jkti=] fgekpy izns'k
fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr
ohjokj] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2, the 02nd May, 2016
No. Ind-A(F)17-3/2009-loose.—The Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased extend the
validity period of the State Level Advisory Board for the development of MSME, constituted vide
this department Notification No.Ind-A(F)17-3/2009 dated 05-06-2013, upto 31-03-2017.
By order,
Sd/-
Pr. Secretary(Inds.).
27&jkti=@2016&05&05&2016 ¼625½
626
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-02, the 2nd May, 2016
No. EDN-A-Ka (1)-15/2013.—The Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order to take
over the services of following Assistant Professors in different subjects of erstwhile Pt. Anant
Ram Degree College, Baroh, Distt. Kangra, H.P. on contract basis subject to the terms and
conditions as indicated in the notification.
The Governor, Himachal Pradesh is further pleased to post them on their fresh appointment
as Assistant Professor (College Cadre) on contract basis at the place shown against their
name(s):—
Sr.No. Name
Father,s Name
Designation
Place of posting
1.
Sh. Rakesh Kumar
Sh. Ishwar Dass
Physics
Govt. College, Baroh.
2.
Smt. Poonam Sharma
Sh. Satish Kumar
History
Govt. College, Baroh.
3.
Sh. Aman Walia
Sh. Surinder Kumar
English
Govt. College, Sangrah
(Sirmour).
4.
Sunita Devi
Sh. Om Prakash
English
Govt. College, Baroh.
Terms and conditions:—
1.
The Assistant Professor (College Cadre) in the Department of Higher Education, H.P.
will be engaged on contract basis initially for one year, which may be extendable
on year to year basis. The date of joining will be considered for counting of service for
annual increase etc.
2.
The Assistant Professor (College Cadre) appointed on contract basis will be paid
consolidated fixed contractual amount @ Rs. 21,600 P.M. (Rs. Twenty one thousand
and six hundred only) (which shall be equal to initial of the pay band + Grade
Pay). An amount of Rs. 648/- as annual increase in contractual emoluments for the
subsequent years will be allowed if contract is extended beyond one year and no
other allied benefits such as senior/selection scales etc. shall be given.
3.
The Addl. Chief Secretary/Principal Secretary/Secretary (Hr. Education) to the
Government of Himachal Pradesh will be appointing and disciplinary authority.
4.
He / she will not be governed by the rules, regulations and orders in force from
time to time as applicable to other government servants such as CCS (CCA) Rules,
1965 and CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 as are applicable in Himachal Pradesh.
5.
Before submitting the report to the Government the contract appointee shall sign an
agreement as per Annexure –A.
6.
The service of the Contract Appointee will be purely on temporary basis. The
appointment is liable to be terminated in case the performance/conduct of the contract
appointee is not found satisfactory.
627
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
7.
During the contract service, no advance will be given to him/her.
8.
Contractual Appointee Assistant Professor (Colleges) will be entitled for one day’s
casual leave after putting in one month service. However, the contract employees will
also be entitled for 12 weeks Maternity Leave and 10 day’s Medical Leave. He/She
shall not be entitled for Medical Re-imbursement and LTC etc. No Leave of any
other kind except above is admissible to the contractual appointee. Provided that
the un-availed Casual Leave and Medical Leave can be accumulated upto the
calendar Year and will not be carried forwarded for the next calendar Year.
9.
Unauthorized absence from the duty without the approval of the Controlling Officer
shall automatically lead to the termination from the contract. Contract Appointee
shall not be entitled for contractual amount for the period of absence from duty.
10. Transfer of a contract appointee will be permitted from one place to another after
putting three years of service at one place.
11. Selected candidate will have to submit a certificate of his/her fitness from Medical
Board, DDU Hospital, Shimla-1. Woman candidate pregnant beyond 12 weeks will
stand temporarily unfit till the confinement is over. The woman candidate will be re-
examined for the fitness.
12. Contract appointee will be entitled to TA/DA if required to go on tour in
connection with his/her official duties at the same rate as applicable to regular
officials at the minimum of pay scale.
13. The candidate engaged on contract basis under these Rules shall have no right to
claim for regularization/ permanent absorption as Assistant Professor (College cadre)
in the Department at any stage.
14. The appointment is provisional and is subject to the educational qualification and other
certificates being verified through proper channels and if the verification reveals that
the claim to belong to reserve categories, as the case may be is false, the services will
be terminated forthwith without assigning any further reasons and without prejudice
to such further action as may be taken under the provisions of the Indian Penal
Code for production of false certificate.
15. He/She will have to give a declaration to the effect that he/she has only one living
spouse, if married.
16. He/She will have to take an oath of allegiance/ faithfulness to the Constitution of
India or making a solemn affirmation.
17. He/She will have to produce all the certificates in original at the time of joining
this appointment.
If, the above terms and conditions are acceptable to him/her, should report for duty within
a week from the issue of this Notification in the Government College mentioned against his/her
name, failing which this offer of appointment shall stand cancelled and no further
628
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
correspondence shall be entertained in this behalf. No Travelling allowance will be allowed to
join the contract appointment.
By order,
(P. C. DHIMAN),
Addl. Chief Secretary (Hr.Edu.).
_____________
No.EDN-A-Ka(1)15 /2013
Dated:Shimla-02, 2nd May, 2016.
Copy for information and necessary action to :—
1.
The Director Higher Education, HP Shimla-01 with the direction to maintain the
personal files of the newly contract appointee i.e. Assistant Professor and keep all the
record of individual concerned. The DHE may also ensure that the newly contract
appointee fulfill all the requisite educational qualification and other criteria required
under the R & P Rules of the Assistant Professor (College Cadre).
2. The Principal, Government College concerned with the direction to submit the DOB
certificates, medical fitness certificate and other certificates / credentials of the
incumbent(s) to the Director of Higher Education after verifying the photocopies from
the original certificates. He/She should also be administered oath as mentioned in Para
15, 16 and certificate to this effect be also sent to the Director of Higher Education.
The Principal should accept joining as per the above Terms & Conditions including
after production of Medical Fitness Certificate, Agreement duly signed by the
candidate on Judicial Paper and completing all codal formalities.
3. The Secretary, H.P. Public Service Commission, Shimla-2.
4. The Under Secretary (Edu.-D) to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh.
5. The Chief Medical Officer, DDU Hospital, Shimla-1 with the request to send the
medical fitness report / certificate to the Director of Higher Education, Himachal
Pradesh, Shimla-1.
6. The individual concerned (By name by Speed/registered post).
7. Guard file.
(PUSHPA CHAUDHARY),
Joint Secretary (Hr.Edu.) to the
Government of Himachal Pradesh.
____________
ANNEXURE –A
Form of contract/agreement to be executed between the _________________ (Name of the
post) and the Government of Himachal Pradesh through _________________ (Designation of
the Appointing Authority).
This agreement is made on this ____________________day of_______________in the
year_________________________Between Sh./Smt. ______________________________S/o/D/o
Shri______________R/o_________________________
629
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
Contract appointee (hereinafter called the FIRST PARTY), AND the Governor of
Himachal Pradesh through____________________ (Designation of the Appointing Authority)
Himachal Pradesh (here-in-after the SECOND PARY).
Whereas, the SECOND PARTY has engaged the aforesaid FIRST PARTY and the
FIRST PARTY has agreed to serve as a Assistant Professor (College Cadre) on contract basis on the
following terms & conditions:—
1.
That the FIRST PARTY shall remain in the service of the SECOND PARTY as
an Assistant Professor (College Cadre) for a period of 1 year commencing on day
of _____________ and ending on the day of ____________ It is specifically
mentioned and agreed upon by both the parties that the contract of the FIRST PARTY
with SECOND PARTY shall ipso-facto stand terminated on the last
working day i.e. on______________And information notice shall not be necessary.
Provided that for-further extension/renewal of contract period the HOD shall issue a
certificate that the service and conduct of the contract appointee was satisfactory
during the year and only then the period of contract is to be renewed / extended.
2.
The contractual amount of the FIRST PARTY will be Rs. 21, 600/- per month.
3.
The service of FIRST PARTY will be purely on temporary basis. The appointment is
liable to be terminated in case the performance/conduct of the contract appointee is not
found good or if a regular incumbent is appointed / posted against the vacancy for
which the first party was engaged on contract.
4.
Contractual appointee i.e. Assistant Professor(Colleges) will be entitled for one day
casual leave after putting in one month service. However, the Contract employee
will also be entitled for 12 weeks Maternity Leave and 10 day’s Medical Leave. She
shall not be entitled for Medical re-imbursement and LTC etc. No leave of any other
kind except above is admissible to the contractual appointee. Provided that the un
availed Casual Leave and Medical Leave can be accumulated upto the calendar Year
and will not be carried forward for the next calendar Year.
5.
Unauthorized absence from the duty without the approval of the Controlling Officer
shall automatically lead to the termination of the contract. A contractual appointee will
not be entitled for contractual amount for the period of absence from duty.
6.
An official appointed on contract basis who have completed three years tenure at
one place of posting will be eligible for transfer on need based basis wherever
required on administrative grounds.
7.
Selected candidate will have to submit a certificate of her fitness from a
Government/Registered Medical Practitioner. In case of women candidates
pregnancy beyond twelve weeks will render her temporarily unfit till the confinement
is over. The women candidate should be re-examined for fitness from an authorized
Medical Officer/Practitioner.
8.
Contract appointee shall be entitled to TA/DA if required to go on tour in connection
with his/her official duties at the same rate as applicable to regular counter-part
official at the minimum of pay scale.
630
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
9.
The Employees Group Insurance Scheme as well as EPF/GPF will not be applicable
to contractual appointee(s).
IN WITNESS the FIRST PARTY AND SECOND PARTY have herein to set their hands
the day, month and year first, above written.
IN THE PRESENCE OF WITNESS:
1.
_____________________
_____________________
_____________________
(Name and Full Address)
(Signature of the SECOND PARTY)
2.
______________________
______________________
______________________
(Name and Full Address)
IN THE PRESENCE OF WITNESS:
1.
_____________________
_____________________
_____________________
(Name and Full Address)
(Signature of the FIRST PARTY)
2.
_____________________
_____________________
_____________________
(Name and Full Address)
____________
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla, the 25th April, 2016
No: Shram (A) 6-1/2016 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under section
17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the
publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court
Shimla on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of Himachal
Pradesh:—
Sr.
No.
Case No.
Title of the Case
Date of
Award
1. 77/2015
Sh. Amit Sharma V/s M/s C&E Ltd. Baddi.
03-03-2016
631
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
2. 31/2014
Smt. Nirmla Devi V/S Raja Forgings & Gear Ltd.
11-03-2016
3. 32/2014
Sh. Rajinder Kumar V/S –do-
11-03-2016
4. 39/2014
Smt Jaswinder Kaur V/S –do-
11-03-2016
5. 40/2014
Sh. Guman Singh V/S -do-
11-03-2016
6. 26/2011
Sh. Anil Kumar V/S M.D. H.P. Financial Corp. Shimla.
15-03-2016
7. 64/2014
Sh Jiya Lal V/S President School Management
Committee & Others.
22-03-2016
8. 98/2010
Sh. Rangila Ram V/S M/S Perfect Security Panchkula &
Others.
22-03-2016
9. 55/2015
Sh. Ram Gopal V/S HPPWD.
22-03-2016
10. 60/2012
Sh. Ram Singh Mehta V/S Z plus Security & Others.
28-03-2016
11. 42/2011
Smt. Seema V/S Sanitation Promotion & Others.
30-03-2016
12. 43/2011
Sh. Manoj V/S -do-
30-03-2016
13. 44/2011
Smt. Nirmala V/S -do-
30-03-2016
14. 45/2011
Smt. Zeerina V/S -do-
30-03-2016
15. 46/2011
Smt. Bimbla V/s Sanitation Promotion & Others.
30-03-2016
16. 47/2011
Sh. Satinder V/S -do-
30-03-2016
17. 51/2011
Sh. Palak Ram V/S -do-
30-03-2016
18. 29/2014
Smt. Santresh V/S -do-
30-03-2016
19. 59/2015
Sh. Ramesh Kumar V/S M/S Wipro Enterprises Ltd.
31-03-2016
By order,
Sd/-
Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.).
__________
3.3.2016.
Present: None for the petitioner.
Shri Alok Bhardwaj, Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondent and filed
memo of appearance.
632
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
Case called twice but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. It is 10:50 AM. Be
called again.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
Case called again
Present: None for the petitioner.
Shri Alok Bhardwaj, Advocate for respondent.
It is 12:55 PM case called again but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Be
called after lunch.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
Case called after lunch
Present: None for the petitioner.
Shri Alok Bhardwaj, Advocate for respondent.
It is 3:05 PM. Case called repeatedly in pre and post lunch sessions but none appeared on
behalf of the petitioner despite the fact that he has been duly served for today as per the AD
received back. Since, the petitioner has failed to appear before this Court despite having been duly
served and to file claim petition which shows that he is not interested to pursue his claim arising out
of the reference which has been sent by the appropriate government to this Court for adjudication,
hence, this Court is left with no other alternative but to decide the reference on the basis of material
whatsoever is available on file. The reference sent by the appropriate government for adjudication
is as under:
“Whether termination of Shri Amit Sharma S/o Shri H.R Sharma Village Daryota,
P.O Bhira, Tehsil & District Hamirpur HP by Employer/Management of M/s C& E
Ltd., Chemical Division (unit-II) Village Judikalan, adjoining plot no. 69B Industrial
Area Baddi District Solan, HP on account of resignation which has been alleged to be
taken by the management under duress from above ex- worker, is legal and justified?
If not, to what relief of reinstatement, back-wages, compensation and other service
benefits
the
above
aggrieved
workman
is
entitled
to
from
the
above
employer/management?”
In the absence of any claim petition and evidence on behalf of petitioner, it cannot be held
that his services were wrongly and illegally terminated by the respondent. Hence, the reference is
answered against the petitioner and the award is passed accordingly. Let a copy of this award be
sent to the appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion be
consigned to records.
Announced:
(Sushil Kukreja)
3.3.2016.
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
633
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
11.3.2016.
Present:
Shri NiranjanVerma, Advocate for petitioner.
None for respondent.
Today, also correct address of respondent has not been filed. The record reveals that the
respondent is not being served as the petitioner has failed to file correct address of the respondent
despite repeated opportunities. The learned counsel for the petitioner today stated at bar that the
correct address of the respondent is not available and cannot be served. Therefore, it will be a futile
exercise to keep the reference pending particularly in view of the fact that the correct address of the
respondent is not available and is notbeing served. Hence, this Court is left with no other alternative
but to decide the reference on the basis of material whatsoever is available on the file. The
following reference has been received from the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services lf Smt. Nirmala Devi W/o Shri Soma Singh C/o Shri
Joginder Singh Village Sandholi, P.O HaripurSandhol, Tehsil Baddi, District Solan
HP by the Managing Director M/s Raja Forging & Gears Ltd., Sai Road Baddi
District Solan, HP w.e.f. 1.3.2013 without following the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-wages, seniority,
past service benefits and compensation the above Ex- worker is entitled to from the
above employer?”
As per reference received from the appropriate government, the petitioner has alleged
hertermination of services by the respondent w.e.f. 1.3.2013 to be illegal and unjustified but the
petitioner has failed to file the correct address of the respondent.Moreover, the petitioner has also
failed to file any claim petition and to lead evidence which could go to show that she was illegally
terminated by the respondent. Hence, in the absence of any claim petition/ evidence on record, the
reference is answered against the petitioner. However, the liberty is granted to the petitioner to
agitate her termination of service, as and when the correct address of the respondent becomes
available with her, by moving an application before this Court in order to revive the reference. Let
a copy of this order/award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in the official
gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced:
11.3.2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, HP INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL- CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA.
App. No. 13 of 2011.
Instituted on.21.6.2011.
Decided on. 31.3.2016.
Rajinder Kumar S/o Shri Janki Ram R/o Village Kasar, Tehsil Pachhad, District Sirmour,
HP.
634
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
VS.
Petitioner.
•
HP State Marketing Board, Khalini Shimla-2 through its Secretary.
•
Market Committee Shimla and Kinnaur Regulated Market Complex, Dhallkli Shimla- 12,
through its Secretary.
Respondents.
Petition under the Industrial Disputes Act, seeking declaratory relief.
For petitioner :
Shri Peeyush Verma, Advocate.
For respondent no.1 :
Ex-parte.
For respondent no.2 : Navlesh Verma, Advocate.
ORDER/AWARD
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that he was engaged as clerk by the HP State Marketing
Board in September, 1995 and worked as such till September, 2004, when his services had orally
been terminated without due compliance of any provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred as to Act) despite the fact that the petitioner had been preforming his duties
with zeal and devotion to the best of his capabilities and to the entire satisfaction of his superiors. It
is further stated that the petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year and there was no
complaint against him and even after the retrenchment of the petitioner, the respondents retained
and employed the persons junior to him. It is also stated that the petitioner was falsely implicated in
a criminal case at the instance of certain persons, though he was honorably acquitted by the Ld.
JMIC in the false case and thereafter the petitioner approached the respondents with the written
request for his re-engagement but of no avail. The petitioner had preferred a demand notice to the
respondents which was taken up by the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer Shimla for conciliation
between the parties but the conciliation failed and the matter kept for reference to this Tribunal and
a period of more than three months has expired from 16.8.2010 when the petitioner had preferred
the demand notice. Against this back-drop, a prayer has been made for re-instatement with seniority
and continuity along-with back- wages.
3
Respondent no.1 has not filed any reply and vide separate statement of Shri Sanjeev
Sharma, Advocate, respondent no.1 has adopted the reply filed on behalf of respondent no.2.
However, on 15.1.2014, the respondent no.1 was proceeded against ex-parte.
4
Respondent no.2 filed detailed reply wherein preliminary objections qua
maintainability, time barred, estoppel, petition is bad for mis-joinder of parties and the petitioner
has not approached this Court with clean hands. On merits, it has been asserted that the petitioner
was engaged on daily wage basis by the committee to meet its exigency of services and avowed
objects specified under the special Act of which it is a creation. It is denied that the petitioner was
performing his duties with zeal and devotions to the best of his capability and to the entire
satisfaction of his superiors and that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is asserted
that the petitioner had left the job on his own without seeking permission form the competent
authority. It is further asserted that while the petitioner was serving as daily waged worker he was
deputed at Check Post Neri Pul to collect levy as per the provisions of the Act ibid, it was
discovered by the flying squad consisting of Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary of the Committee
on checking that the petitioner was absent from duty on 6.9.2004 without any intimation and due to
635
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
his absence many trucks crossed the barrier/check post without payment of due market fees viz @
1% of the total price of the produce/goods. It is also asserted that few days earlier a FIR bearing no.
66/2004 at Police Station Rajgarh under sections 420, 409, 465, 471, 468 and 120-B of IPC had
been registered against the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner while performing his duties
at the Check Post Neri Pul, had been cheating, misappropriating the government money for his
personal use by forging documents, receipts etc. and after facing trial, he was acquitted by giving
benefit of doubt. It is denied that the service record of the petitioner was excellent. It is further
stated that there is no work available for the petitioner as new recruitments had been made to meet
the exigency of the work. The respondent no.2 prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.
5
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner has reiterated his allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
6
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
22.6.2013.
•
Whether the services of the petitioner were illegally and arbitrarily terminated in the
month of September, 2004 as alleged?
OPP……….
•
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits, the applicant is entitled
to?
OPP……..
•
Whether this petition is not maintainable as alleged?
OPR……….
•
Whether this petition is time barred?
OPR………..
•
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing this petition as alleged?
OPR………….
•
Whether this petition is bad for misjoinder and nonjoinder of necessary parties as
alleged?
OPR…….
•
Relief.
7
I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and respondent no.2 and have also
gone through the record of the case carefully.
8
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
Entitled to reinstatement with seniority and continuity w.e.f
11.8.2010 but without back wages.
Issue no.3 No.
636
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
Issue no.4 No.
Issue no.5 No.
Issue no.6 No.
Relief. Reference answered in favour of the petitioner and against
respondents per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings
Issue no.1
9
Ld. Counsel for petitioner contended that the petitioner had worked continuously with
the respondent from Sept., 1995 till September, 2004 and completed 240 days in each calendar year
but his services had been orally terminated by the respondent without following any provision of
the Act and further that juniors to him were retained by the respondents. He further contended that
consequent upon the judgment Ex. PW-1/A, passed by Ld. JMIC Rajgarh on 28.1.2010, the
petitioner was acquitted of the offences punishable under section 420, 409, 465, 471, 468 and 120-
B of IPC, the petitioner requested the respondents vide Ex. PW-1/C for his re-engagement but of no
avail. Since, the services of the petitioner were terminated in utter violation of the provisions of the
Act, he deserves to be reinstated alongwith all the consequential benefits including back wages.
10 On the contrary, learned counsel for respondent no.2 contended that the services of the
petitioner had been engaged on daily wages basis to collect the market fee at the Check Post at Neri
Pul and on 4th September, 2004, a flying squad consisting of Chairman, Vice Chairman and
Secretary visited Neripul and found the petitioner absent from his duty and on enquiry it was
revealed that from 2.9.2004, nobody was present at check post and an FIR was lodged against the
petitioner and Police seized the record and due to absence of the petitioner the respondents suffered
huge loss on account of non-collection of the due market fee at the check post. He further
contended that thereafter the petitioner had not turned up for his duties and abandoned the job at his
own and the respondents deployed other staff at the check post.
11 While appearing in the witness box as PW-1, the petitioner has deposed that he was
engaged as daily wages clerk by the Committee in August, 1995 and remained posted at Market
Committee Neri Pul Check Post till September, 2004 and then his services had been terminated by
the respondent verbally without any reason by telling that since a case had been registered against
him, his services were being terminated. He had worked round the clock even on Sundays and
Holidays but his presence was not marked. No notice and compensation had been paid to him at the
time of his termination. Neither show cause notice had been issued to him nor any enquiry was
held. The case against him was decided by the JMIC Rajgarh, wherein he was acquitted vide
judgment Ex. PW-1/A. Thereafter, he approached the respondents for his reinstatement vide Ex.
PW-1/C and the reply filed by the respondents is Ex. PW-1/D and after 90 days he again
approached the respondents for his reengagement but he was told vide letters Ex. PW-1/E and Ex.
PW-1/F that his services could not be re-engaged as the then Chairman had engaged him without
sanction in the year, 1995. He is unemployed after his retrenchment. In cross-examination, he
stated that he has not brought any appointment letter and no agreement of appointment or contract
of appointment was got signed between the parties. He remained at home only w.e.f. 2.9.2004 till
2010 and during this period, he was visiting the office of respondent at Shimla two or three times in
a month. He denied that he had not given any representation/letter for his re-engagement. He
admitted that in the criminal case, registered against him, he remained in custody for about 12 to 15
637
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
days. He denied that the respondents were engaging his services from time to time at different
places. He further denied that after 2.9.2004, he on his own had not performed his duties.
12 On the contrary, respondent no.2 examined one Shri Bhagat Ram Garg, Assistant
Secretary, who has stated that the petitioner was engaged by respondent no.2 on daily wage basis to
collect the market fee at the check post at Neri Pul and on 4th September, 2004 a flying squad
consisting of Chairman, Vice Chairman and he himself visited Neri Pul and found the petitioner
absent from his duty. On enquiry, it was revealed that from 2.9.2004 nobody was present at check
post Neri Pul and FIR was lodged against the petitioner and Police had seized the record. He further
stated that due to absence of the petitioner from duty, the Market Committee had suffered huge loss
on account of non-collection of the due market fee at the check post. Thereafter, the petitioner
never turned up for duty and the Committee deployed other staff at the check post Neri Pul. In
cross-examination, he admitted that the petitioner was engaged as clerk in September 1995 and he
had worked till September, 2004 continuously. He denied that the Police had immediately informed
the respondents about the lodging of the FIR. He admitted that no notice and chargesheet was
issued and no enquiry was conducted against the petitioner. He denied that after release on bail, the
petitioner visited the respondents to join his duties but he was not allowed to join. He admitted that
the petitioner was acquitted by the Court on 28.1.2010. He further admitted that the petitioner had
written a letter Ex. PW-1/C for joining with the respondents and thereafter respondent no.2 issued a
letter Ex. PW-1/D to the petitioner and also wrote letters Ex. PW-1/E and Ex. PW-1/F to the
respondent no.1. He also admitted that the issue of resumption of duties by the petitioner has still
not been decided.
13 I have considered the respective contention of learned counsel for petitioner and
respondent no 2 and had also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
14 After the closer scrutiny of the record of the case, it has become clear that the services
of the petitioner had been engaged by the respondent no.2 as daily wages clerk in the month of
September 1995 and he worked as such till September, 2004 continuously. It is an admitted fact
that on 2.9.2004, FIR was lodged against the petitioner under sections 420, 409, 465, 471, 468 and
120-B of IPC and after facing trial the petitioner was acquitted by the learned JMIC Rajgarh vide
judgment Ex. PW-1/A. It is also an admitted fact that after acquittal, the petitioner represented the
respondents for his re-instatement and submitted his joining report/letter Ex. PW-1/C which was
duly replied by the respondents vide letter Ex. PW-1/D but the services of the petitioner had not
been engaged. The only stand which has been taken by the respondents is to the effect that the
petitioner was engaged on daily wages basis to collect the market fee at the Check Post at Neri Pul
and on 4th September, 2004, a flying squad consisting of Chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary
visited Neripul and found the petitioner absent from his duty and on enquiry it was revealed that
from 2.9.2004, nobody was present at check post and thereafter the petitioner never turned up for
duty and the respondents deployed other staff at the check post. It has been admitted by RW-1 Shri
Bhagat Ram in his cross-examination that no notice and chargesheet was issued and no enquiry was
conducted against the petitioner. Since, the petitioner had been in continuous service of the
respondents from the year, 1995 till September 2004, his services could not have been terminated
without complying with the provisions of the Act. It is settled legal proposition that a workman,
against whom misconduct is alleged, cannot be dismissed or discharged unless a proper domestic
enquiry is held against him in respect of the alleged misconduct. Even, if the alleged misconduct is
proved against the workman, he cannot be dis-charged or dismissed from service unless he has
been afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard before initiating any action against him by the
employer/respondent. Since, the petitioner had completed 240 days in twelve calendar months
preceding his termination, a reasonable opportunity of being heard should have been afforded to
him and proper enquiry should have been held before terminating his services. In D. K Yadav Vs.
638
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
M/s J.M A Industries Ltd. as reported in 1993-1 Supreme Court Service Law Judgments -221,
the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“Reasonable opportunity be given to the employee concerned to put forth his case and
proper enquiry be held before terminating his service.”
In a recent judgment of our Hon’ble High Court in ILR-XLV (VI) 938 titled as
Gurcharan Singh Deceased through his LR’s Vs. State of HP and ors. the workman was
arrested and was convicted of the offence punishable under section 324 of the IPC and he was
terminated without conducting any enquiry. The Hon’ble High Court has held that his termination
could not have been ordered without conducting any enquiry as the workman had completed 240
days and was therefore entitled to the enquiry. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads
as under:
“8. The moot question is whether termination can be ordered without conducting any
inquiry? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons:
9……………………………………..
10. While going through the impugned award and the writ petition, one comes to an
inescapable conclusion that the termination of deceased Gurcharan Singh was made
without following the mandate of law.
11……………………………………..
12…………………………………….
13. In the instant case, deceased Gurcharan Singh had completed 240 days in a calendar
year, as discussed and held by the Labour Court, after scanning the evidence, the
inquiry was required, not to speak of only issuance of the notice.
In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner had worked with the respondents from the
year, 1995 to 2.9.2004 continuously which fact is also clear from the cross-examination of RW-1
wherein he has admitted that the petitioner had worked continuously from the year 1995 till
September, 2004 meaning thereby the petitioner had completed 240 working days in twelve
calendar months preceding his termination. However, the petitioner was never asked to answer any
charges as no chargesheet was issued to him and no enquiry was held before terminating his
services, on the basis of the alleged misconduct. Moreover, the petitioner was acquitted by the
learned JMIC Rajgarh vide judgment Ex. PW-1/A and thereafter he approached the respondents for
his reinstatement but of no avail. Hence, the termination of the services of the petitioner without
conducting any enquiry and without affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the
petitioner is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, before terminating the
services of the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondents to have complied with the
provisions of section 25-F of the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the
retrenchment of a workman (workmen) and requires the employer to comply with those conditions
as per clauses (a) to (c) which are mandatory in nature. It has been held by our own Hon’ble High
Court in Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 776 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the
settled law in counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during twelve calendar months and not a year. The relevant extract of the aforesaid
judgment is reproduced as under:
639
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the
right conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has
place on record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health
division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the termination of the
services of an employee by way of retrenchment without complying with the provisions of section
25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant extract of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in
any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in
Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the
employer is required to give to the workman one month’s notice in writing indicating
the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a
duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment,
compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of
continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory
and
non-compliance
thereof
renders
the
retrenchment
of
an
employee
nullity……………..”
(2) Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, as it is clear that the petitioner had
worked for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination, the
respondents were under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act before terminating his services. But, no such compliance was made by the
respondents, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of respondents. As a
result, the termination of petitioner from September, 2004 is not sustainable in the eyes of law and
is hereby set aside.
(3) The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the respondents have
violated the provisions of section 25-G and 25-H of the Act as after the termination of the services
of the petitioner, the respondents have engaged/retained the juniors to the petitioner. RW-1 Shri
Bhagat Ram has stated on oath that the petitioner never turned up for duty and the committee
deployed other staff at the Check Post, Neri Pul. Thus, it has been proved on record that the
respondents have engaged persons junior to him and no notice had been issued to the petitioner
before terminating his services. In 2007 LLR 72, State of Haryana Vs. Dilbagh Singh, it has
been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that where persons junior to a workman were, still working
with management, termination of services of workman being in violation of sections 25-G and 25-
H of the Industrial Disputes Act providing for procedure for retrenchment and re-employment of
retrenched workers will not be valid and legal.
(4) In the present case also, the petitioner has duly proved that after the termination of his
services, juniors have been engaged/retained by the respondent whereas no notice was given to the
petitioner by the respondents at any point of time calling upon him for his re- employment before
the engagement of his juniors and as such the termination of services of the petitioner by the
respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act is improper and
unjustified as the respondents have violated the principle of “first come, last go”.
640
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
(5) Thus, having regard to the entire evidence on record, I have no hesitation in holding
that the services of the petitioner were illegally and arbitrarily terminated by the respondents in the
month of September, 2004. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against
respondents.
Issue no.2
(6) Since I have held under issues no.1 above that the termination of services of the
petitioner by the respondents without following the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified,
hence, the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated in service forth-with with seniority and continuity
w.e.f. 11.8.2010 when he raised the demand notice.
(7) Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner is entitled to full back wages as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In
(2009) 1 SCC 20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is
set-aside, ordinarily, the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an
employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages,
which is independent of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2010 (1) SLJ S.C 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be
granted mechanically, upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that
reinstatement must not be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when
the workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.
(8) Moreover, the petitioner was under an obligation to prove by leading cogent evidence
that he was not gainfully employed after the termination of his services. The initial burden is on the
workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan
and another Vs. S.C Sharma that :
“16…………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back-wages
is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial
burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on
record materials to rebut the claim…………..”
(9) In the present case, the petitioner has failed to discharge his burden by placing any
plausible
material
on
record
that
he
was
not
gainfully
employed
after
his
termination/disengagement. Except for his bald statement, there is nothing on record which could
go to show that after his termination, the petitioner was not gainfully employed. Therefore, in view
of the entire evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no hesitation in holding
that the petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, issue no.2 is partly decided in
favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
Issue no.3.
(10) The onus to prove this issue was on the respondents. However, respondents had failed
to establish as to how the petition is not maintainable. It is not understandable as to how the petition
is not maintainable especially when the same has been filed by the petitioner pursuant to the
demand notice dated 11.8.2010. It has been specifically averred in the petition that the aforesaid
demand notice was taken up by the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, Shimla for conciliation
between the parties but the conciliation failed and the matter was kept for reference to this Court. It
has further been stated in the petition that since a period of more than three months has expired
641
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
when the petitioner has preferred demand notice, the petitioner has filed this application directly
before this Court without further awaiting for reference for adjudication of the dispute by the
appropriate government. The aforesaid averments made by the petitioner have not been specifically
denied by the respondents. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petition is not maintainable.
Accordingly, issue no.3 is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondents.
Issue no. 4
(11) The learned counsel for respondent no.2 contended that the petition filed by the
petitioner is time barred as he has raised the dispute after a gap of six years. However, the law on
the point is well settled that no limitation is prescribed either under the Industrial Disputes Act or
under the Limitation Act for raising the Industrial Dispute. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its
various judgments has held that the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in
(1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing –cum-
processing Service Society Limited and Another. that:-
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the
proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of
delay alone”
It has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurmail Singh Vs. Principal
Government College of Education and others, (2009) 9 SCC 496 that mere delay in challenging
the termination would not be a bar to the adjudication of the matter but could only deprive the
appellant of his back wages for the period of delay in raising the termination issue.
(12) Therefore, the aforesaid law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various context
makes the legal position clear that there is no limitation prescribed either under the Industrial
Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the industrial dispute. The provision of Article
137 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under
the Act and the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Issue no. 5 & 6.
(13) In support of these issues no evidence was led by the respondents. Moreover,
respondents had failed to prove as to how the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition
and as to how the petition is bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of necessary parties. Accordingly,
these issues are decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondents.
Relief
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 6, the claim of the
petitioner succeeds and is hereby partly allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated in
service forthwith with seniority and continuity w.e.f. 11.8.2010 when he raised the demand notice.
However the petitioner is not entitled to back wages. Let a copy of this award/order be sent to the
642
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
appropriate government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to
records. Announced in the open Court today on this 31st Day of March 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
23.2.2016.
Present: Shri Naveen Thakur, Advocate vice csl for petitioner.
None for respondents.
Again the correct address of respondents not filed. Further time prayed. In the interest of
justice one last opportunity is granted to the petitioner to file correct address of the respondent on
or before 11.3.2016.
11.3.2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge
Labour Court, Shimla.
_________
Present:
Shri NiranjanVerma, Advocate for petitioner.
None for respondent.
Today, also correct address of respondents has not been filed. The record reveals that the
respondents are not being served as the petitioner has failed to file correct address of the
respondents despite repeated opportunities. The learned counsel for the petitioner today stated at
bar that the correct address of the respondentsis not available and cannot be served. Therefore, it
will be a futile exercise to keep the reference pending particularly in view of the fact that the
correct address of the respondents is not available and arenot being served. Hence, this Court is left
with no other alternative but to decide the reference on the basis of material whatsoever is available
on the file. The following reference has been received from the appropriate government for
adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Smt. JaswinderKaur W/o late Shri Ranga
RamR/o Village Sandholi, P.O HaripurSandholi, Tehsil Baddi, District Solan HP w.e.f.
1.3.2013 by the employer /Managing Director (1) M/s Raja Forging & Gears Ltd., Sai
Road Baddi District Solan, HP (Gear Unit) (ii) M/s Raja Forging and Gear Ltd., SCO
860, Shivalik Enclave, Manimajra Chandigarh (Regd. and Corporate office)without
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back-wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above Ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
As per reference received from the appropriate government, the petitioner has alleged
hertermination of services by the respondentsw.e.f. 1.3.2013 to be illegal and unjustified but the
petitioner has failed to file the correct address of the respondents.Moreover, the petitioner has also
643
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
failed to file any claim petition and to lead evidence which could go to show that she was illegally
terminated by the respondents. Hence, in the absence of any claim petition/ evidence on record, the
reference is answered against the petitioner. However, the liberty is granted to the petitioner to
agitate her termination of service, as and when the correct address of the respondents becomes
available with her, by moving an application before this Court in order to revive the reference. Let
a copy of this order/award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in the official
gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced:
11.3.2016.
(Sushil Kukreja),
Presiding Judge
Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
11.3.2016.
Present:
Shri NiranjanVerma, Advocate for petitioner.
None for respondent.
Today, also correct address of respondent has not been filed. The record reveals that the
respondent is not being served as the petitioner has failed to file correct address of the respondent
despite repeated opportunities. The learned counsel for the petitioner today stated at bar that the
correct address of the respondent is not available and cannot be served. Therefore, it will be a futile
exercise to keep the reference pending particularly in view of the fact that the correct address of the
respondent is not available and is not being served. Hence, this Court is left with no other
alternative but to decide the reference on the basis of material whatsoever is available on the file.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Shri Gurnam SinghS/o Shri Dalel SinghR/o
Village Ram Nagar Kholi, P.O Nanakpur, Tehsil Kalka District Panchkula (HR) by
the Managing Director M/s Raja Forging & Gears Ltd., Sai Road Baddi District
Solan, HP w.e.f. 1.3.2013 without following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back- wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above Ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
As per reference received from the appropriate government, the petitioner has alleged
histermination of services by the respondent w.e.f. 1.3.2013 to be illegal and unjustified but the
petitioner has failed to file the correct address of the respondent.Moreover, the petitioner has also
failed to file any claim petition and to lead evidence which could go to show that he was illegally
terminated by the respondent. Hence, in the absence of any claim petition/ evidence on record, the
reference is answered against the petitioner. However, the liberty is granted to the petitioner to
agitate his termination of service, as and when the correct address of the respondent becomes
available with him, by moving an application before this Court in order to revive the reference. Let
a copy of this order/award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in the official
gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced:
11.3.2016.
(Sushil Kukreja),
Presiding Judge
Labour Court, Shimla.
644
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Reference No. 26 of 2011.
Instituted on. 13.6.2011.
Decided on 15.3.2016.
Anil Kumar S/o Shri Ami Chand Thakur R/o Village Chewla, P.O Rodi via Totu, Tehsil &
District Shimla, HP.
……………Petitioner.
Vs.
The Managing Director, HP Financial Corporation Shimla, HP.
……………Respondent.
Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri Sumit Raj, Advocate.
For respondent : Shri Jagat Singh Shyam, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether verbal termination of the services of Shri Anil Kumar S/o Shri Ami Chand
Thakur, daily wage chowkidar by The Managing Director HP Financial Corporation,
Shimla w.e.f. 21.11.2006 without serving notice and without complying with the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged by the workman is legal and
justified? If not, to what back-wages, service benefits and relief the above named daily
wage chowkidar is entitled to?”
(a) Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that he had been engaged as daily wages chowkidar
on 28.2.2006 by the respondent corporation for watch and ward at M/s S/L Industries Village
Kandisar, P.O Fagu, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla and on 2.11.2006, his services had been
terminated without following any proper procedure as contemplated under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). The petitioner had worked continuously for 287 days
without any break. It is further averred that the petitioner was forced to work on Sundays and other
gazetted holidays and continuously for 24 hours while wages were paid only for 8 working hours
@ ` 70/ per day and the numerous representation and requests of the petitioner for re-engagement
fell deaf to the ears of the respondent. It is also averred that the petitioner had competed 240 days
of continuous service in a calendar year preceding his retrenchment and after withdrawing the
services of the petitioner, the respondent had engaged Shri Roshan Lal on 4.12.2006, in violation of
section 25-H of the Act whereas no opportunity was given to the petitioner. Neither any notice
under section 25-F of the Act nor the retrenchment compensation had been given to the petitioner,
who is not employed in any service and is out of job since his illegal retrenchment. Against this
back-drop the petitioner has prayed for his re-instatement in service with seniority and continuity
along-with back-wages. The petitioner also prayed for payment of over-time.
645
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
(b) The respondent contested the claim of the petitioner by filing reply wherein
preliminary objections have been taken that the petitioner was engaged as daily waged chowkidar
on contract basis for watch and ward of assets of the industrial unit taken over under section 29 of
the SFCs Act, 1951 by the respondent and as such the petitioner had to perform his duties for a
limited period and his engagement was co-terminus with the sale of the Industrial unit under
section 29 of the SFCs Act. Since, the unit was sold by the respondent, the services of petitioner
were automatically discontinued in view of the terms of conditions of contract and conveyed to him
verbally at the time of his engagement as daily waged chowkidar and written contract was agreed to
be executed by him later on but the petitioner refused to execute the agreement-cum-undertaking on
the prescribed proforma, hence, disengagement of the petitioner does not attract the definition of
retrenchment. It is also asserted that the respondent had no regular vacancy of chowkidar and there
is no industrial activity in the closed/sick units at the time of takeover of the assets by the
respondent. It is further asserted that the respondent has not framed any rules for engaging the
services of chowkidars in the taken over units and the wages to the petitioner were paid from the
loan account of concerned industrial concern. On merits, it has been asserted that the respondent
had sanctioned term loan of ` 6.08 lacs and soft loan of ` 2.34 lacs on 26.9.1997 for setting up an
industrial unit for mushroom compost and mushroom processing to M/s S.L Industries but the said
industrial concern committed persistent defaults in the repayment of outstanding loan dues and
consequently the respondent had taken over the assets and as such the petitioner was engaged as
daily waged chowkidar on 28.2.2006 for watch and ward of the taken over assets. It is further
asserted that at the time of engaging the petitioner, it was made clear that his services were being
engaged on purely temporary basis. The respondent had not violated any provision of law by
disengaging the petitioner. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.
(c) No rejoinder was filed despite opportunities. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the
following issues which were struck on 12.3.2012.
•
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent
w.e.f. 21.11.2006, is in violation of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
OPP……..
•
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what relief, the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP…..
•
Whether there were no industrial activities in the closed units at the time of take-over
of the assets?
OPR……..
•
Relief.
(2) Besides having heard the Learned Counsels for the parties, I, have also gone through
the record of the case carefully.
(3) For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under:
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
Entitled to reinstatement with seniority and continuity but
without back-wages.
Issue no.3
Yes.
646
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
Relief. Reference answered in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings
Issue no.1
(4) The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner have
been terminated by the respondent without complying with the mandatory provisions of the Act as
neither any notice was served upon him nor he was paid compensation. He further contended that
the petitioner had completed more than 240 days in one calendar year and juniors to him are still
working with the respondent and his services have been terminated without any reason and even no
opportunity of being heard was afforded to him before terminating his services. The learned
counsel also contended that the petitioner was forced to work on Sundays and other gazetted
holidays and that too for 24 hours whereas the wages were being paid to him only for 8 working
hours per day.
(5) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended
that the petitioner had worked as daily waged chowkidar on contract basis for watch and ward of
assets of the industrial units taken over under section 29 of the SFCs Act and as such the
engagement of the petitioner was co-terminus with the sale of the industrial unit, hence, the
petitioner is not entitled for the protection of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.
(6) To prove his case, the petitioner has appeared himself as PW-1 and stated that he had
been working as daily waged chowkidar w.e.f 28.2.2006. He was engaged for watch and ward of
industry at Theog and worked as such till 22.11.2006 continuously for 24 hours. He was working
day and night whereas the respondent was paying him ` 70/- per day for eight hours and no wages
for remaining 16 hours had been paid to him. When he demanded for the wages of 16 hours, he was
terminated from service without any notice. The respondent had engaged some other daily wagers
after his termination. He had worked for 24 hours per day continuously for 287 days. In cross-
examination, he admitted that he was engaged on daily wages only as chowkidar at the unit of S.L
industry. He denied that at the time of his engagement, it was made clear to him that his services
had been engaged only for S.L Industry or till the same was sold. He denied that he was called by
the respondent to execute an agreement and he refused to sign the same. He further denied that
when he had not signed the agreement, his services had been terminated by the respondent in
November, 2006. He admitted that after his termination one Shri Roshan Lal was engaged as
chowkidar. He denied that Roshan Lal and Diwan Singh were engaged on co-terminus basis. He
also denied that he had not worked for 287 days. He denied that he is working on daily wages basis
these days at some other place.
(7) To rebut the case of the petitioner, the respondent has examined one Shri R.P Sandhu,
Deputy Manager as RW-1, who has tendered his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A in examination-in- chief
wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the reply. In cross-examination, he
admitted that the duty of the petitioner as chowkidar was for 24 hours and the petitioner has
discharged his duties continuously from 28.2.2006 till 22.11.2006. He further admitted that no
over-time charges have been paid to the petitioner and no written agreement was executed with him
(petitioner) regarding the contractual employment. He also admitted that no written letter was
issued to petitioner to call upon him to execute an agreement with the respondent and no notice was
issued to the petitioner before his termination. He admitted that after the disengagement of the
petitioner, two new persons were appointed as chowkidar and the respondent had engaged various
persons as daily wages chowkidars after the year, 2006 in the taken over units only.
647
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
(8) I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence, on record, and from the closer scrutiny
thereof it has become clear that the petitioner had worked as daily waged chowkidar for watch and
ward of taken over assets with the respondent w.e.f. 28.2.2006 till 22.11.2006. It is also an admitted
fact that the petitioner had worked for 287 days continuously prior to his retrenchment. The case of
the respondent is to the effect that the services of the petitioner had been engaged for specific
period as chowkidar for watch and ward of taken over assets and his services were co-terminus
with the sale of taken over unit. However, no material has been produced on record that the
petitioner was engaged for specific period as chowkidar and his services were co-terminus with the
sale of taken-over unit. The further case of the respondent is to the effect that the petitioner had to
execute specific written contract with the respondent in the shape of agreement-cum-undertaking
and the petitioner had agreed to execute the same but when the respondent corporation called upon
the petitioner to execute the aforesaid agreement, he had failed to execute the same and as such the
respondent had dis-engaged his services. However, to this effect also no material has been
produced by the respondent corporation. Except for the bald statement of RW-1, there is no
evidence on record to suggest that the petitioner had been engaged for specific period on co-
terminus basis with the sale of taken-over unit and he had failed to execute an agreement with the
respondent corporation regarding the contractual employment. Rather, in cross-examination RW-1
Shri Ram Pal Sandhu, Deputy Manager, categorically admitted that the petitioner had discharged
his duties continuously w.e.f. 28.2.2006 till 22.11.2006. He further admitted that no written
agreement was executed with the petitioner regarding the contractual employment and that no letter
in writing was issued to the petitioner to call upon him to execute an agreement with the
corporation. The respondent has failed to prove on record that the services of the petitioner were
engaged for specific period on contract basis as no material in this regard was brought on record by
the respondent. Admittedly, neither any notice nor any letter was issued to the petitioner by the
respondent calling upon him to execute an agreement. In normal circumstances, the agreement is
executed with the person prior to or at the time of engagement of his services and not thereafter.
The respondent had failed to explain as to why the services of the petitioner were engaged before
executing the agreement as alleged by it. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence on record, it
cannot be believed that after the services of the petitioner were engaged, the respondent had called
upon him to execute the agreement regarding his contractual employment.
(9) It is an admitted fact that the petitioner had completed more than 240 days in a
calendar year preceding his termination. Therefore, before terminating the services of the
petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have complied with the provisions of section
25-F of the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a workman
(workmen) and requires the employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a) to (c)
which are mandatory in nature. However, in the present case, the perusal of the record shows that
the respondent has failed to comply with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act. It has been held
by our own Hon’ble High Court in Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 776 titled as State of Himachal
Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the settled law in counting 240 days is that the same has to be
calculated preceding the date of retrenchment during twelve calendar months and not a year. The
relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the
right conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has
place on record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
648
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public
Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment without
complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant
extract of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman
employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one
year under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions
enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In
terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month’s
notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu
of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at
the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay
for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six
months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is
mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee
nullity……………..”
(10) In the present case also before terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondent
had not complied with the conditions precedent to the retrenchment as per section 25-F of the Act
which are mandatory in law.
(11) The learned counsel of the petitioner next contended that at the time of the termination
of the petitioner, the respondent had retained his juniors who are still working and besides this even
fresh persons have been engaged by the respondent as such the respondent had violated the
principles of “last come first go”. It has been admitted by RW-1 Shri Ram Pal Sandhu, Deputy
Manager in his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A that the respondent had engaged the services of Roshan Lal
and Diwan Singh as daily wager chowkidar after the dis-engagement of the services of the
petitioner. In cross-examination he also admitted that after the disengagement of the petitioner two
new persons were engaged as chowkidars and the respondent had also engaged various persons as
daily rated chowkidars after the year 2006 in the taken over units. Thus, from the evidence, on
record, it has been proved that after the disengagement of the services of the petitioner, fresh
workers have been engaged without giving an opportunity to the petitioner for re-employment,
which is clear cut violation of section 25-H of the Act.
2- Thus, having regard to entire evidence on record and in view of above cited rulings and
my foregoing observations, I have no hesitation in holding that the termination/disengagement of
the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 21.11.2006, by the respondent without complying with the
provisions of the Act, is illegal and unjustified.
3- Consequently, the petitioner succeeds to prove this issue, to which my answer is in the
affirmative.
Issue no.2.
4- Since I have held under issue no.1 above that the termination of services of the
petitioner by the respondent without following the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is illegal
and unjustified, hence, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and
continuity.
649
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
5- Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner is entitled to full back wages as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In
(2009) 1 SCC 20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is
set-aside, ordinarily, the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an
employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages,
which is independent of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2010 (1) SLJ S.C 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be
granted mechanically, upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that
reinstatement must not be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when
the workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.
6- Moreover, the petitioner was under an obligation to prove by leading cogent evidence
that he was not gainfully employed after the termination of his services. The initial burden is on the
workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan
and another Vs. S.C Sharma that :
“16…………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back-wages
is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial
burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on
record materials to rebut the claim…………..”
7- In the present case, the petitioner has failed to discharge his burden by placing any
material on record that he was not gainfully employed after his termination/disengagement.
Therefore, in view of the entire evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no
hesitation in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, issue no.2 is
partly decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue no.3.
8- To prove this issue no evidence has been led by the respondent. Hence, in the absence
of any evidence on record, this issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 3, the claim of the
petitioner succeeds and is hereby partly allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated in
service forthwith with seniority and continuity. However the petitioner is not entitled to back wages
and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in
official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 15th Day of March 2016.
(Parveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
650
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
Ref No. 64 of 2014
Sh Jiya Lal V/s President , School Management Committee, Govt primary School & others
22.3.2016:-
Present:-
Sh R.K.Khidtta, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri H.N.Kashyap ADA for the respondent .
Today also claim not filed by the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for
one more opportunity . Prayer considered but cannot be allowed in view of the fact that for filing of
claim the petitioner has availed various opportunities but failed to file the claim. The record reveals
that the present reference has been received by this Court on 13.8.2014 and since then the case is
being listed for filing of claim . Since , the petitioner has failed to file statement of claim, this Court
is left with no other alternative but to close the right of the petitioner to file the statement of claim
and to proceed further to decide the reference on the basis of material whatsoever is available on
the file. The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication to
this Court:
“ Whether termination of the services of Shri Jiya Lal S/o Shri Yash Pal R/o Village
kandi, P/o Dharmpur ) Mandhan), Tehsil Theog, District Shimla HP who was engaged
as cook- cum-helper for Mid-day-Meal Scheme byi). The Preseident School
Management Committee Government Primary School Sunder Ghat, Kandi Tehsil
Theog, District Shimla, HP & ii)The Primary Education Officer, Theog District
Shimla. HP during the year , 2012, without complying with the provisions of the
industrial Dispute Act,1947 id legal and justified ?If not, what amount of back-wages,
seniority, past servicebenefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from
the above employers?.
From the above reference, it is clear that the petitioner has challenged his termination
during the year, 2012 to be illegal and unjustified but no statement of claim in support thereof has
been filed buy him. In the absence of any claim petition and evidence on behalf of petitioner, it
cannot be held that his services were wrongly and illegally terminated by the respondents. Hence,
the reference is answered against the petitioner and the award is passed accordingly. Let a copy of
this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after
completion be consigned to records.
Announced:-
22.3.2016
Sd/-
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
22.3.2016
Present:
Petitioners with ShriNirnajanVerma, Advocate for petitioners.
Shri O.P Batra, Advocate for respondent no.1.
Ms. VeenaSood, Advocate vice csl. for respondent no.2
651
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
At this stage, vide separate statements recorded today, it has been stated by all the
petitioners that they have settled the dispute with the respondent no.1 and received payment of Rs.
17,500/- each vide cheques of HDFC Bank as full & final settlement of their claim and nothing is
due from any of the respondents and they prayed that the reference be decided accordingly.
From the perusal of the statement of the petitioners, it is clear that the petitioners have
settled the dispute with the respondents and received payment of Rs. 17,500/- each through cheque
from respondent no.1 and now nothing is due from any of the respondents. Since, the matter has
been settled between the parties amicably as such the reference is ordered to be answered
accordingly and the award is passed in terms of the statements of the petitioners which shall form
part of this award. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in
the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced:
22.3.2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge, Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Ref. No. 55 of 2015.
Instituted on. 31.7.2015.
Decided on 22.3.2016.
Ram Gopal S/o Shri Liaq Ram R/o Village Harloti, P.O Khara, Tehsil Sunni, District
Shimla, HP.
Vs.
……………Petitioner.
The Assistant Engineer, HPPWD Sub Division no.1, Winter Field Shimla, HP.
…………Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner
: Shri R.L Sharma, Advocate.
For respondent
: Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Shri Ram Gopal S/o Shri Laiq Ram R/o
Village Harloti, P.O Khara, Tehsil Sunni, District Shimla, HP by the Assistant
Engineer, HPPWD Sub Division no.1 Winter Field, Shimla HP w.e.f. 1.4.1996 without
652
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and
justified? If not, keeping in view the delay of about 14 years in raising the industrial
dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation
the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
7- In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that initially he was appointed as beldar on
8.7.1990 and was deputed in the HPPWD Sub Division Winter Field. He worked continuously
w.e.f. 8.7.1990 till 31.3.1996, when his services had been dis-engaged w.e.f. 1.4.1996. It is further
averred that the petitioner had completed more than 240 working days in each calendar year and the
work being performed by the petitioner was that of clerk in the HP Secretariat but the muster roll of
beldar was issued to him. The services of certain persons namely Sunita, Anil Kumar, Rakesh, Ved
Parkesh etc. who do not fall in the sub division their services have been regularized/conferred work
charge status. It is also averred that the petitioner vide representations dated 4.11.1996, 15.6.1999,
9.4.2002, 24.1.2005 and 1.4.2008 had also submitted before the respondent but till date no response
has been received. There was sufficient work available with the respondent and the persons junior
to him are still working. Against this back-drop a prayer for his re-engagement, along-with back-
wages and other consequential service benefits has been made.
8- By filing reply, the respondent had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua maintainability, barred by limitation, hit by the
principles of resajuidcata and abandonment. On merits, it has been asserted that initially the
petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis on 23.8.1991 and worked only
for four years w.e.f. 23.8.1991 to 30.3.1996 and he was never asked to work as supervisor or clerk
in H.P Secretariat. The petitioner had abandoned his job at his own without any intimation to the
respondent department. It is denied that the petitioner had made representations dated 4.11.1996,
15.6.1999, 9.4.2002, 24.1.2005 and 1.4.2008 to respondent. It is asserted that the new persons who
have been appointed/kept on daily wages basis had performed their duties continuously and
regularly whereas the petitioner had left the job at his own and had not competed 10 years of
service as this criteria is essential for regularization. It is admitted that the petitioner had competed
240 days only in the years 1992 to 1995. The documents mentioned from serial no.1 to 5 and 7
seem to be fabricated as the same have been prepared later on just to mislead this Court. The
respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.
9- Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 17.12.2015.
•
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 1.4.1996 without
complying with the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is illegal and
unjustified?
OPP……
•
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
OPP……..
•
Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged?
OPR……..
•
Whether the petition is barred by Limitation?
OPR………..
•
Whether the petition is hit by the principles of res-judicata as alleged?
OPR……….
653
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
•
Relief.
10- Besides having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
11- For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
Entitled for reinstatement from the date when the petitioner
raised demand notice.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
No.
Issue no.5
No.
Relief. Reference answered in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.1 & 4.
12- Being interlinked and co-related, both these issues are taken up together for discussion
and decision.
13- The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner had
been terminated by the respondent illegally without serving him any notice as required under
section 25-F of the Act especially when he had completed more than 240 days in each calendar
year. He further contended that the petitioner represented several times for his re-engagement but
of no avail and even junior persons to the petitioner are still working with the respondent
department and fresh workers have been engaged.
14- On the other hand, Ld. ADA for the respondent contended that the services of the
petitioner had never been terminated by the respondent, who himself had abandoned his job
without intimation to the respondent department. He further contended that the petitioner had raised
the industrial dispute after a gap of about 14 years, hence, at this stage, he is not entitled to any
relief as prayed for.
15- The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PA
in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. He also tendered in evidence representation dated 4.11.1996, Ex. PB vide UPC receipt Ex.
PC, representation dated 15.6.1999 Ex. PD vide UPC receipt Ex. PE, representation dated 9.4.2002
Ex. PF vide UPC receipt Ex. PG, representation dated 24.1.2005 Ex. PH vide UC receipt Ex. PJ,
representation dated 1.4.2008 Ex. PK vide UPC receipt Ex. PL and the certificate of Pradhan Gram
Panchyat Chebdi dated 3.4.2015, Ex. PM. In cross-examination, he denied that all the
representations have been written in same pen and in the same hand and that all the representations
have been written on same day. He also denied that the post office date in all postal receipts have
been tempered and no representation had been made by him to the department from the year, 1996
654
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
till the year, 2010. He admitted that the present case had been filed by him after a gap of fourteen
years.
16- On the contrary, the respondent examined one Shri Ravi Bhatti, Assistant Engineer, as
RW-1, who tendered his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated almost
all the averments as stated in the reply. He also tendered in evidence copy of order dated 13.5.2015
of Hon’ble High Court Ex. RW-1/B and mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW-1/C. In cross-
examination, he admitted that no notice was issued to the petitioner to resume the duties. He denied
that the petitioner had not abandoned his job and that the petitioner had visited many times and also
made various representations on different dates to re-instate him in service. He admitted that the
department had engaged many fresh persons after the termination of the services of the petitioner.
17- The first question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the
petition is barred by limitation. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had worked till March, 1996
with the respondent and he raised the industrial dispute before Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer,
Shimla on 5.8.2010 after a gap of about 14 years. The law on the point is well settled that no
limitation is prescribed either under the Industrial Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for
raising the Industrial Dispute. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgments has held that
the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground
of delay. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in (1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab
Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing –cum- processing Service Society Limited and
Another. that:-
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the
proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of
delay alone”
It has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurmail Singh Vs. Principal
Government College of Education and others, (2009) 9 SCC 496 that mere delay in challenging
the termination would not be a bar to the adjudication of the matter but could only deprive the
appellant of his back wages for the period of delay in raising the termination issue. In a latest
judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2014, 10 SCC 301 titled as Raghubir Singh Vs.
General Manager, Haryana Roadways Hissar has held that Limitation Act has no application to
reference made by the appropriate government to Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication
of existing industrial dispute. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as
under:
“16 Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka it was held by this Court as follows:
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in
raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying
relief to the appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta
and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held
that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of
remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the
remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and
655
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at
hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....”
(Emphasis supplied).
17 In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the
reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State
Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute
between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal
case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman
that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover,
it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising
and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising
the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for
adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from
claiming rightful relief from his employer”.
Therefore, the aforesaid law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various context
makes the legal position clear that there is no limitation prescribed either under the Industrial
Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the industrial dispute. The provision of Article
137 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under
the Act and the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay.
18- In the back-ground of the aforesaid legal position, in the instant case, the services of
the petitioner were terminated in March, 1996 and thereafter the petitioner had been approaching
the respondent against his illegal termination for his reinstatement and had submitted the
representations dated 4.11.1996 Ex. PB, Ex. PD dated 15.6.1999, Ex. PF dated 9.4.2002, Ex. PH
dated 24.1.2005 and Ex. PK dated 1.4.2008 and all the aforesaid representations have been sent by
the petitioner through UPC receipts seeking reinstatement. Thereafter, the petitioner raised the
Industrial Dispute and the matter was referred to Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, who submitted
the failure report of the Labour Commissioner. However, the Labour Commissioner refused to
make the reference on the ground of delay and latches. Thereafter, the petitioner filed CPW no. 238
of 2012 before the Hon’ble High Court of HP wherein the Hon’ble High Court directed the Labour
Commissioner to make the reference to the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal and thereafter
the present reference has been received by this Court for adjudication. Therefore, in view of the
facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner cannot be blamed for the delay in raising
the present dispute as he was all along hoping that one day his grievance will be considered by the
respondent and had kept his dispute alive. Moreover, it is not the case of the respondent that due to
the delay in raising the industrial dispute, there is any loss or unavailability of material evidence.
Hence, it cannot be said that delay in raising the industrial dispute is fatal to the reference and as
such the petitioner cannot be debarred from claiming the relief from his employer and mere delay
in challenging the termination would not be a bar to the adjudication of the present dispute which
has been referred to this Court by the appropriate government.
19- From the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that initially the petitioner
was engaged as beldar on daily wages basis by the respondent in the month of August, 1991 and
worked as such till March, 1996. Admittedly, as per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/C, the petitioner had
worked for 100 days in the year, 1991, 282 days in 1992, 365 days in 1993, 316 days in 1994, 329
days in 1995 and 90 days in 1996. From the mandays chart Ex. RW-1/C, it is also clear that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. It
656
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
is also an admitted fact that neither any notice had been issued to the petitioner nor he was paid
compensation. Therefore, before terminating the services of the petitioner, it was incumbent upon
the respondent to have complied with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act which lay down
certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a workman (workmen) and requires the
employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a) to (c) which are mandatory in nature.
However, in the present case, the perusal of the record shows that the respondent has failed to
comply with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act. In (2015) 4 SCC 544, Mackinnon
Mackenzie and Company Ltd., Vs. Mackinnon employees Union, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
held as under:
“34. ………………….The Industrial Court after examining the facts and evidence on
record has rightly answered the question of breach of Section 25F clause (b) in the
negative since no evidence has been produced by the respondent-Union to prove the
same and further no calculation is brought to our notice as to the amount received by
way of retrenchment compensation and also the actual amount sought to have been
paid to the retrenched workmen. Further, with regard to the provision of Section 25F
clause (c), the appellant-Company has not been able to produce cogent evidence that
notice in the prescribed manner has been served by it to the State Government prior
to the retrenchment of the concerned workmen. Therefore, we have to hold that the
appellant- Company has not complied with the conditions precedent to retrenchment
as per Section 25F clauses (a) and (c) of the I.D. Act which are mandatory in law.”
20- In the present case also admittedly no notice under section 25-F of the Act was issued
to the petitioner before terminating his services. Hence, In view of the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court (supra) and my foregoing observations, I have no hesitation in holding that
the termination/disengagement of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 1.4.1996 by the respondent
without complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act, is illegal and unjustified.
21- The learned counsel of the petitioner next contended that at the time of the termination
of the petitioner, the respondent had retained his juniors who are still working and besides this even
fresh persons have been engaged by the respondent as such the respondent had violated the
principles of “last come first go”. It has been admitted by RW-1 Shri Ram Gopal, Assistant
Engineer, in his cross-examination that the department had engaged fresh workers after the
termination of the services of the petitioner. Thus, from the evidence, on record, it has been
established that after the disengagement of the services of the petitioner, fresh workers have been
engaged by the respondent without giving an opportunity to the petitioner for re-employment,
which is clear cut violation of section 25-H of the Act.
17. The learned ADA for the respondent next contended that the petitioner had left the job
at his own after 30.3.1996. However, there is no iota of evidence on record which could go to show
that the petitioner had left the job on his own as no notice or letter regarding abandonment of the
job by the petitioner is placed on record by the respondent. Even RW-1 Shri Ram Gopal, Assistant
Engineer, has admitted in cross-examination that no notice was issued to the petitioner to resume
the duties. Although RW-2 Shri Kuldeeep Singh deposed that after the year 1996, the petitioner had
not reported for work. However, in the absence of any record no reliance can be placed upon his
oral testimony. Therefore, in the absence of any record, inference cannot be drawn that the
petitioner had abandoned the job. Reliance is placed on decision reported in AIR 1979 SC 582 case
titled as G.T Lad and others Vs. Chemicals and Fibers India Ltd. where it has been held that:
“From the connotations reproduced above it clearly follows that to constitute
abandonment, there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an
intention not to resume the same. In Buckingham Co. v. Venkatiah (1964) 4 SC R 265:
657
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
(AIR 1964 SC 1272), it was observed by this Court that under common law an
inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn
unless from the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an
inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the
employee intended to abandon service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is
always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to
an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. Thus whether there has been a
voluntary abandonment of service or not is a question of fact which has to be
determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case.”
Hence, in view of the law laid down (supra), and also in view of the evidence led by the
parties, it cannot be said that the petitioner had left the job at his own.
1.
Thus, having regard to entire evidence on record and in view of above cited rulings and
my foregoing observations, I have no hesitation in holding that the termination of the services of
the petitioner w.e.f. 1.4.1996, by the respondent without complying with the provisions of the Act,
is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of the petitioner and
against the respondent.
Issue no.2.
2.
Since I have held under issues no.1 & 2 above that the termination of services of the
petitioner by the respondent without following the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
Now, it has to be seen as to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to. Admittedly, the
present dispute has been raised by the petitioner after a gap of 14 years, hence, keeping in view all
the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in service
with seniority and continuity with effect from the date when he raised the demand notice.
3.
Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner is entitled to full back wages as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In
(2009) 1 SCC 20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is
set-aside, ordinarily, the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an
employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages,
which is independent of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2010 (1) SLJ S.C 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be
granted mechanically, upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that
reinstatement must not be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when
the workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.
4.
Moreover, the petitioner was under an obligation to prove by leading cogent evidence
that he was not gainfully employed after the termination of his services. The initial burden is on the
workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan
and another Vs. S.C Sharma that :
“16…………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back-wages
is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial
burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on
record materials to rebut the claim…………..”
658
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
5.
In the present case, the petitioner has failed to discharge his burden by placing any
material on record that he was not gainfully employed after his termination/disengagement.
Moreover, the petitioner had raised the present dispute after a gap of about 14 years, hence, the
back-wages cannot be granted to him after such a long gap of 14 years. Therefore, in view of the
entire evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no hesitation in holding that the
petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, issue no.2 is partly decided in favour of
the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No.3.
6.
In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Issue No.5.
7.
To prove this issue no evidence was led by the respondent to show that as to how the
petition is hit by the principles of res-judicata. Hence, in the absence of any evidence, this issue is
decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 5, the claim of the
petitioner succeeds and is hereby partly allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated in
service forthwith with seniority and continuity with effect from the date when he raised the demand
notice. However the petitioner is not entitled to back wages and as such the reference is ordered to
be answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent
to the appropriate government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion, be
consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 22nd Day of March, 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
28.3.2016.
Present:
None for the petitioner.
ShriRupesh Sharma, Advocate vice csl for respondent.
Case called twice but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. It is 10:50 AM. Be called
again.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
659
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
Case called again
Present: None for the petitioner.
Shri Rupesh Sharma, Advocate vice csl. for respondent.
It is 12:55 PM case called again but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Be called
after lunch.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge, Labour Court, Shimla.
Case called after lunch
Present:
None for the petitioner.
Shri Rupesh Sharma, Advocate vice csl. for respondent.
It is 3:05 PM. Case called repeatedly in pre and post lunch sessions but none appeared on
behalf of the petitioner.
For today, this case has been fixed for the evidence of the respondent. At this
stageShriRupesh Sharma, Advocate Ld. vice csl for respondent has stated at bar that since the
petitioner has failed to lead any evidence in support of his case arise out of the reference which has
been sent by the appropriate government to this Court, the respondent also does not want to lead
any evidence. Therefore, this Court is left with no other alternative but to decide the reference on
the basis of the material whatsoever is available on file. The reference sent by the appropriate
government for adjudication is as under:
“Whether termination of Shri Ram Singh Mehta Ex-serviceman R/o Village Tihana,
P.O Chanair, Tehsil Theog District Shimla, HP by i) The Manager M/s Z Plus Security
Service Cell Railway Chowk, Tehsil Joginder Nagar District Mandi ii) M/s Longjian
Road Add Bridge Ltd., Company Hotel Farmer Nest, Near Huli, P.O Chhaila, Tehsil
Theog District Shimla, HPw.e.f. 23.4.2011 without complying with the provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to
from the above employer?”
The petitioner has filed the statement of claim and the respondent also filed reply to the
same. Thereafter, on the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by this Court on
11.3.2014.
4.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitionerw.e.f. 23.4.2011 is illegal and
unjustified as alleged?
OPP……..
5.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits, the petitioner is entitled
to?
OPP…….
660
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
6.
Whether this petition is not maintainable as alleged?
OPR……..
7.
Whether this petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?
OPR……..
8.
Relief:
It may be pertinent to mention here that despite repeated opportunities, the petitioner has
failed to lead evidence in support of his case and therefore, on 15.3.2016, this Court has closed the
evidence of the petitioner. Since, the petitioner has failed to lead any evidence in support of issues
no.1 & 2 above, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that he has failed to prove that his
services had been terminated w.e.f. 23.4.2011 by the respondents in an illegal and unjustified
manner. Hence, in the absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be held that his services were
wrongly and illegally terminated by the respondents. Accordingly, issues no. 1 & 2 are decided in
favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. As far as issues no. 3 & 4 are concerned, the
onus of prove these issues was on the respondents but they have also failed to lead any evidence in
support thereof, hence, these issues are decided against the respondents. Hence, in view of the
aforesaid back- ground, the reference is ordered to be answered against the petitioner and the award
is passed accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for
publication in the official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced:
28.3.2016.
(SushilKukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Ref. No. 42 of 2011.
Instituted on. 1.11.2011.
Decided on 30.3.2016.
Seema W/o Shri Babloo R/o Village Dublu, P.O Janedghat, District Shimla, HP through
Shri J.C Bhardwaj, President HP AITUC, HQ Saproon, Solan, HP.
……………Petitioner.
Vs.
1.
M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka,
New Dehli through its Advisor.
2.
Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP
thought the Registrar.
…………Respondent.
661
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR.
For respondent no.1 :
Already ex-parte.
For respondent no.2. :
Shri Vivek Kalia, Advocate vice Shri M.P Kanwar,
Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Smt. Seema W/o Shri Babloo R/o Village Dublu,
P.O Janedghat, District Shimla, HP w.e.f. 28.11.2009 by i) Hony, Advisor M/s
Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli (contractor society) and ii) The Registrar, Dr. Y.S Parmar University of
Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP (Principal Employer) however no
registration certificate and licence was respectively obtained by the Principal
Employer and Contractor as provided in the Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 and not giving
her an opportunity of consideration for re-employment by the employers from the
date her juniors were allegedly employed, thus in violation of provisions of section 25-
F, 25-G & H of the ibid Act and further demand to declare her direct employee of the
Principal employer is legal and justified, if not, what amount of back wages, seniority,
past service benefits, compensation and relief the above worker is entitled to from the
above employers/ management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that in the month of March, 2008, she was
engaged by the principal employer i.e Registrar of Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and
Forestry Nauni, District Solan, HP (hereinafter referred to as University) as safai
karmachari/worker but her name was not entered on the roll of the University and was unrolled
with the so called name lender, contractor whose address and particulars are not known to the
petitioner though her name remained on the roll of contractor till her termination on 28.11.2009. It
is further stated that the legitimate dues of the petitioner were neither paid by the contractor nor the
University. Since, the contractor was only name, hence the contract was sham, in-genuine and
camouflage for all purposes. Even, the petitioner was working under the supervision of official of
the University whereas her name was transferred by the principal employer from his roll to the roll
of the non-existent contractor without the consent of the workman concerned. The petitioner was
working as sweeper and was doing sweeping work in the premises of Department of Forestry &
Horticulture, Library etc., and sometimes she had also been deployed to work as sweeper in the
Administration Block of the University and as such the work which was being performed by the
petitioner was never incidental but it is of permanent in nature and as such the services rendered by
the petitioner under the control of University and her name on the roll of contractor amounts to
unfair labour practice which are prohibited under section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act
1970 (hereinafter referred to as Contract Labour Act). It is also stated that neither the University
had applied to employ the workmen for any work through contractor nor any licence had been
obtained by the contractor from the licensing officer, hence, any recruitment without obtaining any
valid licence of contractor, the workmen deemed to be an employee of the University. The
petitioner had worked for more than two years continuously and completed 240 days in each
calendar year preceding her termination. The services of the petitioner had been terminated without
any notice, chargesheet and without the compliance of sections 25-N, 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act) which is a mandatory provision of law and even
662
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
juniors have been retained by the respondents in violation of the provisions of section 25-G and 25-
h OF the Act. The authorities of the University have indulged in unfair labour practice with the help
of contractor and the sudden removal of the petitioner by the University have made her integrity
doubtful in the eyes of one and all, who is still unemployed and even while terminating the services
of the petitioner, the officials of the University have restored to the formula of “hire and fire” as no
enquiry had been conducted against her. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the
petitioner be declared the employee of the University and she be re-instated in service with
seniority and continuity along-with back-wages.
3. Before, I proceed further it is important to mention here that the respondent no.1
(contractor) was duly served but did not put appearance before this Court, hence, vide order dated
8.5.2013, proceeded against ex-parte.
4. By filing detailed reply, the respondent no.2 (university) had contested the claim of the
petitioner wherein preliminary objections had been taken that there is no relationship of principal
employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent, the claim of the petitioner is bad
for non-joinder of necessary party, suppression of material facts and the petition has been filed by
the petitioner in connivance with the contractor. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner
was engaged as safai karamchari in the University. The petitioner was not the direct employee of
the University and the salary had not been paid to her by the respondent directly and even the work
performed by the petitioner had never been controlled and supervised by the respondent. It is
asserted that the work of safai was given to the contractor who filed quotation/tender for the job of
safai karamchari/cleaners of the university and even no record of the employee of the contractor
had been maintained by the respondent university. It is further asserted that the respondent
university neither engaged/appointed the petitioner as safai karmachari in the University nor
terminated her services on 28.11.2009 as there is no record with the respondent university
regarding the workers of the contractor. It is denied that the contractor was only name lender and as
such the contract was sham, ingenuine and camouflage for any purpose and that the petitioner was
working under the supervision of the official of the respondent university. It is further denied that
the petitioner was engaged on 20.11.2007 and the work performed by her is of permanent in nature.
The provisions of section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is not applicable. It is also
denied that the contractor or his agents were not present in the University to supervise the work of
the employee. Since, the petitioner was not the employee of respondent university, hence, the
question of issuing notice for termination of services and filling chargesheet and to pay
retrenchment compensation does not arise at all. The respondent university prayed for the dismissal
of the claim petition.
5.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed her allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
6.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
8.7.2013.
5.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 28.11.2009 by the
respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H is illegal
and unjustified as alleged?
OPP……
6.
Whether demand of the petitioner to declare her the direct employee of the principal
employer in the absece of registration certificate and licence by the Principal employer
and contractor as provided under the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is legal and
justified?
OPP……..
663
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
7.
Whether there is no relationship of principal employer and employee between the
petitioner and respondent no.2 (Dr. Y.S Parmar University) as alleged?
OPR-2…..
8.
If issue no.1 & 2 are decided in affirmative and issue no.3 in negative to what service
benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP………..
9.
Relief.
7.
Besides having heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent
no.2 (university), I have also gone through the record of the case carefully.
8.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
No.
Issue no.3
Yes.
Issue no.4
Entitled to lump sum compensation.
Relief. Reference partly answered in favour of the petitioner and against
respondent no.1 contractor.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.2 & 3.
9.
Being interlinked and co-related, all these issues are taken up together for discussion
and decision.
10. The AR for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is entitled to be declared as
permanent workman of respondent no.2 University right from the date of her joining of services
and she is entitled to the full wages and consequential benefits. He further contended that there is
no contract between the respondent university and so called contract to engage the workers through
contractor is sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes. He also contended that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in each calendar year preceding her termination and her
termination without the compliance of the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 University contended
that the petitioner was engaged through contractor i.e respondent no.1 under the provisions of
Contract Labour Act. He further contended that there was no relationship of employer and
employee between the parties and the University had availed the services of the petitioner and other
workers through the contractor.
12. The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered her affidavit Ex. PA
in examination-in-chief wherein she reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. In cross-examination, she stated that she cannot produce any appointment letter issued by
664
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
respondent no.2 and any other proof and she also cannot produce any salary certificate issued by
respondent no.2. She admitted that she along-with others had filed one complaint against
respondent no.1 (M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society) regarding minimum wages
before Labour Officer, Solan. She further admitted that the respondent no.1 had made payment to
settle the claim and to receive the said payment she had put her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1.
The respondent no.1 used to pay the salary @ 70/- per day. She denied that her services were
terminated by respondent no.1 but explained that her services had been terminated by respondent
no.2. She denied that the supervision was done by the respondent no.2 but admitted that one Mr.
Mukesh of the Society used to make payment.
13. On the contrary, the respondent no.2 examined two witnesses. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer, tendered his affidavit Ex. R-1 in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated
almost all the averments as stated in the reply filed by respondent university. He also tendered in
evidence other documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-10. In cross-examination, he admitted that they have
obtained the security and permanent address from the contractor, who was working in the name and
style of M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, Dwarka New Dehli. He admitted that
the University had contacted the contractor after the reference petition but he had not explained any
reason as to why he was not appearing before the Court. The University had entered into an
agreement with the contractor which is Ex. R-3. He denied that the University had forged the
agreement. He further denied that no contractor was in existence. He admitted that they have not
applied to the Labour Officer for employing contract labour in the house keeping. He denied that
the University had engaged the contractor who was not having any licence and the contractor was
only a name lender. He further denied that no labourer was engaged by the contractor and the SDO
of the University used to deploy the workman to do the work. The University had issued a
notification regarding out sourcing of sweeping work.
14. RW-2 Shri Devinder Kumar, Clerk of Labour Office Solan has stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by respondent no.1 Sanitation Promotion and Development
Society. In cross-examination, he admitted that neither the University had applied under contract
Labour (R&A) Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor (respondent no.1) had obtained
any licence from the licensing authority.
15. I have heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent no.2
(University) and also gone through the record. On the perusal of the pleadings of the parties, after
analyzing evidence and material placed on record and considering the arguments addressed by
AR/Counsel for the parties, I am of the firm opinion that the petitioner cannot be deemed to be the
direct employee of the University in the absence of registration certificate by the principal
employer and licence by the contractor as provided under the Contract Labour Act.
16. As mentioned above, the petitioner had claimed that she was the employee of
respondent no.2 (university) whereas the University had stated that she was the employee of
respondent no.1 (contractor). At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce sections 7 & 12 of
the Contract Labour Act.
7. Registration of certain establishments.- (1) Every principal employer of an establishment
to which this Act applies shall, within such period as the appropriate Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with respect to establishments
generally or with respect to any class of them, make an application to the registering officer
in the prescribed manner for registration of the establishment…………
12. Licensing of contractors.- (1) With effect from such date as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, no contractor to
665
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
whom this Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work through contract labour
except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer…………………
As per the provisions of section 7 & 12 of the aforesaid Act, the principal employer i.e
respondent no.2 (University) should have a certificate of registration from the prescribed authority
and secondly the contractor i.e respondent no.1 should have a licence issued by competent authority
i.e the Labour Department. On perusal of the record, it is clear that neither the principal employer
(university) had the certificate of registration from the prescribed authority nor the contractor had a
licence issued by the competent authority. RW-2, Shri Devinder Kumar an official from the Labour
Office had categorically admitted in cross-examination that neither the University had applied
under the Contract Labour Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor had obtained any
licence from the authority.
17. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner and other workers would be deemed to be direct employees of the respondent University
because their engagement as contract labour was in violation of sections 7, and 12 of the
Regulation Act as on the date of engagement of the petitioner, neither the University had a
certificate of registration nor the respondent no.1 contractor was holding a licence under section 12
of the Contract Labour Act ? This question was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
AIR 1992 SC 457, titled as Dena Nath & Ors Vs. National Fertilizers Ltd. And others and it
was held as under:
“20……………..The Act as can be seen from the scheme of the Act merely regulates the
employment of contract labour in certain establishment and provides for its abolition in
certain circumstances. The Act does not provide for total abolition of contract labour but it
provides for abolition by the appropriate Government in appropriate cases under Section 10
of the Act.
22……………….The only consequences provided in the Act where either the principal
employer or the labour contractor violates the provision of Sections 9 and 12 respectively is
the penal provision, as envisaged under the Act for which reference may be made to
Sections 23 and 25 of the Act………………...”
The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Steal Authority of India Vs. National Union Water Front 2000 (7) SCC-1 in
which it was observed as under:
“96. In Dena Naths case (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the question,
whether as a consequence of noncompliance with Sections 7 and 12 of the CLRA Act
by the principal employer and the licensee respectively, the contract labour employed
by the principal employer would become the employees of the principal employer.
Having noticed the observation of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in The
Standard-Vacuums case (supra) and having pointed out that the guidelines enumerated
in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act are practically based on the guidelines given
by the Tribunal in the said case, it was held that the only consequence was the penal
provisions under Sections 23 and 25 as envisaged under the CLRA Act and that merely
because the contractor or the employer had violated any provision of the Act or the
Rules, the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution could not
issue any mandamus for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees
of the principal employer. This Court thus resolved the conflict of opinions on the said
question among various High Courts. It was further held that neither the Act nor the
666
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
Rules framed by the Central Government or by any appropriate Government provided
that upon abolition of the contract labour, the labourers would be directly absorbed by
the principal employer”.
18. Hence, the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court shows that
the consequence of violation of the Contract Labour Act i.e non registration of the establishment
under section 7 and non-possession of the licence under section 12 of the Act would not result in
the absorption of concerned workman by the principal employer rather it would result in
prosecution under section 23/25 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid legal position, there
is no force in the contention of the AR for the workman that in view of the fact that respondent no.2
University was not having certificate of registration under section 7 and the contractor was not
having any licence under section 12 of the Contract Labour Act, the petitioner and other workmen
would be deemed to be the direct employees of the University.
19. Now, the next question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the contract was sham, ingeniune and camouflage as contended by the AR for the
petitioner. As per the statement of claim, the petitioner and other workers were engaged as
safaikarmacharies and they were doing the work in the premises of University in the departments of
Forestry, Horticulture, Library etc. of respondent no.2 University and some-times they had also
been deployed to work as sweepers in the Administrative Block of the University.
20. It is by now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds the contract between the
principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal and a camouflage to deny employment
benefits to the employee, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the
direct employee of the principal employer. In (2009) 13 SCC titled as International Airport
Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Anr., it has been held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:
“36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under section 10 of CLRA Act, but
the contract labour contend that the contract between principal employer and
contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles
in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen
is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they
are the direct employees of the principle employer and the agreement is sham, nominal
and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under section 10(1) of CLRA
Act.
37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between
principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to
deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to
remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee
the way in which the work should be done, in short who has direction and control over
the employee. But where there is no notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and
where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was sham/nominal
and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise.
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained the terms
“control” and “supervision” which reads as under:
667
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
“38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the contract
labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For example, if the
contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will
work under the directions, supervision and control of the principal employer but that
would not make the worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if the salary is
paid by contractor, if the right to regulate employment is with the contractor, and the
ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract
labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as
employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal
employer or used otherwise. In short worker being the employee of the contractor, the
ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he decides where the
employee will work and how long he will work and subject to what conditions. Only
when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal employer,
the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that
is secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.”
53. 13……………… Merely because the contract labour work is under the supervision of
the officers of the principal employer, it cannot be taken as evidence of direct
employment under the principal employer.
54. …………………..Exercise of some control over the activities of contract labour while
they discharge their duties as labourers, is inevitable and such exercise is not sufficient
to hold that the contract labour will become the direct employees of the principle
employer.”
21. In the back-ground of the aforesaid legal position, in the instant case except for the
bald statement of the petitioner, there is no other evidence on record to suggest that she was doing
the work under the direct supervision of the officials of the University and that the contract was
sham, ingenuine, camouflage for all purposes. Rather in cross-examination, she admitted that
neither she cannot produce any appointment letter or documentary proof by the respondent no.2
University appointing her as safaikarmachari nor any salary certificate issued by respondent no.2
University. She further admitted that she along-with other workers had filed a complaint against the
respondent no.1 contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan. She also
admitted that the respondent no.1 contractor had made payment to settle the claim and she had put
her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1. She further admitted that the contractor used to pay her salary
@ Rs. 70/- per day. She denied that the supervision was done by the University and admitted that
one Mr. Mukesh of the contractor society used to make payment.
22. Therefore, the cross-examination of the PW-1 makes it clear that the contractor used to
pay her salary @ ` 70 per day. As per her own admission, neither any appointment letter nor any
salary certificate was issued to the petitioner by the University rather she had filed a complaint
against the contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan and the
contractor had made payment to her to settle the claim and she had put her signatures on the
receipt. RW-2 an official from the Labour Office Solan had also categorically stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by the respondent no.1 contractor. There is also no satisfactory
evidence on record to suggest that the petitioner and other workers were under the direct
supervision and control of respondent no.2 University. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma, Executive
Engineer had produced the documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-8 regarding the outsourcing of sweeping
arrangements in the University. As per the same the respondent no.2 university invited tenders for
668
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
outsourcing of sweeping work in the University vide notice dated 11.08.2006 Ex. R-2 and the work
was awarded to the respondent no.1 contractor for a period of one year vide letter Ex R-3. The
contractor started the work from 1. 11.2006 and the one year period was considered w.e.f 1.11.2006
to 31.10.2007 vide letter of Executive Engineer(Design) dated 20.10.2006 Ex R-4. The validity of
the contract was further extended upto 31.01.2008 on the same terms and conditions vide letter Ex
R-5. After expiry of the contract the university again invited tenders vide notice Ex R-6 and the
work was again awarded to the contractor for a period of one year w.e.f. 1.2.2008 to 31.01.2009
vide letter Ex R-7 and the contract was further extended for one year w.e.f 1.02.2009 to 31.01.2010
vide letter Ex R-8. Therefore, the perusal of the aforesaid documents shows that the respondent
no.2 University had outsourced the arrangements of the sweeping work to the respondent no.1
contractor. Moreover, the University is not a private body and in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it cannot be said that the contract entered by the University with the contractor was sham,
ingenuine and camouflage.
23. Hence, in view of the evidence led by the parties, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was the direct employee of the University and the contract between the university and contractor is
sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes and as such it has been established that there is no
relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent no.2 university.
Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of respondent no.2 and against the petitioner.
Issue no.1.
24. Since, I have held under issues no.2 & 3 above, that the petitioner was the employee of
respondent no.1 contractor, now, it has to be seen as to whether the services of the petitioner had
been illegally terminated by the respondent no.1. Before, I proceed further it is relevant to mention
here that after receiving the reference by this Court, notices were issued to both the respondents but
none appeared on behalf of the respondent no.1 Contractor despite having been served, hence, he
was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 8.5.2013. The petitioner in her claim petition as
well as in her affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PA has stated as PW-1 that she was engaged as
safaikaramchari in the month of March, 2008 and worked as such till 28.11.2009. Since, the
evidence led by the petitioner remained un-rebutted as the respondent no.1 did not appear to rebut
this testimony of the petitioner, her evidence is sufficient to prove that she had worked for 240 days
in twelve calendar months preceding her termination. Therefore, before terminating the services of
the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondent no.1 to have complied with the provisions of
section 25-F of the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a
workman (workmen) and requires the employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a)
to (c) which are mandatory in nature. It has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Latest
HLJ 2007 (HP) 776 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the settled law in
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of retrenchment during
twelve calendar months and not a year. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced as under:
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the right
conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with Section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has place on
record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public
Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
669
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment without
complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant
extract of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in
any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in
Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the
employer is required to give to the workman one month’s notice in writing indicating
the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a
duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment,
compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of
continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory
and
non-compliance
thereof
renders
the
retrenchment
of
an
employee
nullity……………..”
25. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid unrebutted testimony of the petitioner that she had
worked continuously for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding her termination,
the respondent no.1 was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating her services. But, no such compliance was made
by the respondent no.1 contractor, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent no.1 contractor. As a result, the termination of petitioner w.e.f. 28.11.2009 is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against respondent no.1 contractor.
Issue no.4.
26. Since, I have held under issue no. 1 above, that the termination of the services of the
petitioner w.e.f. 28.11.2009 by respondent no.1 without complying with the provisions of the Act is
not legal and justified, hence, the question arises as to what service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled. It is by now well settled that if the termination of employee is found to be illegal, the relief
by way of reinstatement with back-wages is not automatic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh
Kumar Seal and others reported in 2010 LLR 677: 2010 III CLR 17 SC, has held that relief by
way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found
to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that mandatory compensation in
lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate.
27. In Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC
327, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:
“It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal
position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
maybe wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.”
670
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
28. In the present case, even though the termination of the petitioner is held to be illegal
but her reinstatement will not be appropriate relief in view of the fact that the contract had expired
and the respondent no.1 contractor had left the premises of the respondent no.2 University.
Therefore, in such a situation, it would not be appropriate to make the order of reinstatement in the
present case. Hence, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of
justice would be met, if the lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is
awarded to the petitioner. Therefore, in my view the petitioner is entitled to receive a suitable,
appropriate, just and equitable compensation from the respondent no.1 Contractor and keeping in
view the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be quite reasonable and justified if lump sum
compensation of ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five Thousand only) is awarded to the petitioner instead of
reinstatement. Consequently, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against respondent
no.1 Contractor.
Relief
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner is partly
allowed and as such the respondent no.1 Contractor is directed to pay ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five
Thousand only) as lump sum compensation to the petitioner within three months from today failing
which the same shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of publication of this award.
The reference is answered accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of March, 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Ref. No. 43 of 2011.
Instituted on. 1.11.2011.
Decided on 30.3.2016.
Manoj Kumar S/o Shri Chunnu Ram R/o Village & P.O Nauni District Solan, HP through
Shri J.C Bhardwaj, President HP AITUC, HQ Saproon, Solan, HP.
……………Petitioner. Vs.
3.
M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli through its Advisor.
4.
Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP thought
the Registrar.
…………Respondent.
671
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR.
For respondent no.1 : Already ex-parte.
For respondent no.2. : Shri Vivek Kalia, Advocate vice Shri M.P Kanwar,
Advocate
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Shri Manoj Kumar S/o Shri Chunnu Ram R/o
Village & P.O Nauni District Solan, HP w.e.f. 13.10.2009 by i) Hony, Advisor M/s
Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli (contractor society) and ii) The Registrar, Dr. Y.S Parmar University of
Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP (Principal Employer) however no
registration certificate and licence was respectively obtained by the Principal
Employer and Contractor as provided in the Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 and not giving
him an opportunity of consideration for re-employment by the employers from the
date his juniors were allegedly employed, thus in violation of provisions of section 25-
F, 25-G & H of the ibid Act and further demand to declare her direct employee of the
Principal employer is legal and justified, if not, what amount of back wages, seniority,
past service benefits, compensation and relief the above worker is entitled to from the
above employers/ management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that on 17.7. 2007, he was engaged by the
principal employer i.e Registrar of Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nauni,
District Solan, HP (hereinafter referred to as University) as safai karmachari/worker but his name
was not entered on the roll of the University and was unrolled with the so called name lender,
contractor whose address and particulars are not known to the petitioner though his name remained
on the roll of contractor till his termination on 28.11.2009. It is further stated that the legitimate
dues of the petitioner were neither paid by the contractor nor the University. Since, the contractor
was only name, hence the contract was sham, in-genuine and camouflage for all purposes. Even,
the petitioner was working under the supervision of official of the University whereas his name was
transferred by the principal employer from his roll to the roll of the non-existent contractor without
the consent of the workman concerned. The petitioner was working as sweeper and was doing
sweeping work in the premises of Department of Forestry & Horticulture, Library etc., and
sometimes he had also been deployed to work as sweeper in the Administration Block of the
University and as such the work which was being performed by the petitioner was never incidental
but it is of permanent in nature and as such the services rendered by the petitioner under the control
of University and his name on the roll of contractor amounts to unfair labour practice which are
prohibited under section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act 1970 (hereinafter referred to as
Contract Labour Act). It is also stated that neither the University had applied to employ the
workmen for any work through contractor nor any licence had been obtained by the contractor from
the licensing officer, hence, any recruitment without obtaining any valid licence of contractor, the
workmen deemed to be an employee of the University. The petitioner had worked for more than
two years continuously and completed 240 days in each calendar year preceding his termination.
The services of the petitioner had been terminated without any notice, chargesheet and without the
compliance of sections 25-N, 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
Act) which is a mandatory provision of law and even juniors have been retained by the respondents
672
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
in violation of the provisions of section 25-G and 25-h OF the Act. The authorities of the
University have indulged in unfair labour practice with the help of contractor and the sudden
removal of the petitioner by the University have made his integrity doubtful in the eyes of one and
all, who is still unemployed and even while terminating the services of the petitioner, the officials
of the University have restored to the formula of “hire and fire” as no enquiry had been conducted
against him. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the petitioner be declared the
employee of the University and he be re-instated in service with seniority and continuity along-
with back-wages.
3.
Before, I proceed further it is important to mention here that the respondent no.1
(contractor) was duly served but did not put appearance before this Court, hence, vide order dated
8.5.2013, proceeded against ex-parte.
4.
By filing detailed reply, the respondent no.2 (university) had contested the claim of the
petitioner wherein preliminary objections had been taken that there is no relationship of principal
employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent, the claim of the petitioner is bad
for non-joinder of necessary party, suppression of material facts and the petition has been filed by
the petitioner in connivance with the contractor. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner
was engaged as safai karamchari in the University. The petitioner was not the direct employee of
the University and the salary had not been paid to him by the respondent directly and even the work
performed by the petitioner had never been controlled and supervised by the respondent. It is
asserted that the work of safai was given to the contractor who filed quotation/tender for the job of
safai karamchari/cleaners of the university and even no record of the employee of the contractor
had been maintained by the respondent university. It is further asserted that the respondent
university neither engaged/appointed the petitioner as safai karmachari in the University nor
terminated his services on 28.11.2009 as there is no record with the respondent university regarding
the workers of the contractor. It is denied that the contractor was only name lender and as such the
contract was sham, ingenuine and camouflage for any purpose and that the petitioner was working
under the supervision of the official of the respondent university. It is further denied that the
petitioner was engaged on 20.11.2007 and the work performed by him is of permanent in nature.
The provisions of section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is not applicable. It is also
denied that the contractor or his agents were not present in the University to supervise the work of
the employee. Since, the petitioner was not the employee of respondent university, hence, the
question of issuing notice for termination of services and filling chargesheet and to pay
retrenchment compensation does not arise at all. The respondent university prayed for the dismissal
of the claim petition.
5.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
6.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
8.7.2013.
10. Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 13.10.2009 by the
respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H is illegal
and unjustified as alleged?
OPP……
11. Whether demand of the petitioner to declare her the direct employee of the principal
employer in the absence of registration certificate and licence by the Principal
employer and contractor as provided under the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is
legal and justified?
OPP……..
673
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
12. Whether there is no relationship of principal employer and employee between
the petitioner and respondent no.2 (Dr. Y.S Parmar University) as alleged?
OPR-2…..
13. If issue no.1 & 2 are decided in affirmative and issue no.3 in negative to what service
benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP………..
14. Relief.
7.
Besides having heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent
no.2 (university), I have also gone through the record of the case carefully.
8.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
No.
Issue no.3
Yes.
Issue no.4
Entitled to lump sum compensation.
Relief. Reference partly answered in favour of the petitioner and
against respondent no.1 contractor.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.2 & 3.
9.
Being interlinked and co-related, all these issues are taken up together for discussion
and decision.
10. The AR for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is entitled to be declared as
permanent workman of respondent no.2 University right from the date of his joining of services and
he is entitled to the full wages and consequential benefits. He further contended that there is no
contract between the respondent university and so called contract to engage the workers through
contractor is sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes. He also contended that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in each calendar year preceding his termination and his
termination without the compliance of the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 University contended
that the petitioner was engaged through contractor i.e respondent no.1 under the provisions of
Contract Labour Act. He further contended that there was no relationship of employer and
employee between the parties and the University had availed the services of the petitioner and other
workers through the contractor.
12. The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PA
in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. In cross-examination, he stated that he cannot produce any appointment letter issued by
respondent no.2 and any other proof and he also cannot produce any salary certificate issued by
674
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
respondent no.2. He admitted that he along-with others had filed one complaint against respondent
no.1 (M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society) regarding minimum wages before
Labour Officer, Solan. He further admitted that the respondent no.1 had made payment to settle the
claim and to receive the said payment he had put his signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1. The
respondent no.1 used to pay the salary @ 70/- per day. He denied that his services were terminated
by respondent no.1 but explained that his services had been terminated by respondent no.2. He
denied that the supervision was done by the respondent no.2 but admitted that one Mr. Mukesh of
the Society used to make payment.
13. On the contrary, the respondent no.2 examined two witnesses. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer, tendered his affidavit Ex. R-1 in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated
almost all the averments as stated in the reply filed by respondent university. He also tendered in
evidence other documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-10. In cross-examination, he admitted that they have
obtained the security and permanent address from the contractor, who was working in the name and
style of M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, Dwarka New Dehli. He admitted that
the University had contacted the contractor after the reference petition but he had not explained any
reason as to why he was not appearing before the Court. The University had entered into an
agreement with the contractor which is Ex. R-3. He denied that the University had forged the
agreement. He further denied that no contractor was in existence. He admitted that they have not
applied to the Labour Officer for employing contract labour in the house keeping. He denied that
the University had engaged the contractor who was not having any licence and the contractor was
only a name lender. He further denied that no labourer was engaged by the contractor and the SDO
of the University used to deploy the workman to do the work. The University had issued a
notification regarding out sourcing of sweeping work.
14. RW-2 Shri Devinder Kumar, Clerk of Labour Office Solan has stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by respondent no.1 Sanitation Promotion and Development
Society. In cross-examination, he admitted that neither the University had applied under contract
Labour (R&A) Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor (respondent no.1) had obtained
any licence from the licensing authority.
15. I have heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent no.2
(University) and also gone through the record. On the perusal of the pleadings of the parties, after
analyzing evidence and material placed on record and considering the arguments addressed by
AR/Counsel for the parties, I am of the firm opinion that the petitioner cannot be deemed to be the
direct employee of the University in the absence of registration certificate by the principal
employer and licence by the contractor as provided under the Contract Labour Act.
16. As mentioned above, the petitioner had claimed that he was the employee of
respondent no.2 (university) whereas the University had stated that he was the employee of
respondent no.1 (contractor). At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce sections 7 & 12 of
the Contract Labour Act.
7. Registration of certain establishments.- (1) Every principal employer of an
establishment to which this Act applies shall, within such period as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with respect
to establishments generally or with respect to any class of them, make an application to
the registering officer in the prescribed manner for registration of the
establishment…………
12. Licensing of contractors.- (1) With effect from such date as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, no contractor to
675
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
whom this Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work through contract labour
except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer…………………
As per the provisions of section 7 & 12 of the aforesaid Act, the principal employer i.e
respondent no.2 (University) should have a certificate of registration from the prescribed authority
and secondly the contractor i.e respondent no.1 should have a licence issued by competent authority
i.e the Labour Department. On perusal of the record, it is clear that neither the principal employer
(university) had the certificate of registration from the prescribed authority nor the contractor had a
licence issued by the competent authority. RW-2, Shri Devinder Kumar an official from the Labour
Office had categorically admitted in cross-examination that neither the University had applied
under the Contract Labour Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor had obtained any
licence from the authority.
17. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner and other workers would be deemed to be direct employees of the respondent University
because their engagement as contract labour was in violation of sections 7, and 12 of the
Regulation Act as on the date of engagement of the petitioner, neither the University had a
certificate of registration nor the respondent no.1 contractor was holding a licence under section 12
of the Contract Labour Act ? This question was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
AIR 1992 SC 457, titled as Dena Nath & Ors Vs. National Fertilizers Ltd. And others and it
was held as under:
“20……………..The Act as can be seen from the scheme of the Act merely regulates the
employment of contract labour in certain establishment and provides for its abolition in
certain circumstances. The Act does not provide for total abolition of contract labour but it
provides for abolition by the appropriate Government in appropriate cases under Section 10
of the Act.
22……………….The only consequences provided in the Act where either the principal
employer or the labour contractor violates the provision of Sections 9 and 12 respectively is
the penal provision, as envisaged under the Act for which reference may be made to
Sections 23 and 25 of the Act………………...”
The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Steal Authority of India Vs. National Union Water Front 2000 (7) SCC-1 in
which it was observed as under:
“96. In Dena Naths case (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the question,
whether as a consequence of noncompliance with Sections 7 and 12 of the CLRA Act
by the principal employer and the licensee respectively, the contract labour employed
by the principal employer would become the employees of the principal employer.
Having noticed the observation of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in The
Standard-Vacuums case (supra) and having pointed out that the guidelines enumerated
in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act are practically based on the guidelines given
by the Tribunal in the said case, it was held that the only consequence was the penal
provisions under Sections 23 and 25 as envisaged under the CLRA Act and that merely
because the contractor or the employer had violated any provision of the Act or the
Rules, the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution could not
issue any mandamus for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees
of the principal employer. This Court thus resolved the conflict of opinions on the said
question among various High Courts. It was further held that neither the Act nor the
676
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
Rules framed by the Central Government or by any appropriate Government provided
that upon abolition of the contract labour, the labourers would be directly absorbed by
the principal employer”.
18. Hence, the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court shows that
the consequence of violation of the Contract Labour Act i.e non registration of the establishment
under section 7 and non-possession of the licence under section 12 of the Act would not result in
the absorption of concerned workman by the principal employer rather it would result in
prosecution under section 23/25 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid legal position, there
is no force in the contention of the AR for the workman that in view of the fact that respondent no.2
University was not having certificate of registration under section 7 and the contractor was not
having any licence under section 12 of the Contract Labour Act, the petitioner and other workmen
would be deemed to be the direct employees of the University.
19. Now, the next question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the contract was sham, ingeniune and camouflage as contended by the AR for the
petitioner. As per the statement of claim, the petitioner and other workers were engaged as
safaikarmacharies and they were doing the work in the premises of University in the departments of
Forestry, Horticulture, Library etc. of respondent no.2 University and some-times they had also
been deployed to work as sweepers in the Administrative Block of the University.
20. It is by now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds the contract between the
principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal and a camouflage to deny employment
benefits to the employee, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the
direct employee of the principal employer. In (2009) 13 SCC titled as International Airport
Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Anr., it has been held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:
“36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under section 10 of CLRA Act, but
the contract labour contend that the contract between principal employer and
contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles
in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen
is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they
are the direct employees of the principle employer and the agreement is sham, nominal
and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under section 10(1) of CLRA
Act.
37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between
principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to
deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to
remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee
the way in which the work should be done, in short who has direction and control over
the employee. But where there is no notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and
where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was sham/nominal
and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise.
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained the terms
“control” and “supervision” which reads as under:
“38.The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the
677
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For
example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by
the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the
principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by contractor, if the right to regulate
employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies
with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract
labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as
employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal
employer or used otherwise. In short worker being the employee of the contractor, the
ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he decides where the
employee will work and how long he will work and subject to what conditions. Only
when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal employer,
the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that
is secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.”
53. 13……………… Merely because the contract labour work is under the supervision of
the officers of the principal employer, it cannot be taken as evidence of direct
employment under the principal employer.
54. …………………..Exercise of some control over the activities of contract labour while
they discharge their duties as labourers, is inevitable and such exercise is not sufficient
to hold that the contract labour will become the direct employees of the principle
employer.”
21. In the back-ground of the aforesaid legal position, in the instant case except for the
bald statement of the petitioner, there is no other evidence on record to suggest that he was doing
the work under the direct supervision of the officials of the University and that the contract was
sham, ingenuine, camouflage for all purposes. Rather in cross-examination, he admitted that neither
he can produce any appointment letter or documentary proof by the respondent no.2 University
appointing him as safaikarmachari nor any salary certificate issued by respondent no.2 University.
He further admitted that he along-with other workers had filed a complaint against the respondent
no.1 contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan. He also admitted that
the respondent no.1 contractor had made payment to settle the claim and he had put his signatures
on the receipt Ex. R-1. He further admitted that the contractor used to pay him salary @ Rs. 70/-
per day. He denied that the supervision was done by the University and admitted that one Mr.
Mukesh of the contractor society used to make payment.
22. Therefore, the cross-examination of the PW-1 makes it clear that the contractor used to
pay him salary @ ` 70 per day. As per his own admission, neither any appointment letter nor any
salary certificate was issued to the petitioner by the University rather he had filed a complaint
against the contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan and the
contractor had made payment to him to settle the claim and he had put his signatures on the receipt.
RW-2 an official from the Labour Office Solan had also categorically stated that the receipt of
payment Ex. R-1 has been made by the respondent no.1 contractor. There is also no satisfactory
evidence on record to suggest that the petitioner and other workers were under the direct
supervision and control of respondent no.2 University. Moreover, RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer had produced the documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-8 regarding the outsourcing of
sweeping arrangements in the University. As per the same the respondent no.2 university invited
tenders for outsourcing of sweeping work in the University vide notice dated 11.08.2006 Ex. R-2
678
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
and the work was awarded to the respondent no.1 contractor for a period of one year vide letter Ex
R-3. The contractor started the work from 1. 11.2006 and the one year period was considered w.e.f
1.11.2006 to 31.10.2007 vide letter of Executive Engineer(Design) dated 20.10.2006 Ex R-4. The
validity of the contract was further extended upto 31.01.2008 on the same terms and conditions
vide letter Ex R-5. After expiry of the contract the university again invited tenders vide notice Ex
R-6 and the work was again awarded to the contractor for a period of one year w.e.f. 1.2.2008 to
31.01.2009 vide letter Ex R-7 and the contract was further extended for one year w.e.f 1.02.2009 to
31.01.2010 vide letter Ex R-8. Therefore, the perusal of the aforesaid documents shows that the
respondent no.2 University had outsourced the arrangements of the sweeping work to the
respondent no.1 contractor. Moreover, the University is not a private body and in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, it cannot be said that the contract entered by the University with the
contractor was sham, ingenuine and camouflage.
23. Hence, in view of the evidence led by the parties, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was the direct employee of the University and the contract between the university and contractor is
sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes and as such it has been established that there is no
relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent no.2 university.
Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of respondent no.2 and against the petitioner.
Issue no.1.
24. Since, I have held under issues no.2 & 3 above, that the petitioner was the employee of
respondent no.1 contractor, now, it has to be seen as to whether the services of the petitioner had
been illegally terminated by the respondent no.1. Before, I proceed further it is relevant to mention
here that after receiving the reference by this Court, notices were issued to both the respondents but
none appeared on behalf of the respondent no.1 Contractor despite having been served, hence, he
was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 8.5.2013. The petitioner in his claim petition as
well as in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PA has stated as PW-1 that he was engaged as
safaikaramchari on 17.7.2007 and worked as such till 28.11.2009. Since, the evidence led by the
petitioner remained un-rebutted as the respondent no.1 did not appear to rebut this testimony of the
petitioner, his evidence is sufficient to prove that he had worked for 240 days in twelve calendar
months preceding his termination. Therefore, before terminating the services of the petitioner, it
was incumbent upon the respondent no.1 to have complied with the provisions of section 25-F of
the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a workman (workmen)
and requires the employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a) to (c) which are
mandatory in nature. It has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Latest HLJ 2007 (HP)
776 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the settled law in counting 240 days
is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of retrenchment during twelve calendar
months and not a year. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the right
conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with Section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has place on
record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public
Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment without
complying with the provisions of section 25- F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant
extract of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
679
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed
in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions
enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In
terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month’s
notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu
of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at
the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay
for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six
months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is
mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee
nullity……………..”
25. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid unrebutted testimony of the petitioner that he had
worked continuously for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination,
the respondent no.1 was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating his services. But, no such compliance was made
by the respondent no.1 contractor, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent no.1 contractor. As a result, the termination of petitioner w.e.f. 13.10.2009 is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against respondent no.1 contractor.
Issue no.4.
26. Since, I have held under issue no. 1 above, that the termination of the services of the
petitioner w.e.f. 13.10.2009 by respondent no.1 without complying with the provisions of the Act is
not legal and justified, hence, the question arises as to what service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled. It is by now well settled that if the termination of employee is found to be illegal, the relief
by way of reinstatement with back-wages is not automatic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh
Kumar Seal and others reported in 2010 LLR 677: 2010 III CLR 17 SC, has held that relief by
way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found
to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that mandatory compensation in
lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate.
27. In Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC
327, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:
“It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal
position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
maybe wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.”
28. In the present case, even though the termination of the petitioner is held to be illegal
but his reinstatement will not be appropriate relief in view of the fact that the contract had expired
and the respondent no.1 contractor had left the premises of the respondent no.2 University.
Therefore, in such a situation, it would not be appropriate to make the order of reinstatement in the
680
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
present case. Hence, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of
justice would be met, if the lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is
awarded to the petitioner. Therefore, in my view the petitioner is entitled to receive a suitable,
appropriate, just and equitable compensation from the respondent no.1 Contractor and keeping in
view the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be quite reasonable and justified if lump sum
compensation of ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five Thousand only) is awarded to the petitioner instead of
reinstatement. Consequently, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against respondent
no.1 Contractor.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner is partly
allowed and as such the respondent no.1 Contractor is directed to pay ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five
Thousand only) as lump sum compensation to the petitioner within three months from today failing
which the same shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of publication of this award.
The reference is answered accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of March, 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Ref. No. 44 of 2011.
Instituted on. 1.11.2011.
Decided on 30.3.2016.
Nirmala Devi W/o Shri Pritam Singh R/o Near Congress Bhawan, P.O Saproon, District
Solan, HP through Shri J.C Bhardwaj, President HP AITUC, HQ Saproon, Solan, HP.
……………Petitioner. Vs.
1.
M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli through its Advisor.
2.
Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP thought
the Registrar.
…………Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR.
681
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
For respondent no.1 : Already ex-parte.
For respondent no.2. : Shri Vivek Kalia, Advocate vice Shri M.P Kanwar, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Smt. Nirmala Devi W/o Shri Pritam Singh Near
Congress Bhawan, District Solan HP w.e.f. 13.10.2009 by i) Hony, Advisor M/s Sanitation
Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New Dehli (contractor
society) and ii) The Registrar, Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry
Nouni, District Solan, HP (Principal Employer) however no registration certificate and
licence was respectively obtained by the Principal Employer and Contractor as provided in
the Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 and not giving her an opportunity of consideration for re-
employment by the employers from the date her juniors were allegedly employed, thus in
violation of provisions of section 25-F, 25-G & H of the ibid Act and further demand to
declare her direct employee of the Principal employer is legal and justified, if not, what
amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits, compensation and relief the above
worker is entitled to from the above employers/ management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that on 20.12.2007, she was engaged by the
principal employer i.e Registrar of Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nauni,
District Solan, HP (hereinafter referred to as University) as safai karmachari/worker but her name
was not entered on the roll of the University and was unrolled with the so called name lender,
contractor whose address and particulars are not known to the petitioner though her name remained
on the roll of contractor till her termination on 28.11.2009. It is further stated that the legitimate
dues of the petitioner were neither paid by the contractor nor the University. Since, the contractor
was only name, hence the contract was sham, in-genuine and camouflage for all purposes. Even,
the petitioner was working under the supervision of official of the University whereas her name
was transferred by the principal employer from his roll to the roll of the non-existent contractor
without the consent of the workman concerned. The petitioner was working as sweeper and was
doing sweeping work in the premises of Department of Forestry & Horticulture, Library etc., and
sometimes she had also been deployed to work as sweeper in the Administration Block of the
University and as such the work which was being performed by the petitioner was never incidental
but it is of permanent in nature and as such the services rendered by the petitioner under the control
of University and her name on the roll of contractor amounts to unfair labour practice which are
prohibited under section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act 1970 (hereinafter referred to as
Contract Labour Act). It is also stated that neither the University had applied to employ the
workmen for any work through contractor nor any licence had been obtained by the contractor from
the licensing officer, hence, any recruitment without obtaining any valid licence of contractor, the
workmen deemed to be a employee of the University. The petitioner had worked for more than two
years continuously and completed 240 days in each calendar year preceding her termination. The
services of the petitioner had been terminated without any notice, chargesheet and without the
compliance of sections 25-N, 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
Act) which is a mandatory provision of law and even juniors have been retained by the respondents
in violation of the provisions of section 25-G and 25-h OF the Act. The authorities of the
University have indulged in unfair labour practice with the help of contractor and the sudden
removal of the petitioner by the University have made her integrity doubtful in the eyes of one and
all, who is still unemployed and even while terminating the services of the petitioner, the officials
of the University have restored to the formula of “hire and fire” as no enquiry had been conducted
against her. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the petitioner be declared the
682
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
employee of the University and she be re-instated in service with seniority and continuity along-
with back-wages.
3.
Before, I proceed further it is important to mention here that the respondent no.1
(contractor) was duly served but did not put appearance before this Court, hence, vide order dated
8.5.2013, proceeded against ex-parte.
4.
By filing detailed reply, the respondent no.2 (university) had contested the claim of the
petitioner wherein preliminary objections had been taken that there is no relationship of principal
employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent, the claim of the petitioner is bad
for non-joinder of necessary party, suppression of material facts and the petition has been filed by
the petitioner in connivance with the contractor. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner
was engaged as safai karamchari in the University. The petitioner was not the direct employee of
the University and the salary had not been paid to her by the respondent directly and even the work
performed by the petitioner had never been controlled and supervised by the respondent. It is
asserted that the work of safai was given to the contractor who filed quotation/tender for the job of
safai karamchari/cleaners of the university and even no record of the employee of the contractor
had been maintained by the respondent university. It is further asserted that the respondent
university neither engaged/appointed the petitioner as safai karmachari in the University nor
terminated her services on 28.11.2009 as there is no record with the respondent university
regarding the workers of the contractor. It is denied that the contractor was only name lender and as
such the contract was sham, ingenuine and camouflage for any purpose and that the petitioner was
working under the supervision of the official of the respondent university. It is further denied that
the petitioner was engaged on 20.11.2007 and the work performed by her is of permanent in nature.
The provisions of section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is not applicable. It is also
denied that the contractor or his agents were not present in the University to supervise the work of
the employee. Since, the petitioner was not the employee of respondent university, hence, the
question of issuing notice for termination of services and filling chargesheet and to pay
retrenchment compensation does not arise at all. The respondent university prayed for the dismissal
of the claim petition.
5.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed her allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
6.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
8.7.2013.
15. Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 113.10.2009 by the
respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H is illegal
and unjustified as alleged?
OPP……
16. Whether demand of the petitioner to declare her the direct employee of the principal
employer in the absece of registration certificate and licence by the Principal employer
and contractor as provided under the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is legal and
justified?
OPP……..
17. Whether there is no relationship of principal employer and employee between the
petitioner and respondent no.2 (Dr. Y.S Parmar University) as alleged?
OPR-2…..
683
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
18. If issue no.1 & 2 are decided in affirmative and issue no.3 in negative to what service
benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP………..
19. Relief.
7.
Besides having heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent
no.2 (university), I have also gone through the record of the case carefully.
8.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
No.
Issue no.3
Yes.
Issue no.4
Entitled to lump sum compensation.
Relief. Reference partly answered in favour of the petitioner and
against respondent no.1 contractor.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.2 & 3.
9.
Being interlinked and co-related, all these issues are taken up together for discussion
and decision.
10. The AR for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is entitled to be declared as
permanent workman of respondent no.2 University right from the date of her joining of services
and she is entitled to the full wages and consequential benefits. He further contended that there is
no contract between the respondent university and so called contract to engage the workers through
contractor is sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes. He also contended that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in each calendar year preceding her termination and her
termination without the compliance of the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 University contended
that the petitioner was engaged through contractor i.e respondent no.1 under the provisions of
Contract Labour Act. He further contended that there was no relationship of employer and
employee between the parties and the University had availed the services of the petitioner and other
workers through the contractor.
12. The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered her affidavit Ex. PA
in examination-in-chief wherein she reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. In cross-examination, she stated that she cannot produce any appointment letter issued by
respondent no.2 and any other proof and she also cannot produce any salary certificate issued by
respondent no.2. She admitted that she along-with others had filed one complaint against
respondent no.1 (M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society) regarding minimum wages
before Labour Officer, Solan. She further admitted that the respondent no.1 had made payment to
684
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
settle the claim and to receive the said payment she had put her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1.
The respondent no.1 used to pay the salary @ 70/- per day. She denied that her services were
terminated by respondent no.1 but explained that her services had been terminated by respondent
no.2. She denied that the supervision was done by the respondent no.2 but admitted that one Mr.
Mukesh of the Society used to make payment.
13. On the contrary, the respondent no.2 examined two witnesses. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer, tendered his affidavit Ex. R-1 in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated
almost all the averments as stated in the reply filed by respondent university. He also tendered in
evidence other documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-10. In cross-examination, he admitted that they have
obtained the security and permanent address from the contractor, who was working in the name and
style of M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, Dwarka New Dehli. He admitted that
the University had contacted the contractor after the reference petition but he had not explained any
reason as to why he was not appearing before the Court. The University had entered into an
agreement with the contractor which is Ex. R-3. He denied that the University had forged the
agreement. He further denied that no contractor was in existence. He admitted that they have not
applied to the Labour Officer for employing contract labour in the house keeping. He denied that
the University had engaged the contractor who was not having any licence and the contractor was
only a name lender. He further denied that no labourer was engaged by the contractor and the SDO
of the University used to deploy the workman to do the work. The University had issued a
notification regarding out sourcing of sweeping work.
14. RW-2 Shri Devinder Kumar, Clerk of Labour Office Solan has stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by respondent no.1 Sanitation Promotion and Development
Society. In cross-examination, he admitted that neither the University had applied under contract
Labour (R&A) Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor (respondent no.1) had obtained
any licence from the licensing authority.
15. I have heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent no.2
(University) and also gone through the record. On the perusal of the pleadings of the parties, after
analyzing evidence and material placed on record and considering the arguments addressed by
AR/Counsel for the parties, I am of the firm opinion that the petitioner cannot be deemed to be the
direct employee of the University in the absence of registration certificate by the principal
employer and licence by the contractor as provided under the Contract Labour Act.
16. As mentioned above, the petitioner had claimed that she was the employee of
respondent no.2 (university) whereas the University had stated that she was the employee of
respondent no.1 (contractor). At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce sections 7 & 12 of
the Contract Labour Act.
7. Registration of certain establishments.- (1) Every principal employer of an
establishment to which this Act applies shall, within such period as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with respect
to establishments generally or with respect to any class of them, make an application to
the registering officer in the prescribed manner for registration of the
establishment…………
12. Licensing of contractors.- (1) With effect from such date as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, no contractor to
whom this Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work through contract labour
except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer…………………
685
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
As per the provisions of section 7 & 12 of the aforesaid Act, the principal employer i.e
respondent no.2 (University) should have a certificate of registration from the
prescribed authority and secondly the contractor i.e respondent no.1 should have a
licence issued by competent authority i.e the Labour Department. On perusal of the
record, it is clear that neither the principal employer (university) had the certificate of
registration from the prescribed authority nor the contractor had a licence issued by the
competent authority. RW-2, Shri Devinder Kumar an official from the Labour Office
had categorically admitted in cross-examination that neither the University had applied
under the Contract Labour Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor had
obtained any licence from the authority.
17. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner and other workers would be deemed to be direct employees of the respondent University
because their engagement as contract labour was in violation of sections 7, and 12 of the
Regulation Act as on the date of engagement of the petitioner, neither the University had a
certificate of registration nor the respondent no.1 contractor was holding a licence under section 12
of the Contract Labour Act ? This question was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
AIR 1992 SC 457, titled as Dena Nath & Ors Vs. National Fertilizers Ltd. And others and it
was held as under:
“20……………..The Act as can be seen from the scheme of the Act merely regulates the
employment of contract labour in certain establishment and provides for its abolition in
certain circumstances. The Act does not provide for total abolition of contract labour
but it provides for abolition by the appropriate Government in appropriate cases under
Section 10 of the Act.
22……………….The only consequences provided in the Act where either the principal
employer or the labour contractor violates the provision of Sections 9 and 12
respectively is the penal provision, as envisaged under the Act for which reference may
be made to Sections 23 and 25 of the Act………………...”
The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Steal Authority of India Vs. National Union Water Front 2000
(7) SCC-1 in which it was observed as under:
“96. In Dena Naths case (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the
question, whether as a consequence of noncompliance with Sections 7 and 12 of
the CLRA Act by the principal employer and the licensee respectively, the
contract labour employed by the principal employer would become the employees
of the principal employer. Having noticed the observation of the three-Judge
Bench of this Court in The Standard-Vacuums case (supra) and having pointed
out that the guidelines enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act are
practically based on the guidelines given by the Tribunal in the said case, it was
held that the only consequence was the penal provisions under Sections 23 and 25
as envisaged under the CLRA Act and that merely because the contractor or the
employer had violated any provision of the Act or the Rules, the High Court in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution could not issue any mandamus
for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees of the principal
employer. This Court thus resolved the conflict of opinions on the said question
among various High Courts. It was further held that neither the Act nor the Rules
686
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
framed by the Central Government or by any appropriate Government provided
that upon abolition of the contract labour, the labourers would be directly
absorbed by the principal employer”.
18. Hence, the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court shows that
the consequence of violation of the Contract Labour Act i.e non registration of the establishment
under section 7 and non-possession of the licence under section 12 of the Act would not result in
the absorption of concerned workman by the principal employer rather it would result in
prosecution under section 23/25 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid legal position, there
is no force in the contention of the AR for the workman that in view of the fact that respondent no.2
University was not having certificate of registration under section 7 and the contractor was not
having any licence under section 12 of the Contract Labour Act, the petitioner and other workmen
would be deemed to be the direct employees of the University.
19. Now, the next question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the contract was sham, ingeniune and camouflage as contended by the AR for the
petitioner. As per the statement of claim, the petitioner and other workers were engaged as
safaikarmacharies and they were doing the work in the premises of University in the departments of
Forestry, Horticulture, Library etc. of respondent no.2 University and some-times they had also
been deployed to work as sweepers in the Administrative Block of the University.
20. It is by now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds the contract between the
principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal and a camouflage to deny employment
benefits to the employee, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the
direct employee of the principal employer. In (2009) 13 SCC titled as International Airport
Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Anr., it has been held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:
“36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under section 10 of CLRA Act, but
the contract labour contend that the contract between principal employer and
contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles
in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen
is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they
are the direct employees of the principle employer and the agreement is sham, nominal
and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under section 10(1) of CLRA
Act.
37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between
principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to
deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to
remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee
the way in which the work should be done, in short who has direction and control over
the employee. But where there is no notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and
where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was sham/nominal
and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise.
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained the terms
“control” and “supervision” which reads as under:
687
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
“38.The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the
contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For
example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by
the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the
principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by contractor, if the right to regulate
employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies
with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract
labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor
as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the
principal employer or used otherwise. In short worker being the employee of the
contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he
decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work
under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control
of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is
with the contractor.”
53. 13……………… Merely because the contract labour work is under the
supervision of the officers of the principal employer, it cannot be taken as
evidence of direct employment under the principal employer.
54. …………………..Exercise of some control over the activities of contract labour
while they discharge their duties as labourers, is inevitable and such exercise is
not sufficient to hold that the contract labour will become the direct employees of
the principle employer.”
21. In the back-ground of the aforesaid legal position, in the instant case except for the
bald statement of the petitioner, there is no other evidence on record to suggest that she was doing
the work under the direct supervision of the officials of the University and that the contract was
sham, ingenuine, camouflage for all purposes. Rather in cross-examination, she admitted that
neither she can produce any appointment letter or documentary proof by the respondent no.2
University appointing her as safaikarmachari nor any salary certificate issued by respondent no.2
University. She further admitted that she along-with other workers had filed a complaint against the
respondent no.1 contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan. She also
admitted that the respondent no.1 contractor had made payment to settle the claim and she had put
her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1. She further admitted that the contractor used to pay her salary
@ Rs. 70/- per day. She denied that the supervision was done by the University and admitted that
one Mr. Mukesh of the contractor society used to make payment.
22. Therefore, the cross-examination of the PW-1 makes it clear that the contractor used to
pay her salary @ ` 70 per day. As per her own admission, neither any appointment letter nor any
salarycertificate was issued to the petitioner by the University rather she had filed a complaint
against the contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan and the
contractor had made payment to her to settle the claim and she had put her signatures on the
receipt. RW-2 an official from the Labour Office Solan had also categorically stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by the respondent no.1 contractor. There is also no satisfactory
evidence on record to suggest that the petitioner and other workers were under the direct
supervision and control of respondent no.1 University. Moreover, RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
688
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
Executive Engineer had produced the documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-8 regarding the outsourcing of
sweeping arrangements in the University. As per the same the respondent no.2 university invited
tenders for outsourcing of sweeping work in the University vide notice dated 11.08.2006 Ex. R-2
and the work was awarded to the respondent no.1 contractor for a period of one year vide letter Ex
R-3. The contractor started the work from 1. 11.2006 and the one year period was considered w.e.f
1.11.2006 to 31.10.2007 vide letter of Executive Engineer(Design) dated 20.10.2006 Ex R-4. The
validity of the contract was further extended upto 31.01.2008 on the same terms and conditions
vide letter Ex R-5. After expiry of the contract the university again invited tenders vide notice Ex
R-6 and the work was again awarded to the contractor for a period of one year w.e.f. 1.2.2008 to
31.01.2009 vide letter Ex R-7 and the contract was further extended for one year w.e.f 1.02.2009 to
31.01.2010 vide letter Ex R-8.Therefore, the perusal of the aforesaid documents shows that the
respondent no.2 University had outsourced the arrangements of the sweeping work to the
respondent no.1 contractor. Moreover, the University is not a private body and in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, it cannot be said that the contract entered by the University with the
contractor was sham, ingenuine and camouflage.
23. Hence, in view of the evidence led by the parties, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was the direct employee of the University and the contract between the university and contractor
is sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes and as such it has been established that there is
no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent no.2 university.
Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of respondent no.2 and against the petitioner.
Issue no.1.
24. Since, I have held under issues no.2 & 3 above, that the petitioner was the employee of
respondent no.1 contractor, now, it has to be seen as to whether the services of the petitioner had
been illegally terminated by the respondent no.1. Before, I proceed further it is relevant to mention
here that after receiving the reference by this Court, notices were issued to both the respondents but
none appeared on behalf of the respondent no.1 Contractor despite having been served, hence, he
was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 8.5.2013. The petitioner in her claim petition as
well as in her affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PA has stated as PW-1 that she was engaged as
safaikaramchari on 20.12.2007 and worked as such till 28.11.2009. Since, the evidence led by the
petitioner remained un-rebutted as the respondent no.1 did not appear to rebut this testimony of the
petitioner, her evidence is sufficient to prove that she had worked for 240 days in twelve calendar
months preceding her termination. Therefore, before terminating the services of the petitioner, it
was incumbent upon the respondent no.1 to have complied with the provisions of section 25-F of
the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a workman (workmen)
and requires the employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a) to (c) which are
mandatory in nature. It has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Latest HLJ 2007 (HP)
776 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the settled law in counting 240 days
is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of retrenchment during twelve calendar
months and not a year. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the right
conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with Section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has place on
record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
689
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public
Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment without
complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant
extract of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed
in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions
enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In
terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month’s
notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu
of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at
the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay
for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six
months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory
and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee
nullity……………..”
25. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid unrebutted testimony of the petitioner that she had
worked continuously for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding her termination,
the respondent no.1 was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating her services. But, no such compliance was made
by the respondent no.1 contractor, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent no.1 contractor. As a result, the termination of petitioner w.e.f. 13.10.2009 is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against respondent no.1 contractor.
Issue no.4.
26. Since, I have held under issue no. 1 above, that the termination of the services of the
petitioner w.e.f. 13.10.2009 by respondent no.1 without complying with the provisions of the Act is
not legal and justified, hence, the question arises as to what service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled. It is by now well settled that if the termination of employee is found to be illegal, the relief
by way of reinstatement with back-wages is not automatic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh
Kumar Seal and others reported in 2010 LLR 677: 2010 III CLR 17 SC, has held that relief by
way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found
to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that mandatory compensation in
lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate.
27. In Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC
327, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:
“It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal
position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
maybe wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. “
690
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
28. In the present case, even though the termination of the petitioner is held to be illegal
but her reinstatement will not be appropriate relief in view of the fact that the contract had expired
and the respondent no.1 contractor had left the premises of the respondent no.2 University.
Therefore, in such a situation, it would not be appropriate to make the order of reinstatement in the
present case. Hence, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of
justice would be met, if the lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is
awarded to the petitioner. Therefore, in my view the petitioner is entitled to receive a suitable,
appropriate, just and equitable compensation from the respondent no.1 Contractor and keeping in
view the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be quite reasonable and justified if lump sum
compensation of ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five Thousand only) is awarded to the petitioner
instead of reinstatement. Consequently, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against
respondent no.1 Contractor.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner is partly
allowed and as such the respondent no.1 Contractor is directed to pay ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five
Thousand only) as lump sum compensation to the petitioner within three months from today failing
which the same shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of publication of this award.
The reference is answered accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of March, 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Ref. No. 45 of 2011.
Instituted on. 1.11.2011.
Decided on 30.3.2016.
Zeerina W/o Shri Sadhu Ram R/o Village Degu, P.O Narag, District Sirmour, HP through
Shri J.C Bhardwaj, President HP AITUC, HQ Saproon, Solan, HP.
……………Petitioner. Vs.
1.
M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli through its Advisor.
2.
Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP thought
the Registrar.
…………Respondent.
691
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR.
For respondent no.1 : Already ex-parte.
For respondent no.2. : Shri Vivek Kalia, Advocate vice Shri M.P Kanwar,
Advocate
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Smt. Zeerina W/o Shri Sadhu Ram R/o Village
Degu, P.O Narag, District Sirmour, HP w.e.f. 28.11.2009 by i) Hony, Advisor M/s
Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli (contractor society) and ii) The Registrar, Dr. Y.S Parmar University of
Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP (Principal Employer) however no
registration certificate and licence was respectively obtained by the Principal
Employer and Contractor as provided in the Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 and not giving
her an opportunity of consideration for re-employment by the employers from the
date her juniors were allegedly employed, thus in violation of provisions of section 25-
F, 25-G & H of the ibid Act and further demand to declare her direct employee of the
Principal employer is legal and justified, if not, what amount of back wages, seniority,
past service benefits, compensation and relief the above worker is entitled to from the
above employers/ management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that on 20.11.2007, she was engaged by the
principal employer i.e Registrar of Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nauni,
District Solan, HP (hereinafter referred to as University) as safai karmachari/worker but her name
was not entered on the roll of the University and was unrolled with the so called name lender,
contractor whose address and particulars are not known to the petitioner though her name remained
on the roll of contractor till her termination on 28.11.2009. It is further stated that the legitimate
dues of the petitioner were neither paid by the contractor nor the University. Since, the contractor
was only name, hence the contract was sham, in-genuine and camouflage for all purposes. Even,
the petitioner was working under the supervision of official of the University whereas her name
was transferred by the principal employer from his roll to the roll of the non-existent contractor
without the consent of the workman concerned. The petitioner was working as sweeper and was
doing sweeping work in the premises of Department of Forestry & Horticulture, Library etc., and
sometimes she had also been deployed to work as sweeper in the Administration Block of the
University and as such the work which was being performed by the petitioner was never incidental
but it is of permanent in nature and as such the services rendered by the petitioner under the control
of University and her name on the roll of contractor amounts to unfair labour practice which are
prohibited under section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act 1970 (hereinafter referred to as
Contract Labour Act). It is also stated that neither the University had applied to employ the
workmen for any work through contractor nor any licence had been obtained by the contractor from
the licensing officer, hence, any recruitment without obtaining any valid licence of contractor, the
workmen deemed to be a employee of the University. The petitioner had worked for more than two
years continuously and completed 240 days in each calendar year preceding her termination. The
services of the petitioner had been terminated without any notice, chargesheet and without the
compliance of sections 25-N, 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
Act) which is a mandatory provision of law and even juniors have been retained by the respondents
692
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
in violation of the provisions of section 25-G and 25-h OF the Act. The authorities of the
University have indulged in unfair labour practice with the help of contractor and the sudden
removal of the petitioner by the University have made her integrity doubtful in the eyes of one and
all, who is still unemployed and even while terminating the services of the petitioner, the officials
of the University have restored to the formula of “hire and fire” as no enquiry had been conducted
against her. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the petitioner be declared the
employee of the University and she be re-instated in service with seniority and continuity along-
with back-wages.
3.
Before, I proceed further it is important to mention here that the respondent no.1
(contractor) was duly served but did not put appearance before this Court, hence, vide order dated
8.5.2013, proceeded against ex-parte.
4.
By filing detailed reply, the respondent no.2 (university) had contested the claim of the
petitioner wherein preliminary objections had been taken that there is no relationship of principal
employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent, the claim of the petitioner is bad
for non-joinder of necessary party, suppression of material facts and the petition has been filed by
the petitioner in connivance with the contractor. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner
was engaged as safai karamchari in the University. The petitioner was not the direct employee of
the University and the salary had not been paid to her by the respondent directly and even the work
performed by the petitioner had never been controlled and supervised by the respondent. It is
asserted that the work of safai was given to the contractor who filed quotation/tender for the job of
safai karamchari/cleaners of the university and even no record of the employee of the contractor
had been maintained by the respondent university. It is further asserted that the respondent
university neither engaged/appointed the petitioner as safai karmachari in the University nor
terminated her services on 28.11.2009 as there is no record with the respondent university
regarding the workers of the contractor. It is denied that the contractor was only name lender and as
such the contract was sham, ingenuine and camouflage for any purpose and that the petitioner was
working under the supervision of the official of the respondent university. It is further denied that
the petitioner was engaged on 20.11.2007 and the work performed by her is of permanent in nature.
The provisions of section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is not applicable. It is also
denied that the contractor or his agents were not present in the University to supervise the work of
the employee. Since, the petitioner was not the employee of respondent university, hence, the
question of issuing notice for termination of services and filling chargesheet and to pay
retrenchment compensation does not arise at all. The respondent university prayed for the dismissal
of the claim petition.
5.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed her allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
6.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
8.7.2013.
20. Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 28.11.2009 by the
respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H is illegal
and unjustified as alleged?
OPP……
21. Whether demand of the petitioner to declare her the direct employee of the principal
employer in the absece of registration certificate and licence by the Principal employer
693
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
and contractor as provided under the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is legal and
justified?
OPP……..
22. Whether there is no relationship of principal employer and employee between the
petitioner and respondent no.2 (Dr. Y.S Parmar University) as alleged?
OPR-2…..
23. If issue no.1 & 2 are decided in affirmative and issue no.3 in negative to what service
benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP………..
24. Relief.
7.
Besides having heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent
no.2 (university), I have also gone through the record of the case carefully.
8.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
No.
Issue no.3
Yes.
Issue no.4
Entitled to lump sum compensation.
Relief. Reference partly answered in favour of the petitioner and
against respondent no.1 contractor.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.2 & 3.
9.
Being interlinked and co-related, all these issues are taken up together for discussion
and decision.
10. The AR for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is entitled to be declared as
permanent workman of respondent no.2 University right from the date of her joining of services
and she is entitled to the full wages and consequential benefits. He further contended that there is
no contract between the respondent university and so called contract to engage the workers through
contractor is sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes. He also contended that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in each calendar year preceding her termination and her
termination without the compliance of the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 University contended
that the petitioner was engaged through contractor i.e respondent no.1 under the provisions of
Contract Labour Act. He further contended that there was no relationship of employer and
employee between the parties and the University had availed the services of the petitioner and other
workers through the contractor.
694
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
12. The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered her affidavit Ex. PA
in examination-in-chief wherein she reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. In cross-examination, she stated that she cannot produce any appointment letter issued by
respondent no.2 and any other proof and she also cannot produce any salary certificate issued by
respondent no.2. She admitted that she along-with others had filed one complaint against
respondent no.1 (M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society) regarding minimum wages
before Labour Officer, Solan. She further admitted that the respondent no.1 had made payment to
settle the claim and to receive the said payment she had put her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1.
The respondent no.1 used to pay the salary @ 70/- per day. She denied that her services were
terminated by respondent no.1 but explained that her services had been terminated by respondent
no.2. She denied that the supervision was done by the respondent no.2 but admitted that one Mr.
Mukesh of the Society used to make payment.
13. On the contrary, the respondent no.2 examined two witnesses. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer, tendered his affidavit Ex. R-1 in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated
almost all the averments as stated in the reply filed by respondent university. He also tendered in
evidence other documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-10. In cross-examination, he admitted that they have
obtained the security and permanent address from the contractor, who was working in the name and
style of M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, Dwarka New Dehli. He admitted that
the University had contacted the contractor after the reference petition but he had not explained any
reason as to why he was not appearing before the Court. The University had entered into an
agreement with the contractor which is Ex. R-3. He denied that the University had forged the
agreement. He further denied that no contractor was in existence. He admitted that they have not
applied to the Labour Officer for employing contract labour in the house keeping. He denied that
the University had engaged the contractor who was not having any licence and the contractor was
only a name lender. He further denied that no labourer was engaged by the contractor and the SDO
of the University used to deploy the workman to do the work. The University had issued a
notification regarding out sourcing of sweeping work.
14. RW-2 Shri Devinder Kumar, Clerk of Labour Office Solan has stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by respondent no.1 Sanitation Promotion and Development
Society. In cross-examination, he admitted that neither the University had applied under contract
Labour (R&A) Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor (respondent no.1) had obtained
any licence from the licensing authority.
15. I have heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent no.2
(University) and also gone through the record. On the perusal of the pleadings of the parties, after
analyzing evidence and material placed on record and considering the arguments addressed by
AR/Counsel for the parties, I am of the firm opinion that the petitioner cannot be deemed to be the
direct employee of the University in the absence of registration certificate by the principal
employer and licence by the contractor as provided under the Contract Labour Act.
16. As mentioned above, the petitioner had claimed that she was the employee of
respondent no.2 (university) whereas the University had stated that she was the employee of
respondent no.1 (contractor). At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce sections 7 & 12 of
the Contract Labour Act.
7. Registration of certain establishments.- (1) Every principal employer of an
establishment to which this Act applies shall, within such period as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with respect
to establishments generally or with respect to any class of them, make an application to
the registering officer in the prescribed manner for registration of the
establishment…………
695
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
12. Licensing of contractors.- (1) With effect from such date as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, no contractor to
whom this Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work through contract labour
except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer…………………
As per the provisions of section 7 & 12 of the aforesaid Act, the principal employer i.e
respondent no.2 (University) should have a certificate of registration from the
prescribed authority and secondly the contractor i.e respondent no.1 should have a
licence issued by competent authority i.e the Labour Department. On perusal of the
record, it is clear that neither the principal employer (university) had the certificate of
registration from the prescribed authority nor the contractor had a licence issued by the
competent authority. RW-2, Shri Devinder Kumar an official from the Labour Office
had categorically admitted in cross-examination that neither the University had applied
under the Contract Labour Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor had
obtained any licence from the authority.
17. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner and other workers would be deemed to be direct employees of the respondent University
because their engagement as contract labour was in violation of sections 7, and 12 of the
Regulation Act as on the date of engagement of the petitioner, neither the University had a
certificate of registration nor the respondent no.1 contractor was holding a licence under section 12
of the Contract Labour Act ? This question was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
AIR 1992 SC 457, titled as Dena Nath & Ors Vs. National Fertilizers Ltd. And others and it
was held as under:
“20……………..The Act as can be seen from the scheme of the Act merely regulates the
employment of contract labour in certain establishment and provides for its abolition in
certain circumstances. The Act does not provide for total abolition of contract labour
but it provides for abolition by the appropriate Government in appropriate cases under
Section 10 of the Act.
22……………….The only consequences provided in the Act where either the principal
employer or the labour contractor violates the provision of Sections 9 and 12
respectively is the penal provision, as envisaged under the Act for which reference may
be made to Sections 23 and 25 of the Act………………...”
The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Steal Authority of India Vs. National Union Water Front 2000
(7) SCC-1 in which it was observed as under:
“96. In Dena Naths case (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the
question, whether as a consequence of noncompliance with Sections 7 and 12 of
the CLRA Act by the principal employer and the licensee respectively, the
contract labour employed by the principal employer would become the employees
of the principal employer. Having noticed the observation of the three-Judge
Bench of this Court in The Standard-Vacuums case (supra) and having pointed
out that the guidelines enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act are
practically based on the guidelines given by the Tribunal in the said case, it was
held that the only consequence was the penal provisions under Sections 23 and 25
as envisaged under the CLRA Act and that merely because the contractor or the
employer had violated any provision of the Act or the Rules, the High Court in
696
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution could not issue any mandamus
for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees of the principal
employer. This Court thus resolved the conflict of opinions on the said question
among various High Courts. It was further held that neither the Act nor the Rules
framed by the Central Government or by any appropriate Government provided
that upon abolition of the contract labour, the labourers would be directly
absorbed by the principal employer”.
18. Hence, the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court shows that
the consequence of violation of the Contract Labour Act i.e non registration of the establishment
under section 7 and non-possession of the licence under section 12 of the Act would not result in
the absorption of concerned workman by the principal employer rather it would result in
prosecution under section 23/25 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid legal position, there
is no force in the contention of the AR for the workman that in view of the fact that respondent no.2
University was not having certificate of registration under section 7 and the contractor was not
having any licence under section 12 of the Contract Labour Act, the petitioner and other workmen
would be deemed to be the direct employees of the University.
19. Now, the next question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the contract was sham, ingeniune and camouflage as contended by the AR for the
petitioner. As per the statement of claim, the petitioner and other workers were engaged as
safaikarmacharies and they were doing the work in the premises of University in the departments of
Forestry, Horticulture, Library etc. of respondent no.2 University and some-times they had also
been deployed to work as sweepers in the Administrative Block of the University.
20. It is by now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds the contract between the
principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal and a camouflage to deny employment
benefits to the employee, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the
direct employee of the principal employer. In (2009) 13 SCC titled as International Airport
Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Anr., it has been held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:
“36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under section 10 of CLRA Act, but
the contract labour contend that the contract between principal employer and
contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles
in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen
is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they
are the direct employees of the principle employer and the agreement is sham, nominal
and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under section 10(1) of CLRA
Act.
37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between
principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to
deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to
remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee
the way in which the work should be done, in short who has direction and control over
the employee. But where there is no notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and
where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was sham/nominal
and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise.
697
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained the terms
“control” and “supervision” which reads as under:
“38.The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the
contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For
example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by
the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the
principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by contractor, if the right to regulate
employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies
with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract
labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor
as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the
principal employer or used otherwise. In short worker being the employee of the
contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he
decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work
under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control
of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is
with the contractor.”
53.13……………… Merely because the contract labour work is under the supervision
of the officers of the principal employer, it cannot be taken as evidence of direct
employment under the principal employer.
54. …………………..Exercise of some control over the activities of contract labour
while they discharge their duties as labourers, is inevitable and such exercise is
not sufficient to hold that the contract labour will become the direct employees of
the principle employer.”
21. In the back-ground of the aforesaid legal position, in the instant case except for the
bald statement of the petitioner, there is no other evidence on record to suggest that she was doing
the work under the direct supervision of the officials of the University and that the contract was
sham, ingenuine, camouflage for all purposes. Rather in cross-examination, she admitted that
neither she can produce any appointment letter or documentary proof by the respondent no.2
University appointing her as safaikarmachari nor any salary certificate issued by respondent no.2
University. She further admitted that she along-with other workers had filed a complaint against the
respondent no.1 contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan. She also
admitted that the respondent no.1 contractor had made payment to settle the claim and she had put
her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1. She further admitted that the contractor used to pay her salary
@ Rs. 70/- per day. She denied that the supervision was done by the University and admitted that
one Mr. Mukesh of the contractor society used to make payment.
22. Therefore, the cross-examination of the PW-1 makes it clear that the contractor used to
pay her salary @` 70 per day. As per her own admission, neither any appointment letter nor any
salary certificate was issued to the petitioner by the University rather she had filed a complaint
against the contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan and the
contractor had made payment to her to settle the claim and she had put her signatures on the
receipt. RW-2 an official from the Labour Office Solan had also categorically stated that the receipt
698
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by the respondent no.1 contractor. There is also no satisfactory
evidence on record to suggest that the petitioner and other workers were under the direct
supervision and control of respondent no.2 University. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma, Executive
Engineer had produced the documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-8 regarding the outsourcing of sweeping
arrangements in the University. As per the same the respondent no.2 university invited tenders for
outsourcing of sweeping work in the University vide notice dated 11.08.2006 Ex. R-2 and the work
was awarded to the respondent no.1 contractor for a period of one year vide letter Ex R-3. The
contractor started the work from 1. 11.2006 and the one year period was considered w.e.f 1.11.2006
to 31.10.2007 vide letter of Executive Engineer(Design) dated 20.10.2006 Ex R-4. The validity of
the contract was further extended upto 31.01.2008 on the same terms and conditions vide letter Ex
R-5. After expiry of the contract the university again invited tenders vide notice Ex R-6 and the
work was again awarded to the contractor for a period of one year w.e.f. 1.2.2008 to 31.01.2009
vide letter Ex R-7 and the contract was further extended for one year w.e.f 1.02.2009 to 31.01.2010
vide letter Ex R-8. Therefore, the perusal of the aforesaid documents shows that the respondent
no.2 University had outsourced the arrangements of the sweeping work to the respondent no.1
contractor. Moreover, the University is not a private body and in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it cannot be said that the contract entered by the University with the contractor was sham,
ingenuine and camouflage.
23. Hence, in view of the evidence led by the parties, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was the direct employee of the University and the contract between the university and contractor is
sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes and as such it has been established that there is no
relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent no.2 university.
Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of respondent no.2 and against the petitioner.
Issue no.1.
24. Since, I have held under issues no.2 & 3 above, that the petitioner was the employee of
respondent no.1 contractor, now, it has to be seen as to whether the services of the petitioner had
been illegally terminated by the respondent no.1. Before, I proceed further it is relevant to mention
here that after receiving the reference by this Court, notices were issued to both the respondents but
none appeared on behalf of the respondent no.1 Contractor despite having been served, hence, he
was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 8.5.2013. The petitioner in her claim petition as
well as in her affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PA has stated as PW-1 that she was engaged as
safaikaramchari on 20.11.2007 and worked as such till 28.11.2009. Since, the evidence led by the
petitioner remained un-rebutted as the respondent no.1 did not appear to rebut this testimony of the
petitioner, her evidence is sufficient to prove that she had worked for 240 days in twelve calendar
months preceding her termination. Therefore, before terminating the services of the petitioner, it
was incumbent upon the respondent no.1 to have complied with the provisions of section 25-F of
the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a workman (workmen)
and requires the employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a) to (c) which are
mandatory in nature. It has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Latest HLJ 2007 (HP)
776 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the settled law in counting 240 days
is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of retrenchment during twelve calendar
months and not a year. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the right
conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with Section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has place on
record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
699
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health
division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the
termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment without complying with
the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant extract of aforesaid
judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in
any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in
Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the
employer is required to give to the workman one month’s notice in writing indicating
the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a
duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment,
compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of
continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory and
non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee nullity……………..”
25. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid unrebutted testimony of the petitioner that she had
worked continuously for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding her termination,
the respondent no.1 was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating her services. But, no such compliance was made
by the respondent no.1 contractor, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent no.1 contractor. As a result, the termination of petitioner w.e.f. 28.11.2009 is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against respondent no.1 contractor.
Issue no.4.
26. Since, I have held under issue no. 1 above, that the termination of the services of the
petitioner w.e.f. 28.11.2009 by respondent no.1 without complying with the provisions of the Act is
not legal and justified, hence, the question arises as to what service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled. It is by now well settled that if the termination of employee is found to be illegal, the relief
by way of reinstatement with back-wages is not automatic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh
Kumar Seal and others reported in 2010 LLR 677: 2010 III CLR 17 SC, has held that relief by
way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found
to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that mandatory compensation in
lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate.
27. In Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC
327, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:
“It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal
position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
maybe wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
700
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. “
28. In the present case, even though the termination of the petitioner is held to be illegal
but her reinstatement will not be appropriate relief in view of the fact that the contract had expired
and the respondent no.1 contractor had left the premises of the respondent no.2 University.
Therefore, in such a situation, it would not be appropriate to make the order of reinstatement in the
present case. Hence, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of
justice would be met, if the lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is
awarded to the petitioner. Therefore, in my view the petitioner is entitled to receive a suitable,
appropriate, just and equitable compensation from the respondent no.1 Contractor and keeping in
view the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be quite reasonable and justified if lump sum
compensation of ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five Thousand only) is awarded to the petitioner instead of
reinstatement. Consequently, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against respondent
no.1 Contractor.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner is partly
allowed and as such the respondent no.1 Contractor is directed to pay ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five
Thousand only) as lump sum compensation to the petitioner within three months from today failing
which the same shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of publication of this award.
The reference is answered accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of March, 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Ref. No. 46 of 2011.
Instituted on. 1.11.2011.
Decided on 30.3.2016.
Bimla W/o Shri Mohan Singh R/o Village Nauni, P.O Oachghat, District Solan, HP through
Shri J.C Bhardwaj, President HP AITUC, HQ Saproon, Solan, HP.
……………Petitioner.
Vs.
1.
M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli through its Advisor.
701
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
2.
Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP thought
the Registrar.
…………Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR.
For respondent no.1 :
Already ex-parte.
For respondent no.2. : Shri Vivek Kalia, Advocate vice Shri M.P Kanwar,
Advocate
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Smt. Bimla W/o Shri Mohan Singh R/o Village
Nauni, P.O Oachghat, District Solan, HP w.e.f. 29.11.2009 by i) Hony, Advisor M/s
Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli (contractor society) and ii) The Registrar, Dr. Y.S Parmar University of
Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP (Principal Employer) however no
registration certificate and licence was respectively obtained by the Principal
Employer and Contractor as provided in the Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 and not giving
her an opportunity of consideration for re-employment by the employers from the
date her juniors were allegedly employed, thus in violation of provisions of section 25-
F, 25-G & H of the ibid Act and further demand to declare her direct employee of the
Principal employer is legal and justified, if not, what amount of back wages, seniority,
past service benefits, compensation and relief the above worker is entitled to from the
above employers/ management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that in the month of March, 2008, she was
engaged by the principal employer i.e Registrar of Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and
Forestry Nauni, District Solan, HP (hereinafter referred to as University) as safai
karmachari/worker but her name was not entered on the roll of the University and was unrolled
with the so called name lender, contractor whose address and particulars are not known to the
petitioner though her name remained on the roll of contractor till her termination on 28.11.2009. It
is further stated that the legitimate dues of the petitioner were neither paid by the contractor nor the
University. Since, the contractor was only name, hence the contract was sham, in-genuine and
camouflage for all purposes. Even, the petitioner was working under the supervision of official of
the University whereas her name was transferred by the principal employer from his roll to the roll
of the non-existent contractor without the consent of the workman concerned. The petitioner was
working as sweeper and was doing sweeping work in the premises of Department of Forestry &
Horticulture, Library etc., and sometimes she had also been deployed to work as sweeper in the
Administration Block of the University and as such the work which was being performed by the
petitioner was never incidental but it is of permanent in nature and as such the services rendered by
the petitioner under the control of University and her name on the roll of contractor amounts to
unfair labour practice which are prohibited under section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act
1970 (hereinafter referred to as Contract Labour Act). It is also stated that neither the University
had applied to employ the workmen for any work through contractor nor any licence had been
obtained by the contractor from the licensing officer, hence, any recruitment without obtaining any
702
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
valid licence of contractor, the workmen deemed to be a employee of the University. The petitioner
had worked for more than two years continuously and completed 240 days in each calendar year
preceding her termination. The services of the petitioner had been terminated without any notice,
chargesheet and without the compliance of sections 25-N, 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred to as Act) which is a mandatory provision of law and even juniors have been
retained by the respondents in violation of the provisions of section 25-G and 25-h OF the Act. The
authorities of the University have indulged in unfair labour practice with the help of contractor and
the sudden removal of the petitioner by the University have made her integrity doubtful in the eyes
of one and all, who is still unemployed and even while terminating the services of the petitioner,
the officials of the University have restored to the formula of “hire and fire” as no enquiry had been
conducted against her. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the petitioner be
declared the employee of the University and she be re-instated in service with seniority and
continuity along-with back-wages.
3.
Before, I proceed further it is important to mention here that the respondent no.1
(contractor) was duly served but did not put appearance before this Court, hence, vide order dated
8.5.2013, proceeded against ex-parte.
4.
By filing detailed reply, the respondent no.2 (university) had contested the claim of the
petitioner wherein preliminary objections had been taken that there is no relationship of principal
employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent, the claim of the petitioner is bad
for non-joinder of necessary party, suppression of material facts and the petition has been filed by
the petition in connivance with the contractor. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner was
engaged as safai karamchari in the University. The petitioner was not the direct employee of the
University and the salary had not been paid to her by the respondent directly and even the work
performed by the petitioner had never controlled and supervised by the respondent. It is asserted
that the work of safai was given to the contractor who filed quotation/tender for the job of safai
karamchari/cleaners of the university and even no record of the employee of the contractor had
been maintained by the respondent university. It is further asserted that the respondent university
neither engaged/appointment the petitioner as safai karmachari in the University nor terminated her
services on 28.11.2009 as there is no record with the respondent university regarding the workers
of the contractor. It is denied that the contractor was only name lender and as such the contract was
sham, ingenuine and camouflage for any purpose and that the petitioner was working under the
supervision of the official of the respondent university. It is further denied that the petitioner was
engaged on 20.11.2007 and the work performed by her is of permanent in nature. The provisions of
section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is not applicable. It is also denied that the
contractor or his agents were not present in the University to supervise the work of the employee.
Since, the petitioner was not the employee of respondent university, hence, the question of issuing
notice for termination of services and filling chargesheet and to pay retrenchment compensation
does not arise at all. The respondent university prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.
5.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed her allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
6.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
8.7.2013.
25. Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 29.11.2009 by the
respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H is illegal
and unjustified as alleged?
OPP……
703
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
26. Whether demand of the petitioner to declare her the direct employee of the principal
employer in the absece of registration certificate and licence by the Principal employer
and contractor as provided under the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is legal and
justified?
OPP……..
27. Whether there is no relationship of principal employer and employee between the
petitioner and respondent no.2 (Dr. Y.S Parmar University) as alleged?
OPR-2…..
28. If issue no.1 & 2 are decided in affirmative and issue no.3 in negative to what service
benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP………..
29. Relief.
7.
Besides having heard the learned AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for the
respondent no.2 (university), I have also gone through the record of the case carefully.
8.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
No.
Issue no.3
Yes.
Issue no.4
Entitled to lump sum compensation.
Relief. Reference partly answered in favour of the petitioner and
against respondent no.1 contractor.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.2 & 3.
9.
Being interlinked and co-related, all these issues are taken up together for discussion
and decision.
10. Learned AR for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is entitled to be declared as
permanent workman of respondent no.2 University right from the date of her joining of services
and she is entitled to the full wages and consequential benefits. He further contended that there is
no contract between the respondent university and so called contract to engage the workers through
contractor is sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes. He also contended that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in each calendar year preceding her termination and her
termination without the compliance of the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 University contended
that the petitioner was engaged through contractor i.e respondent no.1 under the provisions of
Contract Labour Act. He further contended that there was no relationship of employer and
704
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
employee between the parties and the University had availed the services of the petitioner and other
workers through the contractor.
12. The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered her affidavit Ex. PA
in examination-in-chief wherein she reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. In cross-examination, she stated that she cannot produce any appointment letter issued by
respondent no.2 and any other proof and she also cannot produce any salary certificate issued by
respondent no.2. She admitted that she along-with others had filed one complaint against
respondent no.1 (M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society) regarding minimum wages
before Labour Officer, Solan. She further admitted that the respondent no.1 had made payment to
settle the claim and to receive the said payment she had put her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1
encircled red. The respondent no.1 used to pay the salary towards @ 70/- per day. She denied that
her services were terminated by respondent no.1 but explained that her services had been
terminated by respondent no.2. She denied that the supervision was done by the respondent no.2
but admitted that one Mr. Mukesh of the Society used to make payment.
13. On the contrary, the respondent no.2 examined two RWs. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer, who tendered his affidavit Ex. R-1 in examination-in-chief wherein he
reiterated almost all the averments as stated in the reply filed by respondent university. He also
tendered in evidence other documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-10. In cross-examination, he admitted that
they have obtained the security and permanent address from the contractor, who was working in the
name and style of M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, Dwarka New Dehli. He
admitted that the University had contacted the contractor after the reference petition but he had not
explained any reason as to why he was not appearing before the Court. The University had entered
into an agreement with the contractor which is Ex. R-3. He denied that the University had forged
the agreement. He further denied that no contractor was in existence. He admitted that they have
not applied to the Labour Officer for employing contract labour in the house keeping. He denied
that the University had engaged the contractor who was not having any licence and the contractor
was only a name lender. He further denied that no labourer was engaged by the contractor and the
SDO of the University used to deploy the workman to do the work. The University had issued a
notification regarding out sourcing of sweeping work.
14. RW-2 Shri Devinder Kumar, Clerk of Labour Office Solan has stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by respondent no.1 Sanitation Promotion and Development
Society. In cross-examination, he admitted that neither the University had applied under contract
Labour (R&A) Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor (respondent no.1) had obtained
any licence from the licensing authority.
15. I have heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent no.2
(University) and also gone through the record. On the perusal of the pleadings of the parties, after
analyzing evidence and material placed on record and considering the arguments addressed by
AR/Counsel for the parties, I am of the firm opinion that the petitioner cannot be deemed to be the
direct employee of the University in the absence of registration certificate by the principal
employer and licence by the contractor as provided under the Contract Labour Act.
16. As mentioned above, the petitioner had claimed that she was the employee of
respondent no.2 (university) whereas the University had stated that she was the employee of
respondent no.1 (contractor). At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce sections 7 & 12 of
the Contract Labour Act.
7. Registration of certain establishments.- (1) Every principal employer of an
establishment to which this Act applies shall, within such period as the appropriate
705
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with respect
to establishments generally or with respect to any class of them, make an application to
the registering officer in the prescribed manner for registration of the
establishment…………
12. Licensing of contractors.- (1) With effect from such date as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, no contractor to
whom this Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work through contract labour
except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer…………………
As per the provisions of section 7 & 12 of the aforesaid Act, the principal employer i.e
respondent no.2 (University) should have a certificate of registration from the
prescribed authority and secondly the contractor i.e respondent no.1 should have a
licence issued by competent authority i.e the Labour Department. On perusal of the
record, it is clear that neither the principal employer (university) had the certificate of
registration from the prescribed authority nor the contractor had a licence issued by the
competent authority. RW-2, Shri Devinder Kumar an official from the Labour Office
had categorically admitted in cross-examination that neither the University had applied
under the Contract Labour Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor had
obtained any licence from the authority.
17. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner and other workers would be deemed to be direct employees of the respondent University
because their engagement as contract labour was in violation of sections 7, and 12 of the
Regulation Act as on the date of engagement of the petitioner, neither the University had a
certificate of registration nor the respondent no.1 contractor was holding a licence under section 12
of the Contract Labour Act ? This question was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
AIR 1992 SC 457, titled as Dena Nath & Ors Vs. National Fertilizers Ltd. And others and it
was held as under:
“20……………..The Act as can be seen from the scheme of the Act merely regulates the
employment of contract labour in certain establishment and provides for its abolition in
certain circumstances. The Act does not provide for total abolition of contract labour but it
provides for abolition by the appropriate Government in appropriate cases under Section 10
of the Act.
22……………….The only consequences provided in the Act where either the principal
employer or the labour contractor violates the provision of Sections 9 and 12 respectively is
the penal provision, as envisaged under the Act for which reference may be made to
Sections 23 and 25 of the Act………………...”
The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Steal Authority of India Vs. National Union Water Front 2000 (7) SCC-1 in
which it was observed as under:
“96. In Dena Naths case (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the question,
whether as a consequence of noncompliance with Sections 7 and 12 of the CLRA Act
by the principal employer and the licensee respectively, the contract labour employed
by the principal employer would become the employees of the principal employer.
Having noticed the observation of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in The
Standard-Vacuums case (supra) and having pointed out that the guidelines enumerated
706
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act are practically based on the guidelines given
by the Tribunal in the said case, it was held that the only consequence was the penal
provisions under Sections 23 and 25 as envisaged under the CLRA Act and that merely
because the contractor or the employer had violated any provision of the Act or the
Rules, the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution could not
issue any mandamus for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees
of the principal employer. This Court thus resolved the conflict of opinions on the said
question among various High Courts. It was further held that neither the Act nor the
Rules framed by the Central Government or by any appropriate Government provided
that upon abolition of the contract labour, the labourers would be directly absorbed by
the principal employer”.
18. Hence, the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court shows that
the consequence of violation of the Contract Labour Act i.e non registration of the establishment
under section 7 and non-possession of the licence under section 12 of the Act would not result in
the absorption of concerned workman by the principal employer rather it would result in
prosecution under section 23/25 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid legal position, there
is no force in the contention of the AR for the workman that in view of the fact that respondent no.2
University was not having certificate of registration under section 7 and the contractor was not
having any licence under section 12 of the Contract Labour Act, the petitioner and other workmen
would be deemed to be the direct employees of the University.
19. Now, the next question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the contract was sham, ingeniune and camouflage as contended by the AR for the
petitioner. As per the statement of claim, the petitioner and other workers were engaged as
safaikarmacharies and they were doing the work in the premises of University in the departments of
Forestry, Horticulture, Library etc. of respondent no.2 University and some-times they had also
been deployed to work as sweepers in the Administrative Block of the University.
20. It is by now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds the contract between the
principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal and a camouflage to deny
employment benefits to the employee, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the
workman is the direct employee of the principal employer. In (2009) 13 SCC titled as
International Airport Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and
Anr., it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:
“36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under section 10 of CLRA Act, but
the contract labour contend that the contract between principal employer and
contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles
in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen
is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they
are the direct employees of the principle employer and the agreement is sham, nominal
and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under section 10(1) of CLRA
Act.
37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between
principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to
deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to
remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee
the way in which the work should be done, in short who has direction and control over
the employee. But where there is no notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and
707
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was sham/nominal
and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise.
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained the terms
“control” and “supervision” which reads as under:
“38.The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the
contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For
example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by
the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the
principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by contractor, if the right to regulate
employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies
with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract
labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor
as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the
principal employer or used otherwise. In short worker being the employee of the
contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he
decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work
under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control
of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is
with the contractor.”
53. 13……………… Merely because the contract labour work is under the
supervision of the officers of the principal employer, it cannot be taken as
evidence of direct employment under the principal employer.
54. …………………..Exercise of some control over the activities of contract labour
while they discharge their duties as labourers, is inevitable and such exercise is
not sufficient to hold that the contract labour will become the direct employees of
the principle employer.”
21. In the back-ground of the aforesaid legal position, in the instant case except for the
bald statement of the petitioner, there is no other evidence on record to suggest that she was doing
the work under the direct supervision of the officials of the University and that the contract was
sham, ingenuine, camouflage for all purposes. Rather in cross-examination, she admitted that
neither she cannot produce any appointment letter or documentary proof by the respondent no.2
University appointing her as safaikarmachari nor any salary certificate issued by respondent no.2
University. She further admitted that she along-with other workers had filed a complaint against the
respondent no.1 contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan. She also
admitted that the respondent no.1 contractor had made payment to settle the claim and she had put
her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1. She further admitted that the contractor used to pay her salary
@ Rs. 70/- per day. She denied that the supervision was done by the University and admitted that
one Mr. Mukesh of the contractor society used to make payment.
22. Therefore, the cross-examination of the PW-1 suggests that the contractor used to pay
her salary @ ` 70 per day. As per her own admission, neither any appointment letter nor any
708
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
salary certificate was issued to the petitioner by the University rather she had filed a complaint
against the contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan and the
contractor had made payment to her to settle the claim and she had put her signatures on the
receipt. RW-2 an official from the Labour Office Solan had also categorically stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by the respondent no.1 contractor. There is also no evidence on
record to suggest that the petitioner and other workers were under the direct supervision of
respondent no.1 University. RW- 1 Shri V.K Sharma, Executive Engineer had produced the
documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-8 regarding the outsourcing of sweeping arrangements in the
University. Ex. R-2 and E. R-6 are the notices inviting tenders for outsourcing of sweeping work in
the University, Ex. R-3 and Ex R-7 are the letters issued to the respondent no.1 contractor by the
Executive Engineer (Const) of the respondent University regarding approval of the rates quoted by
the respondent no.1 contractor, Ex. R-4 is the letter written by University to the contractor whereby
the request of contractor for extension for the start of the sweeping work has been accepted, Ex. R-
5 is the letter for extension of sweeping arrangement, and Ex. R-8 is the letter written by
respondent University for approval of the extension of sweeping arrangement at University.
Therefore, the perusal of the aforesaid documents shows that the respondent no.1 University had
outsourced the arrangements of the sweeping work and had entered into a contract with the
respondent no.1 contractor. Moreover, the University is not a private body and in view of the
aforesaid documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-8, it cannot be said that the contract entered by the
University with the contractor was sham, ingeniune and camouflage.
23. Hence, in view of the evidence led by the parties, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was the direct employee of the University and the contract between the university and contractor is
sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes and as such it has been established that there is
no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent no.2
university. Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of respondent no.2 and against the
petitioner.
Issue no.1.
24. Since, I have held under issues no.2 & 3 above, that the petitioner was the employee of
respondent no.1 contractor, now, it has to be seen as to whether the services of the petitioner had
been illegally terminated by the respondent no.1. Before, I proceed further it is relevant to mention
here that after receiving the reference by this Court, notices were issued to both the respondents but
none appeared on behalf of the respondent no.1 Contractor despite having been served, hence, he
was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 8.5.2013. The petitioner in her claim petition as
well as in her affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PA has stated as PW-1 that she was engaged as
safaikaramchari in the month of March, 2008 and worked as such till 28.11.2009. Since, the
evidence led by the petitioner remained un-rebutted as the respondent no.1 did not appear to rebut
this testimony of the petitioner, her evidence is sufficient to prove that she had worked for 240 days
in twelve calendar months preceding her termination. Therefore, before terminating the services of
the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondent no.1 to have complied with the provisions of
section 25-F of the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a
workman (workmen) and requires the employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a)
to (c) which are mandatory in nature. It has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Latest
HLJ 2007 (HP) 776 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the settled law in
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of retrenchment during
twelve calendar months and not a year. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced as under:
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the right
conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with Section
709
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has place on
record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public
Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment without
complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant
extract of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed
in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions
enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In
terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month’s
notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu
of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at
the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay
for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six
months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory
and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee
nullity……………..”
25. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid unrebutted testimony of the petitioner that she had
worked continuously for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding her termination,
the respondent no.1 was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating her services. But, no such compliance was made
by the respondent no.1 contractor, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent no.1 contractor. As a result, the termination of petitioner w.e.f. 29.11.2009 is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against respondent no.1 contractor.
Issue no.4.
26. Since, I have held under issue no. 1 above, that the termination of the services of the
petitioner w.e.f. 29.11.2009 by respondent no.1 without complying with the provisions of the Act is
not legal and justified, hence, the question arises as to what service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled. It is by now well settled that if the termination of employee is found to be illegal, the relief
by way of reinstatement with back-wages is not automatic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh
Kumar Seal and others reported in 2010 LLR 677: 2010 III CLR 17 SC, has held that relief by
way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found
to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that mandatory compensation in
lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate.
27. In Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC
327, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:
“It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal
position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
710
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
maybe wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. “
28. In the present case, even though the termination of the petitioner is held to be illegal
but her reinstatement will not be appropriate relief in view of the fact that the respondent no.1
contractor had left the premises of the respondent no.2 University. Therefore, in such a situation, it
would not be appropriate to make the order of reinstatement in the present case. Hence, taking into
account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of justice would be met, if the lump
sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is awarded to the petitioner. Therefore,
in my view the petitioner is entitled to receive a suitable, appropriate, just and equitable
compensation from the respondent no.1 Contractor and keeping in view the facts and circumstances
of the case, it would be quite reasonable and justified if lump sum compensation of ` 25,000/- (`
Twenty Five Thousand only) is awarded to the petitioner instead of reinstatement. Consequently,
this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against respondent no.1 Contractor.
Relief
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner is partly
allowed and as such the respondent no.1 Contractor is directed to pay ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five
Thousand only) as lump sum compensation to the petitioner within three months from today failing
which the same shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of publication of this award.
The reference is answered accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of March, 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Ref. No. 47 of 2011.
Instituted on. 1.11.2011.
Decided on 30.3.2016.
Satinder S/o Shri Leela Ram R/o Village Bathival, P.O Dilman, Teshil Pachhad District
Sirmour, HP through Shri J.C Bhardwaj, President HP AITUC, HQ Saproon, Solan, HP.
……………Petitioner.
Vs.
1.
M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli through its Advisor.
711
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
2.
Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP thought
the Registrar.
…………Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR.
For respondent no.1 : Already ex-parte.
For respondent no.2. : Shri Vivek Kalia, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Shri Satinder S/o Shri Leela Ram R/o Village
Bathival, P.O Dilman, Teshil Pachhad District Sirmour, HP w.e.f. 26.10.2009 by i)
Hony, Advisor M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2,
Sector-6 Dwarka, New Dehli (contractor society) and ii) The Registrar, Dr. Y.S
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP (Principal
Employer) however no registration certificate and licence was respectively obtained by
the Principal Employer and Contractor as provided in the Labour (R&A) Act, 1970
and not giving him an opportunity of consideration for re- employment by the
employers from the date his juniors were allegedly employed, thus in violation of
provisions of section 25-F, 25-G & H of the ibid Act and further demand to declare
him direct employee of the Principal employer is legal and justified, if not, what
amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits, compensation and relief the
above worker is entitled to from the above employers/ management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that in the month of August, 2007, he was
engaged by the principal employer i.e Registrar of Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and
Forestry Nauni, District Solan, HP (hereinafter referred to as University) as safai
karmachari/worker but his name was not entered on the roll of the University and was unrolled with
the so called name lender, contractor whose address and particulars are not known to the petitioner
though his name remained on the roll of contractor till his termination on 28.11.2009. It is further
stated that the legitimate dues of the petitioner were neither paid by the contractor nor the
University. Since, the contractor was only name, hence the contract was sham, in-genuine and
camouflage for all purposes. Even, the petitioner was working under the supervision of official of
the University whereas his name was transferred by the principal employer from his roll to the roll
of the non-existent contractor without the consent of the workman concerned. The petitioner was
working as sweeper and was doing sweeping work in the premises of Department of Forestry &
Horticulture, Library etc., and sometimes he had also been deployed to work as sweeper in the
Administration Block of the University and as such the work which was being performed by the
petitioner was never incidental but it is of permanent in nature and as such the services rendered by
the petitioner under the control of University and his name on the roll of contractor amounts to
unfair labour practice which are prohibited under section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act
1970 (hereinafter referred to as Contract Labour Act). It is also stated that neither the University
had applied to employ the workmen for any work through contractor nor any licence had been
obtained by the contractor from the licensing officer, hence, any recruitment without obtaining any
valid licence of contractor, the workmen deemed to be an employee of the University. The
712
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
petitioner had worked for more than two years continuously and completed 240 days in each
calendar year preceding his termination. The services of the petitioner had been terminated without
any notice, chargesheet and without the compliance of sections 25-N, 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act) which is a mandatory provision of law and even
juniors have been retained by the respondents in violation of the provisions of section 25-G and 25-
h OF the Act. The authorities of the University have indulged in unfair labour practice with the help
of contractor and the sudden removal of the petitioner by the University have made his integrity
doubtful in the eyes of one and all, who is still unemployed and even while terminating the services
of the petitioner, the officials of the University have restored to the formula of “hire and fire” as no
enquiry had been conducted against him. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the
petitioner be declared the employee of the University and he be re-instated in service with seniority
and continuity along-with back-wages.
3.
Before, I proceed further it is important to mention here that the respondent no.1
(contractor) was duly served but did not put appearance before this Court, hence, vide order dated
8.5.2013, proceeded against ex-parte.
4.
By filing detailed reply, the respondent no.2 (university) had contested the claim of the
petitioner wherein preliminary objections had been taken that there is no relationship of principal
employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent, the claim of the petitioner is bad
for non-joinder of necessary party, suppression of material facts and the petition has been filed by
the petitioner in connivance with the contractor. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner
was engaged as safai karamchari in the University. The petitioner was not the direct employee of
the University and the salary had not been paid to him by the respondent directly and even the work
performed by the petitioner had never been controlled and supervised by the respondent. It is
asserted that the work of safai was given to the contractor who filed quotation/tender for the job of
safai karamchari/cleaners of the university and even no record of the employee of the contractor
had been maintained by the respondent university. It is further asserted that the respondent
university neither engaged/appointed the petitioner as safai karmachari in the University nor
terminated his services on 28.11.2009 as there is no record with the respondent university regarding
the workers of the contractor. It is denied that the contractor was only name lender and as such the
contract was sham, ingenuine and camouflage for any purpose and that the petitioner was working
under the supervision of the official of the respondent university. It is further denied that the
petitioner was engaged on 20.11.2007 and the work performed by him is of permanent in nature.
The provisions of section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is not applicable. It is also
denied that the contractor or his agents were not present in the University to supervise the work of
the employee. Since, the petitioner was not the employee of respondent university, hence, the
question of issuing notice for termination of services and filling chargesheet and to pay
retrenchment compensation does not arise at all. The respondent university prayed for the dismissal
of the claim petition.
5.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
6.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
8.7.2013.
1.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 26.10.2009 by the
respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H is illegal
and unjustified as alleged?
OPP……
713
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
2.
Whether demand of the petitioner to declare her the direct employee of the principal
employer in the absece of registration certificate and licence by the Principal employer
and contractor as provided under the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is legal and
justified?
OPP……..
3.
Whether there is no relationship of principal employer and employee between the
petitioner and respondent no.2 (Dr. Y.S Parmar University) as alleged?
OPR-2…..
4.
If issue no.1 & 2 are decided in affirmative and issue no.3 in negative to what service
benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP………..
5.
Relief.
7.
Besides having heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent
no.2 (university), I have also gone through the record of the case carefully.
8.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
No.
Issue no.3
Yes.
Issue no.4
Entitled to lump sum compensation.
Relief. Reference partly answered in favour of the petitioner and
against respondent no.1 contractor.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.2 & 3.
9.
Being interlinked and co-related, all these issues are taken up together for discussion
and decision.
10. The AR for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is entitled to be declared as
permanent workman of respondent no.2 University right from the date of his joining of services and
he is entitled to the full wages and consequential benefits. He further contended that there is no
contract between the respondent university and so called contract to engage the workers through
contractor is sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes. He also contended that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in each calendar year preceding his termination and his
termination without the compliance of the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 University contended
that the petitioner was engaged through contractor i.e respondent no.1 under the provisions of
Contract Labour Act. He further contended that there was no relationship of employer and
714
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
employee between the parties and the University had availed the services of the petitioner and other
workers through the contractor.
12. The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PA
in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. In cross-examination, he stated that he cannot produce any appointment letter issued by
respondent no.2 and any other proof and he also cannot produce any salary certificate issued by
respondent no.2. He admitted that he along-with others had filed one complaint against respondent
no.1 (M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society) regarding minimum wages before
Labour Officer, Solan. He further admitted that the respondent no.1 had made payment to settle the
claim and to receive the said payment he had put his signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1. The
respondent no.1 used to pay the salary @ 70/- per day. He denied that his services were terminated
by respondent no.1 but explained that his services had been terminated by respondent no.2. He
denied that the supervision was done by the respondent no.2 but admitted that one Mr. Mukesh of
the Society used to make payment.
13. On the contrary, the respondent no.2 examined two witnesses. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer, tendered his affidavit Ex. R-1 in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated
almost all the averments as stated in the reply filed by respondent university. He also tendered in
evidence other documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-10. In cross-examination, he admitted that they have
obtained the security and permanent address from the contractor, who was working in the name and
style of M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, Dwarka New Dehli. He admitted that
the University had contacted the contractor after the reference petition but he had not explained any
reason as to why he was not appearing before the Court. The University had entered into an
agreement with the contractor which is Ex. R-3. He denied that the University had forged the
agreement. He further denied that no contractor was in existence. He admitted that they have not
applied to the Labour Officer for employing contract labour in the house keeping. He denied that
the University had engaged the contractor who was not having any licence and the contractor was
only a name lender. He further denied that no labourer was engaged by the contractor and the SDO
of the University used to deploy the workman to do the work. The University had issued a
notification regarding out sourcing of sweeping work.
14. RW-2 Shri Devinder Kumar, Clerk of Labour Office Solan has stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by respondent no.1 Sanitation Promotion and Development
Society. In cross-examination, he admitted that neither the University had applied under contract
Labour (R&A) Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor (respondent no.1) had obtained
any licence from the licensing authority.
15. I have heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent no.2
(University) and also gone through the record. On the perusal of the pleadings of the parties, after
analyzing evidence and material placed on record and considering the arguments addressed by
AR/Counsel for the parties, I am of the firm opinion that the petitioner cannot be deemed to be the
direct employee of the University in the absence of registration certificate by the principal
employer and licence by the contractor as provided under the Contract Labour Act.
16. As mentioned above, the petitioner had claimed that he was the employee of
respondent no.2 (university) whereas the University had stated that he was the employee of
respondent no.1 (contractor). At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce sections 7 & 12 of
the Contract Labour Act.
7. Registration of certain establishments.- (1) Every principal employer of an
establishment to which this Act applies shall, within such period as the appropriate
715
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with respect
to establishments generally or with respect to any class of them, make an application to
the registering officer in the prescribed manner for registration of the
establishment…………
12. Licensing of contractors.- (1) With effect from such date as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, no contractor to
whom this Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work through contract labour
except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer…………………
As per the provisions of section 7 & 12 of the aforesaid Act, the principal employer i.e
respondent no.2 (University) should have a certificate of registration from the
prescribed authority and secondly the contractor i.e respondent no.1 should have a
licence issued by competent authority i.e the Labour Department. On perusal of the
record, it is clear that neither the principal employer (university) had the certificate of
registration from the prescribed authority nor the contractor had a licence issued by the
competent authority. RW-2, Shri Devinder Kumar an official from the Labour Office
had categorically admitted in cross-examination that neither the University had applied
under the Contract Labour Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor had
obtained any licence from the authority.
17. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner and other workers would be deemed to be direct employees of the respondent University
because their engagement as contract labour was in violation of sections 7, and 12 of the
Regulation Act as on the date of engagement of the petitioner, neither the University had a
certificate of registration nor the respondent no.1 contractor was holding a licence under section 12
of the Contract Labour Act ? This question was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
AIR 1992 SC 457, titled as Dena Nath & Ors Vs. National Fertilizers Ltd. And others and it
was held as under:
“20……………..The Act as can be seen from the scheme of the Act merely regulates the
employment of contract labour in certain establishment and provides for its abolition in
certain circumstances. The Act does not provide for total abolition of contract labour
but it provides for abolition by the appropriate Government in appropriate cases under
Section 10 of the Act.
22……………….The only consequences provided in the Act where either the principal
employer or the labour contractor violates the provision of Sections 9 and 12
respectively is the penal provision, as envisaged under the Act for which reference may
be made to Sections 23 and 25 of the Act………………...”
The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Steal Authority of India Vs. National Union Water Front 2000
(7) SCC-1 in which it was observed as under:
“96. In Dena Naths case (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the
question, whether as a consequence of noncompliance with Sections 7 and 12 of
the CLRA Act by the principal employer and the licensee respectively, the
contract labour employed by the principal employer would become the employees
of the principal employer. Having noticed the observation of the three-Judge
Bench of this Court in The Standard-Vacuums case (supra) and having pointed
716
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
out that the guidelines enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act are
practically based on the guidelines given by the Tribunal in the said case, it was
held that the only consequence was the penal provisions under Sections 23 and 25
as envisaged under the CLRA Act and that merely because the contractor or the
employer had violated any provision of the Act or the Rules, the High Court in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution could not issue any mandamus
for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees of the principal
employer. This Court thus resolved the conflict of opinions on the said question
among various High Courts. It was further held that neither the Act nor the Rules
framed by the Central Government or by any appropriate Government provided
that upon abolition of the contract labour, the labourers would be directly
absorbed by the principal employer”.
18. Hence, the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court shows that
the consequence of violation of the Contract Labour Act i.e non registration of the establishment
under section 7 and non-possession of the licence under section 12 of the Act would not result in
the absorption of concerned workman by the principal employer rather it would result in
prosecution under section 23/25 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid legal position, there
is no force in the contention of the AR for the workman that in view of the fact that respondent no.2
University was not having certificate of registration under section 7 and the contractor was not
having any licence under section 12 of the Contract Labour Act, the petitioner and other workmen
would be deemed to be the direct employees of the University.
19. Now, the next question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the contract was sham, ingeniune and camouflage as contended by the AR for the
petitioner. As per the statement of claim, the petitioner and other workers were engaged as
safaikarmacharies and they were doing the work in the premises of University in the departments of
Forestry, Horticulture, Library etc. of respondent no.2 University and some-times they had also
been deployed to work as sweepers in the Administrative Block of the University.
20. It is by now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds the contract between the
principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal and a camouflage to deny employment
benefits to the employee, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the
direct employee of the principal employer. In (2009) 13 SCC titled as International Airport
Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Anr., it has been held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:
“36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under section 10 of CLRA Act, but
the contract labour contend that the contract between principal employer and
contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles
in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen
is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they
are the direct employees of the principle employer and the agreement is sham, nominal
and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under section 10(1) of CLRA
Act.
37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between
principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to
deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to
remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee
the way in which the work should be done, in short who has direction and control over
717
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
the employee. But where there is no notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and
where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was sham/nominal
and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise.
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained the terms
“control” and “supervision” which reads as under:
“38.The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the
contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For
example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by
the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the
principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by contractor, if the right to regulate
employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies
with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract
labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor
as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the
principal employer or used otherwise. In short worker being the employee of the
contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he
decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to
what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work
under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control
of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is
with the contractor.”
53.13……………… Merely because the contract labour work is under the supervision
of the officers of the principal employer, it cannot be taken as evidence of direct
employment under the principal employer.
54. …………………..Exercise of some control over the activities of contract labour
while they discharge their duties as labourers, is inevitable and such exercise is
not sufficient to hold that the contract labour will become the direct employees of
the principle employer.”
21. In the back-ground of the aforesaid legal position, in the instant case except for the
bald statement of the petitioner, there is no other evidence on record to suggest that he was doing
the work under the direct supervision of the officials of the University and that the contract was
sham, ingenuine, camouflage for all purposes. Rather in cross-examination, he admitted that neither
he can produce any appointment letter or documentary proof by the respondent no.2 University
appointing him as safaikarmachari nor any salary certificate issued by respondent no.2 University.
He further admitted that he along-with other workers had filed a complaint against the respondent
no.1 contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan. He also admitted that
the respondent no.1 contractor had made payment to settle the claim and he had put his signatures
on the receipt Ex. R-1. He further admitted that the contractor used to pay him salary @ Rs. 70/-
per day. He denied that the supervision was done by the University and admitted that one Mr.
Mukesh of the contractor society used to make payment.
22. Therefore, the cross-examination of the PW-1 makes it clear that the contractor used to
pay him salary @ ` 70 per day. As per his own admission, neither any appointment letter nor any
718
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
salary certificate was issued to the petitioner by the University rather he had filed a complaint
against the contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan and the
contractor had made payment to him to settle the claim and he had put his signatures on the receipt.
RW-2 an official from the Labour Office Solan had also categorically stated that the receipt of
payment Ex. R-1 has been made by the respondent no.1 contractor. There is also no satisfactory
evidence on record to suggest that the petitioner and other workers were under the direct
supervision and control of respondent no.2 University. Moreover, RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer had produced the documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-8 regarding the outsourcing of
sweeping arrangements in the University. As per the same the respondent no.2 university invited
tenders for outsourcing of sweeping work in the University vide notice dated 11.08.2006 Ex. R-2
and the work was awarded to the respondent no.1 contractor for a period of one year vide letter Ex
R-3. The contractor started the work from 1. 11.2006 and the one year period was considered w.e.f
1.11.2006 to 31.10.2007 vide letter of Executive Engineer(Design) dated 20.10.2006 Ex R-4. The
validity of the contract was further extended upto 31.01.2008 on the same terms and conditions
vide letter Ex R-5. After expiry of the contract the university again invited tenders vide notice Ex
R-6 and the work was again awarded to the contractor for a period of one year w.e.f. 1.2.2008 to
31.01.2009 vide letter Ex R-7 and the contract was further extended for one year w.e.f 1.02.2009 to
31.01.2010 vide letter Ex R-8. Therefore, the perusal of the aforesaid documents shows that the
respondent no.2 University had outsourced the arrangements of the sweeping work to the
respondent no.1 contractor. Moreover, the University is not a private body and in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, it cannot be said that the contract entered by the University with the
contractor was sham, ingenuine and camouflage.
23. Hence, in view of the evidence led by the parties, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was the direct employee of the University and the contract between the university and contractor is
sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes and as such it has been established that there is no
relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent no.2 university.
Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of respondent no.2 and against the petitioner.
Issue no.1.
24. Since, I have held under issues no.2 & 3 above, that the petitioner was the employee of
respondent no.1 contractor, now, it has to be seen as to whether the services of the petitioner had
been illegally terminated by the respondent no.1. Before, I proceed further it is relevant to mention
here that after receiving the reference by this Court, notices were issued to both the respondents but
none appeared on behalf of the respondent no.1 Contractor despite having been served, hence, he
was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 8.5.2013. The petitioner in his claim petition as
well as in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PA has stated as PW-1 that he was engaged as
safaikaramchari in the month of August, 2007 and worked as such till 28.11.2009. Since, the
evidence led by the petitioner remained un-rebutted as the respondent no.1 did not appear to rebut
this testimony of the petitioner, his evidence is sufficient to prove that he had worked for 240 days
in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. Therefore, before terminating the services of
the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondent no.1 to have complied with the provisions of
section 25-F of the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a
workman (workmen) and requires the employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a)
to (c) which are mandatory in nature. It has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Latest
HLJ 2007 (HP) 776 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the settled law in
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of retrenchment during
twelve calendar months and not a year. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced as under:
719
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the right
conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with Section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has place on
record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public
Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment without
complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant
extract of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed
in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions
enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In
terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month’s
notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu
of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at
the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay
for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six
months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory
and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee
nullity……………..”
25. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid unrebutted testimony of the petitioner that he had
worked continuously for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination,
the respondent no.1 was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating his services. But, no such compliance was made
by the respondent no.1 contractor, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent no.1 contractor. As a result, the termination of petitioner w.e.f. 26.10.2009 is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against respondent no.1 contractor.
Issue no.4.
26. Since, I have held under issue no. 1 above, that the termination of the services of the
petitioner w.e.f. 26.10.2009 by respondent no.1 without complying with the provisions of the Act is
not legal and justified, hence, the question arises as to what service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled. It is by now well settled that if the termination of employee is found to be illegal, the relief
by way of reinstatement with back-wages is not automatic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh
Kumar Seal and others reported in 2010 LLR 677: 2010 III CLR 17 SC, has held that relief by
way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found
to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that mandatory compensation in
lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate.
27. In Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC
327, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:
720
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
“It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal
position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
maybe wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. “
28. In the present case, even though the termination of the petitioner is held to be illegal
but his reinstatement will not be appropriate relief in view of the fact that the contract had expired
and the respondent no.1 contractor had left the premises of the respondent no.2 University.
Therefore, in such a situation, it would not be appropriate to make the order of reinstatement in the
present case. Hence, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of
justice would be met, if the lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is
awarded to the petitioner. Therefore, in my view the petitioner is entitled to receive a suitable,
appropriate, just and equitable compensation from the respondent no.1 Contractor and keeping in
view the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be quite reasonable and justified if lump sum
compensation of ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five Thousand only) is awarded to the petitioner instead of
reinstatement. Consequently, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against respondent
no.1 Contractor.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner is partly
allowed and as such the respondent no.1 Contractor is directed to pay ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five
Thousand only) as lump sum compensation to the petitioner within three months from today failing
which the same shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of publication of this award.
The reference is answered accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of March, 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Ref. No. 51 of 2011.
Instituted on. 14.11.2011.
Decided on 30.3.2016.
Palak Ram S/o Shri Prem Dutt R/o Village Danal P.O Panawa, Teshil Pachhad District
Sirmour, HP through Shri J.C Bhardwaj, President HP AITUC, HQ Saproon, Solan, HP.
……………Petitioner.
721
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
Vs.
1.
M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli through its Advisor.
2.
Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP thought
the Registrar.
…………Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR.
For respondent no.1 : Already ex-parte.
For respondent no.2. : Shri Vivek Kalia, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Shri Palak Ram S/o Shri Prem Dutt R/o Village
Danal P.O Panawa, Teshil Pachhad District Sirmour, HP w.e.f. 28.11.2009 by i) Hony,
Advisor M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6
Dwarka, New Dehli (contractor society) and ii) The Registrar, Dr. Y.S Parmar
University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP (Principal
Employer) however no registration certificate and licence was respectively obtained by
the Principal Employer and Contractor as provided in the Labour (R&A) Act, 1970
and not giving him an opportunity of consideration for re- employment by the
employers from the date his juniors were allegedly employed, thus in violation of
provisions of section 25-F, 25-G & H of the ibid Act and further demand to declare
him direct employee of the Principal employer is legal and justified, if not, what
amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits, compensation and relief the
above worker is entitled to from the above employers/ management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that in the month of 20.11.2007, he was
engaged by the principal employer i.e Registrar of Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and
Forestry Nauni, District Solan, HP (hereinafter referred to as University) as safai
karmachari/worker but his name was not entered on the roll of the University and was unrolled with
the so called name lender, contractor whose address and particulars are not known to the petitioner
though his name remained on the roll of contractor till his termination on 28.11.2009. It is further
stated that the legitimate dues of the petitioner were neither paid by the contractor nor the
University. Since, the contractor was only name, hence the contract was sham, in-genuine and
camouflage for all purposes. Even, the petitioner was working under the supervision of official of
the University whereas his name was transferred by the principal employer from his roll to the roll
of the non-existent contractor without the consent of the workman concerned. The petitioner was
working as sweeper and was doing sweeping work in the premises of Department of Forestry &
Horticulture, Library etc., and sometimes he had also been deployed to work as sweeper in the
Administration Block of the University and as such the work which was being performed by the
petitioner was never incidental but it is of permanent in nature and as such the services rendered by
the petitioner under the control of University and his name on the roll of contractor amounts to
722
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
unfair labour practice which are prohibited under section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act
1970 (hereinafter referred to as Contract Labour Act). It is also stated that neither the University
had applied to employ the workmen for any work through contractor nor any licence had been
obtained by the contractor from the licensing officer, hence, any recruitment without obtaining any
valid licence of contractor, the workmen deemed to be an employee of the University. The
petitioner had worked for more than two years continuously and completed 240 days in each
calendar year preceding his termination. The services of the petitioner had been terminated without
any notice, chargesheet and without the compliance of sections 25-N, 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act) which is a mandatory provision of law and even
juniors have been retained by the respondents in violation of the provisions of section 25-G and 25-
h OF the Act. The authorities of the University have indulged in unfair labour practice with the help
of contractor and the sudden removal of the petitioner by the University have made his integrity
doubtful in the eyes of one and all, who is still unemployed and even while terminating the services
of the petitioner, the officials of the University have restored to the formula of “hire and fire” as no
enquiry had been conducted against him. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the
petitioner be declared the employee of the University and he be re-instated in service with seniority
and continuity along-with back-wages.
3.
Before, I proceed further it is important to mention here that the respondent no.1
(contractor) was duly served but did not put appearance before this Court, hence, vide order dated
8.5.2013, proceeded against ex-parte.
4.
By filing detailed reply, the respondent no.2 (university) had contested the claim of the
petitioner wherein preliminary objections had been taken that there is no relationship of principal
employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent, the claim of the petitioner is bad
for non-joinder of necessary party, suppression of material facts and the petition has been filed by
the petitioner in connivance with the contractor. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner
was engaged as safai karamchari in the University. The petitioner was not the direct employee of
the University and the salary had not been paid to him by the respondent directly and even the work
performed by the petitioner had never been controlled and supervised by the respondent. It is
asserted that the work of safai was given to the contractor who filed quotation/tender for the job of
safai karamchari/cleaners of the university and even no record of the employee of the contractor
had been maintained by the respondent university. It is further asserted that the respondent
university neither engaged/appointed the petitioner as safai karmachari in the University nor
terminated his services on 28.11.2009 as there is no record with the respondent university regarding
the workers of the contractor. It is denied that the contractor was only name lender and as such the
contract was sham, ingenuine and camouflage for any purpose and that the petitioner was working
under the supervision of the official of the respondent university. It is further denied that the
petitioner was engaged on 20.11.2007 and the work performed by him is of permanent in nature.
The provisions of section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is not applicable. It is also
denied that the contractor or his agents were not present in the University to supervise the work of
the employee. Since, the petitioner was not the employee of respondent university, hence, the
question of issuing notice for termination of services and filling chargesheet and to pay
retrenchment compensation does not arise at all. The respondent university prayed for the dismissal
of the claim petition.
5.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
6.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
8.7.2013.
723
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
6.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 28.10.2009 by the
respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H is illegal
and unjustified as alleged?
OPP……
7.
Whether demand of the petitioner to declare her the direct employee of the principal
employer in the absece of registration certificate and licence by the Principal employer
and contractor as provided under the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is legal and
justified?
OPP……..
8.
Whether there is no relationship of principal employer and employee between the
petitioner and respondent no.2 (Dr. Y.S Parmar University) as alleged?
OPR-2…..
9.
If issue no.1 & 2 are decided in affirmative and issue no.3 in negative to what service
benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP………..
10. Relief.
7.
Besides having heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent
no.2 (university), I have also gone through the record of the case carefully.
8.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
No.
Issue no.3
Yes.
Issue no.4
Entitled to lump sum compensation.
Relief. Reference partly answered in favour of the petitioner and
against respondent no.1 contractor.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.2 & 3.
9.
Being interlinked and co-related, all these issues are taken up together for discussion
and decision.
10. The AR for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is entitled to be declared as
permanent workman of respondent no.2 University right from the date of his joining of services and
he is entitled to the full wages and consequential benefits. He further contended that there is no
contract between the respondent university and so called contract to engage the workers through
contractor is sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes. He also contended that the
724
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
petitioner had completed 240 working days in each calendar year preceding his termination and his
termination without the compliance of the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 University contended
that the petitioner was engaged through contractor i.e respondent no.1 under the provisions of
Contract Labour Act. He further contended that there was no relationship of employer and
employee between the parties and the University had availed the services of the petitioner and other
workers through the contractor.
12. The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PA
in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. In cross-examination, he stated that he cannot produce any appointment letter issued by
respondent no.2 and any other proof and he also cannot produce any salary certificate issued by
respondent no.2. He admitted that he along-with others had filed one complaint against respondent
no.1 (M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society) regarding minimum wages before
Labour Officer, Solan. He further admitted that the respondent no.1 had made payment to settle the
claim and to receive the said payment he had put his signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1. The
respondent no.1 used to pay the salary @ 70/- per day. He denied that his services were terminated
by respondent no.1 but explained that his services had been terminated by respondent no.2. He
denied that the supervision was done by the respondent no.2 but admitted that one Mr. Mukesh of
the Society used to make payment.
13. On the contrary, the respondent no.2 examined two witnesses. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer, tendered his affidavit Ex. R-1 in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated
almost all the averments as stated in the reply filed by respondent university. He also tendered in
evidence other documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-10. In cross-examination, he admitted that they have
obtained the security and permanent address from the contractor, who was working in the name and
style of M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, Dwarka New Dehli. He admitted that
the University had contacted the contractor after the reference petition but he had not explained any
reason as to why he was not appearing before the Court. The University had entered into an
agreement with the contractor which is Ex. R-3. He denied that the University had forged the
agreement. He further denied that no contractor was in existence. He admitted that they have not
applied to the Labour Officer for employing contract labour in the house keeping. He denied that
the University had engaged the contractor who was not having any licence and the contractor was
only a name lender. He further denied that no labourer was engaged by the contractor and the SDO
of the University used to deploy the workman to do the work. The University had issued a
notification regarding out sourcing of sweeping work.
14. RW-2 Shri Devinder Kumar, Clerk of Labour Office Solan has stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by respondent no.1 Sanitation Promotion and Development
Society. In cross-examination, he admitted that neither the University had applied under contract
Labour (R&A) Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor (respondent no.1) had obtained
any licence from the licensing authority.
15. I have heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent no.2
(University) and also gone through the record. On the perusal of the pleadings of the parties, after
analyzing evidence and material placed on record and considering the arguments addressed by
AR/Counsel for the parties, I am of the firm opinion that the petitioner cannot be deemed to be the
direct employee of the University in the absence of registration certificate by the principal
employer and licence by the contractor as provided under the Contract Labour Act.
725
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
16. As mentioned above, the petitioner had claimed that he was the employee of
respondent no.2 (university) whereas the University had stated that he was the employee of
respondent no.1 (contractor). At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce sections 7 & 12 of
the Contract Labour Act.
7.
Registration of certain establishments.- (1) Every principal employer of an
establishment to which this Act applies shall, within such period as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with respect
to establishments generally or with respect to any class of them, make an application to
the registering officer in the prescribed manner for registration of the
establishment…………
12. Licensing of contractors.- (1) With effect from such date as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, no contractor to
whom this Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work through contract labour
except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer…………………
As per the provisions of section 7 & 12 of the aforesaid Act, the principal employer i.e
respondent no.2 (University) should have a certificate of registration from the
prescribed authority and secondly the contractor i.e respondent no.1 should have a
licence issued by competent authority i.e the Labour Department. On perusal of the
record, it is clear that neither the principal employer (university) had the certificate of
registration from the prescribed authority nor the contractor had a licence issued by the
competent authority. RW-2, Shri Devinder Kumar an official from the Labour Office
had categorically admitted in cross-examination that neither the University had applied
under the Contract Labour Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor had
obtained any licence from the authority.
17. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner and other workers would be deemed to be direct employees of the respondent University
because their engagement as contract labour was in violation of sections 7, and 12 of the
Regulation Act as on the date of engagement of the petitioner, neither the University had a
certificate of registration nor the respondent no.1 contractor was holding a licence under section 12
of the Contract Labour Act ? This question was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
AIR 1992 SC 457, titled as Dena Nath & Ors Vs. National Fertilizers Ltd. And others and it
was held as under:
“20……………..The Act as can be seen from the scheme of the Act merely regulates the
employment of contract labour in certain establishment and provides for its abolition in
certain circumstances. The Act does not provide for total abolition of contract labour but it
provides for abolition by the appropriate Government in appropriate cases under Section 10
of the Act.
22……………….The only consequences provided in the Act where either the principal
employer or the labour contractor violates the provision of Sections 9 and 12 respectively is
the penal provision, as envisaged under the Act for which reference may be made to
Sections 23 and 25 of the Act………………...”
The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Steal Authority of India Vs. National Union Water Front 2000 (7) SCC-1 in
which it was observed as under:
726
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
“96. In Dena Naths case (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the question,
whether as a consequence of noncompliance with Sections 7 and 12 of the CLRA Act
by the principal employer and the licensee respectively, the contract labour employed
by the principal employer would become the employees of the principal employer.
Having noticed the observation of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in The
Standard-Vacuums case (supra) and having pointed out that the guidelines enumerated
in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act are practically based on the guidelines given
by the Tribunal in the said case, it was held that the only consequence was the penal
provisions under Sections 23 and 25 as envisaged under the CLRA Act and that merely
because the contractor or the employer had violated any provision of the Act or the
Rules, the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution could not
issue any mandamus for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees
of the principal employer. This Court thus resolved the conflict of opinions on the said
question among various High Courts. It was further held that neither the Act nor the
Rules framed by the Central Government or by any appropriate Government provided
that upon abolition of the contract labour, the labourers would be directly absorbed by
the principal employer”.
18. Hence, the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court shows that
the consequence of violation of the Contract Labour Act i.e non registration of the establishment
under section 7 and non-possession of the licence under section 12 of the Act would not result in
the absorption of concerned workman by the principal employer rather it would result in
prosecution under section 23/25 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid legal position, there
is no force in the contention of the AR for the workman that in view of the fact that respondent no.2
University was not having certificate of registration under section 7 and the contractor was not
having any licence under section 12 of the Contract Labour Act, the petitioner and other workmen
would be deemed to be the direct employees of the University.
19. Now, the next question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the contract was sham, ingeniune and camouflage as contended by the AR for the
petitioner. As per the statement of claim, the petitioner and other workers were engaged as
safaikarmacharies and they were doing the work in the premises of University in the departments of
Forestry, Horticulture, Library etc. of respondent no.2 University and some-times they had also
been deployed to work as sweepers in the Administrative Block of the University.
20. It is by now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds the contract between the
principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal and a camouflage to deny employment
benefits to the employee, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the
direct employee of the principal employer. In (2009) 13 SCC titled as International Airport
Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Anr., it has been held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:
“36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under section 10 of CLRA Act, but
the contract labour contend that the contract between principal employer and
contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles
in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen
is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they
are the direct employees of the principle employer and the agreement is sham, nominal
and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under section 10(1) of CLRA
Act.
37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between
principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to
727
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to
remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee
the way in which the work should be done, in short who has direction and control over
the employee. But where there is no notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and
where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was sham/nominal
and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise.
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained the terms
“control” and “supervision” which reads as under:
“38.The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the
contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For
example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by
the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the
principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by contractor, if the right to regulate
employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies
with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a
contract labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the
contractor as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted
to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short worker being the employee
of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as
he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject
to what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work
under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control
of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is
with the contractor.”
53. 13……………… Merely because the contract labour work is under the
supervision of the officers of the principal employer, it cannot be taken as
evidence of direct employment under the principal employer.
54. …………………..Exercise of some control over the activities of contract labour
while they discharge their duties as labourers, is inevitable and such exercise is
not sufficient to hold that the contract labour will become the direct employees of
the principle employer.”
21. In the back-ground of the aforesaid legal position, in the instant case except for the
bald statement of the petitioner, there is no other evidence on record to suggest that he was doing
the work under the direct supervision of the officials of the University and that the contract was
sham, ingenuine, camouflage for all purposes. Rather in cross-examination, he admitted that neither
he can produce any appointment letter or documentary proof by the respondent no.2 University
appointing him as safaikarmachari nor any salary certificate issued by respondent no.2 University.
He further admitted that he along-with other workers had filed a complaint against the respondent
no.1 contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan. He also admitted that
the respondent no.1 contractor had made payment to settle the claim and he had put his signatures
on the receipt Ex. R-1. He further admitted that the contractor used to pay him salary @ Rs. 70/-
728
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
per day. He denied that the supervision was done by the University and admitted that one Mr.
Mukesh of the contractor society used to make payment.
22. Therefore, the cross-examination of the PW-1 makes it clear that the contractor used to
pay him salary @ ` 70 per day. As per his own admission, neither any appointment letter nor any
salary certificate was issued to the petitioner by the University rather he had filed a complaint
against the contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan and the
contractor had made payment to him to settle the claim and he had put his signatures on the receipt.
RW-2 an official from the Labour Office Solan had also categorically stated that the receipt of
payment Ex. R-1 has been made by the respondent no.1 contractor. There is also no satisfactory
evidence on record to suggest that the petitioner and other workers were under the direct
supervision and control of respondent no.2 University. Moreover, RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer had produced the documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-8 regarding the outsourcing of
sweeping arrangements in the University. As per the same the respondent no.2 university invited
tenders for outsourcing of sweeping work in the University vide notice dated 11.08.2006 Ex. R-2
and the work was awarded to the respondent no.1 contractor for a period of one year vide letter Ex
R-3. The contractor started the work from 1. 11.2006 and the one year period was considered w.e.f
1.11.2006 to 31.10.2007 vide letter of Executive Engineer(Design) dated 20.10.2006 Ex R-4. The
validity of the contract was further extended upto 31.01.2008 on the same terms and conditions
vide letter Ex R-5. After expiry of the contract the university again invited tenders vide notice Ex
R-6 and the work was again awarded to the contractor for a period of one year w.e.f. 1.2.2008 to
31.01.2009 vide letter Ex R-7 and the contract was further extended for one year w.e.f 1.02.2009 to
31.01.2010 vide letter Ex R-8. Therefore, the perusal of the aforesaid documents shows that the
respondent no.2 University had outsourced the arrangements of the sweeping work to the
respondent no.1 contractor. Moreover, the University is not a private body and in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, it cannot be said that the contract entered by the University with the
contractor was sham, ingenuine and camouflage.
23. Hence, in view of the evidence led by the parties, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was the direct employee of the University and the contract between the university and contractor is
sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes and as such it has been established that there is no
relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent no.2 university.
Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of respondent no.2 and against the petitioner.
Issue no.1.
24. Since, I have held under issues no.2 & 3 above, that the petitioner was the employee of
respondent no.1 contractor, now, it has to be seen as to whether the services of the petitioner had
been illegally terminated by the respondent no.1. Before, I proceed further it is relevant to mention
here that after receiving the reference by this Court, notices were issued to both the respondents but
none appeared on behalf of the respondent no.1 Contractor despite having been served, hence, he
was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 8.5.2013. The petitioner in his claim petition as
well as in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PA has stated as PW-1 that he was engaged as
safaikaramchari on 20.11.2007 and worked as such till 28.11.2009. Since, the evidence led by the
petitioner remained un-rebutted as the respondent no.1 did not appear to rebut this testimony of the
petitioner, his evidence is sufficient to prove that he had worked for 240 days in twelve calendar
months preceding his termination. Therefore, before terminating the services of the petitioner, it
was incumbent upon the respondent no.1 to have complied with the provisions of section 25-F of
the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a workman (workmen)
and requires the employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a) to (c) which are
mandatory in nature. It has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Latest HLJ 2007 (HP)
776 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the settled law in counting 240 days
729
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of retrenchment during twelve calendar
months and not a year. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the
right conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has
place on record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public
Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment without
complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant
extract of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed
in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions
enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In
terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month’s
notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu
of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at
the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay
for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six
months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is
mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee
nullity……………..”
25. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid unrebutted testimony of the petitioner that he had
worked continuously for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination,
the respondent no.1 was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating his services. But, no such compliance was made
by the respondent no.1 contractor, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent no.1 contractor. As a result, the termination of petitioner w.e.f. 28.11.2009 is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against respondent no.1 contractor.
Issue no.4.
26. Since, I have held under issue no. 1 above, that the termination of the services of the
petitioner w.e.f. 28.11.2009 by respondent no.1 without complying with the provisions of the Act is
not legal and justified, hence, the question arises as to what service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled. It is by now well settled that if the termination of employee is found to be illegal, the relief
by way of reinstatement with back-wages is not automatic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh
Kumar Seal and others reported in 2010 LLR 677: 2010 III CLR 17 SC, has held that relief by
way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found
to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that mandatory compensation in
lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate.
730
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
27. In Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC
327, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:
“It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal
position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
maybe wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. “
28. In the present case, even though the termination of the petitioner is held to be illegal
but his reinstatement will not be appropriate relief in view of the fact that the contract had expired
and the respondent no.1 contractor had left the premises of the respondent no.2 University.
Therefore, in such a situation, it would not be appropriate to make the order of reinstatement in the
present case. Hence, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of
justice would be met, if the lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is
awarded to the petitioner. Therefore, in my view the petitioner is entitled to receive a suitable,
appropriate, just and equitable compensation from the respondent no.1 Contractor and keeping in
view the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be quite reasonable and justified if lump sum
compensation of ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five Thousand only) is awarded to the petitioner instead of
reinstatement. Consequently, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against respondent
no.1 Contractor.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner is partly
allowed and as such the respondent no.1 Contractor is directed to pay ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five
Thousand only) as lump sum compensation to the petitioner within three months from today failing
which the same shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of publication of this award.
The reference is answered accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of March, 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).
Ref. No. 29 of 2014.
Instituted on. 10.3.2014.
Decided on 30.3.2016.
Santresh W/o Shri Dalip Kumar R/o VPO Nauni, District Solan, HP through Shri
J.C Bhardwaj, President HP AITUC, HQ Saproon, Solan, HP.
. .Petitioner.
731
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
Vs.
1.
M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New
Dehli through its Advisor.
2.
Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP thought
the Registrar.
…………Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR.
For respondent no.1 : Already ex-parte.
For respondent no.2. :
Shri Vivek Kalia, Advocate vice Shri M.P Kanwar,
Advocate
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Smt. Santresh W/o Shri Dalip Kumar R/o VPO
Nauni, District Solan, HP w.e.f. 13.10.2009 by i) Hony, Advisor M/s Sanitation
Promotion and Development Society, 5-B, Pocket-2, Sector-6 Dwarka, New Dehli
(contractor society) and ii) The Registrar, Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture
and Forestry Nouni, District Solan, HP (Principal Employer) however no registration
certificate and licence was respectively obtained by the Principal Employer and
Contractor as provided in the Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 and not giving her an
opportunity of consideration for re-employment by the employers from the date her
juniors were allegedly employed, thus in violation of provisions of section 25-F, 25-G
& H of the ibid Act and further demand to declare her direct employee of the
Principal employer is legal and justified, if not, what amount of back wages, seniority,
past service benefits, compensation and relief the above worker is entitled to from the
above employers/ management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that on 20.11.2007, she was engaged by the
principal employer i.e Registrar of Dr. Y.S Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry Nauni,
District Solan, HP (hereinafter referred to as University) as safai karmachari/worker but her name
was not entered on the roll of the University and was unrolled with the so called name lender,
contractor whose address and particulars are not known to the petitioner though her name remained
on the roll of contractor till her termination on 28.11.2009. It is further stated that the legitimate
dues of the petitioner were neither paid by the contractor nor the University. Since, the contractor
was only name, hence the contract was sham, in-genuine and camouflage for all purposes. Even,
the petitioner was working under the supervision of official of the University whereas her name
was transferred by the principal employer from his roll to the roll of the non-existent contractor
without the consent of the workman concerned. The petitioner was working as sweeper and was
doing sweeping work in the premises of Department of Forestry & Horticulture, Library etc., and
sometimes she had also been deployed to work as sweeper in the Administration Block of the
University and as such the work which was being performed by the petitioner was never incidental
but it is of permanent in nature and as such the services rendered by the petitioner under the control
732
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
of University and her name on the roll of contractor amounts to unfair labour practice which are
prohibited under section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act 1970 (hereinafter referred to as
Contract Labour Act). It is also stated that neither the University had applied to employ the
workmen for any work through contractor nor any licence had been obtained by the contractor from
the licensing officer, hence, any recruitment without obtaining any valid licence of contractor, the
workmen deemed to be a employee of the University. The petitioner had worked for more than two
years continuously and completed 240 days in each calendar year preceding her termination. The
services of the petitioner had been terminated without any notice, chargesheet and without the
compliance of sections 25-N, 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
Act) which is a mandatory provision of law and even juniors have been retained by the respondents
in violation of the provisions of section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The authorities of the University
have indulged in unfair labour practice with the help of contractor and the sudden removal of the
petitioner by the University have made her integrity doubtful in the eyes of one and all, who is still
unemployed and even while terminating the services of the petitioner, the officials of the University
have restored to the formula of “hire and fire” as no enquiry had been conducted against her.
Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the petitioner be declared the employee of the
University and she be re-instated in service with seniority and continuity along- with back-wages.
3.
Before, I proceed further it is important to mention here that the respondent no.1
(contractor) was duly served but did not put appearance before this Court, hence, vide order dated
8.5.2013, proceeded against ex-parte.
4.
By filing detailed reply, the respondent no.2 (university) had contested the claim of the
petitioner wherein preliminary objections had been taken that there is no relationship of principal
employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent, the claim of the petitioner is bad
for non-joinder of necessary party, suppression of material facts and the petition has been filed by
the petitioner in connivance with the contractor. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner
was engaged as safai karamchari in the University. The petitioner was not the direct employee of
the University and the salary had not been paid to her by the respondent directly and even the work
performed by the petitioner had never been controlled and supervised by the respondent. It is
asserted that the work of safai was given to the contractor who filed quotation/tender for the job of
safai karamchari/cleaners of the university and even no record of the employee of the contractor
had been maintained by the respondent university. It is further asserted that the respondent
university neither engaged/appointed the petitioner as safai karmachari in the University nor
terminated her services on 28.11.2009 as there is no record with the respondent university
regarding the workers of the contractor. It is denied that the contractor was only name lender and as
such the contract was sham, ingenuine and camouflage for any purpose and that the petitioner was
working under the supervision of the official of the respondent university. It is further denied that
the petitioner was engaged on 20.11.2007 and the work performed by her is of permanent in nature.
The provisions of section 10(2) of the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is not applicable. It is also
denied that the contractor or his agents were not present in the University to supervise the work of
the employee. Since, the petitioner was not the employee of respondent university, hence, the
question of issuing notice for termination of services and filling chargesheet and to pay
retrenchment compensation does not arise at all. The respondent university prayed for the dismissal
of the claim petition.
5.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed her allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
6.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
4.4.2014.
733
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
11. Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 13.10.2009 by the
respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H is illegal
and unjustified as alleged?
OPP……
12. Whether demand of the petitioner to declare her the direct employee of the principal
employer in the absece of registration certificate and licence by the Principal employer
and contractor as provided under the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 is legal and
justified?
OPP……..
13. Whether there is no relationship of principal employer and employee between the
petitioner and respondent no.2 (Dr. Y.S Parmar University) as alleged?
OPR-2…..
14. If issue no.1 & 2 are decided in affirmative and issue no.3 in negative to what service
benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
OPP………..
15. Relief.
7.
Besides having heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent
no.2 (university), I have also gone through the record of the case carefully.
8.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
No.
Issue no.3
Yes.
Issue no.4
Entitled to lump sum compensation.
Relief. Reference partly answered in favour of the petitioner and
against respondent no.1 contractor.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.2 & 3.
9.
Being interlinked and co-related, all these issues are taken up together for discussion
and decision.
10. The AR for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is entitled to be declared as
permanent workman of respondent no.2 University right from the date of her joining of services
and she is entitled to the full wages and consequential benefits. He further contended that there is
no contract between the respondent university and so called contract to engage the workers through
contractor is sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes. He also contended that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in each calendar year preceding her termination and her
termination without the compliance of the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
734
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 University contended
that the petitioner was engaged through contractor i.e respondent no.1 under the provisions of
Contract Labour Act. He further contended that there was no relationship of employer and
employee between the parties and the University had availed the services of the petitioner and other
workers through the contractor.
12. The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered her affidavit Ex. PA
in examination-in-chief wherein she reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. In cross-examination, she stated that she cannot produce any appointment letter issued by
respondent no.2 and any other proof and she also cannot produce any salary certificate issued by
respondent no.2. She admitted that she along-with others had filed one complaint against
respondent no.1 (M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society) regarding minimum wages
before Labour Officer, Solan. She further admitted that the respondent no.1 had made payment to
settle the claim and to receive the said payment she had put her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1.
The respondent no.1 used to pay the salary @ 70/- per day. She denied that her services were
terminated by respondent no.1 but explained that her services had been terminated by respondent
no.2. She denied that the supervision was done by the respondent no.2 but admitted that one Mr.
Mukesh of the Society used to make payment.
13. On the contrary, the respondent no.2 examined two witnesses. RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer, tendered his affidavit Ex. R-1 in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated
almost all the averments as stated in the reply filed by respondent university. He also tendered in
evidence other documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-10. In cross-examination, he admitted that they have
obtained the security and permanent address from the contractor, who was working in the name and
style of M/s Sanitation Promotion and Development Society, Dwarka New Dehli. He admitted that
the University had contacted the contractor after the reference petition but he had not explained any
reason as to why he was not appearing before the Court. The University had entered into an
agreement with the contractor which is Ex. R-3. He denied that the University had forged the
agreement. He further denied that no contractor was in existence. He admitted that they have not
applied to the Labour Officer for employing contract labour in the house keeping. He denied that
the University had engaged the contractor who was not having any licence and the contractor was
only a name lender. He further denied that no labourer was engaged by the contractor and the SDO
of the University used to deploy the workman to do the work. The University had issued a
notification regarding out sourcing of sweeping work.
14. RW-2 Shri Devinder Kumar, Clerk of Labour Office Solan has stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by respondent no.1 Sanitation Promotion and Development
Society. In cross-examination, he admitted that neither the University had applied under contract
Labour (R&A) Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor (respondent no.1) had obtained
any licence from the licensing authority.
15. I have heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent no.2
(University) and also gone through the record. On the perusal of the pleadings of the parties, after
analyzing evidence and material placed on record and considering the arguments addressed by
AR/Counsel for the parties, I am of the firm opinion that the petitioner cannot be deemed to be the
direct employee of the University in the absence of registration certificate by the principal
employer and licence by the contractor as provided under the Contract Labour Act.
16. As mentioned above, the petitioner had claimed that she was the employee of
respondent no.2 (university) whereas the University had stated that she was the employee of
respondent no.1 (contractor). At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce sections 7 & 12 of
the Contract Labour Act.
735
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
7. Registration of certain establishments.- (1) Every principal employer of an
establishment to which this Act applies shall, within such period as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with respect
to establishments generally or with respect to any class of them, make an application to
the registering officer in the prescribed manner for registration of the
establishment…………
12. Licensing of contractors.- (1) With effect from such date as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, no contractor to
whom this Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work through contract labour
except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer…………………
As per the provisions of section 7 & 12 of the aforesaid Act, the principal employer i.e
respondent no.2 (University) should have a certificate of registration from the
prescribed authority and secondly the contractor i.e respondent no.1 should have a
licence issued by competent authority i.e the Labour Department. On perusal of the
record, it is clear that neither the principal employer (university) had the certificate of
registration from the prescribed authority nor the contractor had a licence issued by the
competent authority. RW-2, Shri Devinder Kumar an official from the Labour Office
had categorically admitted in cross-examination that neither the University had applied
under the Contract Labour Act to give any work on contract nor the contractor had
obtained any licence from the authority.
17. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner and other workers would be deemed to be direct employees of the respondent University
because their engagement as contract labour was in violation of sections 7, and 12 of the
Regulation Act as on the date of engagement of the petitioner, neither the University had a
certificate of registration nor the respondent no.1 contractor was holding a licence under section 12
of the Contract Labour Act ? This question was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
AIR 1992 SC 457, titled as Dena Nath & Ors Vs. National Fertilizers Ltd. And others and it
was held as under:
“20……………..The Act as can be seen from the scheme of the Act merely regulates the
employment of contract labour in certain establishment and provides for its abolition in
certain circumstances. The Act does not provide for total abolition of contract labour
but it provides for abolition by the appropriate Government in appropriate cases under
Section 10 of the Act.
22……………….The only consequences provided in the Act where either the principal
employer or the labour contractor violates the provision of Sections 9 and 12
respectively is the penal provision, as envisaged under the Act for which reference may
be made to Sections 23 and 25 of the Act………………...”
The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Steal Authority of India Vs. National Union Water Front 2000
(7) SCC-1 in which it was observed as under:
“96. In Dena Naths case (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the
question, whether as a consequence of noncompliance with Sections 7 and 12 of
the CLRA Act by the principal employer and the licensee respectively, the
contract labour employed by the principal employer would become the employees
736
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
of the principal employer. Having noticed the observation of the three-Judge
Bench of this Court in The Standard-Vacuums case (supra) and having pointed
out that the guidelines enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act are
practically based on the guidelines given by the Tribunal in the said case, it was
held that the only consequence was the penal provisions under Sections 23 and 25
as envisaged under the CLRA Act and that merely because the contractor or the
employer had violated any provision of the Act or the Rules, the High Court in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution could not issue any mandamus
for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees of the principal
employer. This Court thus resolved the conflict of opinions on the said question
among various High Courts. It was further held that neither the Act nor the Rules
framed by the Central Government or by any appropriate Government provided
that upon abolition of the contract labour, the labourers would be directly
absorbed by the principal employer”.
18. Hence, the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court shows that
the consequence of violation of the Contract Labour Act i.e non registration of the establishment
under section 7 and non-possession of the licence under section 12 of the Act would not result in
the absorption of concerned workman by the principal employer rather it would result in
prosecution under section 23/25 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid legal position, there
is no force in the contention of the AR for the workman that in view of the fact that respondent no.2
University was not having certificate of registration under section 7 and the contractor was not
having any licence under section 12 of the Contract Labour Act, the petitioner and other workmen
would be deemed to be the direct employees of the University.
19. Now, the next question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the contract was sham, ingeniune and camouflage as contended by the AR for the
petitioner. As per the statement of claim, the petitioner and other workers were engaged as
safaikarmacharies and they were doing the work in the premises of University in the departments of
Forestry, Horticulture, Library etc. of respondent no.2 University and some-times they had also
been deployed to work as sweepers in the Administrative Block of the University.
20. It is by now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds the contract between the
principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal and a camouflage to deny employment
benefits to the employee, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the
direct employee of the principal employer. In (2009) 13 SCC titled as International Airport
Authority of India Vs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Anr., it has been held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:
“36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under section 10 of CLRA Act, but
the contract labour contend that the contract between principal employer and
contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles
in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen
is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they
are the direct employees of the principle employer and the agreement is sham, nominal
and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under section 10(1) of CLRA
Act.
37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between
principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to
deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct
employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to
737
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee
the way in which the work should be done, in short who has direction and control over
the employee. But where there is no notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and
where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was sham/nominal
and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or
regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise.
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained the terms
“control” and “supervision” which reads as under:
“38.The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor may not automatically apply in finding out whether the
contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For
example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by
the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the
principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by contractor, if the right to regulate
employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies
with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a
contract labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the
contractor as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted
to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short worker being the employee
of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as
he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject
to what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work
under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control
of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is
with the contractor.”
53. 13……………… Merely because the contract labour work is under the
supervision of the officers of the principal employer, it cannot be taken as
evidence of direct employment under the principal employer.
54. …………………..Exercise of some control over the activities of contract labour
while they discharge their duties as labourers, is inevitable and such exercise is
not sufficient to hold that the contract labour will become the direct employees of
the principle employer.”
21. In the back-ground of the aforesaid legal position, in the instant case except for the
bald statement of the petitioner, there is no other evidence on record to suggest that she was doing
the work under the direct supervision of the officials of the University and that the contract was
sham, ingenuine, camouflage for all purposes. Rather in cross-examination, she admitted that
neither she can produce any appointment letter or documentary proof by the respondent no.2
University appointing her as safaikarmachari nor any salary certificate issued by respondent no.2
University. She further admitted that she along-with other workers had filed a complaint against the
respondent no.1 contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan. She also
admitted that the respondent no.1 contractor had made payment to settle the claim and she had put
her signatures on the receipt Ex. R-1. She further admitted that the contractor used to pay her salary
@ Rs. 70/- per day. She denied that the supervision was done by the University and admitted that
one Mr. Mukesh of the contractor society used to make payment.
738
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
22. Therefore, the cross-examination of the PW-1 makes it clear that the contractor used to
pay her salary @ ` 70 per day. As per her own admission, neither any appointment letter nor any
salary certificate was issued to the petitioner by the University rather she had filed a complaint
against the contractor regarding minimum wages before the Labour Officer Solan and the
contractor had made payment to her to settle the claim and she had put her signatures on the
receipt. RW-2 an official from the Labour Office Solan had also categorically stated that the receipt
of payment Ex. R-1 has been made by the respondent no.1 contractor. There is also no satisfactory
evidence on record to suggest that the petitioner and other workers were under the direct
supervision and control of respondent no.1 University. Moreover, RW-1 Shri V.K Sharma,
Executive Engineer had produced the documents Ex. R-2 to Ex. R-8 regarding the outsourcing of
sweeping arrangements in the University. As per the same, the respondent no.2 university invited
tenders for outsourcing of sweeping work in the University vide notice dated 11.08.2006 Ex. R-2
and the work was awarded to the respondent no.1 contractor for a period of one year vide letter Ex
R-3. The contractor started the work from 1. 11.2006 and the one year period was considered w.e.f
1.11.2006 to 31.10.2007 vide letter of Executive Engineer(Design) dated 20.10.2006 Ex R-4. The
validity of the contract was further extended upto 31.01.2008 on the same terms and conditions
vide letter Ex R-5. After expiry of the contract the university again invited tenders vide notice Ex
R-6 and the work was again awarded to the contractor for a period of one year w.e.f. 1.2.2008 to
31.01.2009 vide letter Ex R-7 and the contract was further extended for one year w.e.f 1.02.2009 to
31.01.2010 vide letter Ex R-8. Therefore, the perusal of the aforesaid documents shows that the
respondent no.2 University had outsourced the arrangements of the sweeping work to the
respondent no.1 contractor. Moreover, the University is not a private body and in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, it cannot be said that the contract entered by the University with the
contractor was sham, ingenuine and camouflage.
23. Hence, in view of the evidence led by the parties, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was the direct employee of the University and the contract between the university and contractor is
sham, ingenuine and camouflage for all purposes and as such it has been established that there is no
relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent no.2 university.
Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of respondent no.2 and against the petitioner.
Issue no.1.
24. Since, I have held under issues no.2 & 3 above, that the petitioner was the employee of
respondent no.1 contractor, now, it has to be seen as to whether the services of the petitioner had
been illegally terminated by the respondent no.1. Before, I proceed further it is relevant to mention
here that after receiving the reference by this Court, notices were issued to both the respondents but
none appeared on behalf of the respondent no.1 Contractor despite having been served, hence, he
was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 8.5.2013. The petitioner in her claim petition as
well as in her affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PA has stated as PW-1 that she was engaged as
safaikaramchari on 20.11.2007 and worked as such till 28.11.2009. Since, the evidence led by the
petitioner remained un-rebutted as the respondent no.1 did not appear to rebut this testimony of the
petitioner, her evidence is sufficient to prove that she had worked for 240 days in twelve calendar
months preceding her termination. Therefore, before terminating the services of the petitioner, it
was incumbent upon the respondent no.1 to have complied with the provisions of section 25-F of
the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a workman (workmen)
and requires the employer to comply with those conditions as per clauses (a) to (c) which are
mandatory in nature. It has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Latest HLJ 2007 (HP)
776 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sohan Lal that the settled law in counting 240 days
is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of retrenchment during twelve calendar
months and not a year. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
739
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
“2. I have perused the record and heard the parties. The Labour Court has come to the right
conclusion that the workman could not be retrenched without complying with Section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the petitioner-State has place on
record the copy of man-days to substantiate its plea that the workman has not
completed 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment. The settled law for
counting 240 days is that the same has to be calculated preceding the date of
retrenchment during 12 calendar months and not a year.”
In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public
Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment without
complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant
extract of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed
in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year
under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions
enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In
terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month’s
notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu
of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at
the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay
for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six
months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is
mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee
nullity……………..”
25. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid unrebutted testimony of the petitioner that she had
worked continuously for more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding her termination,
the respondent no.1 was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the section 25-
F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating her services. But, no such compliance was made
by the respondent no.1 contractor, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent no.1 contractor. As a result, the termination of petitioner w.e.f. 13.10.2009 is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against respondent no.1 contractor.
Issue no.4.
26. Since, I have held under issue no. 1 above, that the termination of the services of the
petitioner w.e.f. 13.10.2009 by respondent no.1 without complying with the provisions of the Act is
not legal and justified, hence, the question arises as to what service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled. It is by now well settled that if the termination of employee is found to be illegal, the relief
by way of reinstatement with back-wages is not automatic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh
Kumar Seal and others reported in 2010 LLR 677: 2010 III CLR 17 SC, has held that relief by
way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found
to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that mandatory compensation in
lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate.
27. In Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC
327, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:
740
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
“It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal
position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there
has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
maybe wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an
employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. “
28. In the present case, even though the termination of the petitioner is held to be illegal
but her reinstatement will not be appropriate relief in view of the fact that the contract had expired
and the respondent no.1 contractor had left the premises of the respondent no.2 University.
Therefore, in such a situation, it would not be appropriate to make the order of reinstatement in the
present case. Hence, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of
justice would be met, if the lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is
awarded to the petitioner. Therefore, in my view the petitioner is entitled to receive a suitable,
appropriate, just and equitable compensation from the respondent no.1 Contractor and keeping
in view the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be quite reasonable and justified if lump
sum compensation of ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five Thousand only) is awarded to the petitioner
instead of reinstatement. Consequently, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against
respondent no.1 Contractor.
Relief
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner is partly
allowed and as such the respondent no.1 Contractor is directed to pay ` 25,000/- (` Twenty Five
Thousand only) as lump sum compensation to the petitioner within three months from today failing
which the same shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of publication of this award.
The reference is answered accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of March, 2016.
(Praveen)
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Shimla.
31.3.2016.
Present:
None for the petitioner.
Ms. Ashima Sharma, Advocate vice csl for respondent.
Case called twice but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite having been served.
It is 10:50 AM. Be called again.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
Case called again
Present:
None for the petitioner.
Ms. Ashima Sharma, Advocate vice csl for respondent.
741
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
It is 12:55 PM case called again but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Be called
after lunch.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
Case called after lunch
Present:
None for the petitioner.
Ms. Ashima Sharma, Advocate vice csl for respondent.
It is 3:05 PM. Case called repeatedly in pre and post lunch sessions but none appeared on
behalf of the petitioner.
For today, this case has been fixed for the service of petitioner. Notice was issued to the
petitioner through registered post for today. However, the AD has been received back duly
servedanddespite having been duly served, the petitioner has failed to appear before this Court
which clearly shows that he is not interested to pursue his case.Therefore, this Court is left with no
other alternative but to decide the reference on the basis of the material whatsoever is available on
file. The reference sent by the appropriate government for adjudication is as under:
“Whether termination of the services of Shri Ramesh Kumar S/o Late
ShriParmod Singh Village Tain, P.O Sansai, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, HP
w.e.f3.1.2014 by the General Manager M/s Wipro Enterprises Ltd., Plot no.77, EPIP,
Phase-1 Jharmajri, Badi, District Solan, HP without complying with the provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief of
reinstatement, back-wages, compensation and other service benefits the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer/management?”
Since, the petitioner has failed to appear before this Court despite having been served and to
file statement of claim, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that he has failed to prove
that his services had been terminated w.e.f. 3.1.2014 by the respondent in an illegal and unjustified
manner. Hence, in the absence of any material/evidence on record, it cannot be held that his
services were wrongly and illegally terminated by the respondentand as such the reference is
answered against the petitioner and the award is passed accordingly. Let a copy of this award be
sent to the appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion be
consigned to records.
Announced:
31.3.2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
742
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
c vnkyr eksfgUnz flag jk.kk dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] MygkSth] ftyk pEck] fgekpy izns'k
Jherh larks"k dqekjh iRuh Jh lUuh dqekj] fuoklh xkao dqBsM] Mkd?kj cxBkj] rglhy MygkSth]
ftyk pEck] fgekpy izns'kA
fo"k;-&izkFkZuk&i= tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
mijksDr izkfFkZ;k us v/kksgLrk{kjh dh vnkyr esa izkFkZuk&i=] C;ku&gYQh oe; vU; dkxtkr bl
vk'; ls xqtkjk gS fd mldh iq=h thfodk Bkdqj dh tUe frfFk 12&08&2011 gS] tksfd xzke iapk;r
VIij ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ u gSA ftls ntZ fd;k tkosA
bl lEcU/k esa loZlk/kkj.k turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkfFkZ;k dh iq=h
dh tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r VIij ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djus ij] ;fn fdlh dks dksbZ mtj&,rjkt gks rks og
vlkyru ;k odkyru vnkyr v/kksgLrk{kjh fnukad 24&05&2016 dks gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt ntZ
djok ldrk gSA gkftj uk vkus dh lwjr esa ,d rjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk djds uke o tUe
frfFk ntZ djus ds vkns'k ns fn, tk,axsA
vkt fnukad 23&04&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o vnkyr eksgj ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
MygkSth ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; oxZ] MygkSth] ftyk pEck] fgekpy izns'k
dkfeuh liq=h Jh fd'ku pUn] fuoklh xkao dksVk] Mkd?kj nzMMk] rglhy MygkSth] ftyk pEck]
fgekpy izns'kA
fo"k;-&izkFkZuk&i= cjk, uke n#Lrh ckjsA
mijksDr izkfFkZ;k us v/kksgLrk{kjh dh vnkyr esa izkFkZuk&i=] C;ku&gYQh oe; vU; dkxtkr bl
vk'; ls xqtkjk gS fd mldk lgh uke dkfeuh gS] tksfd xzke iapk;r nzMMk ds fjdkMZ esa lgh ntZ gSA
ysfdu jktLo foHkkx ds eqgky /kjksVk i0 o`r :fy;k.kh esa xyrh ls vpZuk nsoh ntZ gS] ftldh n#Lrh
dh tkosA
bl lEcU/k esa loZlk/kkj.k turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkfFkZ;k dkfeuh ds
uke n#Lrh ckjs ;fn fdlh dks dksbZ mtj&,rjkt gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru vnkyr
v/kksgLrk{kjh fnukad 23&5&2016 dks gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt ntZ djok ldrk gSA gkftj uk vkus dh
lwjr esa ,d rjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk djds uke n:Lrh ds vkns'k ns fn, tk,axsA
vkt fnukad 13&4&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o vnkyr eksgj ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
eksfgUnz flag jk.kk]
lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; oxZ]
MygkSthA
743
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
c vnkyr vfuy Hkkj}kt dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] MygkSth] ftyk pEck] fgekpy izns'k
Jh NORBU DHUNDUP liq= Jh YESHI NGODUP] fuoklh feMy cdjksVk] Mkd?kj
MygkSth] rglhy MygkSth] ftyk pEck] fgekpy izns'kA
fo"k;-&izkFkZuk&i= tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
mijksDr izkFkhZ us v/kksgLrk{kjh dh vnkyr esa izkFkZuk&i=] C;ku&gYQh oe; vU; dkxtkr bl
vk'; ls xqtkjk gS fd mldh (NORBU DHUNDUP) tUe frfFk 7&10&97 gS] tksfd uxj ifj"kn~
MygkSth ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ u gSA ftls ntZ fd;k tkosA
bl lEcU/k esa loZlk/kkj.k turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ dh tUe
frfFk uxj ifj"kn~ MygkSth ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djus ij] ;fn fdlh dks dksbZ mtj&,rjkt gks rks og
vlkyru ;k odkyru vnkyr v/kksgLrk{kjh fnukad 23&5&2016 dks gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt ntZ
djok ldrk gSA gkftj uk vkus dh lwjr esa ,d rjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk djds uke o tUe
frfFk ntZ djus ds vkns'k ns fn, tk,axsA
vkt fnukad 20&04&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o vnkyr eksgj ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
vfuy Hkkj}kt]
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
MygkSth ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr vfuy Hkkj}kt dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] MygkSth] ftyk pEck] fgekpy izns'k
Jh ;ksxsUnz dqekj liq= Jh fla?kw jke] fuoklh xkao xqfu;kyk] Mkd?kj o rglhy MygkSth] ftyk
pEck] fgekpy izns'kA
fo"k;-&izkFkZuk&i= tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
mijksDr izkFkhZ us v/kksgLrk{kjh dh vnkyr esa izkFkZuk&i=] C;ku&gYQh oe; vU; dkxtkr bl
vk'; ls xqtkjk gS fd mldh iq=h lksuk{kh dh tUe frfFk 27&6&2011 gS] tksfd xzke iapk;r vksly ds
fjdkMZ esa ntZ u gSA ftls ntZ fd;k tkosA
bl lEcU/k esa loZlk/kkj.k turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ dh iq=h dh
tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r vksly ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djus ij] ;fn fdlh dks dksbZ mtj&,rjkt gks rks og
vlkyru ;k odkyru vnkyr v/kksgLrk{kjh fnukad 23&5&2016 dks gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt ntZ
djok ldrk gSA gkftj uk vkus dh lwjr esa ,d rjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk djds uke o tUe
frfFk ntZ djus ds vkns'k ns fn, tk,axsA
vkt fnukad 20&04&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o vnkyr eksgj ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
vfuy Hkkj}kt]
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
MygkSth ¼fg0 iz0½A
744
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
c vnkyr Jh vfuy Hkkj}kt dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] MygkSth] ftyk pEck] fgekpy izns'k
Jh nhid dqekj liq= Jh lqjsUnz dqekj] fuoklh xkao <qfM;kjk] Mkd?kj cSyh rglhy MygkSth]
ftyk pEck] fgekpy izns'kA
fo"k;-&izkFkZuk&i= tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
mijksDr izkFkhZ us v/kksgLrk{kjh dh vnkyr esa izkFkZuk&i=] C;ku&gYQh oe; vU; dkxtkr bl
vk'; ls xqtkjk gS fd mldh tUe frfFk 05&7&1991 gS] tksfd xzke iapk;r ft;qUrk ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ u
gSA ftls ntZ fd;k tkosA
bl lEcU/k esa loZlk/kkj.k turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ dh tUe
frfFk xzke iapk;r ft;qUrk ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djus ij] ;fn fdlh dks dksbZ mtj&,rjkt gks rks og
vlkyru ;k odkyru vnkyr v/kksgLrk{kjh fnukad 23&05&2016 dks gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt ntZ
djok ldrk gSA gkftj uk vkus dh lwjr esa ,d rjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk djds uke o tUe
frfFk ntZ djus ds vkns'k ns fn, tk,axsA
vkt fnukad 21&04&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o vnkyr eksgj ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
vfuy Hkkj}kt]
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
MygkSth ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr rglhynkj ,oe~ dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] rglhy /keZ'kkyk] ftyk dkaxM+k
Jhefr rqylh nsoh
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ fgekpy izns'k iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
uksfVl cuke vke turk
Jhefr rqylh nsoh iRuh Jh xksih jke fuoklh rksrkjkuh] rglhy /keZ'kkyk] ftyk dkaxM+k us bl
vnkyr esa 'kiFk i= lfgr eqdíek nk;j fd;k gS fd mlds iq= uke vtqZu dqekj dh tUe fnukad
15&11&1997 gS ijUrq xzke iapk;r HkrYyk esa tUe iath—r u gS vr% bls iath—r fd;s tkus ds vkns'k
fn;s tk;saA bl uksfVl ds }kjk leLr turk dks rFkk lEcfU/kr lEcfU/k;ksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd
;fn fdlh dks mijksDr cPps vtqZu dqekj dh tUe frfFk iath—r fd;s tkus ckjs dksbZ ,rjkt gks rks og
viuk ,rjkt gekjh vnkyr esa fnukad 7&5&16 dks vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt
is'k dj ldrk gS vU;Fkk eqrkfcd 'kiFk i= tUe frfFk iath—r fd;s tkus ckjs vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s
tk;saxsA
vkt fnukad 22&4&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgj vnkyrA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
/keZ'kkykA
745
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
c vnkyr rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] rglhy /keZ'kkyk] ftyk dkaxM+k
Jh ohj Hkw"k.k lwn
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ fgekpy izns'k iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
uksfVl cuke vke turk
Jh ohj Hkw"k.k iq= Jh jks'ku yky lwn fuoklh jkeuxj] rglhy /keZ'kkyk] ftyk dkaxM+k us bl
vnkyr esa 'kiFk i= lfgr eqdíek nk;j fd;k gS fd mldh iq=h uke izhrh lwn dh tUe fnukad
09&08&1975 gS ijUrq ,e0lh0@xzke iapk;r /keZ'kkyk esa tUe frfFk iath—r u gS vr% bls iath—r fd;s
tkus ds vkns'k fn;s tk;asA bl uksfVl ds }kjk leLr turk dks rFkk lEcfU/kr lEcfU/k;ksa dks lwfpr fd;k
tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh dks mijksDr cPps izhrh lwn dh tUe frfFk iath—r fd;s tkus ckjs dksbZ ,rjkt gks
rks og viuk ,rjkt gekjh vnkyr esa fnukad 7&5&16 dks vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj viuk
,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gS vU;Fkk eqrkfcd 'kiFk i= tUe frfFk iath—r fd;s tkus ckjs vkns'k ikfjr dj
fn;s tk;saxsA
vkt fnukad 22&4&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgj vnkyrA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
/keZ'kkykA
&&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr tukc lgk;d lekgrkZ ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh izFke Js.kh] Tokyh] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0
Jhefr y{eh nsoh iRuh jkts'k dqekj fuoklh egky Qgfj;ka ekStk Tokyh rglhy Tokyh ftyk
dkaxM+k fg0 iz0A
cuke
vke turk
izkFkZuk i= tsj /kkjk 13 ¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e 1969-
Jhefr y{eh nsoh iRuh jkts'k dqekj xkao Qgfj;ka o Mk0 Qgfj;ka rglhy Tokyh ftyk dkaxM+k
fg0 iz0 us bl vnkyr esa izkFkZuk i= xqtkjk gS fd Jh lw;kZ'k pkS/kjh iq= jkts'k dqekj dk tUe fnukad
05&01&2014 dks xkao Qgfj;ka esa gqvk Fkk] tks xYrh ls iapk;r fjdkMZ esa iath—r ugha djok ldhA vc
;g tUe frfFk iapk;r fjdkMZ esa ntZ djokuk pkgrh gSA
vr% bl uksfVl ds ek/;e ls loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks
mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs esa dksbZ mtj o ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 23&5&2016 dks lqcg 10 cts U;k;ky;
esa vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj is'k dj ldrk gSA vU;Fkk gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa ;drjQk
746
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj tUe frfFk iapk;r fjdkMZ esa iath—r djus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s
tk;saxsA blds mijkUr dksbZ ,rjkt u lquk tk;sxkA
vkt fnukad &&&&&&&& dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgj vnkyrA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh izFke Js.kh]
TokyhA
&&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh f'ko eksgu flag lS.kh&lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh] 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0
eqdíek rdlhe Hkfwe
rkjh[k is'kh % 18 ebZ] 2016
Jh ogknqj flag iq= Hkkx flag] fuoklh rrok.kh+] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0A
cuke
Jh vt; dqekj vkfn
izfroknhx.kA
eqdíek okor rdlhe Hkfwe [kkrk ua0 % 5 [krkSuh ua0 % 7 [kljk fdrk&2 jdok rknknh %
0&13&26 gS0 okD;k egky rrok.kh ekStk cMat rg0 'kkgiqj ft0 dkaxM+k fg0 iz0 eqrkfcd tekcanh o"kZ
2007&08A
uksfVl cuke % foUrk nsoh iRuh lksuw dqekj fuoklh Tokyh] rg0 TokyhA
mijksDr fo"k; ls lacfU/kr rdlhe Hkwfe dh fely v/kksgLrk{kjh ds ikl fopkjk/khu gS ftlesa mDr
izfroknh dks bl vnkyr }kjk leu tkjh gq, ijUrq leu fouk rkehy ds izkIr gq,A blfy, bl vnkyr
dks fo'okl gks pqdk gS fd mDr izfroknh dh rkehy lk/kkj.k rjhds ls ugha gks ldrh gSA vr% bl
b'rgkj lekpkj i= }kjk mDr izfroknh dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr fo"k; ds lEcU/k esa fnukad
18 ebZ 2016 dks nksigj ckn 2 cts bl vnkyr esa vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj viuk
i{k@,rjkt@mtj is'k dj ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ
tk,xhA
vkt fnukad &&&&&&&&& dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj U;k;ky; ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]
'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh f'ko eksgu flag lS.kh&lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh] 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0
eqdíek rdlhe Hkfwe
rkjh[k is'kh % 23 ebZ] 2016
Jh vksadkj flag iq= lwadw] fuoklh xksjM+k+] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0A
747
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
cuke
Jh vuwi dqekj] izoh.k dqekj iq= izhre] osn izdk'k iq= lwadw] ek;k nsoh] v:.kk nsoh iqf=;ka lwadw]
eksfudk nsoh iq=h vksadkj flag] vuwi dqekj iq= izhre leLr fuoklhx.k egky Hkukyk rg0 'kkgiqj
izfroknhx.kA
eqdíek okor rdlhe Hkwfe [kkrk ua0 % 117 [krkSuh ua0 % 198 [kljk fdrk &2 jdok rknknh
% 0&24&90 gS0 okD;k egky deykgM+h ekStk Hkukyk rg0 'kkgiqj ft0 dkaxM+k fg0 iz0 eqrkfcd tekcanh
o"kZ 2010&11-
mijksDr fo"k; ls lEcfU/kr rdlhe Hkwfe dh fely v/kksgLrk{kjh ds ikl fopkjk/khu gS ftlesa
mijksDr izfroknhx.k dks bl vnkyr }kjk leu tkjh gq, ijUrq leu fouk rkehy ds izkIr gq,A blfy,
bl vnkyr dks fo'okl gks pqdk gS fd mijksDr izfroknhx.k dh rkehy lk/kkj.k rjhds ls ugha gks ldrh
gSA vr% bl b'rgkj lekpkj i= }kjk mijksDr izfroknhx.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr fo"k;
ds lEcU/k esa fnukad 23 ebZ 2016 dks nksigj ckn 2 cts bl vnkyr esa vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj
vkdj viuk i{k@,rjkt@mtj is'k dj ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey
esa ykbZ tk,xhA
vkt fnukad &&&&&&&&&&dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj U;k;ky; ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]
'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh f'ko eksgu flag lS.kh] lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh ,oa rglhynkj] 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k
fgekpy izns'k
fo/kh pUn iq= fdjyw jke fuoklh Mq<+Ec [kkl rglhy 'kkgiqj ftyk dkaxM+k fgekpy izns'k
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&egky Mq<+Ec [kkl ds jktLo fjdkWMZ esa uke dh n#Lrh ckjsA
izkFkhZ us bl vnkyr esa 'kiFk&i= lfgr nj[okLr xqtkjh gS fd mldk uke rglhy 'kkgiqj ds
vUrxZr iVokj o`Ÿk Mq<+Ec ds egky & Mq<+Ec [kkl ds jktLo vfHkys[k esa oqf/k;k iq= fdjyw ntZ gS tksfd
xyr bUnzkt gS izkFkhZ mDr jktLo fjdkMZ esa vius n:Lr uke fo/kh pUn iq= fdjyw dk bUnzkt djokuk
pkgrk gSA
vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr jktLo fjdkMZ esa izkFkhZ ds
uke dh n#Lrh djus ckjs ;fn fdlh dks dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 23&05&2016 dks
vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa
,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj vkxkeh dk;Zokgh dh tk,xhA mlds ckn dksbZ mtj tsjs lek;r
u gksxkA
748
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
vkt fnukad &&&&&&&& dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh ,oa rglhynkj]
'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh f'ko eksgu flag lS.kh] lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh ,oa rglhynkj] 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k
fgekpy izns'k
rkjh[k is'kh % 18&5&2016
vksadkj flag iq= lUr jke] fuoklh ynokM+k] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fgekpy izns'k
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&egky gkj] eqanyk] ikgye ds jktLo fjdkWMZ esa uke dh n#Lrh ckjsA
izkFkhZ us bl vnkyr esa 'kiFk&i= lfgr nj[okLr xqtkjh gS fd mldk uke rglhy 'kkgiqj ds
vUrxZr iVokj o`Ÿk ynokM+k ds egky& gkj] eqanyk] ikgye ds jktLo vfHkys[k esa Øe'k% Mwe.kw jke iq=
eLr jke] Mwe.kw jke iq= lUr jke] Mwe.kw jke iq= lUrk ntZ gS] tks fd xyr bUnzkt gS] izkFkhZ mDr jktLo
fjdkMZ esa vius o vius firk ds n:Lr uke vksadkj flag iq= lUr jke dk bUnzkt djokuk pkgrk gSA
vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr jktLo fjdkMZ esa izkFkhZ ds
uke dh n#Lrh djus ckjs ;fn fdlh dks dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 18&05&2016 dks
vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa
,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj vkxkeh dk;Zokgh dh tk,xhA mlds ckn dksbZ mtj tsjs lek;r
u gksxkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh ,oa rglhynkj]
'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh f'ko eksgu flag lS.kh] lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh ,oa rglhynkj] 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k
fg0 iz0
rkjh[k is'kh % 17&5&2016
js.kqdk iq=h /kucgknqj] fuoklh pM+h] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fgekpy izns'k
cuke
vke turk
749
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k 1938
fo"k;-&&jktLo fjdkWMZ ds egky pM+h esasa uke dh n#Lrh ckjsA
izkFkhZ us bl U;k;ky; esa 'kiFk&i= lfgr nj[okLr xqtkjh gS fd mldk uke rglhy 'kkgiqj ds
jktLo vfHkys[k ds egky o ekStk pM+h esa js.kqdk iq=h /kucgknqj ds otk; jks.kdw iq=h /kucgknqj ntZ gS]
tks fd xyr bUnzkt gSA izkFkhZ mDr jktLo fjdkWMZ esa lgh uke js.kqdk iq=h /kucgknqj dk bUnzkt djokuk
pkgrh gSA
vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr jktLo fjdkMZ esa izkFkhZ ds
uke dh n#Lrh djus ckjs ;fn fdlh dks dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 17&05&2016 dks
vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa
,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj vkxkeh dk;Zokgh dh tk,xhA mlds ckn dksbZ mtj tsjs lek;r
u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 17&2&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh ,oa rglhynkj]
'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh nh{kkar Bkdqj] lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh] 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fg0 iz0
ifianj dqekj iq= othj pUn] fuoklh pM+h] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fgekpy izns'k
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&& egky pM+h ds jktLo fjdkWMZ esasa uke dh n#Lrh ckjsA
izkFkhZ us bl U;k;ky; esa 'kiFk&i= lfgr nj[okLr xqtkjh gS fd mldk uke rglhy 'kkgiqj ds
jktLo vfHkys[k ds egky pM+h ekStk pM+h esa ifianj dqekj iq= othj pUn ds otk; Hkwfianj iq= othjk
ntZ gS] tks fd xyr bUnzkt gSA izkFkhZ jktLo fjdkWMZ esa vius lgh uke ifianj dqekj iq= othj pUn dk
bUnzkt djokuk pkgrk gSA
vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr jktLo fjdkMZ esa izkFkhZ ds
uke dh n#Lrh djus ckjs ;fn fdlh dks dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 28&05&2016 dks
vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa
,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj vkxkeh dk;Zokgh dh tk,xhA mlds ckn dksbZ mtj tsjs lek;r
u gksxkA
vkt fnukad ----------------------- dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]
'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fg0 iz0A
750
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 05 ebZ] 2016@15 oS'kk[k] 1938
U;k;ky; rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
nkok la[;k % ------------@Teh. Una/M. Reg./20…….
Jh vPNj flag iq= jkefd'ku] tkr tV~V] xkao yksvj nsgyka] Mk0 yksvj nsgyka] rglhy Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
cuke
vke turk
nkok vUrxZr /kkjk 8¼4½ fookg iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1996-
mijksDr eqdíek muoku ckyk esa Jh vPNj flag iq= jkefd'ku] tkr tV~V] xkao yksvj nsgyka]
Mk0 yksvj nsgyka] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd
mldk fookg fnukad 08&02&2015 dks Jherh eksfudk nsoh iq=h Jh vorkj flag] tkr tV~V] xkao
/kfn;ky] Mkd?kj Msjkckok] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ ds lkFk gqvk gSA ysfdu vKkurk ds dkj.k
vius fookg dk bUnzkt LFkkuh; jftLVªkj fookg iathdj.k yksvj nsgyka] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk
¼fg0 iz0½ esa u djok ldkA
vr% bl lUnHkZ esa vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr of.kZr ds fookg dk bUnzkt
jftLVªkj fookg LFkkuh; iathdj.k yksvj nsgyka] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa ntZ djokus ckjs
fdlh dks ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 26&05&2016 dks bl U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj izLrqr dj ldrk
gS] vU;Fkk blds ckn mDr of.kZr fookg iathdj.k gsrq vkxkeh dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk;sxhA blds ckn
dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 26&04&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
fu;U=d] eqnz.k rFkk ys[ku lkexzh] fgekpy izns'k] f'keyk&5 }kjk eqfnzr rFkk izdkf'kr
bysDVªkWfud gLrk{kfjr jkti=] oSclkbV http://rajpatrahimachal.nic.in ij miyC/k gS ,oe~ vkWuykbu lR;kfir fd;k tk ldrk gS