jkti=] fgekpy izns'k

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lkseokj] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

fgekpy izns'k ljdkj

LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla, the 14th March, 2016

No: Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards) D/Shala.—In exercise of the powers vested under

section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to

order the publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour

Court D/Shala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of

Himachal Pradesh:—

251&jkti=@2016&21&03&2016 ¼8867½

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Sr. No. Ref. No.

Petitioner

Respondent

Date of Award/Order

1.

153/13

Ram Dei

D.F.O. Kullu

07-01-2016

2.

76/14

Man Dass

S.E. I&PH, Sunder Nagar

15-01-2016

3.

106/15

Bindai

I&PH/HPPWD, Killar

15-01-2016

4.

116/15

Devi Chand

I&PH/HPPWD, Killar

15-01-2016

5.

117/15

Om Prakash

I&PH/HPPWD, Killar

15-01-2016

6.

124/15

Devi Singh

I&PH/HPPWD, Killar

15-01-2016

7.

104/15

Uday Chand

I&PH/HPPWD, Killar

15-01-2016

8.

127/15

Lekh Ram

I&PH/HPPWD, Killar

15-01-2016

9.

241/13

Naresh Kumar

D.F.O. Suket

19-01-2016

10.

37/13

Manoj Kumar

M/s Surya Resort

19-01-2016

11.

12/14

Kehar Singh

Pradhan, Anu Co-opt.Agri.

Society

19-01-2016

12

95/15

Devi Singh

HPPWD, Killar

20-01-2016

13

119/15

Kushu Ram

HPPWD, Killar

20-01-2016

14

159/15

Man Dass

HPPWD, Killar

20-01-2016

15

169/15

Dharam Singh

HPPWD, Killar

20-01-2016

16

170/15

Hira Lal

HPPWD, Killar

20-01-2016

17

175/15

Chet Ram

HPPWD, Killar

20-01-2016

18

202/15

Ram Lal

HPPWD, Killar

20-01-2016

By order,

Sd/-

Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.).

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 153/2013

Date of Institution : 09.09.2013

Date of decision : 07.01.2016

Smt. Ram Dei w/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o Village Talogi, P.O. Bari, Tehsil and Distirct

Kullu, H.P.

…Petitioner

Versus

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The Divisional Forest Officer, Kullu Forest Division, District Kullu, H.P.

….Respondent

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Vipul Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Smt. Ram Dei, W/O Shri Puran Chand,

R/O Village Talogi, P.O. Bari, Tehsil and District Kullu, H.P. during 2002 to 2009 and

finally w.e.f. 28-4-2012 by the Divisional Forest Officer, Kullu Forest Division, District

Kullu, H.P. without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal

and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner had filed statement of claim before this court.

3.

Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that the services of petitioner were

engaged by the Forest Department as a daily wage worker w.e.f. January, 1990 and on the date of

institution of claim petition petitioner had been working at Mohal Nursery of the forest

department/respondent where she worked to the entire satisfaction of the respondent from January,

1990 to till date of her termination. It is stated that petitioner had applied to respondent seeking

information regarding her work status and mandays under the Right to Information Act and after

filing of the said application, the respondent had started harassing the petitioner unnecessarily

however the petitioner continuously worked with the respondent sincerely, efficiently and honestly

as before. It is further stated that the information which was sought by the petitioner had not been

supplied to her by the respondent/department. It is stated that the petitioner had completed more

than 240 days of work in the 12 calendar months preceding the date of her retrenchment i..e.

28.4.2012. It is further stated that petitioner had requested to the respondent many times but of no

avail besides the information as sought by the petitioner was provided to her after much delay and

petitioner on receipt of information was shocked to see that the information sought was not

correctly supplied to her. It is further stated that the respondent had malafidely terminated the

services of petitioner in illegal manner and in total violation of law, procedure and principles of

natural justice. It is contended that the services of petitioner were retrenched without following any

procedure as well as assigning any reason, charge-sheet, enquiry and also without any issuing show

cause notice and compensation was not paid to her which is total contravention of the mandatory

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as ‘the Act’ for brevity). It

is categorically stated that petitioner is still unemployed and not gainfully employed anywhere from

the date of her alleged termination and she was entitled for full back wages. It is further stated that

petitioner was a workman and respondent is an industry under the Act. It is also stated that before

termination of the services of petitioner, respondent had not obtained permission for retrenchment

under Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is prayed that the termination of the services

of petitioner w.e.f. 28.4.2012 be set aside and respondent be directed to reinstate the petitioner with

full back wages, continuity in service, seniority and all other consequential service benefits and

litigation expenses.

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4. The respondent contested petition, filed separate reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections qua non-maintainability the petition being hit by the vice of delay and laches and the

petitioner having not approached this court with clean hands and he has concealed true or material

facts from the Court. On merits, engagement of the services of the petitioner from January, 1990 is

admitted. However, the respondent/department had not issued any order to engage the petitioner

but she was engaged as casual labour on seasonal work as per availability of works and funds. It is

stated that the petitioner had left the work of daily wager of her own sweet will. It is further stated

that respondent had not been disengaged the services of petitioner and she had never completed

240 days of work in each calendar year. It is stated that the services of petitioner were engaged as

daily wager with the respondent department during the intervening period from January, 1990 to

April, 2009 as per availability of funds and work and thereafter she had left the work of her own

sweet will without assigning reasons to the respondent/department and never made any request for

reengagement as daily wager till date. It is denied that the petitioner had ever applied for seeking

information regarding her mandays chart from the respondent’s office but the required information

under RTI Act was sought by the petitioner had already been supplied by Assistant PIO, Kullu

office vide letter no.144/k dated 13.7.2009. It is further stated that the services of petitioner were

engaged during the intervening period from January, 1990 to April, 2009 and she never completed

240 days of work from the date of her initial engagement and thus question of termination of the

services of petitioner w.e.f. 28.4.2012 does not arise. Hence, no provisions of the Act had been

violated by the replying respondent. Accordingly, cause of action as pleaded in the claim petition

filed by petitioner is denied and the petition is sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder to reply filed by respondent, reiterated his stand as

maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of letter dated 13.7.2009

regarding information under RTI Act and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri Neeraj Kumar the then Divisional Forest

Officer, Kullu as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, Ex. RW1/B copy of mandays

chart/voucher wise detail of petitioner, Ex. RW1/C copy of letter dated 13.7.2009 which

corresponds to Ex. PW1/B, Ex. RW1/D copy of letter dated 27.4.2012, Ex. RW1/E copy of letter

dated 24.4.2012 regarding information under RTI Act and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8.

As per zimni order dated 12.3.2014, ld. counsel for petitioner states at bar that he

does not press the issue regarding providing fictional breaks in service to the petitioner by the

respondent/department from time to time i.e. from 2002 to the year 2009 since no such

industrial dispute was raised in the demand notice served upon the respondent/department

by the petitioner/workman as such no issue on time to time termination was framed however

from the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on 12.3.2014 for

determination:

1.

Whether the final termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

28-04-2012 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

2.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

3.

Whether the petitioner has concealed the true and material facts from the Court as

alleged? If so, its effect?

OPR

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4.

Whether the petition is hit by the vice of delay and laches as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

5.

Relief.

9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1

: No

Issue No.2

: No

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Petition is dismissed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUE NO. 1

10. At the outset, it is apt to mention here that claimant/petitioner has made inconsistent

pleadings in different paragraphs of the claim petition as in para no. 1, petitioner claims to be

working at Mohal Nursery of H.P. Forest Department and in subsequent para of the same claim

petition she has mentioned that her services have been terminated. However, from the mandays

chart supplied with application for Right to Information Act Ex. PW1/D reveal that petitioner had

been engaged in the year 1990 and she continued to work till the year 2009. It is evident from the

mandays chart that petitioner lastly worked in the month of April, 2009 for about 20 days and 25

and 12 days respectively in the months of January and February, 2009. The case of the petitioner is

that she had completed 240 days in each calendar year and even prior to her termination, she had

completed 240 days who was not issued notice by the respondent and at the same time salary in lieu

of notice had also not been given and for said reason, termination was stated to be illegal under

Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.

11. A bare glance on the mandays chart would further reveal that petitioner had worked

for 57 days in the year 2009 whereas she had worked for 165 days from April, 2008 to December,

2008 and thus in preceding 12 months to her termination she had worked for 222 days meaning

thereby that the petitioner had not completed 240 days of working as is required so as to claim

petition under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Stepping into witness box as PW1

petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC in which she has reiterated

that respondent had illegally and malafidely terminated her service on 28.4.2012 whereupon

petitioner had given demand notice to respondent on 12.6.2012. In cross-examination she has

subsequently admitted that she had not worked after April, 2009 and later improved stating of her

own that she had worked upto April, 2012 but testimony does not show the period when she

worked last with the respondent. As noted above, petitioner is shown to have worked with the

respondent till April, 2009 and statement of petitioner showing that she had worked till April, 2012

is not substantiated from any corresponding documents and evidence on record that petitioner had

actually worked till 28.4.2012. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent Shri Neeraj Kumar, the then Divisional Forest Officer, Kullu Forest Division has denied

the allegations of termination of petitioner on 28.4.2012 rather he has emphasized that petitioner as

per record available worked till 2009. Nothing has come in the cross-examination of ld. counsel for

petitioner by which it could be established that petitioner had factually worked till 28th April,

2012. Enough has been emphasized, ld counsel for the petitioner that RW1 Shri Neeraj Kumar had

admitted that he had not brought record from the year 2010 to 2012. Close scrutiny of testimony of

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RW1 revealed that he had brought the relevant mandays chart for the year 1990 to 2009 which

were asked to be produced. As such, per statement of RW1 which has remained unsheltered instead

claim of petitioner to remain engaged with respondent after April, 2009 to April, 2012 gets belied

as oral as well as documentary evidence on record led by the petitioner as well as by the respondent

establishes that petitioner had worked till April, 2009 as noted above however petitioner had not

worked for 240 days rather only for 222 days in preceding her date of termination. Accordingly, it

is to be held that respondent was not required to issue any notice under Section 25-F of the

Industrial Disputes Act.

12. In so far as the plea of forest nursery work in the forest department being seasonal

in nature is concerned and at the same time the plea of respondent that petitioner herself abandoned

the job seems to be futile attempt on the part of the respondent to testify retrenchment of petitioner

in the garb of work being seasonal in nature or that petitioner was not required to be given notice as

she did not complete requisite number of days while working with the respondent. It is settled law

that plea of abandonment has to be proved like any other fact by the respondent. There is no iota of

evidence on record establishing that respondent on absence of petitioner had factually recoursed to

issuance of registered legal notice or charge sheet. As such, the plea of abandonment has to be

rejected outright. Similarly, petitioner being employed in seasonal work is not substantiated from

any notification of the Government which would show that work in nursery in the forest

department was purely in seasonal in nature. Otherwise also from mandays chart relied upon by the

respondent, it is evident that in the year 1990 petitioner herself had worked for 236 days and as

such it would be unsafe to hold that petitioner had given seasonal assignment rather plea seems to

have been raised with the object to escape liability. In view of foregoing discussions, petitioner is

held to have not proved by reliable oral evidence as well documentary under the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, retrenchment of petitioner by the

respondent finally w.e.f. 28.4.2012 could not be stated to be illegal and unjustified. Issue in hand is

answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.2

13. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that

present claim petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of her own and

did not join her duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of

the parties and evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition

being not maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the

issue in hand is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO.3

14. It is not shown by the respondent as to what facts have been withheld by the petitioner

from the court. Neither any evidence has been led nor any submissions have been made in this

behalf by the respondent. Hence, this issue is also decided against the respondent and in favour of

the petitioner.

ISSUE NO.4

15. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent/department has contended with vehemence that

claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on April, 2012 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

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H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act. It was observed that the relief under Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. It has been contended that delay if any raised by employer is required to be proved

as a matter of fact and that no reference made by appropriate government can be questioned on the

ground of delay alone. In the case in hand, respondent department has failed to prove on record any

material by which it could be stated that there was inordinate delay which has remained

unexplained due to which any prejudice had been caused to the respondent rather petitioner in his

evidence has highlighted and proved material facts establishing that on account of conciliation

proceeding before authority under Act, industrial dispute was not raised by petitioner immediately

or earlier on retrenchment and finally raised when his services were illegally terminated. Thus, the

petition filed by petitioner cannot be stated to be bad on vice of delay and laches. Issue in question

thus is accordingly answered in negative against respondent and in favour of petitioner.

RELIEF

16. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the instant claim petition is dismissed.

In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

17. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

18. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

19. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 7th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 76/2014

Date of Institution : 24.02.2014

Date of Decision : 15.01.2016

Shri Man Dass s/o Shri Sita Ram, r/o Village Kanda Guard, P.O. Barindi, Tehsil Karsog,

Distt. Mandi, H.P.

.…Petitioner

Versus

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1.

The Superintending Engineer, Irrigation & Public Health Circle, Sunder Nagar, Distt.

Mandi, H.P.

2.

The Executive Engineer, Irrigation & Public Health Division, Karsog, Distt. Mandi,

H.P.

….Respondents

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent(s) : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether Sh. Man Dass S/O Sh. Sita Ram, R/O Village Kanda Guard, P.O. Barindi, Tehsil

Karsog, Distt. Mandi, H.P. is eligible for regularization on the post of beldar as per policy

of the Government, of H.P. after granting him relaxation in minimum educational

qualification by the i) The Superintending Engineer, Irrigation & Public Health Circle,

Sundar Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P. & ii) The Executive Engineer, Irrigation and Public

Health Division, Karsog, Distt. Mandi, H.P.? If yes, what are his entitlements to relief like

back wages, seniority and other consequential service benefits?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the present claim petition reveal that petitioner

claimant/petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar on 21.4.1987 whose services had been

illegally terminated on 21.7.1989 for which he raised industrial dispute regarding his reengagement

vide reference no.2 of 2001 Presiding Judge, Labour Court, Shimla had passed award and vide

which he was directed to be reinstated. The case of the petitioner remains that he continuously

remained in service from 1987 to 2013 but his seniority has been ignored and about 50 workers

were junior to him have been regularized. The claimant/petitioner had raised industrial dispute

before the Labour Inspector Circle Sundar Nagar on 1.12.2011 consequent upon which the

reference has been received to this court in which the petitioner has alleged that his regularization

in service has been delayed by the respondents. The petitioner has also claimed that he had

completed 8 years of service but he had not been regularized which was unfair labour practice and

thus petitioner claims that his regularization be made w.e.f. 1st January, 2009 instead of 19.2.2014

as has been done by the respondent.

4.

The respondents no.1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken

preliminary objections of maintainability and delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner

had been engaged with the department w.e.f. 21.4.1987 to 20.4.1989 however denied that petitioner

was disengaged from 21.4.1989. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job after April, 1989

without any intimation and thereafter he had worked continuously 240 days from calendar year

2001 till his regularization on 19.2.2014. Vide award no. 2/2001 passed by the Labour Court

Shimla, the petitioner has been granted seniority w.e.f. 19.1.2001 and had completed eight years of

service on 31.12.2008 but he could not be regularized as he did not fulfill the eligibility criteria as

per R&P Rules petitioner did not possess minimum qualification on date when regularization

process was considered. It is alleged that petitioner had been considered for regularization as per

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latest policy of the government from prospective date and regularized on 19.2.2014 and relaxation

of R&P Rules however only those persons whose named have been mentioned in the claim petition

were regularized as they had fulfilled the criteria of regularization as per R&P Rules and policy of

the State government. Merely, it is asserted that petitioner was although not regularized when initial

service of 8 years had been completed in the year 2008 in pursuance to order of Labour Court,

Shimla but thereafter he joined in service and continued to work till 19.1.2001 for more than 240

days in each calendar year but qualification of passing 5th standard was relaxed in view of policy

adopted by the government on 19.2.2014. As such, the petitioner is stated to have been rightly

regularized when he fulfilled criteria of qualification which was relaxed in the year 2014 and thus

respondent claims to have not violated any provisions of Industrial Disputes Act or recoursed to

any unfair labour practice as alleged by the petitioner. Accordingly, petition was sought to be

dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It

is contended that rules of recruitment and promotion which have not been adhered to by the

respondent.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of letter dated 18.1.2012,

copy of letter dated 12.4.2013 Ex. PW1/C, certified copy of judgment dated 23.11.2012 Ex. PW1/D

and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent

examined RW1 Shri Lekh Ram Chaudhary, the then Superintending Engineer, I&PH Circle

Sundarnagar, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B

mandays chart, list of daily wage workers Ex. RW1/C, copy of letter dated 1.1.2014 Ex. RW1/D,

Ex. RW1/E copy of letter dated 7.12.2013, Ex. RW1/F copy of proceedings dated 28.1.2014 Ex.

RW1/F and closed evidence.

7.

I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on

11.11.2014 for determination:

(1) Whether the petitioner is eligible for regularization on the post of beldar as per policy

of the Government of H.P. after granting him relaxation in minimum educational

qualification by the respondent is illegal and unjustified as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPP

(2) Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

(3) Whether the petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

(4) Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: No

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: No

Relief

: Petition is dismissed per operative part of the Award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUE NO.1

10. The grievance of the petitioner can be gathered from his pleadings and evidence

remains that petitioner should have been regularized from 1.1.2009 and his regularization vide

order dated 19.2.2014 was not correct as his juniors were regularized who have not been considered

for promotion earlier.

11. Stepping into witness box, petitioner has reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim

petition in which he has alleged about allegation of ignoring his seniority and regularization of 50

workers were junior to him. The case of respondent, on the other hand, remains that petitioner was

not qualified for regularization. He has not possessed minimum qualification of 5th standard. Thus,

the bone of contention remains with regards period when petitioner was factually eligible and if he

was regularized in 2014 the same of the contravention of any provisions of law.

12. Cross-examination of the petitioner revealed that even on the date of examination on

oath before this court on 1.7.2015, he had not passed 5th standard. Significantly, he has admitted in

cross-examination that those persons who were working with him were regularized as they

possessed minimum education qualification which is required. In so far as the previous service of

the petitioner from 21.4.1987 to 20.4.1989 is concerned, respondent in their reply have admitted

that petitioner had worked during these period and even after passing of award in reference

no.2/2001 of Labour Court, Shimla he had been given seniority. Be it noticed that petitioner has not

produced on record qua notification dated 19.2.2014 however he has challenged the action of

respondent not regularizing his service on the ground that even earlier policy of government he did

not present minimum qualification. It is not the case of petitioner that policy for regularization of

qualification was available when he completed 8 years of service rather petitioner had completed

minimum 8 years of service with 240 days working in each calendar year along-with exemption in

qualification when notification of February, 2014 took place although respondents have not

disputed regularization of 50 workers junior to the petitioner yet this would not help petitioner in

any manner. The petitioner himself in his cross-examination has admitted that the persons who

were regularized earlier possessed minimum qualification as well as requisite years of service.

Issue no.1 is answered in negative holding that regularization of petitioner on the post of beldar as

per policy of the State Govt. after granting relaxation in minimum qualification by the respondents

could not be stated illegal and unjustified rather petitioner has been regularized when he was

exempted from minimum education qualification and possessed requisite number of working

days/years. Issue no.1 is accordingly answered in negative.

ISSUE NO.2

13. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing for State contended with vehemence that claim petition is not

maintainable. In support of his contention he has pointed through reply and evidence on record that

petitioner was not eligible to be considered for regularization till he possessed minimum

qualification or till the contention for minimum qualification was exempted. That being so, the

previous regularization process began petitioner had failed to produce any record by which it could

be stated that petitioner was legally declined for being regularized in service rather he did not

possess minimum education qualification as per policy of the government but the same was made

in the year 2014. As such, issue in had is decided in favour of respondents and against the

petitioner.

ISSUE NO.3

14. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent State has contended with vehemence that the claim petition

is bad on account of delay and laches. It is observed from the pleadings and evidence on record that

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petitioner was working with the respondents/department even on the date of disposal of claim

petition He has admitted that due to relaxation in his qualification he had been regularized. Since,

the petitioner was not eligible to be considered for regularization prior to 2014, the claim petition

could not be stated to be dime barred. Moreso, when petitioner had invoked remedy of seeking

relief by raising industrial dispute and consequent upon industrial dispute raised and filed claim

petition. Thus, there is no delay in filing the claim petition as the petitioner learnt about his

regularization only in the year February, 2014 when notification took place and thereafter he raised

the industrial dispute and matter was sent to Labour Court for adjudication. Hence, this issue is

answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against the respondents.

RELIEF

15. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the instant claim petition is dismissed.

In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

16. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

17. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

18. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 106/2015

Date of Institution : 09.03.2015

Date of Decision : 15.01.2016

Smt. Bindai w/o Shri Teg Ram, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D, Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Bindai W/O Shri Teg Ram, R/O

Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 26-06-2011 regarding her alleged illegal termination of service during October,

2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Smt.

Bindai W/O Shri Teg Ram, R/O Village Shoon, P.O.Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. during October, 2005 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of September, 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division,

Sach. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in

each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October,

2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to

petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated

to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under

the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while

retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed

by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner

and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October,

2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with

one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period

had also not been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima

facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record

who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at

the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time,

no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has

remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date

of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along- with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal

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termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between July, 1995 to October, 2005 be counted 160

days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1995 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar

Chand is concerned he was senior to her and other persons as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim

petition were worked with the respondent continuously. On the plea of termination of service of

petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore

serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has

maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in

para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal

Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 she

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is

stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance

of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for

charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner

was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior

workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division

Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-

workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted

on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 26.6.2011

qua her termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers from the

vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

OPP

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2.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,

2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of September, 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2005 at

HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any

written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute

that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own

and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of

appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s

termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner

requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of

reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as

claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from July, 1995 to 2005. She has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

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the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the

respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work

as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in

absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that

respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 70 days in the year 1995, 56 days in 1996, 133 days in 1997, 154 days in 1998, 103.5

days in 1999, 129 days in 2000, 101 days in 2001, 141.5 days in 2002, 133 days in 2003, 106 days

in 2004 and 28 days in 2005 and thus a total of her service in 1995 to 2005 in 11 years she had

worked for 1155 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for

more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the

point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had

merely worked for 28 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month

of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law

of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have

issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not

violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

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mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1995 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2005, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning

from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

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between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

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down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the

demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal

from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which she approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

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between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

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been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment

ofcompensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

11 years and actually worked for 1155 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e.

demand notice was given on 26.6.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above

in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

one lac only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are

answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

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24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 116/2015

Date of Institution : 13.03.2015

Date of Decision : 15.01.2016

Shri Devi Chand s/o Shri Chet Ram, r/o Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner:

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent:

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Chand S/O Shri Chet Ram,

R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated

19.10.2009 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. October, 2005 suffers

from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Devi Chand S/O

Shri Chet Ram, R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P. by

the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, District Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. October,

2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

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2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of April/May, 2002 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division

Sach. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in

each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of

October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were

junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department

was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers

working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner

and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been

followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to

petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month

of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October,

2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting

aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with back wages,

seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of

his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between April/May, 2002 to October, 2005

be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2010 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 2000 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

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denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar

Chand, Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Amar Nath and Shri Karam Dev s/o Shri Lala Ram are concerned

they were senior to him and other persons as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim petition were

worked with the respondent continuously. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner,

respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of

notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that

petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated

to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as

haraness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have

definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be

agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the

services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or

wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or

issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist

and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/E mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D7 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted

on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

19.10.2009 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

OPP

2.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,

2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

Relief.

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9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.50,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of April/May, 2000 who continuously worked till October, 2005 at

HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any

written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute

that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of

appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s

termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner

requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of

reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as

claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged in 2000 to 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under

Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same

time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was

illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all

the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

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13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in

the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for

Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 71 days in the year 2000, 79 days in 2004 and 75 days in 2005 and thus a total of his

service in 2000 to 2005 in 3 years he had worked for 223 days in his entire service period. Be it

noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the

Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings

only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in

the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 75 days and thus immediately in preceding 12

calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days

so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all

required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,

the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 2000 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D7. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D7 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative of

petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner

who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus,

plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as

he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda

(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he

cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed

and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the

relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that

petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment

of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

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has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D. Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 3

years and actually worked for 225 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services

of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had

raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about four years i.e. demand

notice was given on 19.10.2009. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

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that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees

fifty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are

answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 117/2015

Date of Institution: 13.03.2015

Date of Decision : 15.01.2016

Shri Om Prakash s/o Shri Moti Chand, r/o Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Om Prakash S/O Shri Moti Chand

R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated

08.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. October, 2005 suffers

from vice of delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Om

Prakash S/O Shri Moti Chand R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba,

H.P. w.e.f. October, 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of April, 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

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petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between April, 1997 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2005 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar

Chand, Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Hari Ram are concerned they were senior to him and other persons

as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim petition were worked with the respondent continuously. On

the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had

left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet

will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if

petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute

immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on

account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been

terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise

and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner

after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and

was thus not entitled for back wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted

on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

08.08.2010 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

OPP

2.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,

2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10.

All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11.

Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of April, 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 at

HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any

written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute

that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of

appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s

termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner

requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of

reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as

claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged in 1997 to 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under

Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same

time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was

illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all

the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in

the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for

Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 155 days in the year 1997, 155.5 days in 1998, 102 days in 1999, 59 days in 2000, 74.5

days in 2001, 30.5 days in 2002, 70 days in 2003, 74 days in 2004 and 82 days in 2005 and thus a

total of his service in 1997 to 2005 in 9 years he had worked for 802.5 days in his entire service

period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 75 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 2000 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as

such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

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The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule

to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act

and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to

be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a

merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the

delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing

with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back

wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his

illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of

full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the

case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of

his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in

adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after

his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation

officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for

adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the

respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on

which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the

respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was

a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to

the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its

reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour

Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred

to supra. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by

both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by

dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining

the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the

public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

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the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 9

years and actually worked for 802.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about five years i.e.

demand notice was given on 8.8.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above

in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

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compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1

to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 124/2015

Date of Institution : 18.03.2015

Date of Decision : 15.01.2016

Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Devi Lal, r/o Village Chasak, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

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Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial disputes raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh S/O Shri Devi Lal,

R/O Village Chasak, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 22- 04-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of

Shri Devi Singh S/O Shri Devi Lal, R/O Village Chasak, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division,

Killar, Tehsil Pangi District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

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for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between May, 1991 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State

of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

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7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted

on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

22.04.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

OPP

2.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,

2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of May, 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 at

HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any

written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute

that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of

appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s

termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner

requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of

reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as

claimed by him.

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12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged in 1991 to 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice under

Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same

time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was

illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all

the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same

merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it

could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1

specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

October, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part

of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling

upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as

abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as

PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete

160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the

Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe

to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked

for 86 days in the year 1991, 53 days in 1992, 73.5 days in 1993, 17 days in 1993, 60 days in 1997,

53 days in 1998, 23 days in 2000, 72.5 days in 2001, 95 days in 2002, 96 days in 2003 and 74 days

in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1991 to 2004 in 11 years he had worked for 703 days in his

entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as

there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this

court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 74 days and

thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of

one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

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Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1991 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative of

petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner

who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus,

plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as

he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda

(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment

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wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he

cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed

and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the

relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that

petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment

of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

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17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

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I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

11 years and actually worked for 703 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e.

demand notice was given on 22.4.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above

in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1

to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

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RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 104/2015

Date of Institution : 04.03.2015

Date of Decision : 15.01.2016

Shri Uday Chand s/o Shri Jagdev, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

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“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Uday Chand S/O Shri Jagdev,

R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated

18.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during year, 1995 suffers

from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Uday Chand S/O

Shri Jagdev, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by

the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. during year

1995 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of March, 1989 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between March, 1989 to November, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and

regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.1999 having completed 10 years of service

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and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj

Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till 1995

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1995 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted

on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 18.8.2010

qua his termination of service during the year 1995 by respondent suffers from the vice

of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

OPP

2.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

1995 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

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3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.50,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis who continuously worked till the year 1995 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not

in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and

conditions by the respondent. At the same time it is also not disputed that no written order was

passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own worked intermittently as

per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1991 to 1995. He has also stated on oath that no notice under

Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same

time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was

illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all

the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1991 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

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no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 1995. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in

the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for

Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 76 days in the year 1991, 96 days in 1992, 24 days in 1993, 44 days in 1994 and 33

days in 1995 and thus a total of his service in 1991 to 1995 in 5 years he had worked for 273 days

in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and

as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this

court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1995 the petitioner had merely worked for 33 days and

thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of

one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 1995 even at the time when junior

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persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1991 was terminated

and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for

work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)

SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-

H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in 1995, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative of

petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner

who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus,

plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as

he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda

(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he

cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed

and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the

relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that

petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment

of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

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18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

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acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

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pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1995 and the industrial dispute was

raised after about five years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for

the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

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Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court, factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5

years who had actually worked for 273 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

petitioner was disengaged in 1995 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fifteen years i.e. demand notice

was given on 18.8.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement

or for full back wages but lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of

judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees

fifty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are

answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

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26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 127/2015

Date of Institution : 18.03.2015

Date of Decision: 15.01.2016

Shri Lekh Ram s/o Shri Mangat Ram, r/o VPO Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi) Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Lekh Ram S/O Shri Mangat Ram,

R/O V.P.O. Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer,

H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated

18-08-2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during October 2005 suffers

from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Lekh Ram S/O

Shri Mangat Ram, R/O V.P.O. Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

October, 2005 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

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3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of July, 1993 who continuously worked till October, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between July, 1993 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1993 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

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thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed 7.7.2015 but were recasted

on 27.11.2015 for determination which are as under:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 18.8.2010

qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers from the

vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

OPP

2.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during October,

2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

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Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of July, 1993 who continuously worked till October, 2005 at

HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any

written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute

that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of

appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s

termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner

requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of

reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as

claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from July, 1993 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the

Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

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admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in

the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for

Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 42 days in the year 1993, 112 days in 1994, 151 days in 1995, 161.5 days in 1996, 186

days in 1997, 159 days in 1998, 173 days in 1999, 89 days in 2000, 113 days in 2001, 121.5 days in

2002, 114.5 days in 2003, 75 days in 2004 and 84 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in

1992 to 2005 in 13 years he had worked for 1581.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed

that except 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998 and 2000 to 2005 he had worked for more than 160 days and as

there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this

court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 84 days and

thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of

one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1993 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

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has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the

relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the

Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to

exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to

either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in

the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly

exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute

to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court

in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

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the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

13 years and actually worked for 1581.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e.

demand notice was given on 18.8.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above

in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

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reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump- sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are

answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 15th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 241/2013

Date of Institution : 09.12.2013

Date of decision : 19.01.2016

Shri Naresh Kumar s/o Shri Lilidhar, r/o Village Sarihani, P.O. Behli, Sub Tehsil Nihri,

District Mandi, H.P.

…Petitioner

Versus

The Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Naresh Kumar, S/O Shri Lilidhar,

R/O Village Sarihani, P.O. Behli, Sub Tehsil Nihri, District Mandi, H.P. by The Divisional

Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. during year 2008

to 2012, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner above named had been

appointed as daily waged beldar by the respondent on 1st June, 2000 under Kangoo Forest Range.

It is contended that petitioner had worked from 2000 to 2007 and in the year 2000 he worked for 55

days, 15 days in 2001, 115 days in 2005, 10 days in 2006. It is further alleged that

respondent/department had given fictional breaks to the petitioner w.e.f. 2008 to 2012 wherein he

had worked for 183 days in 2008, 285 days in 2009, 195 days in 2010, 116 days in 2011 and 140

days in 2012 and thereafter petitioner had raised industrial dispute before the Labour Inspector,

Circle Sundar Nagar and now the case was pending before this Court. It is further alleged that

the respondent had not made seniority as per rule which is unfair labour practice under the

provisions of Certified Standing Orders, 1946. It is stated that respondent/department had not

complied the settlement which had been done between the parties on 15.9.2003 besides respondent

had retained juniors to the petitioner although 24 workers had been regularized by the respondent

but the petitioner was ignored for the same and not followed the principal of ‘Last come, First go’

as such the respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-F(a), 25-F(b), 25-G and 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act which was also unfair labour practice. Accordingly, the petitioner has

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prayed for the benefit of seniority as well as consequential service benefits for the period of break

in service.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits,

admitted that petitioner was initially engaged in forest department in June, 2000 to carryout the

seasonal forestry works and as such worked upto March, 2014. It is claimed that petitioner is still

continuing to work intermittently with the department as per availability of work and funds. It is

stated that the petitioner had presented his case before the Conciliation Officer, Sunder Nagar is not

in dispute. Asserted that the services of petitioner were engaged as intermittent worker and no

fictional breaks had been give to him.. Thus, it is stated that the respondent had provided work to

petitioner as and when petitioner reported for duty. It is also stated that the services of only those

persons had been regularized who have completed 8 years of continuous service with minimum of

240 days in each calendar year per their seniority and no juniors to the petitioner had been

regularized. It is contended that petitioner had not completed 240 days in any calendar year except

2009 and no fictional breaks had been given to the petitioner and the respondent/department had

not violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is further stated that the respondent

had adhered the principle of ‘First Come, Last go’ and no fictional breaks had been provided to the

petitioner but petitioner had left the forestry work of his own sweet will. Thus, petitioner is stated

to be not entitled to any relief. Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition

and contentions raised by the respondent had been denied by petitioner.

6.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B is the conciliation letter dated

15.9.2003, copy of letter dated 24.4.2013 Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list and closed

evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined

Dr. L.C. Bandana, the then Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division as RW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, Ex. RW1/B is the mandays chart and closed evidence.

7.

I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on

10.11.2014 for determination:

1. Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent is

illegal and unjustified as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPP

2. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPP

3. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged. If so, its

effect?

OPR

4. Relief.

9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: No

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Issue No.3

: No

Relief

: Petition is allowed in part per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUE NO. 1

10. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A

under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein the manner in which he was engaged and continued

to work uninterruptedly under the supervision of Range Officer, Kangoo upto 2012. He has

specifically deposed on oath that from the year 2008 to 2012, his services had been engaged and

disengaged by the respondent/department by giving fictional breaks to petitioner besides

maintained that the fictional breaks had been given by respondent with the object that petitioner did

not complete 240 days of work for the purpose of continuous service and that due to these fictional

breaks from 2008 till 2012, petitioner could not complete 240 days besides denied that petitioner

had not worked for 2002, 2003 and 2007 although admitted that petitioner had worked after 2012

with the respondent. Be it noticed that in cross-examination petitioner has denied that the

respondent had not kept any junior to him.

11. Ex. RW1/B is mandays chart of petitioner reflecting that he had been appointed in the

month of June, 2000. The contents of said document revealed abstract of working mandays

showing that petitioner to have worked for 55 days in the year, 2000, 14 days in 2001, 115 days in

2005, 10 days in 2006, 183 days in 2008, 285 days in 2009, 195 days in 2010, 116 days in 2011,

140 days in 2012 and 150 days in 2013. Be it stated that petitioner has admitted that

department/respondent had regularized the services of only those workers who had completed 240

days or more but the case of petitioner primarily remains that he had been given fictional breaks

and that co-workers who were junior to him were retained whereas he was not issued muster roll

for whole month. It would, therefore, apt to scrutinize entire evidence so as to determine if fictional

breaks had been given with the object that petitioner did not complete 240 days in a given year and

thus could not avail benefit of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act.

12. It is the admitted case of the parties that services of petitioner were engaged as daily

wager by respondent in the month of June, 2000 as claimed by him in statement of claim. This facts

find support from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B. Be it noticed that the respondent has not

placed/exhibited or filed any document establishing that the services of petitioner were engaged for

undertaking forestry works only. Otherwise also, the mandays chart referred to above unfolds the

fact that petitioner had worked for 55 days in the year, 2000, 14 days in 2001, 115 days in 2005, 10

days in 2006, 183 days in 2008, 285 days in 2009, 195 days in 2010, 116 days in 2011, 140 days in

2012 and 150 days in 2013 and therefore when petitioner had served respondent for more than 150

days in several calendar years as per mandays chart it could not be construed that petitioner was a

seasonal worker instead the plea so raised by respondent manifestly establishes that in order to

escape liability, plea of forestry work being seasonal in nature has been taken. It is nowhere in

evidence of respondent that forest department has been declared as seasonal work so far as required

under the law.

13. It is settled principle of law that plea of ‘abandonment’ has to be proved like any

other fact by respondent/department. Simply because workman fails to report for duty

intermittently cannot be construed to mean that concerned workman has abandoned the job. There

is no iota of evidence on record establishing that any notice was ever issued or served to petitioner

by respondent when he had absented from duty calling upon him to resume duty or explain the

cause for his unauthorized absence as absence from duty is serious misconduct requiring initiation

of departmental proceedings before taking any action against workman Again there is no iota of

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evidence showing that the respondent had initiated any action in the absence of petitioner from

duty. It is evident from record that no explanation of petitioner was called even no show cause

notice was issued by respondent qua absence of petitioner from duty from time to time when he

absented as per the mandays referred to above. Thus, the plea of abandonment or absence from

duty put forth by the respondent also merits rejection being devoid of merits.

14. It has also come in the evidence that muster roll had not been issued for whole month

in a year. Even in some months muster rolls were not at all issued. No muster roll was issued as

petitioner is shown to have not been given any work however it is evident from the mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that petitioner was engaged and disengaged whimsically in arbitrary manner without

cogent reason and that no letter or notice whatsoever had been issued qua non attendance and as

such the plea of petitioner for having been given fictional breaks cannot be disbelieved. In view of

foregoing evidence on record, it can be safely concluded that artificial/fictional breaks in service

was provided to petitioner by respondent from 2008 to 2012 which is an unfair labour practice

within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and the break period has to be counted for the

purposes of “continuous service” envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act.

15. Another aspect of the case which cannot be lost sight while appreciating evidence on

record is that junior workmen were allowed to be retained and that petitioner was disengaged

arbitrarily while giving fictional breaks by respondent in violation of Section 25-G of the Act. It is

evident from the seniority list that after engagement of petitioner in the year 2000 about 80 workers

who were junior to him had been engaged from 2000 to 2002 and 24 of them have been regularized

which goes to show that these 24 workers had not been given any break in their service. Thus when

petitioner who was senior to these junior workers had given fictional breaks, the action of the

respondent primarily reflects arbitrariness and whimsical manner and picking few workmen for

work and is ignored. It has been contended by the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner that

break given during 2008 to 2012 was deliberate on the part of respondent with the object that

petitioner did not completed 240 days entitled him benefit of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act and manifestly in the nature of fictional breaks. Significantly, conciliation was

entered into between union and the Divisional Forest Officer as is evident from Ex. P1 dated

15.9.2003 on the file. This document further strengthens the plea of petitioner in as much that

temporary seniority list of daily wagers would be prepared within one month and if any defect was

found it will be rectified within a period of one month besides those temporary workers who have

been illegally removed from service would be retained in service. Since petitioner was engaged and

disengaged primarily the action of respondent also is not consonance with undertaking given before

conciliation officer by the Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division Sundar Nagar as is

evident from Ex. P1. In view of foregoing evidence on record it can be safely concluded that

artificial/fictional breaks in service was provided to petitioner by respondent from 2008 to 2012 is

primarily an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and the break

period has to be counted for the purposes of “continuous service” envisaged under Section 25-B of

the Act. Ld. AR for the petitioner has contended that for applicability of Section 25-G of the Act, it

is not necessary that the petitioner should have worked for 240 days atleast in a calendar year as has

also been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996

(5) SCC 419. That being so, the relief sought for by petitioner is liable to be granted in view of

violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act by respondent. Thus, petitioner/claimant has

succeeded in establishing that fictional breaks had been given to petitioner illegally by respondent

due to which he could not complete 240 days in any calendar year more-so when respondent had

failed to prove allegation of abandonment as stated above. It is accordingly held that respondent

had given fictional breaks from time to time to the petitioner as stated above which is illegal and

unjustified as has come in the evidence. As the petitioner herself has not discharged initial onus qua

remaining unemployed during break period or not gainfully employed, so he cannot be awarded

back wages however petitioner is entitled to relief of continuity in service from the date of initial

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engagement as well as seniority except back wages for the reasons stated hereinabove. Issue no.1

for the aforestated reason is answered in affirmative in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO.2

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondent department has contended with

vehemence that claim petition is not maintainable. As has come in my findings in foregoing paras

that respondent had deliberately given fictional breaks to petitioner by not issuing any muster roll

for the whole month in a calendar year, it cannot not be stated that the petitioner cannot claim that

the period of fictional break be counted in his services under Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act. Otherwise also, it is not specifically mentioned in what manner the claim petition is

not maintainable. Since petitioner is a workman working with the respondent who had been given

fictional breaks, as stated in foregoing paras, with the object that he did not complete 240 days, the

claim petition cannot be stated to be not maintainable. Issue in hand is answered in negative in

favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO.3

17. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing state respondent has contended that petition so filed was

bad on account of delay and laches. It is evident from findings in foregoing paras that petitioner

was given fictional breaks from 2008 to 2012 which was not within knowledge of petitioner. It

seems that when workmen junior to petitioner had been regularized, he come to know about

intermittent breaks. The matter was brought to notice of Conciliation Officer where it did not

materialize and consequently Labour Commissioner made reference to this court. Ld. counsel for

petitioner, on the other hand, has maintained that no prejudice had been caused to petitioner.

Moreover, not a single question has been asked by ld. Dy. D.A. on delay to the petitioner. As such,

delay which is not questioned stands explained as stated above. Otherwise also, plea of delay or

limitation would not eclipse claim of petitioner in any manner. It is settled preposition of law that in

case a dispute is referred to for determination, the Court will have to return a finding on merits and

the delay in raising the dispute may be considered by the Court at the time of granting the final

relief, as has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Bhatag Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903).

In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the

delay of more than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services

were illegally terminated by holding that the provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to

industrial dispute but however, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the

principle of delay and laches have to be seen and applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and

Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs.

Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled

as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar, there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar

vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425, it has been held by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has

been referred by the State Government and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference

which was made by the State Government and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits

without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co.

Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those

employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of

their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they

may have to make under the provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be

open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh

vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:

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“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of

fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to

the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

18. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there

was inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any

prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot

be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is

decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.

RELIEF

19. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is to be in continuous

uninterrupted service with the respondent from 2008 to 2012 and that the breaks given by the

respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of

the petitioner. Accordingly, claim petition is hereby allowed in part and reference is accordingly

answered in favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in continuous service of

respondent as stated above with all consequential benefits except back wages. The parties,

however, shall bear their own costs.

20. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

21. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

22. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 19th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 37/2013

Date of Institution: 05.4.2013

Date of Decision : 19.01.2016

Shri Manoj Kumar s/o Shri Daulat Ram Sharma, r/o Village Dhaneri, P.O. Khuni, Tehsil

Nankhari, District Shimla, H.P.

.…Petitioner

Versus

The Managing Director, M/s Surya Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Mcleodganj, Dharamshala, District

Kangra, H.P.

….Respondent

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Jitender Sharma, Adv.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Sh. Manoj Kumar S/O Sh. Daulat Ram Sharma,

Village-Dhaneri, P.O. Khuni, Tehsil Nankhari, Distt. Shimla, H.P. by Managing Director,

M/s Surya Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Mcleodganj, Dharamsala, Distt. Kangra w.e.f. 28.8.2010

without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, salary, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the claim petition reveal that claimant/petitioner was

appointed as ‘Order Taker’ on monthly rate basis w.e.f. September, 1998 by the respondent where

he continuously worked till 11th July, 2010. Averments made in the claim petition further revealed

that on 11.7.2012 petitioner after discharging his duties proceeded towards room when slipped in

the darkness and his foot as well as leg got fractured due to which petitioner was unable to perform

his duties however on 12.7.2010, petitioner submitted leave application with the respondent and got

treatment vide OPD no. 4882/2010 dated 12.7.2010 and thereafter proceeded from Dharamshala to

his native village as no one resided with him to look after him but at his native village he realized

sudden pain in his backbone for which he took treatment from Ayurvedic Hospital Shimla on

19.7.2010 and was advised by doctor to take complete rest due to which petitioner could not

perform his duties from 12.7.2010 to 27.8.2010 who had yet not been given salary from the month

of July, 2010. It is alleged that petitioner after discharges from hospital reported for duty on

28.8.2010 who moved leave application and medical fitness certificate to the respondent requesting

to allow to join duty. It is claimed that the services of petitioner have been unlawfully terminated

by the respondent who had not been given any show cause notice and at the same time no inquiry

was conducted against him qua his misconduct or one month pay in lieu of notice period was not

given to him. The grievance of the petitioner also remains that he was permanent employee with

the respondent who worked in the Resort of respondent upto 11.7.2010 and he was on medical

leave upto 28.8.2010 but thereafter petitioner was not allowed to resume duty by the management

on 28.8.2010 due to the reason that petitioner was President of the union of Hotel Karamchari

Sangh who asserted that he was not allowed to join even after producing of the requisite documents

as demanded by the respondent and thus despite having rendered 240 days continuous service in

preceding last 12 calendar months preceding his termination, the respondent is alleged to have

violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘the Act’ for brevity).

Not only this, while terminating the services of the petitioner, respondent had ignored principle of

‘Last come First go’ in allowing one Shri Shashi Pal, a junior to petitioner in service which was

also in violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. Similarly, respondent having not

offered to join duty offering to a junior had also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

Accordingly, petitioner prays that act of the respondent in terminating his services due to

petitioner’s union activities was highly illegal, unjustified and unconstitutional within the ambit of

unfair labour practice and that petitioner was harassed and victimized by the respondent from time

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to time who was pressurized to withdraw case of union pending before this court. Accordingly,

petitioner alleges that he was still unemployed and not gainfully employed anywhere from the date

of his illegal termination and was thus entitled to full back wages. Accordingly, petitioner has

prayed for setting aside the illegal termination i.e. 28.8.2010 of the respondent with direction to the

respondent to reinstate petitioner in service with full back wages, seniority, continuity of service

with all consequential service benefits and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, estoppel, act and conduct petitioner having not come to the court with

clean hands and that petitioner had himself abandoned the job voluntarily. On merits admitted that

petitioner was engaged by the respondent on 1st September, 1998 as Order Taker but denied that

conduct of the petitioner during period was satisfactory and upto the mark. It is alleged that

petitioner was habitually taking leave while giving false reasons. It is alleged that respondent asked

the petitioner to furnish the copy of prescription slips but petitioner failed to furnish the same and

on 12th July, 2010 he deliberately absented from his duties. It is claimed that since petitioner failed

to join his duties after 11.7.2010 his salary from 1.7.2010 to 11.7.2010 was lying undisbursed and

pending before the respondent which could be taken by petitioner on submission of proper

documents which he failed to submit at the time of joining earlier as stated above. It is claimed that

photocopy of medical certificate did not appear to be genuine as medical officer recommending bed

rest had made inconsistent observation on the point of rest. It has been emphatically denied that

petitioner was never allowed by the

respondent to join duties. As Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act have also been denied and petition

is sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B Mark-A and Mark-B are the OPD

slips dated 12.7.2010 and 19.7.2010, Mark-C copy of medical certificate, Ex. PW1/B copy of

demand notice and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Paramjeet Bamba, the then Executive Director, M/s.

Surya Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Mcleodganj, Dharamshala tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A under

Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B seniority list, Ex. RW1/C copy of mandays chart, Exts. RW1/D1

to D11 copies of ledge statement and closed evidence.

7.

I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld.

counsel for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on

30.9.2013 for determination:

1.

Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

28.8.2010 is illegal and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

2.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

Whether the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands as alleged. If so, its

effect?

OPR

3.

Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing of the claim petition by his act and

conduct as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

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4.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: No

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Petition is allowed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUE NO.1

10. Admittedly, petitioner had been appointed by the respondent as Order Taker in the

month of September, 1998 who continuously worked upto 11th July, 2010. This fact further finds

support from mandays chart Ex. RW1/C which shows petitioner to have worked for 257 days in the

year 2005, 284 days in 2006, 259 days in 2007 and 144 days in 2010. The ledger statement Ext.

RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D11 further strengthen the plea of respondent being engaged with respondent

as Order Taker from September, 1998 till July, 2010. Thus, from testimony of petitioner coupled

with documents as referred to above, it is established that petitioner has been working with the

respondent as Order Taker continuously from September, 1998 till July, 2010.

11. The mandays chart primarily establishes that petitioner had worked for more than 240

days during preceding 12 calendar months before the date of retrenchment on 28.8.2010. Section

25-F of the Act reads as under:

“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any

industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer

shall be retrenched by that employer until-

(a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons

for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been

paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be

equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service

or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such

authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the

Official Gazette.”

12. Cross-examination of the respondent Shri Paramjeet Bamba (RW1) clearly shows that

no notice was given to petitioner prior to his termination rather respondent has made futile attempt

by stating that respondent had not terminated services of petitioner rather petitioner had abandoned

the job of his own which is not at all established from records. Thus, it is to be concluded under the

plea of improper medical fitness document, respondent did not allow petitioner to join duties and

resultantly petitioner was disengaged from job by necessary implication.

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13. The case of petitioner further remains that he had sustained injury in leg while he was

proceeding towards his room on 11.7.2010 after performing his duties and had slipped due to which

his foot and leg got fractured and had taken treatment vide OPD slip no. 4882 issued photocopy of

OPD slips and medical fitness certificate along with application were submitted to the respondent

and that the petitioner had left for native place as there was no one to look after him and due to

recurrence of backbone pain he had again taken treatment at Ayurvedic Hospital Shimla and after

availing medical leave when he join for duty on 28th August, 2010 he was not allowed to join as

complete documents concerning treatment were demanded by the respondent. Be it noticed that

petitioner in his cross-examination has admitted that according to Mark-C he was fit to join duty on

27.8.2010 but the case of respondent remains that petitioner had abandoned the job as he did not

report for duty after 28.8.2010 when he was asked to produce complete medical record qua his

treatment of leg and backbone.

14. It is admitted case of the respondent that neither any departmental inquiry was

conducted nor any charge sheet was raised against the petitioner qua his absence from duty for

period aforestated before his termination. The plea of respondent remains that the services of

petitioner were never terminated rather he himself had abandoned the job. It may be relevant to

mention here that dispute was also raised before the Labour Inspector which had started within 15

days from 28.8.2010 as has been admitted by RW1 in cross-examination. If the petitioner had not

been terminated, respondent ought to have produced such evidence which would establish that

petitioner continued to remain employed/engaged with the respondent and that he was to be

allowed only on production of documents but petitioner did not report for duty. Thus, it was

incumbent upon the respondent to have initiated departmental proceedings qua his absence from

duty which is not done in this case or atleast prior to it show cause notice for unauthorized absence

was ought to be served. It is uncertain from respondent’s evidence as to how he inferred that

petitioner had abandoned the job. Be it noticed that respondent has taken plea that salary of the

petitioner from 1.7.2010 to 11.7.2010 was lying undisbursed which establishes that the respondent

intended only to pay balance amount of salary which had not been taken by the petitioner. There is

no iota of evidence on record establishing that the petitioner was ever issued any notice envisaged

under Section 25-F of the Act which was mandatory in nature as per the provisions. At the same

time, salary of one month in lieu of notice period was required to be paid which has not been given

by the respondent. As such, when petitioner is held to have worked with the respondent

continuously for more than 240 days in preceding 12 calendar months as well as has come in the

evidence as discussed in the foregoing paras and that he has not been allowed to resume duties on

the plea of non production of documents. It is settled law that plea of abandonment has to be

proved like a fact burden of which lies upon party alleging the same. In the case in hand from

testimony of petitioner and other attending circumstances, it is to be held that the services of

petitioner have been terminated in absence of proof of plea of abandonment and that there is no

evidence from the side of respondent to show that petitioner had been asked to join for duties or

resume duties at any point of time. As such, respondent is held to have violated provisions of

Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.

15. In so far as the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it would be

relevant to mention here seniority list of Order Takers Ex. RW1/B in which petitioner’s name

figured at serial no. 1 whereas Shashi Pal was at serial no. 4. The grievance of petitioner remains

that he had been removed from service by the respondent retaining a junior and for said reason the

respondent is held to have also violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act.

16. Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is reproduced for reference:

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment,

who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of

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workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and

the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was

the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the

employer retrenches any other workman”.

17. A bare glance of the provisions aforestated would establish that respondent has

retained junior Shashipal at serial no.4 and retrenched petitioner who was at serial no.1. There is

nothing in evidence of respondent that for any misconduct of petitioner his service had been

terminated.

18. With regard to petitioner having remained engaged or not gainfully employee it has

been specifically averred in the claim petition as well as affidavit Ex. PW1/A that petitioner was

not gainfully employed and there is nothing in cross-examination of petitioner which would be

established that he was employed or was gainfully engaged ever since at the time of his illegal

termination. In these circumstances when burden of proof for establishing that petitioner was

gainfully employed lied on the employer and having failed discharge the same, petitioner would be

entitled for full back wages in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 2014 LLR

673, Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s. Hindalco Industries Ltd. In the circumstances of the

case, there is nothing in evidence qua earning capacity of the petitioner from month of July, 2010

as has come in the evidence this court is left with no option but to hold that petitioner is entitled to

full back wages. Ld. counsel for petitioner has relied upon judgment titled as Jasmer Singh vs.

State of Haryana & Anr. reported in 2015 LLR 225 in which Hon’ble Court has held that if the

workman has completed 240 days continuous service during the preceding 12 calendar months his

termination without compliance with the mandatory provisions of Industrial Disputes Act would

make the workman entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and

respondent/management and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and that he did not remain gainfully employed after his

retrenchment and as such petitioner is liable to be reengaged with seniority and in continuity in

service as well as full back wages from the date of his illegal termination. Issue no.1 is thus

answered holding that retrenchment of services of petitioner by respondent w.e.f. 28th August,

2010 was illegal and unjustified and the petitioner is entitled to be reengaged along-with seniority,

past service benefits with full back wages. Issue no. 1 is answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.2

19. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. counsel for respondent has failed to allege in reply in what manner

petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from

pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be

raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the

respondent.

ISSUES NO.3 AND 4

20. It is not shown as to how the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands

and estopped from filing of claim petition. No evidence has been led on these issues. Hence, these

issues are decided accordingly.

RELIEF

21. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, termination order dated 28.8.2010 of the

services of petitioner by the respondent is hereby set aside and quashed and the reference/claim

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petition is allowed in favour of petitioner. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner

forthwith who shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service with full back wages from the

date of his illegal termination. However, respondent shall release undisbursed salary/wages of

petitioner lying with him w.e.f. 1.7.2010 to 10.7.2010. The parties, however, shall bear their own

costs.

22. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

23. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

24. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 19th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 12/2014

Date of Institution : 09.01.2014

Date of Decision : 19.01.2016

Shri Kehar Singh Gandhi s/o Shri Bhagat Ram, r/o Ward No.2 Shop No.5, Near New Court

Complex Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

The Pradhan, The Anu Cooperative Agriculture Society Ltd. Hamirpur, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Umesh Dhiman, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. O.P. Sharma, Adv.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Kehar Singh Gandhi, S/O Shri Bhagat Ram,

R/O Ward No.2, Shop No.5, Near New Court Complex Hamirpur, District Hamirpur,

H.P. w.e.f. 1-6-2008 by The Pradhan, The Anu Coperative Agriculture Society Ltd.

Hamirpur, H.P. without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

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is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

from which date the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

The claimant/petitioner has instituted present statement of claim alleging therein that

he was engaged as salesman by the respondent society vide resolution no. 5 dated 27.11.1997. The

petitioner further claims to have continued to work with the respondent till his services were

allegedly verbally disengaged on 31.5.2008 by respondent society. After disengagement of the

petitioner from job, he requested time and again to the respondent for reengagement but he was

denied to do the work. It is alleged that at the time of joining, petitioner was paid the salary of

Rs.500/- per month w.e.f. 27.11.1997 and thereafter consolidated salary was received from 1st

September, 2000 vide which the salary was enhanced to Rs.1,000/- per month and again it was

revised on 1.10.2001 @ Rs.1200/- per month. The petitioner thus claims that he had been given less

salary by the respondent in violation of provisions of Minimum Wages Act vide which the

petitioner was entitled to receive salary of Rs.3000/- p.m. @ Rs.100/- per day as wages and thus

petitioner was entitled to get balance arrears of salary amounting to Rs.2,50,900/- along with

interest. The petitioner further claims that at the instance of respondent society, petitioner had hired

shop on rent for Rs.650/- per month from 27.11.1997 to 31.5.2008 and had in total paid Rs.81,900/-

which was also liable to be paid by the society to the petitioner. The grievance of petitioner remains

that instead of paying him the dues as aforestated respondent had appointed another salesman in

violation of provisions of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act moreso when petitioner had

already rendered 240 days in every calendar year and appointment of another salesman was in

violation of Section 25-F (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, petitioner asserts that he

had not been given any retrenchment notice prior to his termination and was thus entitled for

reinstatement under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner has further prayed

that order of termination dated 31.5.2008 of the respondent be revoked and he be reinstated in

service with seniority and continuity in service with consequential service benefits and the

respondent be directed to pay difference of minimum wages arrears along-with interest and rent of

shop/depot as aforesaid or to any other relief to which petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, limitation, locus standi, estoppel and cause of action. On merits

claimed that petitioner had never remained employee of the respondent society who had filed

complaint before the Dy. Registrar Cooperative Society Dharamshala which was decided against

him on 30.4.2011 against which appeal was filed before the Additional Registrar (Administration)

Co-operative Societies H.P. Shimla vide order dated 29.9.2012 declined to give any relief qua

salary, gratuity, incentives etc. While denying the status of petitioner to be that of salesman of the

society was contended that in the year 1997 salesman of the respondent society namely Onkar

Singh was arrested in criminal case for which society was required to make temporary arrangement

to provide ration to the public and that the petitioner at that time was holding private depot in

vicinity. Vide resolution no.2 petitioner who had depot near the office of the respondent society,

managing committee of the respondent society made attachment of society depot with the

petitioner’s private depot vide resolution no. 4 dated 27.11.1997 so that public did not suffer and

said arrangement was purely on temporary basis and later Onkar Singh was arrested and released

on bail who offered to work with the respondent society and for said reason meeting was convened

on 11.12.1997 and a resolution was passed in which Onkar Singh was taken in service. Asserting

attachment of depot of society with the depot of petitioner was purely a temporary arrangement

which was made in pursuance to order dated 15.11.1997 by District Food and Civil Supply

Controller but there was no appointment of petitioner as salesman of the society at any point of

time. It is categorically stated that appointment of salesman is made only in accordance with

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rules and bye-laws of society of the Managing Committee and since the petitioner himself was

running the same kind of business as a private depot holder, so he was neither a salesman/employee

nor the question of disengagement of petitioner from service arose. It is also pleaded that vide

resolution no.2 dated 6.5.2008 the action of the respondent society stood approved by the higher

authority including DFC Hamirpur. It is also stated that petitioner was paid remuneration and not

salary in lieu of service rendered by him and the payments made to the petitioner were not made

payment as salary but was remuneration for attachment of depot for running the fair price shop near

the society’s office. It is denied that petitioner was entitled for difference of remuneration paid and

the minimum wages amounting to Rs.2,50,900/- and the complaint filed before the Deputy

Registrar Co-operative Societies who held inquiry qua entitlement of petitioner through Block

Inspector Cooperative Societies Hamirpur submitted report on 17.9.2010 and did not find any merit

as petitioner was made payment for amounting to Rs.1,24,300/- and Rs.5604/- for temporary

arrangement made by respondent society. Thereafter, the Deputy Registrar cooperative societies

Dharamshala also enquired the matter in dispute from the District Inspector Hamirpur who

submitted his report on 28.2.2011 and had categorically held in para no.3 that on the total profit of

Rs.1,79,052.77 paise profit to the society from the year 1996-97 to 2008 petitioner had been paid

more than 75% i.e. amounting to Rs.1,29,100/- and Rs.6250/- as his remuneration and incentive

and therefore compliant filed by him was dismissed. Similarly, appeal filed against the order

challenged before the Additional Registrar Cooperative Societies Shimla too was dismissed and

order/resolution of respondent society dated 6.5.2008 was held to be legal and in accordance with

rules of society. Similarly, it was also emphatically denied that no agreement was entered

between the petitioner and respondent society to hire shop on rent. Accordingly, petition is sought

to be dismissed alleging that whatever remuneration or incentive was payable to petitioner same

has been paid and that the depot which was attached with the depot of petitioner was separated vide

resolution of society. Moreover, petitioner had challenged his grievances before the authorities with

regard to difference of salary or rent of premises allegedly hired.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of resolution no.3, Ex.

PW1/C copy of list of employees, Ex. PW1/D copy of inspection letter, Ex. PW1/E1 to E5 copies

of payment account, Ex. PW1/F1 to F7 copies of pay detail, Ex. PW1/G copy of letter dated

14.6.2011, Ex. PW1/H to H1 copies of permit, Ex. PW1/I-1 to I-6 copies of monthly feedback, Ex.

PW1/J copies of resolution no.5, Ex. PW1/K copy of officer order dated 15.12.1997, Ex. PW1/L

copy of monthly feedback, Ex. PW1/M copies of resolution dated 11.9.2009, Ex. PW1/N copy of

receipt dated 31.1.2008, Ex. PW1/N-1 to N-5 copies of receipts, Ex. PW1/O copy of receipt dated

10.12.2001, Marks X and Y are the copies of inspection reports and closed the evidence. On the

other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Satish

Chand, Secretary, Anu cooperative society as RW1 tendered/proved Ex. RW1/B copy of resolution

dated 26.3.2014, Ex. RW1/C copy of proceeding book, Ex. RW1/D copy of resolution dated

11.12.1997, Ex. RW1/E copy of resolution no. 2 dated 6.5.2008, Ex. RW1/F copy of office order

dated 15.12.1997, Ex. RW1/G copy of inquiry report dated 17.9.2010, Ex. RW1/H copy of

seniority list, Ex. RW1/I copy of letter dated 2.6.2008, Ex. RW1/J copy of letter dated 9.5.2008,

Ex. Ex. RW1/K copy of letter dated 16.10.2010, Mark Y copy of inquiry report, Ex. R1 copy of

show cause notice dated 28.8.2007, Ex. R-2, copy of letter dated 16.10.2005, Ex. R-3 copy of

judgment dated 29.9.2012 and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel for both the parties, gone through records of the case

carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

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8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on

4.11.2014 for determination which are as under:

1.

Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

01.06.2008 is illegal and unjustified. If so, its effect?

OPP

2.

Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

3.

Whether the present petition is barred by limitation. If so, its effect?

OPR

4.

Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the case?

OPR

5.

Whether the petitioner has estopped by his act and conduct to file the petition. If so, its

effect?

OPR

6.

Whether the petitioner has no cause of action?

OPR

7.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: No

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: Unpressed

Issue No.5

: Unpressed

Issue No.6

: Yes

Relief.

: Petition is dismissed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 AND 6

10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is admitted case of parties that claimant/petitioner was already running a ration depot

in ward no.2 at Hamirpur prior to attachment of depot of respondent society vide resolution Ex.

RW1/C so as to maintain PDS supply of the respondent. It is equally admitted case of the parties

that both the depots run at one place in a shop. It is equally admitted case of the petitioner that

petitioner was engaged when a salesman of the respondent society namely Onkar Singh was

arrested by police and thus engagement of claimant/petitioner was purely stop gap arrangement in

pursuance to resolution passed by the respondent society. It is equally admitted case of the

petitioner that no appointment letter was ever issued in favour of petitioner to establish relationship

of master and servant. In view of forgoing admitted facts placed on record, it is to be determined if

there are existed relationship of ‘employer’ and the ‘workman’ between the respondent and

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petitioner and if such relationship factually existed then disengagement of petitioner was in

violation of any of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Similarly, it is also to be

adjudicated that petitioner was paid less wages in view of the provisions of Minimum Wages Act

and was also entitled for rent of shop which he had hired at the behest of the respondent society.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in detailed affidavit Ex.

PW1/A wherein he asserted as maintained in the claim petition stipulating therein that petitioner

was engaged in pursuance to resolution no.5 dated 27.5.1997 as salesman and was disengaged by a

verbal order on 31.5.2008 and at the time of joining, he was given salary of Rs.500/- per month

w.e.f. 27.11.1997 thereafter consolidated salary received on 1.9.2000 which was enhanced to

Rs.1,000/- per month and again revised on 1.10.2001 @ Rs.1200/- per month. The petitioner has

asserted on oath that sum of Rs.2,50,900/- along-with interest was recoverable being difference in

minimum wages admissible to the petitioner and the actual wages which had not been paid by the

respondent society. The petitioner has also claimed to be entitled to rent of building hired so as to

run attached depot of society. It further remains the case of petitioner that in violation of provisions

of society son of Secretary namely Satish has been appointed although petitioner himself had

completed 240 days in a year in all years preceding his termination and hired a separate shop on

monthly rent of Rs.650/- per month at instance of respondent. Accordingly, violation of provisions

of Section 25-F (b) and (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act has also been asserted. In cross-

examination of the petitioner, it is revealed that he had been running a private depot prior 1997

which existed in vicinity of respondent society. He has admitted that Onkar Singh was earlier

salesman who was arrested. He has further revealed in cross-examination that he had 200 permit

holders and similarly respondent society had similar number of permit holders. He has also

admitted vide Ex. PW1/K, DFC Hamirpur had attached depot of respondent society with the

petitioner’s depot. He further admitted that he had been supplying ration to the consumers of the

respondent society till 6.5.2008 till appointment of new salesman. Although petitioner repeatedly

asserted that he had been given salary and this fact finds mentioned in the proceedings of the

society as well but scrutiny of the entire documentary evidence coupled with testimonies of parties,

it is established that petitioner was never a salesman of the society who was merely paid

remuneration and incentive for service being rendered by him to the consumers for the respondent

society. Admittedly, there was no appointment letter issued to petitioner as salesman as he also

admitted so in cross-examination that while making complaint before the Additional Registrar

Cooperative Society Hamirpur in the year 2010 he did not claim his status to be that of salesman of

respondent society which establishes that he had manipulated entry of payments to him as salary. It

is not understood as to why the petitioner did not assert his claim as that of salesman while filing

complaint in the year 2010 before the Deputy Registrar Cooperative Societies which was

consequently got enquired by Inspector Cooperative Societies and that it was found that petitioner

was not a salesman.

13. It would be relevant to consider the proceeding of respondent society and

subsequent complaint of the petitioner with the authorities claiming difference in arrears of wages

as well as rent for accommodation hired by him. Ex. R3 is detailed order passed by Additional

Registrar Cooperative Society in which petitioner as appellant had filed appeal under Rule 21 of

H.P. Primary Agriculture Cooperative Credit Societies Employees (terms of employment and

working conditions) Rules, 2001 had been dismissed affirming the order of Deputy Registrar

Cooperative Societies Dharamshala rejecting claim of the petitioner. It was observed by the

Additional Registrar Cooperative Society that the appellant i.e. present claimant/petitioner was

authorized by the respondent society to do the work of PDS in a capacity of private depot

holder and thus temporary arrangement was made to provide public facilities under the PDS.

Thus, there was no need to follow any procedure while disengaging or detaching in supply of ration

to the consumers/holders earlier attached with petitioner since 1997. Hence, appellate authority

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under Rule 21 found no merit in the appeal qua grievances of the appellant with regard to

detachment of depot as well as other benefits claimed by him.

14. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has laid much emphasis on language used while passing

resolution no. 4 dated 27.11.1997 Ex. RW1/C in which it was mentioned that a sum of Rs.500/-

would be paid to petitioner as monthly salary. Similarly, in Ex. RW1/G Inspector Cooperative

Society has observed that petitioner was paid a sum of Rs.1,24,300/- and Rs.5,604/- as incentive.

RW1 has although admitted that in Ex. RW1/C petitioner was shown to be paid Rs.500/- as salary

but clarified that the members of society were not so educated as to know difference between

“incentive” and “salary” and such words were used interchangeably. RW1 although admitted in

cross-examination that petitioner was given remuneration but he could not produce any record

which would show that petitioner was given incentive for service rendered by him but maintained

that same had been clarified in the reports. Be it noticed that the main thrust of the petitioner for his

claim as salesman of the society was stipulation in records of respondent society as receiving

salary. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the copies of ledger account vide which

salary had been remitted to the petitioner. These ledgers accounts are Ex. PW1/E1 to Ex. PW1/F7

which account show that initially petitioner was payment of Rs.500/- per month and it was

enhanced to Rs.1000/- and later to Rs.1200/- per month. As such, the plea of petitioner receiving

different amounts of remuneration get substantiated from ledger account produced by him.

15. It is the case of the respondent that a salesman is strictly appointed as per rules and

regulations of the society and the petitioner was merely engaged so as to run the depot of society so

that PDS supply of ration was not affected for those consumers. Thus, even when temporary

arrangement was made in the year 1997, the respondent/society never intended to engage petitioner

as salesman rather it could be seen as one society seeking service of the other depot holder for

selling or supply of its products i.e. ration etc. In that eventuality also there could be no relationship

of ‘employer’ and ‘workman’ or salesman as claimed by the petitioner and thus petitioner has made

futile attempt to get benefit of being a salesman of the society but he certainly fell in error in

considering that he was already running a ration shop adjacent to the office of the respondent

society and arrangement was purely made to run govt. ration shop with the aid of depot of

petitioner. Since the petitioner had at no point of time claimed to be employee of

respondent/society in the year 2010 when he had filed complaint before the Deputy Registrar

Cooperative Society and even later stage also he has not asserted his status as alleging salesman

rather he was dealing in the sales of respondent society on account of resolution as referred to

above and claimed rent and other benefits but the temporary arrangement made by the society was

certainly acceptable to the petitioner who did not project himself as salesman at any point of time

and there is no iota of evidence which would show that respondent society treated petitioner as

salesman.

16. Ex. PW1/K is the office order of DFSC Hamirpur vide which depot of respondent

society was attached with the petitioner’s depot under the H.P. Special Essential Commodities

Regulation and Distribution Order 1979. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has also contended with

vehemence that in pursuance to the order of Deputy Registrar Food and Supply, petitioner had

hired shop for which he paid rent as is evident from Ex. RW1/C. A bare scrutiny of this document

would reveal that auction of the shop had taken place on 10.12.2001 which was taken by petitioner

on deposit of Rs.5000/- as security with Municipal Council Hamirpur meaning thereby that from

1997 to 2001 petitioner had not hired any shop. Even in the cross-examination petitioner has

admitted that old ration shop of petitioner was attached in same premises and therefore question of

hiring of separate accommodation for which rent is claimed did not arise. As such, it is not proved

that any shop or premises was factually hired for which amount of Rs.81,900/- from 1997 to 2008

was paid. Even no witness of municipal corporation Hamirpur has been examined so as prove the

actual shop in question to run ration shop. On the point of claim of petitioner for rent Ex. R2 dated

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16.10.2010 in which inquiry had been conducted and this document revealed that there was no

understanding between the petitioner and respondent to pay rent for the premises rather petitioner

had been paid substantial amount from 1997 to 2008 as remuneration and incentive for the services

rendered by him. As such, there is no evidence on record to show that the petitioner was entitling to

arrears of rent payable for running depot of the respondent society. In view of the foregoing

discussions, it would be unsafe to hold that there are existed relationship of ‘employer’ and

‘salesman’ between the petitioner and the respondent. Since the disengagement was on the basis of

subsequent resolution, it could not be stated that petitioner had been disengaged in violation of any

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act rather petitioner was notified about the detachment by the

respondent society as its earlier appointment as salesman were released on bail and the temporary

arrangement was restored to its original position as before. Since there existed no relationship of

employer and salesman between the petitioner and respondent, the petitioner could not claim any

difference in amount of wages more specifically a sum of Rs.2,50,900/- as claimed by the petitioner

and similarly when petitioner has failed to establish hiring of accommodation with the object keep

ration of PDS of respondent society, it could not be stated that he had incurred a sum of Rs.81,900/-

on account of rent in running the depot of the society. As such, petitioner is held not entitled to any

amount from respondent society as rent and for said reason petitioner has no cause of action to file

the present claim petition. Accordingly, it is held that termination of services of petitioner is legal

and justified and petitioner is not entitled for any wages, seniority past service benefits from

respondent society. Issues no. 1 and 6 are decided accordingly.

ISSUE NO.2

17. As is evident from foregoing paras, there are no existed relationship of

employer and salesman between petitioner and respondent who could not claim relief sought for in

view of provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petition is thus held to be not maintainable in

the present form more so, when petitioner had already approached competent authorities of H.P.

Cooperative Societies for remedies available to him qua his grievances as stated in foregoing paras.

With regard to difference of arrears of wages, rent etc. his claim was already rejected and after

exhausting all remedies, he had chosen forum of Industrial Dispute Act claiming his status as

salesman of the society which was found to be not correct. As such, petition is not maintainable.

This issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of respondent society.

ISSUE NO.3

18. Ld. counsel for the respondent has contended that petition so filed was bad on account

of delay and laches. Ld. counsel for petitioner, on the other hand, has maintained that not a single

question has been asked by ld. counsel for respondent on delay to the petitioner. As such, delay

which is not questioned stands explained as stated above. Otherwise also, plea of delay or

limitation would not eclipse claim of petitioner in any manner had petitioner succeeded in

establishing his status as salesman and that of respondent society as employer. In this case

disengagement was done on 6.5.2008 and after litigating before authorities under H.P. Cooperative

Act petitioner filed claim before authorities under Industrial Dispute Act and finally appropriate

government referred the dispute in 2014. Period of six years was spent in litigation only. It is

settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the Court will have

to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered by the Court at

the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Bhatag

Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not come in the

way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the provisions of

Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon the facts and

circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and applied. In Deepa

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Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there was a delay of 12

years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was a delay of 9 years.

In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar, there was a delay of

14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425, it has been held by

the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of

delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the Labour Court is

bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same is required to be

adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Apex

Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has categorically

held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C (2)

may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of

limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of

any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the

ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of

fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to

the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

19. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there

was inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any

prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot

be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is

decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.

ISSUES NO.4 AND 5

20. Both these issues were not pressed by ld. counsel for the respondent at the time of

arguments which are decided unpressed in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

RELIEF

21. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the instant claim petition is dismissed.

In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

22. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

23. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

24. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 19th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 95/2015

Date of Institution : 04.03.2015

Date of Decision : 20.01.2016

Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Amar Chand, r/o Village and Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh S/O Shri Amar

Chand, R/O Village and Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice

dated 25.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. August, 2005

suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Devi

Singh S/O Shri Amar Chand, R/O Village and Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. August, 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in the year

1994 and 161 days in 1995 who had completed criteria of 160 days prescribed for tribal area of

Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory

provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted

by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such

breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

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respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of

August, 2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were

junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department

was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers

working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner

and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been

followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to

petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

August, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August,

2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting

aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 2005. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 2005 along-with back wages,

seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of

his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between June, 1994 to August, 2005 be

counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar

Chand is concerned he was senior to him and other persons as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim

petition were worked with the respondent continuously. On the plea of termination of service of

petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore

serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has

maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in

para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal

Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after six years petitioner is

stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance

of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for

charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner

was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 07.07.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

August, 2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

OPR

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

:Petition

is

partly

allowed

awarding

compensation

Rs.1,20,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2005 at HPPWD

Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order

or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under

Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same

time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was

illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all

the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2005 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in

the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for

Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 160 days in the year 1994, 161 days in 1995, 146 days in 1996, 85 days in 1997, 116

days in 1998, 91 days in 1999, 30 days in 2000, 103.5 days in 2001, 62 days in 2002, 35 days in

2003, 73 days in 2004 and 59 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2005 in 12

years he had worked for 1121.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except 1996 to

2005 he had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 59 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August 2005 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

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25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

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demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

12 years and actually worked for 1121.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e.

demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above

in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble

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Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees

one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1

to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 119/2015

Date of Institution : 13.03.2015

Date of Decision : 20.01.2016

Shri Kushu Ram s/o Shri Amar Chand, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

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Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Kushu Ram S/O Shri Amar

Chand, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 08.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. August,

2001 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri

Kushu Ram S/O Shri Amar Chand, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District

Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. August, 2001 without complying the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2001 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 311 days in the year

1996, 345 days in 1997, 352 days in 1998, 279 days in 1999 and 215 ½ days in 2000 who had

completed criteria of 160 days prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and

became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). It is alleged that

respondent had terminated the services of petitioner in November, 1999 and against the illegal

termination, petitioner had filed O.A. bearing no.2876/1999 before the Hon’ble Administrative

Tribunal, Shimla in which Hon’ble Administrative Tribunal had directed the respondents to

reengage the petitioner in same capacity vide order dated 29.11.1999 and thereafter the services of

petitioner were reengaged by the respondent in December, 1999. Averments made in the petition

revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given

by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as

continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2001 by an oral

order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been

retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified

and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent

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had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the

services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the

department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and

joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2001

when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one

month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had

also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima

facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record

who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at

the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time,

no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has

remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August, 2001 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 2001. He further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 2001 along- with back wages, seniority including

continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between May, 1994 to August, 2001 be counted 160

days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2001

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Dev Raj s/o Mehar

Chand is concerned he was senior to him and other persons as mentioned in para no.4 of the claim

petition were worked with the respondent continuously. On the plea of termination of service of

petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore

serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has

maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in

para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal

Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2001 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after nine years petitioner is

stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance

of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for

charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner

was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

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6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of order of Hon’ble

Administrative Tribunal, H.P., Ex. PW1/C to PW1/M mandays charts of junior workers and closed

evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined

RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1

tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-workers Ex.

RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 07.07.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

August, 2001 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

OPR

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2001 at HPPWD Sub Division

Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement

of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was

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passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 2001. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2001. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in

the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for

Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 119 days in the year 1994, 157.5 days in 1995, 289 days in 1996, 345 days in 1997, 352

days in 1998, 281 days in 1999, 216.5 days in 2000 and 128 days in 2001 and thus a total of his

service in 1994 to 2001 in 8 years he had worked for 1888 days in his entire service period. Be it

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noticed that except 1994, 1995 and 2001 he had worked for more than 160 days as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2001 the petitioner had merely worked for 128 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/C, Ex.

PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and

had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/M are the mandays chart

of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of

workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient

work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given

muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2001 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and even

thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which

also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)

SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-

H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2001, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

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examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

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its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

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the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

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directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 8

years and actually worked for 1888 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2001 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e.

demand notice was given on 08.08.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above

in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

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ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 159/2015

Date of Institution : 11.04.2015

Date of Decision : 20.01.2016

Shri Man Dass s/o Shri Hari Chand, r/o Village & P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

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For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Man Dass S/O Shri Hari Chand,

R/O Village & P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 02-02-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during October,

2003 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Man

Dass S/O Shri Hari Chand, R/O Village & P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

during October, 2003 by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi),

District Chamba, H.P. without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1990 who continuously worked till October, 2003 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2003 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2003 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of October, 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

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India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 2003. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2003 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between May, 1990 to October, 2003 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2000 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State

of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1990 who remained engaged till 2003

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 26 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after nine years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

October, 2003 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

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2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1990 who continuously worked till 2003 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach

is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of

terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed

while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched

petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as

per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1990 to October, 2003. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2003 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

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obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2003. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in

the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for

Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 51 days in the year 1990, 148 days in 1991, 91 days in 1995, 165 days in 1996, 141

days in 1997, 146 days in 1998, 139 days in 1999, 133 days in 2000, 125 days in 2001, 140 days in

2002 and 127 days in 2003 and thus a total of his service in 1990 to 2005 in 11 years he had

worked for 1406 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except 1991, 1992, 1995 and

1997 to 2003 he had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 127 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

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had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2003 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1990 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

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retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

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adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

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19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

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years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

11 years and actually worked for 1406 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2003 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e.

demand notice was given on 02.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above

in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

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25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 169/2015

Date of Institution : 11.04.2015

Date of Decision : 20.01.2016

Shri Dharam Singh s/o Shri Raju, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dharam Singh S/O Shri Raju, R/O

Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service

during July, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Dharam Singh S/O Shri Raju, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H.

Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during July, 2005 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

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2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till July, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of July, 2005 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of July, 2005 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of July, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who

had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of July, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of July,

2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May,

1994 to July, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of

petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in

pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any

other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 26 in

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para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

July, 2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

7.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

OPR

8.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

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Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2005 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach

is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of

terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed

while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched

petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as

per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to July, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in July, 2005 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

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admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after July, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in

the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for

Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 164 days in the year 1994, 157 days in 1995, 134 days in 1996, 83 days in 1997, 116

days in 1998, 72 days in 1999, 77 days in 2001, 86 days in 2002, 68 days in 2003, 70 days in 2004

and 30 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2005 in 11 years he had worked for

1057 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except 1995 to 1999 and 2001 to 2005 he

had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,

Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to

alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the

petitioner had merely worked for 30 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months

from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from

respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after July, 2005 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in July, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as

such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative

of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the

petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private

labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner

in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as

well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda

(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he

cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed

and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the

relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that

petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment

of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

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has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

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the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

11 years and actually worked for 1057 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in July, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and

had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e.

demand notice was given on 02.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above

in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

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reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 170/2015

Date of Institution : 11.04.2015

Date of Decision : 20.01.2016

Shri Hira Lal s/o Shri Thanu Ram, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Hira Lal S/o shri Thanu

Ram, R/O Village Thandal, Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before

the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal

termination of service during September, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

Whether termination of the services of Shri Hira Lal S/o Shri Thanu Ram, R/O Village

Thandal, Post Office Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,

Killar Division H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

September, 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is

legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2005 in HPPWD Sub Division

Sach. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in

each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

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department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,

2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to

petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated

to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under

the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while

retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed

by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner

and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

September, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of

September, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of

September, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2005

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May,

1994 to September, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service

of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt.

in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to

any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

September, 2005 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

9.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

OPR

10. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2005 at

HPPWD Sub Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any

written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute

that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of

appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s

termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner

requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of

reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as

claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from May, 1994 to September, 2005. He has also stated on oath that

no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2005 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2005.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the

respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work

as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in

absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that

respondent had established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 168 days in the year 1994, 128 days in 1995, 122 days in 1996, 115 days in 1997, 106

days in 1998, 96 days in 1999, 75 days in 2001, 60 days in 2002, 59 days in 2003, 72 days in 2004

and 61 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2005 in 11 years he had worked for

1062 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except 1995 to 2005 he had worked for

more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the

point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had

merely worked for 61 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month

of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law

of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have

issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not

violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2005 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for

back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

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The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

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employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

11 years and actually worked for 1062 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2005 who worked as non skilled

worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven

years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors

mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be

entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump- sum would be

appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon

by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or

less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of

delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir

Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the

Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015

SC 3473.

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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 175/2015

Date of Institution : 04.04.2015

Date of Decision : 20.01.2016

Shri Chet Ram s/o Shri Bali Ram, r/o Village and P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

….Petitioner

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Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Chet Ram S/O Shri Bali Ram,

R/O Village and P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 27.09.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services .w.e.f.

August, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of

Shri Chet Ram S/O Shri Bali Ram, R/O Village and P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. August, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of September, 1992 who continuously worked till August, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division

Killar. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in

each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of

August, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were

junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department

was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers

working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner

and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been

followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to

petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month

of August, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

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petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August,

2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting

aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 2004. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 2004 along-with back wages,

seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of

his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between September, 1992 to August, 2004

be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2001 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 & 26

in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25

& 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after six years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

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7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

August, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

OPR

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1.00 lac

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 at HPPWD Sub Division

Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement

of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was

passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

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12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1992 to August, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2004. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in

the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for

Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 37 days in the year 1992, 67 days in 1994, 148 days in 1996, 90 days in 1997, 120 days

in 1998, 59 days in 1999, 130 days in 2000, 83 days in 2001, 31 days in 2002, 26 days in 2003 and

78 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1992 to 2004 in 11 years he had worked for 869

days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160

days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial

breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is

evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for

78 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of

petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a

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notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

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would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

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17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

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I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

11 years and actually worked for 869 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e.

demand notice was given on 27.9.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above

in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief

in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

One Lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

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RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 202/2015

Date of Institution : 04.05.2015

Date of Decision : 20.01.2016

Shri Ram Lal s/o Shri Natha Ram, r/o Village Hugal, P.O. Kariyas, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

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“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Ram Lal S/O Shri Natha Ram,

R/O Village Hugal, P.O. Kariyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 08.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services

of Shri Ram Lal S/O Shri Natha Ram, R/O Village Hugal, P.O. Kariyas, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved worker

is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of April, 1997 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 171 days in the year

1997, 207 days in 1998 and 341 days in 2001 who had completed criteria of 160 days prescribed

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service

envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). It is alleged that respondent had terminated the

services of petitioner in November, 1999 and against the illegal termination, petitioner had filed

O.A. bearing no.3523/1999 before the Hon’ble Administrative Tribunal, Shimla in which Hon’ble

Administrative Tribunal had directed the respondents to reengage the petitioner in same capacity

vide order dated 02.8.2000 and thereafter the services of petitioner were reengaged by the

respondent in September, 2000. Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of

petitioner

had

interrupted

by

way

of

intermittent/artificial

breaks

given

by

the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the

department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and

joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September,

2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with

one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period

had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was

prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service

record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and

even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the

same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he

has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the

date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was

thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

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of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between April, 1997 to September, 2004 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2005 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after six years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of order dated 2.8.2000 of

Hon’ble Administrative Tribunal, H.P., Ex. PW1/C to PW1/M mandays charts of junior workers

and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent

examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1

tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-workers Ex.

RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

September, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

OPP

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2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

OPP

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

OPR

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

OPR

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

:Petition

is

partly

allowed

awarding

compensation

Rs.1,20,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till September, 2004 at HPPWD Sub

Division Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating

and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1997 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

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obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the

Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the

respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work

as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in

absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that

respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 171 days in the year 1997, 207 days in 1998, 143 days in 1999, 85 days in 2000, 341

days in 2001, 146 days in 2002, 136 days in 2003 and 81 days in 2004 and thus a total of his

service in 1997 to 2004 in 8 years he had worked for 1310 days in his entire service period. Be it

noticed that except 1999, 2000 and 2002 to 2004 he had worked for more than 160 days as there is

no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 81 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/C, Ex.

PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and

had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/M are the mandays chart

of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of

workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient

work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given

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muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior

persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated

and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for

work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)

SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-

H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

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retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between

workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour

Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.

The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c)

of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union

of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer

retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay

itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay

would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to

adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that

the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for

any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute

made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to

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adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the

industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since

there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the

delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and

it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to

the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that

the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical

defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the

ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the

tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the

relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court

may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the

date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the

State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference

by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award

passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge

and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the

Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in

view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and

intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits

between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and

harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

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19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of

H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

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years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 8

years and actually worked for 1310 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled

worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years

i.e. demand notice was given on 08.08.2010. Taking into consideration factors mentioned

above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled

either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be

appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon

by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or

less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of

delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir

Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the

Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015

SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees

one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

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25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of January, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

HOME DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-2, the 21st March, 2016

No. Home-B-B(15)4/2014.—The Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to create one post

in the cadre of District and Sessions Judge in the pay scale of Rs. 51550-1230-58920-1380-63070

for appointment as Chairman of the H.P. Waqf Tribunal.

By order,

P.C. Dhiman,

Additional Chief Secretary (Home).

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1-

lf{kIr uke A

2- fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lfpr fuf/ esa ls foÙkh; o"kZ 2015&2016 ds fy,

` 21]02]27]31]206 dh vkSj jkf'k tkjh djuk A

3-

fofu;ksx A

vuqlwphA

&&&&&&

2016 dk vf/fu;e la[;kad 1

fgekpy izns'k fofu;ksx vf/fu;e] 2016

(jkT;iky egksn; }kjk rkjh[k 17 ekpZ] 2016 dks ;Fkkvuqeksfnr)

31 ekpZ] 2016 dks lekIr gksus okys foÙkh; o"kZ ds fy, fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls lsokvksa

ds fy, dfri; vkSj èkujkf'k;ksa ds lank; dks izkf/Ñr djus vkSj mudk fofu;ksx djus ds fy, vf/fu;eA

Hkkjr x.kjkT; ds lM+lBosa o"kZ esa fgekpy izns'k fo/ku lHkk }kjk fuEufyf[kr :i esa ;g vf/fu;fer gks%&

1 - laf{kIr uke-&bl vf/fu;e dk laf{kIr uke fgekpy izns'k fofu;ksx vf/fu;e] 2016 gS A

2- fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls foÙkh; o"kZ 2015&2016 ds fy,

`21]02]27]31]206 dh vkSj jkf'k tkjh djuk-&fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls foÙkh; o"kZ

2015&2016 ds fy, ` 21,02,27,31,206 dh vkSj jkf'k tkjh djukA fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls

vuqlwph ds r`rh; LrEHk esa fofufnZ"V ls vuf/d /ujkf'k;ka] ftudk ;ksx dsoy ` 21]02]27]31]206 (nks gtkj

,d lkS nks djksM+ lÙkkbZl yk[k bdrhl gtkj nks lkS Ng #i,) gS] lanÙk vkSj mi;ksftr dh tk,] ftudk foÙkh;

o"kZ 2015&2016 dh vof/ esa vuqlwph ds f}rh; LrEHk esa fofufnZ"V lsokvksa vkSj iz;kstuksa ls lEcfU/r fofHkUu

izHkkjksa dks pqdkus ds fy, mi;ksx fd;k tk,xkA

3- fofu;ksx-&bl vf/fu;e }kjk fgekpy izns'k jkT; dh lafpr fuf/ esa ls lanÙk vkSj mi;ksftr fd,

tkus ds fy, izkf/Ñr /ujkf'k;ksa dk bl vfèkfu;e dh /kjk 2 ds v/hu fofufnZ"V vof/ ls lEcfU/r vuqlwph esa

vfHkO;Dr lsokvksa vkSj iz;kstuksa ds fy, vkSj fofu;kstu fd;k tk,xkA

9025

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

vuqlwph

(/kjk 2 vkSj 3 ns[ksa)

ekax

lsok,a vkSj iz;kstu

fuEufyf[kr jkf'k;ksa ls vuf/d

la[;k

fo/ku lHkk }kjk

lafpr fuf/ ij

dqy

nÙker

izHkkfjr

` esa

` esa

` esa

1

2

3

4

5

1 fo/ku lHkk

(jktLo)

1,78,41,000

5,00,000

1,83,41,000

(iwathxr)

7,00,00,000

—

7,00,00,000

2 jkT;iky vkSj eU=kh ifj"kn~

(jktLo)

6,72,18,500

47,41,000

7,19,59,500

3 U;k; iz'kklu

(jktLo)

9,89,94,000

11,000

9,90,05,000

(iwathxr)

10,01,81,000

—

10,01,81,000

4 lkekU; iz'kklu

(jktLo)

22,92,06,000

1,68,57,000

24,60,63,000

(iwathxr)

2,00,00,000

—

2,00,00,000

5 Hkw&jktLo o

(jktLo)

1,21,96,99,000

—

1,21,96,99,000

ftyk iz'kklu

(iwathxr)

1,40,00,000

—

1,40,00,000

6 vkcdkjh vkSj djk/ku

(jktLo)

4,75,60,438

—

4,75,60,438

7 iqfyl vkSj lEc¼ laxBu

(jktLo)

61,20,97,000

1,39,000

61,22,36,000

(iwathxr)

3,000

—

3,000

8 f'k{kk

(jktLo)

66,40,80,000

—

66,40,80,000

(iwathxr)

70,25,60,000

—

70,25,60,000

9 LokLF; ,oa ifjokj dY;k.k

(jktLo)

10,000

—

10,000

(iwathxr)

49,78,65,000

—

49,78,65,000

10 yksd fuekZ.k&lM+dsa] iqy

(jktLo)

52,79,24,000

9,07,000

52,88,31,000

,oa Hkou

(iwathxr)

70,68,91,000

40,55,80,513

1,11,24,71,513

11 d`f"k

(jktLo)

2,000

—

2,000

(iwathxr)

5,00,00,000

—

5,00,00,000

12 m|ku

(jktLo)

5,57,37,335

—

5,57,37,335

(iwathxr)

31,38,98,000

—

31,38,98,000

13 flapkbZ] tykiwfrZ ,oa

(jktLo)

23,74,42,000

—

23,74,42,000

lQkbZ

14 i'kq ikyu] nqX/ fodkl

(iwathxr)

43,00,000

—

43,00,000

,oa eRL;

15 ;kstuk ,oa fiNM+k {ks=k

(jktLo)

14,69,000

—

14,69,000

mi&;kstuk

(iwathxr)

27,72,37,000

—

27,72,37,000

9026

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

16 ou vkSj oU; thou

(jktLo)

5,000

51,416

56,416

(iwathxr)

70,50,000

—

70,50,000

17 fuokZpu

(jktLo)

14,54,62,832

—

14,54,62,832

18 m|ksx] [kfut] vkiwfrZ

(iwathxr)

6,08,22,000

—

6,08,22,000

,oa lwpuk izkS|ksfxdh

19 lkekftd U;k; ,oa

(jktLo)

1,000

17,239

18,239

vf/dkfjrk

20 xzkeh.k fodkl

(jktLo)

7,000

58,96,000

59,03,000

(iwathxr)

4,10,85,000

—

4,10,85,000

21 lgdkfjrk

(jktLo)

10,25,15,000

—

10,25,15,000

22 [kk| vkSj ukxfjd

(jktLo)

2,000

—

2,000

vkiwfrZ

(iwathxr)

54,83,000

—

54,83,000

23 fo|qr fodkl

(jktLo)

5,27,59,68,619

48,32,550

5,28,08,01,169

24 eqnz.k ,oa ys[ku lkexzh

(jktLo)

79,62,983

—

79,62,983

25 lM+d vkSj ty ifjogu

(jktLo)

1,80,77,63,265

—

1,80,77,63,265

26 i;ZVu vkSj ukxj foekuu

(jktLo)

59,78,000

—

59,78,000

(iwathxr)

2,77,07,000

—

2,77,07,000

27 Je] jkstxkj vkSj

(jktLo)

4,000

—

4,000

izf'k{k.k

(iwathxr)

1,000

—

1,000

28 'kgjh fodkl] uxj ,oa

(jktLo)

85,37,26,816

—

85,37,26,816

xzke ;kstuk rFkk vkokl

29 foÙk

(jktLo)

16,000

1,57,86,42,000

1,57,86,58,000

(iwathxr)

1,25,79,16,000

1,25,79,16,000

30 fofo/ lkekU; lsok,a

(jktLo)

4,57,47,000

—

4,57,47,000

(iwathxr)

1,37,84,000

—

1,37,84,000

31 tutkrh; fodkl

(jktLo)

63,33,25,700

—

63,33,25,700

(iwathxr)

5,000

—

5,000

32 vuqlwfpr tkfr

(jktLo)

1,85,08,40,000

—

1,85,08,40,000

mi&;kstuk

(iwathxr)

32,51,63,000

—

32,51,63,000

(jktLo)

14,50,86,05,488

1,61,25,94,205

16,12,11,99,693

(iwathxr)

3,23,80,35,000

1,66,34,96,513

4,90,15,31,513

dqy tksM+

17,74,66,40,488

3,27,60,90,718

21,02,27,31,206

9027

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

AUTHORITATIVE ENGLISH TEXT

THE HIMACHAL PRADESH APPROPRIATION ACT, 2016

ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS

Sections:

1. Short title.

2. Issue of a further sum of ` 21,02,27,31,206 out of the Consolidated Fund of the State of

Himachal Pradesh for the financial year 2015-2016.

3. Appropriation.

THE SCHEDULE.

___________

Act No. 1 of 2016

THE HIMACHAL PRADESH APPROPRIATION ACT, 2016

(AS ASSENTED TO BY THE GOVERNOR ON 17TH MARCH, 2016)

AN

ACT

to authorise payment and appropriation of certain further sums from and out of the

Consolidated Fund of the State of Himachal Pradesh for the services for the financial year ending

on the 31st day of March, 2016.

BE it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh in the Sixty-seventh Year

of the Republic of India as follows:—

1. Short title.—This Act may be called the Himachal Pradesh Appropriation Act, 2016.

2. Issue of a further sum of `21,02,27,31,206 out of the Consolidated Fund of the

State of Himachal Pradesh for the financial year 2015-2016.—From and out of the

Consolidated Fund of the State of Himachal Pradesh, there may be paid and applied sums not

exceeding those specified in column (3) of the Schedule amounting in the aggregate to the sum of

` 21,02,27,31,206 (Rupees Two Thousand one Hundred and Two crore, twenty seven lakh, thirty

one thousand, two hundred six) only towards defraying the several charges which will come in

course of payment during the financial year 2015-2016 in respect of the services and purposes

specified in column (2) of the Schedule.

3. Appropriation.—The sums authorized to be paid and applied from and out of the

Consolidated Fund of the State of Himachal Pradesh by this Act shall be further appropriated for

the services and purposes expressed in the Schedule in relation to the period specified under section

2 of this Act.

9028

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

THE SCHEDULE

(See sections 2 and 3)

Demand

Services and purposes

Sums not exceeding

No.

Voted by

Charged on the Total

the Legislative Consolidated Fund

Assembly

in `

in `

in `

1

2

3

4

5

1

Vidhan Sabha

(Revenue)

1,78,41,000

5,00,000

1,83,41,000

(Capital)

7,00,00,000

—

7,00,00,000

2

Governor and Council

(Revenue)

6,72,18,500

47,41,000

7,19,59,500

of Ministers

3

Administration of Justice

(Revenue)

9,89,94,000

11,000

9,90,05,000

(Capital)

10,01,81,000

—

10,01,81,000

4

General Administration

(Revenue)

22,92,06,000

1,68,57,000

24,60,63,000

(Capital)

2,00,00,000

—

2,00,00,000

5

Land Revenue and

(Revenue)

1,21,96,99,000

—

1,21,96,99,000

District Administration

(Capital)

1,40,00,000

—

1,40,00,000

6

Excise and Taxation

(Revenue)

4,75,60,438

—

4,75,60,438

7

Police and Allied

(Revenue)

61,20,97,000

1,39,000

61,22,36,000

Organisations

(Capital)

3,000

—

3,000

8

Education

(Revenue)

66,40,80,000

—

66,40,80,000

(Capital)

70,25,60,000

—

70,25,60,000

9

Health and Family

(Revenue)

10,000

—

10,000

Welfare

(Capital)

49,78,65,000

—

49,78,65,000

10

Public Works—Roads,

(Revenue)

52,79,24,000

9,07,000

52,88,31,000

Bridges and Buildings

(Capital)

70,68,91,000

40,55,80,513

1,11,24,71,513

11

Agriculture

(Revenue)

2,000

—

2,000

(Capital)

5,00,00,000

—

5,00,00,000

12

Horticulture

(Revenue)

5,57,37,335

—

5,57,37,335

(Capital)

31,38,98,000

—

31,38,98,000

13

Irrigation, Water Supply

(Revenue)

23,74,42,000

—

23,74,42,000

and Sanitation

14

Animal Husbandry,

(Capital)

43,00,000

—

43,00,000

Dairy Development

and Fisheries

15

Planning and Backward

(Revenue)

14,69,000

—

14,69,000

Area Sub-Plan

(Capital)

27,72,37,000

—

27,72,37,000

16

Forest and Wild Life

(Revenue)

5,000

51,416

56,416

(Capital)

70,50,000

—

70,50,000

17

Election

(Revenue)

14,54,62,832

—

14,54,62,832

18

Industries, Minerals,

(Capital)

6,08,22,000

—

6,08,22,000

Supplies & Information

Technology

9029

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

19

Social Justice and

(Revenue)

1,000

17,239

18,239

Empowerment

20

Rural Development

(Revenue)

7,000

58,96,000

59,03,000

(Capital)

4,10,85,000

—

4,10,85,000

21

Co-operation

(Revenue)

10,25,15,000

—

10,25,15,000

22

Food and Civil Supplies

(Revenue)

2,000

—

2,000

(Capital)

54,83,000

—

54,83,000

23

Power Development

(Revenue)

5,27,59,68,619

48,32,550

5,28,08,01,169

24

Printing and Stationery

(Revenue)

79,62,983

—

79,62,983

25

Road and Water

(Revenue)

1,80,77,63,265

—

1,80,77,63,265

Transport

26

Tourism and Civil

(Revenue)

59,78,000

—

59,78,000

Aviation

(Capital)

2,77,07,000

—

2,77,07,000

27

Labour, Employment

(Revenue)

4,000

—

4,000

and Training

(Capital)

1,000

—

1,000

28

Urban Development,

(Revenue)

85,37,26,816

—

85,37,26,816

Town and Country

Planning and Housing

29

Finance

(Revenue)

16,000

1,57,86,42,000

1,57,86,58,000

(Capital)

—

1,25,79,16,000

1,25,79,16,000

30

Miscellaneous General

(Revenue)

4,57,47,000

—

4,57,47,000

Services

(Capital)

1,37,84,000

—

1,37,84,000

31

Tribal Development

(Revenue)

63,33,25,700

—

63,33,25,700

(Capital)

5,000

—

5,000

32

Scheduled Castes Sub-

(Revenue)

1,85,08,40,000

—

1,85,08,40,000

Plan

(Capital)

32,51,63,000

—

32,51,63,000

Total

(Revenue)

14,50,86,05,488

1,61,25,94,205

16,12,11,99,693

(Capital)

3,23,80,35,000

1,66,34,96,513

4,90,15,31,513

Grand Total

17,74,66,40,488

3,27,60,90,718

21,02,27,31,206

&&&&&&&&

In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rural,

District Mandi, H. P.

In the matter of :—

1.

Shri Deep Kumar s/o Shri Tej Singh, r/o Village Shami, P.O. Brikhmani, Tehsil Balh,

District Mandi, H. P.

2.

Smt. Pooja Devi d/o Shri Dharam Singh, r/o V. P.O. Dudar, Tehsil Sadar, District

Mandi, H.P. (At present wife of Shri Deep Kumar s/o Shri Tej Singh, r/o Village

Shami, P.O. Brikhmani, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.)

. . Applicants.

Versus

General Public

9030

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

Subject.—Application for the registration of Marriage under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act,

1954.

Shri Deep Kumar s/o Shri Tej Singh, r/o Village Shami, P.O. Brikhmani, Tehsil Balh,

District Mandi, H. P. and Smt. Pooja Devi d/o Shri Dharam Singh, r/o V. P.O. Dudar, Tehsil

Sadar, District Mandi, H.P. (At present wife of Shri Deep Kumar s/o Shri Tej Singh, r/o Village

Shami, P.O. Brikhmani, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.) have filed an application along with

affidavits in the court of undersigned under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 that they

have solemnized their marriage on 29-05-2014 according to Hindu rites and customs at their

respective houses and they are living together as husband and wife since then. Hence, their

marriage may be registered under Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who

has any objection regarding this marriage, can file the objection personally or in writing before this

court on or before 11-04-2016 after that no objection will be entertained and marriage will be

registered.

Issued today on 9th day of March, 2016 under my hand and seal of the court.

Seal.

Sd/-

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Mandi (Rural), District Mandi.

________

In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rural,

District Mandi, H. P.

In the matter of :—

1.

Shri Dhanjai s/o Shri Nag Raj, r/o V. P.O. Rewalsar, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi,

H. P.

2.

Smt. Ankita Sihna d/o Shri Arun Kumar Sinha, r/o Inderpuri Near Taigor Colony, P.O.

Bettiah, West Champaran, Bihar, India (At present wife of Shri Dhanjai s/o Shri Nag

Raj, r/o V.P.O. Rewalsar, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.)

. . Applicants.

Versus

General Public

Subject.—Application for the registration of Marriage under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act,

1954.

Shri Dhanjai s/o Shri Nag Raj, r/o V. P.O. Rewalsar, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.

and Smt. Ankita Sihna d/o Shri Arun Kumar Sinha, r/o Inderpuri Near Taigor Colony, P.O.

Bettiah, West Champaran, Bihar, India (At present wife of Shri Dhanjai s/o Shri Nag Raj, r/o

V.P.O. Rewalsar, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H. P.) have filed an application along with

affidavits in the court of undersigned under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 that they

have solemnized their marriage on 24-02-2016 according to Hindu rites and customs at

V.P.O.Rewalsar, District Mandi, H. P. and they are living together as husband and wife since then.

Hence, their marriage may be registered under Special Marriage Act, 1954.

9031

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who

has any objection regarding this marriage, can file the objection personally or in writing before this

court on or before 11-04-2016 after that no objection will be entertained and marriage will be

registered.

Issued today on 9th day of March, 2016 under my hand and seal of the court.

Seal.

Sd/-

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Mandi (Rural), District Mandi.

________

In the Court of Shri Gian Sagar Negi, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Shimla (R),

District Shimla (H. P.)

Smt. Meena w/o Shri Tara Chand, r/o Village Panjog, P.O. Mashobra, Tehsil & District

Shimla, Himachal Pradesh.

Versus

General Public

.. Respondent.

Whereas Smt. Meena w/o Shri Tara Chand, r/o Village Panjog, P.O. Mashobra, Tehsil &

District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh has filed an application along with affidavit in the court of

undersigned under Section 13(3) of the Birth & Death Registration Act, 1969 to enter date of birth

of her son named Mr. Divya Thakur s/o Smt. Meena w/o Shri Tara Chand, r/o Village Panjog, P.

O. Mashobra, Tehsil & District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh in the record of Secy., Birth and Death,

Gram Panchayat Dhalli, Shimla.

Sl.

No.

Name of the family member

Relation

Date of birth

1.

Mr. Divya Thakur

Son

21-10-2010

Hence, this proclamation is issued to the general public if they have any objection/claim

regarding entry of the name & date of birth of above named in the record of Gram Panchayat

Dhalli, Shimla may file their claims/objections on or before one month of publication of this notice

in Govt. Gazette in this court, failing which necessary orders will be passed.

Issued today 17-03-2016 under my signature and seal of the court.

Seal.

Sd/-

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Shimla (R), District Shimla.

9032

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

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fg0 iz0A

cuke

vke turk

uksfVl cuke vke turk

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us bl vnkyr esa ,d nj[okLr xqtkjh gS fd mldk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj ds

fjdkMZ esa ntZ ugha gSA ftls izkFkhZ vc viuk uke o tUe frfFk mDr xzke iapk;r esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk

gSA ftldh iqf"V gsrq izkFkhZ us vkosnu i= e; gyQkC;ku] lfpo xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj }kjk tkjh izi=

la[;k 10] Ldwy izek.k i= izLrqr fd;k gSA

vr% bl uksfVl }kjk leLr turk xzke cSMksu o izkFkhZ ds leLr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk

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D;kj ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djus ckjs mtj o ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 08&04&2016 dks vlkyru o

odkyru gkftj gksdj viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk@ldrh gSA mlds mijkUr dksbZ mtj o ,rjkt

ugha lquk tk,xk vkSj fu;ekuqlkj izkFkZuk&i= dk fuiVkjk dj fn;k tk,xkA

vkt fnukad 09&03&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj ,oa dk;kZy; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]

mi rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr lgk;d lekgrkZ ¼izFke Js.kh½ rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0

c eqdíek % Jh iw.kZ pUn iq= Jh j.kchj flag] fuoklh xzke [kkyk D;kj] rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj]

fg0 iz0A

cuke

vke turk

uksfVl cuke vke turk

Jh iw.kZ pUn iq= Jh j.kchj flag] fuoklh xzke [kkyk D;kj] rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0

us bl vnkyr esa ,d nj[okLr xqtkjh gS fd izkFkhZ ds cPpksa dk uke gfjpUn tUe frfFk 24&04&2012

¼iq=½ o lqeu tUe frfFk 08&07&2013 ¼iq=h½ xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ ugha gSA ftldh

iqf"V gsrq izkFkhZ us vkosnu i= e; gyQkC;ku] lfpo xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj ,oe~ ftyk jftLVªkj] tUe

,oe~ e`R;q ,oe~ eq[; fpfdRlk vf/kdkjh] ukgu] ftyk fljekSj dh larqfr izLrqr dh gSA ftls izkFkhZ vc

vius cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gSA

vr% bl uksfVl }kjk leLr turk xzke [kkyk D;kj o izkFkhZ ds leLr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k

tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh dks mDr izkFkhZ ds cPpksa dk uke gfjpUn tUe frfFk 24&04&2012 ¼iq=½ o lqeu

tUe frfFk 08&07&2013 ¼iq=h½ xzke iapk;r [kkyk D;kj ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djus ckjs mtj o ,rjkt gks

9033

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

rks og fnukad 11&04&2016 dks vlkyru o odkyru gkftj gksdj viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk@

ldrh gSA mlds mijkUr dksbZ mtj o ,rjkt ugha lquk tk,xk vkSj fu;ekuqlkj izkFkZuk&i= dk fuiVkjk

dj fn;k tk,xkA

vkt fnukad 10&03&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj ,oa dk;kZy; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]

mi rglhy nnkgw] ftyk fljekSj ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh dfiy rksej] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼rglhynkj½ jktx<+] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0

Jh czgenr iq= Jh jes'k pUn] fuoklh dksVyh] rglhy jktx<+] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0

cuke

vke turk

mijksDr izkFkZuk i= Jh czgenr iq= Jh jes'k pUn] fuoklh dksVyh] rglhy jktx<+] ftyk

fljekSj] fg0 iz0 us v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e 1969 ds vUrxZr izLrqr djds

izkFkZuk dh gS fd mldh iq=h [kq'kcw o iq= oa'k ftudh tUe frfFk 5&8&2010] 25&2&2012 gS] dk uke

xzke iapk;r fVDdj] rglhy jktx<+] ftyk fljekSj ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ ugha djok;k x;k gSA ftls izkFkhZ

vc ntZ djokuk pkgrk gSA

vr% loZ&lk/kkj.k dks bl bZ'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd bl lEcU/k esa fdlh O;fDr dks

mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks og Lo;a vFkok vius izfrfuf/k }kjk fefr 8&04&2016 dks lqcg nl cts vnkyr

esa mifLFkr vkdj izLrqr djs clwjr nhxj Jh@dq0 [kq'kcw o oa'k dh tUefrfFk dks ntZ djus ds vkns'k

tkjh dj fn;s tkosaxsA

vkt fnukad 5&03&2016 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

dfiy rksej]

dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼rglhynkj½]

jktx<+] ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0A

&&&&&&&

In the court of Marriage Officer (S.D.M.) Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H. P.

NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT.

Whereas Shri Mukesh Kumar Benjwal s/o Shri Devi Prasad Benjwal, r/o H.No. 258/10,

Devi Nagar, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Jyoti Benjwal d/o Shri Girja Shankar Bhatt,

r/o H.No. 41, Village Saun Bhat Gaon, PO Bawai, Tehsil Rudra Prayag, Uttrakhand have filed an

application for registration of their marriage, which was solemnized on 17-01-2016. I solemnised

my marriage at Dehradun Uttrakhand and they have been living husband and wife ever since then.

9034

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this effect that if anybody has got

any objection regarding the registration of marriage. They should file their written objections and

should appear personally or through their authorised agents before me within the period of 30 days

from the date of issue of this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate would

be issued to the applicant by this court and later on no objection will be heard and accepted.

Issued under my hand and seal.

Seal.

Sd/-

Marriage Officer (S D M),

Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.

____________

In the court of Marriage Officer (S.D.M.) Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H. P.

NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT.

Whereas Shri Tsering Ngodup s/o Shri Bhu Dawa, r/o H.No. 68, TCIS, Village Bhuppur,

Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Yeshi Choedon d/o Late Shri Tsewang, r/o Camp

No. 9, H.No. 11, Tibetan Colony, Mundgod, District Karwar, Karnataka, have filed an application

for registration of their marriage solemnized on 20-03-2002 and they have been living husband and

wife ever since then.

Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this effect that if any body has

objection regarding the registration of marriage duly solemnized on 20-03-2002 between above

said Shri Tsering Ngodup s/o Shri Bhu Dawa and Smt. Yeshi Choedon d/o Late Shri Tsewang

both residents of H.No. 68, TCIS, Vilage Bhuppur, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P.

They should file their written objections or appear personally within the period of 30 days from the

date of issue of this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate would be issued

to the applicants by this court.

Issued my hand and seal of this office.

Seal.

Sd/-

Marriage Officer (S D M),

Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.

____________

U;k;ky; rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½

nkok la[;k % ------------@Teh. Una/M. Reg./20…….

Jh jkts'k dqekj iq= Jh tks/kk jke] tkr jktiwr] xkao Maxksyh] Mk0 Maxksyh] rglhy Åuk] ftyk

Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A

cuke

vke turk

9035

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

nkok vUrxZr /kkjk 8¼4½ fookg iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1996-

mijksDr eqdíek muoku ckyk esa Jh jkts'k dqekj iq= Jh tks/kk jke] tkr jktiwr] xkao Maxksyh]

Mk0 Maxksyh] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mldk

fookg fnukad 06&08&2005 dks Jherh vUtw ckyk iq=h Jh 'kfDr pUn] tkr jktiwr] xkao U;w oYyk

dyksuh] Mkd?kj /k;kVk ve`rlj] rglhy ve`rlj] ftyk ve`rlj ¼iatkc½ ds lkFk gqvk gSA ysfdu

vKkurk ds dkj.k vius fookg dk bUnzkt LFkkuh; jftLVªkj fookg iathdj.k Maxksyh] rglhy Åuk] ftyk

Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa u djok ldkA

vr% bl lUnHkZ esa vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr of.kZr ds fookg dk bUnzkt

jftLVªkj fookg LFkkuh; iathdj.k Maxksyh] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa ntZ djokus ckjs fdlh

dks ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 05&04&2016 dks bl U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj izLrqr dj ldrk gS]

vU;Fkk blds ckn mDr of.kZr fookg iathdj.k gsrq vkxkeh dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk;sxhA blds ckn

dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA

vkt fnukad 05&03&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

U;k;ky; rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½

nkok la[;k % ------------@Teh. Una/M. Reg./20…….

Jh jkts'k /kheku iq= Jh ;'kiky /kheku] tkr rj[kku] xkao cgM+kyk] Mk0 cgM+kyk] rglhy Åuk]

ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A

cuke

vke turk

nkok vUrxZr /kkjk 8¼4½ fookg iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1996-

mijksDr eqdíek muoku ckyk esa Jh jkts'k /kheku iq= Jh ;'kiky /kheku] tkr rj[kku] xkao

cgM+kyk] Mk0 cgM+kyk] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr fd;k gS

fd mldk fookg fnukad 26&09&2014 dks Jherh veunhi dkSj iq=h Jh vejthr flag] tkr rj[kku]

xkao Mwesokyk] Mkd?kj Nkt] rglhy vkUuniqj lkfgc] ftyk jksiM+ ¼iatkc½ ds lkFk gqvk gSA ysfdu

vKkurk ds dkj.k vius fookg dk bUnzkt LFkkuh; jftLVªkj fookg iathdj.k cgM+kyk] rglhy Åuk]

ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa u djok ldkA

vr% bl lUnHkZ esa vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr of.kZr ds fookg dk bUnzkt

jftLVªkj fookg LFkkuh; iathdj.k cgM+kyk] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa ntZ djokus ckjs fdlh

dks ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 05&04&2016 dks bl U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj izLrqr dj ldrk gS]

9036

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 21 ekpZ] 2016@01 pS=] 1938

vU;Fkk blds ckn mDr of.kZr fookg ds iathdj.k gsrq vkxkeh dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk;sxhA blds ckn

dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA

vkt fnukad 05&03&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A

fu;U=d] eqnz.k rFkk ys[ku lkexzh] fgekpy izns'k] f'keyk&5 }kjk eqfnzr rFkk izdkf'kr

bysDVªkWfud gLrk{kfjr jkti=] oSclkbV http://rajpatrahimachal.nic.in ij miyC/k gS ,oe~ vkWuykbu lR;kfir fd;k tk ldrk gS