petitioner had been working at Mohal Nursery of the forest
department/respondent where she worked to the entire satisfaction of the respondent from January,
1990 to till date of her termination. It is stated that petitioner had applied to respondent seeking
information regarding her work status and mandays under the Right to Information Act and after
filing of the said application, the respondent had started harassing the petitioner unnecessarily
however the petitioner continuously worked with the respondent sincerely, efficiently and honestly
as before. It is further stated that the information which was sought by the petitioner had not been
supplied to her by the respondent/department. It is stated that the petitioner had completed more
than 240 days of work in the 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment i..e.
28.4.2012. It is further stated that petitioner had requested to the respondent many times but of no
avail besides the information as sought by the petitioner was provided to her after much delay and
petitioner on receipt of information was shocked to see that the information sought was not
correctly supplied to her. It is further stated that the respondent had malafidely terminated the
services of petitioner in illegal manner and in total violation of law, procedure and principles of
natural justice. It is contended that the services of petitioner were retrenched without following any
procedure as well as assigning any reason, charge-sheet, enquiry and also without any issuing show
cause notice and compensation was not paid to her which is total contravention of the mandatory
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as ‘the Act’ for brevity). It
is categorically stated that petitioner is still unemployed and not gainfully employed anywhere from
the date of her alleged termination and she was entitled for full back wages. It is further stated that
petitioner was a workman and respondent is an industry under the Act. It is also stated that before
termination of the services of petitioner, respondent had not obtained permission for retrenchment
under Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is prayed that the termination of the services
of petitioner w.e.f. 28.4.2012 be set aside and respondent be directed to reinstate the petitioner with
full back wages, continuity in service, seniority and all other consequential service benefits and
litigation expenses.
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4. The respondent contested petition, filed separate reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections qua non-maintainability the petition being hit by the vice of delay and laches and the
petitioner having not approached this court with clean hands and he has concealed true or material
facts from the Court. On merits, engagement of the services of the petitioner from January, 1990 is
admitted. However, the respondent/department had not issued any order to engage the petitioner
but she was engaged as casual labour on seasonal work as per availability of works and funds. It is
stated that the petitioner had left the work of daily wager of her own sweet will. It is further stated
that respondent had not been disengaged the services of petitioner and she had never completed
240 days of work in each calendar year. It is stated that the services of petitioner were engaged as
daily wager with the respondent department during the intervening period from January, 1990 to
April, 2009 as per availability of funds and work and thereafter she had left the work of her own
sweet will without assigning reasons to the respondent/department and never made any request for
reengagement as daily wager till date. It is denied that the petitioner had ever applied for seeking
information regarding her mandays chart from the respondent’s office but the required information
under RTI Act was sought by the petitioner had already been supplied by Assistant PIO, Kullu
office vide letter no.144/k dated 13.7.2009. It is further stated that the services of petitioner were
engaged during the intervening period from January, 1990 to April, 2009 and she never completed
240 days of work from the date of her initial engagement and thus question of termination of the
services of petitioner w.e.f. 28.4.2012 does not arise. Hence, no provisions of the Act had been
violated by the replying respondent. Accordingly, cause of action as pleaded in the claim petition
filed by petitioner is denied and the petition is sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to reply filed by respondent, reiterated his stand as
maintained in the claim petition.
6.
To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of letter dated 13.7.2009
regarding information under RTI Act and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the
evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri Neeraj Kumar the then Divisional Forest
Officer, Kullu as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, Ex. RW1/B copy of mandays
chart/voucher wise detail of petitioner, Ex. RW1/C copy of letter dated 13.7.2009 which
corresponds to Ex. PW1/B, Ex. RW1/D copy of letter dated 27.4.2012, Ex. RW1/E copy of letter
dated 24.4.2012 regarding information under RTI Act and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.
D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.
8.
As per zimni order dated 12.3.2014, ld. counsel for petitioner states at bar that he
does not press the issue regarding providing fictional breaks in service to the petitioner by the
respondent/department from time to time i.e. from 2002 to the year 2009 since no such
industrial dispute was raised in the demand notice served upon the respondent/department
by the petitioner/workman as such no issue on time to time termination was framed however
from the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on 12.3.2014 for
determination:
1.
Whether the final termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.
28-04-2012 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
2.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
3.
Whether the petitioner has concealed the true and material facts from the Court as
alleged? If so, its effect?
OPR
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4.
Whether the petition is hit by the vice of delay and laches as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
5.
Relief.
9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No.1
: No
Issue No.2
: No
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: No
Relief
: Petition is dismissed per operative part of the Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE NO. 1
10. At the outset, it is apt to mention here that claimant/petitioner has made inconsistent
pleadings in different paragraphs of the claim petition as in para no. 1, petitioner claims to be
working at Mohal Nursery of H.P. Forest Department and in subsequent para of the same claim
petition she has mentioned that her services have been terminated. However, from the mandays
chart supplied with application for Right to Information Act Ex. PW1/D reveal that petitioner had
been engaged in the year 1990 and she continued to work till the year 2009. It is evident from the
mandays chart that petitioner lastly worked in the month of April, 2009 for about 20 days and 25
and 12 days respectively in the months of January and February, 2009. The case of the petitioner is
that she had completed 240 days in each calendar year and even prior to her termination, she had
completed 240 days who was not issued notice by the respondent and at the same time salary in lieu
of notice had also not been given and for said reason, termination was stated to be illegal under
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
11. A bare glance on the mandays chart would further reveal that petitioner had worked
for 57 days in the year 2009 whereas she had worked for 165 days from April, 2008 to December,
2008 and thus in preceding 12 months to her termination she had worked for 222 days meaning
thereby that the petitioner had not completed 240 days of working as is required so as to claim
petition under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Stepping into witness box as PW1
petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC in which she has reiterated
that respondent had illegally and malafidely terminated her service on 28.4.2012 whereupon
petitioner had given demand notice to respondent on 12.6.2012. In cross-examination she has
subsequently admitted that she had not worked after April, 2009 and later improved stating of her
own that she had worked upto April, 2012 but testimony does not show the period when she
worked last with the respondent. As noted above, petitioner is shown to have worked with the
respondent till April, 2009 and statement of petitioner showing that she had worked till April, 2012
is not substantiated from any corresponding documents and evidence on record that petitioner had
actually worked till 28.4.2012. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,
respondent Shri Neeraj Kumar, the then Divisional Forest Officer, Kullu Forest Division has denied
the allegations of termination of petitioner on 28.4.2012 rather he has emphasized that petitioner as
per record available worked till 2009. Nothing has come in the cross-examination of ld. counsel for
petitioner by which it could be established that petitioner had factually worked till 28th April,
2012. Enough has been emphasized, ld counsel for the petitioner that RW1 Shri Neeraj Kumar had
admitted that he had not brought record from the year 2010 to 2012. Close scrutiny of testimony of
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RW1 revealed that he had brought the relevant mandays chart for the year 1990 to 2009 which
were asked to be produced. As such, per statement of RW1 which has remained unsheltered instead
claim of petitioner to remain engaged with respondent after April, 2009 to April, 2012 gets belied
as oral as well as documentary evidence on record led by the petitioner as well as by the respondent
establishes that petitioner had worked till April, 2009 as noted above however petitioner had not
worked for 240 days rather only for 222 days in preceding her date of termination. Accordingly, it
is to be held that respondent was not required to issue any notice under Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act.
12. In so far as the plea of forest nursery work in the forest department being seasonal
in nature is concerned and at the same time the plea of respondent that petitioner herself abandoned
the job seems to be futile attempt on the part of the respondent to testify retrenchment of petitioner
in the garb of work being seasonal in nature or that petitioner was not required to be given notice as
she did not complete requisite number of days while working with the respondent. It is settled law
that plea of abandonment has to be proved like any other fact by the respondent. There is no iota of
evidence on record establishing that respondent on absence of petitioner had factually recoursed to
issuance of registered legal notice or charge sheet. As such, the plea of abandonment has to be
rejected outright. Similarly, petitioner being employed in seasonal work is not substantiated from
any notification of the Government which would show that work in nursery in the forest
department was purely in seasonal in nature. Otherwise also from mandays chart relied upon by the
respondent, it is evident that in the year 1990 petitioner herself had worked for 236 days and as
such it would be unsafe to hold that petitioner had given seasonal assignment rather plea seems to
have been raised with the object to escape liability. In view of foregoing discussions, petitioner is
held to have not proved by reliable oral evidence as well documentary under the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, retrenchment of petitioner by the
respondent finally w.e.f. 28.4.2012 could not be stated to be illegal and unjustified. Issue in hand is
answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.2
13. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that
present claim petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of her own and
did not join her duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of
the parties and evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition
being not maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the
issue in hand is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
ISSUE NO.3
14. It is not shown by the respondent as to what facts have been withheld by the petitioner
from the court. Neither any evidence has been led nor any submissions have been made in this
behalf by the respondent. Hence, this issue is also decided against the respondent and in favour of
the petitioner.
ISSUE NO.4
15. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent/department has contended with vehemence that
claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on April, 2012 and the industrial dispute was raised
after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
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H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act. It was observed that the relief under Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied merely on the
ground of delay. It has been contended that delay if any raised by employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact and that no reference made by appropriate government can be questioned on the
ground of delay alone. In the case in hand, respondent department has failed to prove on record any
material by which it could be stated that there was inordinate delay which has remained
unexplained due to which any prejudice had been caused to the respondent rather petitioner in his
evidence has highlighted and proved material facts establishing that on account of conciliation
proceeding before authority under Act, industrial dispute was not raised by petitioner immediately
or earlier on retrenchment and finally raised when his services were illegally terminated. Thus, the
petition filed by petitioner cannot be stated to be bad on vice of delay and laches. Issue in question
thus is accordingly answered in negative against respondent and in favour of petitioner.
RELIEF
16. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the instant claim petition is dismissed.
In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
17. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
18. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
19. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 7th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 76/2014
Date of Institution : 24.02.2014
Date of Decision : 15.01.2016
Shri Man Dass s/o Shri Sita Ram, r/o Village Kanda Guard, P.O. Barindi, Tehsil Karsog,
Distt. Mandi, H.P.
.…Petitioner
Versus
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1.
The Superintending Engineer, Irrigation & Public Health Circle, Sunder Nagar, Distt.
Mandi, H.P.
2.
The Executive Engineer, Irrigation & Public Health Division, Karsog, Distt. Mandi,
H.P.
….Respondents
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR
For the Respondent(s) : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether Sh. Man Dass S/O Sh. Sita Ram, R/O Village Kanda Guard, P.O. Barindi, Tehsil
Karsog, Distt. Mandi, H.P. is eligible for regularization on the post of beldar as per policy
of the Government, of H.P. after granting him relaxation in minimum educational
qualification by the i) The Superintending Engineer, Irrigation & Public Health Circle,
Sundar Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P. & ii) The Executive Engineer, Irrigation and Public
Health Division, Karsog, Distt. Mandi, H.P.? If yes, what are his entitlements to relief like
back wages, seniority and other consequential service benefits?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the present claim petition reveal that petitioner
claimant/petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar on 21.4.1987 whose services had been
illegally terminated on 21.7.1989 for which he raised industrial dispute regarding his reengagement
vide reference no.2 of 2001 Presiding Judge, Labour Court, Shimla had passed award and vide
which he was directed to be reinstated. The case of the petitioner remains that he continuously
remained in service from 1987 to 2013 but his seniority has been ignored and about 50 workers
were junior to him have been regularized. The claimant/petitioner had raised industrial dispute
before the Labour Inspector Circle Sundar Nagar on 1.12.2011 consequent upon which the
reference has been received to this court in which the petitioner has alleged that his regularization
in service has been delayed by the respondents. The petitioner has also claimed that he had
completed 8 years of service but he had not been regularized which was unfair labour practice and
thus petitioner claims that his regularization be made w.e.f. 1st January, 2009 instead of 19.2.2014
as has been done by the respondent.
4.
The respondents no.1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability and delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner
had been engaged with the department w.e.f. 21.4.1987 to 20.4.1989 however denied that petitioner
was disengaged from 21.4.1989. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job after April, 1989
without any intimation and thereafter he had worked continuously 240 days from calendar year
2001 till his regularization on 19.2.2014. Vide award no. 2/2001 passed by the Labour Court
Shimla, the petitioner has been granted seniority w.e.f. 19.1.2001 and had completed eight years of
service on 31.12.2008 but he could not be regularized as he did not fulfill the eligibility criteria as
per R&P Rules petitioner did not possess minimum qualification on date when regularization
process was considered. It is alleged that petitioner had been considered for regularization as per
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latest policy of the government from prospective date and regularized on 19.2.2014 and relaxation
of R&P Rules however only those persons whose named have been mentioned in the claim petition
were regularized as they had fulfilled the criteria of regularization as per R&P Rules and policy of
the State government. Merely, it is asserted that petitioner was although not regularized when initial
service of 8 years had been completed in the year 2008 in pursuance to order of Labour Court,
Shimla but thereafter he joined in service and continued to work till 19.1.2001 for more than 240
days in each calendar year but qualification of passing 5th standard was relaxed in view of policy
adopted by the government on 19.2.2014. As such, the petitioner is stated to have been rightly
regularized when he fulfilled criteria of qualification which was relaxed in the year 2014 and thus
respondent claims to have not violated any provisions of Industrial Disputes Act or recoursed to
any unfair labour practice as alleged by the petitioner. Accordingly, petition was sought to be
dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It
is contended that rules of recruitment and promotion which have not been adhered to by the
respondent.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of letter dated 18.1.2012,
copy of letter dated 12.4.2013 Ex. PW1/C, certified copy of judgment dated 23.11.2012 Ex. PW1/D
and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent
examined RW1 Shri Lekh Ram Chaudhary, the then Superintending Engineer, I&PH Circle
Sundarnagar, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B
mandays chart, list of daily wage workers Ex. RW1/C, copy of letter dated 1.1.2014 Ex. RW1/D,
Ex. RW1/E copy of letter dated 7.12.2013, Ex. RW1/F copy of proceedings dated 28.1.2014 Ex.
RW1/F and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.
D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on
11.11.2014 for determination:
(1) Whether the petitioner is eligible for regularization on the post of beldar as per policy
of the Government of H.P. after granting him relaxation in minimum educational
qualification by the respondent is illegal and unjustified as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPP
(2) Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
(3) Whether the petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
(4) Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1
: No
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: No
Relief
: Petition is dismissed per operative part of the Award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE NO.1
10. The grievance of the petitioner can be gathered from his pleadings and evidence
remains that petitioner should have been regularized from 1.1.2009 and his regularization vide
order dated 19.2.2014 was not correct as his juniors were regularized who have not been considered
for promotion earlier.
11. Stepping into witness box, petitioner has reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim
petition in which he has alleged about allegation of ignoring his seniority and regularization of 50
workers were junior to him. The case of respondent, on the other hand, remains that petitioner was
not qualified for regularization. He has not possessed minimum qualification of 5th standard. Thus,
the bone of contention remains with regards period when petitioner was factually eligible and if he
was regularized in 2014 the same of the contravention of any provisions of law.
12. Cross-examination of the petitioner revealed that even on the date of examination on
oath before this court on 1.7.2015, he had not passed 5th standard. Significantly, he has admitted in
cross-examination that those persons who were working with him were regularized as they
possessed minimum education qualification which is required. In so far as the previous service of
the petitioner from 21.4.1987 to 20.4.1989 is concerned, respondent in their reply have admitted
that petitioner had worked during these period and even after passing of award in reference
no.2/2001 of Labour Court, Shimla he had been given seniority. Be it noticed that petitioner has not
produced on record qua notification dated 19.2.2014 however he has challenged the action of
respondent not regularizing his service on the ground that even earlier policy of government he did
not present minimum qualification. It is not the case of petitioner that policy for regularization of
qualification was available when he completed 8 years of service rather petitioner had completed
minimum 8 years of service with 240 days working in each calendar year along-with exemption in
qualification when notification of February, 2014 took place although respondents have not
disputed regularization of 50 workers junior to the petitioner yet this would not help petitioner in
any manner. The petitioner himself in his cross-examination has admitted that the persons who
were regularized earlier possessed minimum qualification as well as requisite years of service.
Issue no.1 is answered in negative holding that regularization of petitioner on the post of beldar as
per policy of the State Govt. after granting relaxation in minimum qualification by the respondents
could not be stated illegal and unjustified rather petitioner has been regularized when he was
exempted from minimum education qualification and possessed requisite number of working
days/years. Issue no.1 is accordingly answered in negative.
ISSUE NO.2
13. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing for State contended with vehemence that claim petition is not
maintainable. In support of his contention he has pointed through reply and evidence on record that
petitioner was not eligible to be considered for regularization till he possessed minimum
qualification or till the contention for minimum qualification was exempted. That being so, the
previous regularization process began petitioner had failed to produce any record by which it could
be stated that petitioner was legally declined for being regularized in service rather he did not
possess minimum education qualification as per policy of the government but the same was made
in the year 2014. As such, issue in had is decided in favour of respondents and against the
petitioner.
ISSUE NO.3
14. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent State has contended with vehemence that the claim petition
is bad on account of delay and laches. It is observed from the pleadings and evidence on record that
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petitioner was working with the respondents/department even on the date of disposal of claim
petition He has admitted that due to relaxation in his qualification he had been regularized. Since,
the petitioner was not eligible to be considered for regularization prior to 2014, the claim petition
could not be stated to be dime barred. Moreso, when petitioner had invoked remedy of seeking
relief by raising industrial dispute and consequent upon industrial dispute raised and filed claim
petition. Thus, there is no delay in filing the claim petition as the petitioner learnt about his
regularization only in the year February, 2014 when notification took place and thereafter he raised
the industrial dispute and matter was sent to Labour Court for adjudication. Hence, this issue is
answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against the respondents.
RELIEF
15. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the instant claim petition is dismissed.
In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
16. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
17. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
18. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open
Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 106/2015
Date of Institution : 09.03.2015
Date of Decision : 15.01.2016
Smt. Bindai w/o Shri Teg Ram, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D, Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
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AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Bindai W/O Shri Teg Ram, R/O
Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated 26-06-2011 regarding her alleged illegal termination of service during October,
2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Smt.
Bindai W/O Shri Teg Ram, R/O Village Shoon, P.O.Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. during October, 2005 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of September, 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division,
Sach. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in
each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October,
2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to
petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated
to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under
the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while
retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed
by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner
and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October,
2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with
one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period
had also not been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima
facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record
who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at
the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time,
no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has
remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date
of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed
for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along- with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal
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termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between July, 1995 to October, 2005 be counted 160
days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1995 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar
Chand is concerned he was senior to her and other persons as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim
petition were worked with the respondent continuously. On the plea of termination of service of
petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore
serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has
maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in
para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal
Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 she
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is
stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance
of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for
charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner
was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior
workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,
respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division
Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-
workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted
on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 26.6.2011
qua her termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers from the
vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
OPP
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2.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,
2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
3.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1 TO 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of September, 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2005 at
HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any
written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute
that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own
and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of
appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s
termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of
reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as
claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from July, 1995 to 2005. She has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
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the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the
respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work
as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in
absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that
respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 70 days in the year 1995, 56 days in 1996, 133 days in 1997, 154 days in 1998, 103.5
days in 1999, 129 days in 2000, 101 days in 2001, 141.5 days in 2002, 133 days in 2003, 106 days
in 2004 and 28 days in 2005 and thus a total of her service in 1995 to 2005 in 11 years she had
worked for 1155 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for
more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the
point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal
termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had
merely worked for 28 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month
of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law
of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have
issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
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mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1995 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in October, 2005, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning
from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
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between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
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down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the
demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal
from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which she approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
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between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
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been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment
ofcompensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about
11 years and actually worked for 1155 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker
and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e.
demand notice was given on 26.6.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above
in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
one lac only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are
answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 116/2015
Date of Institution : 13.03.2015
Date of Decision : 15.01.2016
Shri Devi Chand s/o Shri Chet Ram, r/o Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner:
Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent:
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Chand S/O Shri Chet Ram,
R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated
19.10.2009 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. October, 2005 suffers
from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Devi Chand S/O
Shri Chet Ram, R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P. by
the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, District Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. October,
2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
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2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of April/May, 2002 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division
Sach. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in
each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of
October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were
junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department
was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers
working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner
and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been
followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to
petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month
of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October,
2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed
and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed
violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting
aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. He
further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with back wages,
seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of
his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks
given time and again during entire service of petitioner between April/May, 2002 to October, 2005
be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2010 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief
petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 2000 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
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denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar
Chand, Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Amar Nath and Shri Karam Dev s/o Shri Lala Ram are concerned
they were senior to him and other persons as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim petition were
worked with the respondent continuously. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner,
respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of
notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that
petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated
to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as
haraness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have
definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be
agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the
services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or
wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or
issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist
and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/E mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D7 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted
on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
19.10.2009 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers
from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
OPP
2.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,
2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
3.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
Relief.
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9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.50,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1 TO 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of April/May, 2000 who continuously worked till October, 2005 at
HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any
written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute
that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of
appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s
termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of
reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as
claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged in 2000 to 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under
Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same
time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was
illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all
the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
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13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in
the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for
Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any
specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 71 days in the year 2000, 79 days in 2004 and 75 days in 2005 and thus a total of his
service in 2000 to 2005 in 3 years he had worked for 223 days in his entire service period. Be it
noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the
Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings
only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in
the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 75 days and thus immediately in preceding 12
calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days
so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all
required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,
the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August 2004 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 2000 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
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16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D7. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D7 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative of
petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner
who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus,
plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as
he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda
(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice
Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment
wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment
or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,
the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here
that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was
not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he
cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from
agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed
and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the
relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that
petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act
although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment
of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
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has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D. Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 3
years and actually worked for 225 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services
of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had
raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about four years i.e. demand
notice was given on 19.10.2009. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
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that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees
fifty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are
answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 117/2015
Date of Institution: 13.03.2015
Date of Decision : 15.01.2016
Shri Om Prakash s/o Shri Moti Chand, r/o Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Om Prakash S/O Shri Moti Chand
R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated
08.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. October, 2005 suffers
from vice of delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Om
Prakash S/O Shri Moti Chand R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba,
H.P. w.e.f. October, 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of April, 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
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petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between April, 1997 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of
the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2005 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of
HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of
H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar
Chand, Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Hari Ram are concerned they were senior to him and other persons
as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim petition were worked with the respondent continuously. On
the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had
left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.
Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet
will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if
petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute
immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on
account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been
terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise
and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner
after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and
was thus not entitled for back wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted
on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
08.08.2010 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers
from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
OPP
2.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,
2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
3.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1 TO 3
10.
All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11.
Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of April, 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 at
HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any
written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute
that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of
appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s
termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of
reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as
claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged in 1997 to 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under
Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same
time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was
illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all
the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in
the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for
Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any
specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 155 days in the year 1997, 155.5 days in 1998, 102 days in 1999, 59 days in 2000, 74.5
days in 2001, 30.5 days in 2002, 70 days in 2003, 74 days in 2004 and 82 days in 2005 and thus a
total of his service in 1997 to 2005 in 9 years he had worked for 802.5 days in his entire service
period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no
reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to
confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 75 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not
rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one
year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August 2004 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 2000 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as
such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
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The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule
to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act
and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the
ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to
be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a
merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the
delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing
with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back
wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his
illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of
full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the
case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of
his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in
adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after
his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation
officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for
adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the
respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on
which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the
respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was
a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to
the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its
reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour
Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred
to supra. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by
both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by
dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining
the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred
to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the
public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
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the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 9
years and actually worked for 802.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker
and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about five years i.e.
demand notice was given on 8.8.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above
in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees
seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
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compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1
to 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open
Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 124/2015
Date of Institution : 18.03.2015
Date of Decision : 15.01.2016
Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Devi Lal, r/o Village Chasak, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
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Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial disputes raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh S/O Shri Devi Lal,
R/O Village Chasak, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated 22- 04-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during
October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of
Shri Devi Singh S/O Shri Devi Lal, R/O Village Chasak, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division,
Killar, Tehsil Pangi District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
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for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between May, 1991 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of
the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of
HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State
of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
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7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted
on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
22.04.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers
from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
OPP
2.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,
2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
3.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1 TO 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of May, 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 at
HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any
written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute
that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of
appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s
termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of
reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as
claimed by him.
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12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged in 1991 to 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice under
Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same
time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was
illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all
the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same
merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it
could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays
chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1
specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after
October, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part
of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling
upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as
abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as
PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and
attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately
given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete
160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the
Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe
to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked
for 86 days in the year 1991, 53 days in 1992, 73.5 days in 1993, 17 days in 1993, 60 days in 1997,
53 days in 1998, 23 days in 2000, 72.5 days in 2001, 95 days in 2002, 96 days in 2003 and 74 days
in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1991 to 2004 in 11 years he had worked for 703 days in his
entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as
there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this
court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 74 days and
thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of
one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
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Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2004 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1991 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative of
petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner
who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus,
plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as
he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda
(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice
Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment
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wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment
or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,
the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here
that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was
not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he
cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from
agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed
and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the
relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that
petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act
although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment
of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
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17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
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I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about
11 years and actually worked for 703 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker
and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e.
demand notice was given on 22.4.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above
in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees
seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1
to 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
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RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 104/2015
Date of Institution : 04.03.2015
Date of Decision : 15.01.2016
Shri Uday Chand s/o Shri Jagdev, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
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“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Uday Chand S/O Shri Jagdev,
R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated
18.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during year, 1995 suffers
from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Uday Chand S/O
Shri Jagdev, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by
the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. during year
1995 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of March, 1989 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between March, 1989 to November, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and
regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.1999 having completed 10 years of service
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and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj
Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till 1995
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1995 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted
on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 18.8.2010
qua his termination of service during the year 1995 by respondent suffers from the vice
of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
OPP
2.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year
1995 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
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3.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.50,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1 TO 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis who continuously worked till the year 1995 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not
in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and
conditions by the respondent. At the same time it is also not disputed that no written order was
passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not
retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own worked intermittently as
per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to
plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the
backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with
a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with
seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1991 to 1995. He has also stated on oath that no notice under
Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same
time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was
illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all
the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1991 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
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no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 1995. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in
the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for
Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any
specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 76 days in the year 1991, 96 days in 1992, 24 days in 1993, 44 days in 1994 and 33
days in 1995 and thus a total of his service in 1991 to 1995 in 5 years he had worked for 273 days
in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and
as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this
court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1995 the petitioner had merely worked for 33 days and
thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of
one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 1995 even at the time when junior
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persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained
whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1991 was terminated
and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for
work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)
SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-
H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in 1995, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative of
petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner
who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus,
plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as
he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda
(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice
Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment
wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment
or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,
the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here
that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was
not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he
cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from
agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed
and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the
relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that
petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act
although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment
of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
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18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
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acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
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pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1995 and the industrial dispute was
raised after about five years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for
the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court
of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
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Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court, factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5
years who had actually worked for 273 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
petitioner was disengaged in 1995 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised
industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fifteen years i.e. demand notice
was given on 18.8.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to
judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement
or for full back wages but lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of
judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees
fifty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are
answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
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26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open
Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 127/2015
Date of Institution : 18.03.2015
Date of Decision: 15.01.2016
Shri Lekh Ram s/o Shri Mangat Ram, r/o VPO Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi) Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Lekh Ram S/O Shri Mangat Ram,
R/O V.P.O. Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer,
H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated
18-08-2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during October 2005 suffers
from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Lekh Ram S/O
Shri Mangat Ram, R/O V.P.O. Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during
October, 2005 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
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3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of July, 1993 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between July, 1993 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of
the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of
HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of
H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1993 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
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thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted
on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 18.8.2010
qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers from the
vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
OPP
2.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,
2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
3.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
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Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1 TO 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of July, 1993 who continuously worked till October, 2005 at
HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any
written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute
that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of
appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s
termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of
reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as
claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from July, 1993 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the
Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
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admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in
the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for
Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any
specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 42 days in the year 1993, 112 days in 1994, 151 days in 1995, 161.5 days in 1996, 186
days in 1997, 159 days in 1998, 173 days in 1999, 89 days in 2000, 113 days in 2001, 121.5 days in
2002, 114.5 days in 2003, 75 days in 2004 and 84 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in
1992 to 2005 in 13 years he had worked for 1581.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed
that except 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998 and 2000 to 2005 he had worked for more than 160 days and as
there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this
court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 84 days and
thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of
one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1993 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
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16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
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has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the
relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the
Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to
exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to
either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in
the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly
exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute
to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court
in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
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the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about
13 years and actually worked for 1581.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker
and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e.
demand notice was given on 18.8.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above
in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
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reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump- sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are
answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 241/2013
Date of Institution : 09.12.2013
Date of decision : 19.01.2016
Shri Naresh Kumar s/o Shri Lilidhar, r/o Village Sarihani, P.O. Behli, Sub Tehsil Nihri,
District Mandi, H.P.
…Petitioner
Versus
The Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
….Respondent
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Naresh Kumar, S/O Shri Lilidhar,
R/O Village Sarihani, P.O. Behli, Sub Tehsil Nihri, District Mandi, H.P. by The Divisional
Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. during year 2008
to 2012, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner above named had been
appointed as daily waged beldar by the respondent on 1st June, 2000 under Kangoo Forest Range.
It is contended that petitioner had worked from 2000 to 2007 and in the year 2000 he worked for 55
days, 15 days in 2001, 115 days in 2005, 10 days in 2006. It is further alleged that
respondent/department had given fictional breaks to the petitioner w.e.f. 2008 to 2012 wherein he
had worked for 183 days in 2008, 285 days in 2009, 195 days in 2010, 116 days in 2011 and 140
days in 2012 and thereafter petitioner had raised industrial dispute before the Labour Inspector,
Circle Sundar Nagar and now the case was pending before this Court. It is further alleged that
the respondent had not made seniority as per rule which is unfair labour practice under the
provisions of Certified Standing Orders, 1946. It is stated that respondent/department had not
complied the settlement which had been done between the parties on 15.9.2003 besides respondent
had retained juniors to the petitioner although 24 workers had been regularized by the respondent
but the petitioner was ignored for the same and not followed the principal of ‘Last come, First go’
as such the respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-F(a), 25-F(b), 25-G and 25-H of
the Industrial Disputes Act which was also unfair labour practice. Accordingly, the petitioner has
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prayed for the benefit of seniority as well as consequential service benefits for the period of break
in service.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits,
admitted that petitioner was initially engaged in forest department in June, 2000 to carryout the
seasonal forestry works and as such worked upto March, 2014. It is claimed that petitioner is still
continuing to work intermittently with the department as per availability of work and funds. It is
stated that the petitioner had presented his case before the Conciliation Officer, Sunder Nagar is not
in dispute. Asserted that the services of petitioner were engaged as intermittent worker and no
fictional breaks had been give to him.. Thus, it is stated that the respondent had provided work to
petitioner as and when petitioner reported for duty. It is also stated that the services of only those
persons had been regularized who have completed 8 years of continuous service with minimum of
240 days in each calendar year per their seniority and no juniors to the petitioner had been
regularized. It is contended that petitioner had not completed 240 days in any calendar year except
2009 and no fictional breaks had been given to the petitioner and the respondent/department had
not violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is further stated that the respondent
had adhered the principle of ‘First Come, Last go’ and no fictional breaks had been provided to the
petitioner but petitioner had left the forestry work of his own sweet will. Thus, petitioner is stated
to be not entitled to any relief. Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition
and contentions raised by the respondent had been denied by petitioner.
6.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B is the conciliation letter dated
15.9.2003, copy of letter dated 24.4.2013 Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list and closed
evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined
Dr. L.C. Bandana, the then Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, Ex. RW1/B is the mandays chart and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.
D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on
10.11.2014 for determination:
1. Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is
illegal and unjustified as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPP
2. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPP
3. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged. If so, its
effect?
OPR
4. Relief.
9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: No
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Issue No.3
: No
Relief
: Petition is allowed in part per operative part of the Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE NO. 1
10. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A
under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein the manner in which he was engaged and continued
to work uninterruptedly under the supervision of Range Officer, Kangoo upto 2012. He has
specifically deposed on oath that from the year 2008 to 2012, his services had been engaged and
disengaged by the respondent/department by giving fictional breaks to petitioner besides
maintained that the fictional breaks had been given by respondent with the object that petitioner did
not complete 240 days of work for the purpose of continuous service and that due to these fictional
breaks from 2008 till 2012, petitioner could not complete 240 days besides denied that petitioner
had not worked for 2002, 2003 and 2007 although admitted that petitioner had worked after 2012
with the respondent. Be it noticed that in cross-examination petitioner has denied that the
respondent had not kept any junior to him.
11. Ex. RW1/B is mandays chart of petitioner reflecting that he had been appointed in the
month of June, 2000. The contents of said document revealed abstract of working mandays
showing that petitioner to have worked for 55 days in the year, 2000, 14 days in 2001, 115 days in
2005, 10 days in 2006, 183 days in 2008, 285 days in 2009, 195 days in 2010, 116 days in 2011,
140 days in 2012 and 150 days in 2013. Be it stated that petitioner has admitted that
department/respondent had regularized the services of only those workers who had completed 240
days or more but the case of petitioner primarily remains that he had been given fictional breaks
and that co-workers who were junior to him were retained whereas he was not issued muster roll
for whole month. It would, therefore, apt to scrutinize entire evidence so as to determine if fictional
breaks had been given with the object that petitioner did not complete 240 days in a given year and
thus could not avail benefit of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act.
12. It is the admitted case of the parties that services of petitioner were engaged as daily
wager by respondent in the month of June, 2000 as claimed by him in statement of claim. This facts
find support from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B. Be it noticed that the respondent has not
placed/exhibited or filed any document establishing that the services of petitioner were engaged for
undertaking forestry works only. Otherwise also, the mandays chart referred to above unfolds the
fact that petitioner had worked for 55 days in the year, 2000, 14 days in 2001, 115 days in 2005, 10
days in 2006, 183 days in 2008, 285 days in 2009, 195 days in 2010, 116 days in 2011, 140 days in
2012 and 150 days in 2013 and therefore when petitioner had served respondent for more than 150
days in several calendar years as per mandays chart it could not be construed that petitioner was a
seasonal worker instead the plea so raised by respondent manifestly establishes that in order to
escape liability, plea of forestry work being seasonal in nature has been taken. It is nowhere in
evidence of respondent that forest department has been declared as seasonal work so far as required
under the law.
13. It is settled principle of law that plea of ‘abandonment’ has to be proved like any
other fact by respondent/department. Simply because workman fails to report for duty
intermittently cannot be construed to mean that concerned workman has abandoned the job. There
is no iota of evidence on record establishing that any notice was ever issued or served to petitioner
by respondent when he had absented from duty calling upon him to resume duty or explain the
cause for his unauthorized absence as absence from duty is serious misconduct requiring initiation
of departmental proceedings before taking any action against workman Again there is no iota of
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evidence showing that the respondent had initiated any action in the absence of petitioner from
duty. It is evident from record that no explanation of petitioner was called even no show cause
notice was issued by respondent qua absence of petitioner from duty from time to time when he
absented as per the mandays referred to above. Thus, the plea of abandonment or absence from
duty put forth by the respondent also merits rejection being devoid of merits.
14. It has also come in the evidence that muster roll had not been issued for whole month
in a year. Even in some months muster rolls were not at all issued. No muster roll was issued as
petitioner is shown to have not been given any work however it is evident from the mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B that petitioner was engaged and disengaged whimsically in arbitrary manner without
cogent reason and that no letter or notice whatsoever had been issued qua non attendance and as
such the plea of petitioner for having been given fictional breaks cannot be disbelieved. In view of
foregoing evidence on record, it can be safely concluded that artificial/fictional breaks in service
was provided to petitioner by respondent from 2008 to 2012 which is an unfair labour practice
within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and the break period has to be counted for the
purposes of “continuous service” envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act.
15. Another aspect of the case which cannot be lost sight while appreciating evidence on
record is that junior workmen were allowed to be retained and that petitioner was disengaged
arbitrarily while giving fictional breaks by respondent in violation of Section 25-G of the Act. It is
evident from the seniority list that after engagement of petitioner in the year 2000 about 80 workers
who were junior to him had been engaged from 2000 to 2002 and 24 of them have been regularized
which goes to show that these 24 workers had not been given any break in their service. Thus when
petitioner who was senior to these junior workers had given fictional breaks, the action of the
respondent primarily reflects arbitrariness and whimsical manner and picking few workmen for
work and is ignored. It has been contended by the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner that
break given during 2008 to 2012 was deliberate on the part of respondent with the object that
petitioner did not completed 240 days entitled him benefit of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act and manifestly in the nature of fictional breaks. Significantly, conciliation was
entered into between union and the Divisional Forest Officer as is evident from Ex. P1 dated
15.9.2003 on the file. This document further strengthens the plea of petitioner in as much that
temporary seniority list of daily wagers would be prepared within one month and if any defect was
found it will be rectified within a period of one month besides those temporary workers who have
been illegally removed from service would be retained in service. Since petitioner was engaged and
disengaged primarily the action of respondent also is not consonance with undertaking given before
conciliation officer by the Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division Sundar Nagar as is
evident from Ex. P1. In view of foregoing evidence on record it can be safely concluded that
artificial/fictional breaks in service was provided to petitioner by respondent from 2008 to 2012 is
primarily an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and the break
period has to be counted for the purposes of “continuous service” envisaged under Section 25-B of
the Act. Ld. AR for the petitioner has contended that for applicability of Section 25-G of the Act, it
is not necessary that the petitioner should have worked for 240 days atleast in a calendar year as has
also been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996
(5) SCC 419. That being so, the relief sought for by petitioner is liable to be granted in view of
violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act by respondent. Thus, petitioner/claimant has
succeeded in establishing that fictional breaks had been given to petitioner illegally by respondent
due to which he could not complete 240 days in any calendar year more-so when respondent had
failed to prove allegation of abandonment as stated above. It is accordingly held that respondent
had given fictional breaks from time to time to the petitioner as stated above which is illegal and
unjustified as has come in the evidence. As the petitioner herself has not discharged initial onus qua
remaining unemployed during break period or not gainfully employed, so he cannot be awarded
back wages however petitioner is entitled to relief of continuity in service from the date of initial
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engagement as well as seniority except back wages for the reasons stated hereinabove. Issue no.1
for the aforestated reason is answered in affirmative in favour of petitioner and against respondent.
ISSUE NO.2
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondent department has contended with
vehemence that claim petition is not maintainable. As has come in my findings in foregoing paras
that respondent had deliberately given fictional breaks to petitioner by not issuing any muster roll
for the whole month in a calendar year, it cannot not be stated that the petitioner cannot claim that
the period of fictional break be counted in his services under Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Otherwise also, it is not specifically mentioned in what manner the claim petition is
not maintainable. Since petitioner is a workman working with the respondent who had been given
fictional breaks, as stated in foregoing paras, with the object that he did not complete 240 days, the
claim petition cannot be stated to be not maintainable. Issue in hand is answered in negative in
favour of petitioner and against respondent.
ISSUE NO.3
17. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing state respondent has contended that petition so filed was
bad on account of delay and laches. It is evident from findings in foregoing paras that petitioner
was given fictional breaks from 2008 to 2012 which was not within knowledge of petitioner. It
seems that when workmen junior to petitioner had been regularized, he come to know about
intermittent breaks. The matter was brought to notice of Conciliation Officer where it did not
materialize and consequently Labour Commissioner made reference to this court. Ld. counsel for
petitioner, on the other hand, has maintained that no prejudice had been caused to petitioner.
Moreover, not a single question has been asked by ld. Dy. D.A. on delay to the petitioner. As such,
delay which is not questioned stands explained as stated above. Otherwise also, plea of delay or
limitation would not eclipse claim of petitioner in any manner. It is settled preposition of law that in
case a dispute is referred to for determination, the Court will have to return a finding on merits and
the delay in raising the dispute may be considered by the Court at the time of granting the final
relief, as has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Bhatag Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903).
In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the
delay of more than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services
were illegally terminated by holding that the provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to
industrial dispute but however, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the
principle of delay and laches have to be seen and applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and
Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs.
Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled
as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar, there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar
vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425, it has been held by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has
been referred by the State Government and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference
which was made by the State Government and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits
without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co.
Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those
employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of
their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they
may have to make under the provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be
open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh
vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6
SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:
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“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
18. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there
was inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
RELIEF
19. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is to be in continuous
uninterrupted service with the respondent from 2008 to 2012 and that the breaks given by the
respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of
the petitioner. Accordingly, claim petition is hereby allowed in part and reference is accordingly
answered in favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in continuous service of
respondent as stated above with all consequential benefits except back wages. The parties,
however, shall bear their own costs.
20. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
21. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
22. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 19th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 37/2013
Date of Institution: 05.4.2013
Date of Decision : 19.01.2016
Shri Manoj Kumar s/o Shri Daulat Ram Sharma, r/o Village Dhaneri, P.O. Khuni, Tehsil
Nankhari, District Shimla, H.P.
.…Petitioner
Versus
The Managing Director, M/s Surya Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Mcleodganj, Dharamshala, District
Kangra, H.P.
….Respondent
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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent
: Sh. Jitender Sharma, Adv.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Sh. Manoj Kumar S/O Sh. Daulat Ram Sharma,
Village-Dhaneri, P.O. Khuni, Tehsil Nankhari, Distt. Shimla, H.P. by Managing Director,
M/s Surya Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Mcleodganj, Dharamsala, Distt. Kangra w.e.f. 28.8.2010
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back wages, salary, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the claim petition reveal that claimant/petitioner was
appointed as ‘Order Taker’ on monthly rate basis w.e.f. September, 1998 by the respondent where
he continuously worked till 11th July, 2010. Averments made in the claim petition further revealed
that on 11.7.2012 petitioner after discharging his duties proceeded towards room when slipped in
the darkness and his foot as well as leg got fractured due to which petitioner was unable to perform
his duties however on 12.7.2010, petitioner submitted leave application with the respondent and got
treatment vide OPD no. 4882/2010 dated 12.7.2010 and thereafter proceeded from Dharamshala to
his native village as no one resided with him to look after him but at his native village he realized
sudden pain in his backbone for which he took treatment from Ayurvedic Hospital Shimla on
19.7.2010 and was advised by doctor to take complete rest due to which petitioner could not
perform his duties from 12.7.2010 to 27.8.2010 who had yet not been given salary from the month
of July, 2010. It is alleged that petitioner after discharges from hospital reported for duty on
28.8.2010 who moved leave application and medical fitness certificate to the respondent requesting
to allow to join duty. It is claimed that the services of petitioner have been unlawfully terminated
by the respondent who had not been given any show cause notice and at the same time no inquiry
was conducted against him qua his misconduct or one month pay in lieu of notice period was not
given to him. The grievance of the petitioner also remains that he was permanent employee with
the respondent who worked in the Resort of respondent upto 11.7.2010 and he was on medical
leave upto 28.8.2010 but thereafter petitioner was not allowed to resume duty by the management
on 28.8.2010 due to the reason that petitioner was President of the union of Hotel Karamchari
Sangh who asserted that he was not allowed to join even after producing of the requisite documents
as demanded by the respondent and thus despite having rendered 240 days continuous service in
preceding last 12 calendar months preceding his termination, the respondent is alleged to have
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘the Act’ for brevity).
Not only this, while terminating the services of the petitioner, respondent had ignored principle of
‘Last come First go’ in allowing one Shri Shashi Pal, a junior to petitioner in service which was
also in violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. Similarly, respondent having not
offered to join duty offering to a junior had also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.
Accordingly, petitioner prays that act of the respondent in terminating his services due to
petitioner’s union activities was highly illegal, unjustified and unconstitutional within the ambit of
unfair labour practice and that petitioner was harassed and victimized by the respondent from time
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to time who was pressurized to withdraw case of union pending before this court. Accordingly,
petitioner alleges that he was still unemployed and not gainfully employed anywhere from the date
of his illegal termination and was thus entitled to full back wages. Accordingly, petitioner has
prayed for setting aside the illegal termination i.e. 28.8.2010 of the respondent with direction to the
respondent to reinstate petitioner in service with full back wages, seniority, continuity of service
with all consequential service benefits and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, estoppel, act and conduct petitioner having not come to the court with
clean hands and that petitioner had himself abandoned the job voluntarily. On merits admitted that
petitioner was engaged by the respondent on 1st September, 1998 as Order Taker but denied that
conduct of the petitioner during period was satisfactory and upto the mark. It is alleged that
petitioner was habitually taking leave while giving false reasons. It is alleged that respondent asked
the petitioner to furnish the copy of prescription slips but petitioner failed to furnish the same and
on 12th July, 2010 he deliberately absented from his duties. It is claimed that since petitioner failed
to join his duties after 11.7.2010 his salary from 1.7.2010 to 11.7.2010 was lying undisbursed and
pending before the respondent which could be taken by petitioner on submission of proper
documents which he failed to submit at the time of joining earlier as stated above. It is claimed that
photocopy of medical certificate did not appear to be genuine as medical officer recommending bed
rest had made inconsistent observation on the point of rest. It has been emphatically denied that
petitioner was never allowed by the
respondent to join duties. As Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act have also been denied and petition
is sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B Mark-A and Mark-B are the OPD
slips dated 12.7.2010 and 19.7.2010, Mark-C copy of medical certificate, Ex. PW1/B copy of
demand notice and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Paramjeet Bamba, the then Executive Director, M/s.
Surya Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Mcleodganj, Dharamshala tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A under
Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B seniority list, Ex. RW1/C copy of mandays chart, Exts. RW1/D1
to D11 copies of ledge statement and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld.
counsel for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on
30.9.2013 for determination:
1.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.
28.8.2010 is illegal and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
2.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
Whether the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands as alleged. If so, its
effect?
OPR
3.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing of the claim petition by his act and
conduct as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
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4.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: No
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: No
Relief
: Petition is allowed per operative part of the Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUE NO.1
10. Admittedly, petitioner had been appointed by the respondent as Order Taker in the
month of September, 1998 who continuously worked upto 11th July, 2010. This fact further finds
support from mandays chart Ex. RW1/C which shows petitioner to have worked for 257 days in the
year 2005, 284 days in 2006, 259 days in 2007 and 144 days in 2010. The ledger statement Ext.
RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D11 further strengthen the plea of respondent being engaged with respondent
as Order Taker from September, 1998 till July, 2010. Thus, from testimony of petitioner coupled
with documents as referred to above, it is established that petitioner has been working with the
respondent as Order Taker continuously from September, 1998 till July, 2010.
11. The mandays chart primarily establishes that petitioner had worked for more than 240
days during preceding 12 calendar months before the date of retrenchment on 28.8.2010. Section
25-F of the Act reads as under:
“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any
industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer
shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons
for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been
paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be
equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service
or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such
authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the
Official Gazette.”
12. Cross-examination of the respondent Shri Paramjeet Bamba (RW1) clearly shows that
no notice was given to petitioner prior to his termination rather respondent has made futile attempt
by stating that respondent had not terminated services of petitioner rather petitioner had abandoned
the job of his own which is not at all established from records. Thus, it is to be concluded under the
plea of improper medical fitness document, respondent did not allow petitioner to join duties and
resultantly petitioner was disengaged from job by necessary implication.
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13. The case of petitioner further remains that he had sustained injury in leg while he was
proceeding towards his room on 11.7.2010 after performing his duties and had slipped due to which
his foot and leg got fractured and had taken treatment vide OPD slip no. 4882 issued photocopy of
OPD slips and medical fitness certificate along with application were submitted to the respondent
and that the petitioner had left for native place as there was no one to look after him and due to
recurrence of backbone pain he had again taken treatment at Ayurvedic Hospital Shimla and after
availing medical leave when he join for duty on 28th August, 2010 he was not allowed to join as
complete documents concerning treatment were demanded by the respondent. Be it noticed that
petitioner in his cross-examination has admitted that according to Mark-C he was fit to join duty on
27.8.2010 but the case of respondent remains that petitioner had abandoned the job as he did not
report for duty after 28.8.2010 when he was asked to produce complete medical record qua his
treatment of leg and backbone.
14. It is admitted case of the respondent that neither any departmental inquiry was
conducted nor any charge sheet was raised against the petitioner qua his absence from duty for
period aforestated before his termination. The plea of respondent remains that the services of
petitioner were never terminated rather he himself had abandoned the job. It may be relevant to
mention here that dispute was also raised before the Labour Inspector which had started within 15
days from 28.8.2010 as has been admitted by RW1 in cross-examination. If the petitioner had not
been terminated, respondent ought to have produced such evidence which would establish that
petitioner continued to remain employed/engaged with the respondent and that he was to be
allowed only on production of documents but petitioner did not report for duty. Thus, it was
incumbent upon the respondent to have initiated departmental proceedings qua his absence from
duty which is not done in this case or atleast prior to it show cause notice for unauthorized absence
was ought to be served. It is uncertain from respondent’s evidence as to how he inferred that
petitioner had abandoned the job. Be it noticed that respondent has taken plea that salary of the
petitioner from 1.7.2010 to 11.7.2010 was lying undisbursed which establishes that the respondent
intended only to pay balance amount of salary which had not been taken by the petitioner. There is
no iota of evidence on record establishing that the petitioner was ever issued any notice envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act which was mandatory in nature as per the provisions. At the same
time, salary of one month in lieu of notice period was required to be paid which has not been given
by the respondent. As such, when petitioner is held to have worked with the respondent
continuously for more than 240 days in preceding 12 calendar months as well as has come in the
evidence as discussed in the foregoing paras and that he has not been allowed to resume duties on
the plea of non production of documents. It is settled law that plea of abandonment has to be
proved like a fact burden of which lies upon party alleging the same. In the case in hand from
testimony of petitioner and other attending circumstances, it is to be held that the services of
petitioner have been terminated in absence of proof of plea of abandonment and that there is no
evidence from the side of respondent to show that petitioner had been asked to join for duties or
resume duties at any point of time. As such, respondent is held to have violated provisions of
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
15. In so far as the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it would be
relevant to mention here seniority list of Order Takers Ex. RW1/B in which petitioner’s name
figured at serial no. 1 whereas Shashi Pal was at serial no. 4. The grievance of petitioner remains
that he had been removed from service by the respondent retaining a junior and for said reason the
respondent is held to have also violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act.
16. Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is reproduced for reference:
“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment,
who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of
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workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and
the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was
the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the
employer retrenches any other workman”.
17. A bare glance of the provisions aforestated would establish that respondent has
retained junior Shashipal at serial no.4 and retrenched petitioner who was at serial no.1. There is
nothing in evidence of respondent that for any misconduct of petitioner his service had been
terminated.
18. With regard to petitioner having remained engaged or not gainfully employee it has
been specifically averred in the claim petition as well as affidavit Ex. PW1/A that petitioner was
not gainfully employed and there is nothing in cross-examination of petitioner which would be
established that he was employed or was gainfully engaged ever since at the time of his illegal
termination. In these circumstances when burden of proof for establishing that petitioner was
gainfully employed lied on the employer and having failed discharge the same, petitioner would be
entitled for full back wages in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 2014 LLR
673, Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s. Hindalco Industries Ltd. In the circumstances of the
case, there is nothing in evidence qua earning capacity of the petitioner from month of July, 2010
as has come in the evidence this court is left with no option but to hold that petitioner is entitled to
full back wages. Ld. counsel for petitioner has relied upon judgment titled as Jasmer Singh vs.
State of Haryana & Anr. reported in 2015 LLR 225 in which Hon’ble Court has held that if the
workman has completed 240 days continuous service during the preceding 12 calendar months his
termination without compliance with the mandatory provisions of Industrial Disputes Act would
make the workman entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and
respondent/management and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of the
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and that he did not remain gainfully employed after his
retrenchment and as such petitioner is liable to be reengaged with seniority and in continuity in
service as well as full back wages from the date of his illegal termination. Issue no.1 is thus
answered holding that retrenchment of services of petitioner by respondent w.e.f. 28th August,
2010 was illegal and unjustified and the petitioner is entitled to be reengaged along-with seniority,
past service benefits with full back wages. Issue no. 1 is answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.2
19. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. counsel for respondent has failed to allege in reply in what manner
petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from
pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be
raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the
respondent.
ISSUES NO.3 AND 4
20. It is not shown as to how the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands
and estopped from filing of claim petition. No evidence has been led on these issues. Hence, these
issues are decided accordingly.
RELIEF
21. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, termination order dated 28.8.2010 of the
services of petitioner by the respondent is hereby set aside and quashed and the reference/claim
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petition is allowed in favour of petitioner. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner
forthwith who shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service with full back wages from the
date of his illegal termination. However, respondent shall release undisbursed salary/wages of
petitioner lying with him w.e.f. 1.7.2010 to 10.7.2010. The parties, however, shall bear their own
costs.
22. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
23. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
24. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 19th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 12/2014
Date of Institution : 09.01.2014
Date of Decision : 19.01.2016
Shri Kehar Singh Gandhi s/o Shri Bhagat Ram, r/o Ward No.2 Shop No.5, Near New Court
Complex Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Pradhan, The Anu Cooperative Agriculture Society Ltd. Hamirpur, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. Umesh Dhiman, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. O.P. Sharma, Adv.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Shri Kehar Singh Gandhi, S/O Shri Bhagat Ram,
R/O Ward No.2, Shop No.5, Near New Court Complex Hamirpur, District Hamirpur,
H.P. w.e.f. 1-6-2008 by The Pradhan, The Anu Coperative Agriculture Society Ltd.
Hamirpur, H.P. without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
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is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
from which date the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
The claimant/petitioner has instituted present statement of claim alleging therein that
he was engaged as salesman by the respondent society vide resolution no. 5 dated 27.11.1997. The
petitioner further claims to have continued to work with the respondent till his services were
allegedly verbally disengaged on 31.5.2008 by respondent society. After disengagement of the
petitioner from job, he requested time and again to the respondent for reengagement but he was
denied to do the work. It is alleged that at the time of joining, petitioner was paid the salary of
Rs.500/- per month w.e.f. 27.11.1997 and thereafter consolidated salary was received from 1st
September, 2000 vide which the salary was enhanced to Rs.1,000/- per month and again it was
revised on 1.10.2001 @ Rs.1200/- per month. The petitioner thus claims that he had been given less
salary by the respondent in violation of provisions of Minimum Wages Act vide which the
petitioner was entitled to receive salary of Rs.3000/- p.m. @ Rs.100/- per day as wages and thus
petitioner was entitled to get balance arrears of salary amounting to Rs.2,50,900/- along with
interest. The petitioner further claims that at the instance of respondent society, petitioner had hired
shop on rent for Rs.650/- per month from 27.11.1997 to 31.5.2008 and had in total paid Rs.81,900/-
which was also liable to be paid by the society to the petitioner. The grievance of petitioner remains
that instead of paying him the dues as aforestated respondent had appointed another salesman in
violation of provisions of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act moreso when petitioner had
already rendered 240 days in every calendar year and appointment of another salesman was in
violation of Section 25-F (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, petitioner asserts that he
had not been given any retrenchment notice prior to his termination and was thus entitled for
reinstatement under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner has further prayed
that order of termination dated 31.5.2008 of the respondent be revoked and he be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service with consequential service benefits and the
respondent be directed to pay difference of minimum wages arrears along-with interest and rent of
shop/depot as aforesaid or to any other relief to which petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, limitation, locus standi, estoppel and cause of action. On merits
claimed that petitioner had never remained employee of the respondent society who had filed
complaint before the Dy. Registrar Cooperative Society Dharamshala which was decided against
him on 30.4.2011 against which appeal was filed before the Additional Registrar (Administration)
Co-operative Societies H.P. Shimla vide order dated 29.9.2012 declined to give any relief qua
salary, gratuity, incentives etc. While denying the status of petitioner to be that of salesman of the
society was contended that in the year 1997 salesman of the respondent society namely Onkar
Singh was arrested in criminal case for which society was required to make temporary arrangement
to provide ration to the public and that the petitioner at that time was holding private depot in
vicinity. Vide resolution no.2 petitioner who had depot near the office of the respondent society,
managing committee of the respondent society made attachment of society depot with the
petitioner’s private depot vide resolution no. 4 dated 27.11.1997 so that public did not suffer and
said arrangement was purely on temporary basis and later Onkar Singh was arrested and released
on bail who offered to work with the respondent society and for said reason meeting was convened
on 11.12.1997 and a resolution was passed in which Onkar Singh was taken in service. Asserting
attachment of depot of society with the depot of petitioner was purely a temporary arrangement
which was made in pursuance to order dated 15.11.1997 by District Food and Civil Supply
Controller but there was no appointment of petitioner as salesman of the society at any point of
time. It is categorically stated that appointment of salesman is made only in accordance with
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rules and bye-laws of society of the Managing Committee and since the petitioner himself was
running the same kind of business as a private depot holder, so he was neither a salesman/employee
nor the question of disengagement of petitioner from service arose. It is also pleaded that vide
resolution no.2 dated 6.5.2008 the action of the respondent society stood approved by the higher
authority including DFC Hamirpur. It is also stated that petitioner was paid remuneration and not
salary in lieu of service rendered by him and the payments made to the petitioner were not made
payment as salary but was remuneration for attachment of depot for running the fair price shop near
the society’s office. It is denied that petitioner was entitled for difference of remuneration paid and
the minimum wages amounting to Rs.2,50,900/- and the complaint filed before the Deputy
Registrar Co-operative Societies who held inquiry qua entitlement of petitioner through Block
Inspector Cooperative Societies Hamirpur submitted report on 17.9.2010 and did not find any merit
as petitioner was made payment for amounting to Rs.1,24,300/- and Rs.5604/- for temporary
arrangement made by respondent society. Thereafter, the Deputy Registrar cooperative societies
Dharamshala also enquired the matter in dispute from the District Inspector Hamirpur who
submitted his report on 28.2.2011 and had categorically held in para no.3 that on the total profit of
Rs.1,79,052.77 paise profit to the society from the year 1996-97 to 2008 petitioner had been paid
more than 75% i.e. amounting to Rs.1,29,100/- and Rs.6250/- as his remuneration and incentive
and therefore compliant filed by him was dismissed. Similarly, appeal filed against the order
challenged before the Additional Registrar Cooperative Societies Shimla too was dismissed and
order/resolution of respondent society dated 6.5.2008 was held to be legal and in accordance with
rules of society. Similarly, it was also emphatically denied that no agreement was entered
between the petitioner and respondent society to hire shop on rent. Accordingly, petition is sought
to be dismissed alleging that whatever remuneration or incentive was payable to petitioner same
has been paid and that the depot which was attached with the depot of petitioner was separated vide
resolution of society. Moreover, petitioner had challenged his grievances before the authorities with
regard to difference of salary or rent of premises allegedly hired.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of resolution no.3, Ex.
PW1/C copy of list of employees, Ex. PW1/D copy of inspection letter, Ex. PW1/E1 to E5 copies
of payment account, Ex. PW1/F1 to F7 copies of pay detail, Ex. PW1/G copy of letter dated
14.6.2011, Ex. PW1/H to H1 copies of permit, Ex. PW1/I-1 to I-6 copies of monthly feedback, Ex.
PW1/J copies of resolution no.5, Ex. PW1/K copy of officer order dated 15.12.1997, Ex. PW1/L
copy of monthly feedback, Ex. PW1/M copies of resolution dated 11.9.2009, Ex. PW1/N copy of
receipt dated 31.1.2008, Ex. PW1/N-1 to N-5 copies of receipts, Ex. PW1/O copy of receipt dated
10.12.2001, Marks X and Y are the copies of inspection reports and closed the evidence. On the
other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Satish
Chand, Secretary, Anu cooperative society as RW1 tendered/proved Ex. RW1/B copy of resolution
dated 26.3.2014, Ex. RW1/C copy of proceeding book, Ex. RW1/D copy of resolution dated
11.12.1997, Ex. RW1/E copy of resolution no. 2 dated 6.5.2008, Ex. RW1/F copy of office order
dated 15.12.1997, Ex. RW1/G copy of inquiry report dated 17.9.2010, Ex. RW1/H copy of
seniority list, Ex. RW1/I copy of letter dated 2.6.2008, Ex. RW1/J copy of letter dated 9.5.2008,
Ex. Ex. RW1/K copy of letter dated 16.10.2010, Mark Y copy of inquiry report, Ex. R1 copy of
show cause notice dated 28.8.2007, Ex. R-2, copy of letter dated 16.10.2005, Ex. R-3 copy of
judgment dated 29.9.2012 and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel for both the parties, gone through records of the case
carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
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8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on
4.11.2014 for determination which are as under:
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.
01.06.2008 is illegal and unjustified. If so, its effect?
OPP
2.
Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
3.
Whether the present petition is barred by limitation. If so, its effect?
OPR
4.
Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the case?
OPR
5.
Whether the petitioner has estopped by his act and conduct to file the petition. If so, its
effect?
OPR
6.
Whether the petitioner has no cause of action?
OPR
7.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1
: No
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: Unpressed
Issue No.5
: Unpressed
Issue No.6
: Yes
Relief.
: Petition is dismissed per operative part of the Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1 AND 6
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. It is admitted case of parties that claimant/petitioner was already running a ration depot
in ward no.2 at Hamirpur prior to attachment of depot of respondent society vide resolution Ex.
RW1/C so as to maintain PDS supply of the respondent. It is equally admitted case of the parties
that both the depots run at one place in a shop. It is equally admitted case of the petitioner that
petitioner was engaged when a salesman of the respondent society namely Onkar Singh was
arrested by police and thus engagement of claimant/petitioner was purely stop gap arrangement in
pursuance to resolution passed by the respondent society. It is equally admitted case of the
petitioner that no appointment letter was ever issued in favour of petitioner to establish relationship
of master and servant. In view of forgoing admitted facts placed on record, it is to be determined if
there are existed relationship of ‘employer’ and the ‘workman’ between the respondent and
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petitioner and if such relationship factually existed then disengagement of petitioner was in
violation of any of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Similarly, it is also to be
adjudicated that petitioner was paid less wages in view of the provisions of Minimum Wages Act
and was also entitled for rent of shop which he had hired at the behest of the respondent society.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in detailed affidavit Ex.
PW1/A wherein he asserted as maintained in the claim petition stipulating therein that petitioner
was engaged in pursuance to resolution no.5 dated 27.5.1997 as salesman and was disengaged by a
verbal order on 31.5.2008 and at the time of joining, he was given salary of Rs.500/- per month
w.e.f. 27.11.1997 thereafter consolidated salary received on 1.9.2000 which was enhanced to
Rs.1,000/- per month and again revised on 1.10.2001 @ Rs.1200/- per month. The petitioner has
asserted on oath that sum of Rs.2,50,900/- along-with interest was recoverable being difference in
minimum wages admissible to the petitioner and the actual wages which had not been paid by the
respondent society. The petitioner has also claimed to be entitled to rent of building hired so as to
run attached depot of society. It further remains the case of petitioner that in violation of provisions
of society son of Secretary namely Satish has been appointed although petitioner himself had
completed 240 days in a year in all years preceding his termination and hired a separate shop on
monthly rent of Rs.650/- per month at instance of respondent. Accordingly, violation of provisions
of Section 25-F (b) and (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act has also been asserted. In cross-
examination of the petitioner, it is revealed that he had been running a private depot prior 1997
which existed in vicinity of respondent society. He has admitted that Onkar Singh was earlier
salesman who was arrested. He has further revealed in cross-examination that he had 200 permit
holders and similarly respondent society had similar number of permit holders. He has also
admitted vide Ex. PW1/K, DFC Hamirpur had attached depot of respondent society with the
petitioner’s depot. He further admitted that he had been supplying ration to the consumers of the
respondent society till 6.5.2008 till appointment of new salesman. Although petitioner repeatedly
asserted that he had been given salary and this fact finds mentioned in the proceedings of the
society as well but scrutiny of the entire documentary evidence coupled with testimonies of parties,
it is established that petitioner was never a salesman of the society who was merely paid
remuneration and incentive for service being rendered by him to the consumers for the respondent
society. Admittedly, there was no appointment letter issued to petitioner as salesman as he also
admitted so in cross-examination that while making complaint before the Additional Registrar
Cooperative Society Hamirpur in the year 2010 he did not claim his status to be that of salesman of
respondent society which establishes that he had manipulated entry of payments to him as salary. It
is not understood as to why the petitioner did not assert his claim as that of salesman while filing
complaint in the year 2010 before the Deputy Registrar Cooperative Societies which was
consequently got enquired by Inspector Cooperative Societies and that it was found that petitioner
was not a salesman.
13. It would be relevant to consider the proceeding of respondent society and
subsequent complaint of the petitioner with the authorities claiming difference in arrears of wages
as well as rent for accommodation hired by him. Ex. R3 is detailed order passed by Additional
Registrar Cooperative Society in which petitioner as appellant had filed appeal under Rule 21 of
H.P. Primary Agriculture Cooperative Credit Societies Employees (terms of employment and
working conditions) Rules, 2001 had been dismissed affirming the order of Deputy Registrar
Cooperative Societies Dharamshala rejecting claim of the petitioner. It was observed by the
Additional Registrar Cooperative Society that the appellant i.e. present claimant/petitioner was
authorized by the respondent society to do the work of PDS in a capacity of private depot
holder and thus temporary arrangement was made to provide public facilities under the PDS.
Thus, there was no need to follow any procedure while disengaging or detaching in supply of ration
to the consumers/holders earlier attached with petitioner since 1997. Hence, appellate authority
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under Rule 21 found no merit in the appeal qua grievances of the appellant with regard to
detachment of depot as well as other benefits claimed by him.
14. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has laid much emphasis on language used while passing
resolution no. 4 dated 27.11.1997 Ex. RW1/C in which it was mentioned that a sum of Rs.500/-
would be paid to petitioner as monthly salary. Similarly, in Ex. RW1/G Inspector Cooperative
Society has observed that petitioner was paid a sum of Rs.1,24,300/- and Rs.5,604/- as incentive.
RW1 has although admitted that in Ex. RW1/C petitioner was shown to be paid Rs.500/- as salary
but clarified that the members of society were not so educated as to know difference between
“incentive” and “salary” and such words were used interchangeably. RW1 although admitted in
cross-examination that petitioner was given remuneration but he could not produce any record
which would show that petitioner was given incentive for service rendered by him but maintained
that same had been clarified in the reports. Be it noticed that the main thrust of the petitioner for his
claim as salesman of the society was stipulation in records of respondent society as receiving
salary. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the copies of ledger account vide which
salary had been remitted to the petitioner. These ledgers accounts are Ex. PW1/E1 to Ex. PW1/F7
which account show that initially petitioner was payment of Rs.500/- per month and it was
enhanced to Rs.1000/- and later to Rs.1200/- per month. As such, the plea of petitioner receiving
different amounts of remuneration get substantiated from ledger account produced by him.
15. It is the case of the respondent that a salesman is strictly appointed as per rules and
regulations of the society and the petitioner was merely engaged so as to run the depot of society so
that PDS supply of ration was not affected for those consumers. Thus, even when temporary
arrangement was made in the year 1997, the respondent/society never intended to engage petitioner
as salesman rather it could be seen as one society seeking service of the other depot holder for
selling or supply of its products i.e. ration etc. In that eventuality also there could be no relationship
of ‘employer’ and ‘workman’ or salesman as claimed by the petitioner and thus petitioner has made
futile attempt to get benefit of being a salesman of the society but he certainly fell in error in
considering that he was already running a ration shop adjacent to the office of the respondent
society and arrangement was purely made to run govt. ration shop with the aid of depot of
petitioner. Since the petitioner had at no point of time claimed to be employee of
respondent/society in the year 2010 when he had filed complaint before the Deputy Registrar
Cooperative Society and even later stage also he has not asserted his status as alleging salesman
rather he was dealing in the sales of respondent society on account of resolution as referred to
above and claimed rent and other benefits but the temporary arrangement made by the society was
certainly acceptable to the petitioner who did not project himself as salesman at any point of time
and there is no iota of evidence which would show that respondent society treated petitioner as
salesman.
16. Ex. PW1/K is the office order of DFSC Hamirpur vide which depot of respondent
society was attached with the petitioner’s depot under the H.P. Special Essential Commodities
Regulation and Distribution Order 1979. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has also contended with
vehemence that in pursuance to the order of Deputy Registrar Food and Supply, petitioner had
hired shop for which he paid rent as is evident from Ex. RW1/C. A bare scrutiny of this document
would reveal that auction of the shop had taken place on 10.12.2001 which was taken by petitioner
on deposit of Rs.5000/- as security with Municipal Council Hamirpur meaning thereby that from
1997 to 2001 petitioner had not hired any shop. Even in the cross-examination petitioner has
admitted that old ration shop of petitioner was attached in same premises and therefore question of
hiring of separate accommodation for which rent is claimed did not arise. As such, it is not proved
that any shop or premises was factually hired for which amount of Rs.81,900/- from 1997 to 2008
was paid. Even no witness of municipal corporation Hamirpur has been examined so as prove the
actual shop in question to run ration shop. On the point of claim of petitioner for rent Ex. R2 dated
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16.10.2010 in which inquiry had been conducted and this document revealed that there was no
understanding between the petitioner and respondent to pay rent for the premises rather petitioner
had been paid substantial amount from 1997 to 2008 as remuneration and incentive for the services
rendered by him. As such, there is no evidence on record to show that the petitioner was entitling to
arrears of rent payable for running depot of the respondent society. In view of the foregoing
discussions, it would be unsafe to hold that there are existed relationship of ‘employer’ and
‘salesman’ between the petitioner and the respondent. Since the disengagement was on the basis of
subsequent resolution, it could not be stated that petitioner had been disengaged in violation of any
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act rather petitioner was notified about the detachment by the
respondent society as its earlier appointment as salesman were released on bail and the temporary
arrangement was restored to its original position as before. Since there existed no relationship of
employer and salesman between the petitioner and respondent, the petitioner could not claim any
difference in amount of wages more specifically a sum of Rs.2,50,900/- as claimed by the petitioner
and similarly when petitioner has failed to establish hiring of accommodation with the object keep
ration of PDS of respondent society, it could not be stated that he had incurred a sum of Rs.81,900/-
on account of rent in running the depot of the society. As such, petitioner is held not entitled to any
amount from respondent society as rent and for said reason petitioner has no cause of action to file
the present claim petition. Accordingly, it is held that termination of services of petitioner is legal
and justified and petitioner is not entitled for any wages, seniority past service benefits from
respondent society. Issues no. 1 and 6 are decided accordingly.
ISSUE NO.2
17. As is evident from foregoing paras, there are no existed relationship of
employer and salesman between petitioner and respondent who could not claim relief sought for in
view of provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petition is thus held to be not maintainable in
the present form more so, when petitioner had already approached competent authorities of H.P.
Cooperative Societies for remedies available to him qua his grievances as stated in foregoing paras.
With regard to difference of arrears of wages, rent etc. his claim was already rejected and after
exhausting all remedies, he had chosen forum of Industrial Dispute Act claiming his status as
salesman of the society which was found to be not correct. As such, petition is not maintainable.
This issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of respondent society.
ISSUE NO.3
18. Ld. counsel for the respondent has contended that petition so filed was bad on account
of delay and laches. Ld. counsel for petitioner, on the other hand, has maintained that not a single
question has been asked by ld. counsel for respondent on delay to the petitioner. As such, delay
which is not questioned stands explained as stated above. Otherwise also, plea of delay or
limitation would not eclipse claim of petitioner in any manner had petitioner succeeded in
establishing his status as salesman and that of respondent society as employer. In this case
disengagement was done on 6.5.2008 and after litigating before authorities under H.P. Cooperative
Act petitioner filed claim before authorities under Industrial Dispute Act and finally appropriate
government referred the dispute in 2014. Period of six years was spent in litigation only. It is
settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the Court will have
to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered by the Court at
the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Bhatag
Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not come in the
way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the provisions of
Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and applied. In Deepa
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Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there was a delay of 12
years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was a delay of 9 years.
In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar, there was a delay of
14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425, it has been held by
the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of
delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the Labour Court is
bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same is required to be
adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Apex
Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has categorically
held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C (2)
may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of
limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of
any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the
ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
19. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there
was inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
ISSUES NO.4 AND 5
20. Both these issues were not pressed by ld. counsel for the respondent at the time of
arguments which are decided unpressed in favour of petitioner and against respondent.
RELIEF
21. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the instant claim petition is dismissed.
In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
22. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
23. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
24. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 19th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 95/2015
Date of Institution : 04.03.2015
Date of Decision : 20.01.2016
Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Amar Chand, r/o Village and Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh S/O Shri Amar
Chand, R/O Village and Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice
dated 25.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. August, 2005
suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Devi
Singh S/O Shri Amar Chand, R/O Village and Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. August, 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in the year
1994 and 161 days in 1995 who had completed criteria of 160 days prescribed for tribal area of
Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory
provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’
for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted
by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such
breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days
so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
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respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of
August, 2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were
junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department
was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers
working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner
and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been
followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to
petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of
August, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August,
2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed
and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed
violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting
aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 2005. He
further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 2005 along-with back wages,
seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of
his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks
given time and again during entire service of petitioner between June, 1994 to August, 2005 be
counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief
petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar
Chand is concerned he was senior to him and other persons as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim
petition were worked with the respondent continuously. On the plea of termination of service of
petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore
serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has
maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in
para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal
Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after six years petitioner is
stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance
of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for
charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner
was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 07.07.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year
August, 2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
OPR
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the
petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
:Petition
is
partly
allowed
awarding
compensation
Rs.1,20,000/- per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2005 at HPPWD
Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order
or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1994 to 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under
Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same
time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was
illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all
the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2005 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in
the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for
Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any
specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 160 days in the year 1994, 161 days in 1995, 146 days in 1996, 85 days in 1997, 116
days in 1998, 91 days in 1999, 30 days in 2000, 103.5 days in 2001, 62 days in 2002, 35 days in
2003, 73 days in 2004 and 59 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2005 in 12
years he had worked for 1121.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except 1996 to
2005 he had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with
regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year
2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 59 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar
months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to
meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required
from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the
respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August 2005 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
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25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter
as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
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demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about
12 years and actually worked for 1121.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker
and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e.
demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above
in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble
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Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar
Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees
one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1
to 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 119/2015
Date of Institution : 13.03.2015
Date of Decision : 20.01.2016
Shri Kushu Ram s/o Shri Amar Chand, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
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Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Kushu Ram S/O Shri Amar
Chand, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated 08.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. August,
2001 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri
Kushu Ram S/O Shri Amar Chand, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District
Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. August, 2001 without complying the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2001 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 311 days in the year
1996, 345 days in 1997, 352 days in 1998, 279 days in 1999 and 215 ½ days in 2000 who had
completed criteria of 160 days prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and
became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). It is alleged that
respondent had terminated the services of petitioner in November, 1999 and against the illegal
termination, petitioner had filed O.A. bearing no.2876/1999 before the Hon’ble Administrative
Tribunal, Shimla in which Hon’ble Administrative Tribunal had directed the respondents to
reengage the petitioner in same capacity vide order dated 29.11.1999 and thereafter the services of
petitioner were reengaged by the respondent in December, 1999. Averments made in the petition
revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given
by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as
continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section
25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2001 by an oral
order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been
retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified
and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent
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had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the
services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the
department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and
joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2001
when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one
month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had
also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima
facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record
who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at
the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time,
no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has
remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August, 2001 till the date of
institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 2001. He further prayed for
reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 2001 along- with back wages, seniority including
continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between May, 1994 to August, 2001 be counted 160
days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2001
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar
Chand is concerned he was senior to him and other persons as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim
petition were worked with the respondent continuously. On the plea of termination of service of
petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore
serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has
maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in
para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal
Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2001 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after nine years petitioner is
stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance
of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for
charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner
was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
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6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of order of Hon’ble
Administrative Tribunal, H.P., Ex. PW1/C to PW1/M mandays charts of junior workers and closed
evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined
RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1
tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-workers Ex.
RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 07.07.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year
August, 2001 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
OPR
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the
petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2001 at HPPWD Sub Division
Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement
of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was
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passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not
retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 2001. He has also stated on oath that no notice
under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the
same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination
was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and
all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2001. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in
the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for
Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any
specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 119 days in the year 1994, 157.5 days in 1995, 289 days in 1996, 345 days in 1997, 352
days in 1998, 281 days in 1999, 216.5 days in 2000 and 128 days in 2001 and thus a total of his
service in 1994 to 2001 in 8 years he had worked for 1888 days in his entire service period. Be it
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noticed that except 1994, 1995 and 2001 he had worked for more than 160 days as there is no
reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to
confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2001 the petitioner had merely worked for 128 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not
rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one
year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/C, Ex.
PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and
had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/M are the mandays chart
of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of
workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient
work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given
muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2001 even at the time when junior persons
were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G
of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and even
thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which
also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)
SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-
H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 2001, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter
as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
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examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
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its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
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the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
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directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 8
years and actually worked for 1888 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2001 who worked as non skilled worker
and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e.
demand notice was given on 08.08.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above
in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar
Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4
are answered accordingly.
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ISSUE NO.3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 159/2015
Date of Institution : 11.04.2015
Date of Decision : 20.01.2016
Shri Man Dass s/o Shri Hari Chand, r/o Village & P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
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For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Man Dass S/O Shri Hari Chand,
R/O Village & P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated 02-02-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during October,
2003 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Man
Dass S/O Shri Hari Chand, R/O Village & P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
during October, 2003 by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi),
District Chamba, H.P. without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1990 who continuously worked till October, 2003 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2003 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2003 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of October, 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
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India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of October, 2003. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 2003 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between May, 1990 to October, 2003 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of
the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2000 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of
HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State
of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1990 who remained engaged till 2003
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 26 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after nine years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year
October, 2003 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
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2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the
petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1990 who continuously worked till 2003 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach
is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of
terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed
while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched
petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as
per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to
plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the
backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with
a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with
seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1990 to October, 2003. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2003 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
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obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2003. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in
the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for
Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any
specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 51 days in the year 1990, 148 days in 1991, 91 days in 1995, 165 days in 1996, 141
days in 1997, 146 days in 1998, 139 days in 1999, 133 days in 2000, 125 days in 2001, 140 days in
2002 and 127 days in 2003 and thus a total of his service in 1990 to 2005 in 11 years he had
worked for 1406 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except 1991, 1992, 1995 and
1997 to 2003 he had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with
regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year
2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 127 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar
months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to
meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required
from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the
respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
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had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2003 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1990 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in October, 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
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retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
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adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
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19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
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years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about
11 years and actually worked for 1406 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2003 who worked as non skilled worker
and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e.
demand notice was given on 02.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above
in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar
Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
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25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 169/2015
Date of Institution : 11.04.2015
Date of Decision : 20.01.2016
Shri Dharam Singh s/o Shri Raju, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dharam Singh S/O Shri Raju, R/O
Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
vide demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service
during July, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the
services of Shri Dharam Singh S/O Shri Raju, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H.
Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during July, 2005 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved
workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
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2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till July, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of July, 2005 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of July, 2005 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of July, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who
had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of July, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of July,
2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May,
1994 to July, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of
petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in
pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any
other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 26 in
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para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year
July, 2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
7.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
OPR
8.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the
petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
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Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2005 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach
is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of
terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed
while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched
petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as
per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to
plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the
backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with
a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with
seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1994 to July, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice
under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the
same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination
was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and
all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in July, 2005 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
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admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after July, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in
the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for
Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any
specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 164 days in the year 1994, 157 days in 1995, 134 days in 1996, 83 days in 1997, 116
days in 1998, 72 days in 1999, 77 days in 2001, 86 days in 2002, 68 days in 2003, 70 days in 2004
and 30 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2005 in 11 years he had worked for
1057 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except 1995 to 1999 and 2001 to 2005 he
had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,
Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to
alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the
petitioner had merely worked for 30 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months
from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet
requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from
respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the
respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after July, 2005 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
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16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in July, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as
such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative
of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the
petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private
labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner
in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as
well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda
(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice
Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment
wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment
or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,
the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here
that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was
not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he
cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from
agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed
and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the
relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that
petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act
although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment
of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
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has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
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the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about
11 years and actually worked for 1057 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in July, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and
had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e.
demand notice was given on 02.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above
in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
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reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar
Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 170/2015
Date of Institution : 11.04.2015
Date of Decision : 20.01.2016
Shri Hira Lal s/o Shri Thanu Ram, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Hira Lal S/o shri Thanu
Ram, R/O Village Thandal, Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before
the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal
termination of service during September, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not,
Whether termination of the services of Shri Hira Lal S/o Shri Thanu Ram, R/O Village
Thandal, Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,
Killar Division H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during
September, 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division
Sach. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in
each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
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department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,
2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to
petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated
to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under
the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while
retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed
by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner
and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of
September, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of
September, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere
gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to
have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner
prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of
September, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2005
along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May,
1994 to September, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service
of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt.
in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to
any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28.08.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year
September, 2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
9.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?
OPR
10. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the
petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1 2 AND 4
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2005 at
HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any
written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute
that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of
appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s
termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of
reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as
claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from May, 1994 to September, 2005. He has also stated on oath that
no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2005 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2005.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the
respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work
as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in
absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that
respondent had established plea of abandonment.
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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 168 days in the year 1994, 128 days in 1995, 122 days in 1996, 115 days in 1997, 106
days in 1998, 96 days in 1999, 75 days in 2001, 60 days in 2002, 59 days in 2003, 72 days in 2004
and 61 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2005 in 11 years he had worked for
1062 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except 1995 to 2005 he had worked for
more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the
point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal
termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had
merely worked for 61 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month
of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law
of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have
issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2005 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for
back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
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The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
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employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about
11 years and actually worked for 1062 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2005 who worked as non skilled
worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven
years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors
mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be
entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump- sum would be
appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon
by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or
less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of
delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir
Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the
Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015
SC 3473.
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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 175/2015
Date of Institution : 04.04.2015
Date of Decision : 20.01.2016
Shri Chet Ram s/o Shri Bali Ram, r/o Village and P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
….Petitioner
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Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Chet Ram S/O Shri Bali Ram,
R/O Village and P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 27.09.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services .w.e.f.
August, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of
Shri Chet Ram S/O Shri Bali Ram, R/O Village and P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. August, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of September, 1992 who continuously worked till August, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division
Killar. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in
each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of
August, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were
junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department
was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers
working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner
and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been
followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to
petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month
of August, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
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petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August,
2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed
and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed
violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting
aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 2004. He
further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 2004 along-with back wages,
seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of
his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks
given time and again during entire service of petitioner between September, 1992 to August, 2004
be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2001 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief
petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 & 26
in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25
& 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after six years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
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7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year
August, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
OPR
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the
petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 at HPPWD Sub Division
Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement
of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was
passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not
retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
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12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1992 to August, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice
under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the
same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination
was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and
all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2004. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in
the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for
Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any
specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 37 days in the year 1992, 67 days in 1994, 148 days in 1996, 90 days in 1997, 120 days
in 1998, 59 days in 1999, 130 days in 2000, 83 days in 2001, 31 days in 2002, 26 days in 2003 and
78 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1992 to 2004 in 11 years he had worked for 869
days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160
days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial
breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is
evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for
78 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of
petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a
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notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter
as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
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would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
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17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
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I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about
11 years and actually worked for 869 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker
and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e.
demand notice was given on 27.9.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above
in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief
in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized
Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law
that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.
Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment
in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar
Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
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RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No. : 202/2015
Date of Institution : 04.05.2015
Date of Decision : 20.01.2016
Shri Ram Lal s/o Shri Natha Ram, r/o Village Hugal, P.O. Kariyas, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
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“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Ram Lal S/O Shri Natha Ram,
R/O Village Hugal, P.O. Kariyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 08.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during
September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services
of Shri Ram Lal S/O Shri Natha Ram, R/O Village Hugal, P.O. Kariyas, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar,
Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved worker
is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of April, 1997 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 171 days in the year
1997, 207 days in 1998 and 341 days in 2001 who had completed criteria of 160 days prescribed
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service
envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). It is alleged that respondent had terminated the
services of petitioner in November, 1999 and against the illegal termination, petitioner had filed
O.A. bearing no.3523/1999 before the Hon’ble Administrative Tribunal, Shimla in which Hon’ble
Administrative Tribunal had directed the respondents to reengage the petitioner in same capacity
vide order dated 02.8.2000 and thereafter the services of petitioner were reengaged by the
respondent in September, 2000. Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of
petitioner
had
interrupted
by
way
of
intermittent/artificial
breaks
given
by
the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any
reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster
roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is
alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been
circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of
petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the
department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and
joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September,
2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with
one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period
had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was
prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service
record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and
even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the
same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he
has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the
date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was
thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
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of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed
for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between April, 1997 to September, 2004 be counted
160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2005 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after six years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of order dated 2.8.2000 of
Hon’ble Administrative Tribunal, H.P., Ex. PW1/C to PW1/M mandays charts of junior workers
and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent
examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1
tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-workers Ex.
RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28.08.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year
September, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
OPP
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2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
OPR
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the
petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?
OPR
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
:Petition
is
partly
allowed
awarding
compensation
Rs.1,20,000/- per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till September, 2004 at HPPWD Sub
Division Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating
and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1997 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
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obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the
Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the
respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work
as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in
absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that
respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 171 days in the year 1997, 207 days in 1998, 143 days in 1999, 85 days in 2000, 341
days in 2001, 146 days in 2002, 136 days in 2003 and 81 days in 2004 and thus a total of his
service in 1997 to 2004 in 8 years he had worked for 1310 days in his entire service period. Be it
noticed that except 1999, 2000 and 2002 to 2004 he had worked for more than 160 days as there is
no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to
confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 81 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not
rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one
year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/C, Ex.
PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and
had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/M are the mandays chart
of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of
workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient
work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given
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muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior
persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained
whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated
and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for
work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)
SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-
H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
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retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between
workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour
Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.
The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)
of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised
its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union
of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer
retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay
itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay
would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for
any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute
made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to
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adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since
there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the
delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and
it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to
the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that
the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a
matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the
ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the
tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court
may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the
date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the
State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference
by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored
the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award
passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the
Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in
view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and
intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and
harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
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19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of
H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various
judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para
nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation
and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the
Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has
been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an
industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)
before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992
whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six
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years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division
Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not
the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 8
years and actually worked for 1310 days as per mandays chart on record and that the
services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled
worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years
i.e. demand notice was given on 08.08.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned
above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled
either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be
appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon
by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or
less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of
delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir
Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the
Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015
SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees
one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 4 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
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25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
HOME DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2, the 21st March, 2016
No. Home-B-B(15)4/2014.—The Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to create one post
in the cadre of District and Sessions Judge in the pay scale of Rs. 51550-1230-58920-1380-63070
for appointment as Chairman of the H.P. Waqf Tribunal.
By order,
P.C. Dhiman,
Additional Chief Secretary (Home).
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1-
lf{kIr uke A
2- fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lfpr fuf/ esa ls foÙkh; o"kZ 2015&2016 ds fy,
` 21]02]27]31]206 dh vkSj jkf'k tkjh djuk A
3-
fofu;ksx A
vuqlwphA
&&&&&&
2016 dk vf/fu;e la[;kad 1
fgekpy izns'k fofu;ksx vf/fu;e] 2016
(jkT;iky egksn; }kjk rkjh[k 17 ekpZ] 2016 dks ;Fkkvuqeksfnr)
31 ekpZ] 2016 dks lekIr gksus okys foÙkh; o"kZ ds fy, fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls lsokvksa
ds fy, dfri; vkSj èkujkf'k;ksa ds lank; dks izkf/Ñr djus vkSj mudk fofu;ksx djus ds fy, vf/fu;eA
Hkkjr x.kjkT; ds lM+lBosa o"kZ esa fgekpy izns'k fo/ku lHkk }kjk fuEufyf[kr :i esa ;g vf/fu;fer gks%&
1 - laf{kIr uke-&bl vf/fu;e dk laf{kIr uke fgekpy izns'k fofu;ksx vf/fu;e] 2016 gS A
2- fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls foÙkh; o"kZ 2015&2016 ds fy,
`21]02]27]31]206 dh vkSj jkf'k tkjh djuk-&fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls foÙkh; o"kZ
2015&2016 ds fy, ` 21,02,27,31,206 dh vkSj jkf'k tkjh djukA fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls
vuqlwph ds r`rh; LrEHk esa fofufnZ"V ls vuf/d /ujkf'k;ka] ftudk ;ksx dsoy ` 21]02]27]31]206 (nks gtkj
,d lkS nks djksM+ lÙkkbZl yk[k bdrhl gtkj nks lkS Ng #i,) gS] lanÙk vkSj mi;ksftr dh tk,] ftudk foÙkh;
o"kZ 2015&2016 dh vof/ esa vuqlwph ds f}rh; LrEHk esa fofufnZ"V lsokvksa vkSj iz;kstuksa ls lEcfU/r fofHkUu
izHkkjksa dks pqdkus ds fy, mi;ksx fd;k tk,xkA
3- fofu;ksx-&bl vf/fu;e }kjk fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls lanÙk vkSj mi;ksftr fd,
tkus ds fy, izkf/Ñr /ujkf'k;ksa dk bl vfèkfu;e dh /kjk 2 ds v/hu fofufnZ"V vof/ ls lEcfU/r vuqlwph esa
vfHkO;Dr lsokvksa vkSj iz;kstuksa ds fy, vkSj fofu;kstu fd;k tk,xkA
9025
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
vuqlwph
(/kjk 2 vkSj 3 ns[ksa)
ekax
lsok,a vkSj iz;kstu
fuEufyf[kr jkf'k;ksa ls vuf/d
la[;k
fo/ku lHkk }kjk
lafpr fuf/ ij
dqy
nÙker
izHkkfjr
` esa
` esa
` esa
1
2
3
4
5
1 fo/ku lHkk
(jktLo)
1,78,41,000
5,00,000
1,83,41,000
(iwathxr)
7,00,00,000
—
7,00,00,000
2 jkT;iky vkSj eU=kh ifj"kn~
(jktLo)
6,72,18,500
47,41,000
7,19,59,500
3 U;k; iz'kklu
(jktLo)
9,89,94,000
11,000
9,90,05,000
(iwathxr)
10,01,81,000
—
10,01,81,000
4 lkekU; iz'kklu
(jktLo)
22,92,06,000
1,68,57,000
24,60,63,000
(iwathxr)
2,00,00,000
—
2,00,00,000
5 Hkw&jktLo o
(jktLo)
1,21,96,99,000
—
1,21,96,99,000
ftyk iz'kklu
(iwathxr)
1,40,00,000
—
1,40,00,000
6 vkcdkjh vkSj djk/ku
(jktLo)
4,75,60,438
—
4,75,60,438
7 iqfyl vkSj lEc¼ laxBu
(jktLo)
61,20,97,000
1,39,000
61,22,36,000
(iwathxr)
3,000
—
3,000
8 f'k{kk
(jktLo)
66,40,80,000
—
66,40,80,000
(iwathxr)
70,25,60,000
—
70,25,60,000
9 LokLF; ,oa ifjokj dY;k.k
(jktLo)
10,000
—
10,000
(iwathxr)
49,78,65,000
—
49,78,65,000
10 yksd fuekZ.k&lM+dsa] iqy
(jktLo)
52,79,24,000
9,07,000
52,88,31,000
,oa Hkou
(iwathxr)
70,68,91,000
40,55,80,513
1,11,24,71,513
11 d`f"k
(jktLo)
2,000
—
2,000
(iwathxr)
5,00,00,000
—
5,00,00,000
12 m|ku
(jktLo)
5,57,37,335
—
5,57,37,335
(iwathxr)
31,38,98,000
—
31,38,98,000
13 flapkbZ] tykiwfrZ ,oa
(jktLo)
23,74,42,000
—
23,74,42,000
lQkbZ
14 i'kq ikyu] nqX/ fodkl
(iwathxr)
43,00,000
—
43,00,000
,oa eRL;
15 ;kstuk ,oa fiNM+k {ks=k
(jktLo)
14,69,000
—
14,69,000
mi&;kstuk
(iwathxr)
27,72,37,000
—
27,72,37,000
9026
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
16 ou vkSj oU; thou
(jktLo)
5,000
51,416
56,416
(iwathxr)
70,50,000
—
70,50,000
17 fuokZpu
(jktLo)
14,54,62,832
—
14,54,62,832
18 m|ksx] [kfut] vkiwfrZ
(iwathxr)
6,08,22,000
—
6,08,22,000
,oa lwpuk izkS|ksfxdh
19 lkekftd U;k; ,oa
(jktLo)
1,000
17,239
18,239
vf/dkfjrk
20 xzkeh.k fodkl
(jktLo)
7,000
58,96,000
59,03,000
(iwathxr)
4,10,85,000
—
4,10,85,000
21 lgdkfjrk
(jktLo)
10,25,15,000
—
10,25,15,000
22 [kk| vkSj ukxfjd
(jktLo)
2,000
—
2,000
vkiwfrZ
(iwathxr)
54,83,000
—
54,83,000
23 fo|qr fodkl
(jktLo)
5,27,59,68,619
48,32,550
5,28,08,01,169
24 eqnz.k ,oa ys[ku lkexzh
(jktLo)
79,62,983
—
79,62,983
25 lM+d vkSj ty ifjogu
(jktLo)
1,80,77,63,265
—
1,80,77,63,265
26 i;ZVu vkSj ukxj foekuu
(jktLo)
59,78,000
—
59,78,000
(iwathxr)
2,77,07,000
—
2,77,07,000
27 Je] jkstxkj vkSj
(jktLo)
4,000
—
4,000
izf'k{k.k
(iwathxr)
1,000
—
1,000
28 'kgjh fodkl] uxj ,oa
(jktLo)
85,37,26,816
—
85,37,26,816
xzke ;kstuk rFkk vkokl
29 foÙk
(jktLo)
16,000
1,57,86,42,000
1,57,86,58,000
(iwathxr)
1,25,79,16,000
1,25,79,16,000
30 fofo/ lkekU; lsok,a
(jktLo)
4,57,47,000
—
4,57,47,000
(iwathxr)
1,37,84,000
—
1,37,84,000
31 tutkrh; fodkl
(jktLo)
63,33,25,700
—
63,33,25,700
(iwathxr)
5,000
—
5,000
32 vuqlwfpr tkfr
(jktLo)
1,85,08,40,000
—
1,85,08,40,000
mi&;kstuk
(iwathxr)
32,51,63,000
—
32,51,63,000
(jktLo)
14,50,86,05,488
1,61,25,94,205
16,12,11,99,693
(iwathxr)
3,23,80,35,000
1,66,34,96,513
4,90,15,31,513
dqy tksM+
17,74,66,40,488
3,27,60,90,718
21,02,27,31,206
9027
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
AUTHORITATIVE ENGLISH TEXT
THE HIMACHAL PRADESH APPROPRIATION ACT, 2016
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
Sections:
1. Short title.
2. Issue of a further sum of ` 21,02,27,31,206 out of the Consolidated Fund of the State of
Himachal Pradesh for the financial year 2015-2016.
3. Appropriation.
THE SCHEDULE.
___________
Act No. 1 of 2016
THE HIMACHAL PRADESH APPROPRIATION ACT, 2016
(AS ASSENTED TO BY THE GOVERNOR ON 17TH MARCH, 2016)
AN
ACT
to authorise payment and appropriation of certain further sums from and out of the
Consolidated Fund of the State of Himachal Pradesh for the services for the financial year ending
on the 31st day of March, 2016.
BE it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh in the Sixty-seventh Year
of the Republic of India as follows:—
1. Short title.—This Act may be called the Himachal Pradesh Appropriation Act, 2016.
2. Issue of a further sum of `21,02,27,31,206 out of the Consolidated Fund of the
State of Himachal Pradesh for the financial year 2015-2016.—From and out of the
Consolidated Fund of the State of Himachal Pradesh, there may be paid and applied sums not
exceeding those specified in column (3) of the Schedule amounting in the aggregate to the sum of
` 21,02,27,31,206 (Rupees Two Thousand one Hundred and Two crore, twenty seven lakh, thirty
one thousand, two hundred six) only towards defraying the several charges which will come in
course of payment during the financial year 2015-2016 in respect of the services and purposes
specified in column (2) of the Schedule.
3. Appropriation.—The sums authorized to be paid and applied from and out of the
Consolidated Fund of the State of Himachal Pradesh by this Act shall be further appropriated for
the services and purposes expressed in the Schedule in relation to the period specified under section
2 of this Act.
9028
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
THE SCHEDULE
(See sections 2 and 3)
Demand
Services and purposes
Sums not exceeding
No.
Voted by
Charged on the Total
the Legislative Consolidated Fund
Assembly
in `
in `
in `
1
2
3
4
5
1
Vidhan Sabha
(Revenue)
1,78,41,000
5,00,000
1,83,41,000
(Capital)
7,00,00,000
—
7,00,00,000
2
Governor and Council
(Revenue)
6,72,18,500
47,41,000
7,19,59,500
of Ministers
3
Administration of Justice
(Revenue)
9,89,94,000
11,000
9,90,05,000
(Capital)
10,01,81,000
—
10,01,81,000
4
General Administration
(Revenue)
22,92,06,000
1,68,57,000
24,60,63,000
(Capital)
2,00,00,000
—
2,00,00,000
5
Land Revenue and
(Revenue)
1,21,96,99,000
—
1,21,96,99,000
District Administration
(Capital)
1,40,00,000
—
1,40,00,000
6
Excise and Taxation
(Revenue)
4,75,60,438
—
4,75,60,438
7
Police and Allied
(Revenue)
61,20,97,000
1,39,000
61,22,36,000
Organisations
(Capital)
3,000
—
3,000
8
Education
(Revenue)
66,40,80,000
—
66,40,80,000
(Capital)
70,25,60,000
—
70,25,60,000
9
Health and Family
(Revenue)
10,000
—
10,000
Welfare
(Capital)
49,78,65,000
—
49,78,65,000
10
Public Works—Roads,
(Revenue)
52,79,24,000
9,07,000
52,88,31,000
Bridges and Buildings
(Capital)
70,68,91,000
40,55,80,513
1,11,24,71,513
11
Agriculture
(Revenue)
2,000
—
2,000
(Capital)
5,00,00,000
—
5,00,00,000
12
Horticulture
(Revenue)
5,57,37,335
—
5,57,37,335
(Capital)
31,38,98,000
—
31,38,98,000
13
Irrigation, Water Supply
(Revenue)
23,74,42,000
—
23,74,42,000
and Sanitation
14
Animal Husbandry,
(Capital)
43,00,000
—
43,00,000
Dairy Development
and Fisheries
15
Planning and Backward
(Revenue)
14,69,000
—
14,69,000
Area Sub-Plan
(Capital)
27,72,37,000
—
27,72,37,000
16
Forest and Wild Life
(Revenue)
5,000
51,416
56,416
(Capital)
70,50,000
—
70,50,000
17
Election
(Revenue)
14,54,62,832
—
14,54,62,832
18
Industries, Minerals,
(Capital)
6,08,22,000
—
6,08,22,000
Supplies & Information
Technology
9029
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
19
Social Justice and
(Revenue)
1,000
17,239
18,239
Empowerment
20
Rural Development
(Revenue)
7,000
58,96,000
59,03,000
(Capital)
4,10,85,000
—
4,10,85,000
21
Co-operation
(Revenue)
10,25,15,000
—
10,25,15,000
22
Food and Civil Supplies
(Revenue)
2,000
—
2,000
(Capital)
54,83,000
—
54,83,000
23
Power Development
(Revenue)
5,27,59,68,619
48,32,550
5,28,08,01,169
24
Printing and Stationery
(Revenue)
79,62,983
—
79,62,983
25
Road and Water
(Revenue)
1,80,77,63,265
—
1,80,77,63,265
Transport
26
Tourism and Civil
(Revenue)
59,78,000
—
59,78,000
Aviation
(Capital)
2,77,07,000
—
2,77,07,000
27
Labour, Employment
(Revenue)
4,000
—
4,000
and Training
(Capital)
1,000
—
1,000
28
Urban Development,
(Revenue)
85,37,26,816
—
85,37,26,816
Town and Country
Planning and Housing
29
Finance
(Revenue)
16,000
1,57,86,42,000
1,57,86,58,000
(Capital)
—
1,25,79,16,000
1,25,79,16,000
30
Miscellaneous General
(Revenue)
4,57,47,000
—
4,57,47,000
Services
(Capital)
1,37,84,000
—
1,37,84,000
31
Tribal Development
(Revenue)
63,33,25,700
—
63,33,25,700
(Capital)
5,000
—
5,000
32
Scheduled Castes Sub-
(Revenue)
1,85,08,40,000
—
1,85,08,40,000
Plan
(Capital)
32,51,63,000
—
32,51,63,000
Total
(Revenue)
14,50,86,05,488
1,61,25,94,205
16,12,11,99,693
(Capital)
3,23,80,35,000
1,66,34,96,513
4,90,15,31,513
Grand Total
17,74,66,40,488
3,27,60,90,718
21,02,27,31,206
&&&&&&&&
In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rural,
District Mandi, H. P.
In the matter of :—
1.
Shri Deep Kumar s/o Shri Tej Singh, r/o Village Shami, P.O. Brikhmani, Tehsil Balh,
District Mandi, H. P.
2.
Smt. Pooja Devi d/o Shri Dharam Singh, r/o V. P.O. Dudar, Tehsil Sadar, District
Mandi, H.P. (At present wife of Shri Deep Kumar s/o Shri Tej Singh, r/o Village
Shami, P.O. Brikhmani, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.)
. . Applicants.
Versus
General Public
9030
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
Subject.—Application for the registration of Marriage under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act,
1954.
Shri Deep Kumar s/o Shri Tej Singh, r/o Village Shami, P.O. Brikhmani, Tehsil Balh,
District Mandi, H. P. and Smt. Pooja Devi d/o Shri Dharam Singh, r/o V. P.O. Dudar, Tehsil
Sadar, District Mandi, H.P. (At present wife of Shri Deep Kumar s/o Shri Tej Singh, r/o Village
Shami, P.O. Brikhmani, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.) have filed an application along with
affidavits in the court of undersigned under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 that they
have solemnized their marriage on 29-05-2014 according to Hindu rites and customs at their
respective houses and they are living together as husband and wife since then. Hence, their
marriage may be registered under Special Marriage Act, 1954.
Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who
has any objection regarding this marriage, can file the objection personally or in writing before this
court on or before 11-04-2016 after that no objection will be entertained and marriage will be
registered.
Issued today on 9th day of March, 2016 under my hand and seal of the court.
Seal.
Sd/-
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Mandi (Rural), District Mandi.
________
In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rural,
District Mandi, H. P.
In the matter of :—
1.
Shri Dhanjai s/o Shri Nag Raj, r/o V. P.O. Rewalsar, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi,
H. P.
2.
Smt. Ankita Sihna d/o Shri Arun Kumar Sinha, r/o Inderpuri Near Taigor Colony, P.O.
Bettiah, West Champaran, Bihar, India (At present wife of Shri Dhanjai s/o Shri Nag
Raj, r/o V.P.O. Rewalsar, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.)
. . Applicants.
Versus
General Public
Subject.—Application for the registration of Marriage under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act,
1954.
Shri Dhanjai s/o Shri Nag Raj, r/o V. P.O. Rewalsar, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.
and Smt. Ankita Sihna d/o Shri Arun Kumar Sinha, r/o Inderpuri Near Taigor Colony, P.O.
Bettiah, West Champaran, Bihar, India (At present wife of Shri Dhanjai s/o Shri Nag Raj, r/o
V.P.O. Rewalsar, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.) have filed an application along with
affidavits in the court of undersigned under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 that they
have solemnized their marriage on 24-02-2016 according to Hindu rites and customs at
V.P.O.Rewalsar, District Mandi, H. P. and they are living together as husband and wife since then.
Hence, their marriage may be registered under Special Marriage Act, 1954.
9031
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who
has any objection regarding this marriage, can file the objection personally or in writing before this
court on or before 11-04-2016 after that no objection will be entertained and marriage will be
registered.
Issued today on 9th day of March, 2016 under my hand and seal of the court.
Seal.
Sd/-
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Mandi (Rural), District Mandi.
________
In the Court of Shri Gian Sagar Negi, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Shimla (R),
District Shimla (H. P.)
Smt. Meena w/o Shri Tara Chand, r/o Village Panjog, P.O. Mashobra, Tehsil & District
Shimla, Himachal Pradesh.
Versus
General Public
.. Respondent.
Whereas Smt. Meena w/o Shri Tara Chand, r/o Village Panjog, P.O. Mashobra, Tehsil &
District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh has filed an application along with affidavit in the court of
undersigned under Section 13(3) of the Birth & Death Registration Act, 1969 to enter date of birth
of her son named Mr. Divya Thakur s/o Smt. Meena w/o Shri Tara Chand, r/o Village Panjog, P.
O. Mashobra, Tehsil & District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh in the record of Secy., Birth and Death,
Gram Panchayat Dhalli, Shimla.
Sl.
No.
Name of the family member
Relation
Date of birth
1.
Mr. Divya Thakur
Son
21-10-2010
Hence, this proclamation is issued to the general public if they have any objection/claim
regarding entry of the name & date of birth of above named in the record of Gram Panchayat
Dhalli, Shimla may file their claims/objections on or before one month of publication of this notice
in Govt. Gazette in this court, failing which necessary orders will be passed.
Issued today 17-03-2016 under my signature and seal of the court.
Seal.
Sd/-
Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Shimla (R), District Shimla.
9032
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
c vnkyr lgk;d lekgrkZ ¼izFke Js.kh½ rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0
c eqdíek % Jh va'kqy caly iq= Jh vfuy dqekj] fuoklh xzke cSMksu] rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj]
fg0 iz0A
cuke
vke turk
uksfVl cuke vke turk
Jh va'kqy caly iq= Jh vfuy dqekj] fuoklh xzke cSMksu] rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0
us bl vnkyr esa ,d nj[okLr xqtkjh gS fd mldk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj ds
fjdkMZ esa ntZ ugha gSA ftls izkFkhZ vc viuk uke o tUe frfFk mDr xzke iapk;r esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk
gSA ftldh iqf"V gsrq izkFkhZ us vkosnu i= e; gyQkC;ku] lfpo xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj }kjk tkjh izi=
la[;k 10] Ldwy izek.k i= izLrqr fd;k gSA
vr% bl uksfVl }kjk leLr turk xzke cSMksu o izkFkhZ ds leLr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk
gS fd ;fn fdlh dks va'kqy caly iq= vfuy dqekj] fuoklh xzke cSMksu ds uke dks xzke iapk;r [kkyk
D;kj ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djus ckjs mtj o ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 08&04&2016 dks vlkyru o
odkyru gkftj gksdj viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk@ldrh gSA mlds mijkUr dksbZ mtj o ,rjkt
ugha lquk tk,xk vkSj fu;ekuqlkj izkFkZuk&i= dk fuiVkjk dj fn;k tk,xkA
vkt fnukad 09&03&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj ,oa dk;kZy; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]
mi rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr lgk;d lekgrkZ ¼izFke Js.kh½ rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0
c eqdíek % Jh iw.kZ pUn iq= Jh j.kchj flag] fuoklh xzke [kkyk D;kj] rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj]
fg0 iz0A
cuke
vke turk
uksfVl cuke vke turk
Jh iw.kZ pUn iq= Jh j.kchj flag] fuoklh xzke [kkyk D;kj] rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0
us bl vnkyr esa ,d nj[okLr xqtkjh gS fd izkFkhZ ds cPpksa dk uke gfjpUn tUe frfFk 24&04&2012
¼iq=½ o lqeu tUe frfFk 08&07&2013 ¼iq=h½ xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ ugha gSA ftldh
iqf"V gsrq izkFkhZ us vkosnu i= e; gyQkC;ku] lfpo xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj ,oe~ ftyk jftLVªkj] tUe
,oe~ e`R;q ,oe~ eq[; fpfdRlk vf/kdkjh] ukgu] ftyk fljekSj dh larqfr izLrqr dh gSA ftls izkFkhZ vc
vius cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gSA
vr% bl uksfVl }kjk leLr turk xzke [kkyk D;kj o izkFkhZ ds leLr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k
tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh dks mDr izkFkhZ ds cPpksa dk uke gfjpUn tUe frfFk 24&04&2012 ¼iq=½ o lqeu
tUe frfFk 08&07&2013 ¼iq=h½ xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djus ckjs mtj o ,rjkt gks
9033
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
rks og fnukad 11&04&2016 dks vlkyru o odkyru gkftj gksdj viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk@
ldrh gSA mlds mijkUr dksbZ mtj o ,rjkt ugha lquk tk,xk vkSj fu;ekuqlkj izkFkZuk&i= dk fuiVkjk
dj fn;k tk,xkA
vkt fnukad 10&03&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj ,oa dk;kZy; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]
mi rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh dfiy rksej] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼rglhynkj½ jktx<+] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0
Jh czgenr iq= Jh jes'k pUn] fuoklh dksVyh] rglhy jktx<+] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0
cuke
vke turk
mijksDr izkFkZuk i= Jh czgenr iq= Jh jes'k pUn] fuoklh dksVyh] rglhy jktx<+] ftyk
fljekSj] fg0 iz0 us v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e 1969 ds vUrxZr izLrqr djds
izkFkZuk dh gS fd mldh iq=h [kq'kcw o iq= oa'k ftudh tUe frfFk 5&8&2010] 25&2&2012 gS] dk uke
xzke iapk;r fVDdj] rglhy jktx<+] ftyk fljekSj ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ ugha djok;k x;k gSA ftls izkFkhZ
vc ntZ djokuk pkgrk gSA
vr% loZ&lk/kkj.k dks bl bZ'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd bl lEcU/k esa fdlh O;fDr dks
mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks og Lo;a vFkok vius izfrfuf/k }kjk fefr 8&04&2016 dks lqcg nl cts vnkyr
esa mifLFkr vkdj izLrqr djs clwjr nhxj Jh@dq0 [kq'kcw o oa'k dh tUefrfFk dks ntZ djus ds vkns'k
tkjh dj fn;s tkosaxsA
vkt fnukad 5&03&2016 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
dfiy rksej]
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼rglhynkj½]
jktx<+] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&
In the court of Marriage Officer (S.D.M.) Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H. P.
NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT.
Whereas Shri Mukesh Kumar Benjwal s/o Shri Devi Prasad Benjwal, r/o H.No. 258/10,
Devi Nagar, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Jyoti Benjwal d/o Shri Girja Shankar Bhatt,
r/o H.No. 41, Village Saun Bhat Gaon, PO Bawai, Tehsil Rudra Prayag, Uttrakhand have filed an
application for registration of their marriage, which was solemnized on 17-01-2016. I solemnised
my marriage at Dehradun Uttrakhand and they have been living husband and wife ever since then.
9034
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this effect that if anybody has got
any objection regarding the registration of marriage. They should file their written objections and
should appear personally or through their authorised agents before me within the period of 30 days
from the date of issue of this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate would
be issued to the applicant by this court and later on no objection will be heard and accepted.
Issued under my hand and seal.
Seal.
Sd/-
Marriage Officer (S D M),
Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.
____________
In the court of Marriage Officer (S.D.M.) Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H. P.
NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT.
Whereas Shri Tsering Ngodup s/o Shri Bhu Dawa, r/o H.No. 68, TCIS, Village Bhuppur,
Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Yeshi Choedon d/o Late Shri Tsewang, r/o Camp
No. 9, H.No. 11, Tibetan Colony, Mundgod, District Karwar, Karnataka, have filed an application
for registration of their marriage solemnized on 20-03-2002 and they have been living husband and
wife ever since then.
Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this effect that if any body has
objection regarding the registration of marriage duly solemnized on 20-03-2002 between above
said Shri Tsering Ngodup s/o Shri Bhu Dawa and Smt. Yeshi Choedon d/o Late Shri Tsewang
both residents of H.No. 68, TCIS, Vilage Bhuppur, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P.
They should file their written objections or appear personally within the period of 30 days from the
date of issue of this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate would be issued
to the applicants by this court.
Issued my hand and seal of this office.
Seal.
Sd/-
Marriage Officer (S D M),
Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.
____________
U;k;ky; rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
nkok la[;k % ------------@Teh. Una/M. Reg./20…….
Jh jkts'k dqekj iq= Jh tks/kk jke] tkr jktiwr] xkao Maxksyh] Mk0 Maxksyh] rglhy Åuk] ftyk
Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
cuke
vke turk
9035
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
nkok vUrxZr /kkjk 8¼4½ fookg iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1996-
mijksDr eqdíek muoku ckyk esa Jh jkts'k dqekj iq= Jh tks/kk jke] tkr jktiwr] xkao Maxksyh]
Mk0 Maxksyh] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mldk
fookg fnukad 06&08&2005 dks Jherh vUtw ckyk iq=h Jh 'kfDr pUn] tkr jktiwr] xkao U;w oYyk
dyksuh] Mkd?kj /k;kVk ve`rlj] rglhy ve`rlj] ftyk ve`rlj ¼iatkc½ ds lkFk gqvk gSA ysfdu
vKkurk ds dkj.k vius fookg dk bUnzkt LFkkuh; jftLVªkj fookg iathdj.k Maxksyh] rglhy Åuk] ftyk
Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa u djok ldkA
vr% bl lUnHkZ esa vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr of.kZr ds fookg dk bUnzkt
jftLVªkj fookg LFkkuh; iathdj.k Maxksyh] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa ntZ djokus ckjs fdlh
dks ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 05&04&2016 dks bl U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj izLrqr dj ldrk gS]
vU;Fkk blds ckn mDr of.kZr fookg iathdj.k gsrq vkxkeh dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk;sxhA blds ckn
dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 05&03&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&&
U;k;ky; rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
nkok la[;k % ------------@Teh. Una/M. Reg./20…….
Jh jkts'k /kheku iq= Jh ;'kiky /kheku] tkr rj[kku] xkao cgM+kyk] Mk0 cgM+kyk] rglhy Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
cuke
vke turk
nkok vUrxZr /kkjk 8¼4½ fookg iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1996-
mijksDr eqdíek muoku ckyk esa Jh jkts'k /kheku iq= Jh ;'kiky /kheku] tkr rj[kku] xkao
cgM+kyk] Mk0 cgM+kyk] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr fd;k gS
fd mldk fookg fnukad 26&09&2014 dks Jherh veunhi dkSj iq=h Jh vejthr flag] tkr rj[kku]
xkao Mwesokyk] Mkd?kj Nkt] rglhy vkUuniqj lkfgc] ftyk jksiM+ ¼iatkc½ ds lkFk gqvk gSA ysfdu
vKkurk ds dkj.k vius fookg dk bUnzkt LFkkuh; jftLVªkj fookg iathdj.k cgM+kyk] rglhy Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa u djok ldkA
vr% bl lUnHkZ esa vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr of.kZr ds fookg dk bUnzkt
jftLVªkj fookg LFkkuh; iathdj.k cgM+kyk] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa ntZ djokus ckjs fdlh
dks ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 05&04&2016 dks bl U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj izLrqr dj ldrk gS]
9036
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938
vU;Fkk blds ckn mDr of.kZr fookg ds iathdj.k gsrq vkxkeh dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk;sxhA blds ckn
dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 05&03&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
fu;U=d] eqnz.k rFkk ys[ku lkexzh] fgekpy izns'k] f'keyk&5 }kjk eqfnzr rFkk izdkf'kr
bysDVªkWfud gLrk{kfjr jkti=] oSclkbV http://rajpatrahimachal.nic.in ij miyC/k gS ,oe~ vkWuykbu lR;kfir fd;k tk ldrk gS